toolroll 0.9.63 → 0.9.67

package/dist/agent-fence.js

@@ -40,13 +40,18 @@
  * rename or remove a folder of the user's above a fenced path or the temp
  * folder, which would reach the fenced path under a new name.
  */
+import { INSTANCE_DIR } from "./console-instance.js";
+import { ACP_AGENTS, ACP_PROVIDER_IDS } from "./acp-agents.js";
 import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { existsSync, lstatSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, realpathSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { existsSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, realpathSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { homedir, tmpdir } from "node:os";
 import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve, sep } from "node:path";
 import { readMonitoring } from "./monitoring-settings.js";
 import { existingFolders } from "./names.js";
 import { DEPS_FOLDER, linkedKey, readyCopy, sharedCopies } from "./shared-deps.js";
+/** Beside the database: where Linux builds' network bridges are made (its name reads as secret wherever it is). */
+export const BRIDGE_DIR = "bridge-secrets";
 /** Names that are secrets wherever the database lives (used when its folder is shared with other things). */
 const SENSITIVE_NAME = /(^up-login\.txt$|token|secret|login|password|credential|vapid|keys?\b|\.pem$|\.key$|^backups$|^evidence$|^remote$|^sign-in\.json$|^monitoring\.json$)/i;
 function real(path) {
@@ -127,6 +132,10 @@ export function trustedWorktreeBinding(repository, worktree, poolRoots = []) {
  */
 export function agentFence(options) {
     const fence = new Set();
+    /** The console's run folder: kept by its own pathname through canonicalization (and its target's too). */
+    let runFolder = null;
+    /** The bridges' folder, likewise. */
+    let bridgeFolder = null;
     const home = real(options.home ?? homedir());
     const worktree = options.worktree === null ? null : real(options.worktree);
     if (options.databaseFile !== null && options.databaseFile !== "" && options.databaseFile !== ":memory:") {
@@ -135,6 +144,45 @@ export function agentFence(options) {
         for (const suffix of ["", "-wal", "-shm", "-journal"])
             if (existsSync(database + suffix))
                 fence.add(database + suffix);
+        // The console's run folder (its discovery sockets, console-instance.ts) beside the database, wherever that is: no
+        // build may add, rename or remove anything in it while a console listens there. It is made (owner-only) before any
+        // build starts if it isn't there yet, so a build can never be the one to create it — and the fence always has a
+        // real folder to cover (a Linux bind needs one).
+        // Whatever is at that path is fenced, always — a folder, a file, a link (the path itself, never only where a link
+        // points), a folder holding anything at all — so no build can replace it; when nothing is there it is made first.
+        // If it can't be made, the path is fenced anyway: a sandbox that can't cover a missing path refuses to launch
+        // rather than run unfenced. The name is Toolroll's own; nothing else belongs there.
+        // The folder Linux builds' network bridges are made in (egress-bridge.ts): made before any build starts and fenced
+        // from every build, so no build — however long it runs — can reach a bridge made for a later one.
+        const bridges = join(state, BRIDGE_DIR);
+        try {
+            lstatSync(bridges);
+        }
+        catch {
+            try {
+                mkdirSync(bridges, { mode: 0o700 });
+            }
+            catch { /* fenced below either way */ }
+        }
+        // Fenced by its own name as well as where it leads: a link planted there is itself out of reach (and the bridge
+        // refuses a root that isn't a private folder: egress-bridge.ts).
