verifyhash 0.1.0 → 0.1.2

package/verifier/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,584 @@
+# `verify-vh` — the independent, offline verifier
+
+**You received a sealed verifyhash artifact and you are NOT a verifyhash customer.** This directory
+is everything you need to check it yourself: a single command, near-zero dependencies, **no network,
+and no back-edge into the producer's stack**. You do not need our `ethers`/`hardhat` toolchain, an
+account, a license, or our permission. Read this file, `npm install`, run one command, and decide.
+
+`verify-vh` is **free**. There is no paid tier for verification — the producer pays to *seal*; anyone
+may *verify* forever, offline, at zero cost. That is deliberate: a proof a counterparty cannot
+independently check is not a proof.
+
+---
+
+## 0. Get it in 10 seconds (zero-install — start here)
+
+The fastest way to check a seal needs **no clone, no `npm install`, no `node_modules`, no account**:
+save ONE self-contained file — [`dist/verify-vh-standalone.js`](dist/verify-vh-standalone.js) — and run
+it with `node`. It depends on **nothing but Node core** (the keccak provider is a vendored pure-JS one,
+cross-checked against `js-sha3` and `ethers`):
+
+```bash
+# 1. Save the single file dist/verify-vh-standalone.js next to the packet you were handed.
+
+# 2. (Optional, recommended) check its PUBLISHED checksum so you know the file wasn't swapped in transit.
+#    We ship it beside the bundle as dist/verify-vh-standalone.js.sha256 (standard `sha256sum` format):
+sha256sum -c verify-vh-standalone.js.sha256        # -> "verify-vh-standalone.js: OK"
+#    (macOS: shasum -a 256 -c verify-vh-standalone.js.sha256)
+
+# 3. Run it — no install:
+node verify-vh-standalone.js <packet> --vendor 0xPRODUCER_ADDRESS
+#    exit 0 = verifies; exit 3 = REJECTED (names the changed file / wrong signer).
+```
+
+That one file is **byte-for-byte the same verifier** described in the rest of this README — it is built
+deterministically from these sources, and a stale bundle FAILS CI
+(`../test/verifier.standalone.test.js`). The split-source path below (`npm install` the `verifier/` tree
+and run `verify-vh.js`) stays for auditors who want to read each `lib/*` file on its own; **both compute
+the identical verdict and exit code.** The checksum is a transport-integrity check pinned to a hex you
+get out-of-band from the producer — like `--vendor`; the real trust anchor is the source audit in §6.
+**Don't want to trust our checksum either? Reproduce the bundle from source yourself — see §0b.**
+
+**The easier path changes nothing about what is proven:** whether you run the one-file bundle or the
+split tree, the seal proves **tamper-evidence + signer-pin**, NOT a trusted "sealed at T" (that still
+requires **P-3** — see §4). The convenience is in the *install*, never in the *claim*.
+
+---
+
+## 0y. No Node at all? Verify (and try to fool it) in your browser — one offline page
+
+Everything in §0 still assumes `node` on a PATH. If you — or the counterparty you are convincing —
+have **no terminal at all**, the same verifier ships as **one committed, fully offline HTML file**:
+[`dist/verify-vh-standalone.html`](dist/verify-vh-standalone.html) (integrity sidecar:
+[`dist/verify-vh-standalone.html.sha256`](dist/verify-vh-standalone.html.sha256)). Save it and
+double-click it; the page opens with the **60-second challenge built in**: click **"Load the sample
+packet & verify"** (ACCEPT), then change ONE character of the editable sample file and re-verify
+(**REJECT** — the page names the file you changed) — then drag a REAL packet + its files in and read
+the same verdict + per-file localization this README describes (optional vendor pin and revocations
+drop included). The page also carries a built-in **agent-session demo** (§2c): a sample
+`*.vhagent.json` packet with one tool_call payload already REDACTED behind its hash commitment —
+load it (ACCEPT — redaction is not tamper), tamper one payload byte in the page, and watch the
+REJECT name the offending event `seq`. The page contains **NO network API at all** (no `fetch`, no `XMLHttpRequest`, no
+WebSocket), so your packet bytes never leave your machine — check the browser **devtools Network tab**:
+it stays empty. Like the node bundle, it is built deterministically from these same sources
+(`node build-standalone-html.js --check` reproduces it byte-for-byte, pinned in
+[`dist/BUILD-PROVENANCE.json`](dist/BUILD-PROVENANCE.json)).
