typeclaw 0.50.0 → 0.52.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/types/agent/bash-sandbox-env.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/bash-sandbox-proc.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/bash-sandbox.d.ts +98 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/compaction.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/types/agent/idle-compaction.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/index.d.ts +10 -17
- package/dist/types/agent/multimodal/look-at.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/output-allowance.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/plugin-tools.d.ts +8 -75
- package/dist/types/agent/prompt-cache-key.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/session-tail.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/subagents.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/system-prompt-composition.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/system-prompt.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/channel-disengage.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/channel-edit.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/channel-fetch-attachment.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/channel-handoff.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/channel-history.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/channel-react.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/channel-read.d.ts +10 -2
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/channel-reply.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/channel-send.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/channel-session-search.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/ddg.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/grant-role.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/post-github-review.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/restart.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/skip-response.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/spawn-subagent.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/stream-snapshot.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/subagent-cancel.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/subagent-output.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/todo/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/webfetch/adaptive-html.d.ts +3 -3
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/webfetch/strategies/readability-process.d.ts +48 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/webfetch/tool.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/websearch.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/channels/adapters/github/auth-app.d.ts +25 -0
- package/dist/types/channels/adapters/github/auth-pat.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/types/channels/adapters/github/auth.d.ts +24 -0
- package/dist/types/channels/github-review-check.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/channels/github-token-bridge.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/types/channels/lost-background-context.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/types/channels/persistence.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/channels/router.d.ts +16 -50
- package/dist/types/channels/types.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/coding-agent/tool.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/config/config.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/types/config/providers.d.ts +50 -1
- package/dist/types/container/start.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/cell.d.ts +26 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/config.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/dispatch.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/kernel.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/process.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/protocol.d.ts +34 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/sandbox.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/tool.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/wire.d.ts +33 -0
- package/dist/types/git/resolve-identity.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/types/init/dockerfile.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/init/gitignore.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/permissions/builtins.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/plugin/types.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/types/sandbox/canonical-secrets.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/types/sandbox/coding-agent.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/sandbox/dependency-bins.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/sandbox/dev-source.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/types/sandbox/env-exposure.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/types/sandbox/hidden-paths.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/sandbox/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/sandbox/policy.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/types/typevault/cli-path.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/types/typevault/envelope-store.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/types/typevault/lifecycle.d.ts +13 -0
- package/dist/types/typevault/vault.d.ts +27 -0
- package/package.json +8 -7
- package/scripts/test.ts +252 -0
- package/src/agent/bash-sandbox-env.ts +136 -0
- package/src/agent/bash-sandbox-proc.ts +70 -0
- package/src/agent/bash-sandbox.ts +239 -0
- package/src/agent/compaction.ts +22 -10
- package/src/agent/idle-compaction.ts +7 -3
- package/src/agent/index.ts +185 -187
- package/src/agent/multimodal/look-at.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/output-allowance.ts +7 -0
- package/src/agent/plugin-tools.ts +64 -380
- package/src/agent/prompt-cache-key.ts +26 -3
- package/src/agent/session-origin.ts +41 -19
- package/src/agent/session-tail.ts +28 -0
- package/src/agent/subagent-completion-reminder.ts +2 -2
- package/src/agent/subagents.ts +21 -2
- package/src/agent/system-prompt-composition.ts +159 -0
- package/src/agent/system-prompt.ts +43 -5
- package/src/agent/todo/scope.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tool-error-remediation.ts +18 -3
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-disengage.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-edit.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-fetch-attachment.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-handoff.ts +3 -2
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-history.ts +2 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-react.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-read.ts +36 -3
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-reply.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-send.ts +4 -3
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-session-search.ts +13 -4
- package/src/agent/tools/ddg.ts +71 -11
- package/src/agent/tools/grant-role.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/post-github-review.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/restart.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/skip-response.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/spawn-subagent.ts +15 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/stream-snapshot.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/subagent-cancel.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/subagent-output.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/todo/index.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/adaptive-html.ts +6 -4
