typeclaw 0.46.0 → 0.46.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +1 -1
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/src/agent/multimodal/looker.ts +11 -1
- package/src/agent/network/safe-http.ts +17 -8
- package/src/agent/plugin-tools.ts +1 -3
- package/src/agent/tool-file-safety.ts +414 -145
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/fetch.ts +22 -2
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/strategies/jq.ts +1 -2
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/strategies/readability.ts +39 -16
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/strategies/selector.ts +4 -2
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/strategies/snapshot.ts +3 -2
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/tool.ts +3 -3
- package/src/agent/tools-without-local-file-operands.ts +9 -6
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/README.md +23 -10
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/git-auth.ts +6 -4
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/index.ts +104 -47
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/runner.ts +102 -5
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/git-askpass.ts +74 -26
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/git-command.ts +224 -36
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/graphql-auth-nudge.ts +9 -9
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/index.ts +110 -31
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/token-class.ts +4 -6
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/README.md +9 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/embed-threads.ts +36 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/embedder.ts +19 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/hybrid.ts +10 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/store.ts +21 -9
- package/src/bundled-plugins/researcher/write-report.ts +3 -3
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/outbound-secret-scan.ts +8 -3
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/private-surface-read.ts +616 -50
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/ssrf.ts +119 -34
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/inbound.ts +11 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/index.ts +48 -54
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reconcile-cooldown-store.ts +178 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reconcile-open-prs.ts +31 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot-edit.ts +85 -20
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot.ts +7 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-format.ts +245 -0
- package/src/channels/github-token-bridge.ts +2 -3
- package/src/cli/inspect.ts +16 -0
- package/src/container/docker-app.ts +42 -13
- package/src/container/shared.ts +19 -6
- package/src/container/start.ts +13 -0
- package/src/cron/bridge.ts +9 -2
- package/src/doctor/checks.ts +5 -2
- package/src/git/bound-gc-config.ts +82 -0
- package/src/hostd/spawn.ts +133 -47
- package/src/init/checkpoint.ts +4 -4
- package/src/init/dockerfile.ts +100 -88
- package/src/init/gitignore.ts +5 -6
- package/src/init/run-bun-install.ts +16 -2
- package/src/init/validate-api-key.ts +1 -0
- package/src/inspect/item-list.ts +12 -6
- package/src/inspect/replay.ts +21 -9
- package/src/inspect/session-list.ts +71 -33
- package/src/mcp/tools.ts +1 -0
- package/src/network/internal-destinations.ts +267 -0
- package/src/permissions/permissions.ts +93 -2
- package/src/plugin/types.ts +3 -2
- package/src/role-claim/code.ts +9 -5
- package/src/run/index.ts +45 -36
- package/src/sandbox/canonical-secrets.ts +6 -0
- package/src/sandbox/env-exposure.ts +18 -15
- package/src/sandbox/index.ts +1 -0
- package/src/sandbox/policy.ts +5 -3
- package/src/sandbox/privileged-runtime.ts +1 -0
- package/src/sandbox/symlinks.ts +1 -1
- package/src/secrets/export-claude-credentials-file.ts +13 -22
- package/src/secrets/export-codex-auth-file.ts +12 -28
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-config/SKILL.md +22 -6
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-permissions/SKILL.md +22 -9
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-plugins/SKILL.md +37 -0
- package/src/usage/scan.ts +11 -2
- package/typeclaw.schema.json +5 -0
- package/src/git/secret-history.ts +0 -371
package/src/init/dockerfile.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { ASKPASS_SCRIPT, TYPECLAW_GIT_ASKPASS_PATH } from '@/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/git-askpass'
|
|
1
2
|
import { validateDockerfileAppendLine } from '@/config/config'
|
|
2
3
|
import type { DockerfileConfig, DockerfileFeatureToggle } from '@/config/config'
|
|
3
4
|
import {
|
|
4
5
|
CLAUDE_CREDENTIALS_FILE_NAME,
|
|
5
6
|
CLAUDE_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_PATH,
|
|
6
|
-
CLAUDE_DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR_NAME,
|
|
7
7
|
} from '@/secrets/export-claude-credentials-file'
|
|
8
8
|
|
|
9
9
|
import { GHCR_BASE_IMAGE_REPO } from './cli-version'
|
|
@@ -137,6 +137,13 @@ export const TYPECLAW_ENTRYPOINT_PATH = '/usr/local/bin/typeclaw-entrypoint'
|
|
|
137
137
|
// a path, and resolves `/agent/typeclaw.json` (`Cannot run json files`).
|
|
138
138
|
export const TYPECLAW_CLI_ENTRY = '/agent/node_modules/typeclaw/src/cli/index.ts'
|
|
139
139
|
|
|
140
|
+
// Perf: `--smol` selects JSC's small-heap profile (grows slower, GCs more often),
|
|
141
|
+
// trading a little CPU for lower resident memory. The agent runtime is a
|
|
142
|
+
// burst-then-idle workload, so temporary allocations get reclaimed instead of
|
|
143
|
+
// settling into a high-water RSS. Flag goes before `run`. Used at every exec site
|
|
144
|
+
// below so the runtime phase inherits it on every network-policy path.
