typeclaw 0.43.1 → 0.45.0

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Files changed (86) hide show
  1. package/README.md +1 -1
  2. package/auth.schema.json +92 -0
  3. package/package.json +7 -6
  4. package/secrets.schema.json +92 -0
  5. package/src/agent/index.ts +25 -2
  6. package/src/agent/model-fallback.ts +59 -40
  7. package/src/agent/multimodal/look-at.ts +29 -10
  8. package/src/agent/plugin-tools.ts +9 -4
  9. package/src/agent/provider-error.ts +71 -18
  10. package/src/agent/retry-same-ref.ts +139 -0
  11. package/src/agent/session-origin.ts +1 -0
  12. package/src/agent/subagents.ts +6 -2
  13. package/src/agent/tools/channel-edit.ts +144 -0
  14. package/src/agent/tools/channel-fetch-attachment.ts +51 -8
  15. package/src/agent/tools/channel-reply.ts +41 -18
  16. package/src/agent/tools/channel-send.ts +82 -13
  17. package/src/agent/tools/curl-impersonate.ts +40 -1
  18. package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/fetch.ts +86 -3
  19. package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/tool.ts +26 -3
  20. package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/types.ts +8 -0
  21. package/src/agent/turn-runner.ts +65 -36
  22. package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/skills/agent-browser/SKILL.md +28 -11
  23. package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/gh-review-detect.ts +101 -1
  24. package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/review-recorder.ts +44 -3
  25. package/src/bundled-plugins/guard/policies/managed-config.ts +20 -4
  26. package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/README.md +9 -9
  27. package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/index.ts +40 -9
  28. package/src/bundled-plugins/reviewer/skills/code-review.ts +22 -2
  29. package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-edit.ts +49 -0
  30. package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot.ts +5 -0
  31. package/src/channels/adapters/discord-edit.ts +51 -0
  32. package/src/channels/adapters/discord.ts +4 -0
  33. package/src/channels/adapters/github/inbound.ts +20 -14
  34. package/src/channels/adapters/github/review-thread-resolver.ts +38 -4
  35. package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot-edit.ts +58 -0
  36. package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot.ts +18 -6
  37. package/src/channels/adapters/slack-edit.ts +47 -0
  38. package/src/channels/adapters/slack.ts +5 -0
  39. package/src/channels/adapters/teams-classify.ts +144 -0
  40. package/src/channels/adapters/teams-edit.ts +61 -0
  41. package/src/channels/adapters/teams-id-token.ts +112 -0
  42. package/src/channels/adapters/teams-key.ts +32 -0
  43. package/src/channels/adapters/teams.ts +523 -0
  44. package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot-edit.ts +51 -0
  45. package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot.ts +5 -0
  46. package/src/channels/adapters/webex-bot.ts +5 -0
  47. package/src/channels/adapters/webex-edit.ts +47 -0
  48. package/src/channels/adapters/webex.ts +5 -0
  49. package/src/channels/continuation-willingness.ts +227 -35
  50. package/src/channels/github-review-turn-ledger.ts +43 -0
  51. package/src/channels/index.ts +1 -1
  52. package/src/channels/manager.ts +54 -1
  53. package/src/channels/router.ts +482 -53
  54. package/src/channels/schema.ts +33 -0
  55. package/src/channels/types.ts +36 -0
  56. package/src/cli/channel.ts +92 -4
  57. package/src/cli/hostd.ts +41 -0
  58. package/src/cli/init.ts +58 -1
  59. package/src/config/channels-mutation.ts +9 -1
  60. package/src/cron/index.ts +16 -4
  61. package/src/cron/reloadable.ts +25 -7
  62. package/src/cron/scheduler.ts +4 -0
  63. package/src/cron/schema.ts +143 -35
  64. package/src/doctor/channel-checks.ts +27 -0
  65. package/src/hostd/daemon.ts +23 -3
  66. package/src/hostd/protocol.ts +2 -0
  67. package/src/hostd/teams-renewal-manager.ts +212 -0
  68. package/src/init/checkpoint.ts +1 -1
  69. package/src/init/index.ts +68 -1
  70. package/src/init/run-owner-claim.ts +1 -0
  71. package/src/init/teams-auth.ts +111 -0
  72. package/src/inspect/label.ts +4 -0
  73. package/src/permissions/match-rule.ts +11 -1
  74. package/src/permissions/resolve.ts +1 -0
  75. package/src/role-claim/match-rule.ts +2 -1
  76. package/src/run/index.ts +35 -8
  77. package/src/run/llm-fetch-observer.ts +27 -5
  78. package/src/sandbox/build.ts +12 -0
  79. package/src/sandbox/policy.ts +13 -0
  80. package/src/sandbox/writable-zones.ts +46 -10
  81. package/src/secrets/schema.ts +32 -0
  82. package/src/secrets/teams-renewal.ts +229 -0
  83. package/src/secrets/teams-store.ts +108 -0
  84. package/src/server/command-runner.ts +2 -1
  85. package/src/server/index.ts +2 -1
  86. package/typeclaw.schema.json +163 -3
@@ -33,19 +33,36 @@ const GENERIC_SAFE_NOTICE = 'The upstream LLM provider failed. Operators can che
33
33
  // and surface it. The literal is the system's own token — English by design.
34
34
  const OBSERVER_TIMEOUT = /\(typeclaw observer timeout\)/i
35
35
 
