torusguard 1.0.0 → 1.3.1

package/.torusguard/skills/torusguard/SKILL.md

@@ -1,42 +1,42 @@
----
-name: torusguard
-description: "Autonomous security engine: 71 rules across 11 families, governed remediation (Ponytail Protocol), SARIF v2.1.0 exports, and persistent security memory context for Python & TypeScript web applications."
-version: 1.0.0
----
-
-# TorusGuard Master Security Router
-
-**Principle:** If the browser receives it, users can inspect it. Keep secrets, database queries, and authorization strictly on trusted server-side code.
-
----
-
-## ⚡ Workspace Bootstrap Check
-1. **If `.torusguard/` exists on disk:** Full governance active. Load `.torusguard/memory/context.json` into prompt context for local-first intelligence. Route commands to specialist workflows below.
-2. **If `.torusguard/` is absent (Autonomous AI Mode):** Operates standalone in any AI agent (Kimi, Antigravity, VS Code, Cursor). Apply in-memory security invariants:
-   - Server-side auth & tenant scoping (`.filter(tenant=...)`).
-   - Zero client-side secrets (`SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY`, live API keys).
-   - Ponytail Protocol patch limits ($\le 35$ additions, $\le 25$ deletions).
-   - *Upgrade:* Run `npx torusguard init` to unlock local `.torusguard/` run tracking & individual commands.
-
----
-
-## Specialist Skill Routing (Lazy Loading)
-Load **only** the designated sub-skill on demand to preserve the 1,000–1,500 token budget:
-
-| Command | Specialist Skill | Agent |
-| :--- | :--- | :--- |
-| `/torusguard init` | `skills/torusguard-init/SKILL.md` | `profiler` |
-| `/torusguard authorize` | `skills/torusguard-authorize/SKILL.md` | `reviewer` |
-| `/torusguard audit` | `skills/torusguard-audit/SKILL.md` | `auditor` |
-| `/torusguard verify` | `skills/torusguard-verify/SKILL.md` | `validator` |
-| `/torusguard web-validate` | `skills/torusguard-web-validate/SKILL.md` | `validator` |
-| `/torusguard exploit-check` | `skills/torusguard-exploit-check/SKILL.md` | `validator` |
-| `/torusguard harden` | `skills/torusguard-harden/SKILL.md` | `remediator` |
-| `/torusguard apply` | `skills/torusguard-apply/SKILL.md` | `remediator` |
-| `/torusguard recheck` | `skills/torusguard-recheck/SKILL.md` | `reviewer` |
-| `/torusguard report` | `skills/torusguard-report/SKILL.md` | `reviewer` |
-| `/torusguard status` | `skills/torusguard-status/SKILL.md` | `reviewer` |
-| `/torusguard memory` | `skills/torusguard/SKILL.md` | `reviewer` |
-| `/torusguard full` | `skills/torusguard-full/SKILL.md` | *All* |
-
-*Note: Never load all skills simultaneously. Lazy-load strictly on demand.*
+---
+name: torusguard
+description: "Universal autonomous security engine: 71 rules across 11 families, polyglot stack detection across 16+ languages, governed remediation (Ponytail Protocol <=35 add, <=25 del), SARIF v2.1.0 exports, single-file HTML dashboards, and persistent security memory context for modern web applications."
+version: 1.3.1
+---
+
+# TorusGuard Master Security Router
+
+**Principle:** If the browser or client receives it, users can inspect it. Keep secrets, database queries, and authorization strictly on trusted server-side code.
+
+---
+
+## ⚡ Workspace Bootstrap Check
+1. **If `.torusguard/` exists on disk:** Full autonomous governance active. Load `.torusguard/memory/context.json` into prompt context for local-first intelligence. Route commands to specialist workflows below.
+2. **If `.torusguard/` is absent (Autonomous AI Mode):** Operates standalone in any AI agent (Kimi, Antigravity, VS Code, Cursor, Claude Code, Windsurf). Apply universal security invariants:
+   - Server-side auth & tenant scoping (`.filter(tenant=...)`, `.Where("tenant_id = ?")`, `where: { tenantId: ... }`).
+   - Zero client-side secrets (`SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY`, live API keys, Stripe secret keys).
+   - Ponytail Protocol patch limits ($\le 35$ additions, $\le 25$ deletions, zero full-file rewrites).
+   - *Upgrade:* Run `npx torusguard init` to unlock local `.torusguard/` workspace tracking, persistent memory, and individual slash commands.
+
+---
+
+## Specialist Skill Routing (Lazy Loading)
+Load **only** the designated sub-skill on demand to preserve the 1,000–1,500 token budget:
+
+| Command | Specialist Skill | Agent | Purpose |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| `/torusguard init` | `skills/torusguard-init/SKILL.md` | `profiler` | Workspace discovery, stack detection & scaffolding |
+| `/torusguard authorize` | `skills/torusguard-authorize/SKILL.md` | `reviewer` | Legal scope definition & safety boundaries |
+| `/torusguard audit` | `skills/torusguard-audit/SKILL.md` | `auditor` | Static AST security audit & root-cause clustering |
+| `/torusguard verify` | `skills/torusguard-verify/SKILL.md` | `validator` | Evidence sufficiency & line match audit |
+| `/torusguard web-validate` | `skills/torusguard-web-validate/SKILL.md` | `validator` | Authorized non-destructive HTTP probing |
+| `/torusguard exploit-check`| `skills/torusguard-exploit-check/SKILL.md`| `validator` | Bounded single-step exploitability confirmation |
+| `/torusguard harden` | `skills/torusguard-harden/SKILL.md` | `remediator`| Governed remediation under Ponytail Protocol |
+| `/torusguard apply` | `skills/torusguard-apply/SKILL.md` | `remediator`| Governed patch application with rollback snapshots |
+| `/torusguard recheck` | `skills/torusguard-recheck/SKILL.md` | `reviewer` | Differential AST re-scan & closure verification |
+| `/torusguard report` | `skills/torusguard-report/SKILL.md` | `reviewer` | Executive posture reporting, SARIF & visual HTML export |
+| `/torusguard status` | `skills/torusguard-status/SKILL.md` | `reviewer` | Diagnostic overview of posture, stack & rules |
+| `/torusguard memory` | `skills/torusguard/SKILL.md` | `reviewer` | Persistent memory inspection, decay & context cards |
+| `/torusguard full` | `skills/torusguard-full/SKILL.md` | *All* | End-to-end 7-stage closed-loop execution |
+
+*Note: Never load all skills simultaneously. Lazy-load strictly on demand.*

