w3pk 0.10.4 → 0.11.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +47 -95
- package/dist/chainlist/index.d.mts +2 -2
- package/dist/chainlist/index.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/chainlist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/chainlist/index.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.mts +940 -892
- package/dist/index.d.ts +940 -892
- package/dist/index.js +1135 -470
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.mjs +1135 -470
- package/dist/index.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/zk/index.d.mts +177 -4
- package/dist/zk/index.d.ts +177 -4
- package/dist/zk/index.js +5 -5
- package/dist/zk/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/zk/index.mjs +5 -5
- package/dist/zk/index.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/zk/prove-worker.mjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/zk/utils.js +3 -3
- package/dist/zk/utils.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/zk/utils.mjs +3 -3
- package/dist/zk/utils.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/docs/API_REFERENCE.md +517 -843
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +86 -106
- package/docs/BROWSER_COMPATIBILITY.md +15 -2
- package/docs/BUILD_VERIFICATION.md +35 -8
- package/docs/EIP-7951.md +1 -8
- package/docs/EIP_7702.md +35 -395
- package/docs/INTEGRATION_GUIDELINES.md +69 -818
- package/docs/JUNE_9_2026_AUDIT.md +207 -0
- package/docs/PORTABILITY.md +41 -186
- package/docs/POST_QUANTUM.md +61 -39
- package/docs/RECOVERY.md +165 -173
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +301 -891
- package/docs/ZK.md +250 -0
- package/package.json +32 -54
- package/dist/chainlist/index.js +0 -2
- package/dist/chainlist/index.mjs +0 -2
- package/dist/inspect/browser.d.mts +0 -106
- package/dist/inspect/browser.d.ts +0 -106
- package/dist/inspect/browser.js +0 -194
- package/dist/inspect/browser.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/inspect/browser.mjs +0 -173
- package/dist/inspect/browser.mjs.map +0 -1
- package/dist/inspect/index.d.mts +0 -1
- package/dist/inspect/index.d.ts +0 -1
- package/dist/inspect/index.js +0 -196
- package/dist/inspect/index.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/inspect/index.mjs +0 -173
- package/dist/inspect/index.mjs.map +0 -1
- package/dist/inspect/node.d.mts +0 -112
- package/dist/inspect/node.d.ts +0 -112
- package/dist/inspect/node.js +0 -287
- package/dist/inspect/node.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/inspect/node.mjs +0 -251
- package/dist/inspect/node.mjs.map +0 -1
- package/docs/notes/IFRAME_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md +0 -197
- package/docs/notes/JULY_13_ROADMAP.md +0 -29
- package/docs/notes/NOTES.md +0 -333
- package/docs/notes/SIWE_IMPLEMENTATION.md +0 -129
- package/docs/notes/SYNCING_ACROSS_DEVICES.md +0 -127
- package/docs/notes/ethereum-post-quantum-roadmap.md +0 -213
- package/docs/notes/wulong-building-finding.md +0 -109
package/dist/zk/index.d.mts
CHANGED
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type ProofType = "membership" | "threshold" | "range" | "equality" | "ownership"
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interface CircuitArtifacts {
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wasmPath: string;
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zkeyPath: string;
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-
verificationKey:
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verificationKey: unknown;
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}
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interface ZKProof {
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type: ProofType;
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ interface ZKProof {
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interface VerificationResult {
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valid: boolean;
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type: ProofType;
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publicSignals: Record<string,
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publicSignals: Record<string, string>;
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timestamp: string;
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}
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/**
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@@ -86,6 +86,179 @@ interface NFTOwnershipProofInput {
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minBalance?: bigint;
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}
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/**
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* Baby Jubjub (EIP-2494) point arithmetic and keys
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* Matches circomlib's babyjub gadgets and circomlibjs's encodings
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*/
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/** Affine point `[x, y]`, the layout circom signals use */
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type BabyJubPoint = readonly [bigint, bigint];
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interface BabyJubKeyPair {
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/** Scalar in `[1, BABYJUB_SUBORDER)` */
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privateKey: bigint;
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/** `privateKey · BABYJUB_BASE8` */
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publicKey: BabyJubPoint;
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}
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/** Base field: the BN254 scalar field */
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declare const BABYJUB_FIELD = 21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617n;
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declare const BABYJUB_A = 168700n;
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declare const BABYJUB_D = 168696n;
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/** Curve order, `8 · BABYJUB_SUBORDER` */
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declare const BABYJUB_ORDER = 21888242871839275222246405745257275088614511777268538073601725287587578984328n;
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/** Prime order `l` of the subgroup generated by `BABYJUB_BASE8` */
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declare const BABYJUB_SUBORDER: bigint;
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declare const BABYJUB_GENERATOR: BabyJubPoint;
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/** `8 · BABYJUB_GENERATOR`, the base point of circomlib's `BabyPbk` and `EscalarMulFix` */
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declare const BABYJUB_BASE8: BabyJubPoint;
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declare const BABYJUB_IDENTITY: BabyJubPoint;
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/**
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* Check that `p` has canonical coordinates in `[0, p)` and lies on the curve
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*/
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declare function isOnBabyJub(p: BabyJubPoint): boolean;
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/**
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* Check that `p` lies on the curve and in the prime-order subgroup,
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* which rejects the small-order (torsion) points
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*/
