url-sanitizer 2.3.1 → 4.0.0

package/README.md

@@ -7,31 +7,34 @@
 
 A robust URL sanitizer for Node.js, browsers, and websites.
 It sanitizes not only regular URLs but also deeply inspects `data` URLs and `blob` URLs.
-It also provides built-in utilities to parse URLs and verify URI schemes.
-
-## Features
-
-* **Secure by Default**: Automatically denies `javascript:` and `vbscript:` schemes.
-* **Deep Data URL Inspection**: Parses, decodes (including base64), and sanitizes nested data URLs.
-* **Blob URL Support**: Converts and sanitizes blob URLs into safe data URLs (async).
-* **Relative & Absolute Path Support**: Safely allows same-origin absolute paths and relative paths via an opt-in parameter.
-* **DOMPurify Integration**: Purifies HTML/SVG content embedded within data URLs. *Note: This library is optimized for URL sanitization and is not intended as a complete HTML sanitizer for arbitrary untrusted markup.*
-* **Pure ESM with TypeScript Support**: Works seamlessly across modern environments like Node.js, Deno, websites, and browsers (including WebExtensions).
+It also provides built-in utilities to inspect URLs and verify URI schemes.
 
 ## Table of Contents
+* [Features](#features)
 * [Install](#install)
 * [Usage](#usage)
 * [API Reference](#api-reference)
   * [sanitizeURL(url, opt)](#sanitizeurlurl-opt)
   * [sanitizeURLSync(url, opt)](#sanitizeurlsyncurl-opt)
-  * [parseURL(url)](#parseurlurl)
-  * [parseURLSync(url)](#parseurlsyncurl)
+  * [inspectURL(url)](#inspecturlurl)
+  * [inspectURLSync(url)](#inspecturlsyncurl)
   * [isURI(uri)](#isuriuri)
   * [isURISync(uri)](#isurisyncuri)
   * [urlSanitizer Instance](#urlsanitizer)
+* [Threat Model](#threat-model)
+* [AI / LLM Application Security](#ai--llm-application-security)
 * [Performance](#performance)
 * [Acknowledgments](#acknowledgments)
 
+## Features
+
+* **Secure by Default**: Strictly blocks `javascript:` and `vbscript:` schemes.
+* **Deep Data URL Inspection**: Parses, decodes (including base64), and sanitizes nested data URLs.
+* **Blob URL Support**: Converts and sanitizes blob URLs into safe data URLs (async).
+* **Relative & Absolute Path Support**: Safely allows root-relative paths (e.g., `/foo`) and relative paths (e.g., `./foo`) via an opt-in parameter.
+* **DOMPurify Integration**: Purifies HTML/SVG content embedded within data URLs.
+* **Pure ESM with TypeScript Support**: Works seamlessly across modern environments like Node.js, Deno, websites, and browsers (including WebExtensions).
+
 ## Install
 
 ### Node.js
@@ -42,11 +45,13 @@ npm i url-sanitizer
 
 ### Deno
 
-You can import directly in your code without installing:
-``` javascript
-import urlSanitizer from "npm:url-sanitizer";
+```javascript
+import urlSanitizer from 'npm:url-sanitizer';
 ```
 
+**Note:** This library assumes a Node.js/npm-compatible dependency resolution environment, so we recommend using the `npm:` specifier.
+CDN-based ESM imports (e.g., `esm.sh`, `jsdelivr`, or `unpkg`) may work, but are not tested or guaranteed.
+
 ### Browsers and Websites
 
 Standalone ESM builds are available in the `dist/` directory:
@@ -55,14 +60,26 @@ Standalone ESM builds are available in the `dist/` directory:
 * node_modules/url-sanitizer/dist/url-sanitizer-wo-dompurify.min.js
 
 Alternatively, download them from [Releases](https://github.com/asamuzaK/urlSanitizer/releases).
-**NOTE:** url-sanitizer-wo-dompurify.min.js is a lightweight build without [DOMPurify](https://www.npmjs.com/package/dompurify) bundled.
+``` html
+<script type="module">
+  import urlSanitizer from 'path/to/url-sanitizer.min.js';
+</script>
+```
+
+**Note:** `url-sanitizer-wo-dompurify.min.js` is a lightweight build without [DOMPurify](https://www.npmjs.com/package/dompurify) bundled.
 If you use this build, ensure DOMPurify is exposed globally (e.g., `window.DOMPurify`), otherwise the sanitizer will throw an error at runtime.
+``` html
+<script src="https://unpkg.com/dompurify/dist/purify.min.js"></script>
+<script type="module">
+  import urlSanitizer from 'path/to/url-sanitizer-wo-dompurify.min.js';
+</script>
+```
 
 ## Usage
 
