wave-agent-sdk 1.0.5 → 1.0.6

package/src/utils/bashParser.ts

@@ -1,899 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Splits a complex bash command into individual simple commands by shell operators (&&, ||, ;, |, &).
- * Correctly handles quotes, escaped characters, and subshells.
- */
-export function splitBashCommand(command: string): string[] {
-  let inSingleQuote = false;
-  let inDoubleQuote = false;
-  let escaped = false;
-  let parenLevel = 0;
-  const splitPositions: number[] = [];
-
-  for (let i = 0; i < command.length; i++) {
-    const char = command[i];
-    const nextChar = command[i + 1];
-
-    if (escaped) {
-      escaped = false;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === "\\") {
-      escaped = true;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === "'" && !inDoubleQuote) {
-      inSingleQuote = !inSingleQuote;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === '"' && !inSingleQuote) {
-      inDoubleQuote = !inDoubleQuote;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (inSingleQuote || inDoubleQuote) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === "(") {
-      parenLevel++;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === ")") {
-      parenLevel--;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (parenLevel > 0) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    // Check for operators
-    let opLen = 0;
-    if (char === "&" && nextChar === "&") opLen = 2;
-    else if (char === "|" && nextChar === "|") opLen = 2;
-    else if (char === "|" && nextChar === "&") opLen = 2;
-    else if (char === ";") opLen = 1;
-    else if (char === "|") opLen = 1;
-    else if (char === "&" && nextChar !== ">" && command[i - 1] !== ">")
-      opLen = 1;
-
-    if (opLen > 0) {
-      // Check if preceded by an odd number of backslashes
-      let backslashCount = 0;
-      for (let j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
-        if (command[j] === "\\") backslashCount++;
-        else break;
-      }
-
-      // ALSO check if preceded by an escaped operator character (e.g., \&&)
-      let precededByEscapedOp = false;
-      if (i > 0 && /[&|;]/.test(command[i - 1])) {
-        let bsCount = 0;
-        for (let j = i - 2; j >= 0; j--) {
-          if (command[j] === "\\") bsCount++;
-          else break;
-        }
-        if (bsCount % 2 !== 0) precededByEscapedOp = true;
-      }
-
-      if (backslashCount % 2 === 0 && !precededByEscapedOp) {
-        splitPositions.push(i, i + opLen);
-        i += opLen - 1;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  let lastPos = 0;
-  const parts: string[] = [];
-  for (let i = 0; i < splitPositions.length; i += 2) {
-    const start = splitPositions[i];
-    const end = splitPositions[i + 1];
-    const part = command.substring(lastPos, start).trim();
-    if (part) parts.push(part);
-    lastPos = end;
-  }
-  const lastPart = command.substring(lastPos).trim();
-  if (lastPart) parts.push(lastPart);
-
-  const finalResult: string[] = [];
-  for (const part of parts) {
-    const envStripped = stripEnvVars(part);
-    const stripped = stripRedirections(envStripped);
-    if (
-      stripped.startsWith("(") &&
-      stripped.endsWith(")") &&
-      stripped === envStripped
-    ) {
-      const inner = stripped.substring(1, stripped.length - 1).trim();
-      if (inner) {
-        finalResult.push(...splitBashCommand(inner));
-      }
-    } else {
-      finalResult.push(part);
-    }
-  }
-
-  return finalResult;
-}
-
-/**
- * Removes inline environment variable assignments (e.g., VAR=val cmd -> cmd).
- */
-export function stripEnvVars(command: string): string {
-  let result = command.trim();
-  while (true) {
-    const match = result.match(/^([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)=/);
-    if (!match) break;
-
-    const varNameEnd = match[0].length;
-    let valueEnd = varNameEnd;
-
-    if (result[varNameEnd] === "'") {
-      valueEnd = result.indexOf("'", varNameEnd + 1);
-      if (valueEnd === -1) break;
-      valueEnd++;
-    } else if (result[varNameEnd] === '"') {
-      let escaped = false;
-      let found = false;
-      for (let i = varNameEnd + 1; i < result.length; i++) {
-        if (escaped) {
-          escaped = false;
-          continue;
-        }
-        if (result[i] === "\\") {
-          escaped = true;
-          continue;
-        }
-        if (result[i] === '"') {
-          valueEnd = i + 1;
-          found = true;
-          break;
-        }
-      }
-      if (!found) break;
-    } else {
-      const spaceIndex = result.search(/\s/);
-      if (spaceIndex === -1) {
-        return "";
-      }
-      valueEnd = spaceIndex;
-    }
-
-    result = result.substring(valueEnd).trim();
-  }
-  return result;
-}
-
-/**
- * Removes redirections (e.g., echo "data" > output.txt -> echo "data").
