typeclaw 0.50.0 → 0.51.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/types/agent/bash-sandbox-env.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/bash-sandbox-proc.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/bash-sandbox.d.ts +94 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/compaction.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/types/agent/idle-compaction.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/index.d.ts +5 -17
- package/dist/types/agent/output-allowance.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/plugin-tools.d.ts +4 -75
- package/dist/types/agent/system-prompt-composition.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/ddg.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/stream-snapshot.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/agent/tools/webfetch/tool.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/channels/github-review-check.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/types/channels/router.d.ts +11 -49
- package/dist/types/config/config.d.ts +24 -11
- package/dist/types/config/providers.d.ts +3 -1
- package/dist/types/container/start.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/cell.d.ts +26 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/config.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/dispatch.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/kernel.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/process.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/protocol.d.ts +34 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/sandbox.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/tool.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/types/eval/wire.d.ts +33 -0
- package/dist/types/sandbox/env-exposure.d.ts +2 -0
- package/package.json +5 -5
- package/src/agent/bash-sandbox-env.ts +104 -0
- package/src/agent/bash-sandbox-proc.ts +70 -0
- package/src/agent/bash-sandbox.ts +225 -0
- package/src/agent/compaction.ts +22 -10
- package/src/agent/idle-compaction.ts +7 -3
- package/src/agent/index.ts +66 -157
- package/src/agent/output-allowance.ts +7 -0
- package/src/agent/plugin-tools.ts +29 -379
- package/src/agent/session-origin.ts +2 -1
- package/src/agent/subagent-completion-reminder.ts +2 -2
- package/src/agent/system-prompt-composition.ts +141 -0
- package/src/agent/system-prompt.ts +4 -4
- package/src/agent/todo/scope.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/ddg.ts +71 -11
- package/src/agent/tools-without-local-file-operands.ts +4 -0
- package/src/browser/fill-secret.ts +307 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/explorer/explorer.ts +1 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/gh-review-detect.ts +40 -16
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/graphql-auth-nudge.ts +12 -7
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/index.ts +10 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/managed-browser/index.ts +107 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/dreaming.ts +4 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/load-memory.ts +2 -4
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/memory-logger.ts +74 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/transcript-preload.ts +103 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/hybrid.ts +25 -14
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/private-surface-read.ts +166 -201
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-reference.ts +5 -4
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot.ts +1 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-classify.ts +8 -3
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord.ts +29 -0
- package/src/channels/github-review-check.ts +5 -1
- package/src/channels/github-review-verdict-coordinator.ts +68 -2
- package/src/channels/router.ts +88 -107
- package/src/channels/subagent-completion-bridge.ts +3 -2
- package/src/cli/hostd.ts +3 -0
- package/src/config/config.ts +15 -0
- package/src/config/providers.ts +10 -4
- package/src/container/start.ts +37 -1
- package/src/doctor/checks.ts +25 -16
- package/src/doctor/index.ts +48 -12
- package/src/doctor/operational-incidents.ts +16 -1
- package/src/doctor/plugin-bridge.ts +14 -1
- package/src/doctor/stage.ts +14 -0
- package/src/doctor/types.ts +6 -0
- package/src/eval/cell.ts +93 -0
- package/src/eval/config.ts +32 -0
- package/src/eval/dispatch.ts +67 -0
- package/src/eval/entry.ts +261 -0
- package/src/eval/kernel.ts +154 -0
- package/src/eval/process.ts +113 -0
- package/src/eval/protocol.ts +26 -0
- package/src/eval/redeclare.ts +174 -0
- package/src/eval/sandbox.ts +114 -0
- package/src/eval/tool.ts +98 -0
- package/src/eval/wire.ts +93 -0
- package/src/operations/classify-tool-outcome.ts +1 -1
- package/src/plugin/core-tool-names.ts +6 -1
- package/src/sandbox/env-exposure.ts +20 -0
- package/src/server/index.ts +46 -11
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-config/SKILL.md +20 -2
- package/typeclaw.schema.json +52 -0
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks'
|
|
2
2
|
import { mkdir } from 'node:fs/promises'
|
|
3
|
-
import {
|
|
3
|
+
import { relative, sep } from 'node:path'
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
import {
|
|
6
6
|
createBashToolDefinition as piCreateBashToolDefinition,
|
|
@@ -19,10 +19,8 @@ import { Type } from 'typebox'
|
|
|
19
19
|
import { z } from 'zod'
|
|
20
20
|
|
|
21
21
|
import { ACKNOWLEDGE_GUARDS } from '@/bundled-plugins/guard/keys'
|
|
22
|
-
import { config, getSandboxWritablePathSpecs } from '@/config/config'
|
|
23
22
|
