torusguard 1.3.3 → 1.3.5

package/.torusguard/skills/torusguard-status/SKILL.md

@@ -1,42 +1,58 @@
----
-name: torusguard-status
-description: Display current TorusGuard security posture, active configuration, rules catalog, and run history.
-version: 0.9.2
-workflow: .torusguard/workflows/status.md
-tools: Read, Grep, Glob
-scripts-binding:
-  - .torusguard/scripts/run_manager.py
----
-
-# TorusGuard Status — Workspace Security Posture & Diagnostic Overview
-
-## Objective
-Provide an instant diagnostic summary of the repository's security state, active framework rules, historical run results, and runtime scope validity.
-
----
-
-## Execution Steps
-
-1. **Read Configuration:** Parse `.torusguard/config/torusguard.json` to verify initialization state and detected framework stack.
-2. **Enumerate Active Rules:** Count rule files physically present in `.torusguard/rules/active/`.
-3. **Inspect Run History:** List historical run folders in `.torusguard/runs/` via `run_manager.py`.
-4. **Check Authorization Scope:** Check `.torusguard/config/scope.json` for active targets and TTL expiration.
-5. **Render Diagnostic Overview:** Output formatted status card.
-
----
-
-## Safety Constraints
-- Read-only execution; zero file modifications.
-- Handle uninitialized workspaces gracefully with advice to run `/torusguard init`.
-
----
-
-## Output Format
-```markdown
-🛡️ [TorusGuard] Workspace Status Overview
-- Version: v0.9.2 | Stack: <Detected Framework>
-- Active Rules: <Count> rules active in `.torusguard/rules/active/`
-- Historical Runs: <Count> runs recorded
-- Scope: <Authorized (TTL Active) / Expired / Unconfigured>
-- Posture: <SECURE / ACTION REQUIRED>
-```
+---
+name: torusguard-status
+description: Display current TorusGuard security posture, active configuration, rules catalog, and run history via CLI or AI Agent.
+version: 1.3.4
+workflow: .torusguard/workflows/status.md
+tools: Read, Grep, Glob, run_command
+scripts-binding:
+  - .torusguard/scripts/run_manager.py
+  - .torusguard/scripts/term_ui.py
+---
+
+# TorusGuard Status — Workspace Security Posture & Diagnostic Overview
+
+## Objective
+Provide an instant diagnostic summary of the repository's security state, active framework rules, historical run results, and runtime scope validity.
+
+---
+
+## Two Execution Modes
+
+### Mode A: Automated CLI Execution
+Run the diagnostic overview from your terminal:
+```bash
+# Display 75-column status cards
+npx torusguard status
+
+# Check status of specific project directory
+npx torusguard status ./examples/vulnerable-react-express
+
+# Output machine-readable JSON
+npx torusguard status --json
+```
+**Under the Hood:**
+- Evaluates `.torusguard/config/torusguard.json` for initialized status and detected stack.
+- Enumerates active rules in `.torusguard/rules/active/` (or canonical 71 rules).
+- Scans `.torusguard/runs/` for run history, finding counts, and verified fixes.
+- Inspects `.torusguard/config/scope.json` for authorized runtime validation targets.
+- Displays mathematically aligned 75-column terminal cards.
+
+### Mode B: In-Session AI Chat Agent Status Check
+When checking workspace status in AI chat:
+1. **Verify Workspace Setup:** Check if `.torusguard/` exists on disk.
+2. **Inspect Active Config:** Read `.torusguard/config/torusguard.json` for detected stack, framework, and rules.
+3. **Inspect Latest Run:** Find the latest run directory under `.torusguard/runs/` and read `manifest.json`.
+4. **Inspect Memory Engine:** Check `.torusguard/memory/patterns.json` for captured Golden Fix Recipes.
+5. **Render Diagnostic Card:** Present an overview of posture, stack, and recommended next steps.
+
+---
+
+## Output Card Format
+```markdown
+### 🛡️ TorusGuard Workspace Status Overview
+- **Version:** v1.3.3 | **Stack:** Node.js / React / Express
+- **Active Rules:** 71 canonical security rules enabled
+- **Historical Runs:** 3 runs recorded
+- **Golden Recipes:** 4 distilled into persistent memory
+- **Overall Posture:** SECURE (All targeted vulnerabilities verified closed)
+```