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/strategies/readability-child.ts +25 -0
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/strategies/readability-process.ts +185 -0
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/tool.ts +6 -5
- package/src/agent/tools/websearch.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools-without-local-file-operands.ts +4 -0
- package/src/browser/dockerfile.ts +1 -1
- package/src/browser/fill-secret.ts +364 -0
- package/src/browser/registry.ts +6 -6
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-messenger-cli-auth/command.ts +211 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-messenger-cli-auth/index.ts +186 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/index.ts +17 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/runner.ts +37 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/browser-agent/browser-agent.ts +51 -14
- package/src/bundled-plugins/browser-agent/index.ts +12 -5
- package/src/bundled-plugins/explorer/explorer.ts +1 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/gh-review-detect.ts +40 -16
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/graphql-auth-nudge.ts +12 -7
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/index.ts +10 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/managed-browser/index.ts +130 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/managed-browser/skills/browserskill/browserskill/SKILL.md +13 -5
- package/src/bundled-plugins/managed-browser/skills/omowright/omowright/SKILL.md +56 -5
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/README.md +23 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/append-fragment.ts +133 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/append-tool.ts +80 -149
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/dreaming.ts +6 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/index.ts +33 -6
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/load-memory.ts +2 -4
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/memory-logger.ts +200 -6
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/references/store-reference-tool.ts +56 -32
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/remember-tool.ts +81 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/search-tool-hybrid.ts +91 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/search-tool.ts +58 -12
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/stream-events.ts +2 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/transcript-cursor.ts +30 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/transcript-preload.ts +208 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/transcript-view.ts +36 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/hybrid.ts +25 -14
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/watermark.ts +19 -10
- package/src/bundled-plugins/reviewer/reviewer.ts +20 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/outbound-secret-scan.ts +3 -6
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/outbound-text.ts +20 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/private-surface-read.ts +166 -201
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/system-prompt-leak.ts +2 -7
- package/src/bundled-plugins/typevault/grants.ts +119 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/typevault/index.ts +152 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/typevault/request.ts +87 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/typevault/runtime.ts +45 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/typevault/skills/typevault/SKILL.md +65 -0
- package/src/channels/adapter-halt.ts +17 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-reference.ts +5 -4
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot.ts +1 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-classify.ts +8 -3
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord.ts +29 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/history.ts +23 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/inbound.ts +60 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/index.ts +27 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reconcile-open-prs.ts +7 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-author-resolver.ts +7 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-channel-resolver.ts +45 -15
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-classify.ts +7 -9
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-list.ts +62 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-member-cache.ts +67 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-membership.ts +27 -10
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-mention.ts +61 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk.ts +159 -125
- package/src/channels/adapters/teams-classify.ts +18 -8
- package/src/channels/github-review-check.ts +5 -1
- package/src/channels/github-review-verdict-coordinator.ts +68 -2
- package/src/channels/github-token-bridge.ts +13 -0
- package/src/channels/lost-background-context.ts +46 -0
- package/src/channels/manager.ts +52 -3
- package/src/channels/persistence.ts +5 -0
- package/src/channels/router.ts +208 -128
- package/src/channels/schema.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/subagent-completion-bridge.ts +3 -2
- package/src/channels/types.ts +3 -0
- package/src/cli/hostd.ts +3 -0
- package/src/coding-agent/tool.ts +1 -1
- package/src/config/config.ts +35 -1
- package/src/config/providers.ts +75 -4
- package/src/container/start.ts +52 -3
- package/src/doctor/channel-checks.ts +33 -0
- package/src/doctor/checks.ts +37 -18
- package/src/doctor/index.ts +48 -12
- package/src/doctor/operational-incidents.ts +16 -1
- package/src/doctor/plugin-bridge.ts +14 -1
- package/src/doctor/stage.ts +14 -0
- package/src/doctor/types.ts +6 -0
- package/src/eval/cell.ts +93 -0
- package/src/eval/config.ts +32 -0
- package/src/eval/dispatch.ts +67 -0
- package/src/eval/entry.ts +261 -0
- package/src/eval/kernel.ts +154 -0
- package/src/eval/process.ts +113 -0
- package/src/eval/protocol.ts +26 -0
- package/src/eval/redeclare.ts +174 -0
- package/src/eval/sandbox.ts +117 -0
- package/src/eval/tool.ts +99 -0
- package/src/eval/wire.ts +93 -0
- package/src/git/resolve-identity.ts +67 -2
- package/src/git/system-commit.ts +7 -0
- package/src/init/dockerfile.ts +5 -1
- package/src/init/gitignore.ts +3 -3
- package/src/init/index.ts +1 -0
- package/src/init/models-dev.ts +2 -0
- package/src/init/validate-api-key.ts +5 -0
- package/src/migrations/secrets-v1-to-v2.ts +2 -0
- package/src/operations/classify-tool-outcome.ts +1 -1
- package/src/permissions/builtins.ts +8 -0
- package/src/plugin/core-tool-names.ts +6 -1
- package/src/plugin/types.ts +6 -0
- package/src/run/bundled-plugins.ts +12 -0
- package/src/run/channel-session-factory.ts +3 -0
- package/src/run/index.ts +13 -2
- package/src/sandbox/build.ts +1 -0
- package/src/sandbox/canonical-secrets.ts +6 -0
- package/src/sandbox/dependency-bins.ts +13 -1
- package/src/sandbox/dev-source.ts +21 -12
- package/src/sandbox/env-exposure.ts +20 -0
- package/src/sandbox/hidden-paths.ts +1 -1
- package/src/sandbox/index.ts +1 -0
- package/src/sandbox/policy.ts +5 -0
- package/src/secrets/hydrate.ts +4 -1
- package/src/secrets/storage.ts +10 -1
- package/src/server/command-runner.ts +4 -0
- package/src/server/index.ts +54 -12
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-config/SKILL.md +36 -2
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-memory/SKILL.md +3 -1
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-permissions/SKILL.md +8 -8
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-troubleshooting/SKILL.md +18 -1
- package/src/tunnels/active.ts +14 -0
