typeclaw 0.47.2 → 0.48.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/agent/index.ts +1 -2
- package/src/agent/loop-guard.ts +71 -41
- package/src/agent/plugin-tools.ts +167 -50
- package/src/agent/system-prompt.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/turn-runner.ts +12 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/index.ts +0 -38
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/skills/agent-browser/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/guard/policies/non-workspace-write.ts +16 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/append-tool.ts +75 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/frontmatter.ts +13 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/load-memory.ts +1 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/memory-logger.ts +5 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/secret-detector.ts +7 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/hybrid.ts +3 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/passages.ts +5 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/index.ts +148 -98
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/private-surface-read.ts +43 -28
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-slash-commands.ts +3 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot.ts +20 -23
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/decoy-reviewer.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/history.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/inbound.ts +4 -11
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/index.ts +6 -9
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/outbound.ts +3 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reactions.ts +3 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reconcile-cooldown-store.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reconcile-open-prs.ts +5 -4
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/recover-failed-deliveries.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/review-state.ts +3 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/review-thread-resolver.ts +3 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/webhook-register.ts +5 -8
- package/src/channels/adapters/instagram-channel-resolver.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/instagram.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-author-resolver.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-channel-resolver.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-fetch-attachment.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-membership.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-typing.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/line-channel-resolver.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/line.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot-edit.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot.ts +8 -8
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/teams-edit.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/teams.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot-edit.ts +4 -7
- package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex-bot.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/github-review-claim.ts +89 -4
- package/src/channels/github-token-bridge.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/manager.ts +478 -64
- package/src/channels/membership-cache.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/persistence.ts +3 -6
- package/src/channels/reloadable.ts +23 -6
- package/src/channels/router.ts +134 -56
- package/src/channels/tunnel-bridge.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/types.ts +6 -3
- package/src/cli/hostd.ts +56 -28
- package/src/config/config.ts +10 -0
- package/src/config/providers.ts +179 -0
- package/src/dependencies/bin-resolver.ts +88 -0
- package/src/dependencies/bins.ts +227 -0
- package/src/dependencies/index.ts +17 -0
- package/src/doctor/checks.ts +2 -0
- package/src/doctor/operational-incidents.ts +32 -0
- package/src/hostd/credential-rotation-apply.ts +94 -0
- package/src/init/models-dev.ts +17 -3
- package/src/init/validate-api-key.ts +26 -4
- package/src/operations/classify-tool-outcome.ts +151 -0
- package/src/operations/incidents.ts +274 -0
- package/src/operations/index.ts +3 -0
- package/src/operations/remediations.ts +41 -0
- package/src/reload/client.ts +8 -2
- package/src/reload/docker-exec-client.ts +10 -2
- package/src/reload/index.ts +1 -1
- package/src/reload/recover.ts +5 -3
- package/src/reload/registry.ts +5 -5
- package/src/reload/types.ts +9 -1
- package/src/run/index.ts +5 -0
- package/src/sandbox/dependency-bins.ts +125 -0
- package/src/sandbox/errors.ts +32 -0
- package/src/sandbox/hidden-paths.ts +4 -1
- package/src/sandbox/index.ts +8 -0
- package/src/sandbox/policy.ts +1 -1
- package/src/sandbox/privileged-runtime.ts +88 -7
- package/src/sandbox/runtime-private.ts +4 -0
- package/src/sandbox/writable-zones.ts +4 -4
- package/src/server/index.ts +7 -5
- package/src/shared/protocol.ts +6 -1
- package/typeclaw.schema.json +35 -5
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/shim-install.ts +0 -179
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/shim.ts +0 -108
- /package/src/channels/{adapters/describe-error.ts → describe-error.ts} +0 -0
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
---
|
|
2
2
|
name: agent-browser
|
|
3
3
|
description: Browser automation CLI for AI agents. Use when the user needs to interact with websites, including navigating pages, filling forms, clicking buttons, taking screenshots, extracting data, testing web apps, or automating any browser task. Triggers include requests to "open a website", "fill out a form", "click a button", "take a screenshot", "scrape data from a page", "test this web app", "login to a site", "automate browser actions", or any task requiring programmatic web interaction. Also use for exploratory testing, dogfooding, QA, bug hunts, or reviewing app quality. Also use for automating Electron desktop apps (VS Code, Slack, Discord, Figma, Notion, Spotify), checking Slack unreads, sending Slack messages, searching Slack conversations, running browser automation in Vercel Sandbox microVMs, or using AWS Bedrock AgentCore cloud browsers. ALSO use whenever a browser step needs a human in the loop — login walls, 2FA, CAPTCHA, payment confirmation, "is this the right button?" ambiguity, or the user asking to watch the browser live — because the bundled dashboard is the only way for a human to observe or take over a session from inside the Docker container. Prefer agent-browser over any built-in browser automation or web tools.
