typeclaw 0.39.2 → 0.39.4
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/auth.schema.json +110 -0
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/secrets.schema.json +110 -0
- package/src/agent/index.ts +39 -18
- package/src/agent/model-fallback.ts +13 -4
- package/src/agent/plugin-tools.ts +12 -12
- package/src/agent/provider-error.ts +36 -1
- package/src/agent/session-origin.ts +2 -0
- package/src/agent/subagents.ts +29 -2
- package/src/agent/throttle-circuit.ts +50 -0
- package/src/agent/todo/store.ts +21 -1
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-reply.ts +18 -5
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-send.ts +13 -2
- package/src/agent/turn-runner.ts +162 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/doc-render/render.ts +2 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/approve-idempotency.ts +40 -18
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/README.md +12 -12
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/append-tool.ts +58 -6
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/dreaming.ts +1 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/fragment-parser.ts +10 -3
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/load-memory.ts +28 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/memory-logger.ts +14 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/search-tool.ts +50 -7
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/stream-events.ts +23 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/hybrid.ts +9 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/index.ts +24 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/cron-promotion.ts +94 -62
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/plugin-addition.ts +2 -4
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/role-promotion.ts +2 -4
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-author-resolver.ts +52 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-channel-resolver.ts +44 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-classify.ts +121 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-reactions.ts +138 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord.ts +416 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/outbound.ts +23 -4
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk.ts +8 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/line.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-author-resolver.ts +54 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot.ts +3 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-channel-resolver.ts +49 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-classify.ts +83 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-reactions.ts +126 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack.ts +416 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex-bot.ts +31 -27
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex-prefetch-limiter.ts +120 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex.ts +81 -31
- package/src/channels/github-review-turn-ledger.ts +32 -0
- package/src/channels/github-verdict-activity.ts +60 -0
- package/src/channels/index.ts +6 -0
- package/src/channels/manager.ts +168 -37
- package/src/channels/pr-verdict-activity-bridge.ts +43 -0
- package/src/channels/router.ts +295 -13
- package/src/channels/schema.ts +4 -0
- package/src/channels/types.ts +25 -2
- package/src/cli/builtins.ts +6 -31
- package/src/cli/channel.ts +170 -18
- package/src/cli/command-meta.ts +93 -0
- package/src/cli/help.ts +24 -0
- package/src/cli/index.ts +45 -10
- package/src/cli/init.ts +2 -0
- package/src/cli/update-check.ts +14 -0
- package/src/cli/update-notify.ts +91 -0
- package/src/cli/update-suppression.ts +19 -0
- package/src/config/channels-mutation.ts +3 -1
- package/src/config/config.ts +78 -1
- package/src/config/index.ts +1 -0
- package/src/container/start.ts +52 -8
- package/src/doctor/channel-checks.ts +57 -3
- package/src/hostd/daemon.ts +77 -31
- package/src/hostd/index.ts +11 -1
- package/src/hostd/paths.ts +4 -0
- package/src/hostd/protocol.ts +15 -2
- package/src/hostd/spawn.ts +53 -19
- package/src/init/cli-version.ts +1 -1
- package/src/init/discord-auth.ts +50 -0
- package/src/init/index.ts +94 -4
- package/src/init/reconcile-plugin-deps.ts +30 -5
- package/src/init/run-owner-claim.ts +2 -0
- package/src/init/slack-auth.ts +51 -0
- package/src/mcp/manager.ts +94 -7
- package/src/mcp/tools.ts +7 -4
- package/src/permissions/permissions.ts +12 -0
- package/src/permissions/resolve.ts +2 -0
- package/src/role-claim/match-rule.ts +2 -0
- package/src/run/codex-fetch-observer.ts +11 -6
- package/src/run/index.ts +74 -29
- package/src/secrets/discord-store.ts +96 -0
- package/src/secrets/oauth-xai.ts +2 -2
- package/src/secrets/schema.ts +34 -0
- package/src/secrets/slack-store.ts +96 -0
- package/src/server/command-runner.ts +21 -0
- package/src/server/index.ts +27 -2
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-channels/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-config/SKILL.md +1 -0
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-cron/SKILL.md +20 -4
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-permissions/SKILL.md +18 -6
- package/src/tui/format.ts +0 -19
- package/src/tui/index.ts +2 -8
- package/src/update/check.ts +192 -0
- package/typeclaw.schema.json +332 -0
|
@@ -4,7 +4,16 @@ import path from 'node:path'
|
|
|
4
4
|
import { parseCronJson, type ParsedCronJob } from '@/cron'
|
|
5
5
|
|
|
6
6
|
import type { SecuritySeverity } from '../permissions'
|
|
7
|
-
import {
|
|
7
|
+
import type { SecurityBlock } from '../policy'
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
// True iff the caller may legitimately schedule deferred work that fires as
|
|
10
|
+
// `targetRole` — i.e. `targetRole` grants no permission the caller's own role
|
|
11
|
+
// lacks (capability dominance / permission-subset). The caller supplies this;
|
|
12
|
+
// the production wiring in index.ts compares resolved permission sets, NOT the
|
|
13
|
+
// coarse severity tower (which ranks every custom role equal and would let one
|
|
14
|
+
// custom role launder into another). Fails closed: an unknown caller or target
|
|
15
|
+
// role returns false, so the change is treated as an escalation and blocked.
