web-agent-bridge 3.3.0 → 3.8.1

package/server/utils/safe-fetch.js

@@ -1,228 +1,228 @@
-'use strict';
-
-/**
- * Safe Fetch — SSRF-resistant HTTP client.
- *
- * Mitigations applied:
- *   1. Scheme allow-list (http/https only).
- *   2. Optional domain allow-list (string globs or "*").
- *   3. DNS resolution + private/reserved/loopback/link-local CIDR block.
- *   4. Re-validation on EVERY redirect hop (manual redirect handling).
- *   5. Hard timeout via AbortController.
- *   6. Max response body size (default 5 MB) — drains and aborts.
- *   7. Optional Content-Type allow-list.
- *
- * NEVER call native `fetch(url)` directly with user-supplied URLs anywhere
- * inside this server process. Use this helper.
- */
-
-const dns = require('node:dns').promises;
-const net = require('node:net');
-
-const PRIVATE_V4_CIDRS = [
-  ['10.0.0.0', 8],
-  ['172.16.0.0', 12],
-  ['192.168.0.0', 16],
-  ['127.0.0.0', 8],
-  ['169.254.0.0', 16],   // link-local (AWS metadata 169.254.169.254 lives here)
-  ['100.64.0.0', 10],    // CGNAT
-  ['0.0.0.0', 8],
-  ['224.0.0.0', 4],      // multicast
-  ['240.0.0.0', 4],      // reserved
-  ['198.18.0.0', 15],    // benchmarking
-  ['192.0.0.0', 24],
-  ['192.0.2.0', 24],     // TEST-NET-1
-  ['198.51.100.0', 24],  // TEST-NET-2
-  ['203.0.113.0', 24],   // TEST-NET-3
-];
-
-const PRIVATE_V6_PREFIXES = ['::1', 'fc', 'fd', 'fe80', 'ff', '::ffff:127.', '::ffff:10.', '::ffff:192.168.', '::ffff:172.', '::', '64:ff9b::'];
-
-function _ipToInt(ip) {
-  return ip.split('.').reduce((acc, oct) => (acc << 8) + parseInt(oct, 10), 0) >>> 0;
-}
-
-function _isPrivateV4(ip) {
-  const ipInt = _ipToInt(ip);
-  return PRIVATE_V4_CIDRS.some(([base, bits]) => {
-    const baseInt = _ipToInt(base);
-    const mask = bits === 0 ? 0 : (~0 << (32 - bits)) >>> 0;
-    return (ipInt & mask) === (baseInt & mask);
-  });
-}
-
-function _isPrivateV6(ip) {
-  const lower = ip.toLowerCase();
-  return PRIVATE_V6_PREFIXES.some((p) => lower === p || lower.startsWith(p));
-}
-
-function isPrivateAddress(ip) {
-  if (!ip) return true;
-  if (net.isIPv4(ip)) return _isPrivateV4(ip);
-  if (net.isIPv6(ip)) return _isPrivateV6(ip);
-  return true; // unknown → treat as private
-}
-
-function _matchesGlob(host, pattern) {
-  if (pattern === '*') return true;
-  if (pattern.startsWith('*.')) {
-    const suffix = pattern.slice(2).toLowerCase();
-    return host === suffix || host.endsWith('.' + suffix);
-  }
-  return host.toLowerCase() === pattern.toLowerCase();
-}
-
-function _allowedHost(host, allowList) {
-  if (!allowList || allowList.length === 0) return true; // no list = allow public
-  return allowList.some((p) => _matchesGlob(host, p));
-}
-
-async function _assertSafeHost(hostname) {
-  // If it's already an IP literal, validate directly.
-  if (net.isIP(hostname)) {
-    if (isPrivateAddress(hostname)) {
-      throw new Error(`SSRF blocked: private/reserved IP ${hostname}`);
-    }
-    return;
-  }
-  let records;
-  try {
-    records = await dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true, verbatim: true });
-  } catch (err) {
-    throw new Error(`DNS resolution failed for ${hostname}: ${err.code || err.message}`);
-  }
-  if (!records || records.length === 0) {
-    throw new Error(`DNS returned no records for ${hostname}`);
-  }
-  for (const r of records) {
-    if (isPrivateAddress(r.address)) {
-      throw new Error(`SSRF blocked: ${hostname} resolves to private/reserved address ${r.address}`);
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate a URL string against the SSRF policy.
