ust-protocol 1.0.0-rc.1

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package/README.md

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+# ust-protocol
+
+**Verify machine-readable state without trusting whoever handed it to you.**
+
+UST (Universal State Transcript) is trust infrastructure for data: a signed, canonical, tamper-evident record of
+*state* — some data about the world at a moment — that verifies the same no matter how it reached you (a cache, a
+mirror, another agent, a file on disk). TLS secures the pipe; **UST secures the payload**, and the guarantee
+travels *with* the data.
+
+`ust-protocol` is the stateless reference base: canonical hashing (JCS), Ed25519 signing, three-tier
+verification, privacy commitments, chains, and anchoring. Zero-dependency (`node:crypto`; a WebCrypto/`@noble`
+adapter for browsers and Workers — same rules, same results).
+
+> **Release candidate — `1.0.0-rc.1`.** The specification has been extensively red-teamed; an independent
+> external cryptographic audit is pending. Suitable for evaluation and integration testing. Pin exact versions.
+
+## Install
+
+```
+npm i ust-protocol
+```
+
+## Verify a document
+
+```js
+import { verify } from 'ust-protocol';
+
+const r = verify(doc);
+// { result: 'VALID' | 'INVALID' | 'INDETERMINATE', identity, time, publisher, content_hash, ... }
+```
+
+- **`VALID`** — well-formed, hashes match the data, signature checks out: the document **is** what the publisher
+  committed to, unchanged.
+- **`INVALID`** — a check failed (tampering, bad signature, malformed) — with an `error` code.
+- **`INDETERMINATE`** — something needed for a higher tier was *unavailable* (not a failure; retry).
+
+## What it proves — and what it doesn't
+
+UST proves **fixation, not truth**: *this publisher committed to this data, at this time, unchanged.* It does
+**not** prove the data is *correct* — a publisher can sign a wrong reading. You learn **whom to hold accountable**
+and **that nothing was tampered** — a real, bounded guarantee, not an oracle of truth.
+
+## Trust tiers — same document, more trust as you bring more
+
+| Tier | You also supply | You learn |
+|------|-----------------|-----------|
+| **LIGHT** | nothing (the document alone) | integrity + a *claimed* publisher (`self-asserted`) |
+| **HIGH** | the publisher's genesis + key-log | the key is *provably bound* to the publisher's name (`authoritative`) |
+| **TOP** | an anchor proof | the document provably existed by a point in time; a stream is provably complete |
+
+```js
+// HIGH — resolve name authority
+verify(doc, { genesis, keylog, noForkConfirmed: true, requireAuthoritative: true });
+
+// TOP — verify a time-anchor's inclusion proof (substrate confirmation is delegated to the caller)
+import { verifyAnchor } from 'ust-protocol';
+verifyAnchor(content_hash, proof);
+```
+
+## Create
+
+```js
+import { buildState, seal } from 'ust-protocol';
+
+const state = buildState(
+  { domain_shard: 'example.com', ust_id: 'ust:20260705.15', key_id, class: 'observation' },
+  { generated_at, valid_from, valid_to },
+  { reading: { kind: 'captured', value: { temp_c: '21.4' } } }   // string-only leaves, verbatim
+);
+const doc = seal(state, privateKey, publicKeyB64url);
+```
+
+Also: `buildAttestation` (Merkle root over constituents), `buildDerivation` (based-on + seed), `buildGenesis`,
+`buildKeyLogEntry`, `buildCheckpoint`, `blindPartition` (privacy commitments). `resolveAuthority` and
+`verifyStream` cover HIGH name-authority and TOP completeness.
+
+## Design in one paragraph
+
+Every value is a **string** (numbers stay verbatim — no float drift). Documents are **canonicalized** (JCS,
+tightened) before hashing, so the same state always yields the same bytes. Hashing is **domain-separated**; the
+`content_hash` is a unique descriptor of the whole document. Signatures use **strict** Ed25519 (non-canonical `S`
+rejected). Verification is **fail-closed** and returns one of three honest outcomes — availability is never
+confused with failure.
