vigiles 27.1.4 → 27.1.6

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@@ -109,6 +109,33 @@ function renderResponsesSSE(text, opts = {}) {
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  `data: ${JSON.stringify({ type: e.type, ...e.data })}\n\n`)
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  .join("");
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * 🔴 KNOWN BLIND SPOT — NARROW ON PURPOSE, AND THAT IS NOT THE SAME AS COMPLETE.
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+ * Roadmapped P1 2026-09-10; do not read a `requestContains` miss on a Codex trace
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+ * as "not delivered" until this is closed.
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+ *
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+ * This reads `.text` and nothing else, and its caller takes only the LAST input
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+ * item with `role:"user", type:"message"`. Measured against openai@7.13.0:
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+ * `ResponseInputItem` has THIRTY-TWO variants and we look at one. The ignored
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+ * ones include `FunctionCallOutput`, `ShellCallOutput` and `LocalShellCallOutput`
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+ * — the Responses-API analogues of an Anthropic `tool_result`, i.e. exactly where
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+ * Claude Code relocated a hook's additionalContext in 2.1.228 and where the same
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+ * payload would land here.
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+ *
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+ * WHY THIS IS A COMMENT AND NOT A FIX. `driver.ts` adapts this into a
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+ * `ModelRequest`, so it feeds `requestContains` — the same predicate whose
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+ * `.text`-only twin in src/mock-model.ts produced a false "not delivered", a
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+ * false issue (zernie/vigiles#231) and a near-miss upstream report. The trap is
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+ * armed; nobody has stepped on it only because both delivery harnesses are
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+ * Claude-Code-only today. Closing it properly means deciding what `prompt` MEANS
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+ * across 32 item types — a semantic change, not a bug fix, and too large to ride
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+ * along with the mock-model repair.
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+ *
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+ * The Claude Code side now takes `ContentBlockParam` from @anthropic-ai/sdk and
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+ * fails the BUILD on an unhandled variant (see `flattenBlock` in
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+ * src/mock-model.ts). openai ships the matching union under Apache-2.0; applying
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+ * the same construction here is the fix, and it is the roadmapped work.
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+ */
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  function joinInputText(content) {
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  if (!Array.isArray(content))
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  return "";
package/dist/cli-main.js CHANGED
@@ -5694,7 +5694,13 @@ async function installHookFile(file, adapter, registeredProviders = []) {
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  // appends a duplicate block instead of replacing the existing one.
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  const ref = (0, hook_install_js_1.normalizeHookRef)(file);
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  const compiled = (0, hook_program_js_1.compileHookProgram)(source, program, {
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- gateCommand: `npx vigiles hook-runtime run-program ${ref}`,
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+ // 🔴 ANCHORED AT THE PROJECT ROOT. A hook command does not run with a stable cwd —
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+ // this codebase says so twice (`bareToken`'s header, `PluginLayout.projectRootTokens`)
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+ // and `projectRootOf` relies on the anchored spelling "by construction", but the
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+ // emitter never produced it. Measured 2026-09-10 in a consumer repo: after a compile,
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+ // one `cd` into a subdirectory made a PreToolUse gate fail to load, and a gate that
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+ // cannot load must block — the repo seized, every command refused including the repair.
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+ gateCommand: `npx vigiles hook-runtime run-program ${(0, hook_install_js_1.hookGateRef)(ref, adapter.layout.projectRootTokens)}`,
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  dialect: adapter.dialect,
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  hookProtocol: adapter.hookProtocol,
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  settingsFormat: adapter.layout.settingsFormat,
@@ -156,7 +156,17 @@ export declare function outputContains(trace: Trace, needle: string | RegExp): b
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  * Did ANY request the model received contain `needle` — searching the system
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  * prompt and every message across all requests? The predicate that proves
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  * injected context *reached the model*: a SessionStart hook's `additionalContext`
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- * or a slash command's expansion. Harness tier only — the eval tier drives the
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+ * or a slash command's expansion.
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+ *
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+ * THIS IS A PROJECTION OF THE REQUEST, NOT THE REQUEST — state what it omits
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+ * before building a claim on it. Until 2026-09-10 this sentence was false: the
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+ * flattener read only `.text`, so the eight `ContentBlockParam` variants that
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+ * carry `content` were invisible, and a payload Claude Code had delivered inside
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+ * a `tool_result` read as "never arrived" (zernie/vigiles#231, a false finding).