 ``` javascript
 import urlSanitizer, {
-  isURI, isURISync, parseURL, parseURLSync, sanitizeURL, sanitizeURLSync
+  isURI, isURISync, inspectURL, inspectURLSync, sanitizeURL, sanitizeURLSync
 } from 'url-sanitizer';
 ```
 
@@ -73,79 +90,104 @@ import urlSanitizer, {
 Sanitizes the given URL asynchronously.
 
 * `blob`, `data`, and `file` schemes must be explicitly allowed.
-* Given a blob URL, it returns a sanitized **data** URL.
+* <a name="about-file-scheme">**WARNING**</a><br>
+  **File URLs:** Allowing the `file` scheme can be extremely dangerous in web applications, as it may expose the host's local file system to attacks like Local File Inclusion (LFI). Only allow it if you fully trust the input or are operating in a strictly isolated local environment.
+* **Blob URLs:** Given a **blob** URL, it converts and returns a sanitized **data** URL.
+  * The sanitized data URL will **not** be converted back to a blob URL.
+  * It is highly recommended to set the `opt.revokeObjectURL` option to `true` when you allow `blob` URLs.
+  * Converting a blob URL to a data URL consumes memory, so be aware of the risk of memory exhaustion when handling huge blobs.
+  * You can restrict the allowed blob size using the `opt.maxBlobSize` option.
+    Default is `16_777_216` (16MB).
+    While 16MB may be suitable for client-side processing, it is highly recommended to reduce this limit to `1_048_576` (1MB) or `2_097_152` (2MB) in server-side applications.
+    Parsing large HTML/SVG contents inside Data/Blob URLs via JSDOM can consume massive amounts of V8 heap memory.
 
 #### Parameters
 
 * url **string** URL input.
-* opt **object?** Options.
-  * opt.allow **Array<string>?** Array of allowed schemes, e.g., ['data'].
-  * opt.deny **Array<string>?** Array of denied schemes, e.g., ['web+foo'].
-  * opt.only **Array<string>?** Array of specific schemes to allow, e.g., ['git', 'https'].
+* opt **\[object\]** Options.
+  * opt.allow **\[Array&lt;string&gt;\]** Array of allowed schemes, e.g., \['data'\].
+  * opt.deny **\[Array&lt;string&gt;\]** Array of denied schemes, e.g., \['web+foo'\].
+  * opt.only **\[Array&lt;string&gt;\]** Array of specific schemes to allow, e.g., \['git', 'https'\].
     `only` takes precedence over `allow` and `deny`.
-  * opt.allowRelative **boolean?** If `true`, allows safe same-origin absolute paths and relative paths. Default is `false`.
-  * opt.debug **boolean?** If `true`, outputs internal error/warning logs to the console. Default is `false`.
-  * opt.maxBlobSize **number?** Maximum allowed blob size in bytes. Default is `33554432` (32MB). Exceeding this limit will result in parsing failure to prevent memory exhaustion.
+  * opt.allowRelative **\[boolean\]** If `true`, allows root-relative paths (e.g. `/foo`) and relative paths (e.g. `./foo`). Default is `false`.
+  * opt.debug **\[boolean\]** If `true`, outputs internal error/warning logs to the console. Default is `false`.
+  * opt.revokeObjectURL **\[boolean\]** Revokes the blob URL after sanitization. Default is `false`. However, to prevent memory leaks, it is highly recommended to set this option to `true`.
+  * opt.maxBlobSize **\[number\]** Maximum allowed blob size in bytes. Default is `16_777_216` (16MB).
 
-**Returns** **Promise<string?>** Sanitized URL, nullable.
+**Returns** **Promise&lt;string?&gt;** Sanitized URL, nullable.
 
 #### Samples
 
+Never allow `javascript:` and/or `vbscript:` schemes:
+``` javascript
+const res1 = await sanitizeURL('javascript:alert(1)');
+// => null
+
+const res1_2 = await sanitizeURL('vbscript:msgbox("XSS")');
+// => null
+
+// Even if explicitly added to the `allow` or `only` list, they are strictly blocked:
+const res1_3 = await sanitizeURL('javascript:alert(1)', {
+  allow: ['javascript']
+});
+// => null
+```
+
 Sanitize tags and quotes:
 ``` javascript
-const res1 = await sanitizeURL('https://example.com/?<script>alert(1)</script>');
+const res2 = await sanitizeURL('https://example.com/?<script>alert(1)</script>');
 // => 'https://example.com/'
 