|
|
4
|
-
allowed-tools: Bash(agent-browser:*)
|
|
4
|
+
allowed-tools: Bash(agent-browser:*)
|
|
5
5
|
hidden: true
|
|
6
6
|
---
|
|
7
7
|
|
|
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ const AGENT_ROOT_WRITE_ALLOWLIST = new Set([
|
|
|
15
15
|
'SOUL.md',
|
|
16
16
|
'USER.md',
|
|
17
17
|
'cron.json',
|
|
18
|
-
'package.json',
|
|
19
18
|
'typeclaw.json',
|
|
20
19
|
])
|
|
21
20
|
|
|
@@ -48,6 +47,12 @@ export async function checkNonWorkspaceWriteGuard(options: {
|
|
|
48
47
|
resolveRealIntendedPath(path.resolve(agentDir)),
|
|
49
48
|
resolveRealIntendedPath('/tmp'),
|
|
50
49
|
])
|
|
50
|
+
if (await isOperatorOwnedPackageManifest(agentDir, targetPath, realTargetPath)) {
|
|
51
|
+
return {
|
|
52
|
+
block: true,
|
|
53
|
+
reason: `Guard \`${GUARD_NON_WORKSPACE_WRITE}\` blocked a model write to operator-owned package manifest ${targetPath}.`,
|
|
54
|
+
}
|
|
55
|
+
}
|
|
51
56
|
if (await isSkillAuthoringAllowed({ tool, args, agentDir })) return undefined
|
|
52
57
|
if (await isMemoryTopicsWriteAllowed({ tool, args, agentDir, origin })) return undefined
|
|
53
58
|
if (await isAllowedAgentRootWrite(agentDir, targetPath, realTargetPath)) return undefined
|
|
@@ -74,6 +79,16 @@ export async function checkNonWorkspaceWriteGuard(options: {
|
|
|
74
79
|
}
|
|
75
80
|
}
|
|
76
81
|
|
|
82
|
+
async function isOperatorOwnedPackageManifest(
|
|
83
|
+
agentDir: string,
|
|
84
|
+
targetPath: string,
|
|
85
|
+
realTargetPath: string,
|
|
86
|
+
): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
87
|
+
const rootManifest = path.join(path.resolve(agentDir), 'package.json')
|
|
88
|
+
const realRootManifest = await resolveRealIntendedPath(rootManifest)
|
|
89
|
+
return targetPath === rootManifest || realTargetPath === realRootManifest
|
|
90
|
+
}
|
|
91
|
+
|
|
77
92
|
async function isAllowedAgentRootWrite(agentDir: string, targetPath: string, realTargetPath: string): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
78
93
|
const resolvedAgentDir = path.resolve(agentDir)
|
|
79
94
|
if (path.dirname(targetPath) === resolvedAgentDir && AGENT_ROOT_WRITE_ALLOWLIST.has(path.basename(targetPath))) {
|
|
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { mkdir } from 'node:fs/promises'
|
|
1
|
+
import { mkdir, readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
|
|
2
2
|
import { dirname } from 'node:path'
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
import { z } from 'zod'
|
|
@@ -28,11 +28,13 @@ export type OriginProvider = () => SessionOrigin | undefined
|
|
|
28
28
|
// is already on disk by append time). Lets the append tool strip hallucinated
|
|
29
29
|
// slugs the model invents without ever calling `store_reference`.
|
|
30
30
|
export type ReferenceSlugResolver = (agentDir: string) => Promise<Iterable<string>>
|
|
31
|
+
export type TranscriptPathProvider = () => string | undefined
|
|
31
32
|
|
|
32
33
|
export type CreateAppendToolOptions = {
|
|
33
34
|
onFragmentsAppended?: FragmentsAppendedHook
|
|
34
35
|
originProvider?: OriginProvider
|
|
35
36
|
referenceSlugResolver?: ReferenceSlugResolver
|
|
37
|
+
transcriptPathProvider?: TranscriptPathProvider
|
|
36
38
|
}
|
|
37
39
|
|
|
38
40
|
// Stamped fields are the stable channel coordinates only. Author identity is
|
|
@@ -64,7 +66,7 @@ export function provenanceFromOrigin(origin: SessionOrigin | undefined): Fragmen
|
|
|
64
66
|
}
|
|
65
67
|
|
|
66
68
|
export function createAppendTool(options: CreateAppendToolOptions = {}) {
|
|
67
|
-
const { onFragmentsAppended, originProvider, referenceSlugResolver } = options
|
|
69
|
+
const { onFragmentsAppended, originProvider, referenceSlugResolver, transcriptPathProvider } = options
|
|
68
70
|
return defineTool({
|
|
69
71
|
description:
|
|
70
72
|
"Append a memory fragment to today's JSONL daily stream and advance the watermark. The runtime serializes your call into a JSON line and chooses the filename — do not emit raw JSON and do not pass a path. `topic`/`body` are the fragment's substance; `source` is the parent session id; `entry` is the transcript-entry-id this fragment anchors to; `latestEntryId` is the latest transcript-entry-id you evaluated in this run (advances the watermark, may equal `entry` or be later). `references` may ONLY contain slugs returned by `store_reference` (it returns the slug it wrote) — never topic ids, PR names, stream paths, or invented labels; unknown slugs are dropped. `who` is the display name/handle of the person the fragment's evidence is attributable to — set it ONLY when one transcript speaker clearly owns the evidence; omit it when the fact is the user's own, spans multiple speakers, or is not attributable. The channel/room/platform (`where`) is stamped automatically from the session origin — do not pass it and do not restate it in the body. Refuses content with recognized credential patterns and refuses byte-equivalent topic+body within the same daily stream.",
|
|
@@ -87,6 +89,16 @@ export function createAppendTool(options: CreateAppendToolOptions = {}) {
|
|
|
87
89
|
async execute({ topic, body, source, entry, latestEntryId, references, who }, ctx) {