36
+ // Transport-layer failure: the request died at the connection/session before a
37
+ // usable response — an expired live session, a WebSocket upgrade that never
38
+ // reached `101 Switching Protocols`, or a dropped transport. Unlike an
39
+ // account-wide auth/billing fault, this is transient AND ref-specific: a
40
+ // different ref opens its own session, so failing OVER can succeed. Observed from
41
+ // Codex/ChatGPT (`provider_transport_failure`, expired ChatGPT session, a
42
+ // `wss://…/codex/responses` non-101 upgrade). Provider protocol tokens — English
43
+ // by design (the system-token exception to the multi-language rule).
44
+ const TRANSPORT_FAILURE =
45
+ /provider[_ -]?transport[_ -]?failure|(?:websocket|ws) connection.*failed|expected 101|session expired/i
46
+
47
+ // Auth failure: the provider rejected our credentials (bad/expired/missing API
48
+ // key, 401, failed authentication). Account-wide — a different ref shares the
49
+ // same credential problem — so this is BOTH a redacted safe-message class (a
50
+ // 401 body can carry a Bearer token) AND a NON_FAILOVER_FAULT reason. Shared as
51
+ // one constant so the two uses can never drift: previously the safe-message copy
52
+ // matched `api key ... expired` but the failover copy didn't, letting
53
+ // `session expired: api key expired` wrongly fail over past the auth guard.
54
+ const AUTH_FAULT =
55
+ /\b(401|unauthori[sz]ed|invalid[_ -]?api[_ -]?key|api key.*(?:invalid|expired|missing)|authentication failed|invalid bearer)\b/i
56
+
36
57
  // Each entry pairs a narrow matcher against the raw provider text with the
37
58
  // canonical, leak-free sentence shown in channels. Matchers are intentionally
38
59
  // specific: a miss falls through to GENERIC_SAFE_NOTICE rather than echoing raw
39
60
  // text, so adding a new class is opt-in and never widens what we expose.
40
61
  const SAFE_CLASSES: ReadonlyArray<{ match: RegExp; safe: string }> = [
41
62
  {
42
- // Auth failure: the provider rejected our credentials (bad/expired/missing
43
- // API key). Matched first because a 401 body can also mention "account",
44
- // which would otherwise fall into the billing class below. The safe text
45
- // names the operator action (check the API key) without echoing the raw
46
- // error, whose body can carry a Bearer token.
47
- match:
48
- /\b(401|unauthori[sz]ed|invalid[_ -]?api[_ -]?key|api key.*(?:invalid|expired|missing)|authentication failed|invalid bearer)\b/i,
63
+ // Matched first because a 401 body can also mention "account", which would
64
+ // otherwise fall into the billing class below.
65
+ match: AUTH_FAULT,
49
66
  safe: 'The upstream LLM provider rejected the request as unauthorized. Operators should check the provider API key configuration and `typeclaw logs`.',
50
67
  },
51
68
  {
@@ -71,6 +88,10 @@ const SAFE_CLASSES: ReadonlyArray<{ match: RegExp; safe: string }> = [
71
88
  match: OBSERVER_TIMEOUT,
72
89
  safe: 'The upstream LLM provider stopped responding and the request timed out. Try again shortly.',
73
90
  },
91
+ {
92
+ match: TRANSPORT_FAILURE,
93
+ safe: 'The connection to the upstream LLM provider dropped (session/transport failure). Try again shortly.',
94
+ },
74
95
  ]
75
96
 
76
97
  function toSafeMessage(raw: string): string {
@@ -92,9 +113,12 @@ const THROTTLE_OR_OVERLOAD =
92
113
  // help (same account) and would mask a config error the operator must fix. This
93
114
  // is checked BEFORE the throttle match because providers often pair a `429`
94
115
  // status with a quota/billing/auth reason (e.g. `429 insufficient quota`) — the
95
- // status code alone must not force a pointless failover.
96
- const NON_FAILOVER_FAULT =
97
- /\bcyber_policy\b|insufficient.*(?:quota|credit|fund|balance)|\bquota\b|billing|payment|account is not active|unauthori[sz]ed|invalid[_ -]?api[_ -]?key|authentication failed|invalid bearer/i
116
+ // status code alone must not force a pointless failover. The auth arm reuses the
117
+ // shared `AUTH_FAULT` source so it stays in lockstep with the safe-message class.
118
+ const NON_FAILOVER_FAULT = new RegExp(
119
+ `\\bcyber_policy\\b|insufficient.*(?:quota|credit|fund|balance)|\\bquota\\b|billing|payment|account is not active|${AUTH_FAULT.source}`,
120
+ 'i',
121
+ )
98
122
 