- package/src/typevault/bash-cli.ts +18 -0
- package/src/typevault/cli-path.ts +11 -0
- package/src/typevault/envelope-helper.ts +17 -0
- package/src/typevault/envelope-store.ts +98 -0
- package/src/typevault/lifecycle.ts +132 -0
- package/src/typevault/prompt-tunnel.ts +33 -0
- package/src/typevault/redaction.ts +37 -0
- package/src/typevault/vault.ts +283 -0
- package/typeclaw.schema.json +92 -10
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// trusted runtime hooks, not operator .env.
|
|
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|
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const OVERLAY_SECRET_NAME_PATTERN = /(?:^|_)(?:TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|API_KEY|PRIVATE_KEY|AUTH)$/i
|
|
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|
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function isOverlaySecretName(name: string): boolean {
|
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|
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return SECRET_BASH_ENV_NAMES.has(name) || OVERLAY_SECRET_NAME_PATTERN.test(name)
|
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|
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}
|
|
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|
-
|
|
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108
|
type BashSpawnEnvContext = {
|
|
136
109
|
overlay?: BashEnvOverlay
|
|
137
110
|
withhold?: BashEnvWithhold
|
|
@@ -162,6 +135,20 @@ function readBashEnvWithhold(args: Record<string, unknown>): BashEnvWithhold | u
|
|
|
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135
|
return names.length > 0 ? names : undefined
|
|
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136
|
}
|
|
164
137
|
|
|
138
|
+
function readBashReveal(args: Record<string, unknown>): BashSandboxReveal | undefined {
|
|
139
|
+
const raw = args[TYPECLAW_INTERNAL_BASH_REVEAL]
|
|
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|
+
if (!Array.isArray(raw)) return undefined
|
|
141
|
+
const reveal: BashSandboxReveal = []
|
|
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|
+
for (const entry of raw) {
|
|
143
|
+
if (entry === null || typeof entry !== 'object') continue
|
|
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|
+
const { type, source, dest } = entry as Record<string, unknown>
|
|
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|
+
if (typeof dest !== 'string') continue
|
|
146
|
+
if (type === 'tmpfs') reveal.push({ type, dest })
|
|
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|
+
else if (type === 'ro-bind' && typeof source === 'string') reveal.push({ type, source, dest })
|
|
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|
+
}
|
|
149
|
+
return reveal.length > 0 ? reveal : undefined
|
|
150
|
+
}
|
|
151
|
+
|
|
165
152
|
function readBashPreparation(args: Record<string, unknown>): DeferredBashPreparation | undefined {
|
|
166
153
|
const raw = args[TYPECLAW_INTERNAL_BASH_PREPARE]
|
|
167
154
|
return typeof raw === 'function' ? (raw as DeferredBashPreparation) : undefined
|
|
@@ -309,21 +296,8 @@ export type WrapToolOptions = {
|
|
|
309
296
|
getLoopGuardTurn?: () => number | undefined
|
|
310
297
|
}
|
|
311
298
|
|
|
312
|
-
export type BashSandboxBoundary = {
|
|
313
|
-
ensureAvailable: () => Promise<void>
|
|
314
|
-
buildCommand: typeof buildSandboxedCommand
|
|
315
|
-
resolveProcStrategy?: () => Promise<ProcStrategyResolution>
|
|
316
|
-
resolveRuntime?: typeof resolvePrivilegedSandboxRuntime
|
|
317
|
-
verifyRuntime?: typeof verifyPrivilegedSandboxRuntime
|
|
318
|
-
cleanupRuntime?: typeof cleanupPrivilegedSandboxRuntime
|
|
319
|
-
}
|
|
320
|
-
|
|
321
|
-
const DEFAULT_BASH_SANDBOX_BOUNDARY: BashSandboxBoundary = {
|
|
322
|
-
ensureAvailable: ensureBwrapAvailable,
|
|
323
|
-
buildCommand: buildSandboxedCommand,
|
|
324
|
-
}
|
|
325
|
-
|
|
326
299
|
export type WrapSystemToolOptions = {
|
|
300
|
+
readonly getGithubSelf?: GetGithubSelf
|
|
327
301
|
agentDir: string
|
|
328
302
|
sessionId: string
|
|
329
303
|
hooks: HookBus
|
|
@@ -380,7 +354,7 @@ export function wrapPluginTool(tool: Tool<any>, opts: WrapToolOptions): ToolDefi
|
|
|
380
354
|
label: opts.toolName,
|
|
381
355
|
description: tool.description,
|
|
382
356
|
parameters,
|
|
383
|
-
async execute(toolCallId, params, signal) {
|
|
357
|
+
async execute(toolCallId, params, signal, _onUpdate, ctx) {
|
|
384
358
|
const envelope = extractGuardAcknowledgements(params, opts.toolName, opts.guards ?? [])
|
|
385
359
|
if (!envelope.ok) return errorResult(`invalid arguments: ${envelope.error}`)
|
|
386
360
|
|
|
@@ -391,6 +365,8 @@ export function wrapPluginTool(tool: Tool<any>, opts: WrapToolOptions): ToolDefi
|
|
|
391
365
|
|
|
392
366
|
const mutableArgs = validated.data as Record<string, unknown>
|
|
393
367
|
const liveOrigin = opts.getOrigin?.()
|
|
368
|
+
// Plain Agent/direct invocations may have no extension context.
|
|
369
|
+
const entryId = ctx?.sessionManager?.getLeafId() ?? undefined
|
|
394
370
|
const before: ToolBeforeEvent = {
|
|
395
371
|
tool: opts.toolName,
|
|
396
372
|
sessionId: opts.sessionId,
|
|
@@ -423,6 +399,8 @@ export function wrapPluginTool(tool: Tool<any>, opts: WrapToolOptions): ToolDefi
|
|
|
423
399
|
sessionId: opts.sessionId,
|
|
424
400
|
agentDir: opts.agentDir,
|
|
425
401
|
logger: opts.logger,
|
|
402
|
+
...(liveOrigin === undefined ? {} : { origin: liveOrigin }),
|
|
403
|
+
...(entryId === undefined ? {} : { entryId }),
|
|
426
404
|
}
|
|
427
405
|
|
|
428
406
|
let result: ToolResult | undefined
|
|
@@ -606,6 +584,7 @@ export function wrapBuiltinToolDefinition<TParams extends TSchema, TDetails = un
|
|
|
606
584
|
delete mutableArgs[TYPECLAW_INTERNAL_BASH_ENV]
|
|
607
585
|
delete mutableArgs[TYPECLAW_INTERNAL_BASH_WITHHOLD_ENV]
|
|
608
586
|
delete mutableArgs[TYPECLAW_INTERNAL_BASH_PREPARE]
|
|
587
|
+
delete mutableArgs[TYPECLAW_INTERNAL_BASH_REVEAL]
|
|
609
588
|
const blockResult = await opts.hooks.runToolBefore(
|
|
610
589
|
{
|
|
611
590
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
@@ -633,9 +612,11 @@ export function wrapBuiltinToolDefinition<TParams extends TSchema, TDetails = un
|
|
|
633
612
|
const bashEnvOverlay = readBashEnvOverlay(mutableArgs)
|
|
634
613
|
const bashEnvWithhold = readBashEnvWithhold(mutableArgs)
|
|
635
614
|
const bashPreparation = readBashPreparation(mutableArgs)
|
|
615
|
+
const bashReveal = readBashReveal(mutableArgs)
|
|
636
616
|
delete mutableArgs[TYPECLAW_INTERNAL_BASH_ENV]
|
|
637
617
|
delete mutableArgs[TYPECLAW_INTERNAL_BASH_WITHHOLD_ENV]
|
|
638
618
|
delete mutableArgs[TYPECLAW_INTERNAL_BASH_PREPARE]
|
|
619
|
+
delete mutableArgs[TYPECLAW_INTERNAL_BASH_REVEAL]
|
|
639
620
|
const loopGate = gateLoopGuard(opts.sessionId, tool.name, mutableArgs, opts.getLoopGuardTurn?.(), opts.agentDir)
|
|
640
621
|
if (loopGate.blockNow) {
|
|
641
622
|
fireLoopAbort(opts.getAbort, 'loop_guard:block', opts.sessionId)
|
|
@@ -658,7 +639,7 @@ export function wrapBuiltinToolDefinition<TParams extends TSchema, TDetails = un
|
|
|
658
639
|
let executionError: unknown
|
|
659
640
|
let cleanupError: unknown
|
|
660
641
|
let sandboxedRealProcSucceeded = false
|
|
661
|
-
const sandboxBoundary = opts.bashSandboxBoundary
|
|
642
|
+
const sandboxBoundary = opts.bashSandboxBoundary
|
|
662
643
|
const incidentLedger = opts.incidentLedger ?? new IncidentLedger(opts.agentDir)
|
|
663
644
|
const originalArgs = { ...mutableArgs }
|
|
664
645
|
const executeAttempt = async (): Promise<void> => {
|
|
@@ -678,17 +659,21 @@ export function wrapBuiltinToolDefinition<TParams extends TSchema, TDetails = un
|
|
|
678
659
|
'model-driven bash has no permission service; refusing unsandboxed execution',
|
|
679
660
|
)
|
|
680
661
|
}
|
|
681
|
-
|
|
682
|
-
|
|
683
|
-
opts.
