web3gbit-cli 1.0.0

package/lib/openzeppelin-contracts/fv/specs/DoubleEndedQueue.spec

@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+import "helpers/helpers.spec";
+
+methods {
+    function pushFront(bytes32) external                   envfree;
+    function pushBack(bytes32)                    external envfree;
+    function popFront()         external returns (bytes32) envfree;
+    function popBack()          external returns (bytes32) envfree;
+    function clear()            external                   envfree;
+
+    // exposed for FV
+    function begin()            external returns (uint128) envfree;
+    function end()              external returns (uint128) envfree;
+
+    // view
+    function length()           external returns (uint256) envfree;
+    function empty()            external returns (bool)    envfree;
+    function front()            external returns (bytes32) envfree;
+    function back()             external returns (bytes32) envfree;
+    function at_(uint256)       external returns (bytes32) envfree; // at is a reserved word
+}
+
+definition full() returns bool = length() == max_uint128;
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: front points to the first index and back points to the last one                                               │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule emptiness() {
+    assert empty() <=> length() == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Invariant: front points to the first index and back points to the last one                                          │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule queueFront() {
+    assert at_(0) == front();
+}
+
+rule queueBack() {
+    assert at_(require_uint256(length() - 1)) == back();
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Function correctness: pushFront adds an element at the beginning of the queue                                       │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule pushFront(bytes32 value) {
+    uint256 lengthBefore = length();
+    bool    fullBefore   = full();
+
+    pushFront@withrevert(value);
+    bool success = !lastReverted;
+
+    // liveness
+    assert success <=> !fullBefore, "never revert if not previously full";
+
+    // effect
+    assert success => front() == value, "front set to value";
+    assert success => to_mathint(length()) == lengthBefore + 1, "queue extended";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: pushFront preserves the previous values in the queue with a +1 offset                                         │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule pushFrontConsistency(uint256 index) {
+    bytes32 beforeAt = at_(index);
+
+    bytes32 value;
+    pushFront(value);
+
+    // try to read value
+    bytes32 afterAt = at_@withrevert(require_uint256(index + 1));
+
+    assert !lastReverted, "value still there";
+    assert afterAt == beforeAt, "data is preserved";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Function correctness: pushBack adds an element at the end of the queue                                              │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule pushBack(bytes32 value) {
+    uint256 lengthBefore = length();
+    bool    fullBefore   = full();
+
+    pushBack@withrevert(value);
+    bool success = !lastReverted;
+
+    // liveness
+    assert success <=> !fullBefore, "never revert if not previously full";
+
+    // effect
+    assert success => back() == value, "back set to value";
+    assert success => to_mathint(length()) == lengthBefore + 1, "queue increased";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: pushBack preserves the previous values in the queue                                                           │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule pushBackConsistency(uint256 index) {
+    bytes32 beforeAt = at_(index);
+
+    bytes32 value;
+    pushBack(value);
+
+    // try to read value
+    bytes32 afterAt = at_@withrevert(index);
+
+    assert !lastReverted, "value still there";
+    assert afterAt == beforeAt, "data is preserved";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Function correctness: popFront removes an element from the beginning of the queue                                   │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule popFront {
+    uint256 lengthBefore = length();
+    bytes32 frontBefore = front@withrevert();
+
+    bytes32 popped = popFront@withrevert();
+    bool success = !lastReverted;
+
+    // liveness
+    assert success <=> lengthBefore != 0, "never reverts if not previously empty";
+
+    // effect
+    assert success => frontBefore == popped, "previous front is returned";
+    assert success => to_mathint(length()) == lengthBefore - 1, "queue decreased";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: at(x) is preserved and offset to at(x - 1) after calling popFront                                             |
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule popFrontConsistency(uint256 index) {
+    // Read (any) value that is not the front (this asserts the value exists / the queue is long enough)
+    require index > 1;
+    bytes32 before = at_(index);
+
+    popFront();
+
+    // try to read value
+    bytes32 after = at_@withrevert(require_uint256(index - 1));
+
+    assert !lastReverted, "value still exists in the queue";
+    assert before == after, "values are offset and not modified";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Function correctness: popBack removes an element from the end of the queue                                          │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule popBack {
+    uint256 lengthBefore = length();
+    bytes32 backBefore = back@withrevert();
+
+    bytes32 popped = popBack@withrevert();
+    bool success = !lastReverted;
+
+    // liveness
+    assert success <=> lengthBefore != 0, "never reverts if not previously empty";
+
+    // effect
+    assert success => backBefore == popped, "previous back is returned";
+    assert success => to_mathint(length()) == lengthBefore - 1, "queue decreased";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: at(x) is preserved after calling popBack                                                                     |
