watchmyagents 1.1.3 → 1.1.5

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "watchmyagents",
-  "version": "1.1.3",
+  "version": "1.1.5",
   "description": "Security observability + real-time policy enforcement for AI agents. Local-first NDJSON capture with a continuous Watch daemon that auto-uploads anonymized signals, Shield CLI that blocks policy violations live (with policies pulled from Fortress cloud), anonymizer producing signals-only payloads, bidirectional sync with WatchMyAgents Fortress, and one-command install as an always-on launchd/systemd service — closing the recursive Watch→Guardian→Shield security loop.",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [

package/scripts/shield.js

@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
 // ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var is used if --api-key is omitted.
 
 import { resolve } from 'node:path';
-import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 import { streamWithReconnect } from '../src/shield/stream.js';
 import { loadPolicies, evaluate } from '../src/shield/policy.js';
 import {
@@ -39,6 +38,12 @@ import { FortressPolicySource, postDecision } from '../src/shield/sources/fortre
 import { resolveFortressBase, fortressEndpoint } from '../src/fortress/url.js';
 import { PolicyStream } from '../src/shield/policy-stream.js';
 import { isValidAgentId, isValidSessionId } from '../src/validate.js';
+// v1.1.4 F-19 (P1 Codex audit): all egress to Fortress now flows through
+// buildFortressDecisionPayload, which normalizes tool_name via the
+// anonymizer's allowlist + salted-hash scheme and drops anything it can't
+// safely normalize. Keeps Shield's payload aligned with the README
+// promise that decisions ship fingerprints, not raw values.
+import { buildFortressDecisionPayload } from '../src/shield/upload.js';
 
 function parseArgs(argv) {
   const out = {};
@@ -133,38 +138,20 @@ async function runSessionWorker({ sessionId, ctx }) {
   // refreshes from Fortress (every 5 min) take effect without restart.
   sinfo(sessionId, `attached (${mode} mode)`);
 
-  // Helper: hash an IoC value with the customer salt (same one used by
-  // anonymizer for signals → correlates decisions to signals in Fortress).
-  // Returns null if no salt is configured (decisions still upload, just
-  // without input_hash).
-  const hashIoc = (value) => {
-    if (!signalsSalt || value == null) return null;
-    const s = typeof value === 'string' ? value : JSON.stringify(value);
-    return 'sha256:' + createHash('sha256').update(signalsSalt).update(s).digest('hex').slice(0, 32);
-  };
-
   // Helper: assemble + fire the decision push to Fortress (fire-and-forget).
+  // v1.1.4 F-19 (P1 Codex audit): delegates payload construction to the
+  // pure helper in src/shield/upload.js so the egress-side containment
+  // logic (tool_name allowlist + salted hashing) is unit-tested in
+  // isolation. The helper drops any field it cannot safely normalize
+  // (custom tool without salt, missing salt for hashes) rather than
+  // passing the raw value through.
   const fireToFortress = (rawEvent, normalized, result, decidedInMs) => {
     if (!pushDecisionToFortress) return;
-    // Extract the most relevant input value to hash (URL > command > query > path)
-    const inp = normalized?.input;
-    let inputForHash = null;
-    if (inp && typeof inp === 'object') {
-      inputForHash = inp.url || inp.command || inp.query || inp.path || inp.file_path || null;
-    }
-    pushDecisionToFortress({
-      anthropic_agent_id: agentId,
-      decision: result.decision,
-      rule_id: result.rule_id || undefined,
-      session_hash: hashIoc(sessionId) || undefined,
-      event_id_hash: hashIoc(rawEvent?.id) || undefined,
-      input_hash: hashIoc(inputForHash) || undefined,
-      action_type: normalized?.action_type || undefined,
-      tool_name: normalized?.tool_name || undefined,
-      message: result.message || result.rule_name || undefined,
-      decided_at: new Date().toISOString(),
-      decided_in_ms: decidedInMs,
-    }).catch(() => undefined);
+    const payload = buildFortressDecisionPayload({
+      agentId, sessionId, rawEvent, normalized, result, decidedInMs,
+      signalsSalt,
+    });
+    pushDecisionToFortress(payload).catch(() => undefined);
   };
 
   let processed = 0, enforced = 0, sessionInterrupted = false;

package/src/shield/policy-stream.js

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 import { request as httpsRequest } from 'node:https';
 import { URL } from 'node:url';
 import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events';
+import { normalizeSseBuffer } from './sse.js';
 
 const RECONNECT_MIN_MS = 1_000;
 const RECONNECT_MAX_MS = 60_000;
@@ -154,6 +155,13 @@ export class PolicyStream extends EventEmitter {
       let buffer = '';
       res.on('data', (chunk) => {
         buffer += chunk;
+        // v1.1.4 F-18 (P1 Codex audit): normalize CR / CRLF line
+        // terminators to LF before scanning for the event separator.
+        // Without this, a Fortress deployment behind a reverse-proxy
+        // that emits CRLF would never trigger a policy refresh push —
+        // updates would silently fall back to the 60s polling loop,
+        // breaking the "sub-second propagation" promise.
+        buffer = normalizeSseBuffer(buffer);
         // v1.1.1 F-9: cap on a single SSE event buffer. A buggy/compromised
         // endpoint that never emits "\n\n" would otherwise OOM Shield.
         // Abort + reconnect on overflow; the buffer is dropped so we
@@ -165,7 +173,8 @@ export class PolicyStream extends EventEmitter {
           if (!this._closed) this._scheduleReconnect();
           return;
         }
-        // SSE events are separated by a blank line ("\n\n").
+        // SSE events are separated by a blank line. Post-normalize the
+        // canonical separator is "\n\n".
         let eolIdx;
         while ((eolIdx = buffer.indexOf('\n\n')) !== -1) {
           const rawEvent = buffer.slice(0, eolIdx);