|
|
684
|
-
|
|
685
|
-
opts.
|
|
686
|
-
|
|
687
|
-
|
|
688
|
-
|
|
689
|
-
|
|
690
|
-
|
|
691
|
-
|
|
662
|
+
if (typeof attemptArgs.command !== 'string') throw new SandboxPolicyError('bash command must be a string')
|
|
663
|
+
preparedSandboxRuntime = await prepareBashSandbox({
|
|
664
|
+
getGithubSelf: opts.getGithubSelf,
|
|
665
|
+
command: attemptArgs.command,
|
|
666
|
+
permissions: opts.permissions,
|
|
667
|
+
origin: liveOrigin,
|
|
668
|
+
agentDir: opts.agentDir,
|
|
669
|
+
sessionId: opts.sessionId,
|
|
670
|
+
envOverlay: bashEnvOverlay,
|
|
671
|
+
envWithhold: bashEnvWithhold,
|
|
672
|
+
deferredPreparation: bashPreparation,
|
|
673
|
+
reveal: bashReveal,
|
|
674
|
+
boundary: sandboxBoundary,
|
|
675
|
+
})
|
|
676
|
+
attemptArgs.command = preparedSandboxRuntime.commandString
|
|
692
677
|
}
|
|
693
678
|
|
|
694
679
|
tmpRedirect =
|
|
@@ -902,156 +887,6 @@ export function buildBuiltinPiToolOverrides(opts: WrapSystemToolOptions): ToolDe
|
|
|
902
887
|
return defaultBuiltinPiToolDefinitions(opts.agentDir).map((tool) => wrapBuiltinToolDefinition(tool, opts))
|
|
903
888
|
}
|
|
904
889
|
|
|
905
|
-
type BashFilesystemPolicyOptions = {
|
|
906
|
-
agentDir: string
|
|
907
|
-
canWriteAgentRoot: boolean
|
|
908
|
-
masks: { dirs: string[]; files: string[] }
|
|
909
|
-
writable: { dirs: string[]; files: string[] }
|
|
910
|
-
protected: { dirs: string[]; files: string[] }
|
|
911
|
-
}
|
|
912
|
-
|
|
913
|
-
type PreparedBashSandbox = {
|
|
914
|
-
verify: () => Promise<void>
|
|
915
|
-
cleanup: () => Promise<void>
|
|
916
|
-
spawnEnv?: Record<string, string>
|
|
917
|
-
dependencyBins?: DependencyBinReconciliation
|
|
918
|
-
withheld: {
|
|
919
|
-
paths: { dirs: string[]; files: string[] }
|
|
920
|
-
envNames: string[]
|
|
921
|
-
}
|
|
922
|
-
}
|
|
923
|
-
|
|
924
|
-
export function buildBashFilesystemPolicy(options: BashFilesystemPolicyOptions) {
|
|
925
|
-
const { agentDir, canWriteAgentRoot, masks, writable, protected: protectedZones } = options
|
|
926
|
-
if (canWriteAgentRoot) {
|
|
927
|
-
return { writableRoot: { dir: agentDir }, masks, protected: protectedZones }
|
|
928
|
-
}
|
|
929
|
-
return { masks, writable, protected: protectedZones }
|
|
930
|
-
}
|
|
931
|
-
|
|
932
|
-
// Rewrites mutableArgs.command in place so the bash builtin runs inside bwrap
|
|
933
|
-
// with role-derived private-directory masks and unconditional canonical-secret
|
|
934
|
-
// file masks. When masks are needed but bwrap is unavailable
|
|
935
|
-
// we throw rather than run unsandboxed — fail closed, never leak the masked
|
|
936
|
-
// surface. Runs after the tool.before guards have inspected the raw command.
|
|
937
|
-
async function applyBashSandbox(
|
|
938
|
-
mutableArgs: Record<string, unknown>,
|
|
939
|
-
permissions: PermissionService,
|
|
940
|
-
origin: SessionOrigin | undefined,
|
|
941
|
-
agentDir: string,
|
|
942
|
-
sessionId: string,
|
|
943
|
-
envOverlay: BashEnvOverlay | undefined,
|
|
944
|
-
envWithhold: BashEnvWithhold | undefined,
|
|
945
|
-
deferredPreparation: DeferredBashPreparation | undefined,
|
|
946
|
-
boundary: BashSandboxBoundary,
|
|
947
|
-
): Promise<PreparedBashSandbox> {
|
|
948
|
-
const originalCommand = mutableArgs.command
|
|
949
|
-
if (typeof originalCommand !== 'string') {
|
|
950
|
-
return {
|
|
951
|
-
verify: async () => {},
|
|
952
|
-
cleanup: async () => {},
|
|
953
|
-
withheld: { paths: { dirs: [], files: [] }, envNames: [] },
|
|
954
|
-
}
|
|
955
|
-
}
|
|
956
|
-
|
|
957
|
-
let preparation: DeferredBashPreparationResult | undefined
|
|
958
|
-
let privilegedRuntime: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof resolvePrivilegedSandboxRuntime>> | undefined
|
|
959
|
-
const cleanup = async (): Promise<void> => {
|
|
960
|
-
const tasks: Promise<void>[] = []
|
|
961
|
-
if (privilegedRuntime !== undefined) {
|
|
962
|
-
tasks.push((boundary.cleanupRuntime ?? cleanupPrivilegedSandboxRuntime)(privilegedRuntime))
|
|
963
|
-
}
|
|
964
|
-
if (preparation !== undefined) tasks.push(preparation.cleanup())
|
|
965
|
-
const outcomes = await Promise.allSettled(tasks)
|
|
966
|
-
const failure = outcomes.find((outcome) => outcome.status === 'rejected')
|
|
967
|
-
if (failure?.status === 'rejected') throw failure.reason