import { readOomEvents, toolOomNote } from '@/container/oom-events'
|
|
24
23
|
import { withToolOomPriorityCommand } from '@/container/tool-oom-priority'
|
|
25
|
-
import { readEnvFile } from '@/init/env-file'
|
|
26
24
|
import {
|
|
27
25
|
classifyToolOutcome,
|
|
28
26
|
deriveMechanicallyVerifiedIncidentFingerprints,
|
|
@@ -47,39 +45,28 @@ import type {
|
|
|
47
45
|
} from '@/plugin'
|
|
48
46
|
import { PI_BUILTIN_TOOL_NAMES, type PiBuiltinToolName } from '@/plugin/core-tool-names'
|
|
49
47
|
import {
|
|
50
|
-
buildSandboxedCommand,
|
|
51
|
-
canWriteAgentRootInSandbox,
|
|
52
|
-
canMountRealProc,
|
|
53
|
-
cleanupPrivilegedSandboxRuntime,
|
|
54
48
|
commandNeedsRealProc,
|
|
55
|
-
DEFAULT_SANDBOX_ENV,
|
|
56
|
-
DEPENDENCY_BIN_SANDBOX_DIR,
|
|
57
49
|
dependencyBinUnavailableHint,
|
|
58
|
-
ensureBwrapAvailable,
|
|
59
|
-
ensureHiddenMaskTargets,
|
|
60
50
|
ensureSessionTmpDir,
|
|
61
|
-
getProcBindSafetyVerdict,
|
|
62
51
|
isGitControlPath,
|
|
63
52
|
mapVirtualTmpPath,
|
|
64
|
-
reconcileDependencyBinWrappers,
|
|
65
53
|
resolveHiddenPaths,
|
|
66
|
-
resolvePrivilegedSandboxRuntime,
|
|
67
|
-
resolveProcBindSafetyWithRetry,
|
|
68
|
-
resolveProcSelfExe,
|
|
69
|
-
resolveProtectedZones,
|
|
70
|
-
resolveSandboxSymlinks,
|
|
71
|
-
resolveWritableZones,
|
|
72
54
|
SandboxPolicyError,
|
|
73
|
-
SandboxDegradedProcError,
|
|
74
|
-
SandboxProcProbeUnverifiedError,
|
|
75
|
-
type SandboxMount,
|
|
76
|
-
type DependencyBinReconciliation,
|
|
77
|
-
subtractMasked,
|
|
78
|
-
verifyHiddenMaskTargets,
|
|
79
|
-
verifyPrivilegedSandboxRuntime,
|
|
80
55
|
} from '@/sandbox'
|
|
81
|
-
|
|
82
|
-
import {
|
|
56
|
+
|
|
57
|
+
import {
|
|
58
|
+
prepareBashSandbox,
|
|
59
|
+
type BashSandboxBoundary,
|
|
60
|
+
type DeferredBashPreparation,
|
|
61
|
+
type PreparedBashSandbox,
|
|
62
|
+
} from './bash-sandbox'
|
|
63
|
+
export {
|
|
64
|
+
buildBashFilesystemPolicy,
|
|
65
|
+
type BashSandboxBoundary,
|
|
66
|
+
type DeferredBashPreparation,
|
|
67
|
+
type DeferredBashPreparationResult,
|
|
68
|
+
} from './bash-sandbox'
|
|
69
|
+
export { buildSandboxEnvPolicy } from './bash-sandbox-env'
|
|
83
70
|
|
|
84
71
|
import type { InternalGuard } from './guard-types'
|
|
85
72
|
import { createLoopGuard, type LoopGuard, type LoopGuardDecision } from './loop-guard'
|
|
@@ -113,25 +100,8 @@ export const TYPECLAW_INTERNAL_BASH_PREPARE = '__typeclawBashPrepare'
|
|
|
113
100
|
|
|
114
101
|
type BashEnvOverlay = Record<string, string>
|
|
115
102
|
type BashEnvWithhold = string[]
|
|
116
|
-
export type DeferredBashPreparationResult = {
|
|
117
|
-
command: string
|
|
118
|
-
env?: Record<string, string>
|
|
119
|
-
mount: Extract<SandboxMount, { type: 'ro-bind' }>
|
|
120
|
-
cleanup: () => Promise<void>
|
|
121
|
-
}
|
|
122
|
-
export type DeferredBashPreparation = () => Promise<DeferredBashPreparationResult>
|
|
123
103
|
const SECRET_BASH_ENV_NAMES = new Set(['GH_TOKEN', 'GITHUB_TOKEN'])
|
|
124
104
|
|
|
125
|
-
// Transport classifier for the TRUSTED hook-injected overlay only (e.g.
|
|
126
|
-
// github-cli-auth's per-repo GH_TOKEN). Token/secret-shaped names use `inherit`
|
|
127
|
-
// so their value never renders into the bwrap argv; plain names (GH_REPO) go
|
|
128
|
-
// via `set`. This is NOT a .env exposure filter — the overlay is populated by
|
|
129
|
-
// trusted runtime hooks, not operator .env.
|
|
130
|
-
const OVERLAY_SECRET_NAME_PATTERN = /(?:^|_)(?:TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|API_KEY|PRIVATE_KEY|AUTH)$/i
|
|
131
|
-
function isOverlaySecretName(name: string): boolean {
|
|
132
|
-
return SECRET_BASH_ENV_NAMES.has(name) || OVERLAY_SECRET_NAME_PATTERN.test(name)
|
|
133
|
-
}
|
|
134
|
-
|
|
135
105
|
type BashSpawnEnvContext = {
|
|
136
106
|
overlay?: BashEnvOverlay
|
|
137
107
|
withhold?: BashEnvWithhold
|
|
@@ -309,20 +279,6 @@ export type WrapToolOptions = {
|
|
|
309
279
|
getLoopGuardTurn?: () => number | undefined
|
|
310
280
|
}
|
|
311
281
|
|
|
312
|
-
export type BashSandboxBoundary = {
|
|
313
|
-
ensureAvailable: () => Promise<void>
|
|
314
|
-
buildCommand: typeof buildSandboxedCommand
|
|
315
|
-
resolveProcStrategy?: () => Promise<ProcStrategyResolution>
|
|
316
|
-
resolveRuntime?: typeof resolvePrivilegedSandboxRuntime
|
|
317
|
-
verifyRuntime?: typeof verifyPrivilegedSandboxRuntime
|
|
318
|
-
cleanupRuntime?: typeof cleanupPrivilegedSandboxRuntime
|
|
319
|
-
}
|
|
320
|
-
|
|
321
|
-
const DEFAULT_BASH_SANDBOX_BOUNDARY: BashSandboxBoundary = {
|
|
322
|
-
ensureAvailable: ensureBwrapAvailable,
|
|
323
|
-
buildCommand: buildSandboxedCommand,
|
|
324
|
-
}
|
|
325
|
-
|
|
326
282
|
export type WrapSystemToolOptions = {
|
|
327
283
|
agentDir: string
|
|
328
284
|
sessionId: string
|
|
@@ -658,7 +614,7 @@ export function wrapBuiltinToolDefinition<TParams extends TSchema, TDetails = un
|
|
|
658
614
|
let executionError: unknown
|
|
659
615
|
let cleanupError: unknown
|
|
660
616
|
let sandboxedRealProcSucceeded = false
|
|
661
|
-
const sandboxBoundary = opts.bashSandboxBoundary
|
|
617
|
+
const sandboxBoundary = opts.bashSandboxBoundary
|
|
662
618
|
const incidentLedger = opts.incidentLedger ?? new IncidentLedger(opts.agentDir)
|
|
663
619
|
const originalArgs = { ...mutableArgs }
|
|
664
620
|
const executeAttempt = async (): Promise<void> => {
|
|
@@ -678,17 +634,19 @@ export function wrapBuiltinToolDefinition<TParams extends TSchema, TDetails = un
|
|
|
678
634
|
'model-driven bash has no permission service; refusing unsandboxed execution',
|
|
679
635
|
)
|
|
680
636
|
}
|
|
681
|
-
|
|
682
|
-
|
|
683
|
-
|
|
684
|
-
|
|
685
|
-
|
|
686
|
-
opts.