|
|
145
|
+
const RUNTIME_BUN = 'bun --smol run'
|
|
146
|
+
|
|
140
147
|
// IPv4 networks the container is forbidden to egress to when
|
|
141
148
|
// `network.blockInternal` is true. Loopback (127/8) is NOT here — loopback
|
|
142
149
|
// traffic uses the `lo` interface, which the shim's first ACCEPT rule
|
|
@@ -353,68 +360,6 @@ set -eu
|
|
|
353
360
|
# -nolisten tcp refuse TCP connections (Unix socket only).
|
|
354
361
|
# Defense-in-depth — we are in a netns with
|
|
355
362
|
# no inbound exposure anyway.
|
|
356
|
-
# link_persistent_home_files symlinks credential files that tools write
|
|
357
|
-
# to $HOME into a bind-mounted location so they survive container
|
|
358
|
-
# restarts. The container's $HOME (/root by default) lives on Docker's
|
|
359
|
-
# writable overlay and is wiped on every \`stop\`+\`start\` cycle, so
|
|
360
|
-
# without this symlink the operator would have to re-paste credentials
|
|
361
|
-
# after every restart.
|
|
362
|
-
#
|
|
363
|
-
# Two files are linked today, both following the same contract:
|
|
364
|
-
# - ~/.codex/auth.json — Codex CLI rotates OAuth tokens in place by
|
|
365
|
-
# rewriting auth.json with refreshed credentials.
|
|
366
|
-
# - $CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.credentials.json, or ~/.claude/.credentials.json
|
|
367
|
-
# by default — Claude Code rotates OAuth tokens in place by rewriting
|
|
368
|
-
# .credentials.json on every successful refresh (anthropics/claude-code
|
|
369
|
-
# #53063). Linux/Windows path; macOS uses the Keychain entry "Claude
|
|
370
|
-
# Code-credentials" with the same JSON shape.
|
|
371
|
-
#
|
|
372
|
-
# The persist root lives under /agent/.typeclaw/home/ (bind-mounted
|
|
373
|
-
# from the agent folder via the -v <cwd>:/agent flag in start.ts).
|
|
374
|
-
# Namespacing under .typeclaw/ keeps the agent's top-level layout clean and reserves
|
|
375
|
-
# a system-owned subtree we can extend later (e.g. ~/.gemini/) without
|
|
376
|
-
# colliding with user files. The directory is gitignored by buildGitignore()
|
|
377
|
-
# so credentials never enter history.
|
|
378
|
-
#
|
|
379
|
-
# Three invariants this function enforces:
|
|
380
|
-
#
|
|
381
|
-
# 1. Symlink is unconditional and idempotent. We never check whether
|
|
382
|
-
# auth.json exists before linking — \`ln -sfn\` creates a dangling
|
|
383
|
-
# symlink on first boot, and the first \`codex login\` write goes
|
|
384
|
-
# through it to land at the persistent location. -f replaces an
|
|
385
|
-
# existing symlink; -n stops ln from dereferencing into a directory
|
|
386
|
-
# if a previous container life happened to write a real ~/.codex/
|
|
387
|
-
# dir before this code shipped.
|
|
388
|
-
#
|
|
389
|
-
# 2. We symlink credential FILES for tools whose config dirs are mostly
|
|
390
|
-
# scratch/history (Codex, Claude). We do not redirect global config
|
|
391
|
-
# locations such as XDG_CONFIG_HOME or ~/.config here because tools like
|
|
392
|
-
# git also read config from those paths; first-party bundles that need
|
|
393
|
-
# persistence should set their own app-specific env vars instead.
|
|
394
|
-
#
|
|
395
|
-
# 3. We mkdir -p the target's parent on every boot. /agent is bind-
|
|
396
|
-
# mounted, so the host-side path may exist or not depending on
|
|
397
|
-
# whether the operator ever started the container before this code
|
|
398
|
-
# shipped. mkdir -p is idempotent and cheap.
|
|
399
|
-
#
|
|
400
|
-
# 4. The root is overridable via TYPECLAW_PERSIST_HOME_ROOT, which only
|
|
401
|
-
# the shim's executable tests set. Production never sets it, so the
|
|
402
|
-
# in-container path is always /agent/.typeclaw/home/. The override
|
|
403
|
-
# lets the shim's behavioral tests verify symlink semantics against
|
|
404
|
-
# a real tmpdir on the host without touching /agent (which doesn't
|
|
405
|
-
# exist on developer machines and CI runners).
|
|
406
|
-
link_persistent_home_files() {
|
|
407
|
-
persist_root="\${TYPECLAW_PERSIST_HOME_ROOT:-/agent/.typeclaw/home}"
|
|
408
|
-
mkdir -p "$persist_root/.codex" "$HOME/.codex"
|
|
409
|
-
ln -sfn "$persist_root/.codex/auth.json" "$HOME/.codex/auth.json"
|
|
410
|
-
claude_config_dir="\${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR:-}"
|
|
411
|
-
if [ -z "$claude_config_dir" ]; then
|
|
412
|
-
claude_config_dir="$HOME/${CLAUDE_DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR_NAME}"
|
|
413
|
-
fi
|
|
414
|
-
mkdir -p "$persist_root/${CLAUDE_DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR_NAME}" "$claude_config_dir"
|
|
415
|
-
ln -sfn "$persist_root/${CLAUDE_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_PATH}" "$claude_config_dir/${CLAUDE_CREDENTIALS_FILE_NAME}"