+
+## Spec & conformance
+
+- Specification and a client-side verifier: **https://github.com/thelabmd/UST/blob/main/spec/UST-1.0.md**
+- This library is validated against a suite of deterministic conformance vectors (the same vectors any
+  independent implementation should pass).
+
+## License
+
+Apache-2.0 · © 2026 THE LAB

package/index.mjs

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+// ust-protocol — reference implementation of UST 1.0 (the official STATELESS base; the public verification lib) (REV 24), LIGHT floor first.
+// Written FROM THE SPEC (§ references inline), NOT copied from the vector generator — so running it against
+// the vectors is a cross-check between two independently-written artifacts. Zero-dependency: node:crypto
+// (Ed25519 + SHA-256). Portable note: WebCrypto (SubtleCrypto Ed25519) or @noble/{ed25519,hashes} for
+// browsers/Workers; same rules.
+import { createHash, sign as edSign, verify as edVerify, createPublicKey, createPrivateKey, createDecipheriv } from 'node:crypto';
+
+// ─── §6 Canonicalization (JCS tightened) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// keys sorted by UTF-16 code unit, no whitespace, string-only leaves (reject number/bool/null), NFC,
+// unique member names. Throws {code:'E-CANON'} on violation.
+export function canon(v) {
+  if (v === null || typeof v === 'number' || typeof v === 'boolean') throw err('E-CANON', 'non-string leaf');
+  if (typeof v === 'string') { if (v.normalize('NFC') !== v) throw err('E-CANON', 'non-NFC string'); return JSON.stringify(v); }
+  if (Array.isArray(v)) return '[' + v.map(canon).join(',') + ']';          // §6.3 order significant
+  if (typeof v === 'object') {
+    const k = Object.keys(v);
+    if (new Set(k).size !== k.length) throw err('E-CANON', 'duplicate key'); // §6.1
+    return '{' + k.slice().sort().map(x => JSON.stringify(x) + ':' + canon(v[x])).join(',') + '}';
+  }
+  throw err('E-CANON', 'unsupported');
+}
+
+// ─── §7 Domain-separated hash: H_t(x) = "sha256:" || hex(SHA256(ascii(t) || 0x00 || x)) ──────────────
+function sha(buf) { return 'sha256:' + createHash('sha256').update(buf).digest('hex'); }
+export const H = (tag, strInput) => sha(Buffer.concat([Buffer.from(tag, 'ascii'), Buffer.from([0]), Buffer.from(strInput, 'utf8')])); // x = utf8 string
+export const Hbytes = (tag, rawBuf) => sha(Buffer.concat([Buffer.from(tag, 'ascii'), Buffer.from([0]), rawBuf]));                     // x = raw bytes
+
+// ─── §12.2/§17 key_id = H("ust:keylog", raw_pub_bytes) — raw = base64url-decode(pub), NOT plain SHA256(pub)
+export const keyId = (pubB64url) => Hbytes('ust:keylog', Buffer.from(pubB64url, 'base64url'));
+
+// ─── §4.4 per-partition hash. captured binds domain_shard; computed omits it (cross-engine); private = over commit
+export function partitionHash({ domain_shard, ust_id, name, value, kind, commit }) {
+  if (commit !== undefined) return Hbytes('ust:shard', Buffer.from(commit, 'utf8')); // §4.4 private: hash over its commit
+  const scope = kind === 'computed' ? { ust_id, [name]: value } : { domain_shard, ust_id, [name]: value };
+  return H('ust:shard', canon(scope));
+}
+
+// ─── §7 content_hash = H("ust:state", canon({ust, state})) — the unique document descriptor ─────────────
+export const signedContent = (doc) => canon({ ust: doc.ust, state: doc.state });
+export const contentHash = (doc) => H('ust:state', signedContent(doc));
+
+// ─── §9.4 seed / §9.2 Merkle root ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+export const seed = (contentHashes) => H('ust:seed', canon(contentHashes));           // pinned signed order
+export function merkleRoot(contentHashes) {                                            // byte-ascending sort, ust:leaf/ust:node
+  let lvl = contentHashes.slice().sort().map(h => Hbytes('ust:leaf', Buffer.from(h, 'utf8')));
+  while (lvl.length > 1) {
+    const nx = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < lvl.length; i += 2)
+      nx.push(i + 1 < lvl.length ? Hbytes('ust:node', Buffer.from(lvl[i] + lvl[i + 1], 'utf8')) : lvl[i]);
+    lvl = nx;
+  }
+  return lvl[0];
+}
+
+// ─── §10 PRIVACY — blinded commitment (frame-bound, G23; nonce MUST be fresh & unique per commit, Z2) ────
+// commit = H_shard(canon({domain_shard, ust_id, nonce, <name>: value}))  — verifier reproduces from a disclosure.
