typeclaw 0.46.1 → 0.47.0

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Files changed (57) hide show
  1. package/README.md +2 -1
  2. package/package.json +2 -2
  3. package/src/agent/tool-file-safety.ts +18 -9
  4. package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/strategies/jq.ts +1 -2
  5. package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/strategies/readability.ts +39 -16
  6. package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/strategies/selector.ts +4 -2
  7. package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/strategies/snapshot.ts +3 -2
  8. package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/tool.ts +3 -3
  9. package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/index.ts +21 -4
  10. package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/runner.ts +19 -5
  11. package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/dreaming.ts +2 -1
  12. package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/load-shards.ts +31 -3
  13. package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/memory-logger.ts +2 -1
  14. package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/memory-snapshot.ts +8 -0
  15. package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/embedder.ts +28 -9
  16. package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/hybrid.ts +10 -2
  17. package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/store.ts +21 -9
  18. package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/git-exfil.ts +45 -27
  19. package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/outbound-secret-scan.ts +8 -3
  20. package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/private-surface-read.ts +6 -0
  21. package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot-classify.ts +29 -0
  22. package/src/channels/router.ts +98 -0
  23. package/src/channels/types.ts +7 -0
  24. package/src/cli/command-meta.ts +2 -0
  25. package/src/cli/compose-stats.ts +103 -0
  26. package/src/cli/compose.ts +13 -0
  27. package/src/cli/index.ts +1 -0
  28. package/src/cli/inspect.ts +16 -0
  29. package/src/cli/stats.ts +134 -0
  30. package/src/compose/index.ts +1 -0
  31. package/src/compose/stats.ts +51 -0
  32. package/src/config/config.ts +14 -0
  33. package/src/config/index.ts +4 -0
  34. package/src/container/controller.ts +6 -0
  35. package/src/container/index.ts +1 -0
  36. package/src/container/log-archive.ts +448 -0
  37. package/src/container/shared.ts +49 -19
  38. package/src/container/start.ts +78 -63
  39. package/src/container/stats.ts +86 -0
  40. package/src/container/stop.ts +63 -36
  41. package/src/init/checkpoint.ts +4 -4
  42. package/src/init/dockerfile.ts +87 -88
  43. package/src/init/gitignore.ts +5 -6
  44. package/src/init/restart-deps-preflight.ts +2 -2
  45. package/src/init/run-bun-install.ts +16 -2
  46. package/src/init/validate-api-key.ts +1 -0
  47. package/src/inspect/item-list.ts +12 -6
  48. package/src/permissions/permissions.ts +93 -2
  49. package/src/role-claim/code.ts +9 -5
  50. package/src/run/index.ts +50 -36
  51. package/src/run/resource-report.ts +226 -0
  52. package/src/sandbox/canonical-secrets.ts +7 -0
  53. package/src/sandbox/index.ts +1 -0
  54. package/src/sandbox/symlinks.ts +1 -1
  55. package/src/secrets/export-claude-credentials-file.ts +13 -22
  56. package/src/secrets/export-codex-auth-file.ts +12 -28
  57. package/typeclaw.schema.json +14 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
1
+ import { readFileSync, statfsSync } from 'node:fs'
2
+ import { totalmem } from 'node:os'
3
+
4
+ import { formatMemorySnapshot } from '@/bundled-plugins/memory/memory-snapshot'
5
+
6
+ // The container's memory/cpu ceiling is fixed at `docker run` and never changes
7
+ // while the process lives, so this reports once at boot. It is the missing half
8
+ // of an OOM post-mortem: the per-operation RSS lines show usage climbing, but
9
+ // only this line names the ceiling it climbed toward. Read from INSIDE the
10
+ // container (cgroup + statfs) because the container stage cannot call the host's
11
+ // `docker inspect`.
12
+ //
13
+ // Every read is a tri-state: `finite` (a real limit), `unlimited` (a genuine
14
+ // no-limit sentinel — v2 `max`, v1 `-1`/`LONG_MAX`), or `unknown` (missing,
15
+ // unreadable, or malformed). The distinction is load-bearing: collapsing
16
+ // `unknown` into `unlimited` would turn an unsupported cgroup layout or a read
17
+ // error into a false "no ceiling" claim, which is exactly the wrong signal in an
18
+ // OOM investigation. `unknown` renders as `?`.