+
+The boundary on the page is the same one this README carries, verbatim: **ACCEPT is tamper-evidence
+that these exact bytes match the seal — and, for a signed seal, WHO vouched (signer recovery + optional
+vendor pin). It is NOT a trusted timestamp and NOT proof of WHEN without the P-3 trust-root. For
+CI/production gating use the node standalone (`verify-vh-standalone.js`).** The browser page is the
+first-contact convenience; your pipeline gates on the node standalone (§2b).
+
+---
+
+## 0z. The 5-second proof — one command, no flags, no key (`demo`)
+
+**Never run this tool before? Start here.** Before you have a packet, an address, or any idea what a "seal"
+is, run the **zero-config demo** — it takes a brand-new user from *nothing* to a *verified packet* in one
+command, with **no flags, no `--vendor` to paste, and no key knowledge**:
+
+```bash
+node verify-vh-standalone.js demo      # (or, from the split tree: node verify-vh.js demo)
+#    or, with nothing checked out at all:  npx --yes <package> demo
+```
+
+It ships a tiny, **genuinely-signed** evidence packet baked into the file, plays it through the **exact same
+verify path** every real check uses, and prints the honest verdict:
+
+```
+STEP 1 — verify the genuine packet (signer recovered from the bytes, then pinned):
+  ACCEPT — the artifact verifies. signer: 0x70997970c51812dc3a010c7d01b50e0d17dc79c8
+  ...
+STEP 2 — tamper ONE byte of a referenced file, then re-verify the SAME packet:
+  REJECT (CHANGED) — the tampered copy is caught:
+    CHANGED  model-card.md: sealed 0x1aeca0… != on-disk 0xb71fba…
+```
+
+A genuine packet is **ACCEPTED and its signer named**; a one-byte change is **REJECTED**. The demo's signature
+is a real EIP-191 signature by a **fixed, well-known TEST-ONLY key** (hardhat account #1 — never a real key,
+never real funds); the address above is genuinely *recovered* from the bytes by the same pure-JS secp256k1
+routine a real verify uses, not echoed. The demo writes only a throwaway temp dir it deletes, opens **no
+network**, and exits `0`. It proves exactly what §4 says — **tamper-evidence + signer-pin**, NOT a trusted
+"sealed at T" — and nothing more.
+
+**Want to poke at it with your own hands?** The bare `demo` runs in a throwaway dir and is gone when it exits —
+you can *watch* it but not *touch* it. Add a directory name and it **writes the same genuinely-signed packet
+into a folder you keep**, then prints the exact copy-paste commands to verify, tamper, and restore it yourself:
+
+```bash
+node verify-vh-standalone.js demo ./vh-demo     # writes ./vh-demo/{demo-packet.vhevidence.json, model-card.md, weights.txt}
+# It then prints, ready to paste:
+node verify-vh-standalone.js ./vh-demo/demo-packet.vhevidence.json --vendor 0x7099...79C8   # exit 0 = ACCEPT
+printf 'X' >> ./vh-demo/model-card.md                                                        # tamper one byte
+node verify-vh-standalone.js ./vh-demo/demo-packet.vhevidence.json --vendor 0x7099...79C8   # exit 3 = REJECT (CHANGED)
+```
+
+That is the working on-ramp from *watched a demo* to *verified my own bytes on disk* — the packet it writes is
+the same real artifact a producer would hand you (`mechanically tested in ../test/verifier.demo.test.js`), not a
+toy. Once it clicks, point the tool at a **real** packet you were handed
+(`node verify-vh.js <packet> --vendor 0xPRODUCER_ADDRESS`); and when you want a counterparty to be able to pin
+**you**, that is the paid producer side — **sign your own files** with `vh evidence seal --sign` (see §0a).
+
+---
+
+## 0b. "Who verifies the verifier?" — reproduce the bundle from source yourself (zero-trust bootstrap)
+
+The published checksum in §0 proves the file survived transport — but it comes **from the same place as
+the bundle**, so on its own it cannot prove the bundle is the source you can read here (if our
+distribution were compromised, both would swap together). The answer to *"who verifies the verifier?"* is
+to **reproduce the bundle from the in-tree source** and confirm the published checksum is exactly what
+that source compiles to. It is offline, Node-core-only (no `npm install`, no `hardhat`), and writes
+nothing:
+
+```bash
+# From the verifier/ tree you can READ end to end (the builder + every lib/*.js it inlines):
+node build-standalone.js --check
+#   -> per-target MATCH/MISMATCH for each bundle, its .sha256 sidecar, AND every inlined source file.