|
|
687
|
-
|
|
688
|
-
|
|
689
|
-
|
|
690
|
-
|
|
691
|
-
|
|
637
|
+
if (typeof attemptArgs.command !== 'string') throw new SandboxPolicyError('bash command must be a string')
|
|
638
|
+
preparedSandboxRuntime = await prepareBashSandbox({
|
|
639
|
+
command: attemptArgs.command,
|
|
640
|
+
permissions: opts.permissions,
|
|
641
|
+
origin: liveOrigin,
|
|
642
|
+
agentDir: opts.agentDir,
|
|
643
|
+
sessionId: opts.sessionId,
|
|
644
|
+
envOverlay: bashEnvOverlay,
|
|
645
|
+
envWithhold: bashEnvWithhold,
|
|
646
|
+
deferredPreparation: bashPreparation,
|
|
647
|
+
boundary: sandboxBoundary,
|
|
648
|
+
})
|
|
649
|
+
attemptArgs.command = preparedSandboxRuntime.commandString
|
|
692
650
|
}
|
|
693
651
|
|
|
694
652
|
tmpRedirect =
|
|
@@ -902,156 +860,6 @@ export function buildBuiltinPiToolOverrides(opts: WrapSystemToolOptions): ToolDe
|
|
|
902
860
|
return defaultBuiltinPiToolDefinitions(opts.agentDir).map((tool) => wrapBuiltinToolDefinition(tool, opts))
|
|
903
861
|
}
|
|
904
862
|
|
|
905
|
-
type BashFilesystemPolicyOptions = {
|
|
906
|
-
agentDir: string
|
|
907
|
-
canWriteAgentRoot: boolean
|
|
908
|
-
masks: { dirs: string[]; files: string[] }
|
|
909
|
-
writable: { dirs: string[]; files: string[] }
|
|
910
|
-
protected: { dirs: string[]; files: string[] }
|
|
911
|
-
}
|
|
912
|
-
|
|
913
|
-
type PreparedBashSandbox = {
|
|
914
|
-
verify: () => Promise<void>
|
|
915
|
-
cleanup: () => Promise<void>
|
|
916
|
-
spawnEnv?: Record<string, string>
|
|
917
|
-
dependencyBins?: DependencyBinReconciliation
|
|
918
|
-
withheld: {
|
|
919
|
-
paths: { dirs: string[]; files: string[] }
|
|
920
|
-
envNames: string[]
|
|
921
|
-
}
|
|
922
|
-
}
|
|
923
|
-
|
|
924
|
-
export function buildBashFilesystemPolicy(options: BashFilesystemPolicyOptions) {
|
|
925
|
-
const { agentDir, canWriteAgentRoot, masks, writable, protected: protectedZones } = options
|
|
926
|
-
if (canWriteAgentRoot) {
|
|
927
|
-
return { writableRoot: { dir: agentDir }, masks, protected: protectedZones }
|
|
928
|
-
}
|
|
929
|
-
return { masks, writable, protected: protectedZones }
|
|
930
|
-
}
|
|
931
|
-
|
|
932
|
-
// Rewrites mutableArgs.command in place so the bash builtin runs inside bwrap
|
|
933
|
-
// with role-derived private-directory masks and unconditional canonical-secret
|
|
934
|
-
// file masks. When masks are needed but bwrap is unavailable
|
|
935
|
-
// we throw rather than run unsandboxed — fail closed, never leak the masked
|
|
936
|
-
// surface. Runs after the tool.before guards have inspected the raw command.
|
|
937
|
-
async function applyBashSandbox(
|
|
938
|
-
mutableArgs: Record<string, unknown>,
|
|
939
|
-
permissions: PermissionService,
|
|
940
|
-
origin: SessionOrigin | undefined,
|
|
941
|
-
agentDir: string,
|
|
942
|
-
sessionId: string,
|
|
943
|
-
envOverlay: BashEnvOverlay | undefined,
|
|
944
|
-
envWithhold: BashEnvWithhold | undefined,
|
|
945
|
-
deferredPreparation: DeferredBashPreparation | undefined,
|
|
946
|
-
boundary: BashSandboxBoundary,
|
|
947
|
-
): Promise<PreparedBashSandbox> {
|
|
948
|
-
const originalCommand = mutableArgs.command
|
|
949
|
-
if (typeof originalCommand !== 'string') {
|
|
950
|
-
return {
|
|
951
|
-
verify: async () => {},
|
|
952
|
-
cleanup: async () => {},
|
|
953
|
-
withheld: { paths: { dirs: [], files: [] }, envNames: [] },
|
|
954
|
-
}
|
|
955
|
-
}
|
|
956
|
-
|
|
957
|
-
let preparation: DeferredBashPreparationResult | undefined
|
|
958
|
-
let privilegedRuntime: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof resolvePrivilegedSandboxRuntime>> | undefined
|
|
959
|
-
const cleanup = async (): Promise<void> => {
|
|
960
|
-
const tasks: Promise<void>[] = []
|
|
961
|
-
if (privilegedRuntime !== undefined) {
|
|
962
|
-
tasks.push((boundary.cleanupRuntime ?? cleanupPrivilegedSandboxRuntime)(privilegedRuntime))
|
|
963
|
-
}
|
|
964
|
-
if (preparation !== undefined) tasks.push(preparation.cleanup())
|
|
965
|
-
const outcomes = await Promise.allSettled(tasks)
|
|
966
|
-
const failure = outcomes.find((outcome) => outcome.status === 'rejected')
|
|
967
|
-
if (failure?.status === 'rejected') throw failure.reason
|
|
968
|
-
}
|
|
969
|
-
try {
|
|
970
|
-
preparation = await deferredPreparation?.()
|
|
971
|
-
const command = preparation?.command ?? originalCommand
|
|
972
|
-
const preparedEnvOverlay = preparation?.env === undefined ? envOverlay : { ...envOverlay, ...preparation.env }
|
|
973
|
-
const { dirs, files } = resolveHiddenPaths(permissions, origin, agentDir)
|
|
974
|
-
const envNames = resolveExposableBashEnvNames(agentDir)
|
|
975
|
-
const sandboxEnvOverlay = buildRoleScopedConfigEnv(agentDir, dirs, preparedEnvOverlay)
|
|
976
|
-
const effectiveEnvWithhold = (envWithhold ?? []).filter((name) => !Object.hasOwn(sandboxEnvOverlay ?? {}, name))
|
|
977
|
-
const maskTargets = await ensureHiddenMaskTargets({ dirs, files })
|
|
978
|
-
await boundary.ensureAvailable()
|
|
979
|
-
const sessionTmp = await ensureSessionTmpDir(sessionId)
|
|
980
|
-
const dependencyBins = await reconcileDependencyBinWrappers({ agentDir, sessionTmp })
|
|
981
|
-