+export const blindedCommit = ({ domain_shard, ust_id, name, value, nonce }) =>
+  H('ust:shard', canon({ domain_shard, ust_id, nonce, [name]: value }));
+// producer helper: build a blinded PRIVATE partition envelope + its hashes entry (§4.4 private hash = H over commit).
+export function blindPartition(name, value, { domain_shard, ust_id, nonce, kind = 'captured' }) {
+  const commit = blindedCommit({ domain_shard, ust_id, name, value, nonce });
+  return { partition: { kind, privacy: 'blinded', commit }, hash: partitionHash({ commit }) };
+}
+// §10 encrypted: AEAD-decrypt to recover the committed plaintext canon({nonce,<name>:value}). AES-256-GCM here
+// (node:crypto); XChaCha20-Poly1305 needs @noble/ciphers (browsers/Workers). enc.ct = b64url(iv12 || ct || tag16).
+function aeadDecrypt(enc, keyRawB64url) {
+  try {
+    if (enc.alg !== 'AES-256-GCM') return null;                         // XChaCha20-Poly1305: use @noble/ciphers
+    const raw = Buffer.from(enc.ct, 'base64url'), key = Buffer.from(keyRawB64url, 'base64url');
+    const iv = raw.subarray(0, 12), tag = raw.subarray(raw.length - 16), body = raw.subarray(12, raw.length - 16);
+    const d = createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key, iv); d.setAuthTag(tag);
+    return Buffer.concat([d.update(body), d.final()]).toString('utf8'); // the committed plaintext (utf8 canon)
+  } catch { return null; }                                             // auth-tag failure ⇒ null ⇒ E-COMMIT
+}
+
+// ─── crypto helpers (strict Ed25519 via node:crypto/OpenSSL) ─────────────────────────────────────────
+const pubKeyObj = (b64url) => createPublicKey({ key: Buffer.concat([Buffer.from('302a300506032b6570032100', 'hex'), Buffer.from(b64url, 'base64url')]), format: 'der', type: 'spki' });
+export function edVerifyStrict(pubB64url, msgUtf8, sigB64url) {
+  try { return edVerify(null, Buffer.from(msgUtf8, 'utf8'), pubKeyObj(pubB64url), Buffer.from(sigB64url, 'base64url')); }
+  catch { return false; }
+}
+
+// ─── producer: §7 seal — sign canon({ust,state}) with an Ed25519 private key ─────────────────────────
+export function seal(state, privKeyObj, pubB64url) {
+  const doc = { ust: '1.0', state };
+  const sig = edSign(null, Buffer.from(signedContent(doc), 'utf8'), privKeyObj).toString('base64url');
+  return { ust: '1.0', state, sig: { alg: 'Ed25519', key_id: state.id.key_id, pub: pubB64url, sig } };
+}
+
+// ─── producer helpers: assemble a State with the per-partition `hashes` auto-computed (§4.4). `seal` signs it.
+//     `id` = {domain_shard, ust_id, key_id[, parent_ust]}. `data` = {name: {kind,value} | {kind,privacy,commit,enc?}}.