-const res1_2 = await sanitizeURL('https://example.com/" onclick="alert(1)"');
+const res2_2 = await sanitizeURL('https://example.com/" onclick="alert(1)"');
 // => 'https://example.com/'
 ```
 
 Parse and sanitize data URLs:
 ``` javascript
-const res2 = await sanitizeURL('data:text/html,<div><script>alert(1);</script></div><p onclick="alert(2)"></p>', {
+const res3 = await sanitizeURL('data:text/html,<div><script>alert(1);</script></div><p onclick="alert(2)"></p>', {
   allow: ['data']
 });
 // => 'data:text/html,%3Cdiv%3E%3C/div%3E%3Cp%3E%3C/p%3E'
 
-console.log(decodeURIComponent(res2));
+console.log(decodeURIComponent(res3));
 // => 'data:text/html,<div></div><p></p>'
 
 // Also can parse and sanitize base64 encoded data:
-const base64data3 = btoa('<div><script>alert(1);</script></div>');
-const res3 = await sanitizeURL(`data:text/html;base64,${base64data3}`, {
+const base64data4 = btoa('<div><script>alert(1);</script></div>');
+const res4 = await sanitizeURL(`data:text/html;base64,${base64data4}`, {
   allow: ['data']
 });
 // => 'data:text/html,%3Cdiv%3E%3C/div%3E'
 
-console.log(decodeURIComponent(res3));
+console.log(decodeURIComponent(res4));
 // => 'data:text/html,<div></div>'
 
-const base64data3_2 = btoa('<div><img src="javascript:alert(1)"></div>');
-const res3_2 = await sanitizeURL(`data:text/html;base64,${base64data3_2}`);
+const base64data4_2 = btoa('<div><img src="javascript:alert(1)"></div>');
+const res4_2 = await sanitizeURL(`data:text/html;base64,${base64data4_2}`);
 // => 'data:text/html,%3Cdiv%3E%3Cimg%3E%3C/div%3E'
 
-console.log(decodeURIComponent(res3_2));
+console.log(decodeURIComponent(res4_2));
 // => 'data:text/html,<div><img></div>'
 ```
 
 Parse and sanitize blob URLs:
 ``` javascript
-const blob4 = new Blob(['<svg><g onload="alert(1)"/></svg>'], {
+const blob5 = new Blob(['<svg><g onload="alert(1)"/></svg>'], {
   type: 'image/svg+xml'
 });
-const url4 = URL.createObjectURL(blob4);
-const res4 = await sanitizeURL(url4, {
+const url5 = URL.createObjectURL(blob5);
+const res5 = await sanitizeURL(url5, {
   allow: ['blob']
 });
 // => 'data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg%3E%3Cg%3E%3C/g%3E%3C/svg%3E'
 
-console.log(decodeURIComponent(res4));
+console.log(decodeURIComponent(res5));
 // => 'data:image/svg+xml,<svg><g></g></svg>'
 ```
 
 Denies if the scheme matches the `deny` list:
 ``` javascript
-const res5 = await sanitizeURL('web+foo://example.com', {
+const res6 = await sanitizeURL('web+foo://example.com', {
   deny: ['web+foo']
 });
 // => null
@@ -153,18 +195,18 @@ const res5 = await sanitizeURL('web+foo://example.com', {
 
