torusguard 1.4.0 → 2.0.0-alpha

package/skills/torusguard/payload/agents/reviewer.md

@@ -1,39 +1,39 @@
----
-name: reviewer
-role: Evidence Sufficiency Review, Recheck & Release Sign-Off Specialist
-lifecycle_phase: Recheck (Phase 6) & Sign-Off (Phase 7)
-version: 0.8.0
-tools: [Read, Glob, Grep, Bash]
----
-
-# TorusGuard Reviewer Agent
-
-The **Reviewer** audits the end-to-end provenance chain, verifies targeted recheck results on modified files, ensures SARIF v2.1.0 schema compliance, audits multi-agent role handoffs, and issues the final security sign-off.
-
----
-
-## Responsibilities
-
-1. **Targeted Recheck Verification (`/torusguard recheck`):**
-   - Re-scan only the scoped files modified during patch application.
-   - Confirm whether original vulnerability patterns are truly resolved (`Confirmed Fixed`).
-   - Detect and flag newly introduced security issues (`Regressed`).
-2. **Evidence Sufficiency Audit:**
-   - Verify that every finding marked `Confirmed` has non-repudiable proof (verified code excerpt with SHA-256 hash or reproducible runtime response).
-   - Flag any finding promoted to high confidence without required supporting evidence.
-3. **Multi-Agent Role Governance:**
-   - Audit `role-audit.json` and `agent-handoffs.md` to confirm strict separation of duty across Profiler $\rightarrow$ Auditor $\rightarrow$ Validator $\rightarrow$ Remediator $\rightarrow$ Reviewer.
-4. **SARIF v2.1.0 Multi-Analysis Export:**
-   - Validate and export OASIS SARIF v2.1.0 payloads.
-   - Ensure unique `automationDetails.id` to prevent multi-analysis collision in GitHub Code Scanning.
-   - Include `primaryLocationLineHash` for PR deduplication.
-5. **Executive Posture & Sign-Off:**
-   - Calculate project-wide posture: `🔴 Action Required`, `🟡 Warnings Found`, or `🟢 Ready`.
-   - Render the comprehensive `summary.md` executive report.
-
----
-
-## Safety Constraints
-
-- **Independent Authority:** The Reviewer acts as an impartial check on both the Auditor and the Remediator.
-- **Strict Verification:** Never sign off on a finding as `Fixed` without re-running rule checks against the actual post-patch file state.
+---
+name: reviewer
+role: Evidence Sufficiency Review, Recheck & Release Sign-Off Specialist
+lifecycle_phase: Recheck (Phase 6) & Sign-Off (Phase 7)
+version: 0.8.0
+tools: [Read, Glob, Grep, Bash]
+---
+
+# TorusGuard Reviewer Agent
+
+The **Reviewer** audits the end-to-end provenance chain, verifies targeted recheck results on modified files, ensures SARIF v2.1.0 schema compliance, audits multi-agent role handoffs, and issues the final security sign-off.
+
+---
+
+## Responsibilities
+
+1. **Targeted Recheck Verification (`/torusguard recheck`):**
+   - Re-scan only the scoped files modified during patch application.
+   - Confirm whether original vulnerability patterns are truly resolved (`Confirmed Fixed`).
+   - Detect and flag newly introduced security issues (`Regressed`).
+2. **Evidence Sufficiency Audit:**
+   - Verify that every finding marked `Confirmed` has non-repudiable proof (verified code excerpt with SHA-256 hash or reproducible runtime response).
+   - Flag any finding promoted to high confidence without required supporting evidence.
+3. **Multi-Agent Role Governance:**
+   - Audit `role-audit.json` and `agent-handoffs.md` to confirm strict separation of duty across Profiler $\rightarrow$ Auditor $\rightarrow$ Validator $\rightarrow$ Remediator $\rightarrow$ Reviewer.
+4. **SARIF v2.1.0 Multi-Analysis Export:**
+   - Validate and export OASIS SARIF v2.1.0 payloads.
+   - Ensure unique `automationDetails.id` to prevent multi-analysis collision in GitHub Code Scanning.
+   - Include `primaryLocationLineHash` for PR deduplication.
+5. **Executive Posture & Sign-Off:**
+   - Calculate project-wide posture: `🔴 Action Required`, `🟡 Warnings Found`, or `🟢 Ready`.
+   - Render the comprehensive `summary.md` executive report.
+
+---
+
+## Safety Constraints
+
+- **Independent Authority:** The Reviewer acts as an impartial check on both the Auditor and the Remediator.
+- **Strict Verification:** Never sign off on a finding as `Fixed` without re-running rule checks against the actual post-patch file state.