+        bridgeFolder = bridges;
+        fence.add(bridges);
+        runFolder = join(state, INSTANCE_DIR);
+        const present = () => { try {
+            lstatSync(runFolder);
+            return true;
+        }
+        catch {
+            return false;
+        } };
+        if (!present()) {
+            try {
+                mkdirSync(runFolder, { mode: 0o700 });
+            }
+            catch { /* fenced below either way */ }
+        }
+        fence.add(runFolder);
         // Only a folder that is Toolroll's own (~/.config/toolroll or an older name,
         // the desktop app's "Toolroll") is fenced whole: a database kept
         // in a shared folder (a projects folder, a test's temp folder) must not
@@ -179,12 +227,12 @@ export function agentFence(options) {
             fence.add(path);
     for (const path of options.boundary?.protectedShell ?? [])
         fence.add(real(path));
-    const protectedPaths = new Set([...fence].map(real));
+    const protectedPaths = new Set([...fence].flatMap(path => path === runFolder || path === bridgeFolder ? [path, real(path)] : [real(path)]));
     for (const path of options.boundary?.shell ?? [])
         fence.add(path);
     const binding = options.binding;
     const needed = binding === undefined || binding === null ? [] : [binding.gitdir, real(join(binding.main, ".git"))];
-    return [...new Set([...fence].map(real))].filter(path => {
+    return [...new Set([...fence].flatMap(path => path === runFolder || path === bridgeFolder ? [path, real(path)] : [real(path)]))].filter(path => {
         if (protectedPaths.has(path) || !needed.some(target => target === path || inside(target, path)))
             return true;
         console.warn(`Dropped build fence entry covering this checkout's own Git data: ${path}`);
@@ -197,10 +245,18 @@ export function agentFence(options) {
  * cloud logins or another agent's sign-in, or rewrite their own Claude or
  * Codex setup for the next interactive session.
  */
-const HOME_CONFIGURATION = [".claude", ".claude.json", ".codex", ".gemini", ".ssh", ".aws", ".gnupg", ".netrc", ".git-credentials", ".kube", join(".config", "gh"), join(".docker", "config.json")];
+const HOME_CONFIGURATION = [
+    ".claude", ".claude.json", ".codex", ".gemini", ".ssh", ".aws", ".gnupg", ".netrc", ".git-credentials", ".kube", join(".config", "gh"), join(".docker", "config.json"),
+    // Every ACP agent's own configuration and sign-in (acp-agents.ts): fenced from every build but that agent's own.
+    ...ACP_PROVIDER_IDS.flatMap(id => ACP_AGENTS[id].home),
+];
 /** What a provider's own CLI reads to sign in and keep its sessions. The OS fence around Claude and Gemini holds
  * their whole process, so those stay reachable there; Codex fences only its agent's commands, so it keeps none. */
-const PROVIDER_HOME = { claude: [".claude", ".claude.json"], gemini: [".gemini"], codex: [], openrouter: [] };
+const PROVIDER_HOME = {
+    claude: [".claude", ".claude.json"], gemini: [".gemini"], codex: [], openrouter: [],
+    // Each ACP agent keeps its own configuration and sign-in where its row says (acp-agents.ts).
+    ...Object.fromEntries(ACP_PROVIDER_IDS.map(id => [id, ACP_AGENTS[id].home])),
+};
 /** What Claude's own file tools refuse inside its home: the CLI reads these itself, its model never needs to. */
 const CLAUDE_FILE_TOOL_HOME = [".claude.json", join(".claude", ".credentials.json"), join(".claude", "settings.json"), join(".claude", "settings.local.json"), ".npmrc"];
 /**
@@ -311,8 +367,9 @@ export function taskBoundary(options) {
     const fileTools = options.provider === "claude" ? present(CLAUDE_FILE_TOOL_HOME).filter(path => !shell.has(path)) : [];
     return { protectedShell, shell: [...shell].sort(), fileTools: fileTools.sort(), readOnly: [...readOnly].sort(), lookup: [...lookup].sort() };
 }
-/** The prefixes of every launch's private folders: its tools' config and a Codex build's own home. */
-export const RUN_FOLDER_PREFIXES = ["so-tools-", "so-codex-"];
+/** The prefixes of every launch's private folders: its tools' config, a Codex build's own home, and a Linux build's
+ * network bridge (egress-bridge.ts). */
+export const RUN_FOLDER_PREFIXES = ["so-tools-", "so-codex-", "so-net-", "so-cmd-"];
 export function runFolders(own, root = tmpdir()) {
     return { root: real(root), own: own === null ? null : real(own) };
 }
@@ -327,6 +384,172 @@ function otherRunFolders(folders) {
     }
     return entries.filter(entry => RUN_FOLDER_PREFIXES.some(prefix => entry.startsWith(prefix))).map(entry => join(folders.root, entry)).filter(path => path !== folders.own);
 }
+export { isWritesMode, WRITES_DEFAULT } from "./writes-mode.js";
+/** Claude's transcript folder for a working folder: its path with every character but a letter or digit made `-`
+ * (Claude Code's own naming; a name over 200 characters gets a suffix, so it is granted by prefix). */
+export function claudeProjectFolder(home, cwd) {
+    const slug = cwd.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g, "-");
+    return slug.length > 200 ? { path: join(home, ".claude", "projects", slug.slice(0, 200)), byPrefix: true } : { path: join(home, ".claude", "projects", slug), byPrefix: false };
+}
+/**
+ * A folder a write grant may name: made when absent, then only as the real folder it is — never a link, nor reached
+ * through one (its real path is its parent's real path and its own name). A build can rewrite what it may write, so a
+ * folder it was given could otherwise come back as a link to anywhere and be granted, followed, on its next launch.