|
|
416
|
-
}
|
|
417
|
-
|
|
418
363
|
# link_configured_symlinks creates the operator's \`sandbox.symlinks\` at the real
|
|
419
364
|
# container $HOME for runtime-owned processes. Model-driven bash runs in bwrap
|
|
420
365
|
# for every role and gets an equivalent in-jail symlink from the per-tool builder
|
|
@@ -431,8 +376,7 @@ link_persistent_home_files() {
|
|
|
431
376
|
# per-entry so one bad symlink never blocks container boot.
|
|
432
377
|
#
|
|
433
378
|
# TYPECLAW_AGENT_DIR defaults to /agent (the bind-mount path) and is overridable
|
|
434
|
-
# only by the shim's behavioral tests, which point it at a tmpdir
|
|
435
|
-
# hatch as TYPECLAW_PERSIST_HOME_ROOT in link_persistent_home_files. Production
|
|
379
|
+
# only by the shim's behavioral tests, which point it at a tmpdir. Production
|
|
436
380
|
# never sets it.
|
|
437
381
|
link_configured_symlinks() {
|
|
438
382
|
[ -n "\${TYPECLAW_SANDBOX_SYMLINKS:-}" ] || return 0
|
|
@@ -477,20 +421,72 @@ link_configured_symlinks() {
|
|
|
477
421
|
' || true
|
|
478
422
|
}
|
|
479
423
|
|
|
424
|
+
# link_custom_claude_credentials keeps a custom CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR credential file
|
|
425
|
+
# out of model-visible reach. The Claude Code exporter writes the OAuth refresh
|
|
426
|
+
# token to \$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.credentials.json when that env var is set. Under
|
|
427
|
+
# the default (unset) it lands in the runtime HOME's .claude, which bwrap never
|
|
428
|
+
# binds — invisible to sandboxed bash. But a custom dir under /agent (or any
|
|
429
|
+
# jail-visible root) would put the real token where model bash can read it.
|
|
430
|
+
#
|
|
431
|
+
# Instead of masking every possible custom location, plant a symlink from the
|
|
432
|
+
# custom path INTO the runtime HOME's .claude and let the exporter's
|
|
433
|
+
# symlink-aware writeAtomic() follow it — so the real bytes always live in the
|
|
434
|
+
# unbound, already-denied runtime HOME regardless of where CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR
|
|
435
|
+
# points. This restores the invariant the old persistence helper used to provide
|
|
436
|
+
# (it linked into the masked persist root); the target moved to the ephemeral
|
|
437
|
+
# HOME, but the "credential is only an alias in the custom dir" property is
|
|
438
|
+
# preserved. Runs in the root phase before privilege drop so custom dirs under
|
|
439
|
+
# root-owned roots (e.g. /etc) can still be created. No-op when the value is
|
|
440
|
+
# unset/blank or already resolves to the runtime HOME's .claude (avoids a
|
|
441
|
+
# self-referential link). Re-linking is idempotent (an existing symlink is
|
|
442
|
+
# replaced); failures are non-fatal so a bad custom path never blocks boot.
|
|
443
|
+
#
|
|
444
|
+
# The from-path MUST match where the exporter actually writes. The exporter
|
|
445
|
+
# (src/secrets/export-claude-credentials-file.ts resolveClaudeConfigDir) applies
|
|
446
|
+
# JS String.trim() and treats an all-whitespace value as unset. Replicating that
|
|
447
|
+
# in POSIX sed would diverge on Unicode whitespace (\u00A0, \u2003, …) that
|
|
448
|
+
# .trim() strips but a byte-oriented sed class does not — a divergence is a
|
|
449
|
+
# credential-isolation bypass (exporter writes the trimmed path, alias sits at
|
|
450
|
+
# the padded path, token stays model-readable). So do the normalization in the
|
|
451
|
+
# same \`bun -e\` runtime the exporter uses, guaranteeing byte-for-byte identical
|
|
452
|
+
# trimming, and create the symlink there too.
|
|
453
|
+
link_custom_claude_credentials() {
|
|
454
|
+
CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR="\${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR:-}" _CLAUDE_RUNTIME_HOME="$runtime_home" \\
|
|
455
|
+
_CLAUDE_CRED_FILE="${CLAUDE_CREDENTIALS_FILE_NAME}" _CLAUDE_CRED_REL="${CLAUDE_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_PATH}" bun -e '
|
|
456
|
+
import { mkdirSync, rmSync, symlinkSync } from "node:fs";
|
|
457
|
+
import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
|
|
458
|
+
const raw = process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR;
|
|
459
|
+
const trimmed = raw?.trim();
|
|
460
|
+
if (trimmed === undefined || trimmed.length === 0) process.exit(0);
|
|
461
|
+
const runtimeHome = process.env._CLAUDE_RUNTIME_HOME || "/home/agent";
|
|
462
|
+
const from = join(trimmed, process.env._CLAUDE_CRED_FILE);
|
|
463
|
+
const to = join(runtimeHome, process.env._CLAUDE_CRED_REL);
|
|
464
|
+
if (from === to) process.exit(0);
|
|
465
|
+
try {
|
|
466
|
+
mkdirSync(trimmed, { recursive: true });
|
|
467
|
+
mkdirSync(dirname(to), { recursive: true });
|
|
468
|
+
// Unconditionally (re)point the alias, matching the old ln -sfn: a
|
|
469
|
+
// pre-existing real file at the custom path would otherwise keep the token
|
|
470
|
+
// model-readable, which is exactly the exposure this aliasing closes.