- */
-export function stripRedirections(command: string): string {
-  let result = "";
-  let inSingleQuote = false;
-  let inDoubleQuote = false;
-  let escaped = false;
-
-  for (let i = 0; i < command.length; i++) {
-    const char = command[i];
-
-    if (escaped) {
-      result += char;
-      escaped = false;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === "\\") {
-      result += char;
-      escaped = true;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === "'" && !inDoubleQuote) {
-      inSingleQuote = !inSingleQuote;
-      result += char;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === '"' && !inSingleQuote) {
-      inDoubleQuote = !inDoubleQuote;
-      result += char;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (inSingleQuote || inDoubleQuote) {
-      result += char;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    // Handle whitespace outside quotes: collapse multiple spaces into one
-    if (/\s/.test(char)) {
-      if (result.length > 0 && !/\s/.test(result[result.length - 1])) {
-        result += " ";
-      }
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    // Check for redirection
-    if (char === ">" || char === "<") {
-      // Check if preceded by a digit or & (for 2> or &>)
-      if (result.length > 0 && /[0-9&]/.test(result[result.length - 1])) {
-        // Ensure it's at the start of a word or preceded by whitespace
-        if (result.length === 1 || /\s/.test(result[result.length - 2])) {
-          // Remove the digit/& from result
-          result = result.substring(0, result.length - 1);
-        }
-      }
-
-      let end = i + 1;
-      if (command[end] === char) {
-        end++;
-        if (char === "<" && command[end] === "-") {
-          end++;
-        }
-      } else if (
-        command[end] === "&" ||
-        (char === ">" && command[end] === "|")
-      ) {
-        end++;
-      }
-
-      // Skip whitespace after operator
-      while (end < command.length && /\s/.test(command[end])) {
-        end++;
-      }
-
-      // Skip the following word (the target of redirection)
-      let wordEscaped = false;
-      let wordInSingleQuote = false;
-      let wordInDoubleQuote = false;
-      while (end < command.length) {
-        const c = command[end];
-        if (wordEscaped) {
-          wordEscaped = false;
-          end++;
-          continue;
-        }
-        if (c === "\\") {
-          wordEscaped = true;
-          end++;
-          continue;
-        }
-        if (c === "'" && !wordInDoubleQuote) {
-          wordInSingleQuote = !wordInSingleQuote;
-          end++;
-          continue;
-        }
-        if (c === '"' && !wordInSingleQuote) {
-          wordInDoubleQuote = !wordInDoubleQuote;
-          end++;
-          continue;
-        }
-        if (!wordInSingleQuote && !wordInDoubleQuote && /\s/.test(c)) {
-          break;
-        }
-        end++;
-      }
-
-      i = end - 1;
-      // After stripping a redirection, ensure there's a space if we're not at the end
-      if (result.length > 0 && !/\s/.test(result[result.length - 1])) {
-        result += " ";
-      }
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    result += char;
-  }
-
-  return result.trim();
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a bash command contains any write redirections (>, >>, &>, 2>, >|).