const writable = subtractMasked(await resolveWritableZones(agentDir, getSandboxWritablePathSpecs(config)), {
|
|
982
|
-
dirs,
|
|
983
|
-
files,
|
|
984
|
-
})
|
|
985
|
-
const writableRoot = canWriteAgentRootInSandbox(permissions, origin)
|
|
986
|
-
const baseProtectedZones =
|
|
987
|
-
writableRoot || writable.dirs.includes(join(agentDir, '.git'))
|
|
988
|
-
? subtractMasked(await resolveProtectedZones(agentDir), { dirs, files })
|
|
989
|
-
: { dirs: [], files: [] }
|
|
990
|
-
const protectedZones = {
|
|
991
|
-
dirs: baseProtectedZones.dirs,
|
|
992
|
-
files: [...new Set([...baseProtectedZones.files, ...dependencyBins.protectedFiles])],
|
|
993
|
-
}
|
|
994
|
-
const writableDirSet = new Set(writable.dirs)
|
|
995
|
-
const sandboxHome = DEFAULT_SANDBOX_ENV.HOME ?? '/tmp'
|
|
996
|
-
const symlinks = resolveSandboxSymlinks(agentDir, config.sandbox.symlinks, sandboxHome).filter((op) =>
|
|
997
|
-
writableDirSet.has(op.target),
|
|
998
|
-
)
|
|
999
|
-
const { strategy: proc, degradeReason } = await (boundary.resolveProcStrategy ?? resolveProcStrategy)()
|
|
1000
|
-
if (proc === 'tmpfs' && commandNeedsRealProc(command)) {
|
|
1001
|
-
throw degradeReason === 'unverified' ? new SandboxProcProbeUnverifiedError() : new SandboxDegradedProcError()
|
|
1002
|
-
}
|
|
1003
|
-
privilegedRuntime = await (boundary.resolveRuntime ?? resolvePrivilegedSandboxRuntime)({
|
|
1004
|
-
agentDir,
|
|
1005
|
-
command,
|
|
1006
|
-
env: sandboxEnvOverlay,
|
|
1007
|
-
})
|
|
1008
|
-
await verifyHiddenMaskTargets(maskTargets)
|
|
1009
|
-
const devSourceMount = await resolveDevSourceMount(agentDir)
|
|
1010
|
-
const { commandString, spawnEnv } = boundary.buildCommand(command, {
|
|
1011
|
-
mounts: [
|
|
1012
|
-
{ type: 'ro-bind', source: agentDir, dest: agentDir },
|
|
1013
|
-
{ type: 'bind', source: sessionTmp, dest: '/tmp' },
|
|
1014
|
-
// `/tmp` is writable, but PATH entries must remain runtime-owned for
|
|
1015
|
-
// the lifetime of this command. Last-op-wins makes this narrow re-bind
|
|
1016
|
-
// read-only without adding any broader filesystem exposure.
|
|
1017
|
-
{ type: 'ro-bind', source: dependencyBins.wrapperDir, dest: DEPENDENCY_BIN_SANDBOX_DIR },
|
|
1018
|
-
...(devSourceMount === undefined ? [] : [devSourceMount]),
|
|
1019
|
-
...(privilegedRuntime?.mounts ?? []),
|
|
1020
|
-
...(preparation === undefined ? [] : [preparation.mount]),
|
|
1021
|
-
],
|
|
1022
|
-
...(writableRoot
|
|
1023
|
-
? { writableRoot: { dir: agentDir }, masks: maskTargets, protected: protectedZones }
|
|
1024
|
-
: { masks: maskTargets, writable, protected: protectedZones }),
|
|
1025
|
-
symlinks,
|
|
1026
|
-
network: 'inherit',
|
|
1027
|
-
cwd: agentDir,
|
|
1028
|
-
proc,
|
|
1029
|
-
procSelfExe: resolveProcSelfExe(),
|
|
1030
|
-
...spreadSandboxEnv(
|
|
1031
|
-
buildSandboxEnvPolicy(sandboxEnvOverlay, privilegedRuntime?.env, envNames.exposable, envWithhold),
|
|
1032
|
-
),
|
|
1033
|
-
})
|
|
1034
|
-
mutableArgs.command = commandString
|
|
1035
|
-
// The overlay carries command-scoped secret VALUES (e.g. a per-repo GH_TOKEN)
|
|
1036
|
-
// that live in neither process.env nor argv; resolveSpawnEnv snapshots
|
|
1037
|
-
// inherited names from process.env only, so merge the overlay values in here
|
|
1038
|
-
// to complete the exact bwrap-parent env.
|
|
1039
|
-
const mergedSpawnEnv =
|
|
1040
|
-
spawnEnv !== undefined && sandboxEnvOverlay !== undefined ? { ...spawnEnv, ...sandboxEnvOverlay } : spawnEnv
|
|
1041
|
-
const runtimeForResult = privilegedRuntime
|
|
1042
|
-
return {
|
|
1043
|
-
verify: async () => (boundary.verifyRuntime ?? verifyPrivilegedSandboxRuntime)(runtimeForResult),
|
|
1044
|
-
cleanup,
|
|
1045
|
-
spawnEnv: mergedSpawnEnv,
|
|
1046
|
-
dependencyBins,
|
|
1047
|
-
withheld: { paths: maskTargets, envNames: [...new Set([...envNames.withheld, ...effectiveEnvWithhold])] },
|
|
1048
|
-
}
|
|
1049
|
-
} catch (error) {
|
|
1050
|
-
await cleanup()
|
|
1051
|
-
throw error
|
|
1052
|
-
}
|
|
1053
|
-
}
|
|
1054
|
-
|
|
1055
863
|
function bashResultIsCommandNotFound(result: ToolResult): boolean {
|
|
1056
864
|
if (isRecord(result.details) && result.details.exitCode === 127) return true
|
|
1057
865
|
return (result.content as ContentPart[]).some(
|
|
@@ -1089,164 +897,6 @@ function appendTextResult(result: ToolResult, text: string): ToolResult {
|
|
|
1089
897
|
return { ...result, content: [...(result.content as ContentPart[]), { type: 'text', text }] }
|
|
1090
898
|
}
|
|
1091
899
|
|
|
1092
|
-
export function buildSandboxEnvPolicy(
|
|
1093
|
-
overlay: BashEnvOverlay | undefined,
|
|
1094
|
-
runtimeEnv: Record<string, string> | undefined,
|
|
1095
|
-
exposableEnvNames: readonly string[] = [],
|
|
1096
|
-
withhold: readonly string[] = [],
|
|
1097
|
-
): { inherit?: string[]; set?: Record<string, string>; withhold?: string[] } {
|
|
1098
|
-
const requestedWithhold = new Set(withhold)
|
|
1099
|
-
const overlayNames = new Set(Object.keys(overlay ?? {}))
|
|
1100
|
-
// The overlay is a deliberate command-scoped replacement, while withholding
|
|
1101
|
-
// only removes ambient values; an overlay therefore wins for the same name.