package/src/shield/policy.js

@@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ export async function loadPolicies(path) {
     if (!VALID_MODES.includes(p.mode)) {
       throw new Error(`policy ${p.id || p.name}: unsupported mode "${p.mode}" (must be one of: ${VALID_MODES.join(', ')})`);
     }
+    // v1.1.5 Phase 1.5 — mark every local-file policy so the signature
+    // verifier (src/shield/signature.js) bypasses the Ed25519 chain on
+    // these rows. Today the local path and the Fortress path are entirely
+    // separate (loadPolicies → local ruleset; FortressPolicySource →
+    // cloud ruleset) so this marker is a safety net for future refactors
+    // that might mix them. It also documents intent at read time.
+    p.__local = true;
   }
   // v1.1.2 F-14 (P2 Codex audit): validate the ruleset's default.action
   // against the SAME canonical set as per-policy actions. Before this fix
@@ -68,28 +75,61 @@ export async function loadPolicies(path) {
   return data;
 }
 
-// ReDoS protection: regexes are loaded from a user-provided JSON policy file,
-// so a malicious or buggy pattern (e.g. `(a+)+$`) could pin the CPU on a long
-// input. We mitigate two ways:
+// ReDoS protection: regexes are loaded from a user-provided JSON policy file
+// (LOCAL adapter) AND from Fortress / Guardian-generated rules (FORTRESS
+// adapter), so a malicious or buggy pattern (e.g. `(a+)+$`) could pin
+// Shield's CPU on a long input — taking the whole enforcement loop down.
+// We mitigate three ways:
 //   1) Cap the maximum input length passed to any regex test to MAX_REGEX_INPUT
 //      bytes. Above that we truncate before testing. Real agent values
-//      (URLs, commands, queries) are well under this in practice.
-//   2) Reject obviously dangerous patterns at compile time (heuristic).
+//      (URLs, commands, queries, file paths) are well under this in practice.
+//   2) Reject obviously dangerous patterns at compile time (heuristic — see
+//      SUSPICIOUS_REGEX_PATTERNS below). The list errs toward false positives
+//      because Shield runs in the hot path: a rejected rule is loud (the
+//      rule is dropped at load time with a clear error) while a runaway
+//      regex would silently degrade Shield to "no enforcement" until the
+//      operator notices a CPU spike.
+//   3) Hard upper bound on the regex source length so a deeply nested
+//      pattern can't game the heuristic by spreading the gadget across
+//      thousands of chars.
 //
-// A future v0.5 may add a proper safe-regex-2 dependency for thorough analysis.
-const MAX_REGEX_INPUT = 8192;
+// Future work (v1.2+): proper RE2 or safe-regex-2 dependency for thorough
+// analysis, or moving evaluation into a worker with a hard CPU timeout.
+// We can't ship that today without breaking the zero-runtime-deps promise.
+//
+// v1.1.4 F-20 (P2 Codex audit): cap reduced from 8192 → 2048 (4×). Worst
+// realistic IoC values (URL with long query string, base64 in a path)
+// remain comfortably under 2048; the previous 8192 was a defence-in-depth
+// holdover that no real workload exercises.
+const MAX_REGEX_INPUT = 2048;
 
+// v1.1.4 F-20: heuristic list extended to catch ambiguous alternation
+// (`(a|a)*`, `(a|ab)+`, `(.|.)*`) — these don't trip the existing
+// nested-quantifier heuristic but exhibit the same exponential behavior
+// because every char has two paths to match. The new pattern rejects any
+// alternation group immediately followed by `+` or `*`; this is intentionally
+// over-broad — a customer who needs `(http|https):` should use either a
+// character class (`[a-z]+:`) or move the optional letter (`https?:`).
 const SUSPICIOUS_REGEX_PATTERNS = [
   /(\([^)]*[+*][^)]*\))[+*]/,   // (x+)+ or (x*)* — classic catastrophic backtracking
   /(\.\*){3,}/,                  // multiple .* in a row
+  // F-20: alternation inside a group, then `+` or `*` — `(a|a)*`, `(a|ab)+`,
+  // `(.|.)*`. The `[^)]*\|[^)]*` body requires at least one `|` inside the
+  // group; a single-branch group like `(foo)+` is NOT matched.
+  /\([^)]*\|[^)]*\)[+*]/,
 ];
 
 export function validateRegexString(src, where) {
   if (typeof src !== 'string') {
     throw new Error(`policy ${where}: regex must be a string`);
   }
-  if (src.length > 2000) {
-    throw new Error(`policy ${where}: regex too long (>2000 chars)`);
+  // v1.1.4 F-20: cap regex source at 1024 chars (was 2000). Real Shield
+  // policies are short (URL-prefix match, host-list deny, command-prefix
+  // check). A 1KB regex source is already an outlier; anything longer is
+  // either pathological or trying to bypass the heuristics by smuggling
+  // a gadget across many bytes.
+  if (src.length > 1024) {
+    throw new Error(`policy ${where}: regex too long (>1024 chars)`);
   }
   for (const sus of SUSPICIOUS_REGEX_PATTERNS) {
     if (sus.test(src)) {

