typeclaw 0.31.1 → 0.32.1

package/src/init/index.ts

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { createTui } from '@/tui'
 
 import { resolveBaseImageVersion, resolveScaffoldVersion } from './cli-version'
 import { buildDockerfile, DOCKERFILE } from './dockerfile'
+import { CONFIG_FILE, findAgentDir, isInitialized } from './find-agent-dir'
 import { installGithubWebhooksEagerly, type EagerGithubWebhookInstallResult } from './github-webhook-install'
 import { buildGitignore, GITIGNORE_FILE } from './gitignore'
 import { buildHatchingPrompt } from './hatching'
@@ -35,7 +36,8 @@ export { GITKEEP_FILE, PACKAGES_DIR, PUBLIC_DIR } from './paths'
 
 export { appendOrReplaceEnvKey, hasEnvKey, readEnvFile } from './env-file'
 
-const CONFIG_FILE = 'typeclaw.json'
+export { CONFIG_FILE, findAgentDir, isInitialized }
+
 const CRON_FILE = 'cron.json'
 const PACKAGE_FILE = 'package.json'
 
@@ -491,39 +493,6 @@ export function isDirectoryNonEmpty(dir: string): boolean {
   }
 }
 
-export function isInitialized(dir: string): boolean {
-  return existsSync(join(dir, CONFIG_FILE))
-}
-
-// Walks upward from `start` looking for the agent folder (the dir containing
-// typeclaw.json). Returns the found dir, or null if nothing is found before
-// the walk hits a stop boundary.
-//
-// Stop boundaries (whichever comes first, checked at every level):
-//   1. The current dir contains typeclaw.json — return it.
-//   2. The current dir contains .git — return null. A .git boundary marks a
-//      project root; refusing to cross it prevents accidentally picking up an
-//      unrelated parent project, and matches how typeclaw itself initializes
-//      one .git per agent folder.
-//   3. We've reached the filesystem root — return null.
-//
-// The `.git` check fires AFTER the typeclaw.json check at the same level so
-// that walking up from a subdir of the agent (e.g. `<agent>/workspace/`) still
-// resolves to the agent root, even though the agent root itself contains both
-// typeclaw.json and .git.
-export function findAgentDir(start: string): string | null {
-  let dir = resolve(start)
-  const root = resolve(dir, '/')
-  while (true) {
-    if (existsSync(join(dir, CONFIG_FILE))) return dir
-    if (existsSync(join(dir, '.git'))) return null
-    if (dir === root) return null
-    const parent = dirname(dir)
-    if (parent === dir) return null
-    dir = parent
-  }
-}
-
 const HATCHED_COMMIT_SUBJECT = 'Hatched 🐣'
 
 export async function isHatched(dir: string): Promise<boolean> {

package/src/inspect/transcript-view.ts

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ export type TranscriptViewOptions = {
   createTerminal?: () => Terminal
 }
 
+export const MAX_LIVE_HISTORY_ENTRIES = 250
+
 // Read-only pi-tui transcript viewer: the rich counterpart to the line
 // renderer, matching the live TUI's look (markdown assistant blocks, formatted
 // tool panels) but with NO editor and NO websocket writes. It owns its own
@@ -45,11 +47,18 @@ export function createTranscriptView(opts: TranscriptViewOptions) {
     tui.requestRender()
 
     // The status line is pinned last (no editor to pin, unlike createTui). Each
-    // appended history entry is inserted before it: strip status, add entry,
-    // re-add status.
-    const append = (component: Component): void => {
+    // event's components are inserted before it: strip status, add them, re-add
+    // status. pi-tui re-renders (and re-lays out every Markdown block in) the
+    // whole child list each frame, so an unbounded live tail makes per-frame cost
+    // grow until the viewer stalls; the window evicts the oldest entry to keep
+    // render cost bounded. Components are evicted per event so a timestamp never
+    // outlives its body. Header and pinned status are never evicted.
+    const history = new BoundedComponentWindow(MAX_LIVE_HISTORY_ENTRIES)
+    const appendEntry = (components: HistoryEntry): void => {
       tui.removeChild(status)
-      tui.addChild(component)
+      const evicted = history.push(components)
+      if (evicted !== null) for (const component of evicted) tui.removeChild(component)
+      for (const component of components) tui.addChild(component)
       tui.addChild(status)
     }
 