19
+
20
+ export type Limit = { kind: 'finite'; value: number } | { kind: 'unlimited' } | { kind: 'unknown' }
21
+
22
+ // v1 writes "unlimited" as LONG_MAX rounded DOWN to a page boundary, so the
23
+ // exact value is page-size dependent: 4 KiB pages → 9223372036854771712,
24
+ // 64 KiB pages → 9223372036854710272. Hard-coding the 4 KiB value would let the
25
+ // 64 KiB sentinel slip through as a ~8 EiB finite limit. Instead treat the whole
26
+ // near-LONG_MAX family as unlimited: any value within one max-page (64 KiB) of
27
+ // LONG_MAX. Real container limits are astronomically smaller, so the band is safe.
28
+ const LONG_MAX = 9223372036854775807n
29
+ const MAX_PAGE_SIZE = 65536n
30
+ const CGROUP_V1_UNLIMITED_FLOOR = LONG_MAX - MAX_PAGE_SIZE
31
+
32
+ export function parseCgroupMemory(raw: string | null): Limit {
33
+ if (raw === null) return { kind: 'unknown' }
34
+ const trimmed = raw.trim()
35
+ if (trimmed === 'max') return { kind: 'unlimited' }
36
+ if (trimmed === '') return { kind: 'unknown' }
37
+ let value: bigint
38
+ try {
39
+ value = BigInt(trimmed)
40
+ } catch {
41
+ return { kind: 'unknown' }
42
+ }
43
+ if (value >= CGROUP_V1_UNLIMITED_FLOOR) return { kind: 'unlimited' }
44
+ if (value <= 0n) return { kind: 'unknown' }
45
+ return { kind: 'finite', value: Number(value) }
46
+ }
47
+
48
+ export function parseCpuMax(raw: string | null): Limit {
49
+ if (raw === null) return { kind: 'unknown' }
50
+ const parts = raw.trim().split(/\s+/)
51
+ // Shape first: exactly two fields with a finite, positive period. A malformed
52
+ // record (`max garbage`, `max 100000 extra`, empty) is `unknown`, never
53
+ // `unlimited` — an unreadable ceiling must not masquerade as "no ceiling".
54
+ if (parts.length !== 2) return { kind: 'unknown' }
55
+ const [quota, period] = parts
56
+ if (quota === undefined || period === undefined) return { kind: 'unknown' }
57
+ const periodN = Number(period)
58
+ if (!Number.isFinite(periodN) || periodN <= 0) return { kind: 'unknown' }
59
+ // Only genuine no-limit sentinels are unlimited: v2 `max`, v1 `-1`.
60
+ if (quota === 'max') return { kind: 'unlimited' }
61
+ const quotaN = Number(quota)
62
+ if (quotaN === -1) return { kind: 'unlimited' }
63
+ if (!Number.isFinite(quotaN) || quotaN <= 0) return { kind: 'unknown' }
64
+ return { kind: 'finite', value: quotaN / periodN }
65
+ }
66
+
67
+ const BYTES_PER_MB = 1024 * 1024
68
+
69
+ function renderLimit(limit: Limit, label: string, render: (value: number) => string): string {
70
+ if (limit.kind === 'unknown') return `${label}=?`
71
+ if (limit.kind === 'unlimited') return `${label}=unlimited`
72
+ return `${label}=${render(limit.value)}`
73
+ }
74
+
75
+ export function formatCgroupMemory(limit: Limit): string {
76
+ return renderLimit(limit, 'mem_limit_mb', (v) => String(Math.round(v / BYTES_PER_MB)))
77
+ }
78
+
79
+ export function formatCpuMax(limit: Limit): string {
80
+ return renderLimit(limit, 'cpu_quota', (v) => String(v))
81
+ }
82
+
83
+ // The controller's cgroup membership for THIS process, parsed from
84
+ // /proc/self/cgroup. A container is not at the v1 hierarchy root: Docker places
85
+ // it under `/docker/<id>` (cgroupfs) or `/system.slice/docker-<id>.scope`
86
+ // (systemd), so reading the root file would report the HOST limit (usually
87
+ // unlimited) instead of the container's.
88
+ //
89
+ // `mount` is the controller FIELD verbatim (e.g. `cpu,cpuacct`) — the directory
90
+ // name the controller is actually mounted under in /sys/fs/cgroup, which for a
91
+ // combined controller is NOT the bare controller name. `subPath` is the
92
+ // per-process path within that hierarchy. The requested controller is matched as
93
+ // one comma-separated entry, not whole-field equality. Returns null when the
94
+ // controller is absent (e.g. a pure cgroup-v2 host, whose /proc/self/cgroup has
95
+ // a single `0::` line).