package/src/shield/root-key.js

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Fortress root public key — v1.1.5 Phase 1.5 (Guardian Core Axis 2)
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// The Ed25519 root public key of the WMA Fortress signing hierarchy.
+// All cloud-supplied policies are signed by a signing key, which is itself
+// signed by this root. The verifier in src/shield/signature.js chains
+// from policy → signing_key → ROOT to decide whether to trust a policy.
+//
+// The root PRIVATE key NEVER touches this file (nor any customer machine,
+// nor any release artifact). It lives in the Fortress operator's offline
+// vault. Only the public counterpart is shipped, and only its public
+// counterpart is needed to verify.
+//
+// ROTATION POLICY:
+//   - Compromised root → ship a new SDK version with both the old AND new
+//     root keys in an array, give customers a grace window to upgrade,
+//     then ship another SDK version with only the new key. This is the
+//     same "double-signing" model used by Sigstore + Let's Encrypt.
+//   - Routine rotation: every 2 years. Signing keys (one tier down) are
+//     rotated every quarter and don't require an SDK release.
+//
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Real root pubkey — generated by offline ceremony on 2026-06-02
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// The private counterpart NEVER touched this repository, npm, GitHub, or
+// any connected machine. It was generated on the operator's machine in
+// an air-gapped session and immediately stored in 1Password Vault under
+// "WMA Fortress Root Private Key v1". It will be used 4× per year to
+// sign new signing keys for the Fortress signing pipeline.
+//
+// Fortress operator: Minedor (arma@talkytranslate.com)
+//
+// To rotate this key (every 2 years routine, or on suspected compromise):
+//   1. Generate a NEW keypair offline (same node:crypto snippet)
+//   2. Ship an SDK version with BOTH old + new pubkeys in an array,
+//      give customers 6-12 months overlap
+//   3. Ship a follow-up SDK version with only the new pubkey
+//
+// 32-byte Ed25519 public key as base64 (44 chars).
+export const WMA_FORTRESS_ROOT_PUBKEY_B64 = 'w4qKFACBbawZW1kx2wWxnITlOfvLDe+SXaPyZvp+mV4=';
+
+// Flipped to false at release time (v1.1.5). The FortressPolicySource
+// reads this to decide whether to skip verification entirely (placeholder
+// era) or strictly enforce the chain (production). Keep this field —
+// future rotations may temporarily re-enable placeholder mode in
+// release-candidate builds where the new root isn't yet provisioned.
+export const WMA_FORTRESS_ROOT_IS_PLACEHOLDER = false;