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+ * It now covers every block type the pinned SDK union names, and serialises any
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+ * it does not. STILL OMITTED BY DESIGN: `tool_use` / `server_tool_use` inputs —
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+ * those are what the model SAID, not what it was TOLD, so a needle in a tool
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+ * argument must not read as delivery. See `flattenBlock` in mock-model.ts. Harness tier only — the eval tier drives the
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  * real API, so its `modelRequests` (and this) is empty. Behind `assertRequestContains`.
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  */
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  export declare function requestContains(trace: Trace, needle: string | RegExp): boolean;
@@ -423,7 +423,17 @@ function requestText(trace) {
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  * Did ANY request the model received contain `needle` — searching the system
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  * prompt and every message across all requests? The predicate that proves
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  * injected context *reached the model*: a SessionStart hook's `additionalContext`
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- * or a slash command's expansion. Harness tier only — the eval tier drives the
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+ * or a slash command's expansion.
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+ *
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+ * THIS IS A PROJECTION OF THE REQUEST, NOT THE REQUEST — state what it omits
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+ * before building a claim on it. Until 2026-09-10 this sentence was false: the
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+ * flattener read only `.text`, so the eight `ContentBlockParam` variants that
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+ * carry `content` were invisible, and a payload Claude Code had delivered inside
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+ * a `tool_result` read as "never arrived" (zernie/vigiles#231, a false finding).
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+ * It now covers every block type the pinned SDK union names, and serialises any
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+ * it does not. STILL OMITTED BY DESIGN: `tool_use` / `server_tool_use` inputs —
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+ * those are what the model SAID, not what it was TOLD, so a needle in a tool
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+ * argument must not read as delivery. See `flattenBlock` in mock-model.ts. Harness tier only — the eval tier drives the
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  * real API, so its `modelRequests` (and this) is empty. Behind `assertRequestContains`.
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  */
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  function requestContains(trace, needle) {
@@ -36,6 +36,26 @@ interface SettingsJson {
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  * absolute — still stable, just not relative to anything).
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  */
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  export declare function normalizeHookRef(hookPath: string, cwd?: string): string;
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+ /**
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+ * The path token `compile` EMITS into the harness config — anchored at the project root
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+ * when the harness declares such a variable.
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+ *
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+ * 🔴 IT LIVES BESIDE {@link bareToken} ON PURPOSE. That function STRIPS exactly this prefix
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+ * and these quotes; this one ADDS them. They are one contract read from two ends, and while
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+ * the ends sat apart only one got fixed: 2026-08-21 taught the reader to understand the
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+ * anchored spelling, and the emitter went on writing the relative one for three more weeks.
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+ *
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+ * Why anchored at all, from the two measurements already in this file and in
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+ * `PluginLayout.projectRootTokens`: a hook command does not run with a stable cwd, so a
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+ * relative path "dies with exit 2 the moment the agent runs from a subdirectory". For a
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+ * PreToolUse gate that is not a lost nudge — a gate that cannot load must block, so the
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+ * repository seizes. Measured in a consumer repo 2026-09-10: recoverable by file writes
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+ * only, because every command was refused, including the one that repairs it.
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+ *
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+ * `bareToken(hookGateRef(ref, tokens)) === ref` is what keeps a recompile idempotent, and
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+ * it is asserted directly rather than left to inspection.
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+ */
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+ export declare function hookGateRef(ref: string, projectRootTokens: readonly string[] | undefined): string;
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  /**
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  * Idempotently merge a compiled hook's block into an existing `settings.json`
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  * object. Entries managed by THIS hook file (the runtime command references
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ exports.PROVIDERS_DIR = exports.HOOKS_DIR = void 0;
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  exports.discoverHookFiles = discoverHookFiles;
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  exports.discoverProviderFiles = discoverProviderFiles;
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  exports.normalizeHookRef = normalizeHookRef;
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+ exports.hookGateRef = hookGateRef;
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  exports.mergeHooksJson = mergeHooksJson;
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  exports.mergeHooksToml = mergeHooksToml;
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  exports.serializeConfig = serializeConfig;
@@ -79,6 +80,29 @@ function normalizeHookRef(hookPath, cwd = process.cwd()) {
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  const chosen = rel === "" || rel.startsWith("..") ? abs : rel;
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  return chosen.split(node_path_1.sep).join("/");
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * The path token `compile` EMITS into the harness config — anchored at the project root
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+ * when the harness declares such a variable.