+#   exit 0 = every committed bundle, sidecar, and the build-provenance manifest reproduce byte-for-byte
+#            from source, and every source file hashes to its manifest-pinned sha256.
+#   exit 1 = something does not reproduce — the line NAMES the offending file (bundle, sidecar, or a
+#            specific lib/*.js source).
+```
+
+The build is **deterministic** (no timestamp, no randomness, a hand-fixed module list), so the bundle
+bytes are a pure function of the committed sources. `--check` recompiles both bundles in memory, recomputes
+their checksums, and compares against the committed files — and cross-checks each inlined source against the
+committed **build-provenance manifest**, [`dist/BUILD-PROVENANCE.json`](dist/BUILD-PROVENANCE.json). That
+manifest maps each published bundle's sha256 to the **ordered, individually-hashed** `lib/*.js` files it
+inlines — so you can `sha256` the exact files you audited and find their hashes there, then see they compose
+(in that order) the bundle whose hash is in the `.sha256` sidecar. Trust roots in **reading source**, not in
+trusting our hex.
+
+This proves **build integrity** — the bundle faithfully reproduces the audited source. It is NOT a claim
+that the source's *logic* is correct (read it, and run the conformance corpus, for that), and NOT a trusted
+timestamp/identity (that is **P-3**). `--check` opens **no network** and writes nothing under the tree
+(proven by `../test/verifier.reproduce.test.js`).
+
+Reproducing the bundle changes **nothing** about the trust boundary in §4: whether you run the one-file
+bundle or the split tree, the seal proves **tamper-evidence + signer-pin**, NOT a trusted "sealed at T"
+(that still requires **P-3** — see §4). The reproduce step moves trust from *our hex* to *the source you
+read*; it does not widen the *claim*.
+
+**Make it a RENEWING control, not a one-time read — wire `--check` into your own CI.** Auditing the
+verifier once is good; re-confirming it on *every* build is better, because a supply-chain swap of the
+verifier itself (a stale bundle, a one-byte source edit) then **fails your pipeline** instead of slipping
+past. Two shipped, copy-paste snippets do exactly that — they run `--check` and pass its exit code
+straight through, so any drift blocks the merge:
+
+- **[`ci/reproduce-vh.generic.sh`](ci/reproduce-vh.generic.sh)** — a portable `set -e` shell gate for
+  GitLab CI, CircleCI, Jenkins, a Makefile recipe, or a git hook. No config, no install: `./verifier/ci/reproduce-vh.generic.sh`.
+- **[`ci/reproduce-vh.github-actions.yml`](ci/reproduce-vh.github-actions.yml)** — a GitHub Actions
+  workflow you drop at `.github/workflows/reproduce-vh.yml`; a green check then *means* "the verifier we
+  depend on is still the exact source we audited."
+
+These are the verifier-integrity twins of the seal-gate snippets in §2b (that gate your *seals*; these
+gate the *verifier*). They are **examples the loop never runs**, but their exact gate command is
+mechanically tested (`../test/verifier.reproduce-ci-snippet.test.js`): it must exit `0` on a clean
+checkout and **non-zero, naming the offending source file,** when one byte of an inlined `lib/*.js`
+changes — so the snippet you copy is known-good, not aspirational. Wiring the gate widens **nothing**
+about the trust boundary in §4; it just makes the §0b reproduce answer *renew* on every build.
+
+---
+
+## 0a. Produce your OWN seal in 10 seconds, then hand it off (the free self-service round-trip)
+
+§0 is the FREE **verify** side. There is a matching FREE **produce** side, so you can run the *whole*
+loop yourself — seal your own files, hand the result to a counterparty, watch them verify it — with **no
+clone, no `npm install`, no account, no key**, on either side. Save ONE file —
+[`dist/seal-vh-standalone.js`](dist/seal-vh-standalone.js) — and run it with `node`. Like the verifier,
+it depends on **nothing but Node core** (the keccak provider is the same vendored pure-JS one):
+
+```bash
+# 1. Save the single file dist/seal-vh-standalone.js (optionally check dist/seal-vh-standalone.js.sha256
+#    the same way as the verifier in §0).