package/.torusguard/skills/torusguard-verify/SKILL.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 name: torusguard-verify
 description: Verify finding evidence sufficiency, audit live code line matches, and calibrate 0–100 confidence scores.
-version: 0.9.2
+version: 1.3.4
 workflow: .torusguard/workflows/verify.md
 tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Write
 scripts-binding:
@@ -18,14 +18,15 @@ Audit the evidence sufficiency of candidate findings by reading current disk lin
 ## Execution Steps
 
 1. **Locate Target Findings:** Load active findings from `.torusguard/runs/<latest-run>/findings.md`.
-2. **Live Disk Line Match:** Inspect exact cited lines using `view_file` to confirm code presence.
-3. **Audit Evidence Sufficiency:** Verify source-to-sink flow against criteria below.
-4. **Calibrate Confidence Score:**
+2. **Handle CLI Failures:** If `python .torusguard/scripts/finding_scorer.py` or the verify workflow fails, YOU must manually read the code and calibrate the score based on the evidence parameters.
+3. **Live Disk Line Match:** Inspect exact cited lines using `view_file` to confirm code presence.
+4. **Audit Evidence Sufficiency:** Verify source-to-sink flow against criteria below.
+5. **Calibrate Confidence Score:**
    ```bash
    python .torusguard/scripts/finding_scorer.py --run <run_dir> --verify
    ```
-5. **Update State:** Mark finding as `Confirmed`, `Needs Review`, or `False Positive`.
-6. **Emit Verified Evidence:** Save report in `.torusguard/runs/<run_id>/verified-evidence.md`.
+6. **Update State:** Mark finding as `Confirmed`, `Needs Review`, or `False Positive`.
+7. **Emit Verified Evidence:** Save report in `.torusguard/runs/<run_id>/verified-evidence.md`.
 
 ---
 
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ A finding is verified as sufficient when:
 
 ## Output Format
 ```markdown
-🧪 [TorusGuard] Finding Verification Complete
+🧪 [TorusGuard] Finding Verification Complete (AI Assisted)
 - Findings Audited: <Count> | Confirmed Real: <Count>
 - False Positives Filtered: <Count> | Refined Mean Score: <Score>/100
 - Artifact: `.torusguard/runs/<run_id>/verified-evidence.md`

package/.torusguard/skills/torusguard-web-validate/SKILL.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 name: torusguard-web-validate
 description: Execute authorized HTTP probing against local/staging web applications — session capture, transparent audit headers, and secret redaction.
-version: 0.9.2
+version: 1.3.4
 workflow: .torusguard/workflows/web-validate.md
 tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Write
 scripts-binding:
@@ -34,11 +34,12 @@ All requests pass through `.torusguard/scripts/safety_gate.py`:
 ## Execution Steps
 
 1. **Gate Check:** Validate scope in `scope.json` and query `safety_gate.py`.
-2. **Inject Audit Header:** Attach `X-TorusGuard-AuthID: <auth_id>` to all outbound requests.
-3. **Dispatch Bounded Probe:** Send single non-destructive HTTP request.
-4. **Validate Security Headers:** Check for CSP, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, and CORS configurations.
-5. **Audit Cookie Flags:** Verify `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, and `SameSite` on session cookies.
-6. **Capture Replay Trace:** Save sanitized trace in `.torusguard/runs/<run_id>/requests.json`.
+2. **Handle Automation Failure:** If automated web validation scripts fail, YOU must manually construct the HTTP requests (using `curl` or `fetch`) and inspect the responses.
+3. **Inject Audit Header:** Attach `X-TorusGuard-AuthID: <auth_id>` to all outbound requests.
+4. **Dispatch Bounded Probe:** Send single non-destructive HTTP request.
+5. **Validate Security Headers:** Check for CSP, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, and CORS configurations.
+6. **Audit Cookie Flags:** Verify `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, and `SameSite` on session cookies.
+7. **Capture Replay Trace:** Save sanitized trace in `.torusguard/runs/<run_id>/requests.json`.
 
 ---
 
@@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ All Bearer tokens, cookies, passwords, and API keys are redacted prior to disk s
 
 ## Output Format
 ```markdown
-🌐 [TorusGuard] Web Validation Completed
+🌐 [TorusGuard] Web Validation Completed (AI Assisted)
 - Target: <Host URL> | Endpoints Tested: <Count>
 - Header Posture: <CSP/HSTS Status> | Cookies: <Flags Status>
 - Replay Trace: `.torusguard/runs/<run_id>/requests.json`