|
|
968
|
-
}
|
|
969
|
-
try {
|
|
970
|
-
preparation = await deferredPreparation?.()
|
|
971
|
-
const command = preparation?.command ?? originalCommand
|
|
972
|
-
const preparedEnvOverlay = preparation?.env === undefined ? envOverlay : { ...envOverlay, ...preparation.env }
|
|
973
|
-
const { dirs, files } = resolveHiddenPaths(permissions, origin, agentDir)
|
|
974
|
-
const envNames = resolveExposableBashEnvNames(agentDir)
|
|
975
|
-
const sandboxEnvOverlay = buildRoleScopedConfigEnv(agentDir, dirs, preparedEnvOverlay)
|
|
976
|
-
const effectiveEnvWithhold = (envWithhold ?? []).filter((name) => !Object.hasOwn(sandboxEnvOverlay ?? {}, name))
|
|
977
|
-
const maskTargets = await ensureHiddenMaskTargets({ dirs, files })
|
|
978
|
-
await boundary.ensureAvailable()
|
|
979
|
-
const sessionTmp = await ensureSessionTmpDir(sessionId)
|
|
980
|
-
const dependencyBins = await reconcileDependencyBinWrappers({ agentDir, sessionTmp })
|
|
981
|
-
const writable = subtractMasked(await resolveWritableZones(agentDir, getSandboxWritablePathSpecs(config)), {
|
|
982
|
-
dirs,
|
|
983
|
-
files,
|
|
984
|
-
})
|
|
985
|
-
const writableRoot = canWriteAgentRootInSandbox(permissions, origin)
|
|
986
|
-
const baseProtectedZones =
|
|
987
|
-
writableRoot || writable.dirs.includes(join(agentDir, '.git'))
|
|
988
|
-
? subtractMasked(await resolveProtectedZones(agentDir), { dirs, files })
|
|
989
|
-
: { dirs: [], files: [] }
|
|
990
|
-
const protectedZones = {
|
|
991
|
-
dirs: baseProtectedZones.dirs,
|
|
992
|
-
files: [...new Set([...baseProtectedZones.files, ...dependencyBins.protectedFiles])],
|
|
993
|
-
}
|
|
994
|
-
const writableDirSet = new Set(writable.dirs)
|
|
995
|
-
const sandboxHome = DEFAULT_SANDBOX_ENV.HOME ?? '/tmp'
|
|
996
|
-
const symlinks = resolveSandboxSymlinks(agentDir, config.sandbox.symlinks, sandboxHome).filter((op) =>
|
|
997
|
-
writableDirSet.has(op.target),
|
|
998
|
-
)
|
|
999
|
-
const { strategy: proc, degradeReason } = await (boundary.resolveProcStrategy ?? resolveProcStrategy)()
|
|
1000
|
-
if (proc === 'tmpfs' && commandNeedsRealProc(command)) {
|
|
1001
|
-
throw degradeReason === 'unverified' ? new SandboxProcProbeUnverifiedError() : new SandboxDegradedProcError()
|
|
1002
|
-
}
|
|
1003
|
-
privilegedRuntime = await (boundary.resolveRuntime ?? resolvePrivilegedSandboxRuntime)({
|
|
1004
|
-
agentDir,
|
|
1005
|
-
command,
|
|
1006
|
-
env: sandboxEnvOverlay,
|
|
1007
|
-
})
|
|
1008
|
-
await verifyHiddenMaskTargets(maskTargets)
|
|
1009
|
-
const devSourceMount = await resolveDevSourceMount(agentDir)
|
|
1010
|
-
const { commandString, spawnEnv } = boundary.buildCommand(command, {
|
|
1011
|
-
mounts: [
|
|
1012
|
-
{ type: 'ro-bind', source: agentDir, dest: agentDir },
|
|
1013
|
-
{ type: 'bind', source: sessionTmp, dest: '/tmp' },
|
|
1014
|
-
// `/tmp` is writable, but PATH entries must remain runtime-owned for
|
|
1015
|
-
// the lifetime of this command. Last-op-wins makes this narrow re-bind
|
|
1016
|
-
// read-only without adding any broader filesystem exposure.
|
|
1017
|
-
{ type: 'ro-bind', source: dependencyBins.wrapperDir, dest: DEPENDENCY_BIN_SANDBOX_DIR },
|
|
1018
|
-
...(devSourceMount === undefined ? [] : [devSourceMount]),
|
|
1019
|
-
...(privilegedRuntime?.mounts ?? []),
|
|
1020
|
-
...(preparation === undefined ? [] : [preparation.mount]),
|
|
1021
|
-
],
|
|
1022
|
-
...(writableRoot
|
|
1023
|
-
? { writableRoot: { dir: agentDir }, masks: maskTargets, protected: protectedZones }
|
|
1024
|
-
: { masks: maskTargets, writable, protected: protectedZones }),
|
|
1025
|
-
symlinks,
|
|
1026
|
-
network: 'inherit',
|
|
1027
|
-
cwd: agentDir,
|
|
1028
|
-
proc,
|
|
1029
|
-
procSelfExe: resolveProcSelfExe(),
|
|
1030
|
-
...spreadSandboxEnv(
|
|
1031
|
-
buildSandboxEnvPolicy(sandboxEnvOverlay, privilegedRuntime?.env, envNames.exposable, envWithhold),
|
|
1032
|
-
),
|
|
1033
|
-
})
|
|
1034
|
-
mutableArgs.command = commandString
|
|
1035
|
-
// The overlay carries command-scoped secret VALUES (e.g. a per-repo GH_TOKEN)
|
|
1036
|
-
// that live in neither process.env nor argv; resolveSpawnEnv snapshots
|
|
1037
|
-
// inherited names from process.env only, so merge the overlay values in here
|
|
1038
|
-
// to complete the exact bwrap-parent env.
