vigiles 27.1.5 → 27.1.6

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@@ -109,6 +109,33 @@ function renderResponsesSSE(text, opts = {}) {
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  `data: ${JSON.stringify({ type: e.type, ...e.data })}\n\n`)
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  .join("");
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * 🔴 KNOWN BLIND SPOT — NARROW ON PURPOSE, AND THAT IS NOT THE SAME AS COMPLETE.
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+ * Roadmapped P1 2026-09-10; do not read a `requestContains` miss on a Codex trace
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+ * as "not delivered" until this is closed.
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+ *
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+ * This reads `.text` and nothing else, and its caller takes only the LAST input
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+ * item with `role:"user", type:"message"`. Measured against openai@7.13.0:
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+ * `ResponseInputItem` has THIRTY-TWO variants and we look at one. The ignored
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+ * ones include `FunctionCallOutput`, `ShellCallOutput` and `LocalShellCallOutput`
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+ * — the Responses-API analogues of an Anthropic `tool_result`, i.e. exactly where
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+ * Claude Code relocated a hook's additionalContext in 2.1.228 and where the same
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+ * payload would land here.
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+ *
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+ * WHY THIS IS A COMMENT AND NOT A FIX. `driver.ts` adapts this into a
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+ * `ModelRequest`, so it feeds `requestContains` — the same predicate whose
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+ * `.text`-only twin in src/mock-model.ts produced a false "not delivered", a
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+ * false issue (zernie/vigiles#231) and a near-miss upstream report. The trap is
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+ * armed; nobody has stepped on it only because both delivery harnesses are
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+ * Claude-Code-only today. Closing it properly means deciding what `prompt` MEANS
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+ * across 32 item types — a semantic change, not a bug fix, and too large to ride
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+ * along with the mock-model repair.
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+ *
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+ * The Claude Code side now takes `ContentBlockParam` from @anthropic-ai/sdk and
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+ * fails the BUILD on an unhandled variant (see `flattenBlock` in
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+ * src/mock-model.ts). openai ships the matching union under Apache-2.0; applying
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+ * the same construction here is the fix, and it is the roadmapped work.
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+ */
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  function joinInputText(content) {
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  if (!Array.isArray(content))
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  return "";
@@ -156,7 +156,17 @@ export declare function outputContains(trace: Trace, needle: string | RegExp): b
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  * Did ANY request the model received contain `needle` — searching the system
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  * prompt and every message across all requests? The predicate that proves
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  * injected context *reached the model*: a SessionStart hook's `additionalContext`
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- * or a slash command's expansion. Harness tier only — the eval tier drives the
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+ * or a slash command's expansion.
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+ *
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+ * THIS IS A PROJECTION OF THE REQUEST, NOT THE REQUEST — state what it omits
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+ * before building a claim on it. Until 2026-09-10 this sentence was false: the
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+ * flattener read only `.text`, so the eight `ContentBlockParam` variants that
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+ * carry `content` were invisible, and a payload Claude Code had delivered inside
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+ * a `tool_result` read as "never arrived" (zernie/vigiles#231, a false finding).
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+ * It now covers every block type the pinned SDK union names, and serialises any
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+ * it does not. STILL OMITTED BY DESIGN: `tool_use` / `server_tool_use` inputs —
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+ * those are what the model SAID, not what it was TOLD, so a needle in a tool
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+ * argument must not read as delivery. See `flattenBlock` in mock-model.ts. Harness tier only — the eval tier drives the
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  * real API, so its `modelRequests` (and this) is empty. Behind `assertRequestContains`.
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  */
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  export declare function requestContains(trace: Trace, needle: string | RegExp): boolean;
@@ -423,7 +423,17 @@ function requestText(trace) {
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  * Did ANY request the model received contain `needle` — searching the system
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  * prompt and every message across all requests? The predicate that proves
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  * injected context *reached the model*: a SessionStart hook's `additionalContext`
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- * or a slash command's expansion. Harness tier only — the eval tier drives the
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+ * or a slash command's expansion.
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+ *
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+ * THIS IS A PROJECTION OF THE REQUEST, NOT THE REQUEST — state what it omits
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+ * before building a claim on it. Until 2026-09-10 this sentence was false: the
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+ * flattener read only `.text`, so the eight `ContentBlockParam` variants that
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+ * carry `content` were invisible, and a payload Claude Code had delivered inside
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+ * a `tool_result` read as "never arrived" (zernie/vigiles#231, a false finding).