|
|
1102
|
-
const effectiveWithhold = [...requestedWithhold].filter((name) => !overlayNames.has(name))
|
|
1103
|
-
const effectiveWithholdSet = new Set(effectiveWithhold)
|
|
1104
|
-
const set = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(runtimeEnv ?? {}).filter(([key]) => !requestedWithhold.has(key)))
|
|
1105
|
-
const inherit: string[] = []
|
|
1106
|
-
const inheritSeen = new Set<string>()
|
|
1107
|
-
const pushInherit = (key: string): void => {
|
|
1108
|
-
if (effectiveWithholdSet.has(key) || Object.hasOwn(set, key) || inheritSeen.has(key)) return
|
|
1109
|
-
inheritSeen.add(key)
|
|
1110
|
-
inherit.push(key)
|
|
1111
|
-
}
|
|
1112
|
-
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(overlay ?? {})) {
|
|
1113
|
-
if (Object.hasOwn(set, key)) continue
|
|
1114
|
-
if (isOverlaySecretName(key)) pushInherit(key)
|
|
1115
|
-
else set[key] = value
|
|
1116
|
-
}
|
|
1117
|
-
// Operator-declared .env vars pass through by NAME (inherit), keeping values
|
|
1118
|
-
// out of the rendered bwrap argv. Sandbox-integrity names were already dropped
|
|
1119
|
-
// in resolveExposableEnvNames — these are the survivors.
|
|
1120
|
-
for (const key of exposableEnvNames) pushInherit(key)
|
|
1121
|
-
// Pass the entrypoint-exported Xvfb display (start_xvfb: `export DISPLAY=:99`)
|
|
1122
|
-
// through --clearenv, else sandboxed `agent-browser --headed` dies with
|
|
1123
|
-
// "Missing X server or $DISPLAY". Passing the runtime's OWN value (not a fixed
|
|
1124
|
-
// ":99") keeps `docker.file.xvfb=false` advertising no display. Rendered via
|
|
1125
|
-
// `set` (a display number is neither a credential nor shell-injectable), and no
|
|
1126
|
-
// /tmp/.X11-unix bind is needed: Chrome reaches Xvfb over the netns-scoped
|
|
1127
|
-
// abstract X11 socket while bash keeps network:'inherit'.
|
|
1128
|
-
const display = process.env['DISPLAY']
|
|
1129
|
-
if (
|
|
1130
|
-
display !== undefined &&
|
|
1131
|
-
display !== '' &&
|
|
1132
|
-
!effectiveWithholdSet.has('DISPLAY') &&
|
|
1133
|
-
!Object.hasOwn(set, 'DISPLAY') &&
|
|
1134
|
-
!inheritSeen.has('DISPLAY')
|
|
1135
|
-
) {
|
|
1136
|
-
set['DISPLAY'] = display
|
|
1137
|
-
}
|
|
1138
|
-
return {
|
|
1139
|
-
...(inherit.length > 0 ? { inherit } : {}),
|
|
1140
|
-
...(Object.keys(set).length > 0 ? { set } : {}),
|
|
1141
|
-
...(effectiveWithhold.length > 0 ? { withhold: effectiveWithhold } : {}),
|
|
1142
|
-
}
|
|
1143
|
-
}
|
|
1144
|
-
|
|
1145
|
-
function spreadSandboxEnv(policy: ReturnType<typeof buildSandboxEnvPolicy>): {
|
|
1146
|
-
env?: ReturnType<typeof buildSandboxEnvPolicy>
|
|
1147
|
-
} {
|
|
1148
|
-
return Object.keys(policy).length > 0 ? { env: policy } : {}
|
|
1149
|
-
}
|
|
1150
|
-
|
|
1151
|
-
function resolveExposableBashEnvNames(agentDir: string): { exposable: string[]; withheld: string[] } {
|
|
1152
|
-
const declaredEnv = readEnvFile(agentDir)
|
|
1153
|
-
const exposable = resolveExposableEnvNames(declaredEnv, process.env)
|
|
1154
|
-
const exposableSet = new Set(exposable)
|
|
1155
|
-
const withheld = [...declaredEnv]
|
|
1156
|
-
.filter(([name, value]) => value.length > 0 && !exposableSet.has(name))
|
|
1157
|
-
.map(([name]) => name)
|
|
1158
|
-
return { exposable, withheld }
|
|
1159
|
-
}
|
|
1160
|
-
|
|
1161
|
-
function buildRoleScopedConfigEnv(
|
|
1162
|
-
agentDir: string,
|
|
1163
|
-
hiddenDirs: string[],
|
|
1164
|
-
envOverlay: BashEnvOverlay | undefined,
|
|
1165
|
-
): BashEnvOverlay | undefined {
|
|
1166
|
-
// Low-trust roles have workspace/ masked. Do not let container-global config
|
|
1167
|
-
// env vars point CLIs back at that private surface: apps that honor XDG should
|
|
1168
|
-
// still run, but their config must land in the sandbox's per-session /tmp.
|
|
1169
|
-
// Trusted/owner have only the unconditional credential-dir masks, not the
|
|
1170
|
-
// workspace root mask, so their command broker decides whether to set GWS.