- */
-export function hasWriteRedirections(command: string): boolean {
-  let inSingleQuote = false;
-  let inDoubleQuote = false;
-  let escaped = false;
-
-  for (let i = 0; i < command.length; i++) {
-    const char = command[i];
-
-    if (escaped) {
-      escaped = false;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === "\\") {
-      escaped = true;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === "'" && !inDoubleQuote) {
-      inSingleQuote = !inSingleQuote;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === '"' && !inSingleQuote) {
-      inDoubleQuote = !inDoubleQuote;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (inSingleQuote || inDoubleQuote) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === ">") {
-      // Check if this is a redirection to /dev/null
-      let j = i + 1;
-      // Handle >> or >|
-      if (j < command.length && (command[j] === ">" || command[j] === "|")) {
-        j++;
-      }
-
-      // Skip whitespace after operator
-      while (j < command.length && /\s/.test(command[j])) {
-        j++;
-      }
-
-      // Extract the target word, handling quotes and escapes
-      let target = "";
-      let targetEscaped = false;
-      let targetInSingleQuote = false;
-      let targetInDoubleQuote = false;
-      let k = j;
-      while (k < command.length) {
-        const c = command[k];
-        if (targetEscaped) {
-          targetEscaped = false;
-          target += c;
-          k++;
-          continue;
-        }
-        if (c === "\\") {
-          targetEscaped = true;
-          k++;
-          continue;
-        }
-        if (c === "'" && !targetInDoubleQuote) {
-          targetInSingleQuote = !targetInSingleQuote;
-          k++;
-          continue;
-        }
-        if (c === '"' && !targetInSingleQuote) {
-          targetInDoubleQuote = !targetInDoubleQuote;
-          k++;
-          continue;
-        }
-        if (!targetInSingleQuote && !targetInDoubleQuote && /\s/.test(c)) {
-          break;
-        }
-        target += c;
-        k++;
-      }
-
-      // If the target is exactly /dev/null, we ignore this redirection
-      if (target === "/dev/null") {
-        i = k - 1; // Move the main loop index to the end of the target
-        continue;
-      }
-
-      // Ignore file descriptor redirections like 2>&1, >&2, etc.
-      if (target.startsWith("&") && /^\d+$/.test(target.substring(1))) {
-        i = k - 1;
-        continue;
-      }
-
-      return true;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return false;
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a bash command contains any heredocs (<<, <<-).
- */
-export function hasHeredoc(command: string): boolean {
-  let inSingleQuote = false;
-  let inDoubleQuote = false;
-  let escaped = false;
-
-  for (let i = 0; i < command.length; i++) {
-    const char = command[i];
-
-    if (escaped) {
-      escaped = false;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === "\\") {
-      escaped = true;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === "'" && !inDoubleQuote) {
-      inSingleQuote = !inSingleQuote;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === '"' && !inSingleQuote) {
-      inDoubleQuote = !inDoubleQuote;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (inSingleQuote || inDoubleQuote) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === "<" && command[i + 1] === "<") {
-      return true;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return false;
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a bash command is a heredoc write operation (e.g., cat <<EOF > file).
- */
-export function isBashHeredocWrite(command: string): boolean {
-  return hasHeredoc(command) && hasWriteRedirections(command);
-}
-
-/**
- * Blacklist of dangerous commands that should not be safely prefix-matched
- * and should not have persistent permissions.
- */
-export const DANGEROUS_COMMANDS = [
-  "rm",
-  "mv",
-  "chmod",
-  "chown",
-  "sh",
-  "bash",
-  "zsh",
-  "fish",
-  "pwsh",
-  "cmd.exe",
-  "powershell.exe",
-  "sudo",
-  "dd",
-  "apt",
-  "apt-get",
-  "yum",
-  "dnf",
-  "ssh",
-  "scp",
-  "sftp",
-  "ftp",
-  "telnet",
-  "nc",
-  "netcat",
-];
-
-/**
- * Read-only command set: commands that only read/transform data and write to stdout.
- * When a command in this set is used without write redirections, command substitution,
- * or dangerous flags (e.g. sed -i), it is auto-allowed without a confirmation dialog.
- * Aligned with Claude Code's SEMANTIC_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS, excluding interactive pagers
- * (less, more, man, info), command executors (xargs), and infinite-output generators (yes).
- * FR-019.2 through FR-019.7 in tool-permission-system.md.
