torusguard 2.0.0-alpha → 2.1.0

package/skills/torusguard/payload/scripts/manifest_builder.py

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ def scan_workspace_files(base_dir):
             dirs.remove("__pycache__")
 
         for f in sorted(files):
-            if f in [".manifest.json", ".gitkeep"] or f.endswith(".pyc"):
+            if f in [".manifest.json", ".gitkeep", "auth.json"] or f.endswith(".pyc"):
                 continue
             full_path = Path(root) / f
             rel_path = full_path.relative_to(base_dir).as_posix()

package/skills/torusguard/payload/skills/torusguard/SKILL.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 name: torusguard
 description: Universal autonomous security engine: 74 canonical rules across 18 families, polyglot stack detection across 16+ languages, Ponytail remediation bounds (<=35 add, <=25 del), standardized 75-column terminal UI, SARIF v2.1.0 exports, and persistent security memory context.
-version: 1.3.6
+version: 2.0.0
 ---
 
 # TorusGuard Master Security Engine & Command Router
@@ -10,38 +10,50 @@ version: 1.3.6
 
 ---
 
-## Command Catalog: Terminal CLI & AI Chat Parity
+## Tri-Mode Execution & Command Catalog
 
-TorusGuard operates with 100% feature parity across both the terminal CLI and AI chat slash commands:
+TorusGuard operates with 100% feature parity across the compiled terminal CLI, AI chat slash commands, and Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools:
 
-| Capability | Terminal CLI Command | AI Chat Slash Command | Specialist Skill | Purpose |
+| Capability | Terminal CLI Command | AI Chat Slash Command | Specialist Skill | Governed Purpose |
 | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
-| **Init** | `npx torusguard init` | `/torusguard init` | `skills/torusguard-init` | Stack discovery, rule activation, workspace scaffolding |
-| **Status** | `npx torusguard status` | `/torusguard status` | `skills/torusguard-status` | Posture score, active rules, run history, scope check |
-| **Audit** | `npx torusguard audit` | `/torusguard audit` | `skills/torusguard-audit` | Static AST scan, invariant fingerprinting, confidence scoring |
-| **Verify** | `npx torusguard verify` | `/torusguard verify` | `skills/torusguard-verify` | Evidence sufficiency audit & line match calibration |
-| **Harden** | `npx torusguard harden` | `/torusguard harden` | `skills/torusguard-harden` | Ponytail patch formulation ($\le 35$ add, $\le 25$ del) |
-| **Apply** | `npx torusguard apply [--yes]` | `/torusguard apply` | `skills/torusguard-apply` | Human Gate review, `.bak` snapshots, patch application |
-| **Rollback** | `npx torusguard rollback` | `/torusguard rollback` | `skills/torusguard-apply` | Instant 1-step rollback from pre-apply snapshots |
-| **Recheck** | `npx torusguard recheck` | `/torusguard recheck` | `skills/torusguard-recheck` | Targeted differential AST scan, fix closure verification |
-| **Recipes** | `npx torusguard recipes` | `/torusguard recipes` | `skills/torusguard-harden` | Explore verified Golden Fix Recipes from persistent memory |
-| **Report** | `npx torusguard report --html` | `/torusguard report` | `skills/torusguard-report` | Executive posture reporting, SARIF v2.1.0 & visual HTML |
-| **Authorize** | `npx torusguard authorize` | `/torusguard authorize` | `skills/torusguard-authorize`| Legal scope definition & safety boundaries |
-| **Validate** | `npx torusguard web-validate` | `/torusguard web-validate` | `skills/torusguard-web-validate`| Authorized non-destructive HTTP probing |
-| **Exploit** | `npx torusguard exploit-check` | `/torusguard exploit-check`| `skills/torusguard-exploit-check`| Bounded single-step exploitability confirmation |
-| **Full** | `npx torusguard full` | `/torusguard full` | `skills/torusguard-full` | End-to-end 7-stage closed-loop execution |
-| **Sync** | `npx torusguard rules sync` | `/torusguard rules sync` | `skills/torusguard-init` | Synchronize rules across AI editors (Cursor, Claude, Antigravity) |
+| **Init** | `torusguard init` | `/torusguard init` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-init` | Stack discovery, rule activation, workspace scaffolding |
+| **Status** | `torusguard status` | `/torusguard status` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-status` | Posture score, active rules, run history, scope check |
+| **Audit** | `torusguard audit` | `/torusguard audit` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-audit` | Static AST scan, invariant fingerprinting, confidence scoring |
+| **OCR Vision**| `torusguard ocr-scan <path>` | `/torusguard ocr-scan` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-ocr-scan` | Tesseract OCR secret scan on images/diagrams |