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule popBackConsistency(uint256 index) {
+    // Read (any) value that is not the back (this asserts the value exists / the queue is long enough)
+    require to_mathint(index) < length() - 1;
+    bytes32 before = at_(index);
+
+    popBack();
+
+    // try to read value
+    bytes32 after = at_@withrevert(index);
+
+    assert !lastReverted, "value still exists in the queue";
+    assert before == after, "values are offset and not modified";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Function correctness: clear sets length to 0                                                                        │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule clear {
+    clear@withrevert();
+
+    // liveness
+    assert !lastReverted, "never reverts";
+
+    // effect
+    assert length() == 0, "sets length to 0";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: front/back access reverts only if the queue is empty or querying out of bounds                                │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule onlyEmptyOrFullRevert(env e) {
+    require nonpayable(e);
+
+    method f;
+    calldataarg args;
+
+    bool emptyBefore = empty();
+    bool fullBefore = full();
+
+    f@withrevert(e, args);
+
+    assert lastReverted => (
+        (f.selector == sig:front().selector            && emptyBefore) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:back().selector             && emptyBefore) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:popFront().selector         && emptyBefore) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:popBack().selector          && emptyBefore) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:pushFront(bytes32).selector && fullBefore ) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:pushBack(bytes32).selector  && fullBefore ) ||
+        f.selector == sig:at_(uint256).selector // revert conditions are verified in onlyOutOfBoundsRevert
+    ), "only revert if empty or out of bounds";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: at(index) only reverts if index is out of bounds                                                                  |
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule onlyOutOfBoundsRevert(uint256 index) {
+    at_@withrevert(index);
+
+    assert lastReverted <=> index >= length(), "only reverts if index is out of bounds";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: only clear/push/pop operations can change the length of the queue                                             │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule noLengthChange(env e) {
+    method f;
+    calldataarg args;
+
+    uint256 lengthBefore = length();
+    f(e, args);
+    uint256 lengthAfter = length();
+
+    assert lengthAfter != lengthBefore => (
+        (f.selector == sig:pushFront(bytes32).selector && to_mathint(lengthAfter) == lengthBefore + 1) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:pushBack(bytes32).selector  && to_mathint(lengthAfter) == lengthBefore + 1) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:popBack().selector          && to_mathint(lengthAfter) == lengthBefore - 1) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:popFront().selector         && to_mathint(lengthAfter) == lengthBefore - 1) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:clear().selector            && lengthAfter == 0)
+    ), "length is only affected by clear/pop/push operations";
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: only push/pop can change values bounded in the queue (outside values aren't cleared)                          │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule noDataChange(env e) {
+    method f;
+    calldataarg args;
+
+    uint256 index;
+    bytes32 atBefore = at_(index);
+    f(e, args);
+    bytes32 atAfter = at_@withrevert(index);
+    bool atAfterSuccess = !lastReverted;
+
+    assert !atAfterSuccess <=> (
+        (f.selector == sig:clear().selector                        ) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:popBack().selector  && index == length()) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:popFront().selector && index == length())
+    ), "indexes of the queue are only removed by clear or pop";
+
+    assert atAfterSuccess && atAfter != atBefore => (
+        f.selector == sig:popFront().selector ||
+        f.selector == sig:pushFront(bytes32).selector
+    ), "values of the queue are only changed by popFront or pushFront";
+}

package/lib/openzeppelin-contracts/fv/specs/ERC20.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+    "files": [
+        "fv/harnesses/ERC20PermitHarness.sol"
+    ],
+    "optimistic_loop": true,
+    "process": "emv",
+    "url_visibility": "public",
+    "verify": "ERC20PermitHarness:fv/specs/ERC20.spec"
+}

package/lib/openzeppelin-contracts/fv/specs/ERC20.spec

@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+import "helpers/helpers.spec";
+import "methods/IERC20.spec";
+import "methods/IERC2612.spec";
+
+methods {
+    // exposed for FV
+    function mint(address,uint256) external;
+    function burn(address,uint256) external;
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Ghost & hooks: sum of all balances                                                                                  │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+ghost mathint sumOfBalances {
+    init_state axiom sumOfBalances == 0;
+}
+
+// Because `balance` has a uint256 type, any balance addition in CVL1 behaved as a `require_uint256()` casting,
+// leaving out the possibility of overflow. This is not the case in CVL2 where casting became more explicit.
+// A counterexample in CVL2 is having an initial state where Alice initial balance is larger than totalSupply, which
+// overflows Alice's balance when receiving a transfer. This is not possible unless the contract is deployed into an
+// already used address (or upgraded from corrupted state).
+// We restrict such behavior by making sure no balance is greater than the sum of balances.