package/.torusguard/skills/torusguard/references/csharp-security.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# TorusGuard Skill Reference: C# & ASP.NET Core Security
+
+> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a C# / .NET application (`*.csproj`, `*.sln`, ASP.NET Core detected).
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
+
+### 1. Authentication & Authorization
+* `TG-AUTH-001`: Ensure controllers and endpoints have `[Authorize]` attributes.
+* Prohibit unvetted `[AllowAnonymous]` on sensitive business logic or user data endpoints.
+
+### 2. Entity Framework Core & SQL Injection
+* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use LINQ expressions or `FromSqlInterpolated` with interpolated string syntax (EF Core converts parameters automatically).
+* Prohibit raw `FromSqlRaw` with un-parameterized string concatenations.
+* `TG-DB-004`: Configure Global Query Filters (`HasQueryFilter(e => e.TenantId == _currentTenant)`) for multi-tenant safety.
+
+### 3. Anti-Forgery & TLS
+* `TG-CSRF-001`: Ensure `[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]` or `[AutoValidateAntiforgeryToken]` is applied to POST/PUT/DELETE actions.
+* Prohibit `DangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator`.
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
+
+```csharp
+// Safe Entity Framework Parameterized Query
+var user = await context.Users
+    .Where(u => u.Id == userId && u.TenantId == currentTenantId)
+    .FirstOrDefaultAsync();
+
+// Safe Global Query Filter in DbContext
+modelBuilder.Entity<Invoice>()
+    .HasQueryFilter(i => i.TenantId == _tenantProvider.GetTenantId());
+
+// Safe Controller Security
+[Authorize]
+[ApiController]
+[Route("api/[controller]")]
+public class InvoicesController : ControllerBase { ... }
+```