@@ -83,15 +92,14 @@ export function createTranscriptView(opts: TranscriptViewOptions) {
     // transcripts; render per event once live.
     let live = false
     const onEvent = (event: InspectEvent): void => {
-      append(new Text(formatEventTime(event.ts), 0, 0))
-      append(componentFor(event))
+      appendEntry([new Text(formatEventTime(event.ts), 0, 0), componentFor(event)])
       if (live) tui.requestRender()
     }
     const onPhase = (phase: StreamPhase): void => {
       if (phase.phase === 'replay-end') {
         tui.requestRender()
       } else if (phase.phase === 'live-start') {
-        append(new Text(divider(phase.sessionLive ? 'live' : 'live (broadcasts only)'), 0, 0))
+        appendEntry([new Text(divider(phase.sessionLive ? 'live' : 'live (broadcasts only)'), 0, 0)])
         live = true
         tui.requestRender()
       }
@@ -190,3 +198,21 @@ function statusLine(_phase: 'replay'): string {
 function divider(text: string): string {
   return colors.dim(`─── ${text} ───`)
 }
+
+export type HistoryEntry = readonly Component[]
+
+export class BoundedComponentWindow {
+  private readonly entries: HistoryEntry[] = []
+
+  constructor(private readonly maxEntries: number) {}
+
+  push(entry: HistoryEntry): HistoryEntry | null {
+    this.entries.push(entry)
+    if (this.entries.length <= this.maxEntries) return null
+    return this.entries.shift() ?? null
+  }
+
+  get size(): number {
+    return this.entries.length
+  }
+}

package/src/sandbox/availability.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ import { SandboxUnavailableError } from './errors'
 // resolved bwrap path so a test (or a consumer pinning a non-default path)
 // re-probes instead of reading another path's cached result.
 const availabilityCache = new Map<string, boolean>()
+// In-flight dedup: bash calls run concurrently (subagents, cron, parallel
+// tool calls), so without this two calls racing before the cache is populated
+// would each spawn a probe. The promise is cleared on settle so a probe that
+// was aborted (not "unavailable", just cancelled) does not poison the next
+// caller — the next call re-probes from scratch. Mirrors the channels
+// membership-cache in-flight pattern.
+const availabilityInFlight = new Map<string, Promise<boolean>>()
 
 export async function ensureBwrapAvailable(options?: { bwrapPath?: string }): Promise<void> {
   const bwrap = options?.bwrapPath ?? 'bwrap'
@@ -12,11 +19,29 @@ export async function ensureBwrapAvailable(options?: { bwrapPath?: string }): Pr
   if (cached === true) return
   if (cached === false) throw new SandboxUnavailableError()
 
-  const available = await probe(bwrap)
-  availabilityCache.set(bwrap, available)
+  const available = await dedupedProbe(bwrap)
   if (!available) throw new SandboxUnavailableError()
 }
 
+function dedupedProbe(bwrap: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  const existing = availabilityInFlight.get(bwrap)
+  if (existing !== undefined) return existing
+
+  const promise = probe(bwrap)
+    .then((available) => {
+      // Cache unconditionally, including false: a genuinely missing bwrap is a
+      // process-global fact, so the negative must stick rather than re-probe on
+      // every bash call. (No per-caller signal here — see canMountRealProc.)
+      availabilityCache.set(bwrap, available)
+      return available
+    })
+    .finally(() => {
+      availabilityInFlight.delete(bwrap)
+    })
+  availabilityInFlight.set(bwrap, promise)
+  return promise
+}
+
 async function probe(bwrap: string): Promise<boolean> {
   // Bun.spawn throws synchronously with ENOENT when the binary is not on
   // PATH, rather than resolving with a non-zero exit code — so the
@@ -32,6 +57,333 @@ async function probe(bwrap: string): Promise<boolean> {
 
