uvd-x402-sdk 2.72.0 → 2.73.0

package/dist/backend/index.d.mts

@@ -1486,6 +1486,22 @@ interface PrepareRelayFeedbackResponse {
      * nobody.
      */
     signingPayload?: string;
+    /**
+     * The full `eth_signTypedData_v4` payload. **v4 delegates only.**
+     *
+     * Present exactly when the delegate deployed on that chain is v4, which the
+     * facilitator reads from the chain per request rather than assuming from a
+     * release. **When it is present, sign IT** — the wallet renders the agent, the
+     * score, the tags and the deadline as named fields, so the rater sees what
+     * they authorise instead of a hex blob.
+     *
+     * v4 carries no {@link signingPayload} and needs none: `signTypedData` has no
+     * envelope to apply twice, which is the entire class of bug that kept the v3
+     * rail at zero signatures for days.
+     *
+     * Requires facilitator v1.96.0+.
+     */
+    typedData?: Record<string, unknown>;
     /**
      * Unix seconds after which the authorisation is void. Short on purpose:
      * relaying is permissionless, so a signed authorisation is live in the wild
@@ -2077,6 +2093,9 @@ declare class Erc8004Client {
      *    - wallet: `personal_sign` over `signingPayload`. `personal_sign` adds the
      *      envelope itself, so signing `digest` with it wraps the value TWICE and
      *      recovers a stranger — the only symptom is `relay_bad_signature`.
+     *    - **unless `typedData` came back** — that chain runs a v4 delegate. Then
+     *      sign THAT with `eth_signTypedData_v4` and ignore the other two: it is
+     *      the only form the rater can read, and it has no envelope ambiguity.
      * 2. If `delegated` is `false`, also produce an EIP-7702 authorization over
      *    `(chainId, delegate, accountNonce)`.
      * 3. Hand both to {@link submitRelayedFeedback} with the SAME feedback

package/dist/backend/index.d.ts

@@ -1486,6 +1486,22 @@ interface PrepareRelayFeedbackResponse {
      * nobody.
      */
     signingPayload?: string;
+    /**
+     * The full `eth_signTypedData_v4` payload. **v4 delegates only.**
+     *
+     * Present exactly when the delegate deployed on that chain is v4, which the
+     * facilitator reads from the chain per request rather than assuming from a
+     * release. **When it is present, sign IT** — the wallet renders the agent, the
+     * score, the tags and the deadline as named fields, so the rater sees what
+     * they authorise instead of a hex blob.
+     *
+     * v4 carries no {@link signingPayload} and needs none: `signTypedData` has no
+     * envelope to apply twice, which is the entire class of bug that kept the v3
+     * rail at zero signatures for days.
+     *
+     * Requires facilitator v1.96.0+.
+     */
+    typedData?: Record<string, unknown>;
     /**
      * Unix seconds after which the authorisation is void. Short on purpose:
      * relaying is permissionless, so a signed authorisation is live in the wild
@@ -2077,6 +2093,9 @@ declare class Erc8004Client {
      *    - wallet: `personal_sign` over `signingPayload`. `personal_sign` adds the
      *      envelope itself, so signing `digest` with it wraps the value TWICE and
      *      recovers a stranger — the only symptom is `relay_bad_signature`.
+     *    - **unless `typedData` came back** — that chain runs a v4 delegate. Then
+     *      sign THAT with `eth_signTypedData_v4` and ignore the other two: it is
+     *      the only form the rater can read, and it has no envelope ambiguity.
      * 2. If `delegated` is `false`, also produce an EIP-7702 authorization over
      *    `(chainId, delegate, accountNonce)`.
      * 3. Hand both to {@link submitRelayedFeedback} with the SAME feedback

package/dist/backend/index.js

@@ -2911,6 +2911,9 @@ var Erc8004Client = class {
    *    - wallet: `personal_sign` over `signingPayload`. `personal_sign` adds the
    *      envelope itself, so signing `digest` with it wraps the value TWICE and
    *      recovers a stranger — the only symptom is `relay_bad_signature`.
+   *    - **unless `typedData` came back** — that chain runs a v4 delegate. Then
+   *      sign THAT with `eth_signTypedData_v4` and ignore the other two: it is
+   *      the only form the rater can read, and it has no envelope ambiguity.
    * 2. If `delegated` is `false`, also produce an EIP-7702 authorization over
    *    `(chainId, delegate, accountNonce)`.
    * 3. Hand both to {@link submitRelayedFeedback} with the SAME feedback