99
123
  export function isThrottleOrOverload(raw: string): boolean {
100
124
  if (NON_FAILOVER_FAULT.test(raw)) return false
@@ -102,14 +126,40 @@ export function isThrottleOrOverload(raw: string): boolean {
102
126
  }
103
127
 
104
128
  // Failover predicate for turn-drivers' `shouldFailover`: rotate to the next model
105
- // ref on a transient capacity signal (throttle/overload) OR an observer stall
106
- // timeout. A stall — the provider accepted the stream but stopped sending bytes —
107
- // is as transient as an overload and another ref may well succeed, so it must
108
- // fail OVER before the caller surfaces a failure notice. Account-wide faults
109
- // (billing/quota/auth) still return false via `isThrottleOrOverload` — a
110
- // different ref shares the same account problem.
129
+ // ref on a transient capacity signal (throttle/overload), an observer stall
130
+ // timeout, or a transport/session failure. A stall or a dropped session is as
131
+ // transient as an overload and another ref (its own session/transport) may well
132
+ // succeed, so it must fail OVER before the caller surfaces a failure notice.
133
+ // Account-wide faults (billing/quota/auth) are excluded up front — a different
134
+ // ref shares the same account problem, so switching can't help.
111
135
  export function isFailoverWorthy(raw: string): boolean {
112
- return isThrottleOrOverload(raw) || OBSERVER_TIMEOUT.test(raw)
136
+ if (NON_FAILOVER_FAULT.test(raw)) return false
137
+ return isThrottleOrOverload(raw) || OBSERVER_TIMEOUT.test(raw) || TRANSPORT_FAILURE.test(raw)
138
+ }
139
+
140
+ // Transient network / upstream 5xx signals that a same-model replay may clear.
141
+ // Distinct from THROTTLE_OR_OVERLOAD (429/503/overload) on purpose: an overload
142
+ // means the model is out of capacity NOW, so the right move is to fail OVER to a
143
+ // different ref, not hammer the same one — whereas a socket hang-up or a 500 is a
144
+ // one-off blip a replay against the SAME ref often fixes. `\b` anchors the 5xx
145
+ // codes so they don't match digit runs in prose. Provider protocol tokens —
146
+ // English by design (the system-token exception to the multi-language rule).
147
+ const NETWORK_OR_5XX =
148
+ /econnreset|econnrefused|etimedout|enetunreach|socket hang up|network.?error|connection.?(?:error|refused|reset|lost)|fetch failed|other side closed|reset before headers|http2 request did not get a response|\b(?:500|502|504)\b/i
149
+
150
+ // Retry predicate for typeclaw-owned SAME-REF retry: replay the SAME model ref
151
+ // before advancing the chain. Deliberately NARROWER than `isFailoverWorthy` —
152
+ // only transient failures a same-model replay can plausibly clear: transport/
153
+ // session drops, observer stalls, and network/5xx blips. It intentionally EXCLUDES
154
+ // throttle/overload (429/503) — those mean "this ref is out of capacity now", so
155
+ // they should fail OVER to another ref rather than burn same-ref retries — and
156
+ // account-wide faults (auth/billing/quota/cyber_policy), which must surface. It
157
+ // does NOT match context-overflow: that stays on the SDK compaction path and must
158
+ // never be treated as a retryable provider failure.
159
+ export function isRetryableSameRef(raw: string): boolean {
160
+ if (NON_FAILOVER_FAULT.test(raw)) return false
161
+ if (isThrottleOrOverload(raw)) return false
162
+ return TRANSPORT_FAILURE.test(raw) || OBSERVER_TIMEOUT.test(raw) || NETWORK_OR_5XX.test(raw)
113
163
  }
114
164
 