package/src/shield/signature.js

@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Ed25519 policy signature verification — v1.1.5 Phase 1.5 (Guardian Core Axis 2)
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Two-level chain of trust:
+//
+//   ROOT KEY (offline-generated, public key embedded in the SDK)
+//     │ signs
+//     ▼
+//   SIGNING KEY (rotated quarterly by Fortress, distributed in get-policies)
+//     │ signs
+//     ▼
+//   POLICY (each policy.signature is verified against its signing_key)
+//
+// The root private key NEVER leaves Fortress's secure vault. Signing keys
+// rotate without requiring an SDK release because their public keys travel
+// in the get-policies response, signed by the root. The SDK only needs to
+// know the embedded root public key to validate the whole chain.
+//
+// Why per-policy signatures (not bundle signatures):
+//   - A single corrupted/malicious policy doesn't invalidate the whole
+//     ruleset — we drop the invalid one and keep the rest.
+//   - Lets us mix "Fortress-signed cloud policies" with "local JSON
+//     policies for dev/test" without forcing the local path through the
+//     signing pipeline. The local-file adapter sets `__local: true` on
+//     its policies to opt out of signature requirements.
+//   - Compatible with first-match-wins evaluation: order is preserved,
+//     gaps from dropped policies are silently filled by lower-priority
+//     rules or the ruleset default.
+//
+// Zero runtime deps preserved — uses node:crypto's native Ed25519 support
+// (Node 16+). No tweetnacl, no @noble/curves.
+
+import { createPublicKey, verify as cryptoVerify } from 'node:crypto';
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Canonical serialization for signing
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Both ends (signer + verifier) must agree on EXACTLY what bytes are signed.
+// We use a deterministic JSON encoding: keys sorted lexicographically at
+// every nesting depth, arrays preserved in order, no whitespace, no escape
+// variations (JSON.stringify's default escaping is deterministic).
+//
+// The signed payload for a POLICY excludes the signature field itself plus
+// any signer-side bookkeeping (signed_at, signing_key_id are NOT signed —
+// they're metadata that travels alongside the signature for verifier
+// lookup). The fields we DO sign are the ones whose modification would
+// change Shield's decision: rule_id, match, action, message, priority, mode.
+
+const POLICY_SIGNED_FIELDS = ['rule_id', 'match', 'action', 'message', 'priority', 'mode'];
+
+// Recursive deterministic JSON: sorted keys at every depth, arrays kept in order.
+export function canonicalize(value) {
+  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return JSON.stringify(value);
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    return '[' + value.map(canonicalize).join(',') + ']';
+  }
+  const keys = Object.keys(value).sort();
+  const pairs = keys.map((k) => JSON.stringify(k) + ':' + canonicalize(value[k]));
+  return '{' + pairs.join(',') + '}';
+}
+
+// Build the byte string the policy signer hashed-and-signed.
+// Order: only the fields in POLICY_SIGNED_FIELDS, in their canonical order.
+// Missing fields are encoded as `null` so a policy that loses a field on
+// the wire (truncation, MITM) fails the signature check rather than
+// silently passing under a different shape.
+export function policySigningPayload(policy) {
+  const obj = {};
+  for (const f of POLICY_SIGNED_FIELDS) {
+    obj[f] = policy[f] !== undefined ? policy[f] : null;
+  }
+  return canonicalize(obj);
+}
+
+// Build the byte string the ROOT signs when issuing a signing key.
+// Order: only kid + pubkey + valid_from + valid_until — all four required.
+// `pubkey` is the raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key, base64-encoded.
+const SIGNING_KEY_SIGNED_FIELDS = ['kid', 'pubkey', 'valid_from', 'valid_until'];
+
+export function signingKeyPayload(signingKey) {
+  const obj = {};
+  for (const f of SIGNING_KEY_SIGNED_FIELDS) {
+    obj[f] = signingKey[f] !== undefined ? signingKey[f] : null;
+  }
+  return canonicalize(obj);
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Key parsing
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// Accept either:
+//   - a raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key, base64-encoded
+//   - a SubjectPublicKeyInfo (SPKI) DER-encoded blob, base64-encoded
+//   - a PEM-armored public key
+// Returns a node:crypto KeyObject ready for verify().
+//
+// Errors are surfaced verbatim so the operator sees WHY the key didn't
+// load (corrupted base64, wrong curve, etc.) instead of a silent "no
+// policies loaded".
+export function importEd25519PublicKey(input) {
+  if (input == null) throw new Error('importEd25519PublicKey: input is null/undefined');
+  if (typeof input === 'string') {
+    const trimmed = input.trim();
+    if (trimmed.startsWith('-----BEGIN ')) {
+      return createPublicKey({ key: trimmed, format: 'pem' });
+    }
+    // Try raw 32-byte → wrap in SPKI prefix for Ed25519.
+    const buf = Buffer.from(trimmed, 'base64');
+    if (buf.length === 32) {
+      // Ed25519 SPKI prefix (RFC 8410 §4): 0x302a300506032b6570032100
+      const SPKI_PREFIX = Buffer.from('302a300506032b6570032100', 'hex');
+      return createPublicKey({
+        key: Buffer.concat([SPKI_PREFIX, buf]),
+        format: 'der',
+        type: 'spki',
+      });
+    }
+    // Otherwise assume DER-encoded SPKI.
+    return createPublicKey({ key: buf, format: 'der', type: 'spki' });
+  }
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(input)) {
+    return createPublicKey({ key: input, format: 'der', type: 'spki' });
+  }
+  throw new Error(`importEd25519PublicKey: unsupported input type ${typeof input}`);
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Low-level verify
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// Verify a base64-encoded Ed25519 signature over a string payload.
+// Returns true/false — never throws on a bad signature (operational
+// callers want a boolean, not exception flow). Throws only on programmer
+// errors (missing key, wrong types).
+export function verifyEd25519(publicKey, payloadString, signatureBase64) {
+  if (publicKey == null) throw new Error('verifyEd25519: publicKey required');
+  if (typeof payloadString !== 'string') throw new Error('verifyEd25519: payload must be a string');
+  if (typeof signatureBase64 !== 'string') return false;
+  let sigBuf;
+  try {
+    sigBuf = Buffer.from(signatureBase64, 'base64');
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // Ed25519 signatures are exactly 64 bytes — anything else is invalid.
+  if (sigBuf.length !== 64) return false;
+  try {
+    return cryptoVerify(null, Buffer.from(payloadString, 'utf8'), publicKey, sigBuf);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// High-level chain verification
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Verify a signing key's root signature and parse its public key.
+ *
+ * @param {object} signingKey
+ *   { kid, pubkey, valid_from, valid_until, signed_by_root }
+ * @param {KeyObject} rootPublicKey - the embedded SDK root public key
+ * @param {Date} [now] - clock for valid_from/valid_until checks (default: real now)
+ * @returns {{ ok: true, kid: string, pubkey: KeyObject } | { ok: false, reason: string }}
+ */
+export function verifySigningKey(signingKey, rootPublicKey, now = new Date()) {
+  if (!signingKey || typeof signingKey !== 'object') {
+    return { ok: false, reason: 'signing key is not an object' };
+  }
+  for (const f of SIGNING_KEY_SIGNED_FIELDS) {
+    if (signingKey[f] == null) return { ok: false, reason: `signing key missing required field "${f}"` };
+  }
+  if (typeof signingKey.signed_by_root !== 'string') {
+    return { ok: false, reason: 'signing_key.signed_by_root missing or not a string' };
+  }
+  // Validity window — both ends inclusive per ISO 8601 convention.
+  const from = new Date(signingKey.valid_from);
+  const until = new Date(signingKey.valid_until);
+  if (isNaN(from.getTime()) || isNaN(until.getTime())) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: 'invalid valid_from or valid_until ISO date' };
+  }
+  if (now < from) return { ok: false, reason: `signing key ${signingKey.kid} not yet valid (valid_from ${signingKey.valid_from})` };
+  if (now > until) return { ok: false, reason: `signing key ${signingKey.kid} expired (valid_until ${signingKey.valid_until})` };
+  // Root signature over canonical {kid, pubkey, valid_from, valid_until}.
+  const payload = signingKeyPayload(signingKey);
+  if (!verifyEd25519(rootPublicKey, payload, signingKey.signed_by_root)) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: `signing key ${signingKey.kid} not signed by trusted root` };
+  }
+  // Parse the signing key's pubkey itself (must be a valid Ed25519 key).
+  let pubkey;
+  try {
+    pubkey = importEd25519PublicKey(signingKey.pubkey);
+  } catch (e) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: `signing key ${signingKey.kid} pubkey invalid: ${e.message}` };
+  }
+  return { ok: true, kid: signingKey.kid, pubkey };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify one policy's signature against its signing key.
+ *
+ * @param {object} policy   - must include signature + signing_key_id
+ * @param {Map<string, KeyObject>} signingKeysByKid - verified signing keys
+ * @returns {{ ok: true } | { ok: false, reason: string }}
+ */
+export function verifyPolicy(policy, signingKeysByKid) {
+  if (!policy || typeof policy !== 'object') return { ok: false, reason: 'policy is not an object' };
+  // Local-policy escape hatch: the local JSON adapter sets __local: true
+  // on its rows so dev/test/CI workflows don't have to involve the
+  // signing pipeline. The FortressPolicySource path NEVER sets this.
+  if (policy.__local === true) return { ok: true };
+  if (typeof policy.signature !== 'string') return { ok: false, reason: `policy ${policy.rule_id || '?'} missing signature` };
+  if (typeof policy.signing_key_id !== 'string') return { ok: false, reason: `policy ${policy.rule_id || '?'} missing signing_key_id` };
+  const pubkey = signingKeysByKid.get(policy.signing_key_id);
+  if (!pubkey) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: `policy ${policy.rule_id || '?'} references unknown signing_key_id "${policy.signing_key_id}"` };
+  }
+  const payload = policySigningPayload(policy);
+  if (!verifyEd25519(pubkey, payload, policy.signature)) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: `policy ${policy.rule_id || '?'} signature does not verify against signing key ${policy.signing_key_id}` };
+  }
+  return { ok: true };
+}
+
+/**
+ * High-level: given a Fortress `get-policies` response and the embedded
+ * root pubkey, return { validPolicies, droppedPolicies, validSigningKeys }.
+ *
+ * Caller is expected to ignore droppedPolicies (with logging) and load
+ * validPolicies into the ruleset. Never throws — failure modes are
+ * returned in `droppedPolicies[].reason` for the caller to surface.
+ *
+ * @param {object} opts
+ * @param {Array} opts.policies   - raw policies from get-policies response
+ * @param {Array} opts.signingKeys - raw signing_keys from response
+ * @param {KeyObject} opts.rootPublicKey - SDK-embedded root pubkey
+ * @param {Date} [opts.now]
+ */
+export function verifyPolicyBundle({ policies, signingKeys, rootPublicKey, now = new Date() }) {
+  const validSigningKeys = new Map();
+  const signingKeyErrors = [];
+  for (const sk of signingKeys || []) {
+    const r = verifySigningKey(sk, rootPublicKey, now);
+    if (r.ok) validSigningKeys.set(r.kid, r.pubkey);
+    else signingKeyErrors.push({ kid: sk?.kid || '?', reason: r.reason });
+  }
+  const validPolicies = [];
+  const droppedPolicies = [];
+  for (const p of policies || []) {
+    const r = verifyPolicy(p, validSigningKeys);
+    if (r.ok) validPolicies.push(p);
+    else droppedPolicies.push({ rule_id: p?.rule_id || '?', reason: r.reason });
+  }
+  return { validPolicies, droppedPolicies, validSigningKeys, signingKeyErrors };
+}