|
|
1039
|
-
const mergedSpawnEnv =
|
|
1040
|
-
spawnEnv !== undefined && sandboxEnvOverlay !== undefined ? { ...spawnEnv, ...sandboxEnvOverlay } : spawnEnv
|
|
1041
|
-
const runtimeForResult = privilegedRuntime
|
|
1042
|
-
return {
|
|
1043
|
-
verify: async () => (boundary.verifyRuntime ?? verifyPrivilegedSandboxRuntime)(runtimeForResult),
|
|
1044
|
-
cleanup,
|
|
1045
|
-
spawnEnv: mergedSpawnEnv,
|
|
1046
|
-
dependencyBins,
|
|
1047
|
-
withheld: { paths: maskTargets, envNames: [...new Set([...envNames.withheld, ...effectiveEnvWithhold])] },
|
|
1048
|
-
}
|
|
1049
|
-
} catch (error) {
|
|
1050
|
-
await cleanup()
|
|
1051
|
-
throw error
|
|
1052
|
-
}
|
|
1053
|
-
}
|
|
1054
|
-
|
|
1055
890
|
function bashResultIsCommandNotFound(result: ToolResult): boolean {
|
|
1056
891
|
if (isRecord(result.details) && result.details.exitCode === 127) return true
|
|
1057
892
|
return (result.content as ContentPart[]).some(
|
|
@@ -1089,164 +924,6 @@ function appendTextResult(result: ToolResult, text: string): ToolResult {
|
|
|
1089
924
|
return { ...result, content: [...(result.content as ContentPart[]), { type: 'text', text }] }
|
|
1090
925
|
}
|
|
1091
926
|
|
|
1092
|
-
export function buildSandboxEnvPolicy(
|
|
1093
|
-
overlay: BashEnvOverlay | undefined,
|
|
1094
|
-
runtimeEnv: Record<string, string> | undefined,
|
|
1095
|
-
exposableEnvNames: readonly string[] = [],
|
|
1096
|
-
withhold: readonly string[] = [],
|
|
1097
|
-
): { inherit?: string[]; set?: Record<string, string>; withhold?: string[] } {
|
|
1098
|
-
const requestedWithhold = new Set(withhold)
|
|
1099
|
-
const overlayNames = new Set(Object.keys(overlay ?? {}))
|
|
1100
|
-
// The overlay is a deliberate command-scoped replacement, while withholding
|
|
1101
|
-
// only removes ambient values; an overlay therefore wins for the same name.
|
|
1102
|
-
const effectiveWithhold = [...requestedWithhold].filter((name) => !overlayNames.has(name))
|
|
1103
|
-
const effectiveWithholdSet = new Set(effectiveWithhold)
|
|
1104
|
-
const set = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(runtimeEnv ?? {}).filter(([key]) => !requestedWithhold.has(key)))
|
|
1105
|
-
const inherit: string[] = []
|
|
1106
|
-
const inheritSeen = new Set<string>()
|
|
1107
|
-
const pushInherit = (key: string): void => {
|
|
1108
|
-
if (effectiveWithholdSet.has(key) || Object.hasOwn(set, key) || inheritSeen.has(key)) return
|
|
1109
|
-
inheritSeen.add(key)
|
|
1110
|
-
inherit.push(key)
|
|
1111
|
-
}
|
|
1112
|
-
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(overlay ?? {})) {
|
|
1113
|
-
if (Object.hasOwn(set, key)) continue
|
|
1114
|
-
if (isOverlaySecretName(key)) pushInherit(key)
|
|
1115
|
-
else set[key] = value
|
|
1116
|
-
}
|
|
1117
|
-
// Operator-declared .env vars pass through by NAME (inherit), keeping values
|
|
1118
|
-
// out of the rendered bwrap argv. Sandbox-integrity names were already dropped
|
|
1119
|
-
// in resolveExposableEnvNames — these are the survivors.
|
|
1120
|
-
for (const key of exposableEnvNames) pushInherit(key)
|
|
1121
|
-
// Pass the entrypoint-exported Xvfb display (start_xvfb: `export DISPLAY=:99`)
|
|
1122
|
-
// through --clearenv, else sandboxed `agent-browser --headed` dies with
|
|
1123
|
-
// "Missing X server or $DISPLAY". Passing the runtime's OWN value (not a fixed
|
|
1124
|
-
// ":99") keeps `docker.file.xvfb=false` advertising no display. Rendered via
|
|
1125
|
-
// `set` (a display number is neither a credential nor shell-injectable), and no
|
|
1126
|
-
// /tmp/.X11-unix bind is needed: Chrome reaches Xvfb over the netns-scoped
|
|
1127
|
-
// abstract X11 socket while bash keeps network:'inherit'.
|
|
1128
|
-
const display = process.env['DISPLAY']
|
|
1129
|
-
if (
|
|
1130
|
-
display !== undefined &&
|
|
1131
|
-
display !== '' &&
|
|
1132
|
-
!effectiveWithholdSet.has('DISPLAY') &&
|
|
1133
|
-
!Object.hasOwn(set, 'DISPLAY') &&
|
|
1134
|
-
!inheritSeen.has('DISPLAY')
|
|
1135
|
-
) {
|
|
1136
|
-
set['DISPLAY'] = display
|
|
1137
|
-
}
|
|
1138
|
-
return {
|
|
1139
|
-
...(inherit.length > 0 ? { inherit } : {}),
|
|
1140
|
-
...(Object.keys(set).length > 0 ? { set } : {}),
|
|
1141
|
-
...(effectiveWithhold.length > 0 ? { withhold: effectiveWithhold } : {}),
|
|
1142
|
-
}
|
|
1143
|
-
}
|
|
1144
|
-
|
|
1145
|
-
function spreadSandboxEnv(policy: ReturnType<typeof buildSandboxEnvPolicy>): {
|
|
1146
|
-
env?: ReturnType<typeof buildSandboxEnvPolicy>
|
|
1147
|
-
} {
|
|
1148
|
-
return Object.keys(policy).length > 0 ? { env: policy } : {}
|
|
1149
|
-
}
|
|
1150
|
-
|
|
1151
|
-
function resolveExposableBashEnvNames(agentDir: string): { exposable: string[]; withheld: string[] } {
|
|
1152
|
-
const declaredEnv = readEnvFile(agentDir)
|
|
1153
|
-
const exposable = resolveExposableEnvNames(declaredEnv, process.env)
|
|
1154
|
-
const exposableSet = new Set(exposable)
|
|
1155
|
-
const withheld = [...declaredEnv]
|
|
1156
|
-
.filter(([name, value]) => value.length > 0 && !exposableSet.has(name))
|
|
1157
|
-
.map(([name]) => name)
|
|
1158
|
-
return { exposable, withheld }
|
|
1159
|
-
}
|
|
1160
|
-
|
|
1161
|
-
function buildRoleScopedConfigEnv(
|
|
1162
|
-
agentDir: string,
|
|
1163
|
-
hiddenDirs: string[],
|
|
1164
|
-
envOverlay: BashEnvOverlay | undefined,
|
|
1165
|
-
): BashEnvOverlay | undefined {
|
|
1166
|
-
// Low-trust roles have workspace/ masked. Do not let container-global config
|
|
1167
|
-
// env vars point CLIs back at that private surface: apps that honor XDG should
|
|
1168
|
-
// still run, but their config must land in the sandbox's per-session /tmp.