+
+# 2. Seal up to 25 of YOUR OWN files into one tamper-evident packet — no install, no key, no account:
+node seal-vh-standalone.js <your-folder> -o packet.vhevidence.json      # exit 0 = sealed
+
+# 3. Hand packet.vhevidence.json + your folder to a counterparty. They run the FREE verifier from §0:
+node verify-vh-standalone.js packet.vhevidence.json --dir <your-folder> # exit 0 = verifies; 3 = REJECTED
+```
+
+That is the entire organic adoption loop, self-service and free on both ends, before any sales call: one
+file to **seal**, one file to **verify**, and the `.vhevidence.json` is the only thing that has to change
+hands. The standalone sealer is built deterministically from these sources and a stale bundle FAILS CI
+(`../test/freeseal.standalone.test.js`); its seal bytes are byte-for-byte identical to the producer's own
+`cli/evidence.js` seal over the same folder, so a free seal is the *same* artifact the paid tool wraps —
+never a toy.
+
+**The honest scope boundary is exactly the same as §0 — and the free seal is *narrower* still.** A
+standalone seal proves **tamper-evidence + offline-recompute** — the referenced files are byte-for-byte
+the ones sealed, independently re-derivable by anyone — and **NOT** a trusted "sealed at T" without
+**P-3** (see §4). On top of that, the FREE seal is **UNSIGNED** (no signer to pin — there is no
+`--sign`/`--license`/`--key` flag here at all) and **capped at 25 files** (a folder of more than 25
+hard-errors and writes nothing). **SIGNING** (an EIP-191 signer-pin so a counterparty can pin you with
+`--vendor`) and **UNLIMITED** sealing are the PAID upgrade — `vh evidence seal --sign` / the
+`evidence_unlimited` entitlement (`--license`), routed through the full producer CLI. The free loop is
+the funnel; the paid upgrade adds *who signed it* and *no file cap*.
+
+---
+
+## 1. What you have, in one minute
+
+A counterparty (the "producer") ran a paid verifyhash tool over some files and handed you:
+
+1. **The artifact** — a small JSON file (`*.vhevidence.json`, `*.vhseal`, `*.vhdataset.json`, or a
+   proof bundle). It lists, for each file, a `relPath` and a keccak-256 `contentHash`, folds those
+   into one keccak Merkle **root**, and (if signed) carries a 65-byte secp256k1 signature over the
+   canonical bytes of that root.
+2. **The referenced files** themselves (e.g. `model-card.md`, `weights.bin`). By default they sit
+   next to the artifact; otherwise point `--dir` at them.
+3. **The producer's signer address** (`0x…`, 20 bytes) — out-of-band: a contract, an email
+   signature, a website. You pin it with `--vendor` so a *different* key cannot impersonate them.
+
+`verify-vh` recomputes the root from **the bytes you actually hold**, recovers **who signed it**, and
+tells you in one line whether both match.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Install & run
+
+```bash
+cd verifier
+npm install            # pulls ONE runtime dependency: js-sha3 (keccak). Nothing else.
+node verify-vh.js <artifact> [--vendor 0xADDR] [--dir <files-dir>] [--json]
+# or, after `npm link` / global install:
+verify-vh <artifact> --vendor 0xADDR
+```
+
+Requires Node ≥ 18. No build step, no native modules, no compiler.
+
+**Exit codes** (so you can gate CI on them):
+
+| code | meaning |
+|------|---------|
+| `0`  | **OK** — every referenced byte matches the seal, signature valid, signer == `--vendor` |
+| `3`  | **REJECTED** — a clean, expected NO verdict (file changed/missing, bad signature, wrong issuer) |
+| `2`  | usage error (bad flags) |
+| `1`  | I/O error (artifact unreadable) |
+
+---
+
+## 2a. Gate a whole release in one command — batch / manifest mode
+
+A release produces *many* artifacts (an evidence packet per dataset, a reconciliation seal per report, a
+proof bundle per claim). You should not have to call the verifier once per file and `&&` the exit codes
+by hand. Pass several artifacts — or a **manifest** listing them — and get **ONE** verdict and **ONE** CI
+exit code:
+
+```bash
+# Repeated artifacts (each inherits the one --vendor/--dir you pass):
+verify-vh a.vhevidence.json b.vhseal c.vhevidence.json --vendor 0xADDR --dir ./out
+
+# A manifest file (newline list OR JSON array), each entry with its OWN optional --vendor/--dir:
+verify-vh --manifest release.manifest --json
+```
+
+**The aggregate exit contract** — the same four codes, now over the *whole set*:
+
+| code | meaning |
+|------|---------|
+| `0`  | **OK** — and only if — **every** artifact in the batch verifies |
+| `3`  | **REJECTED** — **any** artifact is rejected; the report names **which** artifact failed and why |
+| `2`  | usage error (bad flag, malformed per-entry `--vendor`, empty manifest, `--manifest` + a positional) |
+| `1`  | I/O error (the manifest, or any listed artifact, is unreadable) — the batch never "passes" while an artifact could not be evaluated |
+
+**Manifest format.** Either a **newline list** (one entry per line; blank lines and `#` comments are
+skipped) or a **JSON array**. Each entry is an artifact path with an optional per-entry `--vendor` /
+`--dir`. Paths resolve relative to the **manifest file's own directory** (a release ships its manifest
+next to its artifacts); a top-level `--vendor`/`--dir` is a **default** each entry may override.