115
165
  export function detectProviderError(message: unknown): DetectedProviderError | null {
@@ -134,7 +184,10 @@ export function detectProviderError(message: unknown): DetectedProviderError | n
134
184
  export function detectHardProviderError(err: unknown): DetectedProviderError | null {
135
185
  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
136
186
  const isProviderFailure =
137
- isThrottleOrOverload(message) || NON_FAILOVER_FAULT.test(message) || OBSERVER_TIMEOUT.test(message)
187
+ isThrottleOrOverload(message) ||
188
+ NON_FAILOVER_FAULT.test(message) ||
189
+ OBSERVER_TIMEOUT.test(message) ||
190
+ TRANSPORT_FAILURE.test(message)
138
191
  if (!isProviderFailure) return null
139
192
  return { message, safeMessage: toSafeMessage(message) }
140
193
  }
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
1
+ import type { AgentSession } from './index'
2
+ import { isRetryableSameRef, subscribeProviderErrors } from './provider-error'
3
+
4
+ // Same-ref retry policy. Conservative on purpose: the pi-ai provider layer ALSO
5
+ // retries transport/5xx blips underneath us (WebSocket→SSE fallback + its own
6
+ // SSE retry loop), and each typeclaw attempt is bounded by the observer timeouts
7
+ // (TTFB 15s / idle 120s / overall 300s). Stacking a large per-ref retry count on
8
+ // top of that turns one outage into minutes of dead air, so we replay the same
9
+ // ref just ONCE by default and rely on cross-ref fallback for anything the single
10
+ // replay can't clear.
11
+ export const RETRIES_PER_REF = 1
12
+ const BASE_DELAY_MS = 1_000
13
+ const MAX_DELAY_MS = 5_000
14
+
15
+ // Full-jitter exponential backoff: random in [0, min(cap, base·2^attempt)].
16
+ // Jitter decorrelates concurrent turns (multiple channels/subagents recovering
17
+ // from the same upstream blip) so they don't retry in lockstep and re-collide.
18
+ export function retryBackoffMs(attempt: number, random: () => number = Math.random): number {
19
+ const ceiling = Math.min(MAX_DELAY_MS, BASE_DELAY_MS * 2 ** attempt)
20
+ return Math.floor(random() * ceiling)
21
+ }
22
+
23
+ function sleep(ms: number, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<void> {
24
+ if (ms <= 0) return Promise.resolve()
25
+ return new Promise((resolve) => {
26
+ const timer = setTimeout(resolve, ms)
27
+ signal?.addEventListener('abort', () => {
28
+ clearTimeout(timer)
29
+ resolve()
30
+ })
31
+ })
32
+ }
33
+
34
+ // For callers that recreate the session themselves (cron) and only need the delay.
35
+ export function sleepBackoff(attempt: number, signal?: AbortSignal, random?: () => number): Promise<void> {
36
+ return sleep(retryBackoffMs(attempt, random), signal)
37
+ }
38
+
39
+ type ContinuableAgent = {
40
+ state?: { messages?: unknown }
41
+ continue?: () => Promise<void>
42
+ }
43
+
44
+ // Replay the CURRENT turn on a persistent session WITHOUT re-appending the user
45
+ // message. Mirrors the SDK's own auto-retry shape, resuming via `agent.continue()`
46
+ // (which replays from the trailing user/tool-result message). Re-calling
47
+ // `session.prompt(text)` instead would duplicate the user message and corrupt
48
+ // history, so we never do that.
49
+ //
50
+ // Two resolved shapes are retryable, matching `continue()`'s contract that the
51
+ // last message be user/tool-result:
52
+ // - trailing ASSISTANT error leaf → pop it, then continue (soft error, or a
53
+ // hard throw AFTER a partial assistant message was written)
54
+ // - trailing USER message → the provider died BEFORE writing any assistant
55
+ // message (the reported incident: transport/session failure before stream
56
+ // start). Nothing to pop — continue() replays the user turn as-is.
57
+ // Any other trailing shape (tool-result mid-execution, custom, empty transcript,
58
+ // no `agent.continue`) fails CLOSED — the caller falls back / surfaces instead.
59
+ export async function retryTurnOnPersistentSession(
60
+ session: AgentSession,
61
+ opts: { attempt: number; signal?: AbortSignal; random?: () => number } = { attempt: 0 },
62
+ ): Promise<boolean> {
63
+ const agent = (session as { agent?: ContinuableAgent }).agent
64
+ if (!agent || typeof agent.continue !== 'function') return false
65
+ const messages = agent.state?.messages
66
+ if (!Array.isArray(messages) || messages.length === 0) return false
67
+ const leafRole = (messages[messages.length - 1] as { role?: unknown }).role
68
+ if (leafRole !== 'assistant' && leafRole !== 'user') return false
69
+
70
+ await sleep(retryBackoffMs(opts.attempt, opts.random), opts.signal)
71
+ if (opts.signal?.aborted) return false
72
+
73
+ // Drop only a trailing assistant error leaf; a trailing user message is already
74
+ // the shape continue() wants, so leave it untouched (and never re-appended).
75
+ if (leafRole === 'assistant') {
76
+ ;(agent.state as { messages: unknown }).messages = messages.slice(0, -1)
77
+ }
78
+ await agent.continue()
79
+ return true
80
+ }
81
+
82
+ // Same-ref retry for DIRECT `session.prompt()` call sites that bypass the model
83
+ // fallback helpers (non-stream TUI, slash commands, subagent drain/required-block
84
+ // nudges, multimodal look-at). These lost the SDK's built-in retry when it was
85
+ // disabled globally to kill the soft-error race; this restores equivalent
86
+ // same-model resilience WITHOUT cross-ref fallback (there's no chain here) and
87
+ // WITHOUT the race (typeclaw owns the soft-error signal). On a non-retryable
88
+ // failure it does exactly what a bare prompt() did: the throw propagates, or the
89
+ // soft error stays on the leaf for the caller to read.
90
+ export async function promptWithSameRefRetryOnly(
91
+ session: AgentSession,
92
+ text: string,
93