package/skills/torusguard/payload/agents/validator.md

@@ -1,46 +1,46 @@
----
-name: validator
-role: Authorized Runtime Validation & Exploitability Confirmation Specialist
-lifecycle_phase: Validate (Phase 3)
-version: 0.8.0
-tools: [Read, Curl, Bash, WebFetch]
----
-
-# TorusGuard Validator Agent
-
-The **Validator** executes authorized, bounded runtime probes against running applications to verify practical exploitability. It proves whether static findings can actually be reached and triggered in practice, capturing redacted HTTP/browser evidence and replayable validation traces.
-
----
-
-## Responsibilities
-
-1. **Authorization Gate Enforcement:**
-   - Verify that `.torusguard/config/scope.json` exists, is active, confirmed by the target owner, and includes the requested host and path prefix before dispatching any network probe.
-2. **Safety Gate Classification:**
-   - Classify all prospective probes before execution:
-     - `Auto-Allowed`: Non-state-changing read queries (GET, OPTIONS, HEAD).
-     - `Approval Required`: Canaries with test markers, authenticated probes.
-     - `Manual Only`: Destructive verbs (DELETE, mass writes, admin drops) — strictly blocked from automated execution.
-3. **Bounded Exploitability Probing:**
-   - Confirm practical reachability for approved vulnerability classes (IDOR, auth bypass, header trust injection, reflected sentinels).
-   - Use non-destructive, verifiable canaries (e.g. `torusguard-probe-token-safe`).
-4. **Evidence Capture & Token Redaction:**
-   - Record raw request/response pairs into `requests.json` and `responses.json`.
-   - Automatically redact authorization headers, passwords, bearer tokens, and session cookies.
-5. **Formal Exploitability Status Classification:**
-   - Assign one of 5 formal verdicts:
-     - `Runtime Confirmed` (Indisputable proof with sensitive marker)
-     - `Runtime Likely` (Strong runtime indicators)
-     - `Needs Manual Review` (Inconclusive or complex boundary)
-     - `Not Reproducible in Scope` (Guarded by gateway/middleware)
-     - `Blocked by Environment / Controls` (Safety gate halted probe)
-6. **Replay Trace Construction:**
-   - Generate `replay.json` and `replay.md` for deterministic re-execution.
-
----
-
-## Safety Constraints
-
-- **No Unauthorized Probes:** Probes targeting hosts or paths outside `scope.json` are strictly forbidden.
-- **Zero Destruction Policy:** Never execute payloads that mutate production databases, delete assets, or cause denial of service.
-- **No Cleartext Credentials:** Redact all sensitive tokens before serializing evidence to disk.
+---
+name: validator
+role: Authorized Runtime Validation & Exploitability Confirmation Specialist
+lifecycle_phase: Validate (Phase 3)
+version: 0.8.0
+tools: [Read, Curl, Bash, WebFetch]
+---
+
+# TorusGuard Validator Agent
+
+The **Validator** executes authorized, bounded runtime probes against running applications to verify practical exploitability. It proves whether static findings can actually be reached and triggered in practice, capturing redacted HTTP/browser evidence and replayable validation traces.
+
+---
+
+## Responsibilities
+
+1. **Authorization Gate Enforcement:**
+   - Verify that `.torusguard/config/scope.json` exists, is active, confirmed by the target owner, and includes the requested host and path prefix before dispatching any network probe.
+2. **Safety Gate Classification:**
+   - Classify all prospective probes before execution:
+     - `Auto-Allowed`: Non-state-changing read queries (GET, OPTIONS, HEAD).
+     - `Approval Required`: Canaries with test markers, authenticated probes.
+     - `Manual Only`: Destructive verbs (DELETE, mass writes, admin drops) — strictly blocked from automated execution.
+3. **Bounded Exploitability Probing:**
+   - Confirm practical reachability for approved vulnerability classes (IDOR, auth bypass, header trust injection, reflected sentinels).
+   - Use non-destructive, verifiable canaries (e.g. `torusguard-probe-token-safe`).
+4. **Evidence Capture & Token Redaction:**
+   - Record raw request/response pairs into `requests.json` and `responses.json`.
+   - Automatically redact authorization headers, passwords, bearer tokens, and session cookies.
+5. **Formal Exploitability Status Classification:**
+   - Assign one of 5 formal verdicts:
+     - `Runtime Confirmed` (Indisputable proof with sensitive marker)
+     - `Runtime Likely` (Strong runtime indicators)
+     - `Needs Manual Review` (Inconclusive or complex boundary)
+     - `Not Reproducible in Scope` (Guarded by gateway/middleware)
+     - `Blocked by Environment / Controls` (Safety gate halted probe)
+6. **Replay Trace Construction:**
+   - Generate `replay.json` and `replay.md` for deterministic re-execution.
+
+---
+
+## Safety Constraints
+
+- **No Unauthorized Probes:** Probes targeting hosts or paths outside `scope.json` are strictly forbidden.
+- **Zero Destruction Policy:** Never execute payloads that mutate production databases, delete assets, or cause denial of service.
+- **No Cleartext Credentials:** Redact all sensitive tokens before serializing evidence to disk.

