usebeeline 0.0.128 → 0.0.130
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +2 -2
- package/dist/usebeeline.mjs +512 -435
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/README.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The corner receives a GitHub App token scoped to **that one repository**, instal
|
|
|
105
105
|
- **The filesystem boundary is the sandbox, not a tool list.** Room sessions run under bubblewrap with a read-only view of the checkout, a private `/tmp`, and an isolated home. Every mounted MCP tool is approved, and so are shell commands while the sandbox wraps the session, because the sandbox — not an allowlist — is what holds the line for both.
|
|
106
106
|
- **When the sandbox cannot be built, the daemon says so and keeps serving.** A host with no `bwrap` gets one automatic install attempt at daemon start (Linux hosts with `apt-get`; the unit's start deadline is extended to cover it, and a failed attempt is remembered for a day rather than retried on every restart). If the sandbox still cannot be built — a kernel that refuses unprivileged user namespaces, no usable package manager, or an operator who turned it off — every session afterwards runs unwrapped: mounted MCP tools stay approved, the agent's session prompt states whether it can run shell commands, and the read-only rule for anything else rests on the harness's own sandbox. Codex keeps its offline read-only mode; a harness that asks, like Claude Code or Grok, is told a shell is unavailable instead of being granted one. Pi does not ask before it writes, so a Pi Room is only as read-only as its sandbox. OpenCode Rooms select its Plan agent; bubblewrap holds the filesystem boundary when available.
|
|
107
107
|
- **Write access requires a corner.** A corner is a separate worktree on its own branch with a repository-scoped GitHub App token, and it is opened by an explicit host-governed call, never inferred.
|
|
108
|
-
- **
|
|
109
|
-
- **Yolo mode**
|
|
108
|
+
- **Resource authority follows ownership.** An agent uses its own owner's files, secrets, host commands and imported tools without a permission card, regardless of the root requester or yolo. Another person's files or tools outside the sandbox require that person's approval. The wallet retains its separate consent rule. Credential-file and unread-script command hard stops still ask. Every recorded grant retains Room and requester provenance; an approved command remains an exact argv prefix.
|
|
109
|
+
- **Yolo mode** remains owner-only agent configuration. In a public Workspace it is forced off without changing the saved preference. Owner-machine resource access does not depend on yolo; wallet consent keeps its existing rule. Generic budget grants are retired.
|
|
110
110
|
- **Provider keys never reach Beeline's servers.** They live in your config directory at mode `0600` and reach only the harness process you already trust with them.
|
|
111
111
|
- **Honest about what is not built yet:** `command` and `mcp` grants directly gate their corresponding operations. `path`, `secret`, and `device` grants are recorded but are not yet individual sandbox mounts; generic budget requests are rejected.
|
|
112
112
|
|