|
|
471
|
+
try { rmSync(from); } catch { /* nothing to remove */ }
|
|
472
|
+
symlinkSync(to, from);
|
|
473
|
+
} catch (e) {
|
|
474
|
+
console.error("typeclaw-entrypoint: failed to alias custom Claude credentials:", String(e));
|
|
475
|
+
}
|
|
476
|
+
' || true
|
|
477
|
+
}
|
|
478
|
+
|
|
480
479
|
# seed_runtime_home copies the image-baked Claude Code / Codex CLI settings from
|
|
481
|
-
# the build-time HOME (/root) into the
|
|
482
|
-
#
|
|
483
|
-
#
|
|
484
|
-
#
|
|
485
|
-
#
|
|
486
|
-
# claudeCode/codexCli users. link_persistent_home_files only links CREDENTIALS,
|
|
487
|
-
# not this config, so we seed it here.
|
|
480
|
+
# the build-time HOME (/root) into the ephemeral runtime HOME. The Dockerfile
|
|
481
|
+
# writes ~/.claude.json, ~/.claude/settings.json, and ~/.codex/hooks.json against
|
|
482
|
+
# /root during \`docker build\`; once the runtime runs under HOME=$runtime_home
|
|
483
|
+
# those files would otherwise be invisible, silently disabling Claude onboarding
|
|
484
|
+
# state and both CLIs' completion hooks for claudeCode/codexCli users.
|
|
488
485
|
#
|
|
489
|
-
# Runs in the root setup phase (HOME is still /root), BEFORE the chown
|
|
490
|
-
#
|
|
491
|
-
#
|
|
492
|
-
#
|
|
493
|
-
# is missing.
|
|
486
|
+
# Runs in the root setup phase (HOME is still /root), BEFORE the optional chown
|
|
487
|
+
# so copied files have the dynamic host ownership when the runtime drops
|
|
488
|
+
# privileges. \`cp -n\` keeps repeated shim execution idempotent within one
|
|
489
|
+
# container life; Docker removes this HOME with the container.
|
|
494
490
|
seed_runtime_home() {
|
|
495
491
|
_src="\${1:-/root}"
|
|
496
492
|
_dst="$2"
|
|
@@ -570,19 +566,25 @@ start_xvfb() {
|
|
|
570
566
|
}
|
|
571
567
|
|
|
572
568
|
if [ "\${TYPECLAW_ENTRYPOINT_RUNTIME:-0}" = "1" ]; then
|
|
573
|
-
link_persistent_home_files
|
|
574
569
|
link_configured_symlinks
|
|
575
570
|
start_xvfb
|
|
576
|
-
exec
|
|
571
|
+
exec ${RUNTIME_BUN} ${TYPECLAW_CLI_ENTRY} "$@"
|
|
577
572
|
fi
|
|
578
573
|
|
|
579
|
-
|
|
580
|
-
|
|
574
|
+
runtime_home="\${TYPECLAW_RUNTIME_HOME:-/home/agent}"
|
|
575
|
+
mkdir -p "$runtime_home"
|
|
576
|
+
seed_runtime_home "$HOME" "$runtime_home"
|
|
577
|
+
link_custom_claude_credentials
|
|
581
578
|
if [ -n "\${TYPECLAW_HOST_UID:-}" ] && [ -n "\${TYPECLAW_HOST_GID:-}" ]; then
|
|
582
|
-
|
|
583
|
-
seed_runtime_home "$HOME" "$runtime_home"
|
|
584
|
-
chown -R "$TYPECLAW_HOST_UID:$TYPECLAW_HOST_GID" "$persist_root"
|
|
579
|
+
chown -R "$TYPECLAW_HOST_UID:$TYPECLAW_HOST_GID" "$runtime_home"