|
|
88
90
|
const streamPath = dailyStreamPath(ctx.agentDir)
|
|
89
91
|
const where = provenanceFromOrigin(originProvider?.())
|
|
92
|
+
const transcriptPath = transcriptPathProvider?.()
|
|
93
|
+
if (
|
|
94
|
+
transcriptPath !== undefined &&
|
|
95
|
+
(await anchorBelongsToOperationalIncident(transcriptPath, entry, latestEntryId))
|
|
96
|
+
) {
|
|
97
|
+
throw new Error(
|
|
98
|
+
'Refusing to append: the transcript anchor belongs to a deterministic operational incident sequence. ' +
|
|
99
|
+
'Operational defects are owned by the incident ledger, not semantic memory.',
|
|
100
|
+
)
|
|
101
|
+
}
|
|
90
102
|
// `who` is LLM-supplied and force-committed to memory, so it clears the
|
|
91
103
|
// same secret guard as topic/body — a token-shaped display name is refused
|
|
92
104
|
// with the same retryable error. (`where` names are origin-derived and the
|
|
@@ -155,6 +167,67 @@ export function createAppendTool(options: CreateAppendToolOptions = {}) {
|
|
|
155
167
|
})
|
|
156
168
|
}
|
|
157
169
|
|
|
170
|
+
const OPERATIONAL_INCIDENT_MARKER = 'TYPECLAW_OPERATIONAL_INCIDENT '
|
|
171
|
+
|
|
172
|
+
export async function anchorBelongsToOperationalIncident(
|
|
173
|
+
transcriptPath: string,
|
|
174
|
+
entryId: string,
|
|
175
|
+
latestEntryId = entryId,
|
|
176
|
+
): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
177
|
+
let raw: string
|
|
178
|
+
try {
|
|
179
|
+
raw = await readFile(transcriptPath, 'utf8')
|
|
180
|
+
} catch {
|
|
181
|
+
return false
|
|
182
|
+
}
|
|
183
|
+
const entries = raw
|
|
184
|
+
.split('\n')
|
|
185
|
+
.filter((line) => line.length > 0)
|
|
186
|
+
.flatMap((line): unknown[] => {
|
|
187
|
+
try {
|
|
188
|
+
return [JSON.parse(line) as unknown]
|
|
189
|
+
} catch {
|
|
190
|
+
return []
|
|
191
|
+
}
|
|
192
|
+
})
|
|
193
|
+
const anchorIndex = entries.findIndex((entry) => entryIdOf(entry) === entryId)
|
|
194
|
+
const latestIndex = entries.findIndex((entry) => entryIdOf(entry) === latestEntryId)
|
|
195
|
+
if (anchorIndex < 0 || latestIndex < anchorIndex) return false
|
|
196
|
+
|
|
197
|
+
for (let i = anchorIndex; i <= latestIndex; i++) {
|
|
198
|
+
if (entryBelongsToOperationalIncident(entries, i)) return true
|
|
199
|
+
}
|
|
200
|
+
return false
|
|
201
|
+
}
|
|
202
|
+
|
|
203
|
+
function entryBelongsToOperationalIncident(entries: unknown[], entryIndex: number): boolean {
|
|
204
|
+
if (containsIncidentMarker(entries[entryIndex])) return true
|
|
205
|
+
for (let i = entryIndex - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
206
|
+
const entry = entries[i]
|
|
207
|
+
if (containsIncidentMarker(entry)) return true
|
|
208
|
+
if (messageRole(entry) === 'user') return false
|
|
209
|
+
}
|
|
210
|
+
return false
|
|
211
|
+
}
|
|
212
|
+
|
|
213
|
+
function entryIdOf(entry: unknown): string | undefined {
|
|
214
|
+
if (typeof entry !== 'object' || entry === null) return undefined
|
|
215
|
+
const id = (entry as { id?: unknown }).id
|
|
216
|
+
return typeof id === 'string' ? id : undefined
|
|
217
|
+
}
|
|
218
|
+
|
|
219
|
+
function messageRole(entry: unknown): string | undefined {
|
|
220
|
+
if (typeof entry !== 'object' || entry === null) return undefined
|
|
221
|
+
const message = (entry as { message?: unknown }).message
|
|
222
|
+
if (typeof message !== 'object' || message === null) return undefined
|
|
223
|
+
const role = (message as { role?: unknown }).role
|
|
224
|
+
return typeof role === 'string' ? role : undefined
|
|
225
|
+
}
|
|
226
|
+
|
|
227
|
+
function containsIncidentMarker(entry: unknown): boolean {
|
|
228
|
+
return JSON.stringify(entry).includes(OPERATIONAL_INCIDENT_MARKER)
|
|
229
|
+
}
|
|
230
|
+
|
|
158
231
|
export const appendTool = createAppendTool()
|
|
159
232
|
|
|
160
233
|
export const advanceWatermarkTool = defineTool({
|
|
@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
export type ShardFrontmatter = {
|
|
2
2
|
heading: string
|
|
3
|
+
kind?: ShardKind
|
|
3
4
|
cites: number
|
|
4
5
|
days: number
|
|
5
6
|
lastReinforced: string
|
|
6
7
|
tags?: string[]
|
|
7
8
|
}
|
|
8
9
|
|
|
10
|
+
export type ShardKind = 'belief' | 'procedure' | 'environmental-incident'
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
9
12
|
const DATE_REGEX = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/
|
|
10
13
|
|
|
11
14
|
export function parseShard(text: string): { frontmatter: ShardFrontmatter; body: string } {
|
|
@@ -111,7 +114,8 @@ function parseFrontmatterBlock(text: string): ShardFrontmatter {
|
|
|
111
114
|
throw new Error(`frontmatter field 'lastReinforced': expected YYYY-MM-DD, got '${values.lastReinforced}'`)
|
|
112
115
|
}
|
|
113
116
|
|
|
114
|
-
const
|
|
117
|
+
const kind = values.kind ?? 'belief'
|
|
118
|
+
const result: ShardFrontmatter = { heading, kind: kind as ShardKind, cites, days, lastReinforced }
|
|
115
119
|
if ('tags' in values) {
|
|
116
120
|
result.tags = values.tags as string[]
|
|
117
121
|
}
|
|
@@ -120,9 +124,15 @@ function parseFrontmatterBlock(text: string): ShardFrontmatter {
|
|
|
120
124
|
}
|
|
121
125
|
|
|
122
126
|
