typeclaw 0.48.8 → 0.48.10
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/scripts/verify-mask-fd-sandbox.sh +106 -0
- package/src/agent/index.ts +9 -0
- package/src/agent/tools/subagent-cancel.ts +14 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/README.md +4 -3
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/runner.ts +125 -32
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/gh-command.ts +106 -9
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/git-command.ts +94 -9
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/index.ts +44 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/inbound.ts +15 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/instagram-continuity-store.ts +141 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/instagram.ts +149 -4
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot.ts +13 -3
- package/src/channels/adapters/teams.ts +8 -6
- package/src/channels/github-verdict-activity.ts +4 -2
- package/src/channels/manager.ts +18 -1
- package/src/channels/router.ts +117 -2
- package/src/channels/types.ts +10 -0
- package/src/cli/compose.ts +7 -4
- package/src/compose/restart.ts +26 -16
- package/src/compose/start.ts +24 -14
- package/src/container/restart.ts +4 -0
- package/src/container/shared.ts +30 -3
- package/src/container/start.ts +104 -32
- package/src/container/stop.ts +2 -1
- package/src/hostd/daemon.ts +40 -17
- package/src/run/channel-session-factory.ts +35 -15
- package/src/sandbox/build.ts +20 -7
- package/src/sandbox/policy.ts +5 -2
package/package.json
CHANGED
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@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Acceptance check for the --ro-bind-data file-mask contract (appendMasks in
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# src/sandbox/build.ts). Not a unit test: it needs the bubblewrap that actually
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# ships in the base image, which the macOS dev host cannot provide and which
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# `ubuntu-latest` does not match — so the bwrap-gated unit test silently skips
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# on every CI runner we have.
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#
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# Why it exists: bwrap copies a --ro-bind-data operand out of its fd and then
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# close()s it, so each mask needs its OWN fd. Sharing one appeared to work on
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# bubblewrap <= 0.11.0 (the next mkstemp reclaimed the just-freed slot and
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# copied the empty temp file onto itself) and hard-fails on 0.12.0 with
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# "Can't write data to file <dest>: Bad file descriptor" — which aborts the
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# WHOLE bwrap invocation, not just the mask, taking down every sandboxed bash
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# call down to `echo`. That shipped in 0.48.8.
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#
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# `bubblewrap` is installed unpinned (BASELINE_APT_PACKAGES), so this behaviour
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# can change under us on any base-image rebuild with no typeclaw commit. Wired
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# into release.yml's merge-base job, which runs before the irreversible npm
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# publish, so a bwrap that rejects our rendered command blocks the release.
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#
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# Asserts only the property we depend on — N masks over N distinct fds succeed
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# and every target reads back empty. It deliberately does NOT assert that a
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# SHARED fd fails: that pins upstream behaviour we neither control nor need.
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#
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# Usage: scripts/verify-mask-fd-sandbox.sh [image] [platform]
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# image defaults to ghcr.io/typeclaw/typeclaw-base:<version-from-package.json>
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# platform e.g. linux/amd64; defaults to the daemon's native platform
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set -euo pipefail
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IMAGE="${1:-}"
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PLATFORM="${2:-}"
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if [ -z "$IMAGE" ]; then
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version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version" 2>/dev/null || echo latest)"
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IMAGE="ghcr.io/typeclaw/typeclaw-base:${version}"
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fi
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# Mirrors CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_FILES + CANONICAL_AGENT_RUNTIME_PRIVATE_FILES.
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# The count is what matters here (one fd per mask); keep in sync if that grows.
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runner='
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set -u
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d=/tmp/maskcheck
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mkdir -p "$d"
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for f in env secrets.json auth.json incidents.json; do printf CANARY > "$d/$f"; done
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# The argv shape mirrors buildArgv()/appendMasks() in src/sandbox/build.ts:
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# masks render after the broad parent bind, and the rendered commandString
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# self-opens one /dev/null fd per masked file. Keep in sync if that changes.