package/.torusguard/snapshots/run-20260912-215731-audit/demo/playground/vulnerable_nextjs/actions.ts.bak

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/**
+ * TorusGuard Playground: Vulnerable Next.js Server Action Fixture
+ * Contains 2 intentional security findings for demonstration purposes:
+ *   - TG-CLIENT-001 (Leaked Service Role Key)
+ *   - TG-AUTH-003 (Unauthenticated Server Action Mutation)
+ */
+
+// Finding 1: TG-CLIENT-001 - Backend admin key exposed in client-accessible code
+export const SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.demo_secret_token_1234567890";
+
+interface UserRecord {
+  id: string;
+  role: string;
+}
+
+// Finding 2: TG-AUTH-003 - Server Action performing state change without session check
+export async function updateUserRole(userId: string, newRole: string): Promise<{ success: boolean }> {
+  "use server";
+
+  // VULNERABLE: Lacks auth session check e.g. const session = await auth(); if (!session?.user?.isAdmin) throw ...
+  console.log(`[VULNERABLE] Updating user ${userId} to role ${newRole} without authentication check`);
+  
+  return { success: true };
+}

package/.torusguard/snapshots/run-20260912-215731-audit/examples/hardened-react-express/server/index.js.bak

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+require('dotenv').config();
+const express = require('express');
+const helmet = require('helmet');
+const cors = require('cors');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const { z } = require('zod');
+
+if (!process.env.JWT_SECRET) {
+  console.error('Missing JWT_SECRET');
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+const app = express();
+const PORT = 3001;
+const isProd = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production';
+
+app.use(helmet());
+app.use(cors({ origin: process.env.CLIENT_ORIGIN, credentials: true }));
+app.use(express.json({ limit: '100kb' }));
+app.use(cookieParser());
+
+const loginLimiter = rateLimit({ windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, max: 5 });
+const resetLimiter = rateLimit({ windowMs: 60 * 60 * 1000, max: 3 });
+const publicWriteLimiter = rateLimit({ windowMs: 60 * 60 * 1000, max: 10 });
+
+const users = [];
+const resetTokens = new Map();
+
+async function seed() {
+  if (users.length) return;
+  const hash = await bcrypt.hash('DemoPass123!', 12);
+  users.push({ id: '1', email: 'alice@demo.local', passwordHash: hash, name: 'Alice', role: 'user' });
+  users.push({ id: '2', email: 'bob@demo.local', passwordHash: hash, name: 'Bob', role: 'user' });
+}
+
+const loginSchema = z.object({
+  email: z.string().email().max(255),
+  password: z.string().min(8).max(128),
+});
+
+function auth(req, res, next) {
+  const token = req.cookies.token;
+  if (!token) return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
+  try {
+    req.user = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
+    next();
+  } catch {
+    return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
+  }
+}
+
+app.post('/api/login', loginLimiter, async (req, res) => {
+  const parsed = loginSchema.safeParse(req.body);
+  if (!parsed.success) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid input' });
+  const { email, password } = parsed.data;
+  const user = users.find((u) => u.email === email);