- * @returns {URL} parsed URL
- */
-async function validateUrl(rawUrl, options = {}) {
-  let parsed;
-  try {
-    parsed = new URL(rawUrl);
-  } catch (e) {
-    throw new Error('Invalid URL');
-  }
-  const allowedSchemes = options.allowedSchemes || ['http:', 'https:'];
-  if (!allowedSchemes.includes(parsed.protocol)) {
-    throw new Error(`Scheme ${parsed.protocol} not allowed`);
-  }
-  if (options.requireHttps && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
-    throw new Error('HTTPS required');
-  }
-  // Block credentials in URLs (defeats some auth-smuggling attacks).
-  if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
-    throw new Error('Credentials in URLs are not allowed');
-  }
-  // Restrict ports to defaults unless explicitly allowed.
-  const allowedPorts = options.allowedPorts || [80, 443];
-  const port = parsed.port ? parseInt(parsed.port, 10) : (parsed.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80);
-  if (!allowedPorts.includes(port)) {
-    throw new Error(`Port ${port} not allowed`);
-  }
-  if (!_allowedHost(parsed.hostname, options.allowList)) {
-    throw new Error(`Host ${parsed.hostname} not in allow-list`);
-  }
-  await _assertSafeHost(parsed.hostname);
-  return parsed;
-}
-
-/**
- * SSRF-resistant fetch.
- * Manually follows redirects so each hop is re-validated.
- */
-async function safeFetch(rawUrl, init = {}, opts = {}) {
-  const maxRedirects = opts.maxRedirects ?? 3;
-  const maxBytes = opts.maxBytes ?? 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5 MB
-  const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? 10000;
-  const allowList = opts.allowList;
-  const allowedContentTypes = opts.allowedContentTypes; // e.g. ['text/html','application/json']
-
-  let currentUrl = rawUrl;
-  for (let hop = 0; hop <= maxRedirects; hop++) {
-    await validateUrl(currentUrl, { allowList, allowedSchemes: opts.allowedSchemes, requireHttps: opts.requireHttps, allowedPorts: opts.allowedPorts });
-
-    const controller = new AbortController();
-    const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);
-
-    let res;
-    try {
-      res = await fetch(currentUrl, {
-        ...init,
-        redirect: 'manual',
-        signal: controller.signal,
-      });
-    } finally {
-      clearTimeout(timer);
-    }
-
-    if (res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {
-      const loc = res.headers.get('location');
-      if (!loc) return _enforceBody(res, maxBytes, allowedContentTypes);
-      if (hop === maxRedirects) throw new Error('Too many redirects');
-      currentUrl = new URL(loc, currentUrl).toString();
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    return _enforceBody(res, maxBytes, allowedContentTypes);
-  }
-  throw new Error('Redirect loop');
-}
-
-async function _enforceBody(res, maxBytes, allowedContentTypes) {
-  const ct = (res.headers.get('content-type') || '').toLowerCase();
-  if (allowedContentTypes && !allowedContentTypes.some((t) => ct.startsWith(t))) {
-    res.body?.cancel?.().catch(() => {});
-    throw new Error(`Content-Type ${ct || 'unknown'} not allowed`);
-  }
-  const declared = parseInt(res.headers.get('content-length') || '0', 10);
-  if (declared && declared > maxBytes) {
-    res.body?.cancel?.().catch(() => {});
-    throw new Error(`Response too large (${declared} bytes, max ${maxBytes})`);
-  }
-  if (!res.body) return res;
-
-  // Buffer the response while enforcing size.
-  const reader = res.body.getReader();
-  const chunks = [];
-  let total = 0;
-  while (true) {
-    const { done, value } = await reader.read();
-    if (done) break;
-    total += value.byteLength;
-    if (total > maxBytes) {
-      reader.cancel().catch(() => {});
-      throw new Error(`Response exceeded ${maxBytes} bytes`);
-    }
-    chunks.push(value);
-  }
-  const buf = Buffer.concat(chunks.map((c) => Buffer.from(c)));
-  // Return a Response-like wrapper matching the parts callers actually use.