+ * Null when it isn't such a folder: nothing is granted, and the write it was for fails.
+ */
+export function grantFolder(path, create = true) {
+    if (create) {
+        try {
+            mkdirSync(path, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+        }
+        catch { /* checked below */ }
+    }
+    try {
+        const held = lstatSync(path);
+        if (held.isSymbolicLink() || !held.isDirectory())
+            return null;
+        // Nor through a link of this user's anywhere above it (a system alias, /var → /private/var, is root's and fine).
+        const uid = process.getuid?.();
+        for (let folder = dirname(resolve(path)); folder !== dirname(folder); folder = dirname(folder)) {
+            const above = lstatSync(folder);
+            if (above.isSymbolicLink() && (uid === undefined || above.uid === uid))
+                return null;
+        }
+        const at = realpathSync(path);
+        return at === join(realpathSync(dirname(path)), basename(path)) ? at : null;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The data folders an ACP agent writes besides a ~/.local/share|state root, per agent, only where known: Goose's
+ * sessions and state; Qwen Code (a Gemini CLI fork) its history and temp, as Gemini measured. An agent not listed
+ * (Cursor, Cline: their settings sit among their data) writes nothing of its own under a workspace build until its
+ * layout is measured; a project using one chooses `anywhere`.
+ */
+const ACP_DATA = {
+    goose: [".local/share/goose", ".local/state/goose"],
+    qwen: [".qwen/tmp", ".qwen/history"],
+};
+/** The suffix Claude Code gives a transcript folder whose name it shortened: `-` and a hash, nothing else. */
+const CLAUDE_SHORTENED = "-[a-z0-9]+(/|$)";
+/** A file and the temporary names it is replaced through (`name.tmp-1`, `name.json.12345`), never a folder below it. */
+const ATOMIC_NAMES = "([.~][^/]*)?$";
+/** The parts of a repository's shared Git data a commit in a worktree writes: objects, refs and their logs (and the
+ * packed refs). Its config, hooks, info, other worktrees' data and submodules' are never among them. */
+function commitGitData(common) {
+    const made = (path) => { try {
+        mkdirSync(path, { recursive: true });
+    }
+    catch { /* granted as named */ } return real(path); };
+    return {
+        subpaths: ["objects", "refs", "logs"].map(name => grantFolder(join(common, name))).filter((path) => path !== null),
+        prefixes: [{ path: join(common, "packed-refs"), suffix: ATOMIC_NAMES }],
+        // Alternates there would let objects come from anywhere.
+        readOnly: [made(join(common, "objects", "info"))],
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * What a `workspace` build writes and what it loses (arc 2): its checkout, its checkout's Git data (less the shared
+ * repository's config, hooks and info, which Git runs or reads as commands), its own launch folder (its temp is there),
+ * its project's cache folder, the terminal devices, and only the provider state its CLI must write (measured: Claude's
+ * transcript folder for this checkout; Gemini's history, temp and project list; an ACP agent's own folders). The
+ * folders named here are made first, so the provider never has to make them where it can't. `deny` is what this
+ * provider must not even read (Claude's live sessions' keys).