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set +e
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out="$(bwrap --unshare-all \
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--new-session --die-with-parent --clearenv \
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--setenv PATH /usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin --setenv HOME /tmp --setenv LANG C.UTF-8 \
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--ro-bind /usr /usr --ro-bind /etc /etc --dev /dev --tmpfs /tmp \
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--ro-bind-try /bin /bin --ro-bind-try /sbin /sbin --ro-bind-try /lib /lib --ro-bind-try /lib64 /lib64 \
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--bind "$d" "$d" \
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--ro-bind-data 3 "$d/env" \
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--ro-bind-data 4 "$d/secrets.json" \
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--ro-bind-data 5 "$d/auth.json" \
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--ro-bind-data 6 "$d/incidents.json" \
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bash -c "cat $d/env $d/secrets.json $d/auth.json $d/incidents.json" \
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3</dev/null 4</dev/null 5</dev/null 6</dev/null 2>/tmp/maskcheck.err)"
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rc=$?
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set -e
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echo "bwrap: $(bwrap --version)"
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if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
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echo "MASK_BWRAP_FAILED rc=$rc"
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cat /tmp/maskcheck.err
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exit 1
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fi
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if [ -n "$out" ]; then
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echo "MASK_LEAKED: masked files were readable: [$out]"
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "MASK_CONTRACT_OK: 4 masks over 4 distinct fds, all empty"
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'
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echo "Image: $IMAGE${PLATFORM:+ ($PLATFORM)}"
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# --pull=always plus an explicit platform, because the caller may have pulled
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# several architectures under this one tag. The classic Docker image store maps
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# a tag to exactly ONE image, so a preceding `docker pull --platform linux/amd64`
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# followed by `--platform linux/arm64` leaves the tag on whichever came LAST.
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# An unqualified `docker run` would then execute a foreign-arch image — and with
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# no QEMU registered that dies on exec format, failing the release for a reason
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# that has nothing to do with bwrap. Re-resolving the tag here keeps the check
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# honest on both the classic and containerd image stores.
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# --privileged so `bwrap --unshare-all` can actually build its namespaces here.
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# The runners restrict namespace creation in layers, and each one aborts the
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# invocation before a single mask is evaluated — so the step fails for reasons
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# that say nothing about the contract under test: docker-default AppArmor denies
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# the opening mount(NULL, "/", MS_SLAVE|MS_REC) ("Failed to make / slave"), and
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# the loopback bring-up in the new netns fails RTM_NEWADDR "Operation not
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# permitted" even with seccomp and AppArmor unconfined and NET_ADMIN added,
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# because the restriction is on the user namespace that would confer it.
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#
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# This is scaffolding for a throwaway container running a known image inside the
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# release pipeline, NOT a runtime capability grant — agent containers get
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# seccomp=unconfined and nothing more. What the gate certifies is unchanged: the
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# bwrap argv still mirrors buildArgv()/appendMasks(), and MASK_BWRAP_FAILED,
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# MASK_LEAKED and MASK_CONTRACT_OK all still fail the release on a real break.