-  return {
-    ok: res.ok,
-    status: res.status,
-    statusText: res.statusText,
-    headers: res.headers,
-    url: res.url,
-    redirected: res.redirected,
-    async text() { return buf.toString('utf8'); },
-    async json() { return JSON.parse(buf.toString('utf8')); },
-    async arrayBuffer() { return buf.buffer.slice(buf.byteOffset, buf.byteOffset + buf.byteLength); },
-    async buffer() { return buf; },
-  };
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  safeFetch,
-  validateUrl,
-  isPrivateAddress,
-};
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * Safe Fetch — SSRF-resistant HTTP client.
+ *
+ * Mitigations applied:
+ *   1. Scheme allow-list (http/https only).
+ *   2. Optional domain allow-list (string globs or "*").
+ *   3. DNS resolution + private/reserved/loopback/link-local CIDR block.
+ *   4. Re-validation on EVERY redirect hop (manual redirect handling).
+ *   5. Hard timeout via AbortController.
+ *   6. Max response body size (default 5 MB) — drains and aborts.
+ *   7. Optional Content-Type allow-list.
+ *
+ * NEVER call native `fetch(url)` directly with user-supplied URLs anywhere
+ * inside this server process. Use this helper.
+ */
+
+const dns = require('node:dns').promises;
+const net = require('node:net');
+
+const PRIVATE_V4_CIDRS = [
+  ['10.0.0.0', 8],
+  ['172.16.0.0', 12],
+  ['192.168.0.0', 16],
+  ['127.0.0.0', 8],
+  ['169.254.0.0', 16],   // link-local (AWS metadata 169.254.169.254 lives here)
+  ['100.64.0.0', 10],    // CGNAT
+  ['0.0.0.0', 8],
+  ['224.0.0.0', 4],      // multicast
+  ['240.0.0.0', 4],      // reserved
+  ['198.18.0.0', 15],    // benchmarking
+  ['192.0.0.0', 24],
+  ['192.0.2.0', 24],     // TEST-NET-1
+  ['198.51.100.0', 24],  // TEST-NET-2
+  ['203.0.113.0', 24],   // TEST-NET-3
+];
+
+const PRIVATE_V6_PREFIXES = ['::1', 'fc', 'fd', 'fe80', 'ff', '::ffff:127.', '::ffff:10.', '::ffff:192.168.', '::ffff:172.', '::', '64:ff9b::'];
+
+function _ipToInt(ip) {
+  return ip.split('.').reduce((acc, oct) => (acc << 8) + parseInt(oct, 10), 0) >>> 0;
+}
+
+function _isPrivateV4(ip) {
+  const ipInt = _ipToInt(ip);
+  return PRIVATE_V4_CIDRS.some(([base, bits]) => {
+    const baseInt = _ipToInt(base);
+    const mask = bits === 0 ? 0 : (~0 << (32 - bits)) >>> 0;
+    return (ipInt & mask) === (baseInt & mask);
+  });
+}
+
+function _isPrivateV6(ip) {
+  const lower = ip.toLowerCase();
+  return PRIVATE_V6_PREFIXES.some((p) => lower === p || lower.startsWith(p));
+}
+
+function isPrivateAddress(ip) {
+  if (!ip) return true;
+  if (net.isIPv4(ip)) return _isPrivateV4(ip);
+  if (net.isIPv6(ip)) return _isPrivateV6(ip);
+  return true; // unknown → treat as private
+}
+
+function _matchesGlob(host, pattern) {
+  if (pattern === '*') return true;
+  if (pattern.startsWith('*.')) {
+    const suffix = pattern.slice(2).toLowerCase();
+    return host === suffix || host.endsWith('.' + suffix);
+  }
+  return host.toLowerCase() === pattern.toLowerCase();
+}
+
+function _allowedHost(host, allowList) {
+  if (!allowList || allowList.length === 0) return true; // no list = allow public
+  return allowList.some((p) => _matchesGlob(host, p));
+}
+
+async function _assertSafeHost(hostname) {
+  // If it's already an IP literal, validate directly.