+ */
+export function writeAllowlist(options) {
+    const home = real(options.home);
+    const worktree = real(options.worktree);
+    const subpaths = new Set([worktree]);
+    const prefixes = new Map();
+    const readOnly = new Set();
+    const deny = new Set();
+    const made = (path) => { try {
+        mkdirSync(path, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    }
+    catch { /* granted as named either way */ } return real(path); };
+    const grant = (path, create = true) => { const at = grantFolder(path, create); if (at !== null)
+        subpaths.add(at); };
+    if (options.binding !== null) {
+        const common = real(join(options.binding.main, ".git"));
+        const gitdir = real(options.binding.gitdir);
+        grant(gitdir, false);
+        // The shared Git data a commit writes, and nothing Git reads as commands or settings: the shared config (filters,
+        // hooks path, fsmonitor), hooks, info (attributes, excludes), other worktrees' data and submodules' stay as they are.
+        const data = commitGitData(common);
+        for (const path of data.subpaths)
+            subpaths.add(path);
+        for (const one of data.prefixes)
+            prefixes.set(`${one.path}\0${one.suffix}`, one);
+        for (const path of data.readOnly)
+            readOnly.add(path);
+        // This worktree's own settings file, present (empty) so it is held read-only everywhere, a bind included.
+        const own = join(gitdir, "config.worktree");
+        try {
+            if (!existsSync(own))
+                writeFileSync(own, "", { mode: 0o644, flag: "wx" });
+        }
+        catch { /* held read-only by name */ }
+        readOnly.add(own);
+    }
+    if (options.launchFolder !== null)
+        grant(options.launchFolder, false);
+    if (options.cache !== null)
+        grant(options.cache);
+    if (options.provider === "claude") {
+        const folder = claudeProjectFolder(home, worktree);
+        if (folder.byPrefix) {
+            made(dirname(folder.path));
+            prefixes.set(folder.path, { path: folder.path, suffix: CLAUDE_SHORTENED });
+        }
+        else
+            grant(folder.path);
+        deny.add(join(home, ".claude", "sessions"));
+    }
+    else if (options.provider === "gemini") {
+        for (const name of ["history", "tmp"])
+            grant(join(home, ".gemini", name));
+        prefixes.set("gemini", { path: join(home, ".gemini", "projects.json"), suffix: ATOMIC_NAMES });
+    }
+    else if (Object.hasOwn(ACP_AGENTS, options.provider)) {
+        // An ACP agent's configuration stays read-only whole (its MCP servers, hooks, plugins, agents and commands could
+        // otherwise be planted for the operator's next session of it); only its known data folders are written (ACP_DATA).
+        for (const name of ACP_AGENTS[options.provider].home)
+            if (/^\.local\/(share|state)\//.test(name))
+                grant(join(home, name));
+        for (const name of ACP_DATA[options.provider] ?? [])
+            grant(join(home, name));
+    }
+    return { writes: { subpaths: [...subpaths].sort(), prefixes: [...prefixes.values()].sort((a, b) => a.path.localeCompare(b.path)) }, readOnly: [...readOnly].sort(), deny: [...deny].sort() };
+}
+/** Where a project's builds keep their package caches: one folder per project (one trust domain), never used by the
+ * plane's own tools, below the user's cache folder. */
+export function buildCacheFolder(repo, home = homedir(), platform = process.platform, env = process.env) {
+    const root = platform === "darwin" ? join(home, "Library", "Caches") : env["XDG_CACHE_HOME"] !== undefined && isAbsolute(env["XDG_CACHE_HOME"]) ? env["XDG_CACHE_HOME"] : join(home, ".cache");
+    return join(root, "toolroll-builds", createHash("sha256").update(real(repo)).digest("hex").slice(0, 16));
+}
+/** The environment that points a build's package managers at its project's cache folder, not the user's own. */
+export function buildCacheEnv(folder) {
+    const at = (name) => join(folder, name);
+    return {
+        npm_config_cache: at("npm"), npm_config_store_dir: at("pnpm"), YARN_CACHE_FOLDER: at("yarn"), BUN_INSTALL_CACHE_DIR: at("bun"),
+        COREPACK_HOME: at("corepack"), npm_config_devdir: at("node-gyp"), PIP_CACHE_DIR: at("pip"), UV_CACHE_DIR: at("uv"),
+        GOCACHE: at("go-build"), GOMODCACHE: at("go-mod"), CARGO_HOME: at("cargo"), GRADLE_USER_HOME: at("gradle"),
+        DENO_DIR: at("deno"), XDG_CACHE_HOME: at("xdg"),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Services a sandboxed process could ask to act outside the sandbox for it (macOS): open a URL in a browser (Launch
+ * Services), script another application (Apple Events), fetch in the background (nsurlsessiond), look a name up
+ * (the DNS service: a lookup is itself a message out), or read and write the clipboard. Denied when the network is
+ * confined; the run's proxy resolves names for it.