 export function _resetBwrapAvailabilityCacheForTests(): void {
   availabilityCache.clear()
+  availabilityInFlight.clear()
+}
+
+// The 'real-proc' sandbox strategy prefixes bwrap with `unshare --pid --fork
+// --mount --mount-proc`, which mounts a fresh procfs in a new PID namespace.
+// That mount needs REAL CAP_SYS_ADMIN. `typeclaw start` grants the container
+// `--cap-add=SYS_ADMIN` when sandbox.realProc is on, but the grant is a no-op
+// on runtimes that virtualize or strip caps: rootless Docker (userns-capped
+// caps), gVisor/runsc (caps never reach the host kernel), Docker Desktop
+// Enhanced Container Isolation (intercepts mount), and AppArmor-enforcing
+// hosts (Ubuntu 24.04+ restricts unprivileged userns even with the cap). On
+// those the `unshare` fails fast with "Operation not permitted" (exit != 0)
+// before bwrap runs. Probing once at the first sandboxed bash call lets the
+// consumer fall back to the '--tmpfs /proc' strategy instead of failing every
+// low-trust bash call — restoring the pre-realProc behavior on unsupported
+// hosts (external-package execution still won't work there, exactly as before).
+let realProcProbeResult: boolean | undefined
+// In-flight dedup for the real-proc probe, same rationale as bwrap above:
+// concurrent first bash calls would otherwise each spawn `unshare`. A single
+// nullable promise suffices (no key — there is one probe), cleared on settle.
+//
+// Deliberately NOT abortable. The answer ("can THIS container mount a fresh
+// procfs?") is a process-global capability fact, not a per-request operation —
+// it does not vary with any one bash call's lifecycle. Threading a caller's
+// AbortSignal here is a category error: a deduped joiner would let the first
+// caller's abort decide a shared fact for everyone waiting on it. The payload
+// (`/bin/true`) exits in milliseconds and the result is cached for the process,
+// so cancellation buys nothing. If a supported environment ever made this probe
+// slow, add an INTERNAL timeout (the result is still global), never a caller
+// signal.
+let realProcProbeInFlight: Promise<boolean> | undefined
+
+export function canMountRealProc(): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (realProcProbeResult !== undefined) return Promise.resolve(realProcProbeResult)
+  if (realProcProbeInFlight !== undefined) return realProcProbeInFlight
+
+  const promise = probeRealProc()
+    .then((canMount) => {
+      realProcProbeResult = canMount
+      return canMount
+    })
+    .finally(() => {
+      realProcProbeInFlight = undefined
+    })
+  realProcProbeInFlight = promise
+  return promise
+}
+
+async function probeRealProc(): Promise<boolean> {
+  // `/bin/true` is the cheapest possible payload: the probe only needs to learn
+  // whether the kernel lets us create the PID+mount namespaces and mount procfs
+  // into them. Bun.spawn throws ENOENT if `unshare` is missing (it is in
+  // util-linux, baseline) — that lands in the catch as "cannot do real-proc".
+  try {
+    const proc = Bun.spawn(['unshare', '--pid', '--fork', '--mount', '--mount-proc', '--', '/bin/true'], {
+      stdout: 'ignore',
+      stderr: 'ignore',
+    })
+    await proc.exited
+    return proc.exitCode === 0
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+
+export function _resetRealProcProbeCacheForTests(): void {
+  realProcProbeResult = undefined
+  realProcProbeInFlight = undefined
+}
+
+// The 'proc-bind' strategy (build.ts) does `bwrap --unshare-all ... --ro-bind
+// /proc /proc`: it binds the container's already-real procfs with NO unshare
+// --mount-proc and NO CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so it works where 'real-proc' is rejected
+// (OrbStack). Its security rests entirely on the kernel BLOCKING cross-userns
+// reads of /proc/<agent>/environ — the FIREWORKS_API_KEY / GH_TOKEN surface —
+// because bwrap's --unshare-all puts the sandbox in a CHILD user namespace. That
+// block is a kernel fact on every mainstream host, but the consumer must never
+// assume it: a misconfigured runtime that preserves parent-userns creds, or a
+// future bwrap flag change, would turn this strategy into a secret leak. So we
+// PROBE it directly before ever selecting it — plant a real secret in a sibling
+// process's env and assert the sandbox cannot read it back.