|
|
16
|
+
export type CanScheduleAs = (targetRole: string | undefined) => boolean
|
|
8
17
|
|
|
9
18
|
export const GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION = 'cronPromotion'
|
|
10
19
|
// Classified `medium` (silent-attack axis). Originally `high`; reclassified
|
|
@@ -18,12 +27,12 @@ export const GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION = 'cronPromotion'
|
|
|
18
27
|
// audience-leak.
|
|
19
28
|
//
|
|
20
29
|
// Net effect on the role-tower model: owner and trusted both bypass
|
|
21
|
-
//
|
|
22
|
-
//
|
|
23
|
-
//
|
|
24
|
-
//
|
|
25
|
-
//
|
|
26
|
-
//
|
|
30
|
+
// (they carry `security.bypass.medium`); member and guest are gated by
|
|
31
|
+
// the caller-role-aware predicate below. This guard does NOT honor
|
|
32
|
+
// `acknowledgeGuards` — an ack flag from an under-privileged session is
|
|
33
|
+
// ignored. Bypassing is a property of the caller's resolved role, not a
|
|
34
|
+
// tool-arg flag, because an args-level ack would let any member/guest
|
|
35
|
+
// launder itself past the guard (it inspected args, not permissions).
|
|
27
36
|
//
|
|
28
37
|
// Cron is the deferred-execution sibling of `roles`. Every cron job
|
|
29
38
|
// carries a `scheduledByRole` field that the runtime stamps into the
|
|
@@ -32,57 +41,64 @@ export const GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION = 'cronPromotion'
|
|
|
32
41
|
// table"). The `parseCronFile` boot gate rejects entries without
|
|
33
42
|
// `scheduledByRole`, but it accepts any role name the file declares.
|
|
34
43
|
//
|
|
35
|
-
// Concrete breach pattern blocked
|
|
36
|
-
//
|
|
44
|
+
// Concrete breach pattern blocked: a `member`-role agent that can
|
|
45
|
+
// `write` `cron.json` authors a brand-new job with
|
|
37
46
|
// `"scheduledByRole": "owner"` and a prompt that does whatever the
|
|
38
47
|
// agent's tool surface allows when running as owner. The cron consumer
|
|
39
|
-
// fires it on schedule; the firing session resolves to `owner
|
|
40
|
-
//
|
|
41
|
-
//
|
|
42
|
-
// — member does not carry `bypass.medium`.
|
|
48
|
+
// fires it on schedule; the firing session resolves to `owner`. The
|
|
49
|
+
// agent has laundered itself into owner via the schedule. This guard
|
|
50
|
+
// blocks it because `canScheduleAs('owner')` is false for a member.
|
|
43
51
|
//
|
|
44
52
|
// Same two-step shape as `gitRemoteTainted`: "do a privileged write
|
|
45
53
|
// now, run the privileged thing later." This guard blocks the first
|
|
46
|
-
// step.
|
|
54
|
+
// step. It is the deferred-write analogue of the `spawnedByRole` cap in
|
|
55
|
+
// src/agent/tools/subagent-access.ts: a caller may only commit deferred
|
|
56
|
+
// work that fires at a role it could already act as.
|
|
47
57
|
//
|
|
48
|
-
// What counts as a cron promotion (
|
|
49
|
-
//
|
|
50
|
-
//
|
|
51
|
-
//
|
|
52
|
-
//
|
|
58
|
+
// What counts as a cron promotion (a finding is raised only when the
|
|
59
|
+
// change introduces deferred authority the caller lacks — i.e. the
|
|
60
|
+
// relevant `scheduledByRole` is NOT schedulable by the caller, where
|
|
61
|
+
// `canScheduleAs(R)` means R's permission set is a SUBSET of the
|
|
62
|
+
// caller's (capability dominance), fail-closed on unknown roles):
|
|
63
|
+
// 1. A new job (by id) was added whose `scheduledByRole` the caller
|
|
64
|
+
// cannot schedule as. Adding a job at-or-below the caller's own
|
|
65
|
+
// role grants nothing new and is allowed.
|
|
66
|
+
// 2. An existing job's `scheduledByRole` was raised to a value the
|
|
67
|
+
// caller cannot schedule as. Lowering it, or a lateral move within
|
|
68
|
+
// the caller's reach, is allowed.