- */
-export const READ_ONLY_COMMANDS = [
-  "ls",
-  "cat",
-  "head",
-  "tail",
-  "wc",
-  "sort",
-  "uniq",
-  "grep",
-  "egrep",
-  "fgrep",
-  "rg",
-  "find",
-  "which",
-  "whereis",
-  "file",
-  "stat",
-  "du",
-  "df",
-  "free",
-  "uptime",
-  "uname",
-  "hostname",
-  "whoami",
-  "id",
-  "groups",
-  "env",
-  "printenv",
-  "echo",
-  "printf",
-  "date",
-  "true",
-  "false",
-  "pwd",
-  "tree",
-  "diff",
-  "cmp",
-  "md5sum",
-  "sha256sum",
-  "sha1sum",
-  "xxd",
-  "od",
-  "hexdump",
-  "strings",
-  "readlink",
-  "realpath",
-  "basename",
-  "dirname",
-  "seq",
-  "column",
-  "jq",
-  "yq",
-  "cut",
-  "paste",
-  "tr",
-  "awk",
-  "sed",
-  "test",
-  "expr",
-  "bc",
-  "sleep",
-];
-
-/**
- * Registry of commands and their expected subcommand depth for smart prefix extraction.
- * For example, 'git: 2' means 'git commit' is a valid prefix, but 'git' alone is not.
- * Multi-word keys can be used for more specific rules.
- */
-export interface ToolRule {
-  depth: number;
-  scopeFlags?: string[];
-}
-
-export const TOOL_RULES: Record<string, ToolRule> = {
-  // Node/JS
-  npm: { depth: 2, scopeFlags: ["--prefix", "-C", "--registry"] },
-  "npm run": { depth: 3, scopeFlags: ["--prefix", "-C", "--registry"] },
-  pnpm: { depth: 2, scopeFlags: ["-C", "--dir", "-F", "--filter"] },
-  "pnpm run": { depth: 3, scopeFlags: ["-C", "--dir", "-F", "--filter"] },
-  yarn: { depth: 2, scopeFlags: ["workspace", "--cwd"] },
-  "yarn run": { depth: 3, scopeFlags: ["workspace", "--cwd"] },
-  "yarn workspace": { depth: 4, scopeFlags: ["--cwd"] },
-  bun: { depth: 2 },
-  "bun run": { depth: 3 },
-  deno: { depth: 2 },
-  "deno run": { depth: 3 },
-  "deno task": { depth: 3 },
-
-  // Git
-  git: {
-    depth: 2,
-    scopeFlags: ["-C", "-c", "--directory", "--work-tree", "--git-dir"],
-  },
-
-  // Python
-  python: { depth: 2 },
-  python3: { depth: 2 },
-  "python -m": { depth: 2 },
-  "python3 -m": { depth: 2 },
-  "python -m pip install": { depth: 3 },
-  "python3 -m pip install": { depth: 3 },
-  pip: { depth: 2 },
-  pip3: { depth: 2 },
-  poetry: { depth: 2 },
-  conda: { depth: 2 },
-
-  // Java
-  mvn: { depth: 2 },
-  gradle: { depth: 2 },
-  java: { depth: 1 },
-  "java -jar": { depth: 1 },
-
-  // Rust & Go
-  cargo: { depth: 2 },
-  go: { depth: 2 },
-
-  // Containers & Infrastructure
-  docker: { depth: 2 },
-  "docker-compose": { depth: 2 },
-  kubectl: { depth: 2 },
-  terraform: { depth: 2 },
-  gcloud: { depth: 2 },
-  "gcloud compute": { depth: 4 },
-  "gcloud container": { depth: 4 },
-  aws: { depth: 2 },
-};
-
-/**
- * Registry of dangerous subcommands for specific tools.
- */
-export const DANGEROUS_SUBCOMMANDS: Record<string, string[]> = {
-  docker: ["rm", "rmi", "system", "volume", "network", "image", "container"],
-  git: ["reset", "clean"],
-  npm: ["uninstall", "un", "remove", "rm"],
-  pnpm: ["uninstall", "un", "remove", "rm"],
-  yarn: ["remove"],
-  deno: ["uninstall"],
-  bun: ["remove", "rm"],
-};
-
-/**
- * Heuristic to determine if a flag takes an argument.
- * If nextArg doesn't start with '-' and isn't a known subcommand, assume it's a flag value.