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run_args=(--rm --pull=always --privileged)
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if [ -n "$PLATFORM" ]; then
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run_args+=(--platform "$PLATFORM")
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fi
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docker run "${run_args[@]}" "$IMAGE" bash -c "$runner"
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package/src/agent/index.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ export async function createSessionWithDispose(options: CreateSessionOptions = {
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stream: options.stream,
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allowBackgroundFromSubagent: options.allowBackgroundFromSubagent,
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coalescer: options.subagentCoalescer,
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channelRouter: options.channelRouter,
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}),
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]
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: [
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@@ -449,6 +450,7 @@ export async function createSessionWithDispose(options: CreateSessionOptions = {
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permissions: options.permissions,
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stream: options.stream,
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coalescer: options.subagentCoalescer,
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channelRouter: options.channelRouter,
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}),
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...buildRoleGrantTools({
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agentDir: options.plugins?.agentDir,
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@@ -862,6 +864,7 @@ export function buildSubagentOrchestrationTools(opts: {
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stream: Stream | undefined
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allowBackgroundFromSubagent?: boolean
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coalescer?: SubagentCoalescer
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channelRouter?: ChannelRouter
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}): ToolDefinition[] {
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if (
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opts.liveRegistry === undefined ||
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@@ -896,6 +899,12 @@ export function buildSubagentOrchestrationTools(opts: {
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liveRegistry: opts.liveRegistry,
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getOrigin: opts.getOrigin,
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callerSessionId: opts.parentSessionId,
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...(opts.channelRouter !== undefined
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? {
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hasOutstandingReviewThreadCloseout: (sessionId: string) =>
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opts.channelRouter?.hasOutstandingGithubReviewThreadCloseout?.(sessionId) ?? false,
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}
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: {}),
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...(opts.permissions ? { permissions: opts.permissions } : {}),
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}),
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]
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@@ -16,10 +16,11 @@ export type CreateSubagentCancelToolOptions = {
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getOrigin: () => SessionOrigin | undefined
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permissions?: PermissionService
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callerSessionId?: string
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hasOutstandingReviewThreadCloseout?: (sessionId: string) => boolean
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}
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export function createSubagentCancelTool(options: CreateSubagentCancelToolOptions) {
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const { liveRegistry, getOrigin, permissions, callerSessionId } = options
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const { liveRegistry, getOrigin, permissions, callerSessionId, hasOutstandingReviewThreadCloseout } = options
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return defineTool({
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name: 'subagent_cancel',
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return errorResult(`abort failed: ${message}`)
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}
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live.releaseCoalesceKey?.()
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const owesReviewThreadCloseout =
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callerSessionId !== undefined && hasOutstandingReviewThreadCloseout?.(callerSessionId) === true
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const hasOtherRunningChild =
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callerSessionId !== undefined &&
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liveRegistry
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.list({ parentSessionId: callerSessionId })
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.some((candidate) => candidate.taskId !== live.taskId && candidate.status === 'running')
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const closeoutWarning =
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owesReviewThreadCloseout && !hasOtherRunningChild
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? ' Warning: cancellation succeeded, but this session still owes its GitHub review thread a close-out. Reply now with an explicit resolve choice, or explain why you are leaving the thread open.'
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: ''
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const details: SubagentCancelToolDetails = {
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ok: true,
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taskId: live.taskId,
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content: [
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{
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type: 'text' as const,
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text: `${live.subagentName} (${live.taskId}) cancellation requested. It will stop on the next abort checkpoint
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text: `${live.subagentName} (${live.taskId}) cancellation requested. It will stop on the next abort checkpoint.${closeoutWarning}`,
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},
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],
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details,
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## What it commits
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The runner stages
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The runner stages an explicit snapshot from NUL-delimited porcelain status:
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- **Tracked
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- **
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- **Tracked changes**, including deletions and both rename/copy endpoints, are staged even when an endpoint is no longer present on disk.
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- **Ordinary untracked paths** are staged only while still present. If one disappears between snapshot and `git add`, the runner re-reads status and retries that same snapshot once without the vanished path; paths discovered during that re-read are never added.
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- **`memory/`** remains excluded. Present **`sessions/` and `todo/`** paths remain force-added; tracked deletions under those prefixes stay in the ordinary snapshot. The post-message pass re-stages only `sessions/` paths that appeared while the message was selected.
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Commit message comes from the `backup-message` subagent, which sees a truncated `git status` and `git diff --cached --stat` and writes a single conventional-ish commit message to a tmp file. On any failure the runner falls back to `chore: backup`.