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declare function isInBabyJubSubgroup(p: BabyJubPoint): boolean;
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declare function babyJubAdd(p: BabyJubPoint, q: BabyJubPoint): BabyJubPoint;
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declare function babyJubNeg(p: BabyJubPoint): BabyJubPoint;
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/**
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* Scalar multiplication `e · p` by a Montgomery ladder over at least 256
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* bits, so the work doesn't depend on the scalar's bits. The scalar is
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* not reduced, so `babyJubMul(p, BABYJUB_SUBORDER)` exposes torsion components
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*/
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declare function babyJubMul(p: BabyJubPoint, e: bigint): BabyJubPoint;
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declare function babyJubEquals(p: BabyJubPoint, q: BabyJubPoint): boolean;
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/**
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* Pack a point into 32 bytes as circomlibjs's `packPoint` does:
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* `y` little-endian, with the top bit set when `x > (p - 1) / 2`
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*/
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declare function packBabyJubPoint(p: BabyJubPoint): Uint8Array;
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/**
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* Unpack 32 bytes from `packBabyJubPoint`. Rejects non-canonical `y`,
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* encodings with no point on the curve, and a sign bit on `x = 0`.
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* Does not check the subgroup: use `unpackBabyJubPublicKey` for keys
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*/
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declare function unpackBabyJubPoint(bytes: Uint8Array): BabyJubPoint;
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/**
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* A public key must be in the prime-order subgroup and not the identity
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*/
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declare function isValidBabyJubPublicKey(p: BabyJubPoint): boolean;
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declare function assertBabyJubPublicKey(p: BabyJubPoint): void;
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declare function assertBabyJubPrivateKey(privateKey: bigint): void;
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declare function packBabyJubPublicKey(publicKey: BabyJubPoint): Uint8Array;
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declare function unpackBabyJubPublicKey(bytes: Uint8Array): BabyJubPoint;
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/**
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* Uniform scalar in `[1, BABYJUB_SUBORDER)`, from 64 random bytes
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*/
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declare function randomBabyJubScalar(): bigint;
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/**
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* Public key `privateKey · BABYJUB_BASE8`, as circomlib's `BabyPbk` computes it
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*/
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declare function babyJubPublicKey(privateKey: bigint): BabyJubPoint;
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declare function generateBabyJubKeyPair(): BabyJubKeyPair;
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/**
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* Derive a key pair from a secret of at least 16 bytes, such as
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* `derivePrfSecret()`'s output. The scalar is
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* `HKDF-SHA256(secret, info = "w3pk-babyjub-v1", 64 bytes) mod (l - 1) + 1`
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*/
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declare function deriveBabyJubKeyPair(secret: Uint8Array): BabyJubKeyPair;
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/**
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* Smallest `m` in `[0, maxValue]` with `m · BABYJUB_BASE8 = point`, by
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* baby-step giant-step, or `null` when there is none. `maxValue` is at
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* most 2^32, which takes about 2^17 point additions
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*/
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declare function babyJubDiscreteLog(point: BabyJubPoint, maxValue: number): bigint | null;
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/**
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* Exponential ElGamal over Baby Jubjub
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* Enc(m; r) = (r · B, m · B + r · PK), with B = BABYJUB_BASE8
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*/
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interface ElGamalCiphertext {
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/** `r · B` */
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c1: BabyJubPoint;
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/** `m · B + r · PK` */
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c2: BabyJubPoint;
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}
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/**
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* Encrypt `message` in `[0, l)` to `publicKey`. `r` defaults to a fresh
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* random scalar; pass it when a proof needs it as a witness
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*/
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declare function elgamalEncrypt(publicKey: BabyJubPoint, message: bigint, r?: bigint): ElGamalCiphertext;
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/**
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* Ciphertext of `m1 + m2` under the same key, with randomness `r1 + r2`
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*/
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declare function elgamalAdd(a: ElGamalCiphertext, b: ElGamalCiphertext): ElGamalCiphertext;
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/**
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* Same plaintext under fresh randomness: adds an encryption of 0 with `r`
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*/
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declare function elgamalRerandomize(publicKey: BabyJubPoint, ciphertext: ElGamalCiphertext, r?: bigint): ElGamalCiphertext;
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/**
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* Recover `m · B = c2 - privateKey · c1`
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*/
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declare function elgamalDecryptToPoint(privateKey: bigint, ciphertext: ElGamalCiphertext): BabyJubPoint;
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/**
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* Decrypt a message known to be in `[0, maxValue]`, such as a tally.