+// Keyed by resolved bwrapPath, like ensureBwrapAvailable: the safety answer is a
+// fact about a SPECIFIC bwrap binary, so a caller pinning a non-default path
+// (tests, or a future deployment) must re-probe rather than inherit the default
+// binary's result. In-flight dedup for the same reason as canMountRealProc:
+// concurrent first callers for one path share a single probe. Both cached
+// process-globally (the answer is a per-container capability fact). Not abortable
+// (see canMountRealProc).
+const procBindProbeCache = new Map<string, boolean>()
+const procBindProbeInFlight = new Map<string, Promise<boolean>>()
+
+// `safe` is the answer; `cacheable` is false for INCONCLUSIVE outcomes (a probe
+// timeout under load, or the sentinel dying mid-probe). Those are transient
+// failure modes, not capability facts, so caching their `safe=false` would
+// PERMANENTLY disable proc-bind for the process — a single slow first bash call
+// would silently break every later bunx until container restart (the exact
+// "works after restart" symptom this whole fix exists to kill). Only a probe that
+// ran to a verdict (definitively safe OR definitively leaking) is cached.
+type ProcBindProbe = { safe: boolean; cacheable: boolean }
+
+export function canBindProcSafely(options?: { bwrapPath?: string }): Promise<boolean> {
+  const bwrap = options?.bwrapPath ?? 'bwrap'
+  const cached = procBindProbeCache.get(bwrap)
+  if (cached !== undefined) return Promise.resolve(cached)
+  const existing = procBindProbeInFlight.get(bwrap)
+  if (existing !== undefined) return existing
+
+  const promise = probeProcBind(bwrap)
+    .then(({ safe, cacheable }) => {
+      if (cacheable) procBindProbeCache.set(bwrap, safe)
+      return safe
+    })
+    .finally(() => {
+      procBindProbeInFlight.delete(bwrap)
+    })
+  procBindProbeInFlight.set(bwrap, promise)
+  return promise
+}
+
+const PROC_BIND_PROBE_SECRET = 'TYPECLAW_PROCBIND_PROBE_SECRET'
+
+const INCONCLUSIVE: ProcBindProbe = { safe: false, cacheable: false }
+
+async function probeProcBind(bwrap: string): Promise<ProcBindProbe> {
+  // The sentinel must model the REAL threat geometry: the agent runtime holds
+  // the secret in its env and lives in the PARENT user namespace, while the
+  // sandbox is a child userns. So spawn the sentinel as a plain sibling (parent
+  // userns, same real uid as the agent runtime) that just sleeps holding the
+  // secret, then enter the EXACT proc-bind bwrap shape and prove the sandbox
+  // cannot read it. A weaker model (sentinel inside the same userns as the probe
+  // bash) would falsely pass.
+  let sentinel: Bun.Subprocess | undefined
+  try {
+    // `env -i` so the sentinel carries ONLY the marker, never the parent's real
+    // FIREWORKS_API_KEY/GH_TOKEN — the probe must not itself plant a real secret,
+    // independent of Bun.spawn's env merge/replace semantics. `sleep 30` outlives
+    // the sub-second probe by a wide margin (so it cannot exit mid-probe and let
+    // a post-exit ESRCH masquerade as the EACCES block), yet is short enough to
+    // self-reap within seconds if cleanup ever fails to fire .kill().
+    sentinel = Bun.spawn(['/usr/bin/env', '-i', `${PROC_BIND_PROBE_SECRET}=leaked`, '/bin/sleep', '30'], {
+      stdout: 'ignore',
+      stderr: 'ignore',
+    })
+    const sentinelPid = sentinel.pid
+
+    // No pid / a failed sentinel setup is a transient local failure, not a
+    // capability verdict — inconclusive, so it is not cached.
+    if (sentinelPid === undefined) return INCONCLUSIVE
+    // Two-sided proof that the in-sandbox block is the USERNS boundary and
+    // nothing else. From the PARENT (this process — container root, parent
+    // userns, same uid as the sentinel) the sentinel's environ MUST contain the
+    // marker: that proves the sentinel is dumpable, same-uid, AND that this pid is
+    // OUR sentinel (not a reused pid), so the ONLY thing that can deny the read
+    // from inside the sandbox is the child-userns boundary (rules out a false
+    // "blocked" from dumpable=0 / uid mismatch). If the parent can't read the
+    // marker, the sentinel setup is unsound — inconclusive, fail closed, no cache.
+    if (!(await parentReadsSentinelMarker(sentinelPid))) return INCONCLUSIVE
+
+    const proc = Bun.spawn(
+      [
+        bwrap,
+        '--unshare-all',
+        '--clearenv',
+        '--ro-bind',