|
|
53
69
|
// 3. An existing job's EXECUTABLE BODY changed — `kind`, `prompt`,
|
|
54
|
-
// `command`, `subagent`, or `payload
|
|
55
|
-
//
|
|
56
|
-
// is the same deferred-laundering
|
|
57
|
-
//
|
|
58
|
-
//
|
|
59
|
-
//
|
|
60
|
-
//
|
|
61
|
-
//
|
|
62
|
-
// consumer
|
|
63
|
-
//
|
|
64
|
-
// separately or are audit metadata
|
|
65
|
-
// 4. An existing job had `enabled: false` flipped to true
|
|
66
|
-
//
|
|
67
|
-
//
|
|
68
|
-
// same sense as adding the job fresh.
|
|
70
|
+
// `command`, `subagent`, or `payload` — AND the job fires above
|
|
71
|
+
// the caller either before or after the change. Rewriting the body
|
|
72
|
+
// of an already-privileged job is the same deferred-laundering
|
|
73
|
+
// attack as job creation (Oracle PR #305 critical finding): the
|
|
74
|
+
// cron consumer fires the new body as the stamped role. Requiring
|
|
75
|
+
// BOTH old and new roles to be within the caller's reach preserves
|
|
76
|
+
// that defense — a member cannot rewrite an owner-stamped body even
|
|
77
|
+
// though `scheduledByRole` is untouched. The fields chosen are
|
|
78
|
+
// exactly those the cron consumer uses to decide what executes;
|
|
79
|
+
// provenance/identity fields (id, scheduledByRole,
|
|
80
|
+
// scheduledByOrigin) are handled separately or are audit metadata.
|
|
81
|
+
// 4. An existing job had `enabled: false` flipped to true while it
|
|
82
|
+
// fires above the caller (same both-sides reach check as body
|
|
83
|
+
// changes). Re-enabling a job at-or-below the caller is allowed.
|
|
69
84
|
//
|
|
70
|
-
// What does NOT count (allowed
|
|
85
|
+
// What does NOT count (allowed):
|
|
86
|
+
// - Any change (add / role-change / body / re-enable) whose resulting
|
|
87
|
+
// job fires at or below the caller's own role: it grants the caller
|
|
88
|
+
// no authority it doesn't already have.
|
|
71
89
|
// - Removing a job entirely.
|
|
72
90
|
// - Changing `schedule` or `timezone` on an existing job (cadence
|
|
73
91
|
// decisions; do not change what runs, only when).
|
|
74
|
-
// - Setting `enabled: true -> false` (disabling a
|
|
75
|
-
//
|
|
76
|
-
//
|
|
77
|
-
//
|
|
78
|
-
// this branch is unreachable in practice; the guard treats it as
|
|
79
|
-
// a non-finding for forward compatibility).
|
|
92
|
+
// - Setting `enabled: true -> false` (disabling is a REDUCTION).
|
|
93
|
+
// - A job with no `scheduledByRole` (`undefined`) is treated as NOT
|
|
94
|
+
// schedulable (fail-closed), so the schema-rejected unset case stays
|
|
95
|
+
// blocked rather than slipping through as a non-finding.
|
|
80
96
|
//
|
|
81
|
-
// Failure-
|
|
82
|
-
//
|
|
83
|
-
//
|
|
84
|
-
//
|
|
85
|
-
//
|
|
97
|
+
// Failure-closed on caller role: an unknown/incomparable caller role
|
|
98
|
+
// makes `canScheduleAs` return false, so every change is treated as an
|
|
99
|
+
// escalation and blocked. Failure-open on file read is unchanged: if the
|
|
100
|
+
// existing `cron.json` cannot be read or parsed, every proposed job is
|
|
101
|
+
// treated as new and then subjected to the same caller-role check.