96
+ export type CgroupV1Membership = { mount: string; subPath: string }
97
+
98
+ export function resolveCgroupV1Path(procSelfCgroup: string | null, controller: string): CgroupV1Membership | null {
99
+ if (procSelfCgroup === null) return null
100
+ for (const line of procSelfCgroup.split('\n')) {
101
+ if (line === '') continue
102
+ const firstColon = line.indexOf(':')
103
+ const secondColon = line.indexOf(':', firstColon + 1)
104
+ if (firstColon === -1 || secondColon === -1) continue
105
+ const field = line.slice(firstColon + 1, secondColon)
106
+ if (field.split(',').includes(controller)) return { mount: field, subPath: line.slice(secondColon + 1) }
107
+ }
108
+ return null
109
+ }
110
+
111
+ // The absolute path to a v1 controller file for THIS process, resolved through
112
+ // BOTH /proc/self/cgroup (membership) and /proc/self/mountinfo (the actual
113
+ // mountpoint + mount root). The membership path from /proc/self/cgroup is
114
+ // relative to the cgroup HIERARCHY root, which is NOT necessarily the mountpoint:
115
+ // a container commonly has its subtree bind-mounted so hierarchy root
116
+ // `/docker/<id>` appears AT `/sys/fs/cgroup/memory`. Appending the full
117
+ // membership path onto the mountpoint (the previous approach) then reads a
118
+ // non-existent `/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/docker/<id>/...` and reports `?`.
119
+ //
120
+ // mountinfo gives, per mount: field[3]=root, field[4]=mountpoint, and after the
121
+ // ` - ` separator, fstype=`cgroup` with the controller in its super-options. The
122
+ // file lives at `mountpoint + (membershipPath relative to mount root)`.
123
+ export function resolveCgroupV1File(
124
+ procSelfCgroup: string | null,
125
+ mountinfo: string | null,
126
+ controller: string,
127
+ file: string,
128
+ ): string | null {
129
+ const membership = resolveCgroupV1Path(procSelfCgroup, controller)
130
+ if (membership === null || mountinfo === null) return null
131
+
132
+ for (const line of mountinfo.split('\n')) {
133
+ if (line === '') continue
134
+ const sep = line.indexOf(' - ')
135
+ if (sep === -1) continue
136
+ const pre = line.slice(0, sep).split(/\s+/)
137
+ const post = line.slice(sep + 3).split(/\s+/)
138
+ const [fstype, , superOptions] = post
139
+ if (fstype !== 'cgroup') continue
140
+ if (superOptions === undefined || !superOptions.split(',').includes(controller)) continue
141
+ const mountRoot = pre[3]
142
+ const mountPoint = pre[4]
143
+ if (mountRoot === undefined || mountPoint === undefined) continue
144
+ const rel = relativeToMountRoot(membership.subPath, mountRoot)
145
+ if (rel === null) continue
146
+ return joinCgroupPath(joinCgroupPath(mountPoint, rel), file)
147
+ }
148
+ return null
149
+ }
150
+
151
+ // The membership sub-path expressed relative to the mount's root. When the mount
152
+ // root IS the membership path (subtree mount), the file sits directly at the
153
+ // mountpoint (rel = ''). When root is `/` (whole-hierarchy mount), rel is the
154
+ // full sub-path. A membership outside the mount root is unreachable → null.