 Allows only if the scheme matches the `only` list:
 ``` javascript
-const res6 = await sanitizeURL('http://example.com', {
+const res7 = await sanitizeURL('http://example.com', {
   only: ['data', 'git', 'https']
 });
 // => null
 
-const res6_2 = await sanitizeURL('https://example.com/"onmouseover="alert(1)"', {
+const res7_2 = await sanitizeURL('https://example.com/"onmouseover="alert(1)"', {
   only: ['data', 'git', 'https']
 });
 // => 'https://example.com/'
 
 // `only` also allows combination of the schemes in the list
-const res7 = await sanitizeURL('git+https://example.com/foo.git?<script>alert(1)</script>', {
+const res8 = await sanitizeURL('git+https://example.com/foo.git?<script>alert(1)</script>', {
   only: ['data', 'git', 'https']
 });
 // => 'git+https://example.com/foo.git'
@@ -175,40 +217,48 @@ const res7 = await sanitizeURL('git+https://example.com/foo.git?<script>alert(1)
 Synchronous version of `sanitizeURL()`.
 
 * `data` and `file` schemes must be explicitly allowed.
-* `blob` scheme is not supported and will return `null`. Use the async version for `blob`.
+* **File URLs:** Allowing the `file` scheme can be extremely dangerous in web applications. [See above](#about-file-scheme)
+* **Blob URLs:** `blob` scheme is **not supported** and will return `null`.
+  Use the async version for `blob`.
+  However, to prevent memory leaks, it is highly recommended to set the `opt.revokeObjectURL` option to `true` so that the unsupported blob URL is properly revoked before returning `null`.
+
+### inspectURL(url)
 
-### parseURL(url)
+**Note:** `parseURL()` is deprecated. Please use `inspectURL()` instead.
 
-Parses the given URL asynchronously.
+Inspects, parses, and sanitizes the given URL asynchronously.
 
-* Blob URLs are simply parsed and not yet sanitized at this stage.
+* **Data URLs:** The embedded payload is fully decoded and sanitized (e.g., removing malicious HTML/SVG attributes) before being safely re-encoded.
+* **Blob URLs:** Simply parsed, but **neither decoded nor sanitized** at this stage.
+  To process and sanitize the content of a blob URL, use [sanitizeURL()](#sanitizeurlurl-opt).
 
 #### Parameters
 
 * url **string** URL input.
 
-**Returns** **Promise<ParsedURL>** Result.
+**Returns** **Promise&lt;InspectedURLResult&gt;** Result.
 
-#### ParsedURL
+#### InspectedURLResult
 
-An object with additional properties based on the standard [URL](https://developer.mozilla.org/ja/docs/Web/API/URL) API.
+An object extending the standard [URL](https://developer.mozilla.org/ja/docs/Web/API/URL) API with additional properties.
+The properties except for `input` and `valid` are omitted from the object for invalid URLs.
 
-* `input` **string** URL input.
-* `valid` **boolean** Is valid URI.
-* `data` **object?** Parsed result of data URL, nullable.
-  * `data.mime` **string?** MIME type.
-  * `data.base64` **boolean?** Is base64 encoded.
-  * `data.data` **string?** Data part of the data URL.
-* `href`, `origin`, `protocol`, `username`, `password`, `host`, `hostname`, `port`, `pathname`, `search`, `hash` — **string?** Properties same as the standard URL API.
+* `input` — **string** The original URL input.
+* `valid` — **boolean** Indicates whether the URI is valid.
+* `data` — **[{ mime: string; base64: boolean; data: string; } | null | undefined]** The parsed result of a data URL. Returns `null` if the URL is valid but not a data URL, and is omitted if the URL is invalid.
+  * `data.mime` — **string** The MIME type of the data.
+  * `data.base64` — **boolean** Indicates whether the data is base64-encoded.
+  * `data.data` — **string** The actual data part of the data URL.
+* `href`, `origin`, `protocol`, `username`, `password`, `host`, `hostname`, `port`, `pathname`, `search`, `hash` — **[string | undefined]** Properties identical to the standard URL API (omitted if the URL is invalid).
 
 ``` javascript
-const res1 = await parseURL('javascript:alert(1)');
+const res1 = await inspectURL('javascript:alert(1)');
 /* => {
         input: 'javascript:alert(1)',
         valid: false
       } */
 
-const res2 = await parseURL('https://www.example.com/?foo=bar#baz');
+const res2 = await inspectURL('https://www.example.com/?foo=bar#baz');
 /* => {
         input: 'https://www.example.com/?foo=bar#baz',
         valid: true,
@@ -224,7 +274,7 @@ const res2 = await parseURL('https://www.example.com/?foo=bar#baz');
       } */
 
 // base64 encoded SVG '<svg><g onclick="alert(1)"/></svg>'
-const res3 = await parseURL('');
+const res3 = await inspectURL('');
 /* => {
         input: '',
         valid: true,
@@ -241,7 +291,7 @@ const res3 = await parseURL('
       } */
 