+ */
+export const DELEGATION_SERVICES = [
+    "com.apple.coreservices.launchservicesd", "com.apple.coreservices.quarantine-resolver", "com.apple.lsd.mapdb", "com.apple.lsd.modifydb", "com.apple.lsd.open",
+    "com.apple.coreservices.appleevents", "com.apple.nsurlsessiond", "com.apple.nsurlsessiond.NSURLSessionProxyService",
+    "com.apple.dnssd.service", "com.apple.mDNSResponder", "com.apple.pasteboard.1",
+];
 export const NO_GRANTS = { readOnly: [], readable: [], lookup: [] };
 /**
  * The pool deny for one launch. `roots` come from the plane's own records (the pool beside the database, and the one
@@ -457,7 +680,14 @@ export function codexFenceArgv(fence, fullAccess, grants = NO_GRANTS) {
     // Codex lets the more specific path win: no read grant inside a pool, but the build's own checkout.
     const pooled = (path) => pool !== undefined && pool.deny.some(one => path === one || inside(path, one))
         && !(pool.own !== null && (path === pool.own || inside(path, pool.own)));
-    if (fullAccess)
+    // Full access writes anywhere its fence allows, unless the build writes only its workspace (arc 2): then exactly its
+    // allowlist, in either mode, beside the workspace Codex's own profile gives.
+    // Codex's own workspace profile also writes the shared temp folders; a workspace build starts from its read-only
+    // profile instead, with exactly the allowlist (its checkout among it) written back.
+    if (grants.writes !== undefined)
+        for (const path of grants.writes.subpaths)
+            access.set(real(path), "write");
+    else if (fullAccess)
         access.set("/", "write");
     for (const path of readOnly)
         if (!pooled(real(path)))
@@ -471,14 +701,22 @@ export function codexFenceArgv(fence, fullAccess, grants = NO_GRANTS) {
         for (const path of held.write)
             access.set(path, "write");
     }
-    for (const path of deny)
+    // Denies are keyed where they resolve; the console's run folder is also denied by its own pathname, so a link there
+    // stays unreplaceable, not only its target.
+    for (const path of deny) {
         access.set(real(path), "deny");
+        if (basename(path) === INSTANCE_DIR)
+            access.set(path, "deny");
+    }
     const filesystem = [...access].map(([path, mode]) => `${toml(path)}=${toml(mode)}`);
     return [
         "-c", 'default_permissions="standing-orders"',
-        "-c", 'permissions.standing-orders.extends=":workspace"',
+        "-c", `permissions.standing-orders.extends=${grants.writes === undefined ? '":workspace"' : '":read-only"'}`,
         "-c", `permissions.standing-orders.filesystem={${filesystem.join(",")}}`,
-        ...(fullAccess ? ["-c", "permissions.standing-orders.network.enabled=true", "-c", 'approval_policy="never"'] : []),
+        // Codex's command sandbox can't route through a proxy: its commands reach the network only when the run's sealed
+        // network is open (and Full access asked for it), and are offline otherwise.
+        ...(fullAccess && (grants.network === undefined || grants.network.mode === "open") ? ["-c", "permissions.standing-orders.network.enabled=true"] : []),
+        ...(fullAccess ? ["-c", 'approval_policy="never"'] : []),
     ];
 }
 /**
@@ -625,6 +863,14 @@ export function macosFenceProfile(fence, grants = NO_GRANTS) {
     return [
         "(version 1)",
         "(allow default)",
+        // A workspace build writes only its allowlist (and the terminal devices); every deny and read-only rule after this
+        // still holds inside it.