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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1
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-
import {
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import { lstatSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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3
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4
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import { hooklessGitArgs } from '@/git/hookless'
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@@ -95,31 +95,35 @@ export async function runBackup(options: BackupRunnerOptions, deps: BackupRunner
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const repo = resolveAgentGit(cwd)
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if (!repo) return { ok: true, kind: 'no-repo' }
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-
const status = await deps.gitSpawn([...repo.gitArgs, 'status', '--porcelain=v1', '--untracked-files=all'], {
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const status = await deps.gitSpawn([...repo.gitArgs, 'status', '--porcelain=v1', '-z', '--untracked-files=all'], {
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cwd,
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timeoutMs: COMMIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
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})
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if (status.exitCode !== 0) return { ok: false, kind: 'aborted', reason: `git status failed: ${shortErr(status)}` }
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-
const
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-
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if (dirty.length === 0 && force.length === 0) return { ok: true, kind: 'clean' }
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const snapshot = selectStagingSnapshot(parsePorcelain(status.stdout), cwd)
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if (snapshot.paths.length === 0 && snapshot.forcePaths.length === 0) return { ok: true, kind: 'clean' }
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if (
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const add = await deps.gitSpawn([...repo.gitArgs, 'add', '--', ...
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-
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timeoutMs: COMMIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
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})
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-
if (addF.exitCode !== 0) {
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-
return { ok: false, kind: 'commit-failed', reason: `git add -f failed: ${shortErr(addF)}` }
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if (snapshot.paths.length > 0) {
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const add = await deps.gitSpawn([...repo.gitArgs, 'add', '--', ...snapshot.paths], {
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cwd,
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timeoutMs: COMMIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
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})
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if (add.exitCode !== 0) {
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const retry = await retryAfterVanishedUntracked(cwd, deps, repo, snapshot)
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if (!retry || retry.exitCode !== 0) {
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return { ok: false, kind: 'commit-failed', reason: `git add failed: ${shortErr(retry ?? add)}` }
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}
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}
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}
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if (snapshot.forcePaths.length > 0) {
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const addF = await deps.gitSpawn([...repo.gitArgs, 'add', '-f', '--', ...snapshot.forcePaths], {
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cwd,
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timeoutMs: COMMIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
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})
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if (addF.exitCode !== 0) {
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return { ok: false, kind: 'commit-failed', reason: `git add -f failed: ${shortErr(addF)}` }
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}
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}
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const stagedCheck = await deps.gitSpawn([...repo.gitArgs, 'diff', '--cached', '--quiet'], {
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cwd,
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@@ -132,7 +136,7 @@ export async function runBackup(options: BackupRunnerOptions, deps: BackupRunner
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timeoutMs: COMMIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
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})
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const message = await deps.pickCommitMessage({
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status: status.stdout.slice(0, 4096),
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status: status.stdout.replaceAll('\0', '\n').slice(0, 4096),
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diffstat: diffstat.stdout.slice(0, 4096),
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})
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@@ -144,12 +148,12 @@ export async function runBackup(options: BackupRunnerOptions, deps: BackupRunner
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// one-cycle-behind churn. Re-status, filter to `sessions/` additions
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// only (don't accidentally stage user work that arrived during the
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// window), and force-add anything new.
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const reStatus = await deps.gitSpawn([...repo.gitArgs, 'status', '--porcelain=v1', '--untracked-files=all'], {
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const reStatus = await deps.gitSpawn([...repo.gitArgs, 'status', '--porcelain=v1', '-z', '--untracked-files=all'], {
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cwd,
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timeoutMs: COMMIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
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})
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if (reStatus.exitCode === 0) {
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const lateForce =
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const lateForce = selectForcePaths(parsePorcelain(reStatus.stdout), cwd, ['sessions/'])
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if (lateForce.length > 0) {
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const lateAdd = await deps.gitSpawn([...repo.gitArgs, 'add', '-f', '--', ...lateForce], {
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cwd,
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@@ -372,23 +376,112 @@ function isNonFastForward(r: GitSpawnResult): boolean {
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return blob.includes('non-fast-forward') || blob.includes('updates were rejected')
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}
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export
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export type PorcelainEntry = {
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status: string
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kind: 'tracked' | 'untracked'
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paths: readonly string[]
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}
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// `-z` makes paths literal rather than C-quoted. Rename/copy records carry the
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// destination followed by the source, and both are needed when staging a
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// snapshot that contains an endpoint which has since disappeared.