package/src/shield/sources/fortress.js

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ function httpsJson(method, url, headers, body, timeoutMs = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS) {
  * @param {string} opts.apiKey - wma_xxx
  * @param {string} opts.base - Fortress base URL (https://x.supabase.co/functions/v1)
  * @param {string} [opts.anthropicAgentId] - optional filter
- * @returns {Promise<{ ok: true, policies: array, fetched_at: string }>}
+ * @returns {Promise<{ ok: true, policies: array, signing_keys: array, fetched_at: string }>}
  */
 export async function fetchPolicies({ apiKey, base, anthropicAgentId }) {
   let url = fortressEndpoint(base, 'get-policies');
@@ -97,7 +97,18 @@ export async function fetchPolicies({ apiKey, base, anthropicAgentId }) {
     accept: 'application/json',
   });
   if (status === 200 && body && body.ok) {
-    return { ok: true, policies: body.policies || [], fetched_at: body.fetched_at };
+    return {
+      ok: true,
+      policies: body.policies || [],
+      // v1.1.5 Phase 1.5 — the chain-of-trust: signing keys travel
+      // with the response, each signed by the embedded root pubkey.
+      // Older Fortress deployments that haven't shipped the signing
+      // pipeline yet just won't include this field — the verifier
+      // then drops every policy as "unknown signing_key_id" and
+      // operators see the gap immediately.
+      signing_keys: body.signing_keys || [],
+      fetched_at: body.fetched_at,
+    };
   }
   const err = body?.error || (typeof body === 'string' ? body.slice(0, 200) : 'unknown');
   throw new Error(`get-policies failed (HTTP ${status}): ${err}`);
@@ -136,11 +147,43 @@ export async function postDecision({ apiKey, base, decision }) {
 // ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 import { matchesPolicy, compileMatchRegexes } from '../policy.js';
+// v1.1.5 Phase 1.5 — signature verification on the cloud path.
+import { verifyPolicyBundle, importEd25519PublicKey } from '../signature.js';
+import { WMA_FORTRESS_ROOT_PUBKEY_B64, WMA_FORTRESS_ROOT_IS_PLACEHOLDER } from '../root-key.js';
 