+| **Verify** | `torusguard verify` | `/torusguard verify` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-verify` | Evidence sufficiency audit & line match calibration |
+| **Harden** | `torusguard harden <patch>` | `/torusguard harden` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-harden` | Ponytail patch formulation ($\le 35$ add, $\le 25$ del) & reflection validation |
+| **Apply** | `torusguard apply [--yes]` | `/torusguard apply` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-apply` | Human Gate review, `.bak` snapshots, patch application |
+| **Rollback** | `torusguard rollback` | `/torusguard rollback` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-apply` | Instant 1-step rollback from pre-apply snapshots |
+| **Recheck** | `torusguard recheck` | `/torusguard recheck` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-recheck` | Targeted differential AST scan, fix closure verification |
+| **Recipes** | `torusguard recipes` | `/torusguard recipes` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-harden` | Explore verified Golden Fix Recipes from persistent memory |
+| **Report** | `torusguard report --html` | `/torusguard report` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-report` | Executive posture reporting, SARIF v2.1.0 & visual HTML |
+| **Authorize** | `torusguard authorize` | `/torusguard authorize` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-authorize`| Legal scope definition & safety boundaries |
+| **Validate** | `torusguard web-validate` | `/torusguard web-validate` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-web-validate`| Authorized non-destructive HTTP probing |
+| **Exploit** | `torusguard exploit-check` | `/torusguard exploit-check`| `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-exploit-check`| Bounded single-step exploitability confirmation |
+| **Full** | `torusguard full` | `/torusguard full` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-full` | End-to-end 7-stage closed-loop execution |
+| **MCP Server**| `torusguard mcp` | — | Native Stdio JSON-RPC 2.0 | Serves native Model Context Protocol tools to AI coding agents |
+| **Update** | `torusguard update` | `/torusguard update` | `.torusguard/skills/torusguard-init` | Self-update TorusGuard engine binary |
+| **Help** | `torusguard help` | `/torusguard help` | — | Interactive command guide |
 
 ---
 
 ## Non-Negotiable Invariants
 
-1. **Browser-Code Truth:** If the client receives it, it is public. Zero hardcoded secrets (`SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY`, private tokens, live API keys) in frontend code.
-2. **Multi-Tenant Isolation:** All database lookups must be scoped by organization or user ownership (`tenant_id`, `organization_id`, `where: { tenantId }`).
+1. **Browser-Code Truth:** If the client receives it, it is public. Zero hardcoded secrets (`SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY`, private tokens, live API keys) in frontend code (`TG-CLIENT-001`).
+2. **Multi-Tenant Isolation:** All database lookups must be scoped by organization or user ownership (`tenant_id`, `organization_id`, `where: { tenantId }`) (`TG-DB-001`).
 3. **Ponytail Churn Bounds:** Patches must be minimal and surgical ($\le 35$ additions, $\le 25$ deletions). Never perform full-file rewrites.
 4. **Standardized 75-Column Terminal:** All CLI terminal output is strictly normalized to 75 visual columns with Unicode emoji width calculation, ANSI escape handling, and visual truncation with ellipsis (`...`).
-5. **Zero Security Bypasses:** Never insert `# nosec`, `verify=False`, `InsecureSkipVerify: true`, `[AllowAnonymous]`, or `csrf().disable()`.
+5. **Zero Security Bypasses:** Never insert `# nosec`, `verify=False`, `InsecureSkipVerify: true`, `[AllowAnonymous]`, or `csrf().disable()` (`TG-DIFF-001`).
 6. **Snapshots Before Edits:** Every code modification must capture a byte-for-byte pre-apply backup in `.torusguard/snapshots/<run_id>/` before touching disk code.
+7. **Living Report Ground Truth:** All findings synchronize directly with `security_report.md` at workspace root.
+
+---
+
+## 🏛️ Alibaba OpenCodeReview Hybrid Architecture Integration
+TorusGuard employs the dual-track hybrid architecture battle-tested at Alibaba Group scale:
+1. **Deterministic Engineering Pipeline (Go CLI Engine):** Mechanical tasks (file traversal, whitespace tolerance, exact AST matching, Ponytail churn bounds calculation, pre-apply snapshot capture, and OCR extraction) are strictly executed by the compiled Go binary.
+2. **Context Minimization (1/9th Token Strategy):** Agents never dump full files into prompt context. Bounded AST windows ($\pm 3$ lines) are extracted via `ExtractContext` to keep review tokens hyper-dense.