|
|
86
102
|
export const GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION_SEVERITY: SecuritySeverity = 'medium'
|
|
87
103
|
|
|
88
104
|
export type CronPromotionFinding =
|
|
@@ -95,8 +111,9 @@ export async function checkCronPromotionGuard(options: {
|
|
|
95
111
|
tool: string
|
|
96
112
|
args: Record<string, unknown>
|
|
97
113
|
agentDir: string
|
|
114
|
+
canScheduleAs: CanScheduleAs
|
|
98
115
|
}): Promise<SecurityBlock | undefined> {
|
|
99
|
-
const { tool, args, agentDir } = options
|
|
116
|
+
const { tool, args, agentDir, canScheduleAs } = options
|
|
100
117
|
if (tool !== 'write' && tool !== 'edit') return undefined
|
|
101
118
|
|
|
102
119
|
const rawPath = args.path
|
|
@@ -106,8 +123,6 @@ export async function checkCronPromotionGuard(options: {
|
|
|
106
123
|
const isCronJson = await pathIsCronJson(agentDir, targetPath)
|
|
107
124
|
if (!isCronJson) return undefined
|
|
108
125
|
|
|
109
|
-
if (isGuardAcknowledged(args, GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION)) return undefined
|
|
110
|
-
|
|
111
126
|
const editRefusal = refuseRiskyEdit(tool, args, targetPath)
|
|
112
127
|
if (editRefusal) return editRefusal
|
|
113
128
|
|
|
@@ -118,7 +133,7 @@ export async function checkCronPromotionGuard(options: {
|
|
|
118
133
|
if (newJobs === undefined) return undefined
|
|
119
134
|
|
|
120
135
|
const oldJobs = await readExistingJobs(targetPath)
|
|
121
|
-
const findings = diffJobs(oldJobs, newJobs)
|
|
136
|
+
const findings = diffJobs(oldJobs, newJobs, canScheduleAs)
|
|
122
137
|
if (findings.length === 0) return undefined
|
|
123
138
|
|
|
124
139
|
return {
|
|
@@ -208,7 +223,21 @@ async function readExistingJobs(targetPath: string): Promise<readonly ParsedCron
|
|
|
208
223
|
return result.file.jobs
|
|
209
224
|
}
|
|
210
225
|
|
|
211
|
-
|
|
226
|
+
// A finding is a *promotion* only when the change introduces deferred authority
|
|
227
|
+
// the caller could not already wield. `canScheduleAs(R)` is true when R's
|
|
228
|
+
// permission set is a subset of the caller's, so a change that lands (and, for
|
|
229
|
+
// mutations, started) at a role granting nothing the caller lacks is not
|
|
230
|
+
// flagged. The laundering shapes still trip every branch: a member
|
|
231
|
+
// adding/role-changing a job to `owner` fails `canScheduleAs('owner')`,
|
|
232
|
+
// rewriting/re-enabling an already-`owner`-stamped body fails the prior-role
|
|
233
|
+
// check, and a custom role scheduling as a different custom role that carries
|
|
234
|
+
// an extra permission fails the subset check — none are schedulable, so all
|
|
235
|
+
// stay blocked.
|
|
236
|
+
export function diffJobs(
|
|
237
|
+
before: readonly ParsedCronJob[],
|
|
238
|
+
after: readonly ParsedCronJob[],
|
|
239
|
+
canScheduleAs: CanScheduleAs,
|
|
240
|
+
): CronPromotionFinding[] {
|
|
212
241
|
const findings: CronPromotionFinding[] = []
|
|
213
242
|
const beforeById = new Map<string, ParsedCronJob>()
|
|
214
243
|
for (const job of before) beforeById.set(job.id, job)
|
|
@@ -217,15 +246,17 @@ export function diffJobs(before: readonly ParsedCronJob[], after: readonly Parse
|
|
|
217
246
|
const prior = beforeById.get(job.id)
|
|
218
247
|
const newRole = job.scheduledByRole
|
|
219
248
|
if (prior === undefined) {
|
|
220
|
-
|
|
221
|
-
|
|
222
|
-
|
|
223
|
-
|
|
224
|
-
|
|
249
|
+
if (!canScheduleAs(newRole)) {
|
|
250
|
+
findings.push({
|
|
251
|
+
kind: 'job-added',
|
|
252
|
+
id: job.id,
|
|
253
|
+
scheduledByRole: newRole ?? '<unset>',
|
|
254
|
+
})
|
|
255
|
+
}
|
|
225
256
|
continue
|
|
226
257
|
}
|
|
227
258
|
const oldRole = prior.scheduledByRole
|
|
228
|
-
if (oldRole !== newRole) {
|
|
259
|
+
if (oldRole !== newRole && !canScheduleAs(newRole)) {
|
|
229
260
|
findings.push({
|
|
230
261
|
kind: 'role-changed',
|
|
231
262
|
id: job.id,
|
|
@@ -233,8 +264,9 @@ export function diffJobs(before: readonly ParsedCronJob[], after: readonly Parse
|
|
|
233
264
|
to: newRole ?? '<unset>',
|
|
234
265
|
})
|
|
235
266
|
}
|
|
267
|
+
const withinReach = canScheduleAs(oldRole) && canScheduleAs(newRole)
|
|
236
268
|
const bodyDelta = diffJobBody(prior, job)
|
|
237
|
-
if (bodyDelta.length > 0) {
|
|
269
|
+
if (bodyDelta.length > 0 && !withinReach) {
|
|
238
270
|
findings.push({
|
|
239
271
|
kind: 'body-changed',
|
|
240
272
|
id: job.id,
|
|
@@ -242,7 +274,7 @@ export function diffJobs(before: readonly ParsedCronJob[], after: readonly Parse