+
+```text
+# release.manifest (newline form)
+datasets/march.vhevidence.json --vendor 0xb463…3221 --dir datasets/march
+recon/q2.vhseal                --vendor 0xb463…3221
+proofs/claim-7.vhproof.json
+```
+
+```json
+[
+  "proofs/claim-7.vhproof.json",
+  { "artifact": "recon/q2.vhseal", "vendor": "0xb463…3221" },
+  { "artifact": "datasets/march.vhevidence.json", "vendor": "0xb463…3221", "dir": "datasets/march" }
+]
+```
+
+`--json` emits a **stable aggregate**:
+
+```json
+{ "ok": false, "total": 3, "passed": 2, "failed": 1,
+  "results": [ /* …one entry PER artifact, each the SAME shape the single-artifact --json emits… */ ] }
+```
+
+Each `results[]` entry is byte-identical in shape to the single-artifact `--json` object (the same core
+verifies every entry — no divergence). Gate your release CI on `ok` (or the process exit code). The
+batch path adds **no new crypto and no new artifact kind**, and every entry keeps the same per-entry
+**path-escape / no-network** guarantees as a lone verify. The **single-artifact** invocation
+(`verify-vh <artifact>`) is unchanged — a lone positional still emits the single-artifact object, not an
+aggregate.
+
+---
+
+## 2b. Wire it into your pipeline — a copy-paste CI merge gate
+
+A pilot becomes a renewal when the gate is *wired in*: the build fails the moment a sealed artifact is
+tampered, forged, or signed by the wrong key. Two shipped snippets make that one paste:
+
+- **[`ci/verify-vh.generic.sh`](ci/verify-vh.generic.sh)** — a portable `set -e` shell gate for **GitLab
+  CI, CircleCI, Jenkins, a Makefile recipe, or a git hook**. It is configured entirely by environment
+  variables (no in-file editing), runs the standalone verifier in single-artifact *or* manifest mode, and
+  passes the `0/3/2/1` exit code straight through so any non-zero verdict **fails the job**:
+
+  ```bash
+  # gate one artifact:
+  VH_VENDOR=0xPRODUCER VH_ARTIFACTS="dist/packet.vhevidence.json" ./verifier/ci/verify-vh.generic.sh
+  # gate a WHOLE release in one invocation:
+  VH_VENDOR=0xPRODUCER VH_MANIFEST=release.manifest               ./verifier/ci/verify-vh.generic.sh
+  ```
+
+  | env | meaning |
+  |-----|---------|
+  | `VH_VENDOR`    | **required** — the producer's signer address (`0x` + 20 bytes), pinned out-of-band |
+  | `VH_MANIFEST`  | a release manifest (gate every artifact at once) |
+  | `VH_ARTIFACTS` | space-separated artifact paths (when no manifest) |
+  | `VH_DIR`       | optional dir holding the referenced files |
+  | `VERIFY_VH`    | path to `verify-vh.js` (default `./verifier/verify-vh.js`) |
+
+- **[`ci/verify-vh.github-actions.yml`](ci/verify-vh.github-actions.yml)** — a GitHub Actions workflow you
+  drop at `.github/workflows/verify-vh.yml`. It installs **only** the standalone verifier (`js-sha3`, no
+  ethers/hardhat) and runs the gate on every push / pull request; a green check then *means* every sealed
+  artifact still matches the bytes the producer signed.
+
+Both ship as **examples the loop never runs**, but their exact gate command is mechanically tested
+(`../test/verifier.ci-snippet.test.js`): it must exit `0` on a good release and `3` on a tampered one, so
+the snippet you copy is known-good, not aspirational.
+
+**The boundary holds in CI too: verification is FREE, sealing is PAID.** Running this gate — like every
+`verify-vh` call — costs nothing, needs no licence, and opens no network. The licence gates only the
+**producer's** paid sealing surface; your pipeline gates on the proofs for free. A green gate is a
+*renewing* dependency precisely because checking the producer's seal never costs you anything, while
+producing a valid one is what the producer pays for.