+        ...(grants.writes === undefined ? [] : [
+            "(deny file-write*)",
+            `(allow file-write* (subpath "/dev")${grants.writes.subpaths.length === 0 ? "" : ` ${paths("subpath", grants.writes.subpaths)}`}${grants.writes.prefixes.map(one => ` (regex #"^${seatbeltRegex(one.path)}${one.suffix}")`).join("")})`,
+            // A granted folder itself can't be renamed, removed or replaced (by a link to anywhere, say): only what is in it.
+            ...(grants.writes.subpaths.length === 0 ? [] : [`(deny file-write* ${paths("literal", grants.writes.subpaths)})`]),
+        ]),
         ...(pool === undefined || pool.deny.length === 0 ? [] : [`(deny file-read* file-write* ${paths("subpath", pool.deny)})`]),
         ...(pool?.own == null ? [] : [
             `(allow file-read* file-write* ${paths("subpath", [pool.own])})`,
@@ -644,9 +890,38 @@ export function macosFenceProfile(fence, grants = NO_GRANTS) {
         "(deny mach-priv-task-port)",
         "(deny mach-task-name)",
         ...(above.length === 0 ? [] : [`(deny file-write* ${paths("literal", above)})`]),
+        ...macosNetworkRules(grants.network),
+        // A workspace build reaches no unix socket but its own (a container engine's, an agent's, a database's would act
+        // outside its limits for it), whatever its network: a confined network has its own rule for this already. Its open
+        // network still names hosts: the system's DNS service answers on a unix socket, and without it nothing resolves.
+        ...(grants.writes === undefined || grants.network?.mode === "allowlist" ? [] : [
+            "(deny network-outbound (remote unix-socket))",
+            `(allow network-outbound (remote unix-socket (path-literal ${seatbelt(MACOS_DNS_SOCKET)})))`,
+            ...(grants.writes.subpaths.length === 0 ? [] : [`(allow network-outbound ${grants.writes.subpaths.map(root => `(remote unix-socket (subpath ${seatbelt(root)}))`).join(" ")})`]),
+        ]),
     ].join("\n");
 }
+/**
+ * The network half of the macOS fence. Every outbound connection is denied, then loopback is given back as the launch
+ * allows: every local port under `loopback: "any"`, else the run's proxy and broker alone. (Seatbelt admits a port an
+ * allow names whatever a deny after it says, so a local port can't be refused once all are admitted: the choice is all
+ * or none, plus the run's own.) Filters name the remote end only: a `local ip` filter would admit any outbound
+ * connection.
+ */
+export function macosNetworkRules(network) {
+    if (network === undefined || network.mode === "open")
+        return [];
+    const local = (port) => `(remote ip "localhost:${port}")`;
+    return [
+        "(deny network-outbound)",
+        `(allow network-outbound ${network.loopback === "any" ? local("*") : [network.proxyPort, ...network.brokerPorts].map(local).join(" ")})`,
+        ...(network.socketRoots.length === 0 ? [] : [`(allow network-outbound ${network.socketRoots.map(root => `(remote unix-socket (subpath ${seatbelt(root)}))`).join(" ")})`]),
+        `(deny mach-lookup ${DELEGATION_SERVICES.map(name => `(global-name ${seatbelt(name)})`).join(" ")})`,
+    ];
+}
 export const SANDBOX_EXEC = "/usr/bin/sandbox-exec";
+/** Where macOS's resolver (mDNSResponder) answers: every name lookup on a Mac is a message to this socket. */
+export const MACOS_DNS_SOCKET = "/private/var/run/mDNSResponder";
 /** A process already inside a Seatbelt sandbox (an agent's, or a flow check zone's) can't apply another: sandbox-exec says so. */
 const NESTED_SANDBOX = /sandbox_apply: Operation not permitted/;
 let seatbeltWorks = null;
@@ -719,6 +994,9 @@ function linuxGrants(fence, grants) {
  * folder, or /dev/null for a file), so what is made there after launch is masked too; then only the explicit grants
  * bound back read-only (bubblewrap binds from the original root, so a grant inside a mask still reaches its files). */