+  if (net.isIP(hostname)) {
+    if (isPrivateAddress(hostname)) {
+      throw new Error(`SSRF blocked: private/reserved IP ${hostname}`);
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  let records;
+  try {
+    records = await dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true, verbatim: true });
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw new Error(`DNS resolution failed for ${hostname}: ${err.code || err.message}`);
+  }
+  if (!records || records.length === 0) {
+    throw new Error(`DNS returned no records for ${hostname}`);
+  }
+  for (const r of records) {
+    if (isPrivateAddress(r.address)) {
+      throw new Error(`SSRF blocked: ${hostname} resolves to private/reserved address ${r.address}`);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate a URL string against the SSRF policy.
+ * @returns {URL} parsed URL
+ */
+async function validateUrl(rawUrl, options = {}) {
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(rawUrl);
+  } catch (e) {
+    throw new Error('Invalid URL');
+  }
+  const allowedSchemes = options.allowedSchemes || ['http:', 'https:'];
+  if (!allowedSchemes.includes(parsed.protocol)) {
+    throw new Error(`Scheme ${parsed.protocol} not allowed`);
+  }
+  if (options.requireHttps && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
+    throw new Error('HTTPS required');
+  }
+  // Block credentials in URLs (defeats some auth-smuggling attacks).
+  if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+    throw new Error('Credentials in URLs are not allowed');
+  }
+  // Restrict ports to defaults unless explicitly allowed.
+  const allowedPorts = options.allowedPorts || [80, 443];
+  const port = parsed.port ? parseInt(parsed.port, 10) : (parsed.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80);
+  if (!allowedPorts.includes(port)) {
+    throw new Error(`Port ${port} not allowed`);
+  }
+  if (!_allowedHost(parsed.hostname, options.allowList)) {
+    throw new Error(`Host ${parsed.hostname} not in allow-list`);
+  }
+  await _assertSafeHost(parsed.hostname);
+  return parsed;
+}
+
+/**
+ * SSRF-resistant fetch.
+ * Manually follows redirects so each hop is re-validated.
+ */
+async function safeFetch(rawUrl, init = {}, opts = {}) {
+  const maxRedirects = opts.maxRedirects ?? 3;
+  const maxBytes = opts.maxBytes ?? 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5 MB
+  const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? 10000;
+  const allowList = opts.allowList;
+  const allowedContentTypes = opts.allowedContentTypes; // e.g. ['text/html','application/json']
+
+  let currentUrl = rawUrl;
+  for (let hop = 0; hop <= maxRedirects; hop++) {
+    await validateUrl(currentUrl, { allowList, allowedSchemes: opts.allowedSchemes, requireHttps: opts.requireHttps, allowedPorts: opts.allowedPorts });
+
+    const controller = new AbortController();
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);
+
+    let res;
+    try {
+      res = await fetch(currentUrl, {
+        ...init,
+        redirect: 'manual',
+        signal: controller.signal,
+      });
+    } finally {
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+    }
+
+    if (res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {
+      const loc = res.headers.get('location');
+      if (!loc) return _enforceBody(res, maxBytes, allowedContentTypes);
+      if (hop === maxRedirects) throw new Error('Too many redirects');
+      currentUrl = new URL(loc, currentUrl).toString();
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    return _enforceBody(res, maxBytes, allowedContentTypes);
+  }
+  throw new Error('Redirect loop');
+}
+
+async function _enforceBody(res, maxBytes, allowedContentTypes) {
+  const ct = (res.headers.get('content-type') || '').toLowerCase();
+  if (allowedContentTypes && !allowedContentTypes.some((t) => ct.startsWith(t))) {
+    res.body?.cancel?.().catch(() => {});
+    throw new Error(`Content-Type ${ct || 'unknown'} not allowed`);
+  }
+  const declared = parseInt(res.headers.get('content-length') || '0', 10);
+  if (declared && declared > maxBytes) {
+    res.body?.cancel?.().catch(() => {});
+    throw new Error(`Response too large (${declared} bytes, max ${maxBytes})`);
+  }
+  if (!res.body) return res;
+
+  // Buffer the response while enforcing size.