 // base64 encoded PNG
-const res4 = await parseURL('');
+const res4 = await inspectURL('');
 /* => {
         input: '',
         valid: true,
@@ -262,7 +312,7 @@ const blob5 = new Blob(['<svg><g onload="alert(1)"/></svg>'], {
   type: 'image/svg+xml'
 });
 const url5 = URL.createObjectURL(blob5);
-const res5 = await parseURL(url5);
+const res5 = await inspectURL(url5);
 /* => {
         input: 'blob:nodedata:82ecc5a4-aea8-48d7-a407-64e2ef0913da',
         valid: true,
@@ -275,22 +325,28 @@ const res5 = await parseURL(url5);
       } */
 ```
 
-### parseURLSync(url)
+### inspectURLSync(url)
 
-Synchronous version of `parseURL()`.
+**Note:** `parseURLSync()` is deprecated. Please use `inspectURLSync()` instead.
+
+Synchronous version of `inspectURL()`.
 
 ### isURI(uri)
 
-Verifies if the given URI is valid and registered.
+Checks if the given string is a valid URI and whether its scheme is registered in the allowed list.
+
+Specifically, it verifies that the input has a correct URI syntax, is not a denied scheme (like `javascript:`), and meets one of the following criteria:
+* The scheme is registered in the default list (e.g., IANA registered schemes, `https`, `mailto`).
+* The scheme has a custom prefix like `web+` or `ext+` (which are always allowed for web applications).
 
 #### Parameters
 
 * uri **string** URI input.
 
-**Returns** **Promise<boolean>** Result.
+**Returns** **Promise&lt;boolean&gt;** `true` if the URI is syntactically valid and uses an allowed/registered scheme; otherwise `false`.
 
-* Always `true` for `web+*` and `ext+*` schemes (except `web+javascript`, `web+vbscript`, `ext+javascript`, and `ext+vbscript`).
-* `false` for `javascript` and `vbscript` schemes.
+* Always `true` for valid `web+*` and `ext+*` schemes (except `web+javascript`, `web+vbscript`, `ext+javascript`, and `ext+vbscript`).
+* Always `false` for `javascript` and `vbscript` schemes, or any unknown/unregistered schemes (e.g., `foo:`).
 
 ``` javascript
 const res1 = await isURI('https://example.com/foo');
@@ -341,7 +397,43 @@ Remove a scheme from the list of registered URI schemes.
 
 #### urlSanitizer.reset()
 
-Reset registered schemes to the default list and clear internal cache.
+Reset registered schemes to the default list.
+
+## Threat Model
+
+To help you decide if this library fits your security requirements, here is the defined threat model detailing what `url-sanitizer` does and does not protect against.
+
+### In-Scope (What we protect against)
+
+This library is primarily designed to prevent **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** and unauthorized protocol execution via malicious URLs.
+
+* **Direct XSS Execution:** Blocks `javascript:` and `vbscript:` schemes outright, even if they are obfuscated with whitespaces or control characters.
+* **Nested XSS in Data/Blob URLs:** Deeply inspects and sanitizes payloads within `data:` and `blob:` URLs. If an attacker tries to hide malicious HTML/SVG within a Base64-encoded data URL, the embedded content is purified using DOMPurify and re-encoded back into a sanitized URL.
+* **Unauthorized Schemes:** Denies unknown or unregistered URI schemes by default, preventing application-specific or OS-level protocol hijacking (unless explicitly allowed).
+
+### Out-of-Scope (What we DO NOT protect against)
+
+This library validates the *syntax and safe construction* of a URL, but it does not validate the *destination or intent* of the server it points to, nor does it secure a compromised host environment.
+
+* **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF):** We do not check if a URL points to an internal IP address (e.g., `http://localhost`, `http://169.254.169.254`) or a malicious external server.
+* **Phishing & Open Redirects:** A perfectly valid HTTP URL pointing to a phishing site (e.g., `https://evil-example.com/login`) will be considered safe. You must implement your own domain allow-listing if you need to restrict destinations.
+* **General HTML Sanitization:** While we sanitize HTML/SVG *inside* data URLs, this library is not a general-purpose HTML body sanitizer. Do not use it to sanitize arbitrary user-generated DOM content.
+* **Compromised Host Environment:** We assume the native `URL` API is intact. We do not protect against runtime attacks where the global `URL` object has been monkey-patched or tampered with. Additionally, when using the lightweight build (`url-sanitizer-wo-dompurify.min.js`), ensuring a secure and untampered global `DOMPurify` instance is the responsibility of the host environment.
+
+## AI / LLM Application Security
+
+With the rise of AI agents, RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation), and LLM-driven applications, developers increasingly render content generated directly by AI.
+Unpredictable AI outputs introduce unique security risks, and `url-sanitizer` is architected to serve as a reliable defense layer for these modern environments.
+
+### Defending Against Complex & Obfuscated Payloads
+LLMs can generate highly complex, nested, or Base64-encoded `data:` URLs — either through prompt injection, RAG data poisoning, or simply reproducing obfuscated code from their training data.
+Because `url-sanitizer` performs **Deep Data URL Inspection** — decoding the payload, purifying the inner HTML/SVG tree via DOMPurify, and re-encoding it — it physically neutralizes hidden XSS vectors, ensuring that AI-generated data URLs are safe to render.
+
+### Neutralizing Hallucinated Schemes
+LLMs generate URLs based on statistical linguistic patterns rather than factual databases.
+As a result, they frequently hallucinate plausible-looking but non-existent or hazardous URI schemes (e.g., `ai-agent://`, `host-settings:`).
+By operating on a **Secure by Default** whitelist approach, `url-sanitizer` automatically denies any unrecognized or unregistered protocols.
+This strict blocking prevents hallucinated schemes from inadvertently triggering application-specific or OS-level protocol hijacking.
 