|
|
1169
|
-
// Trusted/owner have only the unconditional credential-dir masks, not the
|
|
1170
|
-
// workspace root mask, so their command broker decides whether to set GWS.
|
|
1171
|
-
const workspaceHidden = hiddenDirs.includes(join(agentDir, 'workspace'))
|
|
1172
|
-
if (!workspaceHidden) return envOverlay
|
|
1173
|
-
|
|
1174
|
-
return {
|
|
1175
|
-
...envOverlay,
|
|
1176
|
-
XDG_CONFIG_HOME: '/tmp/.config',
|
|
1177
|
-
GWS_CONFIG_HOME: '/tmp/.config/gws',
|
|
1178
|
-
}
|
|
1179
|
-
}
|
|
1180
|
-
|
|
1181
|
-
// Picks the /proc strategy for a sandboxed bash call. The branch order is:
|
|
1182
|
-
// 'real-proc' ONLY when the operator explicitly opted in (sandbox.realProc) AND
|
|
1183
|
-
// the kernel permits the mount (canMountRealProc) — it adds PID isolation but
|
|
1184
|
-
// needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN (unshare --mount-proc), so it is a deliberate, narrow
|
|
1185
|
-
// opt-in; else 'proc-bind' (--ro-bind /proc, NO CAP_SYS_ADMIN) when its userns
|
|
1186
|
-
// leak-block is verified safe; else 'tmpfs'. Because sandbox.realProc DEFAULTS
|
|
1187
|
-
// FALSE, the first branch is normally skipped and proc-bind is the de-facto
|
|
1188
|
-
// default — which is the point: the common path needs no broad outer capability.
|
|
1189
|
-
// 'tmpfs' is the last-resort degraded mode where external packages can't run;
|
|
1190
|
-
// reached only when proc-bind is DEFINITIVELY unavailable (a real cross-userns
|
|
1191
|
-
// environ leak → fail closed) or its safety stays unverifiable after retries.
|
|
1192
|
-
//
|
|
1193
|
-
// Read from the boot-time `config` snapshot, NOT live getConfig(): sandbox is
|
|
1194
|
-
// restart-required, and the strategy MUST track the boot-time CAP_SYS_ADMIN
|
|
1195
|
-
// grant. A `typeclaw reload` flipping realProc would otherwise emit `unshare
|
|
1196
|
-
// --mount-proc` in a container booted WITHOUT the cap (or vice versa). Both
|
|
1197
|
-
// probes are cached process-globally, so this resolves to one spawn per
|
|
1198
|
-
// container lifetime regardless of how many bash calls hit it.
|
|
1199
|
-
// A tmpfs degrade carries WHY it happened so the caller can pick a permanent vs
|
|
1200
|
-
// retryable error. 'definitive': the probe returned a real cross-userns leak
|
|
1201
|
-
// ('unsafe') — the ONLY verdict proven permanent, so it fails closed for good.
|
|
1202
|
-
// 'unverified': the safety probe never reached a definitive verdict within its
|
|
1203
|
-
// retry budget. That covers BOTH a transient load spike AND a durable
|
|
1204
|
-
// incapability (no usable namespaces, a bwrap that starts but cannot set up its
|
|
1205
|
-
// sandbox): the probe cannot prove a NEGATIVE capability — only a leak is
|
|
1206
|
-
// definitive — so a genuinely incapable host also lands here and simply keeps
|
|
1207
|
-
// re-degrading on each call. Since 'inconclusive' is never cached, that costs a
|
|
1208
|
-
// re-probe but is correct: the only false case is "capable but briefly
|
|
1209
|
-
// saturated", which recovers; an incapable host stays degraded either way.
|
|
1210
|
-
// Absent when the strategy is not tmpfs.
|
|
1211
|
-
type ProcStrategyResolution =
|
|
1212
|
-
| { strategy: 'real-proc' | 'proc-bind'; degradeReason?: undefined }
|
|
1213
|
-
| { strategy: 'tmpfs'; degradeReason: 'definitive' | 'unverified' }
|
|
1214
|
-
|
|
1215
|
-
async function resolveProcStrategy(): Promise<ProcStrategyResolution> {
|
|
1216
|
-
if (config.sandbox.realProc && (await canMountRealProc())) return { strategy: 'real-proc' }
|
|
1217
|
-
// Retry an 'inconclusive' proc-bind probe (transient under load) before
|
|
1218
|
-
// degrading — a single such hiccup must not break external-package runs on a
|
|
1219
|
-
// capable host. 'unsafe' still fails closed with no retry.
|
|
1220
|
-
const verdict = await resolveProcBindSafetyWithRetry(
|
|
1221
|
-
() => getProcBindSafetyVerdict(),
|
|
1222
|
-
(ms) => Bun.sleep(ms),
|
|
1223
|
-
)
|
|
1224
|
-
if (verdict === 'safe') return { strategy: 'proc-bind' }
|
|
1225
|
-
// Degraded last resort: no working /proc strategy. External package runners
|
|
1226
|
-
// (bunx/bun run <pkg-bin>) will fail with Bun's opaque "NotDir" because
|
|
1227
|
-
// /proc/self/{fd,maps} are absent. Only a proven 'unsafe' (a real cross-userns
|
|
1228
|
-
// leak) is DEFINITIVE — warn once (a real operator-facing limit). An
|
|
1229
|
-
// 'inconclusive' is reported as retryable upstream and NOT warned (it would cry
|
|
1230
|
-
// wolf every boot storm); a durably-incapable host re-degrades quietly here,
|
|
1231
|
-
// since the probe cannot distinguish it from transient load.