|
|
1171
|
-
const workspaceHidden = hiddenDirs.includes(join(agentDir, 'workspace'))
|
|
1172
|
-
if (!workspaceHidden) return envOverlay
|
|
1173
|
-
|
|
1174
|
-
return {
|
|
1175
|
-
...envOverlay,
|
|
1176
|
-
XDG_CONFIG_HOME: '/tmp/.config',
|
|
1177
|
-
GWS_CONFIG_HOME: '/tmp/.config/gws',
|
|
1178
|
-
}
|
|
1179
|
-
}
|
|
1180
|
-
|
|
1181
|
-
// Picks the /proc strategy for a sandboxed bash call. The branch order is:
|
|
1182
|
-
// 'real-proc' ONLY when the operator explicitly opted in (sandbox.realProc) AND
|
|
1183
|
-
// the kernel permits the mount (canMountRealProc) — it adds PID isolation but
|
|
1184
|
-
// needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN (unshare --mount-proc), so it is a deliberate, narrow
|
|
1185
|
-
// opt-in; else 'proc-bind' (--ro-bind /proc, NO CAP_SYS_ADMIN) when its userns
|
|
1186
|
-
// leak-block is verified safe; else 'tmpfs'. Because sandbox.realProc DEFAULTS
|
|
1187
|
-
// FALSE, the first branch is normally skipped and proc-bind is the de-facto
|
|
1188
|
-
// default — which is the point: the common path needs no broad outer capability.
|
|
1189
|
-
// 'tmpfs' is the last-resort degraded mode where external packages can't run;
|
|
1190
|
-
// reached only when proc-bind is DEFINITIVELY unavailable (a real cross-userns
|
|
1191
|
-
// environ leak → fail closed) or its safety stays unverifiable after retries.
|
|
1192
|
-
//
|
|
1193
|
-
// Read from the boot-time `config` snapshot, NOT live getConfig(): sandbox is
|
|
1194
|
-
// restart-required, and the strategy MUST track the boot-time CAP_SYS_ADMIN
|
|
1195
|
-
// grant. A `typeclaw reload` flipping realProc would otherwise emit `unshare
|
|
1196
|
-
// --mount-proc` in a container booted WITHOUT the cap (or vice versa). Both
|
|
1197
|
-
// probes are cached process-globally, so this resolves to one spawn per
|
|
1198
|
-
// container lifetime regardless of how many bash calls hit it.
|
|
1199
|
-
// A tmpfs degrade carries WHY it happened so the caller can pick a permanent vs
|
|
1200
|
-
// retryable error. 'definitive': the probe returned a real cross-userns leak
|
|
1201
|
-
// ('unsafe') — the ONLY verdict proven permanent, so it fails closed for good.
|
|
1202
|
-
// 'unverified': the safety probe never reached a definitive verdict within its
|
|
1203
|
-
// retry budget. That covers BOTH a transient load spike AND a durable
|
|
1204
|
-
// incapability (no usable namespaces, a bwrap that starts but cannot set up its
|
|
1205
|
-
// sandbox): the probe cannot prove a NEGATIVE capability — only a leak is
|
|
1206
|
-
// definitive — so a genuinely incapable host also lands here and simply keeps
|
|
1207
|
-
// re-degrading on each call. Since 'inconclusive' is never cached, that costs a
|
|
1208
|
-
// re-probe but is correct: the only false case is "capable but briefly
|
|
1209
|
-
// saturated", which recovers; an incapable host stays degraded either way.
|
|
1210
|
-
// Absent when the strategy is not tmpfs.
|
|
1211
|
-
type ProcStrategyResolution =
|
|
1212
|
-
| { strategy: 'real-proc' | 'proc-bind'; degradeReason?: undefined }
|
|
1213
|
-
| { strategy: 'tmpfs'; degradeReason: 'definitive' | 'unverified' }
|
|
1214
|
-
|
|
1215
|
-
async function resolveProcStrategy(): Promise<ProcStrategyResolution> {
|
|
1216
|
-
if (config.sandbox.realProc && (await canMountRealProc())) return { strategy: 'real-proc' }
|
|
1217
|
-
// Retry an 'inconclusive' proc-bind probe (transient under load) before
|
|
1218
|
-
// degrading — a single such hiccup must not break external-package runs on a
|
|
1219
|
-
// capable host. 'unsafe' still fails closed with no retry.
|
|
1220
|
-
const verdict = await resolveProcBindSafetyWithRetry(
|
|
1221
|
-
() => getProcBindSafetyVerdict(),
|
|
1222
|
-
(ms) => Bun.sleep(ms),
|
|
1223
|
-
)
|
|
1224
|
-
if (verdict === 'safe') return { strategy: 'proc-bind' }
|
|
1225
|
-
// Degraded last resort: no working /proc strategy. External package runners
|
|
1226
|
-
// (bunx/bun run <pkg-bin>) will fail with Bun's opaque "NotDir" because
|
|
1227
|
-
// /proc/self/{fd,maps} are absent. Only a proven 'unsafe' (a real cross-userns
|
|
1228
|
-
// leak) is DEFINITIVE — warn once (a real operator-facing limit). An
|
|
1229
|
-
// 'inconclusive' is reported as retryable upstream and NOT warned (it would cry
|
|
1230
|
-
// wolf every boot storm); a durably-incapable host re-degrades quietly here,
|
|
1231
|
-
// since the probe cannot distinguish it from transient load.
