universal-dev-standards 5.3.2 → 5.5.0

package/bundled/ai/standards/secret-management-standards.ai.yaml

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+# Secret Management Standards - AI Optimized
+# Source: XSPEC-065 Wave 4 IaC Pack
+
+id: secret-management-standards
+title: Secret Management and Credential Hygiene Standards
+version: "1.0.0"
+status: Active
+tags: [secrets, vault, kms, sops, security, rotation, credential-management]
+summary: |
+  Defines how teams store, inject, rotate, and audit secrets and credentials
+  across development and production environments. Covers three approved secret
+  source tiers (Vault dynamic secrets, Cloud KMS, SOPS+Git), rotation policies
+  by credential type, automated hardcoded-secret prevention via pre-commit and
+  CI scanning, and safe secret injection patterns. Designed to eliminate
+  credentials from source code and CI logs while maintaining operational
+  practicality across team sizes.
+
+requirements:
+  - id: REQ-001
+    title: Secret Source Three Options
+    description: |
+      Teams MUST use one of three approved secret source tiers based on
+      operational context. (1) HashiCorp Vault dynamic secrets (preferred for
+      production and multi-team environments) — secrets are generated on-demand
+      with short TTLs; no static credentials stored anywhere. (2) Cloud KMS
+      with native secret managers (AWS Secrets Manager / GCP Secret Manager /
+      Azure Key Vault) — suitable for cloud-native deployments; secrets fetched
+      at runtime via IAM-controlled API calls. (3) SOPS + Git encryption —
+      suitable for small teams and GitOps workflows; secrets encrypted with
+      age or KMS key before committing; decrypted only in trusted runtime
+      environments. Storing unencrypted secrets in any other location (env
+      files, wiki, chat) is PROHIBITED.
+    level: MUST
+    examples:
+      - "Vault: app requests DB credentials via Vault agent sidecar with 1h TTL lease"
+      - "AWS Secrets Manager: Lambda reads secret ARN from env var; SDK fetches at cold start"
+      - "SOPS: `secrets.yaml` encrypted with age key; decrypted in CI via SOPS_AGE_KEY env var"
+      - "Prohibited: secrets in `.env` files committed to repo, even private repos"
+
+  - id: REQ-002
+    title: Rotation Policy by Type
+    description: |
+      All secrets MUST have a defined rotation policy enforced by automated
+      tooling or calendar reminders. Minimum rotation frequencies by type:
+      Database credentials: every 90 days. API keys (third-party services):
+      every 180 days. Signing keys (JWT, code signing): every 365 days.
+      One-time tokens and session credentials: revoke immediately after use;
+      MUST NOT be reused. TLS certificates: rotate at least 30 days before
+      expiry; automate with ACME/Let's Encrypt or cert-manager where possible.
+      Rotation events MUST be logged in the audit trail.
+    level: MUST
+    examples:
+      - "DB credentials rotated via Vault dynamic secrets every 90 days automatically"
+      - "Stripe API key rotation reminder calendar event set for 180-day interval"
+      - "JWT signing key rotated annually; old key retained for 7-day grace period"
+      - "CI temporary tokens scoped to single job; revoked by runner post-job"
+
+  - id: REQ-003
+    title: Hardcoded Secret Prevention
+    description: |
+      Teams MUST implement automated scanning to detect and block hardcoded
+      secrets before they reach the repository. Two layers are REQUIRED:
+      (1) Pre-commit hook using detect-secrets, gitleaks, or truffleHog —
+      scans staged files and blocks commit if patterns are detected.
+      (2) CI pipeline scan — rescans all changed files on every PR; blocks
+      merge if secrets are found. Minimum detected patterns: AWS access key
+      format (AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}), PEM private key headers (-----BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY),
+      generic API token patterns (api[_-]?key\s*[:=]\s*\S{16,}), and
+      connection strings containing passwords.