+3. **Line-Level Reflection:** In remediation, the agent provides semantic intent (`find_snippet` + `replace_snippet`). The Go CLI reflection module pins and verifies line bounds deterministically, preventing line-number drift.
 
 ---
 
@@ -67,9 +79,42 @@ TorusGuard operates with 100% feature parity across both the terminal CLI and AI
 │       ├── report.html          # Single-file visual dark-mode HTML report
 │       ├── results.sarif        # OASIS SARIF v2.1.0 log
 │       └── bundles/             # Formulated Ponytail remediation bundles
+├── skills/                      # Canonical distribution skills for end-user AI agents
+├── workflows/                   # Operational step-by-step workflow guides
 └── snapshots/
     └── run-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS-audit/ # Pre-apply .bak files for instant rollback
 ```
 
-## Living Report Ground Truth
-- Read `security_report.md` in the workspace root before taking any action. Update the relevant finding card after completing remediation.
+---
+
+## 🚨 LLM Trap Table
+
+| Pattern | What AI Does Wrong | What Is Actually Correct |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| **Line-Number Diff Hallucination** | Guesses line numbers in unified diff headers (`@@ -42,5 +42,7 @@`) causing patch rejection. | Use the Line-Level Reflection Module (`SemanticPatch` with `find_snippet` and `replace_snippet`) to let Go resolve exact lines. |
+| **Context Window Bloating** | Dumps entire 1,000-line source files into conversation when diagnosing a single finding. | Use bounded AST context extraction ($\pm 3$ lines) matching OpenCodeReview's 1/9th token efficiency. |
+| **Full-File Rewrites** | Rewrites the entire file or surrounding business logic when fixing a vulnerability. | Strictly conform to Ponytail bounds ($\le 35$ additions, $\le 25$ deletions per bundle). |
+| **Security Bypass Insertion** | Introduces `# nosec`, `verify=False`, or `[AllowAnonymous]` to make tests pass. | Strictly forbidden (`TG-DIFF-001`). Rejections are enforced fail-closed by the Go engine. |
+| **Missing Multi-Tenant Scope** | Modifies queries to filter only by record `id`. | Always scope database lookups by tenant or user ownership (`tenantId: user.tenantId`). |
+
+---
+
+## ✅ Pre-Flight Self-Audit
+
+Before producing any security remediation or analysis, verify:
+- [ ] Did I read `security_report.md` at workspace root before proposing changes?
+- [ ] Did I inspect only the bounded AST context window ($\pm 3$ lines) rather than the entire file?
+- [ ] Does my proposed remediation stay strictly within Ponytail bounds ($\le 35$ additions, $\le 25$ deletions)?
+- [ ] Is the fix free of any `# nosec`, `verify=False`, or bypass flags?
+- [ ] Did I verify multi-tenant isolation on all database and model queries?
+- [ ] Can this patch be applied via deterministic reflection (`find_snippet` -> `replace_snippet`)?
+
+---
+
+## 🔁 VBC Protocol (Verify → Build → Confirm)
+
+```
+VERIFY: Inspect living security_report.md and bounded AST context snippet.
+BUILD:  Formulate surgical SemanticPatch (find_snippet + replace_snippet within <=35 add / <=25 del).
+CONFIRM: Validate via torusguard harden, apply snapshot, and execute differential torusguard recheck.
+```

package/skills/torusguard/payload/skills/torusguard/bootstrap.py

@@ -63,14 +63,15 @@ import unicodedata
 ANSI_REGEX = re.compile(r'\033\[[0-9;]*m')
 
 def get_visual_width(text: str) -> int:
-    """Calculate the printable display width of a string (ANSI and emoji aware)."""
+    """Calculate the printable display width of a string (ANSI, emoji and variation selector aware)."""