|
|
1232
|
-
if (verdict === 'unsafe') {
|
|
1233
|
-
warnTmpfsProcFallbackOnce()
|
|
1234
|
-
return { strategy: 'tmpfs', degradeReason: 'definitive' }
|
|
1235
|
-
}
|
|
1236
|
-
return { strategy: 'tmpfs', degradeReason: 'unverified' }
|
|
1237
|
-
}
|
|
1238
|
-
|
|
1239
|
-
let tmpfsProcFallbackWarned = false
|
|
1240
|
-
function warnTmpfsProcFallbackOnce(): void {
|
|
1241
|
-
if (tmpfsProcFallbackWarned) return
|
|
1242
|
-
tmpfsProcFallbackWarned = true
|
|
1243
|
-
console.warn(
|
|
1244
|
-
'[sandbox] degraded /proc mode: neither real-proc nor proc-bind is available on this host, ' +
|
|
1245
|
-
'so sandboxed external package runners (bunx / bun run <pkg-bin>) will fail. ' +
|
|
1246
|
-
'This needs a runtime with working user namespaces.',
|
|
1247
|
-
)
|
|
1248
|
-
}
|
|
1249
|
-
|
|
1250
927
|
// The builtin file tools that take a single filesystem `path` arg. They run in
|
|
1251
928
|
// the main process rather than bwrap, so each must apply the same
|
|
1252
929
|
// /tmp -> session-dir mapping that
|
|
@@ -1438,6 +1115,13 @@ export function forgetSharedLoopGuardTool(sessionId: string, tool: string): void
|
|
|
1438
1115
|
sharedLoopGuard.forgetTool(sessionId, tool)
|
|
1439
1116
|
}
|
|
1440
1117
|
|
|
1118
|
+
// Drops a session's whole loop-guard history when a new user request starts
|
|
1119
|
+
// (see `attachLoopGuardUserRunTracking`), so per-request repetition is not
|
|
1120
|
+
// mistaken for a cycle that spans requests.
|
|
1121
|
+
export function resetSharedLoopGuardSession(sessionId: string): void {
|
|
1122
|
+
sharedLoopGuard.reset(sessionId)
|
|
1123
|
+
}
|
|
1124
|
+
|
|
1441
1125
|
// Test-only seam: swaps the shared loop guard for a fresh instance so tests
|
|
1442
1126
|
// that reuse sessionIds across cases don't see cross-test streak counts.
|
|
1443
1127
|
// Production code never calls this; the guard's LRU bound handles
|
|
@@ -10,9 +10,7 @@ const PROMPT_CACHE_KEY_MAX_LENGTH = 64
|
|
|
10
10
|
// session therefore landed on a cold machine and re-paid its whole ~10K-token
|
|
11
11
|
// system+tools prefix even though sibling sessions of the same kind had just
|
|
12
12
|
// sent the identical prefix. Keying by origin kind (and subagent/component
|
|
13
|
-
// name, whose prompts differ) lets those sessions share the warm prefix.
|
|
14
|
-
// the body key changes: pi still uses the session id for the Codex websocket
|
|
15
|
-
// session cache and request headers.
|
|
13
|
+
// name, whose prompts differ) lets those sessions share the warm prefix.
|
|
16
14
|
export function promptCacheKeyForOrigin(origin: SessionOrigin | undefined): string | undefined {
|
|
17
15
|
const key = unboundedPromptCacheKey(origin)
|
|
18
16
|
return key === undefined ? undefined : Array.from(key).slice(0, PROMPT_CACHE_KEY_MAX_LENGTH).join('')
|
|
@@ -32,6 +30,31 @@ function unboundedPromptCacheKey(origin: SessionOrigin | undefined): string | un
|
|
|
32
30
|
}
|
|
33
31
|
}
|
|
34
32
|
|
|
33
|
+
// Providers route cache affinity by the stream `sessionId` pi turns into
|
|
34
|
+
// session-affinity headers (`session-id`, `x-session-affinity`, `x-affinity`, …)
|
|
35
|
+
// and default cache keys, so rewriting the body key alone does not reach a warm
|
|
36
|
+
// machine. On the ChatGPT Codex backend, a live probe of identical prefixes on
|
|
37
|
+
// fresh connections got 0% reuse with per-session ids and the same body key,
|
|
38
|
+
// and ~96% once the session id was shared. Short-lived subagent and system
|
|
39
|
+
// sessions therefore send their origin key as the session id on every
|
|
40
|
+
// provider, and each cron fire (a fresh session that repeats its job's prompt)
|
|
41
|
+
// shares one id per job. Long-lived tui/channel sessions keep their own id so
|
|
42
|
+
// one hot shared key cannot spill their long histories onto overflow machines.
|
|
43
|
+
// The id travels in HTTP headers, whose values must be Latin-1, so characters
|
|
44
|
+
// outside printable ASCII are percent-encoded. ASCII names stay identical to
|
|
45
|
+
// their body cache key.
|
|
46
|
+
export function sharedSessionIdForOrigin(origin: SessionOrigin | undefined): string | undefined {
|
|
47
|
+
const shared =
|
|
48
|
+
origin?.kind === 'subagent' || origin?.kind === 'system'
|
|
49
|
+
? unboundedPromptCacheKey(origin)!
|
|
50
|
+
: origin?.kind === 'cron'
|
|
51
|
+
? `typeclaw:cron:${origin.jobId}`
|
|
52
|
+
: undefined
|
|
53
|
+
if (shared === undefined) return undefined
|
|
54
|
+
const key = shared.replace(/[^\x20-\x7e]/gu, (char) => encodeURIComponent(char))
|
|
55
|
+
return key.slice(0, PROMPT_CACHE_KEY_MAX_LENGTH)
|
|
56
|
+
}
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
35
58
|
// Rewrites only payloads that already carry a string `prompt_cache_key`, so
|
|
36
59
|
// providers without the field and `cacheRetention: 'none'` (which omits it)
|
|
37
60
|
// are left untouched.
|