+ promptOpts?: Parameters<AgentSession['prompt']>[1],
94
+ ): Promise<void> {
95
+ let softError: Error | undefined
96
+ // Feature-detect subscribe: some lightweight call sites / test fakes pass a
97
+ // session without an event stream. Without it we simply can't observe soft
98
+ // errors — the wrapper then only retries hard throws, still safe.
99
+ const canSubscribe = typeof (session as { subscribe?: unknown }).subscribe === 'function'
100
+ const unsub = canSubscribe
101
+ ? subscribeProviderErrors(session, (err) => {
102
+ if (!softError) softError = new Error(err.message)
103
+ })
104
+ : () => {}
105
+ try {
106
+ // Carry the last attempt's failure so a retry that CAN'T run (unsafe
107
+ // transcript shape → retryTurnOnPersistentSession returns false) still
108
+ // surfaces the original failure instead of resolving as a phantom success.
109
+ let priorHardError: Error | undefined
110
+ for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {
111
+ softError = undefined
112
+ let hardError: Error | undefined
113
+ try {
114
+ if (attempt === 0) {
115
+ await session.prompt(text, promptOpts)
116
+ } else if (!(await retryTurnOnPersistentSession(session, { attempt: attempt - 1 }))) {
117
+ // Continue-recipe not applicable: replay never happened, so the prior
118
+ // failure stands — re-throw a hard error, or return to leave a soft
119
+ // error on the leaf (bare-prompt() semantics).
120
+ if (priorHardError !== undefined) throw priorHardError
121
+ return
122
+ }
123
+ } catch (err) {
124
+ hardError = err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err))
125
+ }
126
+ const error = hardError ?? softError
127
+ if (error === undefined) return
128
+ if (attempt >= RETRIES_PER_REF || !isRetryableSameRef(error.message)) {
129
+ // Out of budget or not retryable: preserve bare-prompt() semantics — a
130
+ // hard error throws; a soft error stays on the leaf for the caller.
131
+ if (hardError !== undefined) throw hardError
132
+ return
133
+ }
134
+ priorHardError = hardError
135
+ }
136
+ } finally {
137
+ unsub()
138
+ }
139
+ }
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ const PLATFORM_INFO: Record<AdapterId, PlatformInfo> = {
162
162
  },
163
163
  webex: { displayName: 'Webex', mentionMode: 'angle-id', supportsReactions: false, supportsAttachments: true },
164
164
  'webex-bot': { displayName: 'Webex', mentionMode: 'angle-id', supportsReactions: false, supportsAttachments: false },
165
+ teams: { displayName: 'Teams', mentionMode: 'alias', supportsReactions: false, supportsAttachments: false },
165
166
  line: { displayName: 'LINE', mentionMode: 'alias', supportsReactions: false, supportsAttachments: false },
166
167
  kakaotalk: { displayName: 'KakaoTalk', mentionMode: 'alias', supportsReactions: false, supportsAttachments: true },
167
168
  }
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import { type AgentSession, createSession, type PluginSessionWiring } from './in
11
11
  import { resolveFallbackChain } from './model-fallback'
12
12
  import { applyModelRuntimeOverrides } from './model-overrides'
13
13
  import { isFailoverWorthy, subscribeProviderErrors } from './provider-error'
14
+ import { promptWithSameRefRetryOnly } from './retry-same-ref'
14
15
  import type { SubagentBashPolicy } from './reviewer-bash-policy'
15
16
  import type { SessionOrigin } from './session-origin'
16
17
  import {
@@ -375,7 +376,7 @@ export async function invokeSubagent(name: string, options: InvokeSubagentOption
375
376
  await runSubagentDrain(drainWatch, {
376
377
  drain: backgroundDrain,
377
378
  prompt: async (text) => {
378
- await session.prompt(`${renderTurnTimeAnchor()}\n\n${text}`)
379
+ await promptWithSameRefRetryOnly(session, `${renderTurnTimeAnchor()}\n\n${text}`)
379
380
  },
380
381
  cancelled: () => aborted,
381
382
  })
@@ -395,7 +396,10 @@ export async function invokeSubagent(name: string, options: InvokeSubagentOption
395
396
  console.warn(
396
397
  `[subagent] ${name} required_block_retry attempt=${attempt}/${MAX_REQUIRED_BLOCK_RETRIES} tag=${requiredBlockTag}`,
397
398
  )
398
- await session.prompt(`${renderTurnTimeAnchor()}\n\n${renderRequiredBlockRetryNudge(requiredBlockTag)}`)
399
+ await promptWithSameRefRetryOnly(
400
+ session,
401
+ `${renderTurnTimeAnchor()}\n\n${renderRequiredBlockRetryNudge(requiredBlockTag)}`,
402
+ )
399
403
  }
400
404
  if (!aborted && !capture.hasRequiredBlock()) {
401
405
  console.warn(`[subagent] ${name} required_block_fallback tag=${requiredBlockTag}`)
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
1
+ import { Type } from '@mariozechner/pi-ai'
2
+ import { defineTool } from '@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent'
3
+
4
+ import {
5
+ containsKimiToolDelimiter,
6
+ isNoReplySignal,
7
+ isUpstreamEmptyResponseSentinel,
8
+ stripThinkBlocks,
9
+ type ChannelRouter,
10
+ } from '@/channels/router'
11
+ import { ADAPTER_IDS, type AdapterId } from '@/channels/schema'
12
+ import type { EditMessageResult } from '@/channels/types'
13
+
14
+ import { type ChannelToolLogger, consoleChannelLogger, formatChannelToolFailure } from './channel-log'
15
+ import { renderOutboundEcho, TOOL_RESULT_PREFIX } from './channel-reply'
16
+ import { fenceToolResult } from './runtime-notice'
17
+
18
+ export type CreateChannelEditToolOptions = {
19
+ router: ChannelRouter
20
+ logger?: ChannelToolLogger
21
+ }
22
+
23
+ export function createChannelEditTool({ router, logger = consoleChannelLogger }: CreateChannelEditToolOptions) {
24
+ return defineTool({
25
+ name: 'channel_edit',
26
+ label: 'Channel Edit',
27
+ description:
28
+ 'Edit the text of a message you already posted to an external messenger channel, replacing its body in place. ' +
29