|
|
1232
|
-
if (verdict === 'unsafe') {
|
|
1233
|
-
warnTmpfsProcFallbackOnce()
|
|
1234
|
-
return { strategy: 'tmpfs', degradeReason: 'definitive' }
|
|
1235
|
-
}
|
|
1236
|
-
return { strategy: 'tmpfs', degradeReason: 'unverified' }
|
|
1237
|
-
}
|
|
1238
|
-
|
|
1239
|
-
let tmpfsProcFallbackWarned = false
|
|
1240
|
-
function warnTmpfsProcFallbackOnce(): void {
|
|
1241
|
-
if (tmpfsProcFallbackWarned) return
|
|
1242
|
-
tmpfsProcFallbackWarned = true
|
|
1243
|
-
console.warn(
|
|
1244
|
-
'[sandbox] degraded /proc mode: neither real-proc nor proc-bind is available on this host, ' +
|
|
1245
|
-
'so sandboxed external package runners (bunx / bun run <pkg-bin>) will fail. ' +
|
|
1246
|
-
'This needs a runtime with working user namespaces.',
|
|
1247
|
-
)
|
|
1248
|
-
}
|
|
1249
|
-
|
|
1250
900
|
// The builtin file tools that take a single filesystem `path` arg. They run in
|
|
1251
901
|
// the main process rather than bwrap, so each must apply the same
|
|
1252
902
|
// /tmp -> session-dir mapping that
|
|
@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ export function renderInteractiveSessionContext(subagentRoster: string): string
|
|
|
297
297
|
'',
|
|
298
298
|
'- Spawns run in the background by default: a `<system-reminder>` arrives when the subagent completes — do not poll `subagent_output`. Pass `run_in_foreground: true` for a quick result you need this turn; deep-profile subagents always run in the background from here. In channel sessions a completion reminder is not a user message: surface the result via `channel_reply`/`channel_send`.',
|
|
299
299
|
'- Broad search: spawn 2-5 `explorer`/`scout` workers in parallel, end your response, then collect each completion once. Use `scout` for narrow lookups and `researcher` for decomposed, multi-source, cross-validated synthesis. When the user *explicitly* asks to research or investigate, you MUST spawn `researcher`: answering from training memory or one inline `web_search` does not satisfy the request, and `scout`/`explorer` fan-out does not replace `researcher`.',
|
|
300
|
+
'- Delegate the search, not the judgment. When an answer depends on reasoning across raw records — transactions, logs, messages, database rows — use `explorer` to locate them, then read or query the decisive records yourself before concluding. A subagent summary drops the cross-record patterns an answer usually hinges on (sequences, matching amounts, what stopped and what started), and a subagent that found nothing is not evidence that the records hold nothing.',
|
|
300
301
|
'- Delegate-and-converse: for side-effectful or noisy work over ~30s, spawn one background subagent and stay responsive — `operator` for side effects, `scout` for a quick lookup, `researcher` for deep investigation, `planner` for risk-aware sequencing, `qa` to prove a PR, repo, or deployed product actually works by running it. Pass `profile: "deep"` only when the work needs stronger reasoning than the default tier.',
|
|
301
302
|
'- Web browsing: never drive a browser yourself. Any task that needs a real browser — navigating, clicking, forms, logins, screenshots, JS-rendered pages — goes to `browser`. Plain lookups stay with `scout`/`web_fetch`.',
|
|
302
303
|
'- Troubleshooting: after ~3 non-converging attempts at the same failure, stop and hand the loop to `operator` (background; `profile: "deep"` when genuinely hard) with the symptom, attempts, and success condition. Read `typeclaw-troubleshooting` before spawning.',
|
|
@@ -346,7 +347,7 @@ function renderChannelRolePolicy(): string {
|
|
|
346
347
|
'',
|
|
347
348
|
'Channel sessions may include multiple speakers; never carry one speaker’s',
|
|
348
349
|
'role onto later messages. The current speaker’s authoritative role is the',
|
|
349
|
-
'`<your-role>` turn tag;
|
|
350
|
+
'`<your-role>` turn tag; no tag means the speaker is the owner.',
|
|
350
351
|
'',
|
|
351
352
|
'Tool calls/channel admission are gated by that speaker’s permissions;',
|
|
352
353
|
'`blocked:` or "denied by permissions" means they lack the needed grant.',
|
|
@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ export type SubagentCompletedPayload = {
|
|
|
101
101
|
hasRecoverableOutput?: boolean
|
|
102
102
|
// Present when the parent was a channel session. Lets the router fall back
|
|
103
103
|
// to the live successor session for the same channel key when the parent
|
|
104
|
-
// rolled over (SESSION_FRESHNESS_TTL_MS) or was
|
|
105
|
-
// subagent ran — otherwise the completion is silently dropped.
|
|
104
|
+
// rolled over after 60 minutes idle (SESSION_FRESHNESS_TTL_MS) or was
|
|
105
|
+
// idle-evicted while the subagent ran — otherwise the completion is silently dropped.
|
|
106
106
|
channelKey?: SubagentCompletedChannelKey
|
|
107
107
|
}
|
|
108
108
|
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import {
|
|
2
|
+
renderInteractiveSessionContext,
|
|
3
|
+
renderSessionOrigin,
|
|
4
|
+
type SessionOrigin,
|
|
5
|
+
type SessionRoleContext,
|
|
6
|
+
} from './session-origin'
|
|
7
|
+
import {
|
|
8
|
+
buildSystemPolicy,
|
|
9
|
+
DEFAULT_SUBAGENT_ROSTER,
|
|
10
|
+
renderRuntimeBlock,
|
|
11
|
+
renderRuntimeNondisclosureRule,
|
|
12
|
+
} from './system-prompt'
|
|
13
|
+
|
|
14
|
+
// Origins with a conversation partner waiting on the reply get the full-mode
|
|
15
|
+
// session context: the interactive orchestration context with the live public
|
|
16
|
+
// roster, the MCP catalog, and the git nudge. Unattended origins (cron fires,
|
|
17
|
+
// default subagents, system processes) skip that context and the roster/git/MCP
|
|
18
|
+
// work it needs — their origin block already says what is expected. Every
|
|
19
|
+
// origin gets the same shared policy either way.
|
|
20
|
+
//
|
|
21
|
+
// Exhaustive switch (not a boolean expression) so a future origin kind forces
|
|
22
|
+
// the author to make an explicit full-or-slim decision at compile time. The
|
|
23
|
+
// previous form silently defaulted new origins to slim, which would have
|
|
24
|
+
// stripped the interactive context from a new interactive surface by
|
|
25
|
+
// accident.
|
|
26
|
+
export function deriveSystemPromptMode(origin: SessionOrigin | undefined): SystemPromptMode {
|
|
27
|
+
if (origin === undefined) return 'full'
|
|
28
|
+
switch (origin.kind) {
|
|
29
|
+
case 'tui':
|
|
30
|
+
case 'channel':
|
|
31
|
+
return 'full'
|
|
32
|
+
case 'cron':
|
|
33
|
+
case 'subagent':
|
|
34
|
+
case 'system':
|
|
35
|
+
return 'slim'
|
|
36
|
+
default: {
|
|
37
|
+
const _exhaustive: never = origin
|
|
38
|
+
void _exhaustive
|
|
39
|
+
return 'full'
|
|
40
|
+
}
|
|
41
|
+
}
|
|
42
|
+
}
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
// Pure inputs for `composeSystemPrompt`. Each field maps 1:1 to a rendered
|
|
45
|
+
// section of the prompt; callers that don't want a section pass `undefined`
|
|
46
|
+
// (or `''` for `gitNudge`). Extracted so the debug dumper in
|
|
47
|
+
// `scripts/dump-system-prompt.ts` can reuse the exact same composition
|
|
48
|
+
// pipeline `createResourceLoader` uses, with no risk of drift if the
|
|
49
|
+
// section order changes.
|
|
50
|
+
//
|
|
51
|
+
// `mode` selects only the optional session context, never the policy: every
|
|
52
|
+
// standard session starts with `buildSystemPolicy(branding)`.