+    level: MUST
+    examples:
+      - "`.pre-commit-config.yaml` includes `detect-secrets` hook; fails on AWS key pattern"
+      - "CI step: `gitleaks detect --source . --exit-code 1` blocks PR merge"
+      - "False positive whitelisted via `.secrets.baseline` with documented justification"
+      - "Developer receives pre-commit error: 'High confidence secret detected: AWS Access Key'"
+
+  - id: REQ-004
+    title: Secret Injection
+    description: |
+      Secrets MUST be injected into application processes via environment
+      variables or mounted files only. Passing secrets via command-line
+      arguments is PROHIBITED (visible in process lists). Passing secrets via
+      URL query parameters is PROHIBITED (logged by proxies and servers).
+      For environment variable injection, use the platform's native secret
+      injection (Kubernetes Secrets, ECS task definition secrets, GitHub
+      Actions secrets). For file-based injection, mount secrets as
+      read-only volumes with restrictive file permissions (0400 or 0600).
+    level: MUST
+    examples:
+      - "Kubernetes: secret mounted as env var via `secretKeyRef` in pod spec"
+      - "Prohibited: `./app --db-password=s3cr3t` (visible in `ps aux`)"
+      - "Prohibited: `https://api.example.com?token=abc123` (logged by nginx)"
+      - "File injection: secret mounted at `/run/secrets/db-password` with mode 0400"
+
+anti_patterns:
+  - "Hardcoding credentials directly in source code or configuration files"
+  - "Storing secrets in CI/CD environment variables without encryption (plaintext in UI)"
+  - "Sharing credentials across multiple environments (dev/staging/prod use same secret)"
+  - "Long-lived static credentials without rotation schedules"
+  - "Committing .env files containing real secrets to version control"
+
+related_standards:
+  - iac-design-principles
+  - audit-trail
+  - pii-classification

package/bundled/ai/standards/secure-op.ai.yaml

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+# Secure-Op: AI Agent Secure Operation Standard - AI Optimized
+# Source: core/secure-op.md
+
+id: secure-op
+meta:
+  version: "1.0.0"
+  updated: "2026-05-04"
+  source: core/secure-op.md
+  description: >
+    AI Agent secure operation methodology covering Veto-based decision pipeline,
+    SOBR multi-dimensional risk scoring, Fail-Closed principle, tamper-evident
+    audit chain, HITL escalation, and prompt injection defense.
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Core Categories
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+categories:
+  - id: veto_based_decision
+    name: Veto-Based Decision Pipeline
+    description: >
+      Security decision logic must be Veto-based, not voting-based.
+      Any single layer issuing DENY terminates the pipeline immediately.
+    principles:
+      - name: Deterministic > Probabilistic
+        rule: >
+          Deterministic systems (policy engines, rule engines) take precedence
+          over LLM inference. Policy engine DENY cannot be overridden by semantic review.
+      - name: Policy-as-Code
+        rule: >
+          All security rules must be version-controlled and regression-testable.
+          No ad-hoc runtime rule injection.
+      - name: Decision Pipeline Order
+        pipeline:
+          - step: 1
+            layer: Policy Engine (OPA or equivalent)
+            type: deterministic
+            on_deny: terminate_immediately
+          - step: 2
+            layer: Risk Score (SOBR model)
+            type: quantitative
+            on_deny: terminate_or_escalate
+          - step: 3
+            layer: Semantic Review (optional LLM)
+            type: probabilistic
+            on_deny: terminate
+            note: Only reached if steps 1 and 2 pass
+    reference_implementation: OPA (Open Policy Agent) or equivalent policy engine
+    anti_patterns:
+      - Allowing LLM to override a deterministic DENY
+      - Treating security decisions as majority-vote among layers
+      - Bypassing policy engine for "efficiency"
+
+  - id: sobr_risk_scoring
+    name: SOBR Risk Scoring Model
+    description: >
+      Four-dimension quantitative risk model: Sensitivity, Operation, BlastRadius,
+      Reversibility. Produces a 0–100 score for routing decisions.