+ 'Pass the `message_id` a prior `channel_send` returned (Slack thread ts, Discord message id), plus the same ' +
30
+ 'adapter/workspace/chat you sent it to, and the new `text`. Use this to fix a typo, correct a wrong answer, ' +
31
+ 'or append a result to a status message you posted earlier — not to carry on a conversation (send a new ' +
32
+ 'message for that). Editing is supported on "slack-bot", "slack", "discord-bot", "discord", "telegram-bot", ' +
33
+ '"webex", "webex-bot", and "teams" (chats/DMs only — Teams team-channel posts cannot be edited); an adapter ' +
34
+ 'that does not implement editing at all returns ' +
35
+ '{ ok: false, error, code: "not-supported" }. You can only edit messages YOU authored; editing someone ' +
36
+ 'else\'s returns code "permission-denied". On success returns { ok: true }; a missing/deleted target returns ' +
37
+ 'code "not-found". Code "adapter-unavailable" is distinct from "not-supported": the adapter DOES support ' +
38
+ 'editing but is not currently running (e.g. it failed to start on an expired token) — re-authenticating and ' +
39
+ 'retrying may fix it, so do not treat it as permanently unsupported.',
40
+ parameters: Type.Object({
41
+ adapter: Type.Union(
42
+ ADAPTER_IDS.map((a) => Type.Literal(a)),
43
+ {
44
+ description:
45
+ 'Adapter id. Editing is supported on "slack-bot", "slack", "discord-bot", "discord", "telegram-bot", ' +
46
+ '"webex", "webex-bot", and "teams" (Teams chats/DMs only — not team-channel posts).',
47
+ },
48
+ ),
49
+ workspace: Type.String({
50
+ description:
51
+ 'Discord guild id or Slack team id (e.g. "T0ACME"); use "@dm" for direct-message channels on either platform.',
52
+ minLength: 1,
53
+ }),
54
+ chat: Type.String({
55
+ description:
56
+ 'Channel id the message lives in. Discord channel id (numeric snowflake) or Slack channel id (e.g. "C0CHANNEL", "D0DMID").',
57
+ minLength: 1,
58
+ }),
59
+ thread: Type.Optional(
60
+ Type.String({
61
+ description:
62
+ 'Optional thread id the message lives in. Context only — the edit is addressed by `message_id`, so this is not required.',
63
+ minLength: 1,
64
+ }),
65
+ ),
66
+ message_id: Type.String({
67
+ description:
68
+ 'Platform-native id of the message to edit, as returned by a prior `channel_send` (Slack thread ts, Discord message id).',
69
+ minLength: 1,
70
+ }),
71
+ text: Type.String({
72
+ description: 'The new message body that fully replaces the current text.',
73
+ minLength: 1,
74
+ }),
75
+ }),
76
+
77
+ async execute(_toolCallId, params) {
78
+ const adapter = params.adapter as AdapterId
79
+ type DenyCode = NonNullable<(EditMessageResult & { ok: false })['code']>
80
+ const deny = (error: string, code?: DenyCode) => {
81
+ logger.warn(formatChannelToolFailure('channel_edit', error))
82
+ const details: { ok: false; error: string; code?: DenyCode } =
83
+ code !== undefined ? { ok: false, error, code } : { ok: false, error }
84
+ return {
85
+ content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: `${TOOL_RESULT_PREFIX}channel_edit denied: ${error}` }],
86
+ details,
87
+ }
88
+ }
89
+
90
+ const contentError = editTextGuardError(params.text)
91
+ if (contentError) return deny(contentError)
92
+
93
+ // Strip leaked `<think>` blocks before the edit reaches the router/adapter,
94
+ // exactly as the send path normalizes text. A replacement that is ONLY a
95
+ // think block leaves nothing to post, so deny rather than blank the message.
96
+ const text = stripThinkBlocks(params.text)
97
+ if (text === '') return deny('the replacement text is empty after removing reasoning blocks')
98
+
99
+ const result = await router.editMessage({
100
+ adapter,
101
+ workspace: params.workspace,
102
+ chat: params.chat,
103
+ ...(params.thread !== undefined ? { thread: params.thread } : {}),
104
+ messageId: params.message_id,
105
+ text,
106
+ })
107
+
108
+ if (!result.ok) {
109
+ return deny(`${adapter}:${params.workspace}/${params.chat}: ${result.error}`, result.code)
110
+ }
111
+
112
+ const echo = renderOutboundEcho(text, undefined)
113
+ const receipt = `edited ${adapter}:${params.workspace}/${params.chat} message ${params.message_id}: ${echo}`
114
+ return {
115
+ content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: fenceToolResult(receipt) }],
116
+ details: { ok: true },
117
+ }
118
+ },
119
+ })
120
+ }
121
+
122
+ // Same content guards channel_send runs, minus the send-only flood/dup/resolve
123
+ // logic: an edit is a mutation of an existing post, so the only shared risk is
124
+ // forwarding a control signal (NO_REPLY), the upstream empty-response sentinel
125
+ // (leaks thinking/signature), or raw provider tool-call delimiters as the new
126
+ // body. Blocked BEFORE the router call so the string never reaches the chat.
127
+ function editTextGuardError(text: string): string {
128
+ if (isNoReplySignal(text)) {
129
+ return '`NO_REPLY` is the silent-turn signal, not a message body. To edit a message, pass the replacement text.'
130
+ }
131
+ if (isUpstreamEmptyResponseSentinel(text)) {
132
+ return (
133
+ 'refusing to forward an upstream `(Empty response: ...)` sentinel; ' +
134
+ "that string is a provider-SDK debug dump containing the model's thinking content and signature, not a message body."
135
+ )
136
+ }
137
+ if (containsKimiToolDelimiter(text)) {
138
+ return (
139
+ 'refusing to forward raw provider tool-call control tokens; these are chat-template ' +
140
+ 'delimiters that should have been parsed into a real tool call upstream.'
141
+ )
142
+ }
143
+ return ''
144
+ }
@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
1
1
  import { mkdir, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
2
- import { join } from 'node:path'
2
+ import { join, sep } from 'node:path'
3
3
 