|
|
|
242
274
|
fields: bodyDelta,
|
|
243
275
|
})
|
|
244
276
|
}
|
|
245
|
-
if (isPreviouslyDisabled(prior) && !isPreviouslyDisabled(job)) {
|
|
277
|
+
if (isPreviouslyDisabled(prior) && !isPreviouslyDisabled(job) && !withinReach) {
|
|
246
278
|
findings.push({
|
|
247
279
|
kind: 'enabled-flipped',
|
|
248
280
|
id: job.id,
|
|
@@ -329,9 +361,9 @@ function buildBlockReason(tool: string, targetPath: string, findings: readonly C
|
|
|
329
361
|
}
|
|
330
362
|
}
|
|
331
363
|
return [
|
|
332
|
-
`Guard \`${GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION}\` blocked ${tool} on ${sanitizeForReason(targetPath)}: this change
|
|
333
|
-
'Cron jobs carry `scheduledByRole`, which the runtime stamps into the firing session\'s origin. Adding a job
|
|
334
|
-
|
|
364
|
+
`Guard \`${GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION}\` blocked ${tool} on ${sanitizeForReason(targetPath)}: this change schedules deferred work above your role — ${lines.join('; ')}.`,
|
|
365
|
+
'Cron jobs carry `scheduledByRole`, which the runtime stamps into the firing session\'s origin. Adding a job, raising its scheduledByRole, or rewriting/re-enabling a job that already fires above your role is the deferred form of the `rolePromotion` attack: "schedule a privileged prompt now, the cron consumer runs it as that role later." A change that fires at or below your own role grants nothing new and is allowed; this block means the resulting (or prior) role outranks yours.',
|
|
366
|
+
'This cannot be acknowledged away from an under-privileged session. The operator must make the change from a session that already resolves to a role at least as high as the cron job — TUI (owner), or a role granted `security.bypass.medium` — or claim the role out-of-band via `typeclaw role claim`.',
|
|
335
367
|
].join(' ')
|
|
336
368
|
}
|
|
337
369
|
|
|
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { parseConfigJson } from '@/config'
|
|
|
5
5
|
import { splitPluginEntrySpec } from '@/plugin'
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
7
|
import type { SecuritySeverity } from '../permissions'
|
|
8
|
-
import {
|
|
8
|
+
import type { SecurityBlock } from '../policy'
|
|
9
9
|
|
|
10
10
|
export const GUARD_PLUGIN_ADDITION = 'pluginAddition'
|
|
11
11
|
// Classified `medium` (silent-attack axis), same tier and rationale as
|
|
@@ -57,8 +57,6 @@ export async function checkPluginAdditionGuard(options: {
|
|
|
57
57
|
const targetPath = path.resolve(agentDir, rawPath)
|
|
58
58
|
if (!(await pathIsTypeclawJson(agentDir, targetPath))) return undefined
|
|
59
59
|
|
|
60
|
-
if (isGuardAcknowledged(args, GUARD_PLUGIN_ADDITION)) return undefined
|
|
61
|
-
|
|
62
60
|
const editRefusal = refuseRiskyEdit(tool, args, targetPath)
|
|
63
61
|
if (editRefusal) return editRefusal
|
|
64
62
|
|
|
@@ -205,7 +203,7 @@ function buildBlockReason(tool: string, targetPath: string, findings: readonly P
|
|
|
205
203
|
return [
|
|
206
204
|
`Guard \`${GUARD_PLUGIN_ADDITION}\` blocked ${tool} on ${sanitizeForReason(targetPath)}: this change introduces a deferred host-code-execution grant — ${lines.join('; ')}.`,
|
|
207
205
|
"Plugin entries in typeclaw.json#plugins are materialized into package.json and installed by the next host `typeclaw start`, where npm lifecycle scripts run as the operator on the host. Even an `owner` operating from TUI must not silently add plugins on behalf of a channel message: the canonical attack is a prompt-injected agent writing a malicious package name into plugins[] so the operator's next start runs its postinstall.",
|
|
208
|
-
|
|
206
|
+
'This cannot be acknowledged away from an under-privileged session. The operator must make the change from a session that already resolves to `owner`/`trusted` (TUI, or a role granted `security.bypass.medium`), or claim the role out-of-band via `typeclaw role claim`.',
|
|
209
207
|
].join(' ')
|
|
210
208
|
}
|
|
211
209
|
|
|
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { parseConfigJson } from '@/config'
|
|
|
5
5
|
import { isBuiltinRoleName, type RoleConfig, type RolesConfig } from '@/permissions'
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
7
|
import type { SecuritySeverity } from '../permissions'
|
|
8
|
-
import {
|
|
8
|
+
import type { SecurityBlock } from '../policy'
|
|
9
9
|
|
|
10
10
|
export const GUARD_ROLE_PROMOTION = 'rolePromotion'
|
|
11