+        '/usr',
+        '/usr',
+        '--dev',
+        '/dev',
+        '--ro-bind-try',
+        '/bin',
+        '/bin',
+        '--ro-bind-try',
+        '/lib',
+        '/lib',
+        '--ro-bind-try',
+        '/lib64',
+        '/lib64',
+        '--ro-bind',
+        '/proc',
+        '/proc',
+        '--',
+        '/bin/sh',
+        '-c',
+        buildProcBindProbeScript(sentinelPid),
+      ],
+      { stdout: 'ignore', stderr: 'ignore' },
+    )
+    // Resolve the probe against three outcomes:
+    //   - the bwrap probe exits → use its verdict (cacheable)
+    //   - the sentinel exits FIRST → the in-sandbox open-failures could now be
+    //     ESRCH (pid gone), so the verdict is void → inconclusive
+    //   - a hung bwrap (a wedged runtime) → time out, so a stuck probe never
+    //     stalls the first low-trust bash call → inconclusive
+    // The timeout is a setTimeout cleared in finally: an abandoned Bun.sleep timer
+    // keeps Bun's event loop alive for the full delay (verified: ~5s hang on
+    // process drain after the first bash call), so it MUST be cancelled once the
+    // race settles.
+    let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined
+    try {
+      const outcome = await Promise.race([
+        proc.exited.then(() => 'probe' as const),
+        sentinel.exited.then(() => 'sentinel-died' as const),
+        new Promise<'timeout'>((resolve) => {
+          timer = setTimeout(() => resolve('timeout'), PROC_BIND_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS)
+        }),
+      ])
+      if (outcome !== 'probe') {
+        // SIGKILL + await reaping so a wedged probe leaves no zombie; swallow any
+        // error so cleanup never throws out of the probe.
+        proc.kill('SIGKILL')
+        await proc.exited.catch(() => {})
+        return INCONCLUSIVE
+      }
+    } finally {
+      if (timer !== undefined) clearTimeout(timer)
+    }
+    // Interpret the verdict by the SPECIFIC exit code the script chose, never by
+    // "non-zero" — a non-zero exit also covers script setup failures (a bwrap that
+    // started but couldn't read /proc/self/fd), bwrap startup failures (missing
+    // lib, transient mount EBUSY → bwrap's own exit), and an external SIGKILL.
+    // Caching any of those transient failures as a definitive safe=false would
+    // PERMANENTLY disable proc-bind — the same cache-poisoning class as the
+    // timeout bug. So only the script's two designated codes are cacheable:
+    // PROC_BIND_SAFE (clean run, every open blocked) and PROC_BIND_LEAK (an open
+    // SUCCEEDED — a real leak). Setup failures use PROC_BIND_SETUP_FAILED, and any
+    // other code (bwrap startup, signals, 127) is treated as inconclusive.
+    if (proc.exitCode === PROC_BIND_LEAK) return { safe: false, cacheable: true }
+    if (proc.exitCode !== PROC_BIND_SAFE) return INCONCLUSIVE
+    // Final liveness: the in-sandbox blocked-open assertions are only meaningful
+    // if the sentinel was alive throughout. Re-read its MARKER from the PARENT —
+    // success proves the pid still resolves to OUR live sentinel, so the in-sandbox
+    // open-failures were EACCES, not a post-exit ESRCH (or a reused pid).
+    // `sentinel.killed`/`exitCode` only report whether Bun signalled it, not
+    // kernel liveness, so this marker re-read is the stronger postcondition. A
+    // failure here means the sentinel vanished mid-probe → inconclusive.
+    if (!(await parentReadsSentinelMarker(sentinelPid))) return INCONCLUSIVE
+    return { safe: true, cacheable: true }
+  } catch {
+    return INCONCLUSIVE
+  } finally {
+    try {
+      sentinel?.kill()
+    } catch {
+      // killing an already-exited sentinel can throw on some runtimes; cleanup
+      // must never propagate out of the probe.
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// Cap on the in-sandbox bwrap probe so a wedged runtime cannot stall the first
+// low-trust bash call. The probe normally completes in a few ms; this is a
+// generous ceiling, not a tuning knob.
+const PROC_BIND_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000
+
+// Designated probe-script exit codes. ONLY these two are a cacheable verdict;
+// every other code (a setup failure, bwrap startup failure, a signal, 127, …) is
+// inconclusive and must NOT be cached — see the exit-code interpretation in