|
|
585
580
|
fi
|
|
581
|
+
# Adopt the runtime HOME for the rest of this root phase, BEFORE any
|
|
582
|
+
# link_configured_symlinks call. The re-exec paths below override HOME again for
|
|
583
|
+
# the fresh runtime process, but the no-host-identity/root fallbacks run
|
|
584
|
+
# link_configured_symlinks in THIS process — without this they would create the
|
|
585
|
+
# operator's \`~/\` symlinks under the inherited build HOME (/root) instead of
|
|
586
|
+
# \$runtime_home.
|
|
587
|
+
export HOME="$runtime_home"
|
|
586
588
|
|
|
587
589
|
if [ "\${TYPECLAW_NETWORK_BLOCK_INTERNAL:-0}" != "1" ]; then
|
|
588
590
|
if [ -n "\${TYPECLAW_HOST_UID:-}" ] && [ -n "\${TYPECLAW_HOST_GID:-}" ]; then
|
|
@@ -598,10 +600,9 @@ if [ "\${TYPECLAW_NETWORK_BLOCK_INTERNAL:-0}" != "1" ]; then
|
|
|
598
600
|
--bounding-set=-all --inh-caps=-all --ambient-caps=-all \\
|
|
599
601
|
-- env HOME="$runtime_home" TYPECLAW_ENTRYPOINT_RUNTIME=1 "$0" "$@"
|
|
600
602
|
fi
|
|
601
|
-
link_persistent_home_files
|
|
602
603
|
link_configured_symlinks
|
|
603
604
|
start_xvfb
|
|
604
|
-
exec
|
|
605
|
+
exec env HOME="$runtime_home" ${RUNTIME_BUN} ${TYPECLAW_CLI_ENTRY} "$@"
|
|
605
606
|
fi
|
|
606
607
|
|
|
607
608
|
iptables -A OUTPUT -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
|
|
@@ -653,10 +654,9 @@ if [ -n "\${TYPECLAW_HOST_UID:-}" ] && [ -n "\${TYPECLAW_HOST_GID:-}" ]; then
|
|
|
653
654
|
--bounding-set=-all --inh-caps=-all --ambient-caps=-all \\
|
|
654
655
|
-- env HOME="$runtime_home" TYPECLAW_ENTRYPOINT_RUNTIME=1 "$0" "$@"
|
|
655
656
|
fi
|
|
656
|
-
link_persistent_home_files
|
|
657
657
|
link_configured_symlinks
|
|
658
658
|
start_xvfb
|
|
659
|
-
exec setpriv --bounding-set -net_admin --inh-caps -net_admin --ambient-caps -net_admin --
|
|
659
|
+
exec env HOME="$runtime_home" setpriv --bounding-set -net_admin --inh-caps -net_admin --ambient-caps -net_admin -- ${RUNTIME_BUN} ${TYPECLAW_CLI_ENTRY} "$@"
|
|
660
660
|
`
|
|
661
661
|
}
|
|
662
662
|
|
|
@@ -673,6 +673,15 @@ RUN echo "${encoded}" | base64 -d > ${TYPECLAW_ENTRYPOINT_PATH} \\
|
|
|
673
673
|
&& chmod +x ${TYPECLAW_ENTRYPOINT_PATH}`
|
|
674
674
|
}
|
|
675
675
|
|
|
676
|
+
// Bake the secret-free git-askpass helper (github-cli-auth broker delivers the
|
|
677
|
+
// token to it via env). Root-owned at build time so the non-root runtime, which
|
|
678
|
+
// cannot write the read-only /usr, still finds it.
|
|
679
|
+
function renderGitAskPassLayer(): string {
|
|
680
|
+
const encoded = Buffer.from(ASKPASS_SCRIPT, 'utf8').toString('base64')
|
|
681
|
+
return `RUN echo "${encoded}" | base64 -d > ${TYPECLAW_GIT_ASKPASS_PATH} \\
|
|
682
|
+
&& chmod 755 ${TYPECLAW_GIT_ASKPASS_PATH}`
|
|
683
|
+
}
|
|
684
|
+
|
|
676
685
|
// Layer 7: install @huggingface/transformers with its linux-native binaries.
|
|
677
686
|
//
|
|
678
687
|
// The host node_modules is bind-mounted over /agent at runtime carrying
|
|
@@ -1418,6 +1427,7 @@ WORKDIR /agent
|
|
|
1418
1427
|
ARG TARGETARCH
|
|
1419
1428
|
|
|
1420
1429
|
${ghKeyringLayer}${toggleAptLayer}${cloudflaredBlock}${claudeCodeBlock}${codexCliBlock}${renderEntrypointShimLayer()}
|
|
1430
|
+
${renderGitAskPassLayer()}
|
|
1421
1431
|
|
|
1422
1432
|
${LAYER_TRANSFORMERS_INSTALL}
|
|
1423
1433
|
|
|
@@ -1481,6 +1491,7 @@ ${LAYER_4_5_AGENT_BROWSER_HEADED_WRAPPER}
|
|
|
1481
1491
|
${renderChromeForTestingLayer(buildKit)}
|
|
1482
1492
|
|
|
1483
1493
|
${cloudflaredBlock}${claudeCodeBlock}${codexCliBlock}${renderEntrypointShimLayer()}
|
|
1494
|
+
${renderGitAskPassLayer()}
|
|
1484
1495
|
|
|
1485
1496
|
${LAYER_TRANSFORMERS_INSTALL}
|
|
1486
1497
|
|
|
@@ -1558,6 +1569,7 @@ ${LAYER_4_5_AGENT_BROWSER_HEADED_WRAPPER}
|
|
|
1558
1569
|
${renderChromeForTestingLayer(true)}
|
|
1559
1570
|
|
|
1560
1571
|
${renderEntrypointShimLayer()}
|
|
1572
|
+
${renderGitAskPassLayer()}
|
|
1561
1573
|
|
|
1562
1574
|
${LAYER_TRANSFORMERS_INSTALL}
|
|
1563
1575
|
`
|
package/src/init/gitignore.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -42,12 +42,11 @@ export function buildGitignore(config: GitignoreConfig = { append: [] }): string