 ## Performance
 
@@ -350,10 +442,10 @@ Execution times were measured using [mitata](https://github.com/evanwashere/mita
 ### Benchmark Results
 
 | URL Type | `url-sanitizer` | [@braintree/sanitize-url](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@braintree/sanitize-url) | [strict-url-sanitise](https://www.npmjs.com/package/strict-url-sanitise) |
-| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
-| **Normal HTTP URL** | ~2.90 µs/iter | ~4.55 µs/iter | ~4.17 µs/iter |
-| **XSS URL** | ~1.31 µs/iter | ~1.58 µs/iter | ~10.19 µs/iter |
-| **Complex Data URL** | ~263.16 µs/iter | ~2.76 µs/iter | ~9.76 µs/iter |
+| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
+| **Normal HTTP URL** | ~0.94 µs/iter | ~4.32 µs/iter | ~4.02 µs/iter |
+| **XSS URL** | ~5.28 µs/iter | ~1.52 µs/iter | ~9.44 µs/iter |
+| **Complex Data URL** | ~169.41 µs/iter | ~2.65 µs/iter | ~9.46 µs/iter |
 
 ### Characteristics & Trade-offs
 

package/dist/url-sanitizer-wo-dompurify.min.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-var Q={sanitize:(...t)=>{if(globalThis?.DOMPurify)return globalThis.DOMPurify.sanitize(...t);let e=["DOMPurify is not available.","Ensure DOMPurify is exposed globally (e.g., window.DOMPurify)."];throw new Error(e.join(" "))}};var K=/^[\w+/=-]+$/;var k=/data:[\w#&+./;=-]*,/,B=/data:[\w#&+./;=^]*base64,[\w+/=-]+/i,V=/data:[\w#&+./;=-]*,[^\x22]+/g,J=/&#(x(?:00)?[\dA-F]{2}|0?\d{1,3});?/gi,W=/^(?:application\/(?:[\w#&.;-]+\+)?x|image\/svg\+x|text\/(?:ht|x))ml;?/;var ee=/^[a-z][\da-z+.-]*$/,te=/^(?:ext|web)\+[a-z]+$/,F=/(?:java|vb)script/,M=/(?:java|vb)script|blob/,N=/%(?:22|27|3C|3E)|[\x22\x27<>]/,se=/^%[\dA-F]{2}$/i;var y=t=>Object.prototype.toString.call(t).slice(8,-1),f=t=>typeof t=="string"||t instanceof String;var{FileReader:re}=globalThis;var 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Map([[128,8364],[130,8218],[131,402],[132,8222],[133,8230],[134,8224],[135,8225],[136,710],[137,8240],[138,352],[139,8249],[140,338],[142,381],[145,8216],[146,8217],[147,8220],[148,8221],[149,8226],[150,8211],[151,8212],[152,732],[153,8482],[154,353],[155,8250],[156,339],[158,382],[159,376]]),be=()=>{let t=new Map;for(let e=0;e<256;e++)!B.has(e)&&!P.has(e)&&t.set(e,`\\x${e.toString(16).padStart(2,"0").toUpperCase()}`);return t},F=be();var[v,Re,xe,Ee,ve,Se]=["&","#","<",">",'"',"'"].map(t=>`%${t.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase()}`),Ue=new RegExp(`[${[...F.values()].join("")}]`),_e=/&#(x(?:00)?[\dA-F]{2}|0?\d{1,3});?/gi,M=class{#e=new Set(K);get(){return[...this.#e]}has(e){return this.#e.has(e)}verify(e,s=this.#e){if(!m(e))return!1;try{let{protocol:a}=new URL(e),r=a.replace(/:$/,""),o=r.split("+");return o.some(l=>C.test(l))?!1:re.test(r)||o.every(l=>s.has(l))}catch{return!1}}};var ie=t=>{let e=t;if(m(e))switch(ae.test(e)&&(e=e.toUpperCase()),e){case v:return`${v}amp;`;case 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s},pe=(t,e=16777216)=>new Promise((s,a)=>{if(Number.isInteger(t?.size)){if(Number.isInteger(e)&&t.size>e){let o=`Blob size (${t.size} bytes) exceeds max (${e} bytes).