const FRONTMATTER_PARSERS: {
|
|
123
|
-
[K in keyof Omit<ShardFrontmatter, 'tags'
|
|
127
|
+
[K in keyof Required<Omit<ShardFrontmatter, 'tags'>>]: (value: string) => unknown
|
|
124
128
|
} = {
|
|
125
129
|
heading: (v) => v,
|
|
130
|
+
kind: (v) => {
|
|
131
|
+
if (v !== 'belief' && v !== 'procedure' && v !== 'environmental-incident') {
|
|
132
|
+
throw new Error(`expected belief, procedure, or environmental-incident, got '${v}'`)
|
|
133
|
+
}
|
|
134
|
+
return v
|
|
135
|
+
},
|
|
126
136
|
cites: parseNonNegativeInt,
|
|
127
137
|
days: parseNonNegativeInt,
|
|
128
138
|
lastReinforced: (v) => v,
|
|
@@ -140,6 +150,7 @@ function parseNonNegativeInt(value: string): number {
|
|
|
140
150
|
export function renderShard(frontmatter: ShardFrontmatter, body: string): string {
|
|
141
151
|
const lines = ['---']
|
|
142
152
|
lines.push(`heading: ${frontmatter.heading}`)
|
|
153
|
+
if (frontmatter.kind !== undefined && frontmatter.kind !== 'belief') lines.push(`kind: ${frontmatter.kind}`)
|
|
143
154
|
lines.push(`cites: ${frontmatter.cites}`)
|
|
144
155
|
lines.push(`days: ${frontmatter.days}`)
|
|
145
156
|
lines.push(`lastReinforced: ${frontmatter.lastReinforced}`)
|
|
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ export async function loadMemoryInjectionPlan(
|
|
|
50
50
|
if (rootMemory.content !== null && !hasTopicsDir) {
|
|
51
51
|
return buildInjectionPlan([rootFallbackEntry(rootMemory)], { budgetBytes: options.injectionBudgetBytes })
|
|
52
52
|
}
|
|
53
|
-
const shards = await loadAllShards(agentDir)
|
|
53
|
+
const shards = (await loadAllShards(agentDir)).filter((shard) => shard.frontmatter.kind !== 'environmental-incident')
|
|
54
54
|
return buildInjectionPlan(shards, { budgetBytes: options.injectionBudgetBytes })
|
|
55
55
|
}
|
|
56
56
|
|
|
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ export function isMemoryLoggerPayload(value: unknown): value is MemoryLoggerPayl
|
|
|
68
68
|
|
|
69
69
|
export const MEMORY_LOGGER_SYSTEM_PROMPT = `You are typeclaw's memory-extraction subagent.
|
|
70
70
|
|
|
71
|
-
Read the parent session transcript past the watermark and write zero or more durable memory fragments to today's stream, then exit. Capture only
|
|
71
|
+
Read the parent session transcript past the watermark and write zero or more durable memory fragments to today's stream, then exit. Capture only facts a future agent would concretely need: explicit user instructions, stable identity/role/tool facts, decisions with reasoning, reproducible user-domain procedures, corrections, changed minds, and content the user explicitly taught the agent or asked it to remember. Most runs produce zero or one fragment; that is expected.
|
|
72
72
|
|
|
73
73
|
A separate \`dreaming\` subagent later consolidates fragments into \`memory/topics/\`, dedupes across days, resolves contradictions, and decides what generalizes. **Dreaming is downstream consolidation, not permission to over-capture upstream.** You do not read \`memory/topics/\`; cross-shard reasoning is dreaming's job. Your inputs are the transcript past the watermark and, optionally, today's daily stream for local dedup. Recurrence across days is useful evidence for dreaming, so a repeated durable fact anchored to new evidence is not a duplicate.
|
|
74
74
|
|
|
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ Capture-worthy categories:
|
|
|
118
118
|
- **Stable collaborator/contact facts.** Durable facts about non-user people the agent is likely to encounter again: name/handle, active-participant status in this context, role, responsibility, project relationship, durable working preference, or coordination/contact context. When a person actively participates in the conversation — recurring presence, multiple messages, or a back-and-forth exchange, not a single drive-by line — capture one compact identity fragment recording who they are (name/handle) and that they are an active participant here, even if they did not state a durable role or preference. A stated role/preference strengthens the fragment but is no longer required. A name appearing inside active back-and-forth can be a capture signal; a name merely mentioned in passing by someone else, especially an absent third party, is not. Keep one introduction to one compact fragment that bundles the person's core durable context (e.g. "Alex is an active participant in this project chat" or "Alex is the frontend lead for Project X and prefers GitHub issues over Slack for bug triage"), never a separate fragment per attribute. True single drive-by participants still do not earn memory. Third-party facts must come from the user/owner, or from that person describing their own role/preference in normal collaboration; do not persist one participant's reputational claims about another unless the user confirms or operationally relies on them.
|
|
119
119
|
- **Decisions with reasoning.** "We chose X over Y because Z" when future sessions must honor X.
|
|
120
120
|
- **Reproducible workarounds and debugging insights.** A config that worked, flag combination, procedure, root cause, or non-obvious fix.