+export function buildState(id, time, data, provenance) {
+  const hashes = {};
+  for (const [name, part] of Object.entries(data))
+    hashes[name] = part.commit !== undefined ? partitionHash({ commit: part.commit })
+      : partitionHash({ domain_shard: id.domain_shard, ust_id: id.ust_id, name, value: part.value, kind: part.kind });
+  const state = { id, time, data, hashes };
+  if (provenance) state.provenance = provenance;
+  return state;
+}
+export const buildAttestation = (id, time, data, constituents, prev) =>            // §9.2 constituents + Merkle root
+  buildState({ ...id, class: 'attestation' }, time, data, { constituents, root: merkleRoot(constituents), ...(prev !== undefined ? { prev } : {}) });
+export const buildDerivation = (id, time, data, basedOn, prev) =>                  // §9.3/§9.4 based_on + seed
+  buildState({ ...id, class: 'derivation' }, time, data, { based_on: basedOn, seed: seed(basedOn.map(b => b.hash)), ...(prev !== undefined ? { prev } : {}) });
+export const buildGenesis = (id, time, pub) =>                                     // §12.1 self-signed name-binding root
+  buildState({ ...id, class: 'genesis' }, time, { genesis: { kind: 'captured', value: { pub, role: 'name-binding-root' } } });
+export const buildKeyLogEntry = (id, time, keyOp, prev) =>                         // §12.2 add|rotate|revoke
+  buildState({ ...id, class: 'key' }, time, { key_op: { kind: 'captured', value: keyOp } }, { prev });
+export const buildCheckpoint = (id, time, head, frameCount, prev) =>              // §11.3 M5
+  buildState({ ...id, class: 'attestation' }, time, { checkpoint: { kind: 'computed', value: { head, frame_count: String(frameCount) } } }, { prev });
+
+// ─── reserved-key sets (§3/§4.2/§17) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+const RESERVED = { transcript: ['ust','state','sig','proof'], state: ['id','time','data','hashes','provenance'],
+  id: ['domain_shard','ust_id','key_id','class','parent_ust'], envelope: ['kind','value','privacy','commit','enc'] };
+const CLASSES = ['observation','attestation','derivation','genesis','key'];
+const TS = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}Z$/;                       // §6 pinned RFC3339 UTC-Z
+const USTID = /^ust:\d{8}\.\d{2}(\d{2}(\d{2})?)?$/;                        // §8
+
+// ─── §13 structural bounds — hard ceilings; exceed ⇒ E-BOUNDS ─────────────────────────────────────────
+const BOUNDS = { depth: 8, array: 4096, partitions: 64, breadth: 64, sizeBytes: 1048576 };
+export function checkBounds(doc) {
+  if (Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(doc), 'utf8') > BOUNDS.sizeBytes) return 'size > 1 MiB';
+  if (doc.state?.data && Object.keys(doc.state.data).length > BOUNDS.partitions) return 'partitions > 64';
+  let bad = null;
+  (function walk(v, d) {
+    if (bad) return;
+    if (d > BOUNDS.depth) { bad = 'depth > 8'; return; }
+    if (Array.isArray(v)) { if (v.length > BOUNDS.array) { bad = 'array > 4096'; return; } for (const x of v) walk(x, d + 1); }
+    else if (v && typeof v === 'object') for (const k of Object.keys(v)) walk(v[k], d + 1);
+  })(doc.state ?? doc, 0);
+  const pr = doc.state?.provenance;
+  if (!bad && pr) for (const f of ['based_on', 'constituents']) if (Array.isArray(pr[f]) && pr[f].length > BOUNDS.breadth) bad = f + ' breadth > 64';
+  return bad;
+}
+
+// ─── §14 Verification (LIGHT floor: steps 1,2,4,5,8 + §13 bounds). Returns the three-outcome result. ──
+// opts: { requireVersion:'1.0', context:'data'|'key' } ; HIGH/TOP (steps 3,6,7) are separate, later.