`;return a(new DOMException(o,"NotReadableError"))}}else return s(null);let r=new J;r.addEventListener("error",()=>a(r.error)),r.addEventListener("abort",()=>s(r.result)),r.addEventListener("load",()=>s(r.result)),r.readAsDataURL(t)}),me=t=>m(t)?t.replace(ee,"").replace(se,""):t;var Ce=Object.freeze(["href","origin","protocol","username","password","host","hostname","port","pathname","search","hash"]),Le=Object.freeze({RETURN_DOM:!1,RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT:!1,RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE:!1}),h=(t,e,s)=>{t&&console.warn(`[URLSanitizer Debug] ${e}`,s?s.message:"")},V=class t extends M{#e;static#t=null;static#s=null;static#o(e,s){if(!s.attrValue||!/^\s*data:/i.test(s.attrValue))return;let a=t.#s,r=t.#t;if(!r||!a)return;let o;try{o=new URL(s.attrValue)}catch{return}if(o.protocol==="data:"){let n=s.attrValue;if(r.recurse||(r.recurse=new Set),r.recurse.has(n)){let l=`Circular Data URL detected and skipped: ${n}`;h(r.debug,l),s.attrValue="";return}r.nest++,r.recurse.add(n);try{let l=a.#a(n,{allow:["data"],deny:[],only:[],allowRelative:!1},r);s.attrValue=l||""}finally{r.nest--,r.recurse.delete(n)}}}static{I.setConfig(Le),I.addHook("uponSanitizeAttribute",t.#o)}constructor(){super(),this.#e=new Set(super.get())}#r(e,s,a,r,o){if(H.test(e))return!1;if(e.split("+").some(d=>C.test(d))||!G.test(e)){let d=`Failed to add scheme '${e}' in '${s}' list.`;return h(o.debug,d),!1}return r.set(e,!0),a.add(e),!0}#n(e,s){let a=e;try{a=decodeURIComponent(e)}catch{}let r=t.#s,o=t.#t;t.#s=this,t.#t=s;let n;try{n=s.domPurify.sanitize(a)}finally{t.#s=r,t.#t=o}n=me(n);try{return encodeURI(n)}catch{return n}}#a(e,s,a){if(a.nest>16)throw new Error("Data URLs nested too deeply.");let{allow:r,deny:o,only:n,allowRelative:l}=s,d=this.#e,u=!1,c=new Map(a.schemeMap);if(n.length){d=new Set;for(let i of 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URL(T,"http://dummy.local");Z.replace(/:$/,"").split("+").some(de=>H.test(de))&&(p="")}catch(T){h(a.debug,"Failed to parse inner data URL protocol.",T)}(!b||te.test(b))&&(w=this.#n(w,a)),p&&w?(W&&w!==j&&$.pop(),p=`${L}:${$.join(";")},${w}`):p=""}if(!N&&z.test(p)){let b=z.exec(p),{index:_}=b;p=p.substring(0,_).replace(/[?&]$/,"")}p&&(f=p)}}return f||null}sanitize(e,s){if(!e||!m(e))return null;if(!(s&&(Array.isArray(s.deny)&&s.deny.length>0||Array.isArray(s.only)&&s.only.length>0||s.allowRelative))&&(e.startsWith("https://")||e.startsWith("http://"))&&!z.test(e)&&!e.includes("data:"))try{let{href:n}=new URL(e);return n.replace(/%26/g,ie)}catch{return null}let r={allow:Array.isArray(s?.allow)?s.allow:[],deny:Array.isArray(s?.deny)?s.deny:[],only:Array.isArray(s?.only)?s.only:[],allowRelative:!!s?.allowRelative},o={debug:!!s?.debug,domPurify:I,nest:0,recurse:null,schemeMap:new Map([["blob",!1],["data",!1],["file",!1],["javascript",!1],["vbscript",!1]])};return this.