package/skills/torusguard/payload/config/scope.json

@@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../schemas/authorization.schema.json",
-  "authorization": {
-    "target": "localhost",
-    "owner_confirmed": false,
-    "scope_type": "source_code_only",
-    "allowed_hosts": [
-      "localhost",
-      "127.0.0.1"
-    ],
-    "allowed_paths": [
-      "/api/*",
-      "/auth/*"
-    ],
-    "excluded_paths": [
-      "/admin/delete*",
-      "/system/shutdown*"
-    ],
-    "duration_hours": 24,
-    "authorized_at": null,
-    "authorized_by": null,
-    "notes": "Default authorization scope template. Run /torusguard authorize to activate for live targets."
-  }
-}
+{
+  "$schema": "../schemas/authorization.schema.json",
+  "authorization": {
+    "target": "localhost",
+    "owner_confirmed": false,
+    "scope_type": "source_code_only",
+    "allowed_hosts": [
+      "localhost",
+      "127.0.0.1"
+    ],
+    "allowed_paths": [
+      "/api/*",
+      "/auth/*"
+    ],
+    "excluded_paths": [
+      "/admin/delete*",
+      "/system/shutdown*"
+    ],
+    "duration_hours": 24,
+    "authorized_at": null,
+    "authorized_by": null,
+    "notes": "Default authorization scope template. Run /torusguard authorize to activate for live targets."
+  }
+}