+  if (!user || !(await bcrypt.compare(password, user.passwordHash))) {
+    return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid email or password' });
+  }
+  const token = jwt.sign({ id: user.id, role: user.role }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1h' });
+  res.cookie('token', token, {
+    httpOnly: true,
+    secure: isProd,
+    sameSite: 'lax',
+    maxAge: 3600000,
+  });
+  res.json({ message: 'Login successful' });
+});
+
+app.get('/api/users/me', auth, (req, res) => {
+  const user = users.find((u) => u.id === req.user.id);
+  if (!user) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+  res.json({ id: user.id, email: user.email, name: user.name });
+});
+
+app.get('/api/search', auth, (req, res) => {
+  const q = String(req.query.q || '').slice(0, 100);
+  const results = users
+    .filter((u) => u.email.includes(q))
+    .slice(0, 20)
+    .map(({ id, email, name }) => ({ id, email, name }));
+  res.json({ results });
+});
+
+const contactSchema = z.object({ message: z.string().min(1).max(2000) });
+app.post('/api/contact', publicWriteLimiter, (req, res) => {
+  const parsed = contactSchema.safeParse(req.body);
+  if (!parsed.success) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid input' });
+  res.json({ ok: true });
+});
+
+app.post('/api/ai', auth, publicWriteLimiter, (req, res) => {
+  const prompt = String(req.body.prompt || '').slice(0, 4000);
+  res.json({ reply: 'demo response', length: prompt.length });
+});
+
+app.post('/api/reset', resetLimiter, (req, res) => {
+  const email = String(req.body.email || '');
+  const user = users.find((u) => u.email === email);
+  if (user) {
+    const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+    resetTokens.set(token, { userId: user.id, expires: Date.now() + 900000 });
+  }
+  res.json({ message: 'If an account exists, a reset link was sent.' });
+});
+
+app.get('/api/admin/stats', auth, (req, res) => {
+  if (req.user.role !== 'admin') return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Forbidden' });
+  res.json({ users: users.length });
+});
+
+app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+  console.error('Error', { message: err.message });
+  res.status(500).json({ error: isProd ? 'Internal server error' : err.message });
+});
+
+seed().then(() => app.listen(PORT, () => console.log(`Hardened demo http://localhost:${PORT}`)));

package/.torusguard/snapshots/run-20260912-215731-audit/examples/python/fastapi-vuln/main.py.bak

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+from fastapi import FastAPI
+import requests
+
+app = FastAPI()
+
+# ❌ TG-SSRF-001: Unvalidated outbound URL fetching
+@app.get("/fetch")
+def fetch_url(url: str):
+    response = requests.get(url)
+    return {"status": response.status_code, "content": response.text}
+
+# ❌ TG-WEBHOOK-001: Unverified webhook payload
+@app.post("/webhook")
+def receive_webhook(payload: dict):
+    return {"status": "success", "data": payload}
+
+# ❌ TG-AUTH-006: Unfiltered dict mass assignment
+@app.post("/update_profile")
+def update_profile(user_id: int, updates: dict):
+    return {"status": "updated", "user_id": user_id, "updates": updates}

package/.torusguard/snapshots/run-20260912-215731-audit/examples/vulnerable-react-express/client/src/App.jsx.bak