|
|
|
42
42
|
# as a safety net so an agent folder cloned from a pre-rename machine never
|
|
43
43
|
# stages credentials by accident.
|
|
44
44
|
#
|
|
45
|
-
# .typeclaw/ is the agent's local-scratch dir. It holds the
|
|
46
|
-
#
|
|
47
|
-
#
|
|
48
|
-
#
|
|
49
|
-
#
|
|
50
|
-
# wizard selections for resume). Local-only; never commit.
|
|
45
|
+
# .typeclaw/ is the agent's local-scratch dir. It holds the in-progress init
|
|
46
|
+
# checkpoint (.typeclaw/init-progress.json, non-secret wizard selections for
|
|
47
|
+
# resume). Upgraded agents may also retain legacy .typeclaw/home/ credentials;
|
|
48
|
+
# the runtime no longer uses or migrates them, but they must remain ignored.
|
|
49
|
+
# Local-only; never commit.
|
|
51
50
|
${TRULY_IGNORED_PATTERNS.join('\n')}
|
|
52
51
|
|
|
53
52
|
# System-managed: gitignored by default so the agent never stages them by hand,
|
|
@@ -107,10 +107,24 @@ async function runTimedBunProcess({
|
|
|
107
107
|
proc.kill('SIGKILL')
|
|
108
108
|
}, timeoutMs)
|
|
109
109
|
try {
|
|
110
|
-
|
|
110
|
+
// Drain both pipes alongside exit: an undrained 'pipe' stdout/stderr holds
|
|
111
|
+
// its fd (and can deadlock a child that fills the buffer) until GC. A drain
|
|
112
|
+
// that rejects must not escape before the child is reaped — otherwise the
|
|
113
|
+
// `finally` clears the timeout while the process is still alive. Kill and
|
|
114
|
+
// await exit on any drain failure so the timer never disarms a live child.
|
|
115
|
+
const stdoutDrain = new Response(proc.stdout).text()
|
|
116
|
+
const stderrDrain = new Response(proc.stderr).text()
|
|
117
|
+
let code: number
|
|
118
|
+
let stderr: string
|
|
119
|
+
try {
|
|
120
|
+
;[code, , stderr] = await Promise.all([proc.exited, stdoutDrain, stderrDrain])
|
|
121
|
+
} catch (err) {
|
|
122
|
+
proc.kill('SIGKILL')
|
|
123
|
+
await Promise.allSettled([proc.exited, stdoutDrain, stderrDrain])
|
|
124
|
+
throw err
|
|
125
|
+
}
|
|
111
126
|
if (timedOut) return { ok: false, reason: timeoutReason(timeoutMs / 1000) }
|
|
112
127
|
if (code === 0) return { ok: true }
|
|
113
|
-
const stderr = await new Response(proc.stderr).text()
|
|
114
128
|
return { ok: false, reason: failureReason(code, stderr) }
|
|
115
129
|
} finally {
|
|
116
130
|
clearTimeout(timeout)
|
package/src/inspect/item-list.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ import { listSessions, type ListSessionsOptions, mergeLiveSessions, type Session
|
|
|
5
5
|
|
|
6
6
|
export type ListViewerItemsOptions = ListSessionsOptions & {
|
|
7
7
|
containerRunning: boolean
|
|
8
|
+
// A writable row dispatches to runTuiViewer, which drives a raw-mode pi-tui
|
|
9
|
+
// terminal — unusable without a TTY. Required (not defaulted) so a non-TTY
|
|
10
|
+
// caller can't silently promote a writable row it then can't drive, which
|
|
11
|
+
// would auto-open a TUI on an explicit id past the picker guard.
|
|
12
|
+
interactive: boolean
|
|
8
13
|
includeLogs?: boolean
|
|
9
14
|
// Defaults to true. The detach-to-list path (after `typeclaw tui` esc) sets
|
|
10
15
|
// this false: detaching ENDS the server-side session, so the just-killed
|
|
@@ -22,18 +27,19 @@ export type ViewerList = {
|
|
|
22
27
|
}
|
|
23
28
|
|
|
24
29
|
// Builds the session-viewer list. The writable TUI row is a heuristic, not an
|
|
25
|
-
// authoritative query: when the container is up, the single
|
|
26
|
-
// tui-origin session becomes the read+write `tui` item; every other
|
|
27
|
-
// read-only. With the container down
|
|
28
|
-
// sessions are read-only. The
|
|
29
|
-
// available offline) so it sits
|
|
30
|
+
// authoritative query: when the container is up AND stdin is a TTY, the single
|
|
31
|
+
// most-recent tui-origin session becomes the read+write `tui` item; every other
|
|
32
|
+
// session is read-only. With the container down (no live session to drive) or a
|
|
33
|
+
// non-TTY stdin (no terminal to drive it), all sessions are read-only. The
|
|
34
|
+
// `logs` row is appended last (container stdout, available offline) so it sits
|
|
35
|
+
// below the divider in the picker.