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* Throws when the plaintext is out of range
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*/
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declare function elgamalDecrypt(privateKey: bigint, ciphertext: ElGamalCiphertext, maxValue: number): bigint;
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/**
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* Custom error classes for better error handling
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*/
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declare class Web3PasskeyError extends Error {
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code: string;
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originalError?: unknown | undefined;
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constructor(message: string, code: string, originalError?: unknown | undefined);
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}
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type ZkArtifactName = "wasm" | "zkey";
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/**
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* A circuit artifact's IPFS CID doesn't match the CID pinned onchain,
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* so it isn't the circuit the app chose.
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*/
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declare class ZkArtifactMismatchError extends Web3PasskeyError {
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artifact: ZkArtifactName;
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expectedCid: string;
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actualCid: string;
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constructor(artifact: ZkArtifactName, expectedCid: string, actualCid: string);
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}
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/**
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* Circuit artifact verification against CIDs pinned onchain
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*/
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/** Artifact bytes, or a URL to fetch them from */
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type ZkArtifactSource = ArrayBufferView | ArrayBuffer | string;
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type ZkArtifactSources = Record<ZkArtifactName, ZkArtifactSource>;
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/**
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* IPFS CIDv1 strings in base32, as `ipfs add --cid-version 1` prints them,
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* compared as exact strings
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*/
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type ZkArtifactPins = Record<ZkArtifactName, string>;
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type ZkArtifactBytes = Record<ZkArtifactName, Uint8Array>;
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/**
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* Any contract with the build registry's `getCidByVersion(string)`,
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* such as an ethers `Contract`
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*/
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interface ZkArtifactRegistry {
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getCidByVersion(key: string): Promise<string>;
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}
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/**
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* Reads the pinned CIDs of a circuit's artifacts from a registry with the
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* build registry's interface, under the given keys
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*
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* @throws Web3PasskeyError `ZK_ARTIFACT_NOT_PINNED` if a key has no CID
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*/
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declare function readZkArtifactPins(registry: ZkArtifactRegistry, keys: Record<ZkArtifactName, string>): Promise<ZkArtifactPins>;
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/**
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* Computes the IPFS CIDs of a circuit's `.wasm` and `.zkey` and checks them
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* against the pinned CIDs. Prove with the returned bytes, not by fetching
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* the URLs again, so the checked artifacts are the ones used.