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export function parsePorcelain(stdout: string): PorcelainEntry[] {
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const separator = stdout.includes('\0') ? '\0' : '\n'
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const records = stdout.split(separator)
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const entries: PorcelainEntry[] = []
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for (let index = 0; index < records.length; index += 1) {
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const raw = records[index] ?? ''
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if (raw.length < 4) continue
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const
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const
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const status = raw.slice(0, 2)
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const path = raw.slice(3)
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const renamedOrCopied = status.includes('R') || status.includes('C')
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const source = renamedOrCopied && separator === '\0' ? records[++index] : undefined
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const fallbackSource = renamedOrCopied && separator === '\n' ? path.split(' -> ')[0] : undefined
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const destination = fallbackSource ? path.slice(fallbackSource.length + 4) : path
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entries.push({
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status,
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kind: status === '??' ? 'untracked' : 'tracked',
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paths: source ? [path, source] : fallbackSource ? [destination, fallbackSource] : [path],
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})
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}
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return
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return entries
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}
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type StagingSnapshot = {
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paths: string[]
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untrackedPaths: Set<string>
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forcePaths: string[]
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}
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function selectStagingSnapshot(entries: readonly PorcelainEntry[], cwd: string): StagingSnapshot {
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const paths: string[] = []
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const untrackedPaths = new Set<string>()
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for (const entry of entries) {
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for (const path of entry.paths) {
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if (isAgentOwned(path)) continue
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const forceAdded = FORCE_ADD_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => path.startsWith(prefix))
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if (entry.kind === 'untracked') {
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if (forceAdded || !hasDirectoryEntry(join(cwd, path))) continue
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untrackedPaths.add(path)
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}
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paths.push(path)
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}
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}
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return { paths: uniquePaths(paths), untrackedPaths, forcePaths: selectForcePaths(entries, cwd) }
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}
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async function retryAfterVanishedUntracked(
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cwd: string,
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deps: BackupRunnerDeps,
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repo: AgentGit,
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snapshot: StagingSnapshot,
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): Promise<GitSpawnResult | undefined> {
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const reread = await deps.gitSpawn([...repo.gitArgs, 'status', '--porcelain=v1', '-z', '--untracked-files=all'], {
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cwd,
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timeoutMs: COMMIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
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})
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if (reread.exitCode !== 0) return undefined
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const reported = new Set(
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parsePorcelain(reread.stdout)
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.filter((entry) => entry.kind === 'untracked')
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.flatMap((entry) => entry.paths),
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)
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const vanished = new Set(
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[...snapshot.untrackedPaths].filter((path) => !hasDirectoryEntry(join(cwd, path)) && !reported.has(path)),
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)
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if (vanished.size === 0) return undefined
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const retryPaths = snapshot.paths.filter((path) => !vanished.has(path))
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if (retryPaths.length === 0) return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', timedOut: false }
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return deps.gitSpawn([...repo.gitArgs, 'add', '--', ...retryPaths], { cwd, timeoutMs: COMMIT_TIMEOUT_MS })
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}
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function selectForcePaths(
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entries: readonly PorcelainEntry[],
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cwd: string,
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prefixes: readonly string[] = FORCE_ADD_PREFIXES,
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): string[] {
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return uniquePaths(
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entries.flatMap((entry) =>
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entry.paths.filter(
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(path) => prefixes.some((prefix) => path.startsWith(prefix)) && hasDirectoryEntry(join(cwd, path)),
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),
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),
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)
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}
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function hasDirectoryEntry(path: string): boolean {
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return lstatSync(path, { throwIfNoEntry: false }) !== undefined
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}
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function
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return
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function uniquePaths(paths: readonly string[]): string[] {
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return [...new Set(paths)]
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}
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function
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return
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function isAgentOwned(path: string): boolean {
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return RUNTIME_OWNED_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => path.startsWith(prefix))
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}
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function sanitizeCommitMessage(raw: string): string {
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@@ -21,11 +21,15 @@ export type GhCommandDecision =
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// (REST, non-`api` subcommands) leave the command unchanged and omit it.