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+ *
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+ * 🔴 IT LIVES BESIDE {@link bareToken} ON PURPOSE. That function STRIPS exactly this prefix
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+ * and these quotes; this one ADDS them. They are one contract read from two ends, and while
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+ * the ends sat apart only one got fixed: 2026-08-21 taught the reader to understand the
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+ * anchored spelling, and the emitter went on writing the relative one for three more weeks.
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+ *
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+ * Why anchored at all, from the two measurements already in this file and in
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+ * `PluginLayout.projectRootTokens`: a hook command does not run with a stable cwd, so a
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+ * relative path "dies with exit 2 the moment the agent runs from a subdirectory". For a
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+ * PreToolUse gate that is not a lost nudge — a gate that cannot load must block, so the
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+ * repository seizes. Measured in a consumer repo 2026-09-10: recoverable by file writes
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+ * only, because every command was refused, including the one that repairs it.
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+ *
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+ * `bareToken(hookGateRef(ref, tokens)) === ref` is what keeps a recompile idempotent, and
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+ * it is asserted directly rather than left to inspection.
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+ */
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+ function hookGateRef(ref, projectRootTokens) {
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+ const token = projectRootTokens?.[0];
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+ return token === undefined ? ref : `"${token}/${ref}"`;
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+ }
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  /**
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  * True when an entry's command routes through the runtime for `hookPath`.
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  *
@@ -58,6 +58,13 @@ export declare function hookStampPath(file: string): string;
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  * action itself ({@link isStampRepairEvent}), and — on a LOAD failure only — the
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  * load-path repair WRITE ({@link isLoadPathRepairEvent}), or the repo wedges
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  * with no way to fix whatever broke the load path.
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+ *
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+ * INJECT-HOOK-SPECIFIC: An inject hook that fails to load is a harness failure,
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+ * not a decision failure. Unlike gates (which must be conservative and block on
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+ * any error), an inject is pure context addition. It degrades gracefully: if it
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+ * cannot load, the session continues without the injected context, and the error
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+ * is logged for debugging. This prevents a single broken inject from wedging all
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+ * sessions.
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  */
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  export declare function runHookProgramCommand(file: string | undefined): Promise<void>;
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  //# sourceMappingURL=hook-runtime.d.ts.map
@@ -364,6 +364,13 @@ function warnIfPathUndecidable(event, root) {
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  * action itself ({@link isStampRepairEvent}), and — on a LOAD failure only — the
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  * load-path repair WRITE ({@link isLoadPathRepairEvent}), or the repo wedges
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  * with no way to fix whatever broke the load path.
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+ *
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+ * INJECT-HOOK-SPECIFIC: An inject hook that fails to load is a harness failure,
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+ * not a decision failure. Unlike gates (which must be conservative and block on
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+ * any error), an inject is pure context addition. It degrades gracefully: if it
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+ * cannot load, the session continues without the injected context, and the error
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+ * is logged for debugging. This prevents a single broken inject from wedging all
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+ * sessions.
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  */
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  async function runHookProgramCommand(file) {
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  if (!file) {
@@ -394,13 +401,20 @@ async function runHookProgramCommand(file) {
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  try {
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  program = await (0, exports.loadHookProgram)(file);
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  }
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- catch {
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+ catch (err) {
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  // A LOAD failure is a fact about the harness, not a verdict about the
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  // command that happened to arrive — so it must still fail CLOSED (a gate
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  // that cannot run must not wave traffic through), but the two things it owes
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  // the author are different from a `deny`'s: name the real cause, and leave a
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  // way back.
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  //
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+ // EXCEPTION: inject hooks. An inject's purpose is to ADD context, not to
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+ // ENFORCE a decision. If it fails to load, the session should degrade
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+ // gracefully (no context injected) rather than wedging the entire harness.
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+ // This is a harness failure, not a gating decision — so we handle it by
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+ // logging the error and exiting 0. Gates (file, bash, prompt, stop) remain
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+ // conservative and fail closed.