 const VALID_ACTIONS = new Set(['allow', 'deny', 'interrupt']);
 
+// v1.1.5 Phase 1.5 — strict-by-default signature verification.
+// Set WMA_REQUIRE_SIGNED_POLICIES=false to accept unsigned policies
+// from Fortress with a loud warning at each refresh. This is an escape
+// hatch for ops emergencies (e.g. Fortress signing pipeline temporarily
+// down) and dev/CI workflows where a staging Fortress hasn't been
+// upgraded yet. Default is strict to honour the security stance chosen
+// for v1.1.5.
+function strictModeFromEnv() {
+  const v = process.env.WMA_REQUIRE_SIGNED_POLICIES;
+  if (v == null) return true;        // unset → strict by default
+  if (v === 'false' || v === '0') return false;
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Parse the embedded root pubkey ONCE at module load. If the file still
+// carries the placeholder, we DO NOT throw — but every refresh logs a
+// loud reminder so an unattended deploy can't silently trust a key whose
+// private counterpart is in the git history.
+const ROOT_PUBLIC_KEY = (() => {
+  try {
+    return importEd25519PublicKey(WMA_FORTRESS_ROOT_PUBKEY_B64);
+  } catch (e) {
+    // The placeholder string isn't valid base64 of 32 bytes, so import
+    // will throw. That's the desired behaviour during development —
+    // verification will fail-closed until the real key is embedded.
+    return null;
+  }
+})();
+
 export class FortressPolicySource {
-  constructor({ apiKey, base, anthropicAgentId, refreshIntervalMs = 5 * 60_000, onError, onRefresh }) {
+  constructor({ apiKey, base, anthropicAgentId, refreshIntervalMs = 5 * 60_000, onError, onRefresh, requireSignedPolicies }) {
     if (!apiKey) throw new Error('FortressPolicySource: apiKey required');
     if (!base) throw new Error('FortressPolicySource: base URL required');
     this.apiKey = apiKey;
@@ -153,6 +196,12 @@ export class FortressPolicySource {
     this.lastFetchedAt = null;
     this._timer = null;
     this._aborted = false;
+    // v1.1.5: per-instance override of the env var. Tests use this to
+    // exercise both modes without touching process.env. If neither the
+    // constructor option nor the env var is set, strict mode wins.
+    this.requireSignedPolicies = requireSignedPolicies != null
+      ? !!requireSignedPolicies
+      : strictModeFromEnv();
   }
 
   /** Initial fetch — fails loud if it can't reach Fortress at startup. */
@@ -186,17 +235,26 @@ export class FortressPolicySource {
   async _refresh({ initial = false } = {}) {
     if (this._aborted) return;
     try {
-      const { policies, fetched_at } = await fetchPolicies({
+      const { policies, signing_keys, fetched_at } = await fetchPolicies({
         apiKey: this.apiKey,
         base: this.base,
         anthropicAgentId: this.anthropicAgentId,
       });
-      // Compile + validate each policy. A single malformed/dangerous policy
-      // (bad action, ReDoS-prone regex) must NOT take down the whole ruleset:
-      // skip it, report it, keep the rest. This matters because policies come
-      // from the cloud (Guardian-generated) — they're not fully trusted input.
+
+      // v1.1.5 Phase 1.5 — verify the chain-of-trust BEFORE any other
+      // processing. We must verify on the raw JSON shape sent by Fortress,
+      // not on the post-compile form, because compileMatchRegexes mutates
+      // `match` in place (adds _regex / _not_regex KeyObjects) and the
+      // signed canonical payload would no longer match.
+      const verifiedPolicies = this._verifyAndFilter(policies, signing_keys);
+
+      // Compile + validate each VERIFIED policy. A single malformed/dangerous
+      // policy (bad action, ReDoS-prone regex) must NOT take down the whole
+      // ruleset: skip it, report it, keep the rest. This matters because
+      // even after signature verification the rule shape can be wrong
+      // (server-side signing happened on a payload the SDK doesn't accept).
       const compiled = [];
-      for (const p of policies) {
+      for (const p of verifiedPolicies) {
         try {
           compiled.push(compilePolicyFromFortress(p));
         } catch (e) {
@@ -228,6 +286,49 @@ export class FortressPolicySource {
       this.onError(e);
     }
   }
+
+  // v1.1.5 Phase 1.5 — verify the Fortress chain of trust on a refresh
+  // response. Returns the array of policies that pass the gate (verified
+  // signatures in strict mode, OR all policies in lax mode with a warning
+  // per unsigned one).
+  //
+  // FAIL MODES:
+  //   - ROOT key is the placeholder (release wasn't ceremony-completed):
+  //     emit a one-line WARNING at each refresh and skip verification
+  //     entirely — better than silently trusting a known-compromised key.
+  //   - Strict (default): drop every policy that doesn't verify; log each
+  //     drop reason via onError so the operator sees the gap.
+  //   - Lax (WMA_REQUIRE_SIGNED_POLICIES=false): keep every policy but
+  //     emit a WARNING per unsigned one — gives migration slack while
+  //     making the audit trail visible.
+  _verifyAndFilter(rawPolicies, rawSigningKeys) {
+    if (WMA_FORTRESS_ROOT_IS_PLACEHOLDER || ROOT_PUBLIC_KEY == null) {
+      this.onError(new Error(
+        'FortressPolicySource: ROOT_PUBLIC_KEY is the placeholder (not a real Fortress root). ' +
+        'Signature verification SKIPPED. This is the expected state during development; ' +
+        'NEVER ship this configuration to production.'
+      ));
+      return rawPolicies || [];
+    }
+    const bundle = verifyPolicyBundle({
+      policies: rawPolicies || [],
+      signingKeys: rawSigningKeys || [],
+      rootPublicKey: ROOT_PUBLIC_KEY,
+    });
+    for (const ke of bundle.signingKeyErrors) {
+      this.onError(new Error(`FortressPolicySource: rejected signing key "${ke.kid}": ${ke.reason}`));
+    }
+    for (const dp of bundle.droppedPolicies) {
+      const verb = this.requireSignedPolicies ? 'DROPPING' : 'WARNING (lax mode)';
+      this.onError(new Error(`FortressPolicySource: ${verb} policy "${dp.rule_id}": ${dp.reason}`));
+    }
+    if (this.requireSignedPolicies) {
+      return bundle.validPolicies;
+    }
+    // Lax mode: keep every raw policy but the loud warnings above let
+    // ops see what would be dropped in strict mode.
+    return rawPolicies || [];
+  }
 }
 