package/.torusguard/skills/torusguard/references/go-security.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Go Security
+
+> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Go application (`go.mod`, `go.sum`, or Go source files detected).
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
+
+### 1. Database & SQL Injection
+* `TG-INPUT-002`: Ensure raw queries use parameterized placeholders (`?`, `$1`), never `fmt.Sprintf` or string concatenation.
+* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant isolation in GORM queries (`db.Where("tenant_id = ?", tenantID)`).
+
+### 2. TLS & Network Security
+* `TG-DIFF-001`: Prohibit `InsecureSkipVerify: true` in `tls.Config`. Always use valid root CA pools.
+* `TG-SSRF-001`: Validate outbound URLs before issuing `http.Get` or `http.Post`.
+
+### 3. Concurrency & Goroutine Safety
+* `TG-BIZ-001`: Ensure context cancellation propagation (`ctx.Done()`) to prevent goroutine leaks.
+* Use mutexes or channels to prevent data races on shared state.
+
+### 4. Input Validation & Path Traversal
+* `TG-INPUT-006`: Sanitize file paths with `filepath.Clean` and check `strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, baseDir)`.
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
+
+```go
+// Safe Parameterized Query
+row := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = ? AND tenant_id = ?", userID, tenantID)
+
+// Safe GORM Scoping
+var invoice Invoice
+result := db.Where("id = ? AND tenant_id = ?", invoiceID, currentTenantID).First(&invoice)
+
+// Safe TLS Client
+tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
+    MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
+}
+client := &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig}}
+```

package/.torusguard/skills/torusguard/references/java-security.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Java & Spring Security
+
+> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Java/Kotlin application (`pom.xml`, `build.gradle`, Spring Boot detected).
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
+
+### 1. Spring Security & CSRF
+* `TG-CSRF-001`: Prohibit `.csrf().disable()` or `AbstractHttpConfigurer::disable` on state-changing browser routes.
+* `TG-PLATFORM-001`: Avoid `@CrossOrigin(origins = "*")` with `allowCredentials = "true"`.
+
+### 2. JPA & Hibernate SQL Injection
+* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use named parameters (`:param`) or `CriteriaBuilder`. Never concatenate strings into JPQL queries.
+* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant isolation via `@Filter` or explicit where clauses.
+
+### 3. Insecure Deserialization & XML
+* Prohibit `ObjectInputStream.readObject()` on untrusted input without look-ahead verification.
+* Disable external entity resolution (`setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true)`).
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
+
+```java
+// Safe JPA Query
+@Query("SELECT u FROM User u WHERE u.id = :id AND u.tenantId = :tenantId")
+Optional<User> findByIdAndTenantId(@Param("id") Long id, @Param("tenantId") String tenantId);
+
+// Safe Spring Security Configuration
+@Bean
+public SecurityFilterChain filterChain(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
+    http
+        .authorizeHttpRequests(auth -> auth
+            .requestMatchers("/public/**").permitAll()
+            .anyRequest().authenticated()
+        );
+    return http.build();
+}
+```

package/.torusguard/skills/torusguard/references/polyglot-security-matrix.md

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# TorusGuard Universal Polyglot Security Matrix
+
+> **Loaded When:** Any language or framework is detected. Maps universal security invariants across major programming language ecosystems.
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Cross-Language Invariant Mappings
+
+| Rule Family | Python | TypeScript / Node.js | Go | Rust | Java / Kotlin | C# / .NET |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **TG-SEC (Secrets)** | `os.environ["KEY"]` | `process.env.KEY` | `os.Getenv("KEY")` | `std::env::var("KEY")` | `System.getenv("KEY")` | `Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable()` |
+| **TG-DB (SQL Injection)** | `%s` / ORM bound | `$1` / Prisma / Drizzle | `?` / `$1` / GORM `?` | `sqlx::query!` / Diesel | Named parameters `:param` | `@p0` / `FromSqlInterpolated` |
+| **TG-DB-004 (Tenant Scope)** | `.filter(tenant=...)` | `where: { tenantId }` | `.Where("tenant_id = ?", tid)` | `filter(tenant_id.eq(tid))` | `WHERE e.tenantId = :tid` | `.Where(x => x.TenantId == tid)` |
+| **TG-AUTH (Access Control)** | `@login_required` / Depends | Middleware auth / Guards | Middleware handlers | Tower layer / extractors | `@PreAuthorize` / Spring Sec | `[Authorize]` attributes |
+| **TG-CSRF (Request Forgery)** | CSRF Middleware | SameSite / csurf | Gorilla CSRF | Anti-CSRF token middleware | Spring Security CSRF | `[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]` |
+| **TG-DIFF (Bypass Comments)** | No `# nosec` | No `// nosec` | No `/* nosec */` | No `#![allow(unsafe)]` | No `@SuppressWarnings` | No pragma disable |
+| **TG-DIFF (TLS Verification)** | No `verify=False` | No `rejectUnauthorized:false` | No `InsecureSkipVerify: true` | No `danger_accept_invalid_certs`| No `TrustAllStrategy` | No `DangerousAcceptAny...` |
+
+---
+
+## 🚀 Polyglot Hardening Rules of Thumb
+
+1. **Parameterize Everything:** Never concatenate raw user input into SQL, shell commands, LDAP filters, or template strings, regardless of language.
+2. **Fail Closed on Auth:** Default all endpoints to authenticated; explicitly mark public routes rather than remembering to protect private ones.
+3. **Strict Bounds:** Keep remediation diffs minimal ($\le 35$ additions, $\le 25$ deletions) to ensure auditability across all codebases.