 export function linuxFenced(file, args, fence, grants = NO_GRANTS) {
+    const network = grants.network?.mode === "allowlist" ? grants.network : null;
+    if (network !== null && network.bridge === undefined)
+        throw new Error("A confined network on Linux needs its bridge");
     const mask = (path) => {
         let folder = true;
         try {
@@ -732,5 +1010,154 @@ export function linuxFenced(file, args, fence, grants = NO_GRANTS) {
     const pool = grants.pool?.deny ?? [];
     const own = grants.pool?.own != null && existsSync(grants.pool.own) ? ["--bind", grants.pool.own, grants.pool.own] : [];
     const kept = linuxGrants([...fence, ...pool], grants).flatMap(path => ["--ro-bind", path, path]);
-    return { file: "bwrap", args: ["--dev-bind", "/", "/", ...pool.flatMap(mask), ...own, ...fence.flatMap(mask), ...kept, "--die-with-parent", "--", file, ...args] };
+    // A confined network: a network and a process view of its own, the host's sockets out of reach (a socket in a
+    // mounted folder is not network, so they are masked), and the run's proxy and broker carried in by the forwarder.
+    const isolated = network === null ? [] : [
+        "--unshare-net", "--unshare-pid", "--proc", "/proc",
+        ...linuxHostSockets(undefined, undefined, undefined, grants.writes !== undefined).flatMap(mask),
+        "--ro-bind", network.bridge.folder, network.bridge.folder,
+    ];
+    // A confined build gets a /tmp of its own (other programs' sockets, other runs' folders and anything planted there
+    // all out of sight at once), with only its own folders there given back; every mask and grant below still applies.
+    // A workspace build (arc 2) sees the whole filesystem read-only, a /dev of its own and a /tmp of its own, with only
+    // its allowlist bound back writable; its own checkout's Git data is in that list.
+    const writes = grants.writes;
+    const root = writes === undefined ? ["--dev-bind", "/", "/"] : ["--ro-bind", "/", "/", "--dev", "/dev"];
+    const writable = writes === undefined ? [] : [...writes.subpaths, ...writes.prefixes.map(one => one.path)].filter(path => existsSync(path)).flatMap(path => ["--bind", path, path]);
+    // What a private /tmp gives back is read-only for a workspace build (its writable part is bound again after): the
+    // checkout's whole shared Git data among it must not come back writable.
+    // A confined network brings a /tmp of its own (arc 1); a workspace build with an open network sees the shared /tmp
+    // read-only like the rest of the root, its own folders there bound back writable.
+    const privateTmp = network === null ? [] : ["--tmpfs", "/tmp", ...(network?.keep ?? []).filter(path => inside(path, "/tmp") && existsSync(path)).flatMap(path => [writes === undefined ? "--bind" : "--ro-bind", path, path])];
+    // A workspace build never reaches the host's own services either (a container engine would write anywhere for it),
+    // whatever its network: confined networks mask them below already.
+    const services = writes === undefined || network !== null ? [] : linuxHostSockets(undefined, undefined, undefined, true).flatMap(mask);
+    const command = network === null ? [file, ...args]
+        : [network.bridge.node, network.bridge.forwarder, network.bridge.folder, ...[network.proxyPort, ...network.brokerPorts].map(String), "--", file, ...args];
+    return { file: "bwrap", args: [...root, ...privateTmp, ...writable, ...pool.flatMap(mask), ...own, ...fence.flatMap(mask), ...kept, ...services, ...isolated, "--die-with-parent", "--", ...command] };
+}
+/** The host's own sockets a process in a mounted filesystem could still talk to (D-Bus, the display, container
+ * engines), wherever they exist here. */
+export function linuxHostSockets(uid = process.getuid?.(), home = homedir(), tmp = "/tmp", followLinks = false, env = process.env) {
+    // The system's own, root-owned: resolved (/var/run is a link to /run) so bubblewrap mounts over the real path, once.