+
+---
+
+## 2c. Verify an AGENT-SESSION packet (`*.vhagent.json`) — AgentTrace, free
+
+The producer's `vh agent seal` turns an ordered AI-agent session log (prompts, completions, tool
+calls/results, notes) into ONE tamper-evident, selectively-REDACTABLE packet. `verify-vh`
+auto-detects it like every other artifact kind — same command, same exit codes, zero install via the
+standalone bundle or the offline browser page (§0y has a built-in agent demo):
+
+```bash
+node verify-vh.js session.vhagent.json                      # unsigned packet (the FREE surface)
+node verify-vh.js session.vhagent.json --vendor 0xPRODUCER  # signed packet, signer pinned
+```
+
+What is INDEPENDENTLY re-derived (this verifier imports **nothing** from the producer stack — the
+whole convention is re-implemented against the verifier's own keccak):
+
+- **Every event leaf.** For a FULL event the payload's keccak-256 hash commitment is recomputed from
+  the payload bytes (and cross-checked against the carried commitment); for a REDACTED event the
+  well-formed carried commitment is what the tree binds. A one-byte payload edit — or a **forged
+  commitment on a redacted event** — is a REJECT that **names the offending event `seq`**. The
+  payload's UTF-8 encoding matches the producer **byte-for-byte** (a lone low surrogate encodes to its
+  literal 3-byte form; only a lone HIGH surrogate — which has no UTF-8 encoding — is rejected), so a
+  genuine packet the producer sealed is never falsely rejected here.
+- **The ordered head.** An RFC-6962-style, position-bound Merkle root (leaf `0x00` / node `0x01`
+  domain separation, children in tree order — NEVER sorted) over the event leaves. Reordering,
+  dropping, or inserting events changes the root: `root_mismatch`.
+- **The head signature, when present.** A signed packet carries a detached EIP-191 attestation over
+  the HEAD `{ size, root }` (so ONE signature stays valid for every redacted copy). The signer is
+  recovered with the same vendored secp256k1 routine and pinned to `--vendor`; a signature pasted
+  from a different session is `head_not_bound`, a forged one `bad_signature`, and a `--vendor` pin
+  on an UNSIGNED packet is a clean REJECT (`unsigned_cannot_pin_vendor`) — a stripped signature
+  never passes a pinned verify.
+
+The packet is SELF-CONTAINED (no sibling files, so `--dir` is irrelevant), and REDACTION IS NOT
+TAMPER: a packet whose payloads were withheld behind their commitments still verifies with the
+IDENTICAL head — the verdict lists exactly which seqs are withheld. The same honest boundary as
+everything else here: ACCEPT proves the LOG is unaltered since seal — **not** that the log
+faithfully records what the agent actually did, not a trusted timestamp, and `ts` fields are
+self-asserted (the packet's own in-band trust note says the same).
+
+---
+
+## 2d. Verify an ANCHORED RECEIPT's binding (`vh-anchored-receipt@1`) — zero producer stack (T-70.4)
+
+The producer's `vh anchor-artifact` binds a sealed artifact's ONE canonical digest into an on-chain
+registry record and emits a canonical **`vh-anchored-receipt@1`** container. The receipt's OFFLINE
+**binding leg** verifies here — same zero-install posture, no `ethers`, no producer code:
+
+```bash
+node verify-vh.js receipt.vhanchored.json --anchored-artifact packet.vhevidence.json
+# same flags on the single-file bundle: node verify-vh-standalone.js <receipt> --anchored-artifact <sealed-file>
+```
+
+The receipt is validated STRICTLY (unknown/missing fields, malformed chain facts, or an edited
+in-band trust note are each a named `bad-receipt`), and the sealed artifact's digest is RECOMPUTED
+through the SAME closed six-kind table the producer core uses (evidence seal, agent-session packet,
+journal tree head, TrustLedger reconciliation seal, dataset/parcel attestation — each re-validated
+through a strict, dependency-free port of its shipped validator first). ACCEPT is exit `0`; any
+deviation is the specific named reject — `digest-mismatch` / `kind-mismatch` / `how-mismatch` /
+`bad-receipt` / the artifact's own named reject — exit `3`, matching the producer cli's verdicts on
+the same inputs. On ACCEPT the verdict also **classifies the chain the receipt claims** — `chainClass`
+(`local-dev` / `public-testnet` / `unknown`) and a `publiclyMeaningful` boolean in `--json`, plus a
+leading `WARNING`/`ADVISORY` line — so a receipt from a **local dev chain** (worth nothing publicly,
+STRATEGY.md P-2) is never mistaken for a public proof. **The honest boundary:** this is the OFFLINE
+binding leg ONLY — the receipt's `chain` facts remain the *anchorer's claim* until re-checked against
+the chain, which needs a chain endpoint by definition and stays with the producer cli
+(`vh verify-anchored --rpc --contract`). See
+[`docs/ANCHORING.md`](../docs/ANCHORING.md) for what an anchored receipt proves and does NOT.