+hook Sload uint256 balance _balances[KEY address addr] {
+    require sumOfBalances >= to_mathint(balance);
+}
+
+hook Sstore _balances[KEY address addr] uint256 newValue (uint256 oldValue) {
+    sumOfBalances = sumOfBalances - oldValue + newValue;
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Invariant: totalSupply is the sum of all balances                                                                   │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+invariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances()
+    to_mathint(totalSupply()) == sumOfBalances;
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Invariant: balance of address(0) is 0                                                                               │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+invariant zeroAddressNoBalance()
+    balanceOf(0) == 0;
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rules: only mint and burn can change total supply                                                                   │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule noChangeTotalSupply(env e) {
+    requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
+
+    method f;
+    calldataarg args;
+
+    uint256 totalSupplyBefore = totalSupply();
+    f(e, args);
+    uint256 totalSupplyAfter = totalSupply();
+
+    assert totalSupplyAfter > totalSupplyBefore => f.selector == sig:mint(address,uint256).selector;
+    assert totalSupplyAfter < totalSupplyBefore => f.selector == sig:burn(address,uint256).selector;
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rules: only the token holder or an approved third party can reduce an account's balance                             │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule onlyAuthorizedCanTransfer(env e) {
+    requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
+
+    method f;
+    calldataarg args;
+    address account;
+
+    uint256 allowanceBefore = allowance(account, e.msg.sender);
+    uint256 balanceBefore   = balanceOf(account);
+    f(e, args);
+    uint256 balanceAfter    = balanceOf(account);
+
+    assert (
+        balanceAfter < balanceBefore
+    ) => (
+        f.selector == sig:burn(address,uint256).selector ||
+        e.msg.sender == account ||
+        balanceBefore - balanceAfter <= to_mathint(allowanceBefore)
+    );
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rules: only the token holder (or a permit) can increase allowance. The spender can decrease it by using it          │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule onlyHolderOfSpenderCanChangeAllowance(env e) {
+    requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
+
+    method f;
+    calldataarg args;
+    address holder;
+    address spender;
+
+    uint256 allowanceBefore = allowance(holder, spender);
+    f(e, args);
+    uint256 allowanceAfter = allowance(holder, spender);
+
+    assert (
+        allowanceAfter > allowanceBefore
+    ) => (
+        (f.selector == sig:approve(address,uint256).selector           && e.msg.sender == holder) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).selector)
+    );
+
+    assert (
+        allowanceAfter < allowanceBefore
+    ) => (
+        (f.selector == sig:transferFrom(address,address,uint256).selector && e.msg.sender == spender) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:approve(address,uint256).selector              && e.msg.sender == holder ) ||
+        (f.selector == sig:permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).selector)
+    );
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rules: mint behavior and side effects                                                                               │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule mint(env e) {
+    requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
+    require nonpayable(e);
+
+    address to;
+    address other;
+    uint256 amount;
+
+    // cache state
+    uint256 toBalanceBefore    = balanceOf(to);
+    uint256 otherBalanceBefore = balanceOf(other);
+    uint256 totalSupplyBefore  = totalSupply();
+
+    // run transaction
+    mint@withrevert(e, to, amount);
+
+    // check outcome
+    if (lastReverted) {
+        assert to == 0 || totalSupplyBefore + amount > max_uint256;
+    } else {
+        // updates balance and totalSupply
+        assert to_mathint(balanceOf(to)) == toBalanceBefore   + amount;
+        assert to_mathint(totalSupply()) == totalSupplyBefore + amount;
+
+        // no other balance is modified
+        assert balanceOf(other) != otherBalanceBefore => other == to;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rules: burn behavior and side effects                                                                               │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule burn(env e) {
+    requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
+    require nonpayable(e);
+
+    address from;
+    address other;
+    uint256 amount;
+
+    // cache state
+    uint256 fromBalanceBefore  = balanceOf(from);
+    uint256 otherBalanceBefore = balanceOf(other);
+    uint256 totalSupplyBefore  = totalSupply();
+
+    // run transaction
+    burn@withrevert(e, from, amount);
+
+    // check outcome
+    if (lastReverted) {
+        assert from == 0 || fromBalanceBefore < amount;
+    } else {
+        // updates balance and totalSupply
+        assert to_mathint(balanceOf(from)) == fromBalanceBefore   - amount;
+        assert to_mathint(totalSupply())   == totalSupplyBefore - amount;
+