|
|
121
|
+
- **Deterministic operational incidents are excluded.** A transcript tool result containing \`TYPECLAW_OPERATIONAL_INCIDENT\` and the immediately following user correction/workaround belong to TypeClaw's incident ledger. Skip the whole failure → response → correction sequence. Do not turn an environment repair into a belief or procedure, even when it recurs; the append tool mechanically rejects incident-owned anchors.
|
|
121
122
|
- **In-transcript changed minds.** Capture "actually, scratch that" only when the prior position is explicit. Do not compare against \`memory/topics/\`.
|
|
122
123
|
- **Corrections the user made to the agent.** Especially when the agent confidently asserted something false that future sessions may repeat. When the agent stated a factual claim and the user corrected it, capture the corrected fact as a distinct, evidence-anchored fragment EVEN IF it sounds like something memory may already know — you cannot inspect \`memory/topics/\`, so your job is to preserve this later correction occurrence so dreaming can reinforce and sharpen the stored belief (repeated corrections are how a contested fact gets stronger, not noise to skip). Anchor the body to the correction: what the agent said, what the user corrected it to. This is semantic and **language-independent** — recognize corrections in any language (Korean, Japanese, Chinese, Arabic, and every Latin-script language), not from English cue phrases.
|
|
123
124
|
- **Content the user explicitly taught, trained on, or asked the agent to remember.** Capture the substance taught, not merely that teaching happened. Treat these six intent families as representative, not exhaustive:
|
|
@@ -304,10 +305,12 @@ export function createMemoryLoggerSubagent(
|
|
|
304
305
|
// The handler runs one logger spawn at a time per agentDir (inFlightKey), so a
|
|
305
306
|
// single mutable cell safely carries this spawn's origin to the append tool.
|
|
306
307
|
let currentOrigin: SessionOrigin | undefined
|
|
308
|
+
let currentTranscriptPath: string | undefined
|
|
307
309
|
const appendTool = createAppendTool({
|
|
308
310
|
onFragmentsAppended: options.onFragmentsAppended,
|
|
309
311
|
originProvider: () => currentOrigin,
|
|
310
312
|
referenceSlugResolver: (agentDir) => listReferenceSlugs(agentDir),
|
|
313
|
+
transcriptPathProvider: () => currentTranscriptPath,
|
|
311
314
|
})
|
|
312
315
|
const storeReferenceTool = createStoreReferenceTool(options.onReferenceStored)
|
|
313
316
|
const customTools = [findEntryTool, appendTool, storeReferenceTool, advanceWatermarkTool]
|
|
@@ -340,6 +343,7 @@ export function createMemoryLoggerSubagent(
|
|
|
340
343
|
},
|
|
341
344
|
handler: async (ctx, runSession) => {
|
|
342
345
|
currentOrigin = ctx.payload.origin
|
|
346
|
+
currentTranscriptPath = ctx.payload.parentTranscriptPath
|
|
343
347
|
const today = formatLocalDate()
|
|
344
348
|
const memoryDir = streamsDir(ctx.payload.agentDir)
|
|
345
349
|
const streamFile = streamFilePath(ctx.payload.agentDir, today)
|
|
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ export const SECRET_RULES: readonly SecretRule[] = [
|
|
|
29
29
|
{ name: 'google-api-key', pattern: /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/ },
|
|
30
30
|
{ name: 'stripe-secret', pattern: /\bsk_live_[0-9A-Za-z]{24,}\b/ },
|
|
31
31
|
{ name: 'stripe-restricted', pattern: /\brk_live_[0-9A-Za-z]{24,}\b/ },
|
|
32
|
+
{ name: 'jwt', pattern: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\b/ },
|
|
32
33
|
{ name: 'rsa-private-key', pattern: /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |OPENSSH |EC |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/ },
|
|
33
34
|
]
|
|
34
35
|
|
|
@@ -47,3 +48,9 @@ export function detectSecrets(content: string): SecretMatch[] {
|
|
|
47
48
|
}
|
|
48
49
|
return matches
|
|
49
50
|
}
|
|
51
|
+
|
|
52
|
+
export function isSecretShapedToken(token: string): boolean {
|
|
53
|
+
if (detectSecrets(token).length > 0) return true
|
|
54
|
+
if (/^[A-Fa-f0-9]{48,}$/.test(token)) return true
|
|
55
|
+
return /^[A-Za-z0-9_+-]{48,}$/.test(token)
|
|
56
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -94,7 +94,9 @@ export async function hybridSearch(
|
|
|
94
94
|
})
|
|
95
95
|
return events.length === 0 ? [] : [{ ...day, events }]
|
|
96
96
|
})
|
|
97
|
-
const eligibleShards = shards.filter(
|
|
97
|
+
const eligibleShards = shards.filter(
|
|
98
|
+
(shard) => shard.frontmatter.kind !== 'environmental-incident' && provenanceIndex.topicEligible(shard.slug, scope),
|
|
99
|
+
)
|
|
98
100
|
const eligibleReferences = scoped ? [] : references
|
|
99
101
|
|
|
100
102
|
const { supersededFragmentIds } = buildParentLinks(shards)
|
|
@@ -72,7 +72,11 @@ export function findMissingPassages(store: VectorStore, passages: Passage[]): Pa
|
|
|
72
72
|
function buildPassages(shards: TopicShard[], streamDays: UndreamedStreamDay[]): Passage[] {
|
|
73
73
|
const { supersededFragmentIds } = buildParentLinks(shards)
|
|
74
74
|
return [
|
|
75
|
-
...shards.