     clean = ANSI_REGEX.sub('', text)
     width = 0
     for ch in clean:
+        cp = ord(ch)
+        if (0xFE00 <= cp <= 0xFE0F) or (0xE0100 <= cp <= 0xE01EF) or cp in (0x200B, 0x200C, 0x200D, 0x00AD):
+            continue
         ea = unicodedata.east_asian_width(ch)
-        if ea in ('W', 'F'):
-            width += 2
-        elif ord(ch) >= 0x1F300:
+        if ea in ('W', 'F') or cp >= 0x1F300:
             width += 2
         else:
             width += 1
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ def truncate_visual(text: str, max_w: int = 67) -> str:
         return text
     out, curr_w, in_ansi, ansi_buf = [], 0, False, ''
     for ch in text:
-        if ch == '\033':
+        if ch in ('\033', '\x1b'):
             in_ansi = True
             ansi_buf = ch
             continue
@@ -92,13 +93,19 @@ def truncate_visual(text: str, max_w: int = 67) -> str:
                 in_ansi = False
                 out.append(ansi_buf)
             continue
+        cp = ord(ch)
+        if (0xFE00 <= cp <= 0xFE0F) or (0xE0100 <= cp <= 0xE01EF) or cp in (0x200B, 0x200C, 0x200D, 0x00AD):
+            out.append(ch)
+            continue
         ea = unicodedata.east_asian_width(ch)
-        cw = 2 if ea in ('W', 'F') or ord(ch) >= 0x1F300 else 1
+        cw = 2 if (ea in ('W', 'F') or cp >= 0x1F300) else 1
         if curr_w + cw > max_w - 3:
-            out.append('...')
+            out.append(RESET + '...')
+            curr_w += 3
             break
         out.append(ch)
         curr_w += cw
+    out.append(RESET)
     return ''.join(out)
 
 def card_line(content: str, max_w: int = 67, border: str = "│", border_color: str = CYAN) -> str:
@@ -109,37 +116,56 @@ def card_line(content: str, max_w: int = 67, border: str = "│", border_color:
     return f"  {border_color}{border}{RESET}  {trunc}{pad}  {border_color}{border}{RESET}"
 
 def card_border_top(title: str = "", border_color: str = CYAN, double: bool = False) -> str:
+    """Generate 75-column top border (single ┌ or double ╔) with optional title."""
     left = "╔" if double else "┌"
     right = "╗" if double else "┐"
     h = "═" if double else "─"
     if title:
         vis = get_visual_width(title)
-        rem = max(0, 71 - 3 - vis - 1)
+        rem = max(0, 68 - vis)
         return f"  {border_color}{left}{h} {BOLD}{WHITE}{title}{RESET}{border_color} {h * rem}{right}{RESET}"
     return f"  {border_color}{left}{h * 71}{right}{RESET}"
 
 def card_border_bottom(border_color: str = CYAN, double: bool = False) -> str:
+    """Generate 75-column bottom border (single └ or double ╚)."""
     left = "╚" if double else "└"
     right = "╝" if double else "┘"
     h = "═" if double else "─"
     return f"  {border_color}{left}{h * 71}{right}{RESET}"
 
-def card_divider(border_color: str = CYAN, double: bool = False) -> str:
+def card_divider(title: str = "", border_color: str = CYAN, double: bool = False) -> str:
+    """Generate 75-column divider (single ├ or double ╠) with optional title."""
     left = "╠" if double else "├"
     right = "╣" if double else "┤"
     h = "═" if double else "─"
+    if title:
+        vis = get_visual_width(title)
+        rem = max(0, 68 - vis)
+        return f"  {border_color}{left}{h} {BOLD}{WHITE}{title}{RESET}{border_color} {h * rem}{right}{RESET}"
     return f"  {border_color}{left}{h * 71}{right}{RESET}"
 
+def card_header(title: str, subtitle: str = "", version: str = "v2.1.0", border_color: str = CYAN) -> str:
+    """Generate standardized 75-column curved header box."""
+    top = f"  {border_color}╭{'─' * 71}╮{RESET}"
+    bottom = f"  {border_color}╰{'─' * 71}╯{RESET}"
+    empty = f"  {border_color}│{' ' * 71}│{RESET}"
+
+    title_vis = get_visual_width(title)
+    ver_vis = get_visual_width(version)
+    space_count = max(1, 67 - title_vis - ver_vis)
+    title_str = f"{BOLD}{WHITE}{title}{RESET}{' ' * space_count}{GRAY}{version}{RESET}"
+
+    lines = [top, empty, card_line(title_str, max_w=67, border_color=border_color)]
+    if subtitle:
+        lines.append(card_line(f"{DIM}{subtitle}{RESET}", max_w=67, border_color=border_color))
+    lines.extend([empty, bottom])
+    return "\n".join(lines)
+
 def print_header():
     """Print the branded TorusGuard header card."""