+
+---
+
+## 3. The exact bytes verified, and the scheme
+
+Nothing here is magic; it is two standard primitives you can re-implement in an afternoon.
+
+### 3a. Per-file content hash
+For each referenced file, `contentHash = keccak256(file_bytes)`, the raw file bytes with no framing,
+no normalization, no encoding step. Change one byte → a different hash. The verifier reports that file
+as `CHANGED` and prints both the sealed and the on-disk hash.
+
+### 3b. The keccak Merkle root
+The per-file `(relPath, contentHash)` leaves (plus, for reconciliation seals, a synthetic
+`verdict`/role header leaf so a verdict edit also moves the root) are folded into one **keccak-256
+Merkle root**. The verifier re-derives this root from the files on disk and compares it, byte-for-byte,
+to the `root` embedded in the artifact. (See `lib/merkle.js` for the exact leaf encoding and pairing
+order — it is short and dependency-free.)
+
+### 3c. The signature: EIP-191 `personal_sign` over keccak
+A signed artifact carries a 65-byte `r(32) || s(32) || v(1)` secp256k1 signature. The signed message
+is the **canonical UTF-8 bytes** of the artifact's unsigned payload (the same bytes the verifier
+re-derives in `lib/canonical.js` — it does NOT trust a "signature" field that just echoes a hash). The
+digest is the standard EIP-191 personal-sign pre-image:
+
+```
+keccak256( "\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n" + <decimal byte length> + <canonical message bytes> )
+```
+
+`verify-vh` recovers the signer **address** from `(message, signature)` using a tiny vendored
+secp256k1 public-key recovery (SEC 1 §4.1.6) over `js-sha3` keccak — **no `ethers`**. The address is
+`"0x" + last-20-bytes( keccak256( X32 || Y32 ) )`, lowercased. If you pass `--vendor 0xADDR`, the
+recovered address must equal it (compared as 20 raw bytes; checksum casing is ignored), or the verdict
+is `wrong_issuer`.
+
+---
+
+## 4. The trust boundary — read this before you rely on it
+
+`verify-vh` is honest about what a recomputation can and cannot prove. It proves, **purely from the
+bytes in your hands**:
+
+- ✅ **Tamper-evidence** — the referenced files are byte-for-byte the ones the producer sealed (if any
+  file changed, you see exactly which one, sealed-hash vs on-disk-hash).
+- ✅ **Offline recompute** — the root is independently re-derivable; you are not trusting our software,
+  our servers, or a "trust us, it matched" claim. No network call happens (proven mechanically — see
+  §6 and `test/verifier.isolation.test.js`).
+- ✅ **Signer-pin** — *which key* vouched for this artifact, pinned to an address you supply
+  out-of-band, so a different key cannot impersonate the producer.
+- ✅ **Revocation-aware (opt-in)** — with `--revocations <file-or-dir> [--as-of <ISO>]` `verify-vh`
+  consults the producer's signed key revocations and **downgrades** an otherwise-ACCEPTED artifact to
+  **REVOKED** (exit 3) when the signing key was revoked **at or before** the as-of instant (default:
+  now). A revocation dated *after* the as-of leaves it ACCEPTED with an informational later-revoked note;
+  a forged / tampered / third-party revocation is **ignored** with a warning (a revocation only ever
+  *removes* trust, never adds it — a key revokes itself). This reaches the **same** downgrade the
+  producer-stack `vh ... verify-signed --revocations <f> --as-of <T>` reaches on the identical inputs —
+  fully OFFLINE, no producer stack, no network, no key (see
+  [`../docs/KEY-LIFECYCLE.md`](../docs/KEY-LIFECYCLE.md)). A directory is read as a flat pool of
+  revocation files; a single file may be one revocation or a JSON array.