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+ * It now covers every block type the pinned SDK union names, and serialises any
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+ * it does not. STILL OMITTED BY DESIGN: `tool_use` / `server_tool_use` inputs —
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+ * those are what the model SAID, not what it was TOLD, so a needle in a tool
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+ * argument must not read as delivery. See `flattenBlock` in mock-model.ts. Harness tier only — the eval tier drives the
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  * real API, so its `modelRequests` (and this) is empty. Behind `assertRequestContains`.
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  */
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  function requestContains(trace, needle) {
@@ -232,19 +232,143 @@ function splitRequestCounts(requests) {
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  sideChannelCount++;
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  return { count: requests.length - sideChannelCount, sideChannelCount };
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  }
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- /** Flatten Anthropic content (string, or an array of text/other blocks) to text. */
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+ /**
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+ * Flatten one Anthropic content block to the text the MODEL actually received.
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+ *
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+ * WHY THIS IS A TYPED, EXHAUSTIVE SWITCH AND NOT A `.text` LOOKUP — the whole
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+ * point of the file, and it was paid for. Until 2026-09-10 this read `b.text`
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+ * and returned `""` for anything else. Eight of the sixteen `ContentBlockParam`
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+ * variants carry their payload in `content`, not `text`, so half the union was
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+ * invisible to every instrument built on `extractRequest` — `requestContains`,
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+ * `refs-nudge.harness.mjs`, `injectable-events-delivery.harness.mjs`.
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+ *
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+ * WHAT THAT COST. Claude Code <= 2.1.227 delivered a `PostToolUse` hook's
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+ * `additionalContext` as its own `text` block. From 2.1.228 (a PATCH release,
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+ * 2026-08-11) it arrives appended to the `tool_result` block's `content`, inside
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+ * a `<system-reminder>`. Nothing broke: the model received the payload on both
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+ * versions. Our probe went blind, every test above reported "not delivered", and
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+ * that false reading was written up as zernie/vigiles#231 and very nearly filed
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+ * upstream as a regression in somebody else's product. MEASURED both ways on one
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+ * machine, claude 2.1.267, changing only this function: blind = "landed=false",
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+ * typed = "landed=true".
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+ *
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+ * WHAT THE TYPE BUYS, precisely — it is NOT a change detector:
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+ * - it does NOT notice a payload moving between fields the type already allows
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+ * (`ToolResultBlockParam.content` predates the relocation; nothing changed);
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+ * - it DOES make a silently-unhandled variant impossible: the `never` binding
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+ * below fails `tsc` until every case is written out, so the seventeenth
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+ * block type Anthropic ships breaks the BUILD instead of quietly emptying a
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+ * measurement.
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+ *
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+ * WHY THE DEFAULT SERIALISES INSTEAD OF RETURNING `""`. This is a measurement
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+ * instrument, and its proven failure mode is the FALSE NEGATIVE — a payload that
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+ * was there, reported missing. So an unrecognised block is over-included (its
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+ * JSON) rather than dropped: a stale pin then costs a noisy match, never a
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+ * silent hole. That asymmetry is deliberate; do not "tidy" it to `""`.
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+ *
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+ * The repo's `assertNever` is deliberately NOT used: it throws, and this parses
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+ * untrusted wire JSON where an unknown block must degrade, not crash.
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+ */
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+ function flattenBlock(b) {
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+ switch (b.type) {
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+ // WALKED — every string field is readable text the model was shown, and
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+ // reading any one of them by name is what this function keeps getting
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+ // wrong. `text` also carries `citations[].cited_text` / `document_title`
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+ // (quoted source text); `search_result` carries `title` and `source`
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+ // BESIDE its `content`; `document` spreads its text across `title`,
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+ // `context` and `source` (`PlainTextSource.data`,
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+ // `ContentBlockSource.content`). A base64 source is skipped inside
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+ // `flattenUnknown` — bytes, not text.
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+ case "text":
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+ case "search_result":
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+ case "document":
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+ return flattenUnknown(b);
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+ // READ NARROWLY, and the dropped field is named so the next reader can
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+ // check the claim instead of trusting it: `signature` is an opaque
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+ // attestation blob, not context.
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+ case "thinking":
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+ return b.thinking;
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+ // The families whose payload hangs off `content`. Their only other field is
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+ // `tool_use_id` — a correlation identifier, not text the model was shown.