+// probeProcBind. Chosen well clear of the shell's own conventional codes (1, 2,
+// 126, 127, 128+n) so a setup/bwrap/signal failure can never be mistaken for the
+// safe or leak verdict.
+const PROC_BIND_SAFE = 0
+const PROC_BIND_LEAK = 10
+const PROC_BIND_SETUP_FAILED = 20
+
+// The in-sandbox assertion, built as a pure function so a unit test can pin its
+// shape (the integration behavior needs a Linux container + bwrap, unrunnable in
+// CI). It must prove the secret block holds for the RIGHT REASON, not by
+// accident: a naive `cat environ && exit 1` exits non-zero for BOTH a permission
+// failure (EACCES — the real userns block, SAFE) and a missing process (ESRCH —
+// the sentinel died, proves NOTHING), so on a host that actually leaks a sentinel
+// that exited early would false-pass. The checks, in order:
+//   1. self /proc/self/{fd,maps} readable — the property that makes bunx work.
+//   2. the sentinel is ALIVE — /proc/<pid>/status readable. A dead pid fails
+//      here, so a later open-failure cannot be ESRCH.
+//   3. environ + maps OPENS fail. `(: < path)` is the no-op builtin with a read
+//      redirect: the SHELL opens the file (the same open(2) path Bun/an attacker
+//      uses), so a cross-userns EACCES makes the redirect fail and the leak-exit
+//      is skipped, while a successful open (a leak) runs `exit PROC_BIND_LEAK`.
+//      This replaces an earlier `cat … | grep 'Permission denied'`, which
+//      depended on a localized errno STRING (a non-C locale would mistranslate it
+//      → grep miss → silent fallback to tmpfs → the bunx crash returns) and on
+//      PATH resolving `cat`/`grep` under --clearenv. The redirect uses no external
+//      command and no error text, so it is locale- and PATH-independent.
+// The exit codes are DISTINCT by outcome so the caller can cache only definitive
+// verdicts: setup checks exit PROC_BIND_SETUP_FAILED (inconclusive — a bwrap that
+// started but lacks /proc/self/fd, etc.), a detected leak exits PROC_BIND_LEAK
+// (definitive unsafe), a clean run exits PROC_BIND_SAFE. A bare `exit 1` would
+// conflate setup failures with leaks and poison the cache.
+// NOTE: `test -r` is deliberately NOT used for the protected files. It asks
+// access(2) (permission bits + uid), which on a same-uid /proc/<pid>/environ
+// returns "readable" even when the ptrace-gated open(2) is actually blocked —
+// empirically verified. Only an open attempt exercises the real leak path.
+// The `2>/dev/null` needs /dev/null, so the probe's bwrap args include `--dev
+// /dev` (matching build.ts's proc-bind branch). Without it the redirect fails and
+// the verdict is unreliable — the bwrap probe MUST keep `--dev /dev`.
+export function buildProcBindProbeScript(sentinelPid: number): string {
+  const blockedOpen = (path: string): string => `(: < ${path}) 2>/dev/null && exit ${PROC_BIND_LEAK}`
+  return [
+    `test -r /proc/self/fd || exit ${PROC_BIND_SETUP_FAILED}`,
+    `test -r /proc/self/maps || exit ${PROC_BIND_SETUP_FAILED}`,
+    `test -r /proc/${sentinelPid}/status || exit ${PROC_BIND_SETUP_FAILED}`,
+    blockedOpen(`/proc/${sentinelPid}/environ`),
+    blockedOpen(`/proc/${sentinelPid}/maps`),
+    `exit ${PROC_BIND_SAFE}`,
+  ].join('; ')
+}
+
+async function parentReadsSentinelMarker(sentinelPid: number): Promise<boolean> {
+  // Direct read, not a `cat` subprocess: an actual open(2)+read is the real leak
+  // path (matching the in-sandbox `(: < path)` check), with no spawn and no PATH
+  // dependence in this non-clearenv parent context. We assert the MARKER bytes are
+  // present, not merely that the read succeeded: this (a) makes the check robust
+  // even if a procfs/Bun edge returned an empty buffer instead of throwing, and
+  // (b) confirms the pid still resolves to OUR sentinel — a reused pid would carry
+  // a different environ, failing the marker match. `.bytes()` forces the read so a
+  // security-gated file that stats fine but blocks read is reported unreadable.
+  try {
+    const bytes = await Bun.file(`/proc/${sentinelPid}/environ`).bytes()
+    return new TextDecoder().decode(bytes).includes(`${PROC_BIND_PROBE_SECRET}=leaked`)
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+
+export function _resetProcBindProbeCacheForTests(): void {
+  procBindProbeCache.clear()
+  procBindProbeInFlight.clear()
 }
 