+
+It deliberately does **NOT** prove:
+
+- ❌ **A trusted "sealed at time T".** The signature says *this key vouched for these bytes*, not *on
+  this date*. Any `timestamp`/`sealedAt` field inside an artifact is producer-asserted and rides the
+  human-owned signing/timestamp trust-root (proposal **P-3** in `../STRATEGY.md`). For an *independent*
+  time anchor, the family offers a separate **RFC-3161** timestamp path (`vh … verify-timestamp`,
+  also offline) — that is a different deliverable, not something `verify-vh` asserts.
+- ❌ **A legal or accounting opinion.** A green verdict means the bytes and the signer check out. It is
+  not an attestation that the underlying claim (a reconciliation, a model's provenance) is *correct* —
+  that judgement belongs to the producer and their reviewers.
+
+In one sentence: **`verify-vh` tells you the bytes are unchanged and which key signed them — not when,
+and not whether the producer's conclusion is true.**
+
+---
+
+## 5. Worked example: producer seals → hands over packet → you run `verify-vh`
+
+This is a real, end-to-end run (test-only ephemeral keys; never a real key or real funds).
+
+**Step 1 — the producer seals** a directory of files into a signed evidence packet with their paid
+tool, then publishes their signer address `0xb463…3221` somewhere you trust:
+
+```
+data/
+  model-card.md
+  weights.bin
+  packet.vhevidence.json   ← the signed seal the producer hands you, alongside the two files
+```
+
+**Step 2 — you, the counterparty, verify** (you did NOT install the producer's stack):
+
+```bash
+cd verifier && npm install
+node verify-vh.js ../data/packet.vhevidence.json --vendor 0xb463f30cf53d1e0365130363ae9b9867998c3221
+```
+
+Output (exit `0`):
+
+```
+# verify-vh — .../data/packet.vhevidence.json
+kind:            vh.evidence-seal-signed
+embedded kind:   vh.evidence-seal
+signed:          yes
+recovered signer: 0xb463f30cf53d1e0365130363ae9b9867998c3221
+claimed signer:  0xb463f30cf53d1e0365130363ae9b9867998c3221
+pinned --vendor: 0xb463f30cf53d1e0365130363ae9b9867998c3221
+signer matches vendor: yes
+sealed root:     0x51004f29ea5b0081be2943d377b2c1572b0543af4bfea724642fa73db3589dd5
+recomputed root: 0x51004f29ea5b0081be2943d377b2c1572b0543af4bfea724642fa73db3589dd5
+root matches:    yes
+files: 2 matched, 0 changed, 0 missing, 0 rejected, 0 unexpected
+
+OK — the artifact verifies.
+```
+
+**Step 3 — tamper detection.** Suppose `model-card.md` was altered by one byte in transit. Re-running
+exits `3` and names the file:
+
+```
+recomputed root: 0xb2dd6f94…   (≠ sealed root)
+root matches:    NO
+REJECTED (CHANGED):
+  CHANGED    model-card.md: sealed 0x59396c16… != on-disk 0xd241bee9…
+```
+
+A wrong `--vendor` yields `wrong_issuer`; a corrupted signature yields `bad_signature` — both clean
+exit `3` verdicts, never a crash. Add `--json` for a stable machine verdict object
+(`{ verdict, reason, accepted, rootMatches, signerMatchesVendor, counts, … }`) to gate CI.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Why you can trust *this verifier* itself
+
+Independence is **mechanically enforced**, not just promised:
+
+- **No producer stack.** Every `require(` in this whole tree (`verify-vh.js` + `lib/*`) is grepped by
+  `../test/verifier.isolation.test.js`; it must never pull `ethers`, `hardhat`, `@nomicfoundation/*`,
+  or anything under `../cli/` or `../trustledger/`. The only runtime dependency is `js-sha3`.
+- **No network, no back-edge.** The same test runs a real verify and asserts the process opens **no
+  socket and no network handle** — `verify-vh` never `require`s `http`/`https`/`net`/`dns`. It cannot
+  phone home, because it has nothing to phone home *with*.
+- **Read-only.** It holds no key, writes nothing, and leaves your working tree byte-for-byte untouched.
+- **Cross-checked crypto.** Its secp256k1 recovery is independently re-implemented and continuously
+  cross-checked against the production path (`../test/verifier.crypto.test.js`) so the two can never
+  silently drift.
+
+See [`../docs/INDEPENDENT-VERIFICATION.md`](../docs/INDEPENDENT-VERIFICATION.md) for the full
+counterparty-facing specification.
+
+
+---
+<sub>© 2026 verifyhash.com · Licensed under Apache-2.0 (SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0) — see the [LICENSE](https://verifyhash.com/LICENSE) and [NOTICE](https://verifyhash.com/NOTICE) served with this file.</sub>