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+import { useState } from 'react';
+import { clientConfig } from './config';
+
+// TG-DB-001: SQL query construction in frontend (never do this)
+function buildSearchQuery(email) {
+  return `SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE email LIKE '%${email}%'`;
+}
+
+// TG-DB-003: Documented anti-pattern — Prisma must never run in browser
+// import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client'; // FORBIDDEN in client
+
+export default function App() {
+  const [email, setEmail] = useState('');
+  const [password, setPassword] = useState('');
+  const [bio, setBio] = useState('<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>');
+  const [userId, setUserId] = useState('1');
+  const [isAdmin] = useState(localStorage.getItem('role') === 'admin'); // TG-AUTH-002
+  const [message, setMessage] = useState('');
+
+  async function login(e) {
+    e.preventDefault();
+    const res = await fetch('/api/login', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      credentials: 'include',
+      body: JSON.stringify({ email, password }),
+    });
+    const data = await res.json();
+    // TG-CLIENT-002: Sensitive console logging
+    console.log('Login token:', data.token, 'config:', clientConfig);
+    setMessage(JSON.stringify(data));
+  }
+
+  async function fetchUser() {
+    const res = await fetch(`/api/users/${userId}`);
+    setMessage(await res.text());
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <div style={{ maxWidth: 560, margin: '2rem auto', fontFamily: 'sans-serif' }}>
+      <h1>Vulnerable Demo</h1>
+      <p style={{ color: 'crimson' }}>Intentionally insecure — localhost lab only</p>
+
+      <form onSubmit={login}>
+        <input value={email} onChange={(e) => setEmail(e.target.value)} placeholder="email" />
+        <input value={password} onChange={(e) => setPassword(e.target.value)} placeholder="password" type="password" />
+        <button type="submit">Login</button>
+      </form>
+
+      <p>Frontend SQL preview: {buildSearchQuery(email)}</p>
+
+      {/* TG-INPUT-003: Unsafe HTML rendering */}
+      <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: bio }} />
+
+      <button onClick={fetchUser}>Fetch user (IDOR demo)</button>
+
+      {/* TG-AUTH-002: Client-only admin gate */}
+      {isAdmin && <section><h2>Admin Panel</h2><p>Visible if localStorage role=admin — not real security</p></section>}
+
+      {message && <pre>{message}</pre>}
+    </div>
+  );
+}

package/.torusguard/snapshots/run-20260912-215731-audit/examples/vulnerable-react-express/client/vite.config.js.bak

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+import { defineConfig } from 'vite';
+import react from '@vitejs/plugin-react';
+
+// TG-CLIENT-001: Public production source maps enabled
+export default defineConfig({
+  plugins: [react()],
+  build: { sourcemap: true },
+  server: {
+    port: 5173,
+    proxy: { '/api': 'http://localhost:3001' },
+  },
+});

package/.torusguard/snapshots/run-20260912-215731-audit/examples/vulnerable-react-express/server/index.js.bak

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+const express = require('express');
+const cors = require('cors');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const app = express();
+const PORT = 3001;
+
+// TG-SEC-001: Hardcoded JWT secret
+const JWT_SECRET = 'FAKE_DEMO_JWT_SECRET_NOT_FOR_PRODUCTION';
+
+// TG-PLATFORM-001: Wildcard CORS with credentials
+app.use(cors({ origin: '*', credentials: true }));
+
+// TG-PLATFORM-004: No explicit JSON body size limit
+app.use(express.json());
+
+const users = [
+  { id: '1', email: 'alice@demo.local', password: 'password123', name: 'Alice' },
+  { id: '2', email: 'bob@demo.local', password: 'secret456', name: 'Bob' },
+];
+
+// TG-RATE-001: No rate limit on login
+// TG-AUTH-001: Plaintext password comparison
+// TG-SEC-004: Logs sensitive data
+// TG-AUTH-004: Insecure cookie (no httpOnly/Secure/SameSite)
+app.post('/api/login', (req, res) => {
+  const { email, password } = req.body;
+  console.log('Login attempt:', { email, password }); // TG-SEC-004
+  const user = users.find((u) => u.email === email && u.password === password);
+  if (!user) return res.status(401).json({ error: 'User not found' }); // enumeration
+  const token = jwt.sign({ id: user.id }, JWT_SECRET);
+  res.cookie('token', token);
+  res.json({ message: 'ok', token, user });
+});
+
+// TG-AUTH-003: IDOR — no ownership check
+app.get('/api/users/:id', (req, res) => {
+  const user = users.find((u) => u.id === req.params.id);
+  if (!user) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+  res.json(user);
+});
+
+// TG-INPUT-002: SQL concatenation (simulated query string)
+// TG-RATE-003: Unbounded results
+app.get('/api/search', (req, res) => {
+  const q = req.query.q || '';
+  const fakeSql = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email LIKE '%${q}%'`;
+  const results = users.filter((u) => u.email.includes(q));
+  res.json({ query: fakeSql, results });
+});
+
+// TG-INPUT-001: No validation
+// TG-RATE-002: Unlimited contact endpoint
+app.post('/api/contact', (req, res) => {
+  res.json({ received: req.body });
+});
+
+// TG-RATE-002: Unlimited AI endpoint
+app.post('/api/ai', (req, res) => {
+  res.json({ reply: 'demo', prompt: req.body.prompt });
+});
+
+// TG-INPUT-004: Unrestricted upload (stub)
+app.post('/api/upload', (req, res) => {
+  res.json({ saved: req.body.filename });
+});
+
+// TG-AUTH-005: Unsafe password reset
+app.post('/api/reset', (req, res) => {
+  const { email } = req.body;
+  const user = users.find((u) => u.email === email);
+  if (!user) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Email not registered' }); // enumeration
+  const token = `reset-${user.id}-12345`; // predictable
+  res.json({ resetToken: token });
+});
+
+app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+  // TG-PLATFORM-003: Stack trace exposed
+  res.status(500).json({ error: err.message, stack: err.stack });
+});
+
+app.listen(PORT, () => console.log(`Vulnerable demo server http://localhost:${PORT}`));