11
|
// Classified `medium` (silent-attack axis). Originally `high`; reclassified
|
|
@@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ export async function checkRolePromotionGuard(options: {
|
|
|
88
88
|
const isTypeclawJson = await pathIsTypeclawJson(agentDir, targetPath)
|
|
89
89
|
if (!isTypeclawJson) return undefined
|
|
90
90
|
|
|
91
|
-
if (isGuardAcknowledged(args, GUARD_ROLE_PROMOTION)) return undefined
|
|
92
|
-
|
|
93
91
|
const editRefusal = refuseRiskyEdit(tool, args, targetPath)
|
|
94
92
|
if (editRefusal) return editRefusal
|
|
95
93
|
|
|
@@ -378,7 +376,7 @@ function buildBlockReason(tool: string, targetPath: string, findings: readonly R
|
|
|
378
376
|
return [
|
|
379
377
|
`Guard \`${GUARD_ROLE_PROMOTION}\` blocked ${tool} on ${sanitizeForReason(targetPath)}: this change is a privilege escalation — ${lines.join('; ')}.`,
|
|
380
378
|
'Granting `owner` / `trusted` (or widening any role) gives the matched actor security-bypass capabilities, cron scheduling, channel respond, and operator-only subagent spawn. Even an operator running from TUI must not silently rewrite the access-control table based on a channel message: the canonical attack is a member-role speaker socially-engineering the agent into adding their own author-id to `roles.owner.match[]`, which the schema check accepts as valid.',
|
|
381
|
-
|
|
379
|
+
'This cannot be acknowledged away from an under-privileged session. The operator must make the change from a session that already resolves to `owner`/`trusted` (TUI, or a role granted `security.bypass.medium`), or claim the role out-of-band via `typeclaw role claim`.',
|
|
382
380
|
].join(' ')
|
|
383
381
|
}
|
|
384
382
|
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import type { DiscordClient, DiscordUser } from 'agent-messenger/discord'
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
const DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
export type DiscordAuthorResolverOptions = {
|
|
6
|
+
client: Pick<DiscordClient, 'getUser'>
|
|
7
|
+
now?: () => number
|
|
8
|
+
ttlMs?: number
|
|
9
|
+
}
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
export type DiscordAuthorResolver = {
|
|
12
|
+
resolve: (userId: string) => Promise<string>
|
|
13
|
+
}
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
type CacheEntry = { name: string; expiresAt: number }
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
export function createDiscordAuthorResolver(options: DiscordAuthorResolverOptions): DiscordAuthorResolver {
|
|
18
|
+
const now = options.now ?? Date.now
|
|
19
|
+
const ttlMs = options.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_TTL_MS
|
|
20
|
+
const cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>()
|
|
21
|
+
const inflight = new Map<string, Promise<string>>()
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
const resolve = async (userId: string): Promise<string> => {
|
|
24
|
+
const cached = cache.get(userId)
|
|
25
|
+
if (cached && cached.expiresAt > now()) return cached.name
|
|
26
|
+
const existing = inflight.get(userId)
|
|
27
|
+
if (existing) return existing
|
|
28
|
+
const promise = options.client
|
|
29
|
+
.getUser(userId)
|
|
30
|
+
.then((user) => pickDisplayName(user) ?? userId)
|
|
31
|
+
.catch(() => userId)
|
|
32
|
+
.then((name) => {
|
|
33
|
+
if (name !== userId) cache.set(userId, { name, expiresAt: now() + ttlMs })
|
|
34
|
+
return name
|
|
35
|
+
})
|
|
36
|
+
.finally(() => {
|
|
37
|
+
inflight.delete(userId)
|
|
38
|
+
})
|
|
39
|
+
inflight.set(userId, promise)
|
|
40
|
+
return promise
|
|
41
|
+
}
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
return { resolve }
|
|
44
|
+
}
|
|
45
|
+
|
|
46
|
+
function pickDisplayName(user: DiscordUser): string | null {
|
|
47
|
+
const candidates = [user.global_name, user.username]
|
|
48
|
+
for (const c of candidates) {
|
|
49
|
+
if (typeof c === 'string' && c !== '') return c
|
|
50
|
+
}
|
|
51
|
+
return null
|
|
52
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ export function createOutboundCallback(deps: {
|
|
|
696
696
|
Object.keys(sendOptions).length > 0 ? sendOptions : undefined,
|
|
697
697
|
)
|
|
698
698
|
logger.info(`[discord-bot] sent id=${sent.id} ${tag}`)
|
|
699
|
-
return { ok: true }
|
|
699
|
+
return { ok: true, messageId: sent.id, messageIds: [sent.id] }
|
|
700
700
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
701
701
|