|
|
30
36
|
export async function listViewerItems(opts: ListViewerItemsOptions): Promise<ViewerList> {
|
|
31
37
|
const diskSessions = await listSessions(opts)
|
|
32
38
|
const sessions =
|
|
33
39
|
opts.liveSessions !== undefined && opts.liveSessions.length > 0
|
|
34
40
|
? mergeLiveSessions(diskSessions, opts.liveSessions)
|
|
35
41
|
: diskSessions
|
|
36
|
-
const allowWritable = opts.allowWritable !== false
|
|
42
|
+
const allowWritable = opts.interactive && opts.allowWritable !== false
|
|
37
43
|
const writableSessionId = opts.containerRunning && allowWritable ? pickWritableSession(sessions) : null
|
|
38
44
|
|
|
39
45
|
const items: ViewerItem[] = sessions.map((summary) =>
|
package/src/inspect/replay.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -311,18 +311,30 @@ function describeErr(err: unknown): string {
|
|
|
311
311
|
return String(err)
|
|
312
312
|
}
|
|
313
313
|
|
|
314
|
+
// Explicit reader + `finally` cancel so a consumer that breaks early (peekSession
|
|
315
|
+
// stops after the first meta + a few user turns) releases the file descriptor
|
|
316
|
+
// deterministically, not relying on async-iterator finalization. Load-bearing when
|
|
317
|
+
// tens of thousands of session files are peeked under a low `ulimit -n`.
|
|
314
318
|
async function* streamLines(stream: ReadableStream<Uint8Array>): AsyncGenerator<string> {
|
|
319
|
+
const reader = stream.getReader()
|
|
315
320
|
const decoder = new TextDecoder()
|
|
316
321
|
let buf = ''
|
|
317
|
-
|
|
318
|
-
|
|
319
|
-
|
|
320
|
-
|
|
321
|
-
|
|
322
|
-
|
|
323
|
-
|
|
324
|
-
|
|
322
|
+
try {
|
|
323
|
+
while (true) {
|
|
324
|
+
const { done, value } = await reader.read()
|
|
325
|
+
if (done) break
|
|
326
|
+
buf += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true })
|
|
327
|
+
let nl = buf.indexOf('\n')
|
|
328
|
+
while (nl !== -1) {
|
|
329
|
+
const line = buf.slice(0, nl)
|
|
330
|
+
buf = buf.slice(nl + 1)
|
|
331
|
+
yield line
|
|
332
|
+
nl = buf.indexOf('\n')
|
|
333
|
+
}
|
|
325
334
|
}
|
|
335
|
+
if (buf.length > 0) yield buf
|
|
336
|
+
} finally {
|
|
337
|
+
await reader.cancel().catch(() => {})
|
|
338
|
+
reader.releaseLock()
|
|
326
339
|
}
|
|
327
|
-
if (buf.length > 0) yield buf
|
|
328
340
|
}
|
|
@@ -39,36 +39,68 @@ export type ListSessionsOptions = {
|
|
|
39
39
|
// character so empty-id filenames like `_.jsonl` don't slip through.
|
|
40
40
|
const FILENAME_PATTERN = /^(?:.*_)?([^_/\\\s][^/\\\s]*)\.jsonl$/
|
|
41
41
|
|
|
42
|
-
|
|
42
|
+
// Bounds concurrent per-file I/O. An agent folder can hold tens of thousands of
|
|
43
|
+
// session files, and an unbounded `Promise.all` over them opens one file
|
|
44
|
+
// descriptor per concurrent stat/stream — enough to blow past a 256 `ulimit -n`
|
|
45
|
+
// and crash the process with EMFILE. 32 keeps throughput high while staying well
|
|
46
|
+
// under any sane FD ceiling.
|
|
47
|
+
const SESSION_IO_CONCURRENCY = 32
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
// A dependency-free bounded worker pool: `concurrency` workers pull from a shared
|
|
50
|
+
// cursor until the list is drained, preserving input order in the result.
|
|
51
|
+
async function mapConcurrent<T, R>(
|
|
52
|
+
items: readonly T[],
|
|
53
|
+
concurrency: number,
|
|
54
|
+
fn: (item: T, index: number) => Promise<R>,
|
|
55
|
+
): Promise<R[]> {
|
|
56
|
+
const results = new Array<R>(items.length)
|
|
57
|
+
let next = 0
|
|
58
|
+
const worker = async (): Promise<void> => {
|
|
59
|
+
while (true) {
|
|
60
|
+
const index = next++
|
|
61
|
+
if (index >= items.length) return
|
|
62
|
+
results[index] = await fn(items[index]!, index)
|
|
63
|
+
}
|
|
64
|
+
}
|
|
65
|
+
const workerCount = Math.min(concurrency, items.length)
|
|
66
|
+
await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: workerCount }, () => worker()))
|
|
67
|
+
return results
|
|
68
|
+
}
|
|
69
|
+
|
|
70
|
+
type StatEntry = { path: string; basename: string; sessionId: string; mtimeMs: number }
|
|
71
|
+
|
|
72
|
+
// Split from listSessions so resolveSession can match ids first and peek only the
|
|
73
|
+
// candidates, instead of reading every file body on disk. Reads no file content.