package/.torusguard/skills/torusguard/references/rust-security.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# TorusGuard Skill Reference: Rust Security
+
+> **Loaded When:** A project is identified as a Rust application (`Cargo.toml` or `.rs` files detected).
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Key Inspection Areas & Rules
+
+### 1. Memory Safety & Unsafe Blocks
+* `TG-INPUT-003`: Audit and restrict `unsafe { ... }` blocks. Must include a `// SAFETY:` rationale comment.
+* Never disable standard borrow checker lints via `#![allow(unsafe_code)]`.
+
+### 2. Database & SQL Queries
+* `TG-INPUT-002`: Use compile-time checked `sqlx::query!` or Diesel query builder methods.
+* `TG-DB-004`: Enforce tenant filtering in queries (`filter(tenant_id.eq(current_tenant_id))`).
+
+### 3. Outbound Requests & TLS
+* `TG-DIFF-001`: Prohibit `danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)` in `reqwest::ClientBuilder`.
+* `TG-SSRF-001`: Enforce IP allowlists before dispatching network calls.
+
+---
+
+## 🛠️ Safe Patterns Summary
+
+```rust
+// Safe sqlx Parameterized Query
+let user = sqlx::query_as!(
+    User,
+    "SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND tenant_id = $2",
+    user_id,
+    current_tenant_id
+)
+.fetch_one(&pool)
+.await?;
+
+// Safe reqwest Client (Strict TLS)
+let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
+    .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
+    .build()?;
+```

package/.torusguard/snapshots/run-20260908-115240-audit/examples/vulnerable-react-express/client/src/App.jsx.bak

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+import { useState } from 'react';
+import { clientConfig } from './config';
+
+// TG-DB-001: SQL query construction in frontend (never do this)
+function buildSearchQuery(email) {
+  return `SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE email LIKE '%${email}%'`;
+}
+
+// TG-DB-003: Documented anti-pattern — Prisma must never run in browser
+// import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client'; // FORBIDDEN in client
+
+export default function App() {
+  const [email, setEmail] = useState('');
+  const [password, setPassword] = useState('');
+  const [bio, setBio] = useState('<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>');
+  const [userId, setUserId] = useState('1');
+  const [isAdmin] = useState(localStorage.getItem('role') === 'admin'); // TG-AUTH-002
+  const [message, setMessage] = useState('');
+
+  async function login(e) {
+    e.preventDefault();
+    const res = await fetch('/api/login', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      credentials: 'include',
+      body: JSON.stringify({ email, password }),
+    });
+    const data = await res.json();
+    // TG-CLIENT-002: Sensitive console logging
+    console.log('Login token:', data.token, 'config:', clientConfig);
+    setMessage(JSON.stringify(data));
+  }
+
+  async function fetchUser() {
+    const res = await fetch(`/api/users/${userId}`);
+    setMessage(await res.text());
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <div style={{ maxWidth: 560, margin: '2rem auto', fontFamily: 'sans-serif' }}>
+      <h1>Vulnerable Demo</h1>
+      <p style={{ color: 'crimson' }}>Intentionally insecure — localhost lab only</p>
+
+      <form onSubmit={login}>
+        <input value={email} onChange={(e) => setEmail(e.target.value)} placeholder="email" />
+        <input value={password} onChange={(e) => setPassword(e.target.value)} placeholder="password" type="password" />
+        <button type="submit">Login</button>
+      </form>
+
+      <p>Frontend SQL preview: {buildSearchQuery(email)}</p>
+
+      {/* TG-INPUT-003: Unsafe HTML rendering */}
+      <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: bio }} />
+
+      <button onClick={fetchUser}>Fetch user (IDOR demo)</button>
+
+      {/* TG-AUTH-002: Client-only admin gate */}
+      {isAdmin && <section><h2>Admin Panel</h2><p>Visible if localStorage role=admin — not real security</p></section>}
+
+      {message && <pre>{message}</pre>}
+    </div>
+  );
+}