4
4
  import { Type } from '@mariozechner/pi-ai'
5
5
  import { defineTool } from '@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent'
6
6
 
7
+ import type { SessionOrigin } from '@/agent/session-origin'
7
8
  import type { ChannelRouter } from '@/channels/router'
8
9
  import type { AdapterId } from '@/channels/schema'
10
+ import type { PermissionService } from '@/permissions'
11
+ import { resolveHiddenPaths } from '@/sandbox'
9
12
 
10
13
  import { type ChannelToolLogger, consoleChannelLogger, formatChannelToolFailure } from './channel-log'
11
14
 
@@ -16,28 +19,43 @@ export type ChannelFetchAttachmentOrigin = {
16
19
  thread: string | null
17
20
  }
18
21
 
22
+ type FetchAttachmentDetails = { ok: boolean; error?: string; path?: string; mimetype?: string; size?: number }
23
+
19
24
  export type CreateChannelFetchAttachmentToolOptions = {
20
25
  router: ChannelRouter
21
26
  origin: ChannelFetchAttachmentOrigin
22
27
  inboxDir?: string
28
+ // Resolved at execute time (role is a property of the live origin, not of
29
+ // construction), and wins over inboxDir/DEFAULT_INBOX_DIR. Lets the save
30
+ // location follow the caller's role so a role hidden from workspace/ never
31
+ // gets a file it can write but not read back (privateSurfaceRead would block
32
+ // its follow-up look_at/read). See buildChannelTools for the decision.
33
+ resolveBaseDir?: () => string
23
34
  logger?: ChannelToolLogger
24
35
  }
25
36
 
37
+ // workspace/ is private-surface: readable only by roles with fs.see.private.
26
38
  export const DEFAULT_INBOX_DIR = '/agent/workspace/inbox'
39
+ // public/ is the guest-visible counterpart, so a redirected file stays readable
40
+ // back through look_at/read by the same role that fetched it.
41
+ export const PUBLIC_INBOX_DIR = '/agent/public/inbox'
27
42
 