+export function verify(doc, opts = {}) {
+  try {
+    // step 1 — structural admission (§14.1)
+    if (typeof doc !== 'object' || doc === null) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'not an object');
+    if (doc.ust === undefined || doc.state === undefined || doc.sig === undefined) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'missing ust/state/sig');
+    if (doc.ust !== '1.0') return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'unknown version ' + doc.ust);   // §19 (this verifier is 1.0)
+    const bnd = checkBounds(doc); if (bnd) return bad('E-BOUNDS', bnd);               // §13 bounds
+    const st = doc.state;
+    for (const k of Object.keys(st)) if (!RESERVED.state.includes(k)) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'reserved-key: state.' + k);
+    if (!st.id || !st.time || !st.data || !st.hashes) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'state missing id/time/data/hashes');
+    for (const k of Object.keys(st.id)) if (!RESERVED.id.includes(k)) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'reserved-key: id.' + k);
+    // §I3 partition names must be non-reserved-envelope, non-collide
+    for (const name of Object.keys(st.data)) {
+      const part = st.data[name];
+      for (const k of Object.keys(part)) if (!RESERVED.envelope.includes(k)) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'reserved-key: data.' + name + '.' + k);
+    }
+    // step 2 — canonical, content_hash, bijection, per-partition hashes (§14.2, G19, §4.4)
+    let S; try { S = signedContent(doc); } catch (e) { return bad('E-CANON', e.detail || 'canon'); }
+    const ch = H('ust:state', S);
+    const dk = Object.keys(st.data).sort(), hk = Object.keys(st.hashes).sort();
+    if (dk.length !== hk.length || dk.some((k, i) => k !== hk[i])) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'hashes⇄data not a bijection (G19)');
+    for (const name of dk) {
+      const part = st.data[name];
+      let recomputed;
+      try {
+        recomputed = part.commit !== undefined
+          ? partitionHash({ commit: part.commit })
+          : partitionHash({ domain_shard: st.id.domain_shard, ust_id: st.id.ust_id, name, value: part.value, kind: part.kind });
+      } catch (e) { return bad('E-CANON', 'partition canon: ' + name); }
+      if (recomputed !== st.hashes[name]) return bad('E-CANON', 'partition hash mismatch: ' + name);
+    }
+    // step 5 — well-formed shape (§14.5)
+    if (!USTID.test(st.id.ust_id)) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'ust_id shape');
+    if (!TS.test(st.time.generated_at) || !TS.test(st.time.valid_from) || !TS.test(st.time.valid_to)) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'timestamp not pinned RFC3339-Z');
+    if (st.time.valid_from > st.time.valid_to) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'valid_from > valid_to');
+    if (!CLASSES.includes(st.id.class)) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'unknown class ' + st.id.class);
+    if (dk.length < 1) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'no partition');
+    for (const name of dk) {                                            // private partitions carry a commit
+      const part = st.data[name];
+      if (part.privacy !== undefined && part.commit === undefined) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'private partition without commit: ' + name);
+      if (part.privacy === undefined && part.value === undefined) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'public partition without value: ' + name);
+    }
+    // W3 class-context: a data verify must not accept a key-log/genesis transcript as data
+    if (opts.context === 'data' && (st.id.class === 'key' || st.id.class === 'genesis')) return bad('E-MALFORMED', 'class ' + st.id.class + ' not valid in data context (W3)');
+    // step 4 — authenticity (§14.4): key_id consistency + strict Ed25519 over S
+    if (doc.sig.key_id !== st.id.key_id) return bad('E-SIG', 'sig.key_id != state.id.key_id');
+    if (doc.sig.pub === undefined) return bad('E-KEY', 'no carried pub (LIGHT)');
+    if (keyId(doc.sig.pub) !== st.id.key_id) return bad('E-SIG', 'key_id != H(ust:keylog, pub)');
+    if (!edVerifyStrict(doc.sig.pub, S, doc.sig.sig)) return bad('E-SIG', 'Ed25519 verify failed');
+    // step 3 — name authority (HIGH, §12/§14.3): resolved ONLY if the caller supplies genesis+keylog.
+    const identity = opts.genesis ? resolveAuthority(doc, opts) : { strength: 'self-asserted', status: 'verified' };
+    if (identity.error) return bad(identity.error, identity.detail);              // forked genesis / broken key-log
+    if (opts.requireAuthoritative && !(identity.strength === 'authoritative' && identity.status === 'verified'))
+      return identity.status === 'unavailable'
+        ? { result: 'INDETERMINATE', reason: 'unavailable', identity, detail: identity.detail }   // W1: retry, NOT failure
+        : bad('E-GENESIS', 'authoritative required but ' + identity.strength + '/' + identity.status);
+    // step 8 — privacy (§14.8/§10): if the caller discloses {nonce,value}, REPRODUCE the commit; for
+    // `encrypted`, AEAD-decrypt must reproduce the SAME committed plaintext (E-COMMIT on mismatch). Never brute-force.