+    formula: "RiskScore = S×0.30 + O×0.25 + B×0.25 + R×0.20"
+    dimensions:
+      - id: S
+        name: Sensitivity
+        weight: 0.30
+        description: Target resource sensitivity level
+        range: 0-100
+        reference_values:
+          user_credentials: 100
+          prod_database: 95
+          internal_api_key: 85
+          staging_database: 60
+          config_file: 45
+          dev_environment: 30
+          public_docs: 5
+      - id: O
+        name: OperationType
+        weight: 0.25
+        description: Danger level of the operation being requested
+        range: 0-100
+        reference_values:
+          delete_permanent: 95
+          execute_arbitrary_code: 100
+          modify_iam_policy: 90
+          write_production_data: 75
+          read_sensitive_data: 50
+          read_public_data: 10
+      - id: B
+        name: BlastRadius
+        weight: 0.25
+        description: Number of systems or users affected if operation goes wrong
+        range: 0-100
+        reference_values:
+          all_production_systems: 100
+          single_production_service: 70
+          staging_environment: 40
+          isolated_dev_sandbox: 10
+      - id: R
+        name: Reversibility
+        weight: 0.20
+        description: Irreversibility degree (higher = harder to undo)
+        range: 0-100
+        reference_values:
+          permanent_delete_no_backup: 100
+          overwrite_with_no_version: 85
+          delete_with_backup: 50
+          read_only_no_side_effect: 0
+    decision_thresholds:
+      - range: "0-25"
+        decision: ALLOW
+        action: Execute normally; log for audit
+      - range: "26-50"
+        decision: ALLOW_WITH_MONITORING
+        action: Execute with enhanced logging; flag for post-hoc review
+      - range: "51-75"
+        decision: REQUIRE_HITL
+        action: Escalate to human reviewer; optionally pause execution
+      - range: "76-100"
+        decision: DENY
+        action: Reject operation; log decision path and violations
+    iso_mapping:
+      - "ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A.8.24 - Use of privileged utility programs"
+      - "ISO/IEC 27005 - Information security risk management"
+
+  - id: fail_closed
+    name: Fail-Closed Principle
+    description: >
+      When any security component fails or is unreachable, the default behavior
+      MUST be DENY. Silent failure or fail-open is strictly prohibited.
+    rules:
+      - condition: Policy Engine unreachable
+        response: DENY ALL
+        exception: Read-only operations with no side effects may be allowed at operator discretion
+      - condition: Risk Scoring computation fails
+        response: REQUIRE_HITL (conservative escalation)
+        rationale: Unknown risk must be treated as high risk
+      - condition: Signature verification fails
+        response: DENY ALL
+        rationale: Tampered or corrupted verdict cannot be trusted
+      - condition: Any unknown/unhandled error
+        response: DENY
+        rationale: Unknown state must default to safe state
+    anti_patterns:
+      - name: Fail-Open
+        description: Defaulting to ALLOW when an error occurs
+        severity: CRITICAL
+      - name: Partial Validation Continue
+        description: Continuing execution after a partial validation failure
+        severity: HIGH
+      - name: Silent Error Swallowing
+        description: Catching errors without changing the decision to DENY
+        severity: HIGH
+    iso_mapping:
+      - "NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture - Section 2.1"
+      - "ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.22 - Filtering of web services"
+
+  - id: audit_chain
+    name: Tamper-Evident Audit Chain
+    description: >
+      All security decisions must be recorded in a verifiable, append-only,
+      tamper-evident audit trail using cryptographic hash chaining.
+    required_fields:
+      - field: request_id
+        type: string (UUID v4)
+        description: Unique identifier for each decision event
+      - field: decision
+        type: enum (ALLOW | ALLOW_WITH_MONITORING | REQUIRE_HITL | DENY)
+        description: Final security verdict
+      - field: risk_score
+        type: number (0-100)
+        description: Computed SOBR risk score
+      - field: timestamp
+        type: ISO 8601 UTC
+        description: Decision timestamp with millisecond precision
+      - field: violations
+        type: string[]
+        description: List of policy violations (empty if ALLOW)
+      - field: signature
+        type: base64-encoded Ed25519 signature
+        description: Cryptographic signature over core fields
+      - field: prev_hash
+        type: SHA-256 hex string
+        description: Hash of the previous audit record (chain link)
+    hash_chain:
+      algorithm: SHA-256
+      chain_field: prev_hash
+      genesis_value: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+      verification: Implement verify_chain() to detect any record tampering
+    signature:
+      algorithm: Ed25519
+      signed_payload: "{request_id}:{decision}:{risk_score}:{timestamp}"
+      note: Use asymmetric cryptography; never symmetric HMAC for audit signatures
+    storage_levels:
+      - level: 0
+        name: Minimum
+        storage: Local append-only file
+        note: Acceptable for dev/test only
+      - level: 1
+        name: Recommended
+        storage: WORM storage (S3 Object Lock / Azure Immutable Blob)
+        note: Required for production
+      - level: 2
+        name: Maximum
+        storage: Immutable cloud storage + remote attestation
+        note: Required for regulated environments (SOC2, ISO 27001 certified)
+    iso_mapping:
+      - "ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.15 - Logging"
+      - "ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.5.33 - Protection of records"
+
+  - id: hitl_escalation
+    name: Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) Escalation
+    description: >
+      When Risk Score falls in the 51-75 range (REQUIRE_HITL), a defined
+      human review escalation mechanism must be triggered.