155
+ function relativeToMountRoot(subPath: string, mountRoot: string): string | null {
156
+ if (mountRoot === '/') return subPath === '/' ? '' : subPath
157
+ if (subPath === mountRoot) return ''
158
+ if (subPath.startsWith(`${mountRoot}/`)) return subPath.slice(mountRoot.length)
159
+ return null
160
+ }
161
+
162
+ function joinCgroupPath(base: string, segment: string): string {
163
+ if (segment === '' || segment === '/') return base
164
+ return `${base.replace(/\/$/, '')}/${segment.replace(/^\//, '')}`
165
+ }
166
+
167
+ function readOrNull(path: string): string | null {
168
+ try {
169
+ return readFileSync(path, 'utf-8')
170
+ } catch {
171
+ return null
172
+ }
173
+ }
174
+
175
+ function readV1ControllerFile(controller: string, file: string): string | null {
176
+ const path = resolveCgroupV1File(
177
+ readOrNull('/proc/self/cgroup'),
178
+ readOrNull('/proc/self/mountinfo'),
179
+ controller,
180
+ file,
181
+ )
182
+ return path === null ? null : readOrNull(path)
183
+ }
184
+
185
+ function readCgroupMemoryLimit(): Limit {
186
+ const v2 = readOrNull('/sys/fs/cgroup/memory.max')
187
+ if (v2 !== null) return parseCgroupMemory(v2)
188
+ return parseCgroupMemory(readV1ControllerFile('memory', 'memory.limit_in_bytes'))
189
+ }
190
+
191
+ function readCgroupCpuQuota(): Limit {
192
+ const v2 = readOrNull('/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu.max')
193
+ if (v2 !== null) return parseCpuMax(v2)
194
+ const quota = readV1ControllerFile('cpu', 'cpu.cfs_quota_us')
195
+ const period = readV1ControllerFile('cpu', 'cpu.cfs_period_us')
196
+ if (quota === null || period === null) return { kind: 'unknown' }
197
+ return parseCpuMax(`${quota.trim()} ${period.trim()}`)
198
+ }
199
+
200
+ function formatStorage(path: string): string {
201
+ try {
202
+ const fs = statfsSync(path)
203
+ const totalMb = Math.round((fs.blocks * fs.bsize) / BYTES_PER_MB)
204
+ const freeMb = Math.round((fs.bavail * fs.bsize) / BYTES_PER_MB)
205
+ return `disk_total_mb=${totalMb} disk_free_mb=${freeMb}`
206
+ } catch {
207
+ return 'disk_total_mb=? disk_free_mb=?'
208
+ }
209
+ }
210
+
211
+ export function logResourceReport(agentDir = '/agent'): void {
212
+ try {
213
+ const memLimit = formatCgroupMemory(readCgroupMemoryLimit())
214
+ const cpuQuota = formatCpuMax(readCgroupCpuQuota())
215
+ // The host/VM total is the OOM ceiling when no cgroup --memory is set (the
216
+ // default `docker run`): the kernel can still kill the process at host RAM
217
+ // exhaustion even with mem_limit=unlimited, so this gives the RSS lines a
218
+ // real comparison point instead of only an "unlimited" that isn't.
219
+ const hostMem = `host_total_mb=${Math.round(totalmem() / BYTES_PER_MB)}`
220
+ const cores = `cpus_visible=${globalThis.navigator?.hardwareConcurrency ?? '?'}`
221
+ const storage = formatStorage(agentDir)
222
+ console.info(`[resource-report] ${memLimit} ${hostMem} ${cpuQuota} ${cores} ${storage} ${formatMemorySnapshot()}`)
223
+ } catch (err) {
224
+ console.warn(`[resource-report] failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`)
225
+ }
226
+ }
@@ -2,10 +2,17 @@ export const CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_DIRS = [
2
2
  'workspace/.config/gws',
3
3
  'workspace/.agent-messenger',
4
4
  '.typeclaw/home',
5
+ '.typeclaw/logs',
5
6
  ] as const
6
7
 
7
8
  export const CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_FILES = ['.env', 'secrets.json', 'auth.json'] as const
8
9
 
10
+ // Trusted runtime processes use this ephemeral container HOME. bwrap builds an
11
+ // empty root and never binds /home, so model bash cannot see it; non-bash tools
12
+ // run in-process and use this fixed path as an unconditional denial root in
13
+ // addition to os.homedir() (which resolves here in the container).