package/skills/torusguard/payload/references/csharp-security.md

@@ -1,41 +1,41 @@
-# TorusGuard Skill Reference: C# & ASP.NET Core Security
-
-> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a C# / .NET application (`*.csproj`, `*.sln`, ASP.NET Core detected).
-
----
-
-## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
-
-### 1. Authentication & Authorization
-* `TG-AUTH-001`: Ensure controllers and endpoints have `[Authorize]` attributes.
-* Prohibit unvetted `[AllowAnonymous]` on sensitive business logic or user data endpoints.
-
-### 2. Entity Framework Core & SQL Injection
-* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use LINQ expressions or `FromSqlInterpolated` with interpolated string syntax (EF Core converts parameters automatically).
-* Prohibit raw `FromSqlRaw` with un-parameterized string concatenations.
-* `TG-DB-004`: Configure Global Query Filters (`HasQueryFilter(e => e.TenantId == _currentTenant)`) for multi-tenant safety.
-
-### 3. Anti-Forgery & TLS
-* `TG-CSRF-001`: Ensure `[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]` or `[AutoValidateAntiforgeryToken]` is applied to POST/PUT/DELETE actions.
-* Prohibit `DangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator`.
-
----
-
-## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
-
-```csharp
-// Safe Entity Framework Parameterized Query
-var user = await context.Users
-    .Where(u => u.Id == userId && u.TenantId == currentTenantId)
-    .FirstOrDefaultAsync();
-
-// Safe Global Query Filter in DbContext
-modelBuilder.Entity<Invoice>()
-    .HasQueryFilter(i => i.TenantId == _tenantProvider.GetTenantId());
-
-// Safe Controller Security
-[Authorize]
-[ApiController]
-[Route("api/[controller]")]
-public class InvoicesController : ControllerBase { ... }
-```
+# TorusGuard Skill Reference: C# & ASP.NET Core Security
+
+> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a C# / .NET application (`*.csproj`, `*.sln`, ASP.NET Core detected).
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
+
+### 1. Authentication & Authorization
+* `TG-AUTH-001`: Ensure controllers and endpoints have `[Authorize]` attributes.
+* Prohibit unvetted `[AllowAnonymous]` on sensitive business logic or user data endpoints.
+
+### 2. Entity Framework Core & SQL Injection
+* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use LINQ expressions or `FromSqlInterpolated` with interpolated string syntax (EF Core converts parameters automatically).
+* Prohibit raw `FromSqlRaw` with un-parameterized string concatenations.
+* `TG-DB-004`: Configure Global Query Filters (`HasQueryFilter(e => e.TenantId == _currentTenant)`) for multi-tenant safety.
+
+### 3. Anti-Forgery & TLS
+* `TG-CSRF-001`: Ensure `[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]` or `[AutoValidateAntiforgeryToken]` is applied to POST/PUT/DELETE actions.
+* Prohibit `DangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator`.
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
+
+```csharp
+// Safe Entity Framework Parameterized Query
+var user = await context.Users
+    .Where(u => u.Id == userId && u.TenantId == currentTenantId)
+    .FirstOrDefaultAsync();
+
+// Safe Global Query Filter in DbContext
+modelBuilder.Entity<Invoice>()
+    .HasQueryFilter(i => i.TenantId == _tenantProvider.GetTenantId());
+
+// Safe Controller Security
+[Authorize]
+[ApiController]
+[Route("api/[controller]")]
+public class InvoicesController : ControllerBase { ... }
+```

package/skills/torusguard/payload/references/go-security.md

@@ -1,41 +1,41 @@
-# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Go Security
-
-> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Go application (`go.mod`, `go.sum`, or Go source files detected).
-
----
-
-## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
-
-### 1. Database & SQL Injection
-* `TG-INPUT-002`: Ensure raw queries use parameterized placeholders (`?`, `$1`), never `fmt.Sprintf` or string concatenation.
-* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant isolation in GORM queries (`db.Where("tenant_id = ?", tenantID)`).
-
-### 2. TLS & Network Security
-* `TG-DIFF-001`: Prohibit `InsecureSkipVerify: true` in `tls.Config`. Always use valid root CA pools.
-* `TG-SSRF-001`: Validate outbound URLs before issuing `http.Get` or `http.Post`.
-
-### 3. Concurrency & Goroutine Safety
-* `TG-BIZ-001`: Ensure context cancellation propagation (`ctx.Done()`) to prevent goroutine leaks.
-* Use mutexes or channels to prevent data races on shared state.
-
-### 4. Input Validation & Path Traversal
-* `TG-INPUT-006`: Sanitize file paths with `filepath.Clean` and check `strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, baseDir)`.
-
----
-
-## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
-
-```go
-// Safe Parameterized Query
-row := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = ? AND tenant_id = ?", userID, tenantID)
-
-// Safe GORM Scoping
-var invoice Invoice
-result := db.Where("id = ? AND tenant_id = ?", invoiceID, currentTenantID).First(&invoice)
-
-// Safe TLS Client
-tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
-    MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
-}
-client := &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig}}
-```
+# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Go Security
+
+> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Go application (`go.mod`, `go.sum`, or Go source files detected).
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
+
+### 1. Database & SQL Injection
+* `TG-INPUT-002`: Ensure raw queries use parameterized placeholders (`?`, `$1`), never `fmt.Sprintf` or string concatenation.
+* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant isolation in GORM queries (`db.Where("tenant_id = ?", tenantID)`).
+
+### 2. TLS & Network Security
+* `TG-DIFF-001`: Prohibit `InsecureSkipVerify: true` in `tls.Config`. Always use valid root CA pools.
+* `TG-SSRF-001`: Validate outbound URLs before issuing `http.Get` or `http.Post`.
+
+### 3. Concurrency & Goroutine Safety
+* `TG-BIZ-001`: Ensure context cancellation propagation (`ctx.Done()`) to prevent goroutine leaks.
+* Use mutexes or channels to prevent data races on shared state.
+
+### 4. Input Validation & Path Traversal
+* `TG-INPUT-006`: Sanitize file paths with `filepath.Clean` and check `strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, baseDir)`.
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
+
+```go
+// Safe Parameterized Query
+row := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = ? AND tenant_id = ?", userID, tenantID)
+
+// Safe GORM Scoping
+var invoice Invoice
+result := db.Where("id = ? AND tenant_id = ?", invoiceID, currentTenantID).First(&invoice)
+
+// Safe TLS Client
+tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
+    MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
+}
+client := &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig}}
+```