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+ //
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  // Escapes, both announced loudly on stderr:
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  // - the stale-stamp one (an edit to the hook itself / `vigiles compile`),
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  // for the hook broken mid-edit;
@@ -414,11 +428,18 @@ async function runHookProgramCommand(file) {
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  // Everything else stays BLOCKED, and the escapes are whitelists of commands
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  // that are WRITES — see `isLoadPathRepairEvent` for why no command is one.
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  const conflicted = conflictedLoadPathFiles(file);
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+ // 🔴 THE THROWN MESSAGE IS THE ONLY THING THAT NAMES THE REAL CAUSE when the
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+ // merge-conflict heuristic above does not fire. Without it this said just
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+ // "cannot be loaded" — a diagnosis that sends the reader looking in the wrong
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+ // place, which is the defect this runtime has already shipped twice (the
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+ // loader that advised `npm run build` when the answer was `npm install`).
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+ // The comment above promises to name the cause; this is what keeps it.
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+ const thrown = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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  const cause = conflicted.length > 0
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  ? `cannot be loaded — ${conflicted.join(", ")} contains merge-conflict ` +
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  `markers, so Node cannot resolve \`vigiles/hook\` from it (the hook itself ` +
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  `may be fine)`
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- : "cannot be loaded";
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+ : `cannot be loaded — ${thrown}`;
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  if ((0, hook_program_js_1.isLoadPathRepairEvent)(event, file, {
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  // The root the REST of this runtime already uses: `hookStampPath` and
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  // `verifyStampOrRefuse` read the hook and its sidecar via `process.cwd()`,
@@ -431,7 +452,8 @@ async function runHookProgramCommand(file) {
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  announceRepairEscape(file, cause);
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  return;
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  }
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- console.error(`vigiles: hook ${file} ${cause}.\n` +
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+ // Log the error, but for inject hooks, degrade gracefully (exit 0).
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+ const errorMsg = `vigiles: hook ${file} ${cause}.\n` +
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  `vigiles: this is the state of the HARNESS, not a decision about your ` +
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  `command — the gate never ran. Blocking anyway (a gate that cannot run ` +
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  `must not pass traffic).\n` +
@@ -448,8 +470,22 @@ async function runHookProgramCommand(file) {
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  `vigiles: no command is allowed, deliberately. \`git merge --abort\` and ` +
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  `\`git checkout\` RUN \`.git/hooks/*\` (measured: reference-transaction, ` +
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  `post-checkout), and \`vigiles compile\` loads the hook through the same ` +
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- `resolver that just failed.`);
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- process.exit(2);
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+ `resolver that just failed.`;
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+ console.error(errorMsg);
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+ // Exit code depends on hook kind. This heuristic is based on the filename —
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+ // a more robust approach would parse the stamp or metadata, but that requires
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+ // the hook to load. Inject hooks typically have "inject" in the name; fall
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+ // back to blocking (exit 2) for safety on gates.
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+ const isLikelyInject = file.includes("inject");
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+ if (isLikelyInject) {
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+ // Inject hook: degrade gracefully. Log the error but don't wedge the session.
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+ console.error(`vigiles: ${file} is an inject hook; degrading gracefully (no context injected).`);
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+ process.exit(0);
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+ }
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+ else {
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+ // Gate hook: fail closed.
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+ process.exit(2);
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+ }
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  return;
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  }
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  verifyStampOrRefuse(file, event);
@@ -232,19 +232,143 @@ function splitRequestCounts(requests) {
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  sideChannelCount++;
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  return { count: requests.length - sideChannelCount, sideChannelCount };
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  }
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- /** Flatten Anthropic content (string, or an array of text/other blocks) to text. */
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+ /**
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+ * Flatten one Anthropic content block to the text the MODEL actually received.
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+ *
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+ * WHY THIS IS A TYPED, EXHAUSTIVE SWITCH AND NOT A `.text` LOOKUP — the whole
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+ * point of the file, and it was paid for. Until 2026-09-10 this read `b.text`
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+ * and returned `""` for anything else. Eight of the sixteen `ContentBlockParam`
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+ * variants carry their payload in `content`, not `text`, so half the union was
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+ * invisible to every instrument built on `extractRequest` — `requestContains`,
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+ * `refs-nudge.harness.mjs`, `injectable-events-delivery.harness.mjs`.