|
|
75
|
+
...shards.flatMap((shard): Passage[] =>
|
|
76
|
+
shard.frontmatter.kind === 'environmental-incident'
|
|
77
|
+
? []
|
|
78
|
+
: [topicPassage(shard.slug, shard.frontmatter.heading, shard.body)],
|
|
79
|
+
),
|
|
76
80
|
...streamDays.flatMap((day) =>
|
|
77
81
|
day.events.flatMap((event): Passage[] => {
|
|
78
82
|
if (event.type === 'watermark') return []
|
|
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { definePlugin } from '@/plugin'
|
|
1
|
+
import { definePlugin, type PluginLogger } from '@/plugin'
|
|
2
2
|
import { resolveHiddenPaths } from '@/sandbox'
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
import { HIGH_TIER_PER_GUARD_PERMISSIONS, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS, SEVERITY_PERMISSION } from './permissions'
|
|
@@ -87,6 +87,15 @@ function withPermissionHint(
|
|
|
87
87
|
}
|
|
88
88
|
}
|
|
89
89
|
|
|
90
|
+
const INTERNAL_SECURITY_GUARD_REASON =
|
|
91
|
+
'The tool call was blocked because an internal security guard error prevented safe evaluation.'
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
function reportInternalGuardError(logger: PluginLogger, guard: string, error: unknown): void {
|
|
94
|
+
const detail = error instanceof Error ? (error.stack ?? error.message) : String(error)
|
|
95
|
+
const code = error instanceof Error && 'code' in error && typeof error.code === 'string' ? ` code=${error.code}` : ''
|
|
96
|
+
logger.error(`internal security guard error guard=${guard}${code}: ${detail}`)
|
|
97
|
+
}
|
|
98
|
+
|
|
90
99
|
export default definePlugin({
|
|
91
100
|
permissions: Object.values(SECURITY_PERMISSIONS),
|
|
92
101
|
// No wildcard exclusions: owner bypasses every security tier by default
|
|
@@ -102,148 +111,189 @@ export default definePlugin({
|
|
|
102
111
|
applyPromptInjectionDefense(event)
|
|
103
112
|
},
|
|
104
113
|
'tool.before': async (event) => {
|
|
105
|
-
|
|
106
|
-
|
|
107
|
-
|
|
108
|
-
|
|
109
|
-
|
|
110
|
-
|
|
111
|
-
|
|
112
|
-
|
|
113
|
-
|
|
114
|
-
|
|
115
|
-
|
|
116
|
-
|
|
117
|
-
|
|
118
|
-
|
|
119
|
-
|
|
120
|
-
|
|
121
|
-
|
|
122
|
-
|
|
123
|
-
|
|
124
|
-
|
|
125
|
-
|
|
114
|
+
try {
|
|
115
|
+
const can = (perm: string) => ctx.permissions.has(event.origin, perm)
|
|
116
|
+
const canBypass = (severity: SecuritySeverity, perGuardPerm: string): boolean =>
|
|
117
|
+
can(SEVERITY_PERMISSION[severity]) || can(perGuardPerm)
|
|
118
|
+
|
|
119
|
+
// The cron guard blocks deferred work that fires as a role granting
|
|
120
|
+
// permissions the caller lacks. Capability dominance — target's
|
|
121
|
+
// permission set must be a SUBSET of the caller's — not the coarse
|
|
122
|
+
// `compareRoleSeverity` tower: every configured custom role ranks
|
|
123
|
+
// equal there, so rank `>= 0` would let one custom role schedule as a
|
|
124
|
+
// different custom role (or `trusted` schedule as a custom role with
|
|
125
|
+
// an extra grant), laundering permissions the caller never had. Unknown
|
|
126
|
+
// caller/target role => undefined permissions => fail closed.
|
|
127
|
+
const callerRole = ctx.permissions.resolveRole(event.origin)
|
|
128
|
+
const canScheduleAs = (targetRole: string | undefined): boolean => {
|
|
129
|
+
if (targetRole === undefined) return false
|
|
130
|
+
const callerPermissions = ctx.permissions.permissionsForRole(callerRole)
|
|
131
|
+
const targetPermissions = ctx.permissions.permissionsForRole(targetRole)
|
|
132
|
+
if (callerPermissions === undefined || targetPermissions === undefined) return false
|
|
133
|
+
const callerSet = new Set(callerPermissions)
|
|
134
|
+
return targetPermissions.every((permission) => callerSet.has(permission))
|
|
135
|
+
}
|
|
136
|
+
|
|
137
|
+
const rolePromotionResult = canBypass(GUARD_ROLE_PROMOTION_SEVERITY, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassRolePromotion)
|
|
138
|
+
? undefined
|
|
139
|
+
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
140
|
+
await checkRolePromotionGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args, agentDir: ctx.agentDir }),
|
|
141
|
+
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassRolePromotion,
|
|
142
|
+
GUARD_ROLE_PROMOTION_SEVERITY,
|
|
143
|
+
)
|
|
144
|
+
if (rolePromotionResult) return rolePromotionResult
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
const cronPromotionResult = canBypass(GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION_SEVERITY, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassCronPromotion)
|
|
147
|
+
? undefined
|
|
148
|
+
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
149
|
+
await checkCronPromotionGuard({
|
|
150
|
+
tool: event.tool,
|
|
151
|
+
args: event.args,
|
|
152
|
+
agentDir: ctx.agentDir,
|
|
153
|
+
canScheduleAs,
|
|
154
|
+
}),
|
|
155
|
+
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassCronPromotion,
|
|
156
|
+
GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION_SEVERITY,
|
|
157
|
+
)
|
|
158
|
+
if (cronPromotionResult) return cronPromotionResult
|
|
159
|
+
|
|
160
|
+
const pluginAdditionResult = canBypass(
|
|
161
|
+
GUARD_PLUGIN_ADDITION_SEVERITY,
|
|
162
|
+
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassPluginAddition,
|
|
163
|
+
)
|
|
164
|
+
? undefined
|
|
165
|
+
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
166
|
+
await checkPluginAdditionGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args, agentDir: ctx.agentDir }),
|
|
167
|
+
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassPluginAddition,
|
|
168
|
+
GUARD_PLUGIN_ADDITION_SEVERITY,
|
|
169
|
+
)
|
|
170
|
+
if (pluginAdditionResult) return pluginAdditionResult