package/.torusguard/snapshots/run-20260908-115240-audit/examples/vulnerable-react-express/server/index.js.bak

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+const express = require('express');
+const cors = require('cors');
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+const app = express();
+const PORT = 3001;
+
+// TG-SEC-001: Hardcoded JWT secret
+const JWT_SECRET = 'FAKE_DEMO_JWT_SECRET_NOT_FOR_PRODUCTION';
+
+// TG-PLATFORM-001: Wildcard CORS with credentials
+app.use(cors({ origin: '*', credentials: true }));
+
+// TG-PLATFORM-004: No explicit JSON body size limit
+app.use(express.json());
+
+const users = [
+  { id: '1', email: 'alice@demo.local', password: 'password123', name: 'Alice' },
+  { id: '2', email: 'bob@demo.local', password: 'secret456', name: 'Bob' },
+];
+
+// TG-RATE-001: No rate limit on login
+// TG-AUTH-001: Plaintext password comparison
+// TG-SEC-004: Logs sensitive data
+// TG-AUTH-004: Insecure cookie (no httpOnly/Secure/SameSite)
+app.post('/api/login', (req, res) => {
+  const { email, password } = req.body;
+  console.log('Login attempt:', { email, password }); // TG-SEC-004
+  const user = users.find((u) => u.email === email && u.password === password);
+  if (!user) return res.status(401).json({ error: 'User not found' }); // enumeration
+  const token = jwt.sign({ id: user.id }, JWT_SECRET);
+  res.cookie('token', token);
+  res.json({ message: 'ok', token, user });
+});
+
+// TG-AUTH-003: IDOR — no ownership check
+app.get('/api/users/:id', (req, res) => {
+  const user = users.find((u) => u.id === req.params.id);
+  if (!user) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+  res.json(user);
+});
+
+// TG-INPUT-002: SQL concatenation (simulated query string)
+// TG-RATE-003: Unbounded results
+app.get('/api/search', (req, res) => {
+  const q = req.query.q || '';
+  const fakeSql = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email LIKE '%${q}%'`;
+  const results = users.filter((u) => u.email.includes(q));
+  res.json({ query: fakeSql, results });
+});
+
+// TG-INPUT-001: No validation
+// TG-RATE-002: Unlimited contact endpoint
+app.post('/api/contact', (req, res) => {
+  res.json({ received: req.body });
+});
+
+// TG-RATE-002: Unlimited AI endpoint
+app.post('/api/ai', (req, res) => {
+  res.json({ reply: 'demo', prompt: req.body.prompt });
+});
+
+// TG-INPUT-004: Unrestricted upload (stub)
+app.post('/api/upload', (req, res) => {
+  res.json({ saved: req.body.filename });
+});
+
+// TG-AUTH-005: Unsafe password reset
+app.post('/api/reset', (req, res) => {
+  const { email } = req.body;
+  const user = users.find((u) => u.email === email);
+  if (!user) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Email not registered' }); // enumeration
+  const token = `reset-${user.id}-12345`; // predictable
+  res.json({ resetToken: token });
+});
+
+app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+  // TG-PLATFORM-003: Stack trace exposed
+  res.status(500).json({ error: err.message, stack: err.stack });
+});
+
+app.listen(PORT, () => console.log(`Vulnerable demo server http://localhost:${PORT}`));