 // The bun binary this process runs as (process.execPath). build.ts re-exposes

package/src/sandbox/build.ts

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ function buildArgv(command: string, policy: SandboxPolicy): string[] {
   const bwrap = policy.bwrapPath ?? 'bwrap'
   const procStrategy = policy.proc ?? 'tmpfs'
   const realProc = procStrategy === 'real-proc'
+  const procBind = procStrategy === 'proc-bind'
 
   // 'real-proc' splits PID-namespace ownership from bwrap. `unshare --pid
   // --fork --mount --mount-proc` (util-linux, baseline) creates the new PID +
@@ -118,13 +119,22 @@ function buildArgv(command: string, policy: SandboxPolicy): string[] {
     '/lib64',
   )
 
-  if (realProc) {
-    // The outer `unshare --mount-proc` already mounted a fresh procfs scoped to
-    // the new PID namespace. --ro-bind /proc /proc binds THAT procfs (not the
-    // outer container's), so the child gets real /proc/self/{fd,maps} and the
-    // agent runtime's pids — and their /proc/N/environ secrets — are simply
-    // absent from this namespace. No /proc/self/exe symlink is needed: a real
-    // /proc/self/exe already resolves correctly.
+  if (realProc || procBind) {
+    // --ro-bind /proc /proc gives the child a real /proc/self/{fd,maps,exe} so a
+    // JS package runner's spawned bin stops aborting with Bun's ENOTDIR. The two
+    // strategies differ only in WHICH procfs is bound:
+    //   real-proc: the outer `unshare --mount-proc` already mounted a fresh
+    //     procfs scoped to the new PID namespace, so this binds THAT — the agent
+    //     runtime's pids are absent from the namespace entirely (full PID
+    //     isolation), at the cost of CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the mount.
+    //   proc-bind: no unshare/mount, so this binds the container's ALREADY-REAL
+    //     procfs. The agent runtime's pids ARE present, but --unshare-all put
+    //     this bash in a CHILD user namespace, so the kernel's
+    //     PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS check blocks /proc/<agent>/environ (EACCES)
+    //     and kill()/ptrace against them fail EPERM (no CAP_KILL in the parent
+    //     userns). Only non-secret metadata (cmdline/status) stays visible.
+    // No /proc/self/exe symlink is needed in either case: a real /proc/self/exe
+    // resolves correctly.
     argv.push('--ro-bind', '/proc', '/proc')
   } else if (procStrategy === 'tmpfs') {
     // --tmpfs /proc, never --proc /proc (OrbStack's kernel blocks