|
|
53
|
+
// - 'full' (default) — TUI, channel, and origin-less sessions: appends the
|
|
54
|
+
// interactive context (`renderInteractiveSessionContext`) with the roster.
|
|
55
|
+
// - 'slim' — cron, default subagents, system processes: no interactive
|
|
56
|
+
// context; the origin block covers per-kind specifics (no human, side
|
|
57
|
+
// effects via tools, narrow scope).
|
|
58
|
+
export type SystemPromptMode = 'full' | 'slim'
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
export type SystemPromptComposition = {
|
|
61
|
+
mode?: SystemPromptMode
|
|
62
|
+
// Whether the prompt discloses that the agent runs on TypeClaw. When false,
|
|
63
|
+
// the policy's opening is phrased generically, the `## Runtime` version
|
|
64
|
+
// block is dropped, and the runtime-disclosure rule is appended. Defaults to
|
|
65
|
+
// true. Mirrors `config.branding`.
|
|
66
|
+
branding?: boolean
|
|
67
|
+
self: string
|
|
68
|
+
// Pre-rendered interactive-context roster (from `renderPublicSubagentRoster`).
|
|
69
|
+
// Kept as a ready string so this composer stays pure and registry-free; the
|
|
70
|
+
// registry-aware caller renders it. Ignored in slim mode (no interactive
|
|
71
|
+
// context). Falls back to `DEFAULT_SUBAGENT_ROSTER` when omitted.
|
|
72
|
+
subagentRoster?: string
|
|
73
|
+
runtimeVersion?: string
|
|
74
|
+
origin?: SessionOrigin
|
|
75
|
+
roleContext?: SessionRoleContext
|
|
76
|
+
mcpCatalog?: string
|
|
77
|
+
gitNudge: string
|
|
78
|
+
proactiveNextStepNudge?: string
|
|
79
|
+
evalHint?: string
|
|
80
|
+
}
|
|
81
|
+
|
|
82
|
+
// Section-order contract for the system prompt. Kept as a pure string→string
|
|
83
|
+
// transform so it can be exercised without disk, plugin runtime, or auth.
|
|
84
|
+
//
|
|
85
|
+
// Cache-suffix ordering: least-volatile sections first, most-volatile last.
|
|
86
|
+
// This minimises the number of cached prompt bytes invalidated when a
|
|
87
|
+
// section changes (the provider's prompt cache hits up to the first byte
|
|
88
|
+
// that differs).
|
|
89
|
+
//
|
|
90
|
+
// 0. shared policy — identical for every standard session of an agent.
|
|
91
|
+
// 1. self — IDENTITY.md + SOUL.md (plus any plugin `session.prompt` append).
|
|
92
|
+
// 2. runtime block (or the runtime-disclosure rule when branding is off) —
|
|
93
|
+
// only changes on typeclaw releases.
|
|
94
|
+
// 3. interactive context (full mode) — stable per agent registry, so it
|
|
95
|
+
// precedes the per-session origin block.
|
|
96
|
+
// 4. origin block + role — stable across sessions of the same kind; channel
|
|
97
|
+
// origins carry per-conversation details.
|
|
98
|
+
// 5. MCP catalog — changes when servers connect or disconnect.
|
|
99
|
+
// 6. gitNudge — rare changes; agent folders force-commit sessions/ and
|
|
100
|
+
// memory/ after every turn, so the dirty-files list is empty most of
|
|
101
|
+
// the time.
|
|
102
|
+
// 7. proactive next-step nudge — deterministic per model family.
|
|
103
|
+
//
|
|
104
|
+
// The wall-clock anchor that used to live here as `## Now` moved out
|
|
105
|
+
// entirely. It is now injected into the user turn at each `session.prompt`
|
|
106
|
+
// site via `renderTurnTimeAnchor` (src/agent/system-prompt.ts) so the
|
|
107
|
+
// stamp reflects the moment of THIS turn, not session creation. Per-turn
|
|
108
|
+
// injection costs zero cached bytes — the user turn is the non-cacheable
|
|
109
|
+
// suffix anyway — and removes the staleness failure mode where a session
|
|
110
|
+
// opened Friday answered "today is Friday" on Thursday. Retrieved memory and
|
|
111
|
+
// the live channel role ride in the user turn for the same reason.
|
|
112
|
+
//
|
|
113
|
+
// pi appends project context (AGENTS.md), the skill catalog, and the cwd
|
|
114
|
+
// after this preamble when it builds the final system message.
|
|
115
|
+
export function composeSystemPrompt(parts: SystemPromptComposition): string {
|
|
116
|
+
const branding = parts.branding ?? true
|
|
117
|
+
let prompt = `${buildSystemPolicy(branding)}\n\n${parts.self}`
|
|
118
|
+
if (branding && parts.runtimeVersion !== undefined) {
|
|
119
|
+
prompt = `${prompt}\n\n${renderRuntimeBlock(parts.runtimeVersion)}`
|
|
120
|
+
}
|
|
121
|
+
if (!branding) {
|
|
122
|
+
prompt = `${prompt}\n\n${renderRuntimeNondisclosureRule()}`
|
|
123
|
+
}
|
|
124
|
+
if (parts.mode !== 'slim') {
|
|
125
|
+
prompt = `${prompt}\n\n${renderInteractiveSessionContext(parts.subagentRoster ?? DEFAULT_SUBAGENT_ROSTER)}`
|
|
126
|
+
}
|
|
127
|
+
if (parts.origin !== undefined) {
|
|
128
|
+
prompt = `${prompt}\n\n${renderSessionOrigin(parts.origin, Date.now(), parts.roleContext)}`
|
|
129
|
+
}
|
|
130
|
+
if (parts.mcpCatalog !== undefined && parts.mcpCatalog !== '') {
|
|
131
|
+
prompt = `${prompt}\n\n${parts.mcpCatalog}`
|
|
132
|
+
}
|
|
133
|
+
if (parts.gitNudge !== '') {
|
|
134
|
+
prompt = `${prompt}\n\n${parts.gitNudge}`
|
|
135
|
+
}
|
|
136
|
+
if (parts.proactiveNextStepNudge !== undefined && parts.proactiveNextStepNudge !== '') {
|
|
137
|
+
prompt = `${prompt}\n\n${parts.proactiveNextStepNudge}`
|
|
138
|
+
}
|
|
139
|
+
if (parts.evalHint) prompt = `${prompt}\n\n${parts.evalHint}`
|
|
140
|
+
return prompt
|
|
141
|
+
}
|