+    const disclosed = [];
+    for (const name of dk) {
+      const part = st.data[name];
+      if (part.privacy === undefined) continue;
+      const disc = opts.disclosures?.[name];
+      if (!disc) continue;                                                // not authorized — commit stands, opaque
+      const reproduced = blindedCommit({ domain_shard: st.id.domain_shard, ust_id: st.id.ust_id, name, value: disc.value, nonce: disc.nonce });
+      if (reproduced !== part.commit) return bad('E-COMMIT', 'blinded commit mismatch: ' + name);
+      if (part.privacy === 'encrypted' && part.enc && opts.decKeys?.[part.enc.key_id]) {
+        const pt = aeadDecrypt(part.enc, opts.decKeys[part.enc.key_id]);  // → canon({nonce,<p>:value}) plaintext
+        if (pt === null || pt !== canon({ nonce: disc.nonce, [name]: disc.value })) return bad('E-COMMIT', 'AEAD↔commit mismatch: ' + name);
+      }
+      disclosed.push(name);
+    }
+    // step 9 — provenance (§14.9): bound source identity (§9.1, I8). A source with a verifiable `src_sig`
+    // (the source's own signature over its `addr`) is AUTHENTICATED; without one it is an operator LABEL —
+    // marked `unauthenticated`, and a consumer MUST NOT surface it as source attribution.
+    const sources = {};
+    if (st.provenance?.sources) for (const [sid, s] of Object.entries(st.provenance.sources)) {
+      const key = opts.sourceKeys?.[sid];
+      sources[sid] = (key && s.src_sig && edVerifyStrict(key, s.addr, s.src_sig)) ? 'authenticated' : 'unauthenticated';
+    }
+    // §14.9 attestation: recompute the Merkle root from constituents (⇒ E-ROOT on mismatch).
+    if (st.id.class === 'attestation' && st.provenance?.constituents && st.provenance?.root !== undefined)
+      if (merkleRoot(st.provenance.constituents) !== st.provenance.root) return bad('E-ROOT', 'attestation root mismatch');
+    return { result: 'VALID', identity, disclosed, sources,
+      publisher: st.id.domain_shard, ust_id: st.id.ust_id, class: st.id.class, content_hash: ch,
+      time: { strength: 'unproven', status: doc.proof ? 'present' : 'none' } };
+  } catch (e) {
+    return bad(e.code || 'E-MALFORMED', e.detail || String(e));         // fail-closed (§14/I10)
+  }
+}
+
+// ─── §12 HIGH name-authority resolution. STATELESS: the caller (ustate/engine) supplies the genesis +
+//     key-log transcripts (retrieval is the stateful layer's job) and asserts no-fork from the witness (W1).