+    modes:
+      - mode: non_blocking
+        description: Send notification but allow execution to continue under enhanced monitoring
+        when_to_use: Lower-risk HITL scenarios (score 51-62), non-critical operations
+      - mode: blocking
+        description: Pause execution and wait for explicit human approval
+        when_to_use: Higher-risk HITL scenarios (score 63-75), sensitive environments
+    requirements:
+      - TTL: HITL review requests must expire (recommended 1800 seconds)
+      - on_ttl_expire: Escalate decision to DENY
+      - audit: HITL trigger event and resolution must be logged in audit chain
+      - notification_interface: Webhook (canonical); adapters for Slack, Teams, PagerDuty
+    notification_payload:
+      fields:
+        - request_id
+        - risk_score
+        - operation_summary
+        - policy_violations
+        - expires_at
+    iso_mapping:
+      - "ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.2 - Privileged access rights"
+      - "NIST SP 800-53 AC-2 - Account Management"
+
+  - id: prompt_injection_defense
+    name: Prompt Injection Defense
+    description: >
+      AI Agent systems must detect and block prompt injection attacks that attempt
+      to override security controls through malicious user input.
+    detection_patterns:
+      override_commands:
+        - "ignore previous instructions"
+        - "disregard your programming"
+        - "override your instructions"
+        - "forget what you were told"
+      role_manipulation:
+        - "you are now"
+        - "act as"
+        - "pretend you are"
+        - "DAN"
+        - "jailbreak"
+      system_token_injection:
+        - "[SYSTEM]"
+        - "[INST]"
+        - "<|system|>"
+        - "<<SYS>>"
+      instruction_prefix:
+        - "New instruction:"
+        - "Updated system prompt:"
+        - "OVERRIDE:"
+    response:
+      on_detection: DENY
+      violation_code: PROMPT_INJECTION_DETECTED
+      audit: Record detected pattern and original input hash in audit chain
+      note: >
+        Do not log raw malicious input; log the detected pattern type and
+        a hash of the input to avoid storing adversarial content in logs.
+    pipeline_integration:
+      intercept_at: M1 Intake layer (earliest possible stage)
+      rationale: Reject before entering evaluation pipeline to reduce attack surface
+    maintenance:
+      - Review and update detection patterns monthly
+      - Subscribe to OWASP LLM Working Group updates
+    iso_mapping:
+      - "OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 - LLM01: Prompt Injection"
+      - "ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.24 - Use of privileged utility programs"
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Quality Gates
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+quality_gates:
+  agent_operation_checklist:
+    description: AI Agent operations MUST pass all gates before execution
+    gates:
+      - id: policy_engine_check
+        check: Policy Engine returns ALLOW (not DENY)
+        on_fail: Reject immediately; log violations
+        required: true
+      - id: risk_score_check
+        check: Risk Score < 76
+        on_fail: Reject; log decision path
+        required: true
+      - id: hitl_check
+        check: If Risk Score 51-75, HITL notification sent (blocking or non-blocking per mode)
+        on_fail: Reject if blocking mode timeout; continue with monitoring if non-blocking
+        required: true
+      - id: prompt_injection_check
+        check: No prompt injection pattern detected in input
+        on_fail: Reject; log PROMPT_INJECTION_DETECTED
+        required: true
+      - id: verdict_signature_check
+        check: Verdict carries valid cryptographic signature
+        on_fail: Reject; log SIGNATURE_INVALID
+        required: true
+      - id: audit_chain_check
+        check: Decision recorded in audit chain with prev_hash linked
+        on_fail: Log failure; decision still applied but alert raised
+        required: true
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Rules
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+rules:
+  - id: veto-over-vote
+    trigger: implementing security decision logic for AI agents
+    instruction: >
+      Use Veto-based pipeline (any DENY terminates). Never use voting/consensus
+      across security layers.