package/.torusguard/workflows/apply.md

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 ---
 description: Governed patch application with pre-apply rollback snapshots and Human Gate authorization.
 tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Edit, Write
-version: 0.9.2
+version: 1.3.5
 agent: remediator
 lifecycle-phase: Phase 5 (Patch Application)
 required-skills:
   - torusguard-apply
 scripts-binding:
+  - .torusguard/scripts/apply_runner.py
+  - .torusguard/scripts/report_sync.py
   - .torusguard/scripts/run_manager.py
   - .torusguard/scripts/diff_guard.py
 ---
@@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ Governed patch application with pre-apply rollback snapshots and Human Gate auth
 
 Inspect bundle validity and file safety before modifying disk code:
 1. **Bundle Verification:** Assert `patch.diff` exists in active run's remediation folder.
-2. **Pre-Apply Snapshot:** Save a byte-for-byte backup copy (`.bak` or `pre_apply/`) prior to editing.
+2. **Pre-Apply Snapshot:** Save a byte-for-byte backup copy (`.bak` or `.torusguard/snapshots/<run_id>/`) prior to editing.
 3. **Uncommitted Changes:** Check git status; ensure target file has clean baseline.
 4. **Ponytail Check:** Re-verify that patch additions $\le 35$ and deletions $\le 25$.
 5. **Human Gate:** Confirm operator approval before committing edits to disk.
@@ -47,11 +49,16 @@ Inspect bundle validity and file safety before modifying disk code:
 
 ---
 
+## Living Report Invariant
+- Applied patches create pre-apply `.bak` snapshots in `.torusguard/snapshots/<run_id>/`.
+- Finding statuses transition in `security_report.md` to `APPLIED 🔵`.
+- Instant rollback available via `npx torusguard rollback`.
+
 ## Execution Steps
 