28
43
  export function createChannelFetchAttachmentTool({
29
44
  router,
30
45
  origin,
31
46
  inboxDir,
47
+ resolveBaseDir,
32
48
  logger = consoleChannelLogger,
33
49
  }: CreateChannelFetchAttachmentToolOptions) {
34
- const baseDir = inboxDir ?? DEFAULT_INBOX_DIR
50
+ const fallbackBaseDir = inboxDir ?? DEFAULT_INBOX_DIR
35
51
  const adapter = origin.adapter
36
52
  return defineTool({
37
53
  name: 'channel_fetch_attachment',
38
54
  label: 'Channel Fetch Attachment',
39
55
  description:
40
- 'Download a file attached to a channel message and save it to disk. Inbound channel ' +
56
+ 'Download a file attached to a channel message and save it to disk. Use this only when you need the ' +
57
+ 'file ON DISK (to edit it, re-upload it, or run a tool over it); to simply VIEW an image, use ' +
58
+ '`look_at_channel_attachment` instead — it returns a description without a disk write. Inbound channel ' +
41
59
  'messages with attachments show `[<Platform> attachment #N: <kind> <metadata>]` in the text. Pass `N` as ' +
42
60
  '`attachment_id`; do not invent ids that are not present in the message. The router resolves the private ' +
43
61
  'platform ref itself. Attachments on the CURRENT inbound message resolve directly; for one from an EARLIER ' +
@@ -59,7 +77,6 @@ export function createChannelFetchAttachmentTool({
59
77
  }),
60
78
 
61
79
  async execute(_toolCallId, params) {
62
- type Details = { ok: boolean; error?: string; path?: string; mimetype?: string; size?: number }
63
80
  const found = router.lookupInboundAttachment({
64
81
  adapter,
65
82
  workspace: origin.workspace,
@@ -96,12 +113,13 @@ export function createChannelFetchAttachmentTool({
96
113
  if (!result.ok) {
97
114
  logger.warn(formatChannelToolFailure('channel_fetch_attachment', `${adapter}: ${result.error}`))
98
115
  const text = `channel_fetch_attachment error: ${result.error}`
99
- const details: Details = { ok: false, error: result.error }
116
+ const details: FetchAttachmentDetails = { ok: false, error: result.error }
100
117
  return { content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text }], details }
101
118
  }
102
119
 
103
120
  const safeFilename = sanitizeFilename(result.filename)
104
121
  const refSlug = sanitizeRefSlug(ref)
122
+ const baseDir = resolveBaseDir?.() ?? fallbackBaseDir
105
123
  const targetDir = join(baseDir, adapter, refSlug)
106
124
  const targetPath = join(targetDir, safeFilename)
107
125
  try {
@@ -111,13 +129,13 @@ export function createChannelFetchAttachmentTool({
111
129
  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
112
130
  logger.warn(formatChannelToolFailure('channel_fetch_attachment', `${adapter}: write failed: ${message}`))
113
131
  const text = `channel_fetch_attachment error: write failed: ${message}`
114
- const details: Details = { ok: false, error: `write failed: ${message}` }
132
+ const details: FetchAttachmentDetails = { ok: false, error: `write failed: ${message}` }
115
133
  return { content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text }], details }
116
134
  }
117
135
 
118
136
  const mimetypePart = result.mimetype !== undefined ? ` (${result.mimetype})` : ''
119
137
  const text = `saved ${result.size} bytes to ${targetPath}${mimetypePart}`
120
- const details: Details = {
138
+ const details: FetchAttachmentDetails = {
121
139
  ok: true,
122
140
  path: targetPath,
123
141
  ...(result.mimetype !== undefined ? { mimetype: result.mimetype } : {}),
@@ -128,8 +146,33 @@ export function createChannelFetchAttachmentTool({
128
146
  })
129
147
  }
130
148
 
149
+ // Picks the inbox root for the caller's live role. Reuses the guard's own
150
+ // deny-list resolution (resolveHiddenPaths) as the single source of truth, so
151
+ // the save location can never drift out of sync with what privateSurfaceRead
152
+ // will let the same role read back: if workspace/inbox lands under a hidden dir
153
+ // the file goes to the guest-visible public/ inbox instead.
154
+ //
155
+ // The hidden-check joins with the OS-native separator to stay byte-identical to
156
+ // resolveHiddenPaths' own dirs, but the RETURNED path is normalized to POSIX:
157
+ // this value names a location inside the Linux container (agentDir is /agent),
158
+ // so a win32 CI host must not leak backslashes into it.
159
+ export function resolveInboxBaseDir(
160
+ permissions: PermissionService,
161
+ origin: SessionOrigin | undefined,
162
+ agentDir: string,
163
+ ): string {
164
+ const privateInbox = join(agentDir, 'workspace', 'inbox')
165
+ const { dirs } = resolveHiddenPaths(permissions, origin, agentDir)
166
+ const hidden = dirs.some((dir) => privateInbox === dir || privateInbox.startsWith(`${dir}${sep}`))
167
+ return toPosix(hidden ? join(agentDir, 'public', 'inbox') : privateInbox)
168
+ }
169
+
170
+ function toPosix(p: string): string {
171
+ return p.split(sep).join('/')
172
+ }
173
+
131
174
  function errorResult(message: string) {
132
- const details = { ok: false, error: message }
175
+ const details: FetchAttachmentDetails = { ok: false, error: message }
133
176
  return { content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: `channel_fetch_attachment error: ${message}` }], details }
134
177
  }
135
178