- */
-function flagTakesArg(flag: string, nextArg: string | undefined): boolean {
-  if (!nextArg) return false;
-  if (nextArg.startsWith("-")) return false;
-  // If it's a common subcommand, it's probably not a flag argument
-  const commonSubcommands = [
-    "install",
-    "add",
-    "remove",
-    "run",
-    "test",
-    "build",
-    "status",
-    "diff",
-    "commit",
-    "push",
-    "pull",
-    "checkout",
-    "log",
-    "fetch",
-    "merge",
-    "rebase",
-  ];
-  if (commonSubcommands.includes(nextArg)) return false;
-  return true;
-}
-
-/**
- * Detects if an argument is a file path or URL.
- */
-function shouldStopAtArg(arg: string): boolean {
-  if (!arg) return false;
-  // URLs
-  if (/^(https?|ftp|ssh|git):\/\//.test(arg)) return true;
-  // File paths (starts with /, ./, ../, or ~/)
-  if (
-    arg.startsWith("/") ||
-    arg.startsWith("./") ||
-    arg.startsWith("../") ||
-    arg.startsWith("~/")
-  )
-    return true;
-  // Common file extensions (but not scoped packages or common subcommands)
-  if (
-    /\.(ts|js|py|sh|md|txt|json|yml|yaml|html|css|go|rs|java|cpp|c|h|php|rb|pl|sql)$/.test(
-      arg,
-    ) &&
-    !arg.includes("@") &&
-    !arg.includes("/")
-  )
-    return true;
-  return false;
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a find command is dangerous (e.g., contains -exec, -delete, etc.).
- */
-export function isDangerousFind(command: string): boolean {
-  const stripped = stripRedirections(stripEnvVars(command));
-  const tokens = stripped.match(/(?:[^\s"']+|"[^"]*"|'[^']*')+/g) || [];
-  if (tokens.length === 0 || tokens[0] !== "find") return false;
-
-  const dangerousFlags = [
-    "-exec",
-    "-execdir",
-    "-ok",
-    "-okdir",
-    "-delete",
-    "-fprint",
-    "-fprint0",
-    "-fprintf",
-  ];
-  return tokens.some((token) => {
-    const unquoted = token.replace(/^(['"])(.*)\1$/, "$2");
-    return dangerousFlags.includes(unquoted);
-  });
-}
-
-/**
- * Detects command substitution $(...) or backticks `...` in a command string.
- * Commands with substitution are never auto-allowed because the substituted
- * command may be dangerous (e.g. cat $(rm x)). FR-019.6.
- */
-export function hasCommandSubstitution(command: string): boolean {
-  // Remove quoted strings first so $() or backticks inside quotes don't trigger
-  const stripped = command
-    .replace(/"(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*"/g, '""')
-    .replace(/'(?:[^'\\]|\\.)*'/g, "''");
-  return /\$\([^)]*\)/.test(stripped) || /`[^`]*`/.test(stripped);
-}
-
-/**
- * Detects process substitution <(...) or >(...) in a command string.
- * These can execute side effects and are never auto-allowed. FR-019.6.
- */
-export function hasProcessSubstitution(command: string): boolean {
-  const stripped = command
-    .replace(/"(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*"/g, '""')
-    .replace(/'(?:[^'\\]|\\.)*'/g, "''");
-  return /[<>]\([^)]*\)/.test(stripped);
-}
-
-/**
- * Detects sed in-place edit flag (-i, with optional backup suffix like -i.bak).
- * sed -i modifies files in place and must NOT be auto-allowed. FR-019.5.
- */
-export function hasSedInPlace(command: string): boolean {
-  const stripped = stripRedirections(stripEnvVars(command));
-  const tokens = stripped.match(/(?:[^\s"']+|"[^"]*"|'[^']*')+/g) || [];
-  if (tokens.length === 0 || tokens[0] !== "sed") return false;
-  return tokens.some((token) => /^-i(\..*)?$/.test(token));
-}
-
-/**
- * Extracts a "smart prefix" from a bash command based on common developer tools.
- * Returns null if the command is blacklisted or cannot be safely prefix-matched.
- */
-export function getSmartPrefix(command: string): string | null {
-  const parts = splitBashCommand(command);
-  if (parts.length === 0) return null;
-
-  // For now, we only support prefix matching for single commands or the first command in a chain
-  // to keep it simple and safe.