 // Convert a Fortress DB policy row to the local Shield format.

package/src/shield/sse.js

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// SSE line terminator normalization — v1.1.4 F-18 (P1 Codex audit).
+//
+// The HTML Living Standard's event-stream parsing rules (whatwg SSE)
+// accept three line terminator forms: LF (\n), CR (\r), and CRLF (\r\n).
+// An event ends at a blank line: TWO consecutive line terminators of any
+// of those forms, possibly mixed (e.g. \r\n\r\n, \r\r, \n\n, \r\n\n).
+//
+// Before this fix, Shield's two SSE consumers (stream.js for live agent
+// events, policy-stream.js for Fortress policy push) only looked for
+// the LF-LF separator. An upstream proxy or endpoint that emitted CRLF
+// (most production-grade reverse-proxies do, by default!) would yield
+// a buffer that never matched \n\n — Shield would silently never see
+// the events:
+//   - agent-stream side: no deny/interrupt would fire live, breaking
+//     the sub-second enforcement promise
+//   - policy-stream side: updates would fall back to the 60s polling
+//     loop, making rule rollouts visibly slow
+//
+// Fix: normalize the buffer to LF-only before scanning. The normalize
+// step is chunk-safe: a CR at the very end of the current buffer is
+// preserved verbatim (it might be the first half of an incoming CRLF
+// on the next chunk). Once a CR is no longer trailing, it's converted.
+
+/**
+ * Normalize SSE line terminators in a streaming buffer to LF.
+ *
+ * Use as: `buffer = normalizeSseBuffer(buffer + newChunk);`
+ *
+ * Guarantees, after the call:
+ *   - every `\r\n` pair has been replaced by `\n`
+ *   - every bare `\r` NOT at the very end has been replaced by `\n`
+ *   - a trailing `\r` is preserved verbatim so the next iteration can
+ *     check whether it was actually the first half of a CRLF
+ *
+ * @param {string} buffer  the streaming buffer (already concatenated)
+ * @returns {string}       buffer with line terminators normalized to LF
+ */
+export function normalizeSseBuffer(buffer) {
+  if (typeof buffer !== 'string' || buffer.length === 0) return buffer;
+  // Defer the very last character if it's a CR — we don't know yet
+  // whether it's a bare CR terminator or the first half of CRLF.
+  const tail = buffer.endsWith('\r') ? '\r' : '';
+  const scannable = tail ? buffer.slice(0, -1) : buffer;
+  // Two-pass replace: CRLF first (so we don't double-convert the LF
+  // half), then any remaining bare CR.
+  const normalized = scannable.replace(/\r\n/g, '\n').replace(/\r/g, '\n');
+  return tail ? normalized + tail : normalized;
+}

package/src/shield/stream.js

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 //
 // Uses built-in fetch + ReadableStream (Node 18+). Zero deps.
 