package/src/sandbox/index.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@
 export { buildSandboxedCommand, type SandboxedCommand } from './build'
-export { ensureBwrapAvailable, resolveProcSelfExe, _resetBwrapAvailabilityCacheForTests } from './availability'
+export {
+  buildProcBindProbeScript,
+  canBindProcSafely,
+  canMountRealProc,
+  ensureBwrapAvailable,
+  resolveProcSelfExe,
+  _resetBwrapAvailabilityCacheForTests,
+  _resetProcBindProbeCacheForTests,
+  _resetRealProcProbeCacheForTests,
+} from './availability'
 export { resolveHiddenPaths, type HiddenPaths } from './hidden-paths'
 export {
   resolveProtectedZones,

package/src/sandbox/policy.ts

@@ -6,15 +6,33 @@ export type SandboxMount =
 
 export type SandboxNetwork = 'none' | 'inherit'
 
-// 'tmpfs' (default): empty /proc + a single /proc/self/exe symlink. Works on
-// every host but gives no /proc/self/{fd,maps}, so a JS package runner's CHILD
-// (the spawned bin) crashes with ENOTDIR reading /proc/self/fd. 'none': no
-// /proc at all. 'real-proc': mount a fresh procfs scoped to a NEW pid namespace
-// so the child gets a real /proc/self/{fd,maps} WITHOUT seeing the agent
-// runtime's pids (no /proc/<agent>/environ leak). 'real-proc' requires the
-// outer container to hold CAP_SYS_ADMIN (mount(2) of proc); start.ts only grants
-// it when the operator opts in via typeclaw.json#sandbox.realProc.
-export type SandboxProcStrategy = 'tmpfs' | 'none' | 'real-proc'
+// 'proc-bind' (the runtime default): --ro-bind /proc /proc binds the container's
+// ALREADY-REAL procfs straight into the sandbox — no `unshare --mount-proc`, no
+// CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A JS package runner's child gets a real /proc/self/{fd,maps,exe}
+// so `bunx`/`bun add`/`bun run <pkg-bin>` stop aborting with Bun's ENOTDIR. The
+// agent runtime's /proc/<agent>/environ (FIREWORKS_API_KEY, GH_TOKEN) is NOT
+// leaked: build.ts always emits --unshare-user, so the sandboxed bash runs as
+// mapped-root in a CHILD user namespace that is not an ancestor of the agent
+// runtime's userns. The kernel's PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS check on
+// /proc/<pid>/environ then fails (EACCES), and kill()/ptrace against those pids
+// fail EPERM (no CAP_KILL in the parent userns) — both verified empirically on
+// live OrbStack. The residual is non-secret metadata (other pids' cmdline/status
+// are visible); accepted on the single-tenant boundary, since environ/mem/ptrace
+// /signal — the API-key surface — stay blocked. Works on every host INCLUDING
+// OrbStack (which denies `unshare --mount-proc` even with CAP_SYS_ADMIN), and is
+// the default precisely because it needs no outer-container capability.
+// 'real-proc' (opt-in, sandbox.realProc=true): mount a fresh procfs scoped to a
+// NEW pid namespace via `unshare --pid --fork --mount --mount-proc`. Adds full
+// PID isolation (the agent runtime's pids are absent from the namespace, not just
+// unreadable) on top of the environ guard, but needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN (mount(2) of
+// proc) — granted by start.ts only when realProc is set — and is rejected on
+// OrbStack. Chosen only when the cap-mount probe confirms it actually works.
+// 'tmpfs' (last-resort degraded fallback): empty /proc + a single /proc/self/exe
+// symlink. Works on every host but gives no /proc/self/{fd,maps}, so a JS package
+// runner's CHILD (the spawned bin) crashes with ENOTDIR reading /proc/self/fd —
+// external packages can't run in the sandbox under this strategy. 'none': no
+// /proc at all.
+export type SandboxProcStrategy = 'tmpfs' | 'none' | 'real-proc' | 'proc-bind'
 
 export type SandboxEnvPolicy = {
   set?: Record<string, string>