-    print(f"""
-  {CYAN}╭─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╮{RESET}
-  {CYAN}│{RESET}                                                                         {CYAN}│{RESET}
-  {CYAN}│{RESET}   {BOLD}{WHITE}🛡️  T O R U S G U A R D{RESET}                                  {GRAY}v1.3.0{RESET}   {CYAN}│{RESET}
-  {CYAN}│{RESET}   {DIM}Autonomous Security Engine for AI-Built Applications{RESET}               {CYAN}│{RESET}
-  {CYAN}│{RESET}                                                                         {CYAN}│{RESET}
-  {CYAN}╰─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯{RESET}
-""")
+    print()
+    print(card_header("🛡️  T O R U S G U A R D", "Autonomous Security Engine for AI-Built Applications", version="v2.1.0"))
+    print()
 
 
 def print_step_1_assets(file_count):
@@ -213,14 +239,15 @@ def print_success_card():
 
 def print_already_initialized(target_root, cfg):
     """Print the already-initialized status card."""
+    print()
+    top = f"  {CYAN}╭{'─' * 71}╮{RESET}"
+    bottom = f"  {CYAN}╰{'─' * 71}╯{RESET}"
+    title_line = card_line(f"{BOLD}{WHITE}🛡️  TORUSGUARD WORKSPACE{RESET}{' ' * 28}{GREEN}[Active]{RESET}")
+    print(f"{top}\n{title_line}\n{bottom}")
     print(f"""
-  {CYAN}╭─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╮{RESET}
-  {CYAN}│{RESET}   {BOLD}{WHITE}🛡️  TORUSGUARD WORKSPACE{RESET}                           {GREEN}[Active]{RESET}         {CYAN}│{RESET}
-  {CYAN}╰─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯{RESET}
-
   {BOLD}▸ Project Root:{RESET}       {GREEN}{target_root}{RESET}
   {BOLD}▸ Workspace:{RESET}          {GREEN}.torusguard/{RESET} {DIM}(Already Initialized){RESET}
-  {BOLD}▸ Version:{RESET}            {CYAN}{cfg.get('version', '1.3.0')}{RESET}
+  {BOLD}▸ Version:{RESET}            {CYAN}{cfg.get('version', '2.1.0')}{RESET}
   {BOLD}▸ Severity Floor:{RESET}     {YELLOW}{cfg.get('severity_threshold', 'medium')}{RESET}
 
   {DIM}To refresh templates or re-scaffold, run:{RESET}
@@ -228,7 +255,7 @@ def print_already_initialized(target_root, cfg):
 """)
 
 
-def scaffold_workspace(target_root=None, force=False, full_commands=False):
+def scaffold_workspace(target_root=None, force=False, full_commands=False, template=None, **kwargs):
     """Scaffold the .torusguard workspace into the target project root."""
     target_root = Path(target_root or find_project_root()).resolve()
     torusguard_target = target_root / ".torusguard"
@@ -379,7 +406,13 @@ def scaffold_workspace(target_root=None, force=False, full_commands=False):
         try:
             with open(config_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
                 cfg = json.load(f)
-            if detected_stack and detected_stack.get("framework") != "None":
+            if template and template.lower() in ("golang", "go"):
+                cfg["detected_stack"] = {
+                    "language": "Go",
+                    "framework": "Gin",
+                    "data_layer": "None"
+                }
+            elif detected_stack and detected_stack.get("framework") != "None":
                 cfg["detected_stack"] = {
                     "language": detected_stack.get("language"),
                     "framework": detected_stack.get("framework"),

package/skills/torusguard/payload/skills/torusguard/references/csharp-security.md

@@ -1,41 +1,41 @@
-# TorusGuard Skill Reference: C# & ASP.NET Core Security
-
-> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a C# / .NET application (`*.csproj`, `*.sln`, ASP.NET Core detected).
-
----
-
-## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
-
-### 1. Authentication & Authorization
-* `TG-AUTH-001`: Ensure controllers and endpoints have `[Authorize]` attributes.
-* Prohibit unvetted `[AllowAnonymous]` on sensitive business logic or user data endpoints.
-
-### 2. Entity Framework Core & SQL Injection
-* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use LINQ expressions or `FromSqlInterpolated` with interpolated string syntax (EF Core converts parameters automatically).
-* Prohibit raw `FromSqlRaw` with un-parameterized string concatenations.
-* `TG-DB-004`: Configure Global Query Filters (`HasQueryFilter(e => e.TenantId == _currentTenant)`) for multi-tenant safety.
-
-### 3. Anti-Forgery & TLS
-* `TG-CSRF-001`: Ensure `[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]` or `[AutoValidateAntiforgeryToken]` is applied to POST/PUT/DELETE actions.
-* Prohibit `DangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator`.