+export function resolveAuthority(doc, { genesis, keylog = [], noForkConfirmed = false, anchorTime } = {}) {
+  if (!genesis) return { strength: 'self-asserted', status: 'verified' };         // LIGHT — nothing to resolve
+  const gv = verify(genesis);                                                     // genesis is itself a UST transcript
+  if (gv.result !== 'VALID') return { error: 'E-GENESIS', detail: 'genesis invalid: ' + gv.error };
+  if (genesis.state.id.class !== 'genesis') return { error: 'E-GENESIS', detail: 'not class:genesis' };
+  if (genesis.sig.key_id !== genesis.state.id.key_id) return { error: 'E-GENESIS', detail: 'genesis not self-signed' };
+  if (genesis.state.id.domain_shard !== doc.state.id.domain_shard) return { error: 'E-GENESIS', detail: 'genesis domain mismatch' };
+  if (keylog.length > 256) return { error: 'E-BOUNDS', detail: 'key-log > 256 (§13)' };
+  let prevHash = contentHash(genesis);
+  const validPubs = new Set([genesis.sig.pub]);                                   // genesis key signs the first entry
+  const addedKeyIds = new Set([genesis.state.id.key_id]);
+  const revoked = new Map();                                                      // §12.2 X1: key_id → {reason, compromised_since, at}
+  for (const [i, e] of keylog.entries()) {                                        // §12.2 walk: prev-chained, self-signed
+    const ev = verify(e, { context: 'key' });
+    if (ev.result !== 'VALID') return { error: 'E-KEY', detail: 'key-log entry ' + i + ' invalid: ' + ev.error };
+    if (e.state.id.class !== 'key') return { error: 'E-KEY', detail: 'entry ' + i + ' not class:key' };
+    if (e.state.provenance?.prev !== prevHash) return { error: 'E-PREV', detail: 'entry ' + i + ' prev not chained' };
+    if (!validPubs.has(e.sig.pub)) return { error: 'E-KEY', detail: 'entry ' + i + ' not signed by a current valid key' };
+    const op = e.state.data.key_op.value;
+    if (op.op === 'add' || op.op === 'rotate') { validPubs.add(op.pub); addedKeyIds.add(op.new_key_id); }
+    else if (op.op === 'revoke') revoked.set(keyId(op.pub), { reason: op.reason, compromised_since: op.compromised_since, at: e.state.time.generated_at });
+    prevHash = contentHash(e);
+  }
+  if (!addedKeyIds.has(doc.state.id.key_id))
+    return { strength: 'self-asserted', status: 'verified', detail: 'doc key not in this key-log' };
+  // §12.2 X1 — revocation window, decided against the anchor UPPER BOUND (U = anchorTime, from §11.2).
+  const rev = revoked.get(doc.state.id.key_id);
+  let suspect = false;
+  if (rev) {
+    const U = anchorTime;                                                         // proven "not later than"
+    if (rev.reason === 'compromised') {
+      if (!U) return { strength: 'self-asserted', status: 'revoked-untrusted', detail: 'compromised key + UNANCHORED doc → untrusted (X1)' };
+      if (U >= rev.compromised_since) return { error: 'E-KEY', detail: 'signature not provably before compromise (U ≥ compromised_since, X1)' };
+      suspect = true;                                                             // provably pre-compromise, but C is a publisher estimate
+    } else if (rev.reason === 'retired' && U && U > rev.at)
+      return { strength: 'self-asserted', status: 'expired', detail: 'signed after hygienic retirement (X1)' };
+  }
+  // W1 — authoritative REQUIRES a positive no-fork confirmation (the witness), the caller/ustate's job.
+  if (!noForkConfirmed) return { strength: 'authoritative', status: 'unavailable',
+    detail: 'no-fork not confirmed (W1: witness check is the caller job) → authoritative DENIED, retry' };
+  return { strength: 'authoritative', status: suspect ? 'suspect' : 'verified' };
+}
+
+// ─── TOP §11.2 anchor-proof: recompute the Merkle inclusion path content_hash→root (RFC 6962, domain-sep
+//     ust:leaf/ust:node). The SUBSTRATE check (e.g. bitcoin-ots) is DELEGATED to opts.substrateVerify (needs
+//     external Bitcoin access — the caller/ustate's job). Returns { inclusion, time, status, anchorTime? }.
+export function verifyAnchor(contentHash, proof, opts = {}) {
+  let node = Hbytes('ust:leaf', Buffer.from(contentHash, 'utf8'));
+  for (const s of proof.path) node = Hbytes('ust:node', Buffer.from(s.dir === 'L' ? s.hash + node : node + s.hash, 'utf8'));
+  const inclusion = node === proof.root;
+  if (!inclusion) return { inclusion: false, time: 'unproven', status: 'verified', detail: 'inclusion path does not reach root' };
+  if (!opts.substrateVerify) return { inclusion: true, time: 'unproven', status: 'unavailable', detail: 'inclusion OK; substrate not verified (caller job)' };
+  const sub = opts.substrateVerify(proof.anchor, proof.root);          // → { final, time }
+  if (!sub) return { inclusion: true, time: 'unproven', status: 'unavailable', detail: 'substrate unreachable' };
+  if (!sub.final) return { inclusion: true, time: 'unproven', status: 'verified', detail: 'substrate not final (e.g. <6 conf)' };
+  return { inclusion: true, time: 'anchored', status: 'verified', anchorTime: sub.time };
+}
+
+// ─── TOP §11.3 completeness: a sequenced stream is prev-chained; first frame's prev = genesis content_hash
+//     (M4); per-frame validity is verified too (X2 — completeness ≠ validity); duplicate ust_id / shared prev
+//     = a fork ⇒ E-PREV (Y1). 'proven' needs a covering checkpoint (M5); else the open tail is 'provisional'.