#a(e,r,o)}inspect(e,s){if(!m(e))throw new TypeError(`Expected String but got ${R(e)}.`);let a=new Map([["input",e]]),r;if(this.verify(e)){let{protocol:o}=new URL(e);o==="blob:"?r=e:r=this.sanitize(e,s??{allow:["data","file"]})}if(r){let o=new URL(r),{pathname:n,protocol:l}=o,u=l.replace(/:$/,"").split("+").includes("data");if(a.set("valid",!0),u){let c=new Map,[f,...S]=n.split(","),x=`${S.join(",")}${o.search}${o.hash}`,g=f.split(";"),i=g[g.length-1]==="base64";i&&g.pop(),c.set("mime",g.join(";")),c.set("base64",i),c.set("data",x),a.set("data",Object.fromEntries(c))}else a.set("data",null);for(let c of Ce){let f=o[c];m(f)&&a.set(c,f)}}else a.set("valid",!1);return Object.fromEntries(a)}get(){return[...this.#e]}has(e){return this.#e.has(e)}add(e){if(!m(e))throw new TypeError(`Expected String but got ${R(e)}.`);if(e.split("+").some(r=>C.test(r))||!G.test(e))throw new Error(`Invalid scheme: ${e}`);return this.#e.add(e),[...this.#e]}remove(e){return this.#e.delete(e)}reset(){this.#e=new Set(super.get())}verify(e,s=this.#e){return super.verify(e,s)}};var y=new V,Ae=async(t,e={allow:[],deny:[],only:[],allowRelative:!1,debug:!1,revokeObjectURL:!1,maxBlobSize:16777216})=>{let s=!!e?.debug,a=Number.isInteger(e?.maxBlobSize)&&e.maxBlobSize>0?e.maxBlobSize:16777216,r;if(t&&m(t)){let o;try{let{protocol:n}=new URL(t);o=n.replace(/:$/,"")}catch(n){h(s,`Invalid URL input format: ${t}`,n)}if(o==="blob"){let{allow:n,deny:l,only:d}=e;if(Array.isArray(n)&&n.includes("blob")&&!(Array.isArray(l)&&l.includes("blob"))||Array.isArray(d)&&d.includes("blob")){let u;try{u=await fetch(t).then(c=>c.blob()).then(c=>pe(c,a))}catch(c){let f=`Failed to fetch and convert blob URL: ${t}`;h(s,f,c)}if(u){let c={...e};Array.isArray(e.only)?c.only=e.only.includes("data")?e.only:[...e.only,"data"]:Array.isArray(e.allow)&&(c.allow=e.allow.includes("data")?e.allow:[...e.allow,"data"],Array.isArray(e.deny)&&(c.deny=e.deny.filter(f=>f!=="data"))),r=y.sanitize(u,c)}}e?.revokeObjectURL&&URL.revokeObjectURL(t)}else(o||e.allowRelative)&&(r=y.sanitize(t,e))}return r||null},$e=(t,e={allow:[],deny:[],only:[],allowRelative:!1,debug:!1,revokeObjectURL:!1})=>{let s=!!e?.debug,a;if(t&&m(t)){let r;try{let{protocol:o}=new URL(t);r=o.replace(/:$/,"")}catch(o){let n=`Invalid URL input format: ${t}`;h(s,n,o)}if(r==="blob")return e?.revokeObjectURL&&URL.revokeObjectURL(t),null;(r||e.allowRelative)&&(a=y.sanitize(t,e))}return a||null},Oe=async t=>y.inspect(t),Ie=t=>Oe(t),ze=t=>y.inspect(t),Pe=t=>ze(t),Me=async t=>y.verify(t),ke=t=>y.verify(t),De=y;export{De as default,Me as isURI,ke as isURISync,Ie as parseURL,Pe as parseURLSync,Ae as sanitizeURL,$e as sanitizeURLSync};
 /*!
  * URL Sanitizer
  *