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
|
|
702
702
|
logger.error(`[discord-bot] sendMessage failed: ${message}`)
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import type { DiscordClient } from 'agent-messenger/discord'
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
import type { ChannelKey, ChannelNameResolver, ResolvedChannelNames } from '@/channels/types'
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
const DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
export type DiscordChannelResolverOptions = {
|
|
8
|
+
client: Pick<DiscordClient, 'getChannel'>
|
|
9
|
+
now?: () => number
|
|
10
|
+
ttlMs?: number
|
|
11
|
+
}
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
type CacheEntry<T> = { value: T; expiresAt: number }
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
export function createDiscordChannelResolver(options: DiscordChannelResolverOptions): ChannelNameResolver {
|
|
16
|
+
const now = options.now ?? Date.now
|
|
17
|
+
const ttlMs = options.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_TTL_MS
|
|
18
|
+
const chatCache = new Map<string, CacheEntry<string>>()
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
const fetchCached = async <T>(
|
|
21
|
+
cache: Map<string, CacheEntry<T>>,
|
|
22
|
+
key: string,
|
|
23
|
+
fetcher: () => Promise<T | null>,
|
|
24
|
+
): Promise<T | null> => {
|
|
25
|
+
const cached = cache.get(key)
|
|
26
|
+
if (cached && cached.expiresAt > now()) return cached.value
|
|
27
|
+
const value = await fetcher()
|
|
28
|
+
if (value !== null) cache.set(key, { value, expiresAt: now() + ttlMs })
|
|
29
|
+
return value
|
|
30
|
+
}
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
return async (key: ChannelKey): Promise<ResolvedChannelNames> => {
|
|
33
|
+
if (key.workspace === '@dm') return {}
|
|
34
|
+
const chatName = await fetchCached(chatCache, key.chat, async () => {
|
|
35
|
+
try {
|
|
36
|
+
const channel = await options.client.getChannel(key.chat)
|
|
37
|
+
return channel.name || null
|
|
38
|
+
} catch {
|
|
39
|
+
return null
|
|
40
|
+
}
|
|
41
|
+
})
|
|
42
|
+
return chatName !== null ? { chatName } : {}
|
|
43
|
+
}
|
|
44
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import type { DiscordGatewayMessageCreateEvent } from 'agent-messenger/discord'
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
import { matchesAnyAlias } from '@/channels/engagement'
|
|
4
|
+
import type { ChannelAdapterConfig } from '@/channels/schema'
|
|
5
|
+
import type { InboundAttachment, InboundMessage } from '@/channels/types'
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
import { encodeDiscordReactionRef } from './discord-reactions'
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
export type DiscordInboundMessageEvent = DiscordGatewayMessageCreateEvent
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
// WORKAROUND: the USER-token SDK type omits `author.bot` and
|
|
12
|
+
// `message_reference`, but the listener spreads the raw Discord payload
|
|
13
|
+
// (`{ ...d }`), so both fields exist at runtime. Narrow locally instead of
|
|
14
|
+
// augmenting the SDK type globally — do not "simplify" this away.
|
|
15
|
+
export type RawDiscordMessageCreateEvent = DiscordGatewayMessageCreateEvent & {
|
|
16
|
+
author: { bot?: boolean }
|
|
17
|
+
message_reference?: { message_id?: string; channel_id?: string; guild_id?: string }
|
|
18
|
+
}
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
export type InboundDropReason = 'self_author' | 'no_user' | 'empty_content' | 'pre_connect'
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
export type InboundClassification =
|
|
23
|
+
| { kind: 'drop'; reason: InboundDropReason }
|
|
24
|
+
| { kind: 'route'; payload: InboundMessage }
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
export type DiscordInboundContext = {
|
|
27
|
+
selfUserId: string | null
|
|
28
|
+
selfAliases?: readonly string[]
|
|
29
|
+
}
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
export function classifyInbound(
|
|
32
|
+
event: DiscordInboundMessageEvent,
|
|
33
|
+
_config: ChannelAdapterConfig,
|
|
34
|
+
context: DiscordInboundContext,
|
|
35
|
+
): InboundClassification {
|
|
36
|
+
if (context.selfUserId !== null && event.author.id === context.selfUserId)
|
|
37
|
+
return { kind: 'drop', reason: 'self_author' }
|
|
38
|
+
if (event.author.id === '') return { kind: 'drop', reason: 'no_user' }