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| { kind: 'inject'; repoSlug: string; rewrittenCommand?: string }
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// Reached whenever no EFFECTIVE DESTINATION repo can be determined — which is not
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// the same as "argv has no slug": `gh label clone owner/repo` names a literal SOURCE
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// slug and still lands here because the destination is what a token would be scoped
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// to. The message must not assert a multi-owner App (MULTI_OWNER_REASON below covers
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// that, and a single-owner App hitting this text reports a cause that is simply false).
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const MISSING_REPO_REASON =
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'
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'Re-run as a single bare command
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'
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'The repo must be a concrete `owner/repo` slug, not a shell variable.'
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'TypeClaw could not determine the effective destination repository for this `gh` command, ' +
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'so it cannot mint a scoped installation token. Re-run as a single bare command that names a ' +
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'LITERAL `owner/repo` slug TypeClaw can read from argv — not a shell variable.'
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const NON_LITERAL_REPO_REASON =
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'The `-R/--repo` value is not a literal `owner/repo` slug TypeClaw can verify. ' +
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@@ -322,7 +326,20 @@ function addGraphqlQuery(queries: string[], field: string): void {
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const SAFE_GH_OPERATIONS: Readonly<Record<string, ReadonlySet<string>>> = {
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api: new Set(['']),
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pr: new Set([
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pr: new Set([
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'view',
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'list',
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'status',
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'checks',
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'diff',
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'review',
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'comment',
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'close',
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'reopen',
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'ready',
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'merge',
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'edit',
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+
]),
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issue: new Set(['view', 'list', 'status', 'comment', 'close', 'reopen', 'create']),
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label: new Set(['list', 'create', 'edit', 'delete', 'clone']),
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release: new Set(['view', 'list']),
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@@ -346,6 +363,26 @@ const CREDENTIAL_UNSAFE_FLAGS = new Set([
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'--delete-branch',
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])
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// `gh pr edit` field flags whose values are inline argv strings. Every one is a
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// label/login/name/free-text operand — none names a file, a host, or a template,
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+
// so they satisfy the same credential-safety criterion as `gh pr comment --body`.
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// `-F`/`--body-file` (file read) and `-t` (template) are excluded here and denied
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// by CREDENTIAL_UNSAFE_FLAGS and the api-field scoping above.
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+
const PR_EDIT_FIELD_FLAGS = new Set([
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'--add-label',
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+
'--remove-label',
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+
'--add-assignee',
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+
'--remove-assignee',
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'--add-reviewer',
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'--remove-reviewer',
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+
'--add-project',
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+
'--remove-project',
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+
'--remove-milestone',
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381
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+
])
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382
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+
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383
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+
const PR_EDIT_IDENTIFIER_FLAGS = new Set([...PR_EDIT_FIELD_FLAGS, '--milestone', '--base'])
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+
const PR_EDIT_TEXT_FLAGS = new Set(['--title', '--body', '-b'])
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+
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const CREDENTIAL_SAFE_FLAGS = new Set([
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'-R',
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'--repo',
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@@ -404,6 +441,7 @@ const CREDENTIAL_SAFE_FLAGS = new Set([
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404
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'--confirm',
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405
442
|
'--branch',
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406
443
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'--event',
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+
...PR_EDIT_FIELD_FLAGS,
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407
445
|
])
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function isCredentialSafeGhCommand(command: string): boolean {
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@@ -415,6 +453,21 @@ function isCredentialSafeGhCommand(command: string): boolean {
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415
453
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return tokens[0] === 'gh' && isCredentialSafeGhArgs(tokens.slice(1))
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}
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417
455
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|
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456
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+
// Flag NAMES are scoped by Cobra command, so a name-only allowlist is not a
|
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457
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+
// flag allowlist. `-F` is `--field` for `gh api`/`gh workflow run`, but Cobra
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458
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+
// binds it to `--body-file` on every pr/issue command in SAFE_GH_OPERATIONS:
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459
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+
// `gh pr comment 1 -R o/r -F /proc/self/environ` reads the minted token out of
|
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460
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+
// gh's own environ and posts it to a public comment thread. The long `--body-file`
|
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461
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+
// was denied while its short alias walked straight through the same allowlist.