|
|
126
171
|
|
|
127
|
-
|
|
128
|
-
|
|
129
|
-
|
|
130
|
-
|
|
131
|
-
|
|
132
|
-
|
|
133
|
-
|
|
134
|
-
|
|
135
|
-
|
|
136
|
-
|
|
137
|
-
|
|
138
|
-
|
|
139
|
-
|
|
140
|
-
|
|
141
|
-
|
|
142
|
-
|
|
143
|
-
|
|
144
|
-
}),
|
|
145
|
-
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassCronPromotion,
|
|
146
|
-
GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION_SEVERITY,
|
|
147
|
-
)
|
|
148
|
-
if (cronPromotionResult) return cronPromotionResult
|
|
149
|
-
|
|
150
|
-
const pluginAdditionResult = canBypass(
|
|
151
|
-
GUARD_PLUGIN_ADDITION_SEVERITY,
|
|
152
|
-
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassPluginAddition,
|
|
153
|
-
)
|
|
154
|
-
? undefined
|
|
155
|
-
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
156
|
-
await checkPluginAdditionGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args, agentDir: ctx.agentDir }),
|
|
157
|
-
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassPluginAddition,
|
|
158
|
-
GUARD_PLUGIN_ADDITION_SEVERITY,
|
|
159
|
-
)
|
|
160
|
-
if (pluginAdditionResult) return pluginAdditionResult
|
|
161
|
-
|
|
162
|
-
// Taint-recording runs FIRST, independently of the gitExfil guard.
|
|
163
|
-
// The gitRemoteTainted defense depends on it. We pass through
|
|
164
|
-
// `permittedBypass` for actors who can skip gitExfil (via either the
|
|
165
|
-
// per-guard permission or the medium-tier permission) so the
|
|
166
|
-
// recorder still fires for them — an acked or permission-bypassed
|
|
167
|
-
// command will actually run, so its remote change must be remembered.
|
|
168
|
-
recordGitRemoteTaintIfAny({
|
|
169
|
-
tool: event.tool,
|
|
170
|
-
args: event.args,
|
|
171
|
-
sessionId: event.sessionId,
|
|
172
|
-
permittedBypass: canBypass(GUARD_GIT_EXFIL_SEVERITY, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassGitExfil),
|
|
173
|
-
})
|
|
174
|
-
|
|
175
|
-
const checks: (SecurityBlock | undefined)[] = [
|
|
176
|
-
canBypass(GUARD_GIT_REMOTE_TAINTED_SEVERITY, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassGitRemoteTainted)
|
|
172
|
+
// Taint-recording runs FIRST, independently of the gitExfil guard.
|
|
173
|
+
// The gitRemoteTainted defense depends on it. We pass through
|
|
174
|
+
// `permittedBypass` for actors who can skip gitExfil (via either the
|
|
175
|
+
// per-guard permission or the medium-tier permission) so the
|
|
176
|
+
// recorder still fires for them — an acked or permission-bypassed
|
|
177
|
+
// command will actually run, so its remote change must be remembered.
|
|
178
|
+
recordGitRemoteTaintIfAny({
|
|
179
|
+
tool: event.tool,
|
|
180
|
+
args: event.args,
|
|
181
|
+
sessionId: event.sessionId,
|
|
182
|
+
permittedBypass: canBypass(GUARD_GIT_EXFIL_SEVERITY, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassGitExfil),
|
|
183
|
+
})
|
|
184
|
+
|
|
185
|
+
const gitRemoteTaintedResult = canBypass(
|
|
186
|
+
GUARD_GIT_REMOTE_TAINTED_SEVERITY,
|
|
187
|
+
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassGitRemoteTainted,
|
|
188
|
+
)
|
|
177
189
|
? undefined
|
|
178
190
|
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
179
191
|
checkGitRemoteTaintedGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args, sessionId: event.sessionId }),
|
|
180
192
|
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassGitRemoteTainted,
|
|
181
193
|
GUARD_GIT_REMOTE_TAINTED_SEVERITY,
|
|
182
|
-
)
|
|
183
|
-
|
|
194
|
+
)
|
|
195
|
+
if (gitRemoteTaintedResult) return gitRemoteTaintedResult
|
|
196
|
+
|
|
197
|
+
const secretExfilBashResult = canBypass(
|
|
198
|
+
GUARD_SECRET_EXFIL_BASH_SEVERITY,
|
|
199
|
+
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSecretExfilBash,
|
|
200
|
+
)
|
|
184
201
|
? undefined
|
|
185
202
|
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
186
203
|
checkSecretExfilBashGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args }),
|
|
187
204
|
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSecretExfilBash,
|
|
188
205
|
GUARD_SECRET_EXFIL_BASH_SEVERITY,
|
|
189
|
-
)
|
|
190
|
-
|
|
206
|
+
)
|
|
207
|
+
if (secretExfilBashResult) return secretExfilBashResult
|
|
208
|
+
|
|
209
|
+
const gitExfilResult = canBypass(GUARD_GIT_EXFIL_SEVERITY, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassGitExfil)
|
|
191
210
|
? undefined
|
|
192
211
|
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
193
212
|
checkGitExfilGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args, sessionId: event.sessionId }),
|
|
194
213
|
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassGitExfil,
|
|
195
214
|
GUARD_GIT_EXFIL_SEVERITY,
|
|
196
|
-
)
|
|
197
|
-
|
|
215
|
+
)
|
|
216
|
+
if (gitExfilResult) return gitExfilResult
|
|
217
|
+
|
|
218
|
+
const secretExfilReadResult = canBypass(
|
|
219
|
+
GUARD_SECRET_EXFIL_READ_SEVERITY,
|
|
220
|
+
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSecretExfilRead,
|
|
221
|
+
)
|
|
198
222
|
? undefined
|
|
199
223
|
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
200
224
|
checkSecretExfilReadGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args }),
|
|
201
225
|
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSecretExfilRead,
|
|
202
226
|
GUARD_SECRET_EXFIL_READ_SEVERITY,
|
|
203
|
-
)
|
|
227
|
+
)
|
|
228
|
+
if (secretExfilReadResult) return secretExfilReadResult
|
|
229
|
+
|
|
204
230
|
// Not severity-bypassed: private directories remain role-derived,
|
|
205
231
|
// while canonical credential-store denial is unconditional. Mirrors
|
|
206
232
|
// the bash masks onto every non-bash path-bearing tool.