+  const reader = res.body.getReader();
+  const chunks = [];
+  let total = 0;
+  while (true) {
+    const { done, value } = await reader.read();
+    if (done) break;
+    total += value.byteLength;
+    if (total > maxBytes) {
+      reader.cancel().catch(() => {});
+      throw new Error(`Response exceeded ${maxBytes} bytes`);
+    }
+    chunks.push(value);
+  }
+  const buf = Buffer.concat(chunks.map((c) => Buffer.from(c)));
+  // Return a Response-like wrapper matching the parts callers actually use.
+  return {
+    ok: res.ok,
+    status: res.status,
+    statusText: res.statusText,
+    headers: res.headers,
+    url: res.url,
+    redirected: res.redirected,
+    async text() { return buf.toString('utf8'); },
+    async json() { return JSON.parse(buf.toString('utf8')); },
+    async arrayBuffer() { return buf.buffer.slice(buf.byteOffset, buf.byteOffset + buf.byteLength); },
+    async buffer() { return buf; },
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  safeFetch,
+  validateUrl,
+  isPrivateAddress,
+};

package/server/utils/secureFields.js

@@ -1,50 +1,50 @@
-/**
- * Optional AES-256-GCM encryption for sensitive DB fields (e.g. SMTP password).
- * Set CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY (any long random string) to enable at-rest encryption.
- */
-
-const crypto = require('crypto');
-
-const PREFIX = 'enc:v1:';
-
-function getKey() {
-  const raw = process.env.CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
-  if (!raw || String(raw).length < 8) return null;
-  return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(String(raw)).digest();
-}
-
-function encryptOptional(plain) {
-  if (plain == null || plain === '') return plain;
-  const key = getKey();
-  if (!key) return plain;
-  const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12);
-  const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key, iv);
-  const enc = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(String(plain), 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
-  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
-  return `${PREFIX}${iv.toString('hex')}:${tag.toString('hex')}:${enc.toString('hex')}`;
-}
-
-function decryptOptional(stored) {
-  if (stored == null || stored === '') return stored;
-  if (typeof stored !== 'string' || !stored.startsWith(PREFIX)) return stored;
-  const key = getKey();
-  if (!key) {
-    console.warn('[WAB] CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY missing; cannot decrypt stored credential');
-    return null;
-  }
-  try {
-    const rest = stored.slice(PREFIX.length);
-    const [ivHex, tagHex, dataHex] = rest.split(':');
-    const iv = Buffer.from(ivHex, 'hex');
-    const tag = Buffer.from(tagHex, 'hex');
-    const data = Buffer.from(dataHex, 'hex');
-    const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key, iv);
-    decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
-    return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(data), decipher.final()]).toString('utf8');
-  } catch (e) {
-    console.error('[WAB] Decrypt failed:', e.message);
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-module.exports = { encryptOptional, decryptOptional };
+/**
+ * Optional AES-256-GCM encryption for sensitive DB fields (e.g. SMTP password).
+ * Set CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY (any long random string) to enable at-rest encryption.
+ */
+
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+
+const PREFIX = 'enc:v1:';
+
+function getKey() {
+  const raw = process.env.CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
+  if (!raw || String(raw).length < 8) return null;
+  return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(String(raw)).digest();
+}
+
+function encryptOptional(plain) {
+  if (plain == null || plain === '') return plain;
+  const key = getKey();
+  if (!key) return plain;
+  const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12);
+  const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key, iv);
+  const enc = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(String(plain), 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
+  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+  return `${PREFIX}${iv.toString('hex')}:${tag.toString('hex')}:${enc.toString('hex')}`;
+}
+
+function decryptOptional(stored) {
+  if (stored == null || stored === '') return stored;
+  if (typeof stored !== 'string' || !stored.startsWith(PREFIX)) return stored;
+  const key = getKey();
+  if (!key) {
+    console.warn('[WAB] CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY missing; cannot decrypt stored credential');
+    return null;
+  }
+  try {
+    const rest = stored.slice(PREFIX.length);
+    const [ivHex, tagHex, dataHex] = rest.split(':');
+    const iv = Buffer.from(ivHex, 'hex');
+    const tag = Buffer.from(tagHex, 'hex');
+    const data = Buffer.from(dataHex, 'hex');
+    const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key, iv);
+    decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
+    return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(data), decipher.final()]).toString('utf8');
+  } catch (e) {
+    console.error('[WAB] Decrypt failed:', e.message);
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { encryptOptional, decryptOptional };