-
----
-
-## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
-
-```csharp
-// Safe Entity Framework Parameterized Query
-var user = await context.Users
-    .Where(u => u.Id == userId && u.TenantId == currentTenantId)
-    .FirstOrDefaultAsync();
-
-// Safe Global Query Filter in DbContext
-modelBuilder.Entity<Invoice>()
-    .HasQueryFilter(i => i.TenantId == _tenantProvider.GetTenantId());
-
-// Safe Controller Security
-[Authorize]
-[ApiController]
-[Route("api/[controller]")]
-public class InvoicesController : ControllerBase { ... }
-```
+# TorusGuard Skill Reference: C# & ASP.NET Core Security
+
+> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a C# / .NET application (`*.csproj`, `*.sln`, ASP.NET Core detected).
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
+
+### 1. Authentication & Authorization
+* `TG-AUTH-001`: Ensure controllers and endpoints have `[Authorize]` attributes.
+* Prohibit unvetted `[AllowAnonymous]` on sensitive business logic or user data endpoints.
+
+### 2. Entity Framework Core & SQL Injection
+* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use LINQ expressions or `FromSqlInterpolated` with interpolated string syntax (EF Core converts parameters automatically).
+* Prohibit raw `FromSqlRaw` with un-parameterized string concatenations.
+* `TG-DB-004`: Configure Global Query Filters (`HasQueryFilter(e => e.TenantId == _currentTenant)`) for multi-tenant safety.
+
+### 3. Anti-Forgery & TLS
+* `TG-CSRF-001`: Ensure `[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]` or `[AutoValidateAntiforgeryToken]` is applied to POST/PUT/DELETE actions.
+* Prohibit `DangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator`.
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
+
+```csharp
+// Safe Entity Framework Parameterized Query
+var user = await context.Users
+    .Where(u => u.Id == userId && u.TenantId == currentTenantId)
+    .FirstOrDefaultAsync();
+
+// Safe Global Query Filter in DbContext
+modelBuilder.Entity<Invoice>()
+    .HasQueryFilter(i => i.TenantId == _tenantProvider.GetTenantId());
+
+// Safe Controller Security
+[Authorize]
+[ApiController]
+[Route("api/[controller]")]
+public class InvoicesController : ControllerBase { ... }
+```

package/skills/torusguard/payload/skills/torusguard/references/go-security.md

@@ -1,41 +1,41 @@
-# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Go Security
-
-> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Go application (`go.mod`, `go.sum`, or Go source files detected).
-
----
-
-## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
-
-### 1. Database & SQL Injection
-* `TG-INPUT-002`: Ensure raw queries use parameterized placeholders (`?`, `$1`), never `fmt.Sprintf` or string concatenation.
-* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant isolation in GORM queries (`db.Where("tenant_id = ?", tenantID)`).
-
-### 2. TLS & Network Security
-* `TG-DIFF-001`: Prohibit `InsecureSkipVerify: true` in `tls.Config`. Always use valid root CA pools.
-* `TG-SSRF-001`: Validate outbound URLs before issuing `http.Get` or `http.Post`.
-
-### 3. Concurrency & Goroutine Safety
-* `TG-BIZ-001`: Ensure context cancellation propagation (`ctx.Done()`) to prevent goroutine leaks.
-* Use mutexes or channels to prevent data races on shared state.
-
-### 4. Input Validation & Path Traversal
-* `TG-INPUT-006`: Sanitize file paths with `filepath.Clean` and check `strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, baseDir)`.
-
----
-
-## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
-
-```go
-// Safe Parameterized Query
-row := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = ? AND tenant_id = ?", userID, tenantID)
-
-// Safe GORM Scoping
-var invoice Invoice
-result := db.Where("id = ? AND tenant_id = ?", invoiceID, currentTenantID).First(&invoice)
-
-// Safe TLS Client
-tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
-    MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
-}
-client := &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig}}
-```
+# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Go Security
+
+> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Go application (`go.mod`, `go.sum`, or Go source files detected).
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
+
+### 1. Database & SQL Injection
+* `TG-INPUT-002`: Ensure raw queries use parameterized placeholders (`?`, `$1`), never `fmt.Sprintf` or string concatenation.
+* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant isolation in GORM queries (`db.Where("tenant_id = ?", tenantID)`).
+
+### 2. TLS & Network Security
+* `TG-DIFF-001`: Prohibit `InsecureSkipVerify: true` in `tls.Config`. Always use valid root CA pools.
+* `TG-SSRF-001`: Validate outbound URLs before issuing `http.Get` or `http.Post`.