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*
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* @throws ZkArtifactMismatchError if an artifact's CID differs from its pin
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*/
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declare function verifyZkArtifacts(artifacts: ZkArtifactSources, pins: ZkArtifactPins): Promise<ZkArtifactBytes>;
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/**
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* Zero-Knowledge Proof Module for w3pk SDK
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* Enables privacy-preserving proofs
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@@ -151,7 +324,7 @@ declare class ZKProofModule {
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*/
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verifyNFTOwnership(proof: ZKProof, expectedContract: string, expectedHoldersRoot: string, expectedMinBalance?: bigint): Promise<boolean>;
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/**
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* Create a
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* Create a Poseidon commitment for hiding values
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*/
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createCommitment(value: bigint, blinding: bigint): Promise<string>;
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/**
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@@ -172,4 +345,4 @@ declare class ZKProofModule {
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get isAvailable(): boolean;
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}
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-
export { type CircuitArtifacts, type MembershipProofInput, type NFTOwnershipProofInput, type OwnershipProofInput, type ProofType, type RangeProofInput, type ThresholdProofInput, type VerificationResult, type ZKProof, type ZKProofConfig, ZKProofModule };
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export { BABYJUB_A, BABYJUB_BASE8, BABYJUB_D, BABYJUB_FIELD, BABYJUB_GENERATOR, BABYJUB_IDENTITY, BABYJUB_ORDER, BABYJUB_SUBORDER, type BabyJubKeyPair, type BabyJubPoint, type CircuitArtifacts, type ElGamalCiphertext, type MembershipProofInput, type NFTOwnershipProofInput, type OwnershipProofInput, type ProofType, type RangeProofInput, type ThresholdProofInput, type VerificationResult, type ZKProof, type ZKProofConfig, ZKProofModule, type ZkArtifactBytes, ZkArtifactMismatchError, type ZkArtifactName, type ZkArtifactPins, type ZkArtifactRegistry, type ZkArtifactSource, type ZkArtifactSources, assertBabyJubPrivateKey, assertBabyJubPublicKey, babyJubAdd, babyJubDiscreteLog, babyJubEquals, babyJubMul, babyJubNeg, babyJubPublicKey, deriveBabyJubKeyPair, elgamalAdd, elgamalDecrypt, elgamalDecryptToPoint, elgamalEncrypt, elgamalRerandomize, generateBabyJubKeyPair, isInBabyJubSubgroup, isOnBabyJub, isValidBabyJubPublicKey, packBabyJubPoint, packBabyJubPublicKey, randomBabyJubScalar, readZkArtifactPins, unpackBabyJubPoint, unpackBabyJubPublicKey, verifyZkArtifacts };
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package/dist/zk/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type ProofType = "membership" | "threshold" | "range" | "equality" | "ownership"
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interface CircuitArtifacts {
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wasmPath: string;
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zkeyPath: string;
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verificationKey:
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verificationKey: unknown;
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}
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interface ZKProof {
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type: ProofType;
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interface VerificationResult {
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valid: boolean;
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type: ProofType;
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publicSignals: Record<string,
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publicSignals: Record<string, string>;
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timestamp: string;
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}
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/**
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@@ -86,6 +86,179 @@ interface NFTOwnershipProofInput {
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minBalance?: bigint;
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}
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/**
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* Baby Jubjub (EIP-2494) point arithmetic and keys
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* Matches circomlib's babyjub gadgets and circomlibjs's encodings
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*/
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/** Affine point `[x, y]`, the layout circom signals use */
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type BabyJubPoint = readonly [bigint, bigint];
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interface BabyJubKeyPair {
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/** Scalar in `[1, BABYJUB_SUBORDER)` */
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privateKey: bigint;
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/** `privateKey · BABYJUB_BASE8` */
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publicKey: BabyJubPoint;
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}
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/** Base field: the BN254 scalar field */
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declare const BABYJUB_FIELD = 21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617n;
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declare const BABYJUB_A = 168700n;
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declare const BABYJUB_D = 168696n;
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/** Curve order, `8 · BABYJUB_SUBORDER` */
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declare const BABYJUB_ORDER = 21888242871839275222246405745257275088614511777268538073601725287587578984328n;
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/** Prime order `l` of the subgroup generated by `BABYJUB_BASE8` */
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declare const BABYJUB_SUBORDER: bigint;
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declare const BABYJUB_GENERATOR: BabyJubPoint;
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/** `8 · BABYJUB_GENERATOR`, the base point of circomlib's `BabyPbk` and `EscalarMulFix` */
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declare const BABYJUB_BASE8: BabyJubPoint;
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declare const BABYJUB_IDENTITY: BabyJubPoint;
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/**
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* Check that `p` has canonical coordinates in `[0, p)` and lies on the curve
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*/
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declare function isOnBabyJub(p: BabyJubPoint): boolean;
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/**
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* Check that `p` lies on the curve and in the prime-order subgroup,
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* which rejects the small-order (torsion) points
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*/
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declare function isInBabyJubSubgroup(p: BabyJubPoint): boolean;
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declare function babyJubAdd(p: BabyJubPoint, q: BabyJubPoint): BabyJubPoint;
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declare function babyJubNeg(p: BabyJubPoint): BabyJubPoint;
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/**
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* Scalar multiplication `e · p` by a Montgomery ladder over at least 256
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* bits, so the work doesn't depend on the scalar's bits. The scalar is
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* not reduced, so `babyJubMul(p, BABYJUB_SUBORDER)` exposes torsion components
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*/
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declare function babyJubMul(p: BabyJubPoint, e: bigint): BabyJubPoint;
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declare function babyJubEquals(p: BabyJubPoint, q: BabyJubPoint): boolean;
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/**
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* Pack a point into 32 bytes as circomlibjs's `packPoint` does:
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* `y` little-endian, with the top bit set when `x > (p - 1) / 2`
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*/
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declare function packBabyJubPoint(p: BabyJubPoint): Uint8Array;
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/**
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* Unpack 32 bytes from `packBabyJubPoint`. Rejects non-canonical `y`,
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* encodings with no point on the curve, and a sign bit on `x = 0`.