+        // no other balance is modified
+        assert balanceOf(other) != otherBalanceBefore => other == from;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: transfer behavior and side effects                                                                            │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule transfer(env e) {
+    requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
+    require nonpayable(e);
+
+    address holder = e.msg.sender;
+    address recipient;
+    address other;
+    uint256 amount;
+
+    // cache state
+    uint256 holderBalanceBefore    = balanceOf(holder);
+    uint256 recipientBalanceBefore = balanceOf(recipient);
+    uint256 otherBalanceBefore     = balanceOf(other);
+
+    // run transaction
+    transfer@withrevert(e, recipient, amount);
+
+    // check outcome
+    if (lastReverted) {
+        assert holder == 0 || recipient == 0 || amount > holderBalanceBefore;
+    } else {
+        // balances of holder and recipient are updated
+        assert to_mathint(balanceOf(holder))    == holderBalanceBefore    - (holder == recipient ? 0 : amount);
+        assert to_mathint(balanceOf(recipient)) == recipientBalanceBefore + (holder == recipient ? 0 : amount);
+
+        // no other balance is modified
+        assert balanceOf(other) != otherBalanceBefore => (other == holder || other == recipient);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: transferFrom behavior and side effects                                                                        │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule transferFrom(env e) {
+    requireInvariant totalSupplyIsSumOfBalances();
+    require nonpayable(e);
+
+    address spender = e.msg.sender;
+    address holder;
+    address recipient;
+    address other;
+    uint256 amount;
+
+    // cache state
+    uint256 allowanceBefore        = allowance(holder, spender);
+    uint256 holderBalanceBefore    = balanceOf(holder);
+    uint256 recipientBalanceBefore = balanceOf(recipient);
+    uint256 otherBalanceBefore     = balanceOf(other);
+
+    // run transaction
+    transferFrom@withrevert(e, holder, recipient, amount);
+
+    // check outcome
+    if (lastReverted) {
+        assert holder == 0 || recipient == 0 || spender == 0 || amount > holderBalanceBefore || amount > allowanceBefore;
+    } else {
+        // allowance is valid & updated
+        assert allowanceBefore            >= amount;
+        assert to_mathint(allowance(holder, spender)) == (allowanceBefore == max_uint256 ? max_uint256 : allowanceBefore - amount);
+
+        // balances of holder and recipient are updated
+        assert to_mathint(balanceOf(holder))    == holderBalanceBefore    - (holder == recipient ? 0 : amount);
+        assert to_mathint(balanceOf(recipient)) == recipientBalanceBefore + (holder == recipient ? 0 : amount);
+
+        // no other balance is modified
+        assert balanceOf(other) != otherBalanceBefore => (other == holder || other == recipient);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: approve behavior and side effects                                                                             │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule approve(env e) {
+    require nonpayable(e);
+
+    address holder = e.msg.sender;
+    address spender;
+    address otherHolder;
+    address otherSpender;
+    uint256 amount;
+
+    // cache state
+    uint256 otherAllowanceBefore = allowance(otherHolder, otherSpender);
+
+    // run transaction
+    approve@withrevert(e, spender, amount);
+
+    // check outcome
+    if (lastReverted) {
+        assert holder == 0 || spender == 0;
+    } else {
+        // allowance is updated
+        assert allowance(holder, spender) == amount;
+
+        // other allowances are untouched
+        assert allowance(otherHolder, otherSpender) != otherAllowanceBefore => (otherHolder == holder && otherSpender == spender);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Rule: permit behavior and side effects                                                                              │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+*/
+rule permit(env e) {
+    require nonpayable(e);
+
+    address holder;
+    address spender;
+    uint256 amount;
+    uint256 deadline;
+    uint8 v;
+    bytes32 r;
+    bytes32 s;
+
+    address account1;
+    address account2;
+    address account3;
+
+    // cache state
+    uint256 nonceBefore          = nonces(holder);
+    uint256 otherNonceBefore     = nonces(account1);
+    uint256 otherAllowanceBefore = allowance(account2, account3);
+
+    // sanity: nonce overflow, which possible in theory, is assumed to be impossible in practice
+    require nonceBefore      < max_uint256;
+    require otherNonceBefore < max_uint256;
+
+    // run transaction
+    permit@withrevert(e, holder, spender, amount, deadline, v, r, s);
+
+    // check outcome
+    if (lastReverted) {
+        // Without formally checking the signature, we can't verify exactly the revert causes
+        assert true;
+    } else {
+        // allowance and nonce are updated
+        assert allowance(holder, spender) == amount;
+        assert to_mathint(nonces(holder)) == nonceBefore + 1;
+
+        // deadline was respected
+        assert deadline >= e.block.timestamp;
+
+        // no other allowance or nonce is modified
+        assert nonces(account1)              != otherNonceBefore     => account1 == holder;
+        assert allowance(account2, account3) != otherAllowanceBefore => (account2 == holder && account3 == spender);
+    }
+}