+
+### 3. Concurrency & Goroutine Safety
+* `TG-BIZ-001`: Ensure context cancellation propagation (`ctx.Done()`) to prevent goroutine leaks.
+* Use mutexes or channels to prevent data races on shared state.
+
+### 4. Input Validation & Path Traversal
+* `TG-INPUT-006`: Sanitize file paths with `filepath.Clean` and check `strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, baseDir)`.
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
+
+```go
+// Safe Parameterized Query
+row := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = ? AND tenant_id = ?", userID, tenantID)
+
+// Safe GORM Scoping
+var invoice Invoice
+result := db.Where("id = ? AND tenant_id = ?", invoiceID, currentTenantID).First(&invoice)
+
+// Safe TLS Client
+tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
+    MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
+}
+client := &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig}}
+```

package/skills/torusguard/payload/skills/torusguard/references/java-security.md

@@ -1,40 +1,40 @@
-# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Java & Spring Security
-
-> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Java/Kotlin application (`pom.xml`, `build.gradle`, Spring Boot detected).
-
----
-
-## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
-
-### 1. Spring Security & CSRF
-* `TG-CSRF-001`: Prohibit `.csrf().disable()` or `AbstractHttpConfigurer::disable` on state-changing browser routes.
-* `TG-PLATFORM-001`: Avoid `@CrossOrigin(origins = "*")` with `allowCredentials = "true"`.
-
-### 2. JPA & Hibernate SQL Injection
-* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use named parameters (`:param`) or `CriteriaBuilder`. Never concatenate strings into JPQL queries.
-* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant isolation via `@Filter` or explicit where clauses.
-
-### 3. Insecure Deserialization & XML
-* Prohibit `ObjectInputStream.readObject()` on untrusted input without look-ahead verification.
-* Disable external entity resolution (`setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true)`).
-
----
-
-## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
-
-```java
-// Safe JPA Query
-@Query("SELECT u FROM User u WHERE u.id = :id AND u.tenantId = :tenantId")
-Optional<User> findByIdAndTenantId(@Param("id") Long id, @Param("tenantId") String tenantId);
-
-// Safe Spring Security Configuration
-@Bean
-public SecurityFilterChain filterChain(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
-    http
-        .authorizeHttpRequests(auth -> auth
-            .requestMatchers("/public/**").permitAll()
-            .anyRequest().authenticated()
-        );
-    return http.build();
-}
-```
+# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Java & Spring Security
+
+> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Java/Kotlin application (`pom.xml`, `build.gradle`, Spring Boot detected).
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
+
+### 1. Spring Security & CSRF
+* `TG-CSRF-001`: Prohibit `.csrf().disable()` or `AbstractHttpConfigurer::disable` on state-changing browser routes.
+* `TG-PLATFORM-001`: Avoid `@CrossOrigin(origins = "*")` with `allowCredentials = "true"`.
+
+### 2. JPA & Hibernate SQL Injection
+* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use named parameters (`:param`) or `CriteriaBuilder`. Never concatenate strings into JPQL queries.
+* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant isolation via `@Filter` or explicit where clauses.
+
+### 3. Insecure Deserialization & XML
+* Prohibit `ObjectInputStream.readObject()` on untrusted input without look-ahead verification.
+* Disable external entity resolution (`setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true)`).
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
+
+```java
+// Safe JPA Query
+@Query("SELECT u FROM User u WHERE u.id = :id AND u.tenantId = :tenantId")
+Optional<User> findByIdAndTenantId(@Param("id") Long id, @Param("tenantId") String tenantId);
+
+// Safe Spring Security Configuration
+@Bean
+public SecurityFilterChain filterChain(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
+    http
+        .authorizeHttpRequests(auth -> auth
+            .requestMatchers("/public/**").permitAll()
+            .anyRequest().authenticated()
+        );
+    return http.build();
+}
+```

package/skills/torusguard/payload/skills/torusguard/references/polyglot-security-matrix.md

@@ -1,25 +1,25 @@
-# TorusGuard Universal Polyglot Security Matrix
-
-> **Loaded When:** Any language or framework is detected. Maps universal security invariants across major programming language ecosystems.