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* Does not check the subgroup: use `unpackBabyJubPublicKey` for keys
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*/
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declare function unpackBabyJubPoint(bytes: Uint8Array): BabyJubPoint;
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/**
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* A public key must be in the prime-order subgroup and not the identity
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*/
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declare function isValidBabyJubPublicKey(p: BabyJubPoint): boolean;
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declare function assertBabyJubPublicKey(p: BabyJubPoint): void;
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declare function assertBabyJubPrivateKey(privateKey: bigint): void;
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declare function packBabyJubPublicKey(publicKey: BabyJubPoint): Uint8Array;
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declare function unpackBabyJubPublicKey(bytes: Uint8Array): BabyJubPoint;
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/**
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* Uniform scalar in `[1, BABYJUB_SUBORDER)`, from 64 random bytes
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*/
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declare function randomBabyJubScalar(): bigint;
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/**
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* Public key `privateKey · BABYJUB_BASE8`, as circomlib's `BabyPbk` computes it
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*/
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declare function babyJubPublicKey(privateKey: bigint): BabyJubPoint;
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declare function generateBabyJubKeyPair(): BabyJubKeyPair;
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/**
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* Derive a key pair from a secret of at least 16 bytes, such as
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* `derivePrfSecret()`'s output. The scalar is
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* `HKDF-SHA256(secret, info = "w3pk-babyjub-v1", 64 bytes) mod (l - 1) + 1`
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*/
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declare function deriveBabyJubKeyPair(secret: Uint8Array): BabyJubKeyPair;
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/**
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* Smallest `m` in `[0, maxValue]` with `m · BABYJUB_BASE8 = point`, by
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* baby-step giant-step, or `null` when there is none. `maxValue` is at
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* most 2^32, which takes about 2^17 point additions
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*/
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declare function babyJubDiscreteLog(point: BabyJubPoint, maxValue: number): bigint | null;
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/**
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* Exponential ElGamal over Baby Jubjub
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* Enc(m; r) = (r · B, m · B + r · PK), with B = BABYJUB_BASE8
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*/
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interface ElGamalCiphertext {
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/** `r · B` */
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c1: BabyJubPoint;
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/** `m · B + r · PK` */
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c2: BabyJubPoint;
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}
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/**
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* Encrypt `message` in `[0, l)` to `publicKey`. `r` defaults to a fresh
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* random scalar; pass it when a proof needs it as a witness
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*/
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declare function elgamalEncrypt(publicKey: BabyJubPoint, message: bigint, r?: bigint): ElGamalCiphertext;
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/**
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* Ciphertext of `m1 + m2` under the same key, with randomness `r1 + r2`
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*/
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declare function elgamalAdd(a: ElGamalCiphertext, b: ElGamalCiphertext): ElGamalCiphertext;
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/**
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* Same plaintext under fresh randomness: adds an encryption of 0 with `r`
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*/
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declare function elgamalRerandomize(publicKey: BabyJubPoint, ciphertext: ElGamalCiphertext, r?: bigint): ElGamalCiphertext;
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/**
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* Recover `m · B = c2 - privateKey · c1`
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*/
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declare function elgamalDecryptToPoint(privateKey: bigint, ciphertext: ElGamalCiphertext): BabyJubPoint;
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/**
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* Decrypt a message known to be in `[0, maxValue]`, such as a tally.
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* Throws when the plaintext is out of range
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*/
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declare function elgamalDecrypt(privateKey: bigint, ciphertext: ElGamalCiphertext, maxValue: number): bigint;
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/**
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* Custom error classes for better error handling
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*/
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declare class Web3PasskeyError extends Error {
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code: string;
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originalError?: unknown | undefined;
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constructor(message: string, code: string, originalError?: unknown | undefined);
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}
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type ZkArtifactName = "wasm" | "zkey";
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/**
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* A circuit artifact's IPFS CID doesn't match the CID pinned onchain,
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* so it isn't the circuit the app chose.