14
+ export const CONTAINER_RUNTIME_HOME = '/home/agent'
15
+
9
16
  export const CANONICAL_HOME_SECRET_DIRS = [
10
17
  '.ssh',
11
18
  '.config/gh',
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ export {
4
4
  CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_FILES,
5
5
  CANONICAL_HOME_SECRET_DIRS,
6
6
  CANONICAL_HOME_SECRET_FILES,
7
+ CONTAINER_RUNTIME_HOME,
7
8
  } from './canonical-secrets'
8
9
  export {
9
10
  buildProcBindProbeScript,
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export type SandboxSymlinkSpec = {
12
12
  // Resolves config `sandbox.symlinks` into the in-jail `--symlink` ops the bwrap
13
13
  // builder consumes. `from` is the symlink LOCATION: a `~/`-prefixed `from` is
14
14
  // expanded against the SANDBOX HOME (`/tmp`, where the per-session tmp dir is
15
- // bound), NOT the container's real `/root` — inside the jail a CLI reading
15
+ // bound), NOT the trusted runtime's `/home/agent` — inside the jail a CLI reading
16
16
  // `$HOME/.foo` looks under `/tmp`, so the symlink must live there. An absolute
17
17
  // `from` is used verbatim. `to` is resolved to the absolute /agent path the
18
18
  // symlink points at. Container paths are always POSIX, so this uses posix path
@@ -43,11 +43,9 @@ export type ExportClaudeCredentialsFileOptions = {
43
43
 
44
44
  // Writes typeclaw's anthropic OAuth credential to
45
45
  // $CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.credentials.json (or $HOME/.claude/.credentials.json
46
- // by default) when it's safe to do so. The Dockerfile entrypoint shim
47
- // symlinks the same resolved credentials path to
48
- // /agent/.typeclaw/home/.claude/.credentials.json on every boot, so the
49
- // write follows the symlink and lands on the persistent host-side path —
50
- // same contract as exportCodexAuthFile.
46
+ // by default) when it's safe to do so. Container HOME is /home/agent and
47
+ // ephemeral; this boot-time export reconstructs the CLI file from secrets.json
48
+ // after provider OAuth refresh has updated the canonical credential.
51
49
  //
52
50
  // Three guards, cheapest first. The first two return without ever touching
53
51
  // the filesystem, which keeps the 90% case (users who don't enable
@@ -192,16 +190,11 @@ function resolveClaudeConfigDir(configDir: string | undefined): string | null {
192
190
  // rename is belt-and-suspenders: writeFileSync's `mode` is applied at
193
191
  // create time, but umask can mask it down on some filesystems.
194
192
  //
195
- // Symlink preservation: the entrypoint shim will install
196
- // $HOME/.claude/.credentials.json as a symlink to
197
- // /agent/.typeclaw/home/.claude/.credentials.json. POSIX rename(2)
198
- // replaces the directory entry at the destination atomically and does
199
- // NOT follow symlinks, so a naive renameSync against the symlink path
200
- // would replace the symlink with a regular file, leaving the persistent
201
- // path empty and Claude Code's in-place token refresh silently lost on
202
- // every restart. Resolve the symlink target with readlinkSync and rename
203
- // against the real path so the symlink itself is preserved. The temp
204
- // file MUST live alongside the real target (same filesystem) because
193
+ // Symlink preservation remains a safety property even though TypeClaw no longer
194
+ // plants one here. An operator or external tool may preconfigure the credentials
195
+ // path as a symlink; POSIX rename(2) replaces that directory entry instead of
196
+ // following it. Resolve the target and rename there so the caller's symlink
197
+ // survives. The temp file MUST live alongside the real target because
205
198
  // renameSync across filesystems fails with EXDEV.
206
199
  function writeAtomic(targetPath: string, contents: string): void {
207
200
  const realTarget = resolveSymlinkTarget(targetPath)
@@ -227,13 +220,11 @@ function writeAtomic(targetPath: string, contents: string): void {
227
220
  }
228
221
  }
229
222
 
230
- // Returns the absolute path renameSync should target. When `path` is a
231
- // symlink (production: $HOME/.claude/.credentials.json -> /agent/...),
232
- // returns the resolved absolute target so we write through the link
233
- // instead of replacing it. Otherwise (tests, or first boot before the
234
- // shim installs the symlink), returns the path unchanged. readlinkSync
235
- // throws EINVAL when the path exists but isn't a symlink and ENOENT
236
- // when nothing is there — both cases fall through to the original path.
223
+ // Returns the absolute path renameSync should target. When `path` is a symlink,
224
+ // returns the resolved absolute target so we write through the link instead of
225
+ // replacing it. Otherwise returns the path unchanged. readlinkSync throws EINVAL
226
+ // when the path exists but isn't a symlink and ENOENT when nothing is there —
227
+ // both cases fall through to the original path.