|
|
39
|
+
const { text, attachments } = splitInbound(event)
|
|
40
|
+
if (text === '') return { kind: 'drop', reason: 'empty_content' }
|
|
41
|
+
if (context.selfUserId === null) return { kind: 'drop', reason: 'pre_connect' }
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
const isDm = event.guild_id === undefined
|
|
44
|
+
const workspace = isDm ? '@dm' : (event.guild_id ?? '')
|
|
45
|
+
const hasGroupMention = GROUP_MENTION_PATTERN.test(event.content)
|
|
46
|
+
const isBotMention =
|
|
47
|
+
hasGroupMention ||
|
|
48
|
+
event.content.includes(`<@${context.selfUserId}>`) ||
|
|
49
|
+
event.content.includes(`<@!${context.selfUserId}>`)
|
|
50
|
+
const aliasMatched = !isBotMention && matchesAnyAlias(event.content, context.selfAliases ?? [])
|
|
51
|
+
const mentionedUsers = event.mentions ?? []
|
|
52
|
+
const mentionsOthers = mentionedUsers.length > 0 && !mentionedUsers.some((user) => user.id === context.selfUserId)
|
|
53
|
+
|
|
54
|
+
const raw = event as RawDiscordMessageCreateEvent
|
|
55
|
+
const replyToParentId = raw.message_reference?.message_id
|
|
56
|
+
const replyToBotMessageId =
|
|
57
|
+
replyToParentId !== undefined && isReplyToSelf(raw, context.selfUserId) ? replyToParentId : null
|
|
58
|
+
const replyToOtherMessageId = replyToParentId !== undefined && replyToBotMessageId === null ? replyToParentId : null
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
return {
|
|
61
|
+
kind: 'route',
|
|
62
|
+
payload: {
|
|
63
|
+
adapter: 'discord',
|
|
64
|
+
workspace,
|
|
65
|
+
chat: event.channel_id,
|
|
66
|
+
thread: null,
|
|
67
|
+
text,
|
|
68
|
+
...(attachments.length > 0 ? { attachments } : {}),
|
|
69
|
+
externalMessageId: event.id,
|
|
70
|
+
reactionRef: encodeDiscordReactionRef({ channel: event.channel_id, message: event.id }),
|
|
71
|
+
authorId: event.author.id,
|
|
72
|
+
authorName: event.author.username,
|
|
73
|
+
authorIsBot: raw.author.bot === true,
|
|
74
|
+
isBotMention: isBotMention || aliasMatched,
|
|
75
|
+
replyToBotMessageId,
|
|
76
|
+
mentionsOthers,
|
|
77
|
+
replyToOtherMessageId,
|
|
78
|
+
isDm,
|
|
79
|
+
ts: parseDiscordTimestamp(event.timestamp),
|
|
80
|
+
},
|
|
81
|
+
}
|
|
82
|
+
}
|
|
83
|
+
|
|
84
|
+
// `message_reference` carries only the parent id, not its author, so we infer
|
|
85
|
+
// "this reply targets us" from the auto-mention Discord injects into the
|
|
86
|
+
// reply's `mentions` array (same trick as the bot adapter). Named "...Self"
|
|
87
|
+
// because the user-token identity is a Discord user; the payload field stays
|
|
88
|
+
// `replyToBotMessageId` to match the InboundMessage contract.
|
|
89
|
+
function isReplyToSelf(event: RawDiscordMessageCreateEvent, selfUserId: string): boolean {
|
|
90
|
+
return (event.mentions ?? []).some((m) => m.id === selfUserId)
|
|
91
|
+
}
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
const GROUP_MENTION_PATTERN = /@(?:everyone|here)/
|
|
94
|
+
|
|
95
|
+
type SplitInbound = { text: string; attachments: InboundAttachment[] }
|
|
96
|
+
|
|
97
|
+
function splitInbound(event: DiscordInboundMessageEvent): SplitInbound {
|
|
98
|
+
const attachments = (event.attachments ?? []).map((attachment, index) => ({
|
|
99
|
+
id: index + 1,
|
|
100
|
+
kind: 'file' as const,
|
|
101
|
+
ref: attachment.url,
|
|
102
|
+
filename: attachment.filename,
|
|
103
|
+
...(attachment.content_type !== undefined ? { mimetype: attachment.content_type } : {}),
|
|
104
|
+
}))
|
|
105
|
+
if (attachments.length === 0) return { text: event.content, attachments: [] }
|
|
106
|
+
const summary = attachments.map(renderPlaceholder).join('\n')
|
|
107
|
+
const text = event.content === '' ? summary : `${event.content}\n${summary}`
|
|
108
|
+
return { text, attachments }
|
|
109
|
+
}
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
111
|
+
function renderPlaceholder(attachment: InboundAttachment): string {
|
|
112
|
+
const parts: string[] = [`Discord attachment #${attachment.id}: ${attachment.kind}`]
|
|
113
|
+
if (attachment.mimetype !== undefined) parts.push(attachment.mimetype)
|
|
114
|
+
if (attachment.filename !== undefined) parts.push(`name=${attachment.filename}`)
|
|
115
|
+
return `[${parts.join(' ')}]`
|
|
116
|
+
}
|
|
117
|
+
|
|
118
|
+
function parseDiscordTimestamp(timestamp: string): number {
|
|
119
|
+
const millis = Date.parse(timestamp)
|
|
120
|
+
return Number.isFinite(millis) ? millis : 0
|
|
121
|
+
}
|