package/skills/torusguard/payload/references/java-security.md

@@ -1,40 +1,40 @@
-# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Java & Spring Security
-
-> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Java/Kotlin application (`pom.xml`, `build.gradle`, Spring Boot detected).
-
----
-
-## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
-
-### 1. Spring Security & CSRF
-* `TG-CSRF-001`: Prohibit `.csrf().disable()` or `AbstractHttpConfigurer::disable` on state-changing browser routes.
-* `TG-PLATFORM-001`: Avoid `@CrossOrigin(origins = "*")` with `allowCredentials = "true"`.
-
-### 2. JPA & Hibernate SQL Injection
-* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use named parameters (`:param`) or `CriteriaBuilder`. Never concatenate strings into JPQL queries.
-* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant isolation via `@Filter` or explicit where clauses.
-
-### 3. Insecure Deserialization & XML
-* Prohibit `ObjectInputStream.readObject()` on untrusted input without look-ahead verification.
-* Disable external entity resolution (`setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true)`).
-
----
-
-## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
-
-```java
-// Safe JPA Query
-@Query("SELECT u FROM User u WHERE u.id = :id AND u.tenantId = :tenantId")
-Optional<User> findByIdAndTenantId(@Param("id") Long id, @Param("tenantId") String tenantId);
-
-// Safe Spring Security Configuration
-@Bean
-public SecurityFilterChain filterChain(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
-    http
-        .authorizeHttpRequests(auth -> auth
-            .requestMatchers("/public/**").permitAll()
-            .anyRequest().authenticated()
-        );
-    return http.build();
-}
-```
+# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Java & Spring Security
+
+> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Java/Kotlin application (`pom.xml`, `build.gradle`, Spring Boot detected).
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
+
+### 1. Spring Security & CSRF
+* `TG-CSRF-001`: Prohibit `.csrf().disable()` or `AbstractHttpConfigurer::disable` on state-changing browser routes.
+* `TG-PLATFORM-001`: Avoid `@CrossOrigin(origins = "*")` with `allowCredentials = "true"`.
+
+### 2. JPA & Hibernate SQL Injection
+* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use named parameters (`:param`) or `CriteriaBuilder`. Never concatenate strings into JPQL queries.
+* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant isolation via `@Filter` or explicit where clauses.
+
+### 3. Insecure Deserialization & XML
+* Prohibit `ObjectInputStream.readObject()` on untrusted input without look-ahead verification.
+* Disable external entity resolution (`setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true)`).
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
+
+```java
+// Safe JPA Query
+@Query("SELECT u FROM User u WHERE u.id = :id AND u.tenantId = :tenantId")
+Optional<User> findByIdAndTenantId(@Param("id") Long id, @Param("tenantId") String tenantId);
+
+// Safe Spring Security Configuration
+@Bean
+public SecurityFilterChain filterChain(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
+    http
+        .authorizeHttpRequests(auth -> auth
+            .requestMatchers("/public/**").permitAll()
+            .anyRequest().authenticated()
+        );
+    return http.build();
+}
+```