 1. **Load Remediation Bundle:** Read `patch.diff` and metadata from active run directory.
 2. **Audit Patch Invariants:** Run `python .torusguard/scripts/diff_guard.py <patch.diff>`.
-3. **Create Rollback Backup:** Copy target file to `.torusguard/runs/<run_id>/pre_apply/<filename>.bak`.
+3. **Create Rollback Backup:** Copy target file to `.torusguard/runs/<run_id>/.torusguard/snapshots/<run_id>/<filename>.bak`.
 4. **Apply Minimal Diff:** Execute precise surgical edit using `replace_file_content` or `patch`.
 5. **Assert Syntax & Integrity:** Check that modified file compiles cleanly without syntax errors.
 6. **Log Application Ledger:** Record timestamp, original SHA-256, and patched SHA-256 in `apply-log.json`.
@@ -81,7 +88,7 @@ Inspect bundle validity and file safety before modifying disk code:
 ### 🚀 TorusGuard Patch Application
 - **Finding Addressed:** `TG-XXX-HASH`
 - **File Patched:** `src/path/to/file.py`
-- **Rollback Backup:** `.torusguard/runs/<run_id>/pre_apply/<file>.bak`
+- **Rollback Backup:** `.torusguard/runs/<run_id>/.torusguard/snapshots/<run_id>/<file>.bak`
 - **Churn Applied:** +[Additions] / -[Deletions] lines
 - **Syntax Check:** PASSED (clean compile)
 - **Status:** APPLIED — run `/torusguard recheck` to verify fix

package/.torusguard/workflows/audit.md

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 ---
 description: Static security AST scanning, stable line-shift invariant fingerprinting, root-cause clustering, and 0-100 confidence scoring.
 tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Write
-version: 0.9.2
+version: 1.3.5
 agent: auditor
 lifecycle-phase: Phase 2 (Static Audit & Clustering)
 required-skills:
   - torusguard-audit
 scripts-binding:
+  - .torusguard/scripts/audit_runner.py
+  - .torusguard/scripts/report_sync.py
   - .torusguard/scripts/run_manager.py
   - .torusguard/scripts/finding_scorer.py
 ---
@@ -45,6 +47,10 @@ Inspect workspace prerequisites before launching static audit:
 
 ---
 
+## Living Report Invariant
+- Audit discoveries automatically synchronize to `security_report.md` at workspace root.
+- Findings transition into `OPEN 🔴` status with stable invariant fingerprints.
+
 ## Execution Steps
 
 1. **Allocate Run Folder:** Run `python .torusguard/scripts/run_manager.py create audit`.

package/.torusguard/workflows/authorize.md

@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 ---
 description: Legal scope definition, target ownership proof verification, and safety boundary enforcement for runtime validation.
 tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Write
-version: 0.9.2
+version: 1.3.5
 agent: reviewer
 lifecycle-phase: Phase 1 (Authorization Gate)
 required-skills:
   - torusguard-authorize
 scripts-binding:
+  - .torusguard/scripts/report_sync.py
   - .torusguard/scripts/safety_gate.py
 ---
 

package/.torusguard/workflows/exploit-check.md

@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 ---
 description: Safe, bounded, single-step exploitability confirmation across 5 standard verification statuses.
 tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Write
-version: 0.9.2
+version: 1.3.5
 agent: validator
 lifecycle-phase: Phase 3c (Exploitability Check)
 required-skills:
   - torusguard-exploit-check
 scripts-binding:
+  - .torusguard/scripts/report_sync.py
   - .torusguard/scripts/safety_gate.py
   - .torusguard/scripts/finding_scorer.py
 ---

package/.torusguard/workflows/harden.md

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 ---
 description: Governed remediation formulation under strict Ponytail Protocol bounds (<= 35 additions, <= 25 deletions) and bundle packaging.
 tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Write
-version: 0.9.2
+version: 1.3.5
 agent: remediator
 lifecycle-phase: Phase 4 (Remediation Formulation)
 required-skills:
   - torusguard-harden
 scripts-binding:
+  - .torusguard/scripts/harden_runner.py
+  - .torusguard/scripts/report_sync.py
   - .torusguard/scripts/run_manager.py
   - .torusguard/scripts/diff_guard.py
 ---
@@ -46,6 +48,10 @@ Inspect finding targets and patch constraints before generating diffs:
 
 ---
 
+## Living Report Invariant
+- Candidate patches transition findings in `security_report.md` into `CANDIDATE 🟡` status.
+- Every patch strictly conforms to Ponytail bounds (<= 35 additions, <= 25 deletions).
+
 ## Execution Steps
 
 1. **Select Target Finding:** Choose verified flaw from active run directory.