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+ *
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+ * WHAT THAT COST. Claude Code <= 2.1.227 delivered a `PostToolUse` hook's
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+ * `additionalContext` as its own `text` block. From 2.1.228 (a PATCH release,
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+ * 2026-08-11) it arrives appended to the `tool_result` block's `content`, inside
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+ * a `<system-reminder>`. Nothing broke: the model received the payload on both
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+ * versions. Our probe went blind, every test above reported "not delivered", and
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+ * that false reading was written up as zernie/vigiles#231 and very nearly filed
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+ * upstream as a regression in somebody else's product. MEASURED both ways on one
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+ * machine, claude 2.1.267, changing only this function: blind = "landed=false",
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+ * typed = "landed=true".
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+ *
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+ * WHAT THE TYPE BUYS, precisely — it is NOT a change detector:
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+ * - it does NOT notice a payload moving between fields the type already allows
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+ * (`ToolResultBlockParam.content` predates the relocation; nothing changed);
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+ * - it DOES make a silently-unhandled variant impossible: the `never` binding
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+ * below fails `tsc` until every case is written out, so the seventeenth
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+ * block type Anthropic ships breaks the BUILD instead of quietly emptying a
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+ * measurement.
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+ *
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+ * WHY THE DEFAULT SERIALISES INSTEAD OF RETURNING `""`. This is a measurement
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+ * instrument, and its proven failure mode is the FALSE NEGATIVE — a payload that
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+ * was there, reported missing. So an unrecognised block is over-included (its
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+ * JSON) rather than dropped: a stale pin then costs a noisy match, never a
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+ * silent hole. That asymmetry is deliberate; do not "tidy" it to `""`.
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+ *
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+ * The repo's `assertNever` is deliberately NOT used: it throws, and this parses
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+ * untrusted wire JSON where an unknown block must degrade, not crash.
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+ */
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+ function flattenBlock(b) {
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+ switch (b.type) {
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+ // WALKED — every string field is readable text the model was shown, and
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+ // reading any one of them by name is what this function keeps getting
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+ // wrong. `text` also carries `citations[].cited_text` / `document_title`
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+ // (quoted source text); `search_result` carries `title` and `source`
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+ // BESIDE its `content`; `document` spreads its text across `title`,
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+ // `context` and `source` (`PlainTextSource.data`,
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+ // `ContentBlockSource.content`). A base64 source is skipped inside
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+ // `flattenUnknown` — bytes, not text.
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+ case "text":
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+ case "search_result":
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+ case "document":
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+ return flattenUnknown(b);
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+ // READ NARROWLY, and the dropped field is named so the next reader can
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+ // check the claim instead of trusting it: `signature` is an opaque
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+ // attestation blob, not context.
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+ case "thinking":
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+ return b.thinking;
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+ // The families whose payload hangs off `content`. Their only other field is
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+ // `tool_use_id` — a correlation identifier, not text the model was shown.
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+ // `content` is optional on `tool_result` alone; on the rest it is required
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+ // and is an OBJECT, which `flattenContent` hands to `flattenUnknown`.
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+ case "tool_result":
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+ case "web_search_tool_result":
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+ case "web_fetch_tool_result":
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+ case "code_execution_tool_result":
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+ case "bash_code_execution_tool_result":
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+ case "text_editor_code_execution_tool_result":
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+ case "tool_search_tool_result":
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+ return b.content === undefined ? "" : flattenContent(b.content);
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+ // The model's own call, not context delivered TO it — kept out of
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+ // `requestContains` on purpose so a needle in a tool ARGUMENT is never read
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+ // as "the model was told this". Their `id` / `name` are identifiers.
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+ case "tool_use":
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+ case "server_tool_use":
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+ return "";
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+ // No readable text by construction: `redacted_thinking.data` is encrypted,
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+ // `container_upload.file_id` is an identifier, an image is pixels.
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+ case "image":
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+ case "redacted_thinking":
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+ case "container_upload":
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+ return "";
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+ default: {
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+ // Compile-time: unreachable, and that is the guard — a new variant makes
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+ // this assignment fail. Run-time: reachable via wire JSON from a newer
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+ // API than the pinned types, so it degrades loudly instead of throwing.