package/skills/torusguard/payload/references/polyglot-security-matrix.md

@@ -1,25 +1,25 @@
-# TorusGuard Universal Polyglot Security Matrix
-
-> **Loaded When:** Any language or framework is detected. Maps universal security invariants across major programming language ecosystems.
-
----
-
-## 🛡️ Cross-Language Invariant Mappings
-
-| Rule Family | Python | TypeScript / Node.js | Go | Rust | Java / Kotlin | C# / .NET |
-|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
-| **TG-SEC (Secrets)** | `os.environ["KEY"]` | `process.env.KEY` | `os.Getenv("KEY")` | `std::env::var("KEY")` | `System.getenv("KEY")` | `Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable()` |
-| **TG-DB (SQL Injection)** | `%s` / ORM bound | `$1` / Prisma / Drizzle | `?` / `$1` / GORM `?` | `sqlx::query!` / Diesel | Named parameters `:param` | `@p0` / `FromSqlInterpolated` |
-| **TG-DB-004 (Tenant Scope)** | `.filter(tenant=...)` | `where: { tenantId }` | `.Where("tenant_id = ?", tid)` | `filter(tenant_id.eq(tid))` | `WHERE e.tenantId = :tid` | `.Where(x => x.TenantId == tid)` |
-| **TG-AUTH (Access Control)** | `@login_required` / Depends | Middleware auth / Guards | Middleware handlers | Tower layer / extractors | `@PreAuthorize` / Spring Sec | `[Authorize]` attributes |
-| **TG-CSRF (Request Forgery)** | CSRF Middleware | SameSite / csurf | Gorilla CSRF | Anti-CSRF token middleware | Spring Security CSRF | `[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]` |
-| **TG-DIFF (Bypass Comments)** | No `# nosec` | No `// nosec` | No `/* nosec */` | No `#![allow(unsafe)]` | No `@SuppressWarnings` | No pragma disable |
-| **TG-DIFF (TLS Verification)** | No `verify=False` | No `rejectUnauthorized:false` | No `InsecureSkipVerify: true` | No `danger_accept_invalid_certs`| No `TrustAllStrategy` | No `DangerousAcceptAny...` |
-
----
-
-## 🚀 Polyglot Hardening Rules of Thumb
-
-1. **Parameterize Everything:** Never concatenate raw user input into SQL, shell commands, LDAP filters, or template strings, regardless of language.
-2. **Fail Closed on Auth:** Default all endpoints to authenticated; explicitly mark public routes rather than remembering to protect private ones.
-3. **Strict Bounds:** Keep remediation diffs minimal ($\le 35$ additions, $\le 25$ deletions) to ensure auditability across all codebases.
+# TorusGuard Universal Polyglot Security Matrix
+
+> **Loaded When:** Any language or framework is detected. Maps universal security invariants across major programming language ecosystems.
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Cross-Language Invariant Mappings
+
+| Rule Family | Python | TypeScript / Node.js | Go | Rust | Java / Kotlin | C# / .NET |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **TG-SEC (Secrets)** | `os.environ["KEY"]` | `process.env.KEY` | `os.Getenv("KEY")` | `std::env::var("KEY")` | `System.getenv("KEY")` | `Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable()` |
+| **TG-DB (SQL Injection)** | `%s` / ORM bound | `$1` / Prisma / Drizzle | `?` / `$1` / GORM `?` | `sqlx::query!` / Diesel | Named parameters `:param` | `@p0` / `FromSqlInterpolated` |
+| **TG-DB-004 (Tenant Scope)** | `.filter(tenant=...)` | `where: { tenantId }` | `.Where("tenant_id = ?", tid)` | `filter(tenant_id.eq(tid))` | `WHERE e.tenantId = :tid` | `.Where(x => x.TenantId == tid)` |
+| **TG-AUTH (Access Control)** | `@login_required` / Depends | Middleware auth / Guards | Middleware handlers | Tower layer / extractors | `@PreAuthorize` / Spring Sec | `[Authorize]` attributes |
+| **TG-CSRF (Request Forgery)** | CSRF Middleware | SameSite / csurf | Gorilla CSRF | Anti-CSRF token middleware | Spring Security CSRF | `[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]` |
+| **TG-DIFF (Bypass Comments)** | No `# nosec` | No `// nosec` | No `/* nosec */` | No `#![allow(unsafe)]` | No `@SuppressWarnings` | No pragma disable |
+| **TG-DIFF (TLS Verification)** | No `verify=False` | No `rejectUnauthorized:false` | No `InsecureSkipVerify: true` | No `danger_accept_invalid_certs`| No `TrustAllStrategy` | No `DangerousAcceptAny...` |
+
+---
+
+## 🚀 Polyglot Hardening Rules of Thumb
+
+1. **Parameterize Everything:** Never concatenate raw user input into SQL, shell commands, LDAP filters, or template strings, regardless of language.
+2. **Fail Closed on Auth:** Default all endpoints to authenticated; explicitly mark public routes rather than remembering to protect private ones.
+3. **Strict Bounds:** Keep remediation diffs minimal ($\le 35$ additions, $\le 25$ deletions) to ensure auditability across all codebases.