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462
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+
// `-f` keeps its `gh label create/clone` `--force` meaning — the same command
|
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463
|
+
// scoping `ghFlagTakesValue` already applies when finding positionals.
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|
+
const API_FIELD_FLAGS = new Set(['-f', '--raw-field', '-F', '--field'])
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465
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+
|
|
466
|
+
function acceptsApiFieldFlag(command: string, flag: string): boolean {
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467
|
+
if (command === 'api' || command === 'workflow') return true
|
|
468
|
+
return flag === '-f' && command === 'label'
|
|
469
|
+
}
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|
470
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+
|
|
418
471
|
function isCredentialSafeGhArgs(args: readonly string[]): boolean {
|
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419
472
|
const parsed = parseGhArgs(args)
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|
420
473
|
if (parsed === null) return false
|
|
@@ -427,6 +480,9 @@ function isCredentialSafeGhArgs(args: readonly string[]): boolean {
|
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|
427
480
|
if (command === 'issue' && operation === 'create' && !isSafeCreateArgs(args)) {
|
|
428
481
|
return false
|
|
429
482
|
}
|
|
483
|
+
if (command === 'pr' && operation === 'edit' && !isSafePrEditArgs(args)) {
|
|
484
|
+
return false
|
|
485
|
+
}
|
|
430
486
|
|
|
431
487
|
for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
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432
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|
const arg = args[i] as string
|
|
@@ -434,10 +490,8 @@ function isCredentialSafeGhArgs(args: readonly string[]): boolean {
|
|
|
434
490
|
if (CREDENTIAL_UNSAFE_FLAGS.has(flag)) return false
|
|
435
491
|
if (flag.endsWith('-file') || flag.endsWith('-file-name')) return false
|
|
436
492
|
if (arg.startsWith('-') && !CREDENTIAL_SAFE_FLAGS.has(flag)) return false
|
|
437
|
-
if (
|
|
438
|
-
|
|
439
|
-
(flag === '--raw-field' || flag === '-f' || flag === '--field' || flag === '-F')
|
|
440
|
-
) {
|
|
493
|
+
if (API_FIELD_FLAGS.has(flag) && !acceptsApiFieldFlag(command, flag)) return false
|
|
494
|
+
if ((command === 'api' || command === 'workflow') && API_FIELD_FLAGS.has(flag)) {
|
|
441
495
|
const value = flagValue(args, i)
|
|
442
496
|
if (value === null || fieldDereferencesFile(value)) return false
|
|
443
497
|
}
|
|
@@ -470,6 +524,30 @@ function isSafeCreateArgs(args: readonly string[]): boolean {
|
|
|
470
524
|
return true
|
|
471
525
|
}
|
|
472
526
|
|
|
527
|
+
// `gh pr edit` with no field flag drops into an interactive survey and spawns
|
|
528
|
+
// $EDITOR for the body — a child process that inherits the minted token, the
|
|
529
|
+
// same shape `gh pr merge --delete-branch` is denied for. Requiring at least one
|
|
530
|
+
// recognized inline field flag keeps the invocation non-interactive. Identifier
|
|
531
|
+
// operands additionally reject `@` values, mirroring isSafeCreateArgs; `--title`
|
|
532
|
+
// and `--body` are free text where a leading `@mention` is legitimate and gh
|
|
533
|
+
// performs no file dereference.