+    priority: required
+
+  - id: fail-closed-default
+    trigger: handling errors in security components
+    instruction: >
+      Default to DENY on any failure. Document explicit exceptions (e.g., read-only
+      fallback) with justification in code comments.
+    priority: required
+
+  - id: sobr-score-before-execution
+    trigger: AI agent requesting an operation
+    instruction: >
+      Compute SOBR risk score before executing any operation. Route based on
+      thresholds: <26 ALLOW, 26-50 ALLOW_WITH_MONITORING, 51-75 HITL, >=76 DENY.
+    priority: required
+
+  - id: audit-every-decision
+    trigger: any security verdict (ALLOW or DENY)
+    instruction: >
+      Record all decisions in audit chain regardless of outcome. ALLOW decisions
+      are auditable too—do not only log denials.
+    priority: required
+
+  - id: prompt-injection-earliest
+    trigger: receiving user input in AI agent pipeline
+    instruction: >
+      Scan for prompt injection at M1 Intake, before any semantic evaluation.
+      Do not allow suspicious input to reach the LLM reasoning layer.
+    priority: required
+
+anti_patterns:
+  - Defaulting to ALLOW when policy engine is unreachable (fail-open)
+  - Using LLM confidence score as the sole security gate
+  - Skipping audit chain for "low-risk" operations
+  - Storing raw malicious prompt injection content in logs
+  - Using HMAC instead of asymmetric signatures for audit records
+  - Setting HITL TTL to infinity (must have an expiry)
+  - Treating Risk Score as advisory rather than binding
+
+quick_reference:
+  secure_op_minimum_baseline: |
+    □ Policy Engine configured and reachable (fail-closed on unavailability)
+    □ SOBR Risk Score computed for every operation
+    □ HITL mechanism implemented for score 51-75 range
+    □ Prompt injection detection active at intake layer
+    □ All decisions recorded in hash-chained audit log with signatures
+    □ Audit log stored in append-only / WORM storage in production

package/bundled/ai/standards/security-testing.ai.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+# Security Testing Standards - AI Optimized
+# Source: core/security-testing.md
+
+id: security-testing
+meta:
+  version: "1.0.0"
+  updated: "2026-05-04"
+  source: core/security-testing.md
+  description: >
+    Security testing methodology covering SAST, dependency auditing, and DAST.
+    Complements security-standards.ai.yaml (architecture) with execution-level guidance.
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Core Categories
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+categories:
+  - id: sast
+    name: Static Application Security Testing (SAST)
+    description: Analyze source code for vulnerabilities without executing it
+    tools:
+      typescript_javascript:
+        - name: eslint-plugin-security
+          config: "eslint-plugin-security/recommended"
+          detects: [eval injection, regex DoS, path traversal, prototype pollution]
+        - name: semgrep
+          config: "p/typescript"
+          detects: [XSS, injection, hardcoded secrets]
+      python:
+        - name: bandit
+          command: "bandit -r . -ll"
+          detects: [SQL injection, hardcoded passwords, insecure deserialization]
+      java:
+        - name: SpotBugs + FindSecBugs
+          detects: [SQL injection, XSS, LDAP injection]
+    trigger: pre-commit + CI on every PR
+    severity_gate: High or Critical → block merge
+
+  - id: dependency_audit
+    name: Dependency Vulnerability Auditing
+    description: Scan third-party packages for known CVEs
+    tools:
+      nodejs:
+        - name: npm audit
+          command: "npm audit --audit-level=high"
+          audit_levels:
+            - level: critical
+              action: Block immediately — patch or remove dependency
+            - level: high
+              action: Block merge — must be resolved before shipping
+            - level: moderate
+              action: Log warning — resolve within 14 days
+            - level: low
+              action: Track — resolve in next scheduled maintenance
+        - name: snyk
+          command: "snyk test --severity-threshold=high"
+          note: Alternative to npm audit; provides remediation suggestions
+      python:
+        - name: pip-audit