package/skills/torusguard/payload/references/rust-security.md

@@ -1,40 +1,40 @@
-# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Rust Security
-
-> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Rust application (`Cargo.toml` or `.rs` files detected).
-
----
-
-## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
-
-### 1. Memory Safety & Unsafe Blocks
-* `TG-INPUT-003`: Audit and restrict `unsafe { ... }` blocks. Must include a `// SAFETY:` rationale comment.
-* Never disable standard borrow checker lints via `#![allow(unsafe_code)]`.
-
-### 2. Database & SQL Queries
-* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use compile-time checked `sqlx::query!` or Diesel query builder methods.
-* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant filtering in queries (`filter(tenant_id.eq(current_tenant_id))`).
-
-### 3. Outbound Requests & TLS
-* `TG-DIFF-001`: Prohibit `danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)` in `reqwest::ClientBuilder`.
-* `TG-SSRF-001`: Enforce IP allowlists before dispatching network calls.
-
----
-
-## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
-
-```rust
-// Safe sqlx Parameterized Query
-let user = sqlx::query_as!(
-    User,
-    "SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND tenant_id = $2",
-    user_id,
-    current_tenant_id
-)
-.fetch_one(&pool)
-.await?;
-
-// Safe reqwest Client (Strict TLS)
-let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
-    .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
-    .build()?;
-```
+# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Rust Security
+
+> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Rust application (`Cargo.toml` or `.rs` files detected).
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
+
+### 1. Memory Safety & Unsafe Blocks
+* `TG-INPUT-003`: Audit and restrict `unsafe { ... }` blocks. Must include a `// SAFETY:` rationale comment.
+* Never disable standard borrow checker lints via `#![allow(unsafe_code)]`.
+
+### 2. Database & SQL Queries
+* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use compile-time checked `sqlx::query!` or Diesel query builder methods.
+* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant filtering in queries (`filter(tenant_id.eq(current_tenant_id))`).
+
+### 3. Outbound Requests & TLS
+* `TG-DIFF-001`: Prohibit `danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)` in `reqwest::ClientBuilder`.
+* `TG-SSRF-001`: Enforce IP allowlists before dispatching network calls.
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
+
+```rust
+// Safe sqlx Parameterized Query
+let user = sqlx::query_as!(
+    User,
+    "SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND tenant_id = $2",
+    user_id,
+    current_tenant_id
+)
+.fetch_one(&pool)
+.await?;
+
+// Safe reqwest Client (Strict TLS)
+let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
+    .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
+    .build()?;
+```

package/skills/torusguard/payload/rules/custom/.gitkeep

@@ -1 +1 @@
-# Retain custom rules directory
+# Retain custom rules directory