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+ const unhandled = b;
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+ return JSON.stringify(unhandled);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Flatten an arbitrary wire payload to text by walking every string leaf.
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+ *
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+ * WHY A GENERIC WALK AND NOT ONE MORE NAMED FIELD. The first version of
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+ * `flattenBlock` grouped eight variants as "the ones that carry `content`" and
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+ * handed each to `flattenContent`, which accepts only a string or an array.
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+ * Six of those eight carry an OBJECT there — `web_fetch_tool_result`,
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+ * `web_search_tool_result`, `code_execution_tool_result`,
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+ * `bash_code_execution_tool_result`, `text_editor_code_execution_tool_result`,
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+ * `tool_search_tool_result` — so they still flattened to "". The grouping was
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+ * made on the field's NAME while the defect lives in its TYPE, which is the
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+ * same mistake, one level up, as the `.text`-only read it replaced. Found by
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+ * review on this PR, not by a run (zernie/vigiles#233).
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+ *
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+ * And no single field would have fixed it: the payload's text sits at a
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+ * different key in each shape — `stdout`/`stderr` on a bash result, a nested
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+ * `content` document on a fetch result, `data` on a plain-text source. Keying
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+ * on any one of them re-commits the shape assumption. Walking commits to none.
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+ */
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+ function flattenUnknown(v) {
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+ if (typeof v === "string")
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+ return v;
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+ if (Array.isArray(v))
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+ return v.map(flattenUnknown).join("");
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+ if (typeof v !== "object" || v === null)
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+ return "";
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+ const o = v;
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+ // A base64 source is bytes, not text. Including it would bury every real
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+ // match under megabytes of encoding — the one over-inclusion that costs more
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+ // than the false negative it avoids.
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+ if (o.type === "base64")
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+ return "";
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+ return Object.entries(o)
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+ .filter(([k]) => k !== "type" && k !== "media_type") // discriminators
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+ .map(([, val]) => flattenUnknown(val))
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+ .join("");
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+ }
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+ /**
362
+ * Flatten Anthropic content to text: a string, an array of blocks, or the
363
+ * OBJECT a server-tool result carries (see `flattenUnknown`).
364
+ */
236
365
  function flattenContent(content) {
237
366
  if (typeof content === "string")
238
367
  return content;
239
368
  if (!Array.isArray(content))
240
- return "";
369
+ return flattenUnknown(content);
241
370
  return content
242
- .map((b) => {
243
- if (typeof b === "string")
244
- return b;
245
- const t = b.text;
246
- return typeof t === "string" ? t : "";
247
- })
371
+ .map((b) => typeof b === "string" ? b : flattenBlock(b))
248
372
  .join("");
249
373
  }
250
374
  /**
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "vigiles",
3
- "version": "27.1.4",
3
+ "version": "27.1.6",
4
4
  "description": "Audit, test and measure the harness your AI agent runs on — grade your CLAUDE.md / AGENTS.md, skills, subagents and hooks, run them against a scripted model, and measure whether they actually fire.",
5
5
  "keywords": [
6
6
  "claude-code",
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@
95
95
  "docs:api": "typedoc"
96
96
  },
97
97
  "devDependencies": {
98
+ "@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.124.0",
98
99
  "@eslint/js": "^10.0.1",
99
100
  "@jackchuka/mdschema": "^0.12.8",
100
101
  "@microsoft/api-extractor": "^7.58.9",
@@ -103,6 +104,7 @@
103
104
  "@types/markdown-it": "^14.1.2",
104
105
  "@types/minimatch": "^5.1.2",
105
106
  "@types/node": "^20.19.39",
107
+ "@types/picomatch": "^4.0.2",
106
108
  "@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin": "^8.58.0",
107
109
  "@typescript-eslint/parser": "^8.58.0",
108
110
  "@vitest/coverage-v8": "^4.1.8",
@@ -113,6 +115,7 @@
113
115
  "eslint-plugin-sonarjs": "^4.0.2",
114
116
  "globals": "^17.4.0",
115
117
  "jest": "^30.4.2",
118
+ "picomatch": "^4.0.4",
116
119
  "prettier": "^3.8.1",
117
120
  "tsx": "^4.21.0",
118
121
  "typedoc": "^0.28.19",