-  const firstCommand = parts[0];
-
-  const stripped = stripRedirections(stripEnvVars(firstCommand));
-  const tokens = stripped.split(/\s+/);
-  if (tokens.length === 0) return null;
-
-  const prefixParts: string[] = [];
-  let i = 0;
-
-  // Handle prefix tools like sudo
-  const prefixTools = ["sudo", "time", "stdbuf", "timeout"];
-  while (i < tokens.length && prefixTools.includes(tokens[i])) {
-    prefixParts.push(tokens[i]);
-    i++;
-  }
-
-  if (i >= tokens.length) return null;
-
-  const exe = tokens[i];
-  // Blacklist - Hard blacklist for dangerous commands
-  if (DANGEROUS_COMMANDS.includes(exe)) return null;
-
-  // Find the longest matching rule in TOOL_RULES
-  let bestRuleKey = "";
-  let rule: ToolRule | undefined;
-
-  for (const [key, r] of Object.entries(TOOL_RULES)) {
-    const keyTokens = key.split(/\s+/);
-    let match = true;
-    for (let j = 0; j < keyTokens.length; j++) {
-      if (tokens[i + j] !== keyTokens[j]) {
-        match = false;
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-    if (match && key.length > bestRuleKey.length) {
-      bestRuleKey = key;
-      rule = r;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // If no rule found, we don't suggest a prefix
-  if (!rule) return null;
-
-  const depth = rule.depth;
-  const scopeFlags = rule.scopeFlags || [];
-  let currentDepth = 0;
-
-  // Safety check: only allow safe subcommands for git
-  const safeGitSubcommands = [
-    "commit",
-    "push",
-    "pull",
-    "checkout",
-    "add",
-    "status",
-    "diff",
-    "branch",
-    "merge",
-    "rebase",
-    "log",
-    "fetch",
-    "remote",
-    "stash",
-  ];
-
-  const destructiveGitFlags = [
-    "-d",
-    "-D",
-    "--delete",
-    "--hard",
-    "--force",
-    "-f",
-  ];
-
-  // Global safety check: scan ALL tokens for dangerous flags/subcommands
-  for (let j = i; j < tokens.length; j++) {
-    const token = tokens[j];
-    if (token.startsWith("-")) {
-      if (exe === "git" && destructiveGitFlags.includes(token)) return null;
-    } else {
-      if (DANGEROUS_SUBCOMMANDS[exe]?.includes(token)) return null;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Include all tokens from the best matching rule
-  const ruleTokens = bestRuleKey.split(/\s+/);
-  for (let j = 0; j < ruleTokens.length; j++) {
-    const token = tokens[i];
-    if (!token) break;
-
-    if (token.startsWith("-")) {
-      if (exe === "git" && destructiveGitFlags.includes(token)) return null;
-    } else {
-      if (DANGEROUS_SUBCOMMANDS[exe]?.includes(token)) return null;
-      if (
-        exe === "git" &&
-        currentDepth > 0 &&
-        !safeGitSubcommands.includes(token)
-      ) {
-        return null;
-      }
-      currentDepth++;
-    }
-
-    prefixParts.push(token);
-    i++;
-  }
-
-  // Continue until we reach the required depth
-  while (i < tokens.length && currentDepth < depth) {
-    const token = tokens[i];
-
-    if (token.startsWith("-")) {
-      // Safety checks for flags
-      if (exe === "git" && destructiveGitFlags.includes(token)) return null;
-
-      prefixParts.push(token);
-      if (scopeFlags.includes(token) || flagTakesArg(token, tokens[i + 1])) {
-        if (i + 1 < tokens.length) {
-          prefixParts.push(tokens[++i]);
-        }
-      }
-    } else {
-      // Safety checks for subcommands
-      if (DANGEROUS_SUBCOMMANDS[exe]?.includes(token)) return null;
-      if (
-        exe === "git" &&
-        currentDepth > 0 &&
-        !safeGitSubcommands.includes(token)
-      ) {
-        return null;
-      }
-
-      // Stop at data/paths
-      if (shouldStopAtArg(token) && currentDepth > 0) break;
-
-      prefixParts.push(token);
-      currentDepth++;
-    }
-    i++;
-  }
-
-  if (currentDepth < depth) return null;
-
-  return prefixParts.join(" ");
-}