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*/
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declare class ZkArtifactMismatchError extends Web3PasskeyError {
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artifact: ZkArtifactName;
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expectedCid: string;
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actualCid: string;
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constructor(artifact: ZkArtifactName, expectedCid: string, actualCid: string);
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}
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/**
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* Circuit artifact verification against CIDs pinned onchain
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*/
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/** Artifact bytes, or a URL to fetch them from */
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type ZkArtifactSource = ArrayBufferView | ArrayBuffer | string;
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type ZkArtifactSources = Record<ZkArtifactName, ZkArtifactSource>;
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/**
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* IPFS CIDv1 strings in base32, as `ipfs add --cid-version 1` prints them,
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* compared as exact strings
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*/
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type ZkArtifactPins = Record<ZkArtifactName, string>;
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type ZkArtifactBytes = Record<ZkArtifactName, Uint8Array>;
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/**
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* Any contract with the build registry's `getCidByVersion(string)`,
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* such as an ethers `Contract`
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*/
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interface ZkArtifactRegistry {
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getCidByVersion(key: string): Promise<string>;
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}
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/**
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* Reads the pinned CIDs of a circuit's artifacts from a registry with the
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* build registry's interface, under the given keys
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*
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* @throws Web3PasskeyError `ZK_ARTIFACT_NOT_PINNED` if a key has no CID
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*/
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declare function readZkArtifactPins(registry: ZkArtifactRegistry, keys: Record<ZkArtifactName, string>): Promise<ZkArtifactPins>;
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/**
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* Computes the IPFS CIDs of a circuit's `.wasm` and `.zkey` and checks them
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* against the pinned CIDs. Prove with the returned bytes, not by fetching
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* the URLs again, so the checked artifacts are the ones used.
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*
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* @throws ZkArtifactMismatchError if an artifact's CID differs from its pin
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*/
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declare function verifyZkArtifacts(artifacts: ZkArtifactSources, pins: ZkArtifactPins): Promise<ZkArtifactBytes>;
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/**
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* Zero-Knowledge Proof Module for w3pk SDK
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* Enables privacy-preserving proofs
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@@ -151,7 +324,7 @@ declare class ZKProofModule {
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*/
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verifyNFTOwnership(proof: ZKProof, expectedContract: string, expectedHoldersRoot: string, expectedMinBalance?: bigint): Promise<boolean>;
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/**
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-
* Create a
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* Create a Poseidon commitment for hiding values
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*/
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createCommitment(value: bigint, blinding: bigint): Promise<string>;
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/**
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@@ -172,4 +345,4 @@ declare class ZKProofModule {
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get isAvailable(): boolean;
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}
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-
export { type CircuitArtifacts, type MembershipProofInput, type NFTOwnershipProofInput, type OwnershipProofInput, type ProofType, type RangeProofInput, type ThresholdProofInput, type VerificationResult, type ZKProof, type ZKProofConfig, ZKProofModule };
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export { BABYJUB_A, BABYJUB_BASE8, BABYJUB_D, BABYJUB_FIELD, BABYJUB_GENERATOR, BABYJUB_IDENTITY, BABYJUB_ORDER, BABYJUB_SUBORDER, type BabyJubKeyPair, type BabyJubPoint, type CircuitArtifacts, type ElGamalCiphertext, type MembershipProofInput, type NFTOwnershipProofInput, type OwnershipProofInput, type ProofType, type RangeProofInput, type ThresholdProofInput, type VerificationResult, type ZKProof, type ZKProofConfig, ZKProofModule, type ZkArtifactBytes, ZkArtifactMismatchError, type ZkArtifactName, type ZkArtifactPins, type ZkArtifactRegistry, type ZkArtifactSource, type ZkArtifactSources, assertBabyJubPrivateKey, assertBabyJubPublicKey, babyJubAdd, babyJubDiscreteLog, babyJubEquals, babyJubMul, babyJubNeg, babyJubPublicKey, deriveBabyJubKeyPair, elgamalAdd, elgamalDecrypt, elgamalDecryptToPoint, elgamalEncrypt, elgamalRerandomize, generateBabyJubKeyPair, isInBabyJubSubgroup, isOnBabyJub, isValidBabyJubPublicKey, packBabyJubPoint, packBabyJubPublicKey, randomBabyJubScalar, readZkArtifactPins, unpackBabyJubPoint, unpackBabyJubPublicKey, verifyZkArtifacts };
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