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+ // `content` is optional on `tool_result` alone; on the rest it is required
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+ // and is an OBJECT, which `flattenContent` hands to `flattenUnknown`.
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+ case "tool_result":
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+ case "web_search_tool_result":
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+ case "web_fetch_tool_result":
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+ case "code_execution_tool_result":
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+ case "bash_code_execution_tool_result":
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+ case "text_editor_code_execution_tool_result":
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+ case "tool_search_tool_result":
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+ return b.content === undefined ? "" : flattenContent(b.content);
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+ // The model's own call, not context delivered TO it — kept out of
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+ // `requestContains` on purpose so a needle in a tool ARGUMENT is never read
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+ // as "the model was told this". Their `id` / `name` are identifiers.
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+ case "tool_use":
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+ case "server_tool_use":
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+ return "";
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+ // No readable text by construction: `redacted_thinking.data` is encrypted,
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+ // `container_upload.file_id` is an identifier, an image is pixels.
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+ case "image":
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+ case "redacted_thinking":
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+ case "container_upload":
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+ return "";
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+ default: {
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+ // Compile-time: unreachable, and that is the guard — a new variant makes
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+ // this assignment fail. Run-time: reachable via wire JSON from a newer
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+ // API than the pinned types, so it degrades loudly instead of throwing.
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+ const unhandled = b;
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+ return JSON.stringify(unhandled);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Flatten an arbitrary wire payload to text by walking every string leaf.
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+ *
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+ * WHY A GENERIC WALK AND NOT ONE MORE NAMED FIELD. The first version of
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+ * `flattenBlock` grouped eight variants as "the ones that carry `content`" and
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+ * handed each to `flattenContent`, which accepts only a string or an array.
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+ * Six of those eight carry an OBJECT there — `web_fetch_tool_result`,
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+ * `web_search_tool_result`, `code_execution_tool_result`,
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+ * `bash_code_execution_tool_result`, `text_editor_code_execution_tool_result`,
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+ * `tool_search_tool_result` — so they still flattened to "". The grouping was
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+ * made on the field's NAME while the defect lives in its TYPE, which is the
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+ * same mistake, one level up, as the `.text`-only read it replaced. Found by
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+ * review on this PR, not by a run (zernie/vigiles#233).
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+ *
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+ * And no single field would have fixed it: the payload's text sits at a
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+ * different key in each shape — `stdout`/`stderr` on a bash result, a nested
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+ * `content` document on a fetch result, `data` on a plain-text source. Keying
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+ * on any one of them re-commits the shape assumption. Walking commits to none.
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+ */
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+ function flattenUnknown(v) {
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+ if (typeof v === "string")
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+ return v;
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+ if (Array.isArray(v))
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+ return v.map(flattenUnknown).join("");
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+ if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null)
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+ return "";
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+ const o = v;
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+ // A base64 source is bytes, not text. Including it would bury every real
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+ // match under megabytes of encoding — the one over-inclusion that costs more
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+ // than the false negative it avoids.
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+ if (o.type === "base64")
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+ return "";
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+ return Object.entries(o)
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+ .filter(([k]) => k !== "type" && k !== "media_type") // discriminators
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+ .map(([, val]) => flattenUnknown(val))
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+ .join("");
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Flatten Anthropic content to text: a string, an array of blocks, or the
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+ * OBJECT a server-tool result carries (see `flattenUnknown`).
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+ */
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  function flattenContent(content) {
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  if (typeof content === "string")
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  return content;
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  if (!Array.isArray(content))
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- return "";
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+ return flattenUnknown(content);
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  return content
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- .map((b) => {
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- if (typeof b === "string")
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- return b;
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- const t = b.text;
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- return typeof t === "string" ? t : "";
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- })
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+ .map((b) => typeof b === "string" ? b : flattenBlock(b))
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  .join("");
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  }
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  /**
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "vigiles",
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- "version": "27.1.5",
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+ "version": "27.1.6",
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  "description": "Audit, test and measure the harness your AI agent runs on — grade your CLAUDE.md / AGENTS.md, skills, subagents and hooks, run them against a scripted model, and measure whether they actually fire.",
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  "keywords": [
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  "claude-code",
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@
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  "docs:api": "typedoc"
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  },
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  "devDependencies": {
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+ "@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.124.0",
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  "@eslint/js": "^10.0.1",
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  "@jackchuka/mdschema": "^0.12.8",
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  "@microsoft/api-extractor": "^7.58.9",