237
228
  function resolveSymlinkTarget(path: string): string {
238
229
  let link: string
239
230
  try {
@@ -38,12 +38,9 @@ export type ExportCodexAuthFileOptions = {
38
38
  }
39
39
 
40
40
  // Writes typeclaw's openai-codex OAuth credential to $HOME/.codex/auth.json
41
- // when it's safe to do so. The Dockerfile entrypoint shim symlinks
42
- // $HOME/.codex/auth.json to /agent/.typeclaw/home/.codex/auth.json on every
43
- // boot, so the write follows the symlink and lands on the persistent
44
- // host-side path — that's the stable contract from src/init/dockerfile.ts
45
- // "link_persistent_home_files" and we MUST use it instead of writing to
46
- // /agent/.typeclaw/home/ directly.
41
+ // when it's safe to do so. Container HOME is /home/agent and ephemeral; this
42
+ // boot-time export reconstructs the CLI file from secrets.json after provider
43
+ // OAuth refresh has had a chance to update the canonical credential.
47
44
  //
48
45
  // Three guards, cheapest first. The first two return without ever touching
49
46
  // the filesystem, which keeps the 90% case (users who don't enable Codex
@@ -170,22 +167,12 @@ function readCredentialExpiry(credential: { expires?: unknown; access?: unknown
170
167
  // belt-and-suspenders: writeFileSync's `mode` is applied at create time,
171
168
  // but umask can mask it down on some filesystems.
172
169
  //
173
- // Symlink preservation: the entrypoint shim
174
- // (src/init/dockerfile.ts link_persistent_home_files) installs
175
- // $HOME/.codex/auth.json as a symlink to
176
- // /agent/.typeclaw/home/.codex/auth.json on every boot. POSIX rename(2)
177
- // replaces the directory entry at the destination atomically — it does
178
- // NOT follow symlinks — so a naive `renameSync(tmp, $HOME/.codex/auth.json)`
179
- // would replace the symlink with a regular file, leaving the persistent
180
- // path empty. Next boot the shim recreates the symlink (force-removing
181
- // our file), the persistent path is still empty, and Codex's in-place
182
- // token refresh is silently lost on every restart.
183
- //
184
- // Fix: resolve the symlink target with readlinkSync and rename against
185
- // the real path so the symlink itself is preserved. The temp file MUST
186
- // live alongside the real target (same filesystem) because renameSync
187
- // across filesystems fails with EXDEV — $HOME is the container's
188
- // overlayfs, but the symlink target is a bind-mounted host path.
170
+ // Symlink preservation is still a safety property even though TypeClaw no
171
+ // longer plants one here. An operator or external tool may preconfigure
172
+ // $HOME/.codex/auth.json as a symlink; POSIX rename(2) replaces that directory
173
+ // entry instead of following it. Resolve the target and rename there so the
174
+ // caller's symlink survives. The temp file MUST live alongside the real target
175
+ // because renameSync across filesystems fails with EXDEV.
189
176
  function writeAtomic(targetPath: string, contents: string): void {
190
177
  const realTarget = resolveSymlinkTarget(targetPath)
191
178
  const dir = dirname(realTarget)
@@ -213,12 +200,9 @@ function writeAtomic(targetPath: string, contents: string): void {
213
200
  }
214
201
  }
215
202
 
216
- // Returns the absolute path renameSync should target. When `path` is a
217
- // symlink (production: $HOME/.codex/auth.json -> /agent/.typeclaw/home/...),
218
- // returns the resolved absolute target so we write through the link
219
- // instead of replacing it. Otherwise (tests, or first boot before the
220
- // shim installs the symlink — though the shim runs before the agent in
221
- // production), returns the path unchanged.
203
+ // Returns the absolute path renameSync should target. When `path` is a symlink,
204
+ // returns the resolved absolute target so we write through the link instead of
205
+ // replacing it. Otherwise returns the path unchanged.
222
206
  //
223
207
  // readlinkSync throws EINVAL when the path exists but isn't a symlink,
224
208
  // and ENOENT when nothing is there. Either case → write to the original
@@ -2734,6 +2734,20 @@
2734
2734
  }
2735
2735
  }
2736
2736
  },
2737
+ "logs": {
2738
+ "default": {
2739
+ "retentionDays": 14
2740
+ },
2741
+ "type": "object",
2742
+ "properties": {
2743
+ "retentionDays": {
2744
+ "default": 14,
2745
+ "type": "integer",
2746
+ "minimum": 1,
2747
+ "maximum": 3650
2748
+ }
2749
+ }
2750
+ },
2737
2751
  "roles": {
2738
2752
  "type": "object",
2739
2753
  "propertyNames": {