|
|
534
|
+
function isSafePrEditArgs(args: readonly string[]): boolean {
|
|
535
|
+
let hasField = false
|
|
536
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
|
|
537
|
+
const arg = args[i] as string
|
|
538
|
+
if (!arg.startsWith('-')) continue
|
|
539
|
+
const flag = arg.includes('=') ? arg.slice(0, arg.indexOf('=')) : arg
|
|
540
|
+
const isIdentifierField = PR_EDIT_IDENTIFIER_FLAGS.has(flag)
|
|
541
|
+
if (!isIdentifierField && !PR_EDIT_TEXT_FLAGS.has(flag)) continue
|
|
542
|
+
hasField = true
|
|
543
|
+
if (flag === '--remove-milestone') continue
|
|
544
|
+
const value = flagValue(args, i)
|
|
545
|
+
if (value === null || value.trim() === '') return false
|
|
546
|
+
if (isIdentifierField && value.startsWith('@')) return false
|
|
547
|
+
}
|
|
548
|
+
return hasField
|
|
549
|
+
}
|
|
550
|
+
|
|
473
551
|
function findFlagValue(args: readonly string[], names: readonly string[]): string | null {
|
|
474
552
|
for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
|
|
475
553
|
const arg = args[i] as string
|
|
@@ -1100,6 +1178,14 @@ const GH_FLAGS_WITH_VALUES = new Set([
|
|
|
1100
1178
|
'--description',
|
|
1101
1179
|
'--branch',
|
|
1102
1180
|
'--event',
|
|
1181
|
+
'--add-label',
|
|
1182
|
+
'--remove-label',
|
|
1183
|
+
'--add-assignee',
|
|
1184
|
+
'--remove-assignee',
|
|
1185
|
+
'--add-reviewer',
|
|
1186
|
+
'--remove-reviewer',
|
|
1187
|
+
'--add-project',
|
|
1188
|
+
'--remove-project',
|
|
1103
1189
|
])
|
|
1104
1190
|
|
|
1105
1191
|
const PR_REPO_SELECTOR_OPERATIONS = new Set([
|
|
@@ -1115,6 +1201,7 @@ const PR_REPO_SELECTOR_OPERATIONS = new Set([
|
|
|
1115
1201
|
'ready',
|
|
1116
1202
|
'merge',
|
|
1117
1203
|
'checkout',
|
|
1204
|
+
'edit',
|
|
1118
1205
|
])
|
|
1119
1206
|
const ISSUE_REPO_SELECTOR_OPERATIONS = new Set(['view', 'list', 'status', 'comment', 'close', 'reopen'])
|
|
1120
1207
|
|
|
@@ -1401,12 +1488,22 @@ function findGhInvocations(tokens: readonly string[]): number[] {
|
|
|
1401
1488
|
return starts
|
|
1402
1489
|
}
|
|
1403
1490
|
|
|
1491
|
+
// bash treats `then`/`else`/`do` as reserved words ONLY in command position, and each
|
|
1492
|
+
// opens a fresh command position after it. Recognizing them is what makes
|
|
1493
|
+
// `if ...; then gh ...; fi` reach the composition gate — without it findGhInvocations
|
|
1494
|
+
// sees no invocation at all and the whole command silently passes through
|
|
1495
|
+
// unauthenticated, which is neither the documented policy nor a usable failure.
|
|
1496
|
+
// The recursion is what keeps `echo then gh` from registering: there, `then` is a
|
|
1497
|
+
// plain argument (not preceded by a boundary), so it opens nothing.
|
|
1498
|
+
const RESERVED_COMMAND_OPENERS = new Set(['then', 'else', 'do'])
|
|
1499
|
+
|
|
1404
1500
|
function isCommandBoundaryBefore(tokens: readonly string[], index: number): boolean {
|
|
1405
1501
|
let cursor = index - 1
|
|
1406
1502
|
while (cursor >= 0) {
|
|
1407
1503
|
const prev = tokens[cursor]
|
|
1408
1504
|
if (prev === undefined) return false
|
|
1409
1505
|
if (prev === '&&' || prev === '||' || prev === '|' || prev === ';' || prev === '\n') return true
|
|
1506
|
+
if (RESERVED_COMMAND_OPENERS.has(prev)) return isCommandBoundaryBefore(tokens, cursor)
|
|
1410
1507
|
if (/^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=/.test(prev)) {
|
|
1411
1508
|
cursor -= 1
|
|
1412
1509
|
continue
|