+export function verifyStream(frames, { genesis, checkpoint, requirePerFrameValid = true } = {}) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(frames) || !frames.length) return { complete: 'none' };
+  let prevHash = genesis ? contentHash(genesis) : null;
+  const seenUstId = new Set(), seenPrev = new Set();
+  for (const [i, f] of frames.entries()) {
+    if (requirePerFrameValid) { const v = verify(f, { context: 'data' }); if (v.result !== 'VALID') return { error: 'E-SIG', detail: 'frame ' + i + ' invalid: ' + v.error }; } // X2
+    if (seenUstId.has(f.state.id.ust_id)) return { error: 'E-PREV', detail: 'duplicate ust_id (fork, Y1): ' + f.state.id.ust_id };
+    seenUstId.add(f.state.id.ust_id);
+    const p = f.state.provenance?.prev;
+    if (i === 0) { if (genesis && p !== prevHash) return { error: 'E-PREV', detail: 'first frame prev != genesis content_hash (M4)' }; }
+    else if (p !== prevHash) return { error: 'E-PREV', detail: 'frame ' + i + ' prev dangling (broken chain)' };
+    if (p && seenPrev.has(p)) return { error: 'E-PREV', detail: 'two frames share a prev (fork, Y1)' };
+    if (p) seenPrev.add(p);
+    prevHash = contentHash(f);
+  }
+  // M5 — a COVERING checkpoint (class:attestation asserting head + frame_count) closes the interval → 'proven'.
+  if (checkpoint) {
+    const cv = verify(checkpoint, { context: 'data' });
+    if (cv.result !== 'VALID' || checkpoint.state.id.class !== 'attestation') return { error: 'E-PREV', detail: 'invalid checkpoint' };
+    const a = checkpoint.state.data.checkpoint?.value;
+    if (!a || a.head !== prevHash || String(a.frame_count) !== String(frames.length))
+      return { error: 'E-PREV', detail: 'checkpoint contradicts observed set (M5)' };
+    return { complete: 'proven', head: prevHash };
+  }
+  return { complete: 'provisional', head: prevHash };                  // no checkpoint → open tail (P5)
+}
+
+function err(code, detail) { const e = new Error(code); e.code = code; e.detail = detail; return e; }
+function bad(code, detail) { return { result: 'INVALID', error: code, detail }; }

package/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+{
+  "name": "ust-protocol",
+  "version": "1.0.0-rc.1",
+  "description": "Universal State Transcript (UST) — the stateless reference base: canonical hashing (JCS), Ed25519 signing, three-tier verification (LIGHT/HIGH/TOP), privacy commitments, chains, and anchoring. Trust infrastructure for machine-readable state.",
+  "author": "THE LAB (https://thelab.md)",
+  "type": "module",
+  "main": "./index.mjs",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": "./index.mjs"
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "index.mjs",
+    "LICENSE",
+    "README.md"
+  ],
+  "keywords": [
+    "ust",
+    "trust-infrastructure",
+    "verification",
+    "ed25519",
+    "canonical",
+    "jcs",
+    "merkle",
+    "provenance",
+    "attestation",
+    "notarization"
+  ],
+  "license": "Apache-2.0",
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">=18"
+  },
+  "sideEffects": false,
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "git+https://github.com/thelabmd/UST.git",
+    "directory": "packages/ust-protocol"
+  },
+  "homepage": "https://github.com/thelabmd/UST/tree/main/packages/ust-protocol#readme",
+  "bugs": "https://github.com/thelabmd/UST/issues"
+}