+          command: "pip-audit --vulnerability-service pypi"
+        - name: safety
+          command: "safety check"
+    trigger:
+      - pre-push hook
+      - CI pipeline (every PR)
+      - Weekly scheduled scan (catch newly disclosed CVEs)
+    severity_gate: High or Critical CVE → block release
+
+  - id: dast
+    name: Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)
+    description: Test running application for vulnerabilities through HTTP interactions
+    when_to_use: Applications with public-facing APIs or web UIs
+    tools:
+      - name: OWASP ZAP
+        mode: [baseline scan, full scan, API scan]
+        trigger: staging deployment
+      - name: Nuclei
+        command: "nuclei -u https://staging.example.com -t cves/"
+        trigger: staging deployment
+    trigger: Post-deployment to staging — NOT in unit/integration test phase
+    severity_gate: High or Critical finding → block production deployment
+
+  - id: secret_scanning
+    name: Secret / Credential Scanning
+    description: Detect accidentally committed secrets, tokens, and credentials
+    tools:
+      - name: gitleaks
+        command: "gitleaks detect --source . --no-git"
+        detects: [API keys, JWT secrets, database URLs, private keys]
+      - name: truffleHog
+        command: "trufflehog git file://."
+    trigger: pre-commit + CI
+    severity_gate: Any detected secret → block commit/merge immediately
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Quality Gates
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+quality_gates:
+  pre_commit:
+    - sast (eslint-plugin-security or equivalent)
+    - secret_scanning (gitleaks)
+
+  pre_push:
+    - dependency_audit (npm audit --audit-level=high)
+
+  pre_merge:
+    - all pre_commit gates
+    - dependency_audit
+
+  pre_release:
+    - all pre_merge gates
+    - dast (staging scan)
+    - full dependency_audit (npm audit without --audit-level filter)
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# CVE Handling Policy
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+cve_policy:
+  critical: Patch or remove within 24 hours; block all deploys until resolved
+  high: Resolve before next release; document if temporary exception needed
+  moderate: Track in backlog; resolve within 14 days
+  low: Track; resolve in scheduled maintenance window
+
+  exception_process:
+    - Document CVE ID and reason for exception
+    - Set expiry date (max 30 days)
+    - Get security lead approval
+    - Add to `.npmrc` / `audit-exceptions.json` with comment
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Rules
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+rules:
+  - id: dependency-audit-pre-push
+    trigger: pushing code to remote
+    instruction: Run npm audit --audit-level=high before push; block on High/Critical findings
+    priority: required
+
+  - id: sast-pre-commit
+    trigger: committing code changes
+    instruction: Run SAST tool (eslint-plugin-security); block on High severity findings
+    priority: required
+
+  - id: secret-scan-always
+    trigger: any code commit
+    instruction: Run secret scanning; never commit with detected secrets
+    priority: required
+
+  - id: dast-on-staging
+    trigger: deploying to staging environment
+    instruction: Run DAST baseline scan; review findings before promoting to production
+    priority: required
+
+  - id: no-mock-security-in-tests
+    trigger: writing tests involving auth or security controls
+    instruction: Never mock security controls in tests (see mock-boundary.ai.yaml)
+    priority: required
+
+anti_patterns:
+  - Treating all CVEs as equal (Critical ≠ Low in urgency)
+  - Running DAST in CI against production (use staging only)
+  - Ignoring npm audit warnings indefinitely without documented exceptions
+  - Mocking auth middleware in security tests (defeats the purpose)
+  - Treating SAST as the only security layer (SAST + DAST + audit = defense in depth)
+
+quick_reference:
+  minimum_security_baseline: |
+    □ npm audit --audit-level=high passes (or exceptions documented)
+    □ SAST tool configured and running in CI
+    □ Secret scanning enabled in pre-commit
+    □ No High/Critical CVEs without documented exceptions
+    □ Security controls NOT mocked in tests