|
|
74
|
+
async function statSessionFiles(opts: ListSessionsOptions): Promise<StatEntry[]> {
|
|
43
75
|
const entries = await readSessionFiles(opts.sessionsDir, opts.onWarn)
|
|
44
|
-
const withStats = await
|
|
45
|
-
|
|
46
|
-
|
|
47
|
-
|
|
48
|
-
|
|
49
|
-
|
|
50
|
-
|
|
51
|
-
|
|
52
|
-
)
|
|
53
|
-
const valid = withStats.filter(
|
|
54
|
-
(v): v is { path: string; basename: string; sessionId: string; mtimeMs: number } => v !== null,
|
|
55
|
-
)
|
|
76
|
+
const withStats = await mapConcurrent(entries, SESSION_IO_CONCURRENCY, async (entry) => {
|
|
77
|
+
const s = await safeStat(entry.path)
|
|
78
|
+
if (s === null) return null
|
|
79
|
+
const mtimeMs = s.mtimeMs
|
|
80
|
+
if (opts.sinceMs !== undefined && mtimeMs < opts.sinceMs) return null
|
|
81
|
+
return { ...entry, mtimeMs }
|
|
82
|
+
})
|
|
83
|
+
const valid = withStats.filter((v): v is StatEntry => v !== null)
|
|
56
84
|
valid.sort((a, b) => b.mtimeMs - a.mtimeMs)
|
|
57
|
-
|
|
85
|
+
return valid
|
|
86
|
+
}
|
|
58
87
|
|
|
59
|
-
|
|
60
|
-
|
|
61
|
-
|
|
62
|
-
|
|
63
|
-
|
|
64
|
-
|
|
65
|
-
|
|
66
|
-
|
|
67
|
-
|
|
68
|
-
|
|
69
|
-
|
|
70
|
-
|
|
71
|
-
|
|
88
|
+
async function summarizeEntry(entry: StatEntry, onWarn?: (msg: string) => void): Promise<SessionSummary> {
|
|
89
|
+
const peek = await peekSession(entry.path, onWarn)
|
|
90
|
+
return {
|
|
91
|
+
sessionId: entry.sessionId,
|
|
92
|
+
sessionFile: entry.path,
|
|
93
|
+
basename: entry.basename,
|
|
94
|
+
mtimeMs: entry.mtimeMs,
|
|
95
|
+
origin: peek.origin,
|
|
96
|
+
firstPrompt: peek.firstPrompt,
|
|
97
|
+
}
|
|
98
|
+
}
|
|
99
|
+
|
|
100
|
+
export async function listSessions(opts: ListSessionsOptions): Promise<SessionSummary[]> {
|
|
101
|
+
const valid = await statSessionFiles(opts)
|
|
102
|
+
const limited = opts.limit !== undefined ? valid.slice(0, opts.limit) : valid
|
|
103
|
+
return mapConcurrent(limited, SESSION_IO_CONCURRENCY, (entry) => summarizeEntry(entry, opts.onWarn))
|
|
72
104
|
}
|
|
73
105
|
|
|
74
106
|
// Overlay container-registry sessions onto the disk listing. A live session
|
|
@@ -105,17 +137,23 @@ export async function resolveSession(
|
|
|
105
137
|
sessionIdOrPrefix: string,
|
|
106
138
|
onWarn?: (msg: string) => void,
|
|
107
139
|
): Promise<ResolveResult> {
|
|
108
|
-
|
|
109
|
-
|
|
110
|
-
|
|
140
|
+
// Match on stat-only metadata (filename-derived id + mtime) first, then peek
|
|
141
|
+
// ONLY the matched candidates. Peeking every session to find one by id/prefix
|
|
142
|
+
// opened a file descriptor per file — tens of thousands at once on a busy agent,
|
|
143
|
+
// which crashes with EMFILE. Id resolution never needs a file's body.
|
|
144
|
+
const entries = await statSessionFiles({ sessionsDir, ...(onWarn !== undefined ? { onWarn } : {}) })
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
const exact = entries.find((e) => e.sessionId === sessionIdOrPrefix)
|
|
147
|
+
if (exact !== undefined) return { ok: true, summary: await summarizeEntry(exact, onWarn) }
|
|
111
148
|
|
|
112
149
|
if (sessionIdOrPrefix.length < MIN_PREFIX_LENGTH || !isSessionIdShape(sessionIdOrPrefix)) {
|
|
113
150
|
return { ok: false, reason: 'not-found', matches: [] }
|
|
114
151
|
}
|
|
115
|
-
const prefixMatches =
|
|
152
|
+
const prefixMatches = entries.filter((e) => e.sessionId.startsWith(sessionIdOrPrefix))
|
|
116
153
|
if (prefixMatches.length === 0) return { ok: false, reason: 'not-found', matches: [] }
|
|
117
|
-
if (prefixMatches.length === 1) return { ok: true, summary: prefixMatches[0]
|
|
118
|
-
|
|
154
|
+
if (prefixMatches.length === 1) return { ok: true, summary: await summarizeEntry(prefixMatches[0]!, onWarn) }
|
|
155
|
+
const matches = await mapConcurrent(prefixMatches, SESSION_IO_CONCURRENCY, (e) => summarizeEntry(e, onWarn))
|
|
156
|
+
return { ok: false, reason: 'ambiguous', matches }
|
|
119
157
|
}
|
|
120
158
|
|
|
121
159
|
const SESSION_ID_SHAPE = /^[^_/\\\s][^/\\\s]*$/
|