+import { normalizeSseBuffer } from './sse.js';
+
 const API_BASE = 'https://api.anthropic.com';
 const BETA = 'managed-agents-2026-04-01';
 const VERSION = '2023-06-01';
@@ -51,6 +53,12 @@ export async function* openEventStream({ apiKey, sessionId, signal }) {
       const { done, value } = await reader.read();
       if (done) break;
       buffer += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });
+      // v1.1.4 F-18 (P1 Codex audit): normalize all SSE line terminators
+      // (CR, CRLF) to LF so the indexOf('\n\n') scan below catches every
+      // event boundary the spec allows. Without this, an upstream that
+      // emits CRLF (common in reverse-proxy paths) yielded a buffer that
+      // never matched and Shield silently lost the live enforcement loop.
+      buffer = normalizeSseBuffer(buffer);
 
       // v1.1.2 F-16: guard against an upstream that never emits "\n\n" —
       // throw to abort the stream cleanly, the caller's reconnect logic
@@ -60,8 +68,9 @@ export async function* openEventStream({ apiKey, sessionId, signal }) {
         throw new Error(`SSE frame exceeded ${MAX_SSE_FRAME_BYTES} bytes — aborting stream (caller should reconnect)`);
       }
 
-      // SSE frames are separated by a blank line ("\n\n"). Each frame may
-      // contain multiple lines; we only care about `data:` lines for now.
+      // SSE frames are separated by a blank line. Post-normalize, the
+      // canonical separator is "\n\n"; each frame may contain multiple
+      // lines; we only care about `data:` lines for now.
       let nlIdx;
       while ((nlIdx = buffer.indexOf('\n\n')) !== -1) {
         const frame = buffer.slice(0, nlIdx);

package/src/shield/upload.js

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+// Shield → Fortress decision payload builder.
+// v1.1.4 F-19 (P1 Codex audit): pure helper extracted from scripts/shield.js
+// so the egress-side containment can be unit-tested in isolation. The
+// security invariant under test:
+//
+//   nothing on this payload may carry raw customer identifiers — tool
+//   names, session ids, event ids, input values must either be in the
+//   documented allowlist (vendor built-ins) or salted-hashed.
+//
+// Anything that can't be safely normalized is DROPPED (set to undefined)
+// rather than passed through. Decision still ships so Fortress can count
+// it — only the leak-y field is omitted.
+
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import { normalizeToolName } from '../anonymizer.js';
+
+// Salted SHA-256 hash with the same 32-char truncation as the anonymizer
+// and the rest of Shield's decision flow. Returns null for nullish input
+// or when no salt is configured (fail-safe omission).
+function hashWithSaltOpt(value, salt) {
+  if (value == null || !salt) return null;
+  const s = typeof value === 'string' ? value : JSON.stringify(value);
+  return 'sha256:' + createHash('sha256').update(salt).update(s).digest('hex').slice(0, 32);
+}
+
+// Extract the most relevant input value to fingerprint (URL > command >
+// query > path > file_path). The actual hashing is done downstream by
+// hashIoc — this function only picks the IoC field.
+function pickInputForHash(input) {
+  if (!input || typeof input !== 'object') return null;
+  return input.url || input.command || input.query || input.path || input.file_path || null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build the body POSTed to Fortress's ingest-decisions endpoint.
+ *
+ * Containment guarantees:
+ *   - tool_name: vendor allowlist returned in clear; custom/MCP names
+ *     return as "tool_hash:<32hex>" when a salt is configured; dropped
+ *     entirely otherwise.
+ *   - session_hash / event_id_hash / input_hash: salted SHA-256, omitted
+ *     when no salt is configured.
+ *   - Raw payload values (rawEvent.input, normalized.input) never
+ *     appear on the wire — only their hashes do.
+ *
+ * @param {object} opts
+ * @param {string} opts.agentId - Anthropic agent id (already an opaque token)
+ * @param {string} opts.sessionId - Anthropic session id (hashed before egress)
+ * @param {object} opts.rawEvent  - raw upstream event (id field is hashed)
+ * @param {object} opts.normalized - normalized event from normalizeForPolicy()
+ * @param {object} opts.result    - policy evaluator output
+ * @param {number} opts.decidedInMs
+ * @param {string|null|undefined} opts.signalsSalt
+ * @param {string} [opts.decidedAtIso] - ISO 8601 timestamp; defaults to now()
+ * @returns {object} payload ready to POST to ingest-decisions
+ */
+export function buildFortressDecisionPayload({
+  agentId, sessionId, rawEvent, normalized, result, decidedInMs,
+  signalsSalt, decidedAtIso,
+}) {
+  // F-19: vendor built-ins survive even without a salt (allowlist short-circuit);
+  // custom tool names throw without a salt — we catch and drop the field.
+  let safeToolName;
+  const rawToolName = normalized?.tool_name;
+  if (rawToolName) {
+    try {
+      safeToolName = normalizeToolName(rawToolName, signalsSalt);
+    } catch {
+      safeToolName = undefined;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return {
+    anthropic_agent_id: agentId,
+    decision: result.decision,
+    rule_id: result.rule_id || undefined,
+    session_hash: hashWithSaltOpt(sessionId, signalsSalt) || undefined,
+    event_id_hash: hashWithSaltOpt(rawEvent?.id, signalsSalt) || undefined,
+    input_hash: hashWithSaltOpt(pickInputForHash(normalized?.input), signalsSalt) || undefined,
+    action_type: normalized?.action_type || undefined,
+    tool_name: safeToolName,
+    message: result.message || result.rule_name || undefined,
+    decided_at: decidedAtIso || new Date().toISOString(),
+    decided_in_ms: decidedInMs,
+    // v1.1.3 Phase 1.D: mode threading so Fortress can store and surface
+    // shadow-vs-enforce in the Reports timeline.
+    mode: result.mode || undefined,
+  };
+}