|
|
207
|
-
checkPrivateSurfaceReadGuard(
|
|
208
|
-
|
|
209
|
-
|
|
210
|
-
|
|
211
|
-
|
|
212
|
-
|
|
213
|
-
|
|
214
|
-
|
|
233
|
+
const privateSurfaceReadResult = checkPrivateSurfaceReadGuard(
|
|
234
|
+
{
|
|
235
|
+
tool: event.tool,
|
|
236
|
+
args: event.args,
|
|
237
|
+
agentDir: ctx.agentDir,
|
|
238
|
+
hidden: resolveHiddenPaths(ctx.permissions, event.origin, ctx.agentDir),
|
|
239
|
+
...(event.fileOperands !== undefined ? { fileOperands: event.fileOperands } : {}),
|
|
240
|
+
},
|
|
241
|
+
{
|
|
242
|
+
onInternalError: (error) => reportInternalGuardError(ctx.logger, 'privateSurfaceRead', error),
|
|
243
|
+
},
|
|
244
|
+
)
|
|
245
|
+
if (privateSurfaceReadResult) return privateSurfaceReadResult
|
|
246
|
+
|
|
247
|
+
const ssrfResult = canBypass(GUARD_SSRF_SEVERITY, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSsrf)
|
|
215
248
|
? undefined
|
|
216
249
|
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
217
250
|
checkSsrfGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args }),
|
|
218
251
|
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSsrf,
|
|
219
252
|
GUARD_SSRF_SEVERITY,
|
|
220
|
-
)
|
|
221
|
-
|
|
253
|
+
)
|
|
254
|
+
if (ssrfResult) return ssrfResult
|
|
255
|
+
|
|
256
|
+
const sessionSearchSecretsResult = canBypass(
|
|
257
|
+
GUARD_SESSION_SEARCH_SECRETS_SEVERITY,
|
|
258
|
+
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSessionSearchSecrets,
|
|
259
|
+
)
|
|
222
260
|
? undefined
|
|
223
261
|
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
224
262
|
checkSessionSearchSecretsGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args }),
|
|
225
263
|
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSessionSearchSecrets,
|
|
226
264
|
GUARD_SESSION_SEARCH_SECRETS_SEVERITY,
|
|
227
|
-
)
|
|
228
|
-
|
|
265
|
+
)
|
|
266
|
+
if (sessionSearchSecretsResult) return sessionSearchSecretsResult
|
|
267
|
+
|
|
268
|
+
const systemPromptLeakResult = canBypass(
|
|
269
|
+
GUARD_SYSTEM_PROMPT_LEAK_SEVERITY,
|
|
270
|
+
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSystemPromptLeak,
|
|
271
|
+
)
|
|
229
272
|
? undefined
|
|
230
273
|
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
231
274
|
checkSystemPromptLeakGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args }),
|
|
232
275
|
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSystemPromptLeak,
|
|
233
276
|
GUARD_SYSTEM_PROMPT_LEAK_SEVERITY,
|
|
234
|
-
)
|
|
235
|
-
|
|
277
|
+
)
|
|
278
|
+
if (systemPromptLeakResult) return systemPromptLeakResult
|
|
279
|
+
|
|
280
|
+
const outboundSecretResult = canBypass(
|
|
281
|
+
GUARD_OUTBOUND_SECRET_SEVERITY,
|
|
282
|
+
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassOutboundSecret,
|
|
283
|
+
)
|
|
236
284
|
? undefined
|
|
237
285
|
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
238
286
|
checkOutboundSecretGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args }),
|
|
239
287
|
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassOutboundSecret,
|
|
240
288
|
GUARD_OUTBOUND_SECRET_SEVERITY,
|
|
241
|
-
)
|
|
242
|
-
|
|
243
|
-
|
|
244
|
-
|
|
289
|
+
)
|
|
290
|
+
if (outboundSecretResult) return outboundSecretResult
|
|
291
|
+
|
|
292
|
+
return undefined
|
|
293
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
294
|
+
reportInternalGuardError(ctx.logger, 'tool.before', error)
|
|
295
|
+
return { block: true, reason: INTERNAL_SECURITY_GUARD_REASON }
|
|
245
296
|
}
|
|
246
|
-
return undefined
|
|
247
297
|
},
|
|
248
298
|
'session.end': async (event) => {
|
|
249
299
|
clearSessionTaints(event.sessionId)
|