-
----
-
-## 🛡️ Cross-Language Invariant Mappings
-
-| Rule Family | Python | TypeScript / Node.js | Go | Rust | Java / Kotlin | C# / .NET |
-|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
-| **TG-SEC (Secrets)** | `os.environ["KEY"]` | `process.env.KEY` | `os.Getenv("KEY")` | `std::env::var("KEY")` | `System.getenv("KEY")` | `Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable()` |
-| **TG-DB (SQL Injection)** | `%s` / ORM bound | `$1` / Prisma / Drizzle | `?` / `$1` / GORM `?` | `sqlx::query!` / Diesel | Named parameters `:param` | `@p0` / `FromSqlInterpolated` |
-| **TG-DB-004 (Tenant Scope)** | `.filter(tenant=...)` | `where: { tenantId }` | `.Where("tenant_id = ?", tid)` | `filter(tenant_id.eq(tid))` | `WHERE e.tenantId = :tid` | `.Where(x => x.TenantId == tid)` |
-| **TG-AUTH (Access Control)** | `@login_required` / Depends | Middleware auth / Guards | Middleware handlers | Tower layer / extractors | `@PreAuthorize` / Spring Sec | `[Authorize]` attributes |
-| **TG-CSRF (Request Forgery)** | CSRF Middleware | SameSite / csurf | Gorilla CSRF | Anti-CSRF token middleware | Spring Security CSRF | `[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]` |
-| **TG-DIFF (Bypass Comments)** | No `# nosec` | No `// nosec` | No `/* nosec */` | No `#![allow(unsafe)]` | No `@SuppressWarnings` | No pragma disable |
-| **TG-DIFF (TLS Verification)** | No `verify=False` | No `rejectUnauthorized:false` | No `InsecureSkipVerify: true` | No `danger_accept_invalid_certs`| No `TrustAllStrategy` | No `DangerousAcceptAny...` |
-
----
-
-## 🚀 Polyglot Hardening Rules of Thumb
-
-1. **Parameterize Everything:** Never concatenate raw user input into SQL, shell commands, LDAP filters, or template strings, regardless of language.
-2. **Fail Closed on Auth:** Default all endpoints to authenticated; explicitly mark public routes rather than remembering to protect private ones.
-3. **Strict Bounds:** Keep remediation diffs minimal ($\le 35$ additions, $\le 25$ deletions) to ensure auditability across all codebases.
+# TorusGuard Universal Polyglot Security Matrix
+
+> **Loaded When:** Any language or framework is detected. Maps universal security invariants across major programming language ecosystems.
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Cross-Language Invariant Mappings
+
+| Rule Family | Python | TypeScript / Node.js | Go | Rust | Java / Kotlin | C# / .NET |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **TG-SEC (Secrets)** | `os.environ["KEY"]` | `process.env.KEY` | `os.Getenv("KEY")` | `std::env::var("KEY")` | `System.getenv("KEY")` | `Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable()` |
+| **TG-DB (SQL Injection)** | `%s` / ORM bound | `$1` / Prisma / Drizzle | `?` / `$1` / GORM `?` | `sqlx::query!` / Diesel | Named parameters `:param` | `@p0` / `FromSqlInterpolated` |
+| **TG-DB-004 (Tenant Scope)** | `.filter(tenant=...)` | `where: { tenantId }` | `.Where("tenant_id = ?", tid)` | `filter(tenant_id.eq(tid))` | `WHERE e.tenantId = :tid` | `.Where(x => x.TenantId == tid)` |
+| **TG-AUTH (Access Control)** | `@login_required` / Depends | Middleware auth / Guards | Middleware handlers | Tower layer / extractors | `@PreAuthorize` / Spring Sec | `[Authorize]` attributes |
+| **TG-CSRF (Request Forgery)** | CSRF Middleware | SameSite / csurf | Gorilla CSRF | Anti-CSRF token middleware | Spring Security CSRF | `[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]` |
+| **TG-DIFF (Bypass Comments)** | No `# nosec` | No `// nosec` | No `/* nosec */` | No `#![allow(unsafe)]` | No `@SuppressWarnings` | No pragma disable |
+| **TG-DIFF (TLS Verification)** | No `verify=False` | No `rejectUnauthorized:false` | No `InsecureSkipVerify: true` | No `danger_accept_invalid_certs`| No `TrustAllStrategy` | No `DangerousAcceptAny...` |
+
+---
+
+## 🚀 Polyglot Hardening Rules of Thumb
+
+1. **Parameterize Everything:** Never concatenate raw user input into SQL, shell commands, LDAP filters, or template strings, regardless of language.
+2. **Fail Closed on Auth:** Default all endpoints to authenticated; explicitly mark public routes rather than remembering to protect private ones.
+3. **Strict Bounds:** Keep remediation diffs minimal ($\le 35$ additions, $\le 25$ deletions) to ensure auditability across all codebases.