+    const system = [
+        ...(uid === undefined ? [] : [`/run/user/${uid}`]), "/run/dbus", "/var/run/dbus", "/var/run/docker.sock", "/run/docker.sock", "/run/containerd", "/run/podman",
+        "/var/run/podman", "/run/systemd/private", "/run/snapd.socket", "/run/screen",
+    ];
+    const masks = new Set();
+    for (const path of system) {
+        try {
+            masks.add(realpathSync(path));
+        }
+        catch { /* not here */ }
+    }
+    // The user's own, in places a build could plant names: taken only as the real folders or sockets they are, never
+    // through a link (a planted link would turn a mask onto any folder at all). Container engines
+    // run per user (Docker Desktop and the docker CLI's folder whole, so a socket made there later is covered too;
+    // Colima, OrbStack, Lima, Rancher Desktop, rootless containers); a terminal multiplexer takes commands from its
+    // socket; an SSH agent signs as you; editors keep IPC sockets in /tmp (hidden by the build's private /tmp).
+    // Masked whoever owns it (a folder `sudo docker` made is root's): only a link is never followed, since a link turns
+    // a mask onto its target. A link there is a residual until builds can't write the home folder (arc 2).
+    const owned = (path) => {
+        try {
+            const held = lstatSync(path);
+            return !held.isSymbolicLink() && (held.isDirectory() || held.isSocket());
+        }
+        catch {
+            return false;
+        }
+    };
+    for (const path of [".docker", ".colima", ".orbstack", ".lima", ".rd", ".local/share/containers"].map(name => join(home, name))) {
+        if (owned(path))
+            masks.add(path);
+        // A workspace build can't plant a link in the home folder, so a link there is the operator's own: its target is
+        // masked too (an engine moved elsewhere).
+        else if (followLinks) {
+            try {
+                if (lstatSync(path).isSymbolicLink())
+                    masks.add(realpathSync(path));
+            }
+            catch { /* dangling */ }
+        }
+    }
+    // An engine Toolroll's own environment points at, wherever it is (never the build's to choose): always masked. So is
+    // the SSH agent it names (it signs as you), which a shared /tmp would otherwise leave in reach.
+    for (const name of ["DOCKER_HOST", "CONTAINER_HOST"]) {
+        const socket = /^unix:\/\/(\/.+)$/.exec(env[name] ?? "")?.[1];
+        if (socket !== undefined) {
+            try {
+                masks.add(realpathSync(socket));
+            }
+            catch { /* not there */ }
+        }
+    }
+    const agent = env["SSH_AUTH_SOCK"];
+    if (agent !== undefined && isAbsolute(agent)) {
+        try {
+            const socket = realpathSync(agent);
+            masks.add(socket);
+            // The folder an agent makes for its socket (ssh-XXXX in /tmp) too, so a socket it makes next is out of reach.
+            if (inside(socket, real(tmp)) && dirname(socket) !== real(tmp) && !lstatSync(dirname(socket)).isSymbolicLink())
+                masks.add(dirname(socket));
+        }
+        catch { /* not there */ }
+    }
+    // A build that shares /tmp (a workspace build with an open network) reaches none of the sockets there either: every
+    // socket two levels down (a multiplexer's, an agent's, a display's, an editor's), and the folder that holds it, taken
+    // as it is (never through a link). Toolroll's own launch folders are fenced by name already.
+    if (followLinks) {
+        const socketIn = (folder, depth) => {
+            let found = false;
+            let entries = [];
+            try {
+                entries = readdirSync(folder);
+            }
+            catch {
+                return false;
+            }
+            for (const entry of entries) {
+                const path = join(folder, entry);
+                if (RUN_FOLDER_PREFIXES.some(prefix => entry.startsWith(prefix)))
+                    continue;
+                let held;
+                try {
+                    held = lstatSync(path);
+                }
+                catch {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                if (held.isSocket()) {
+                    masks.add(path);
+                    found = true;
+                }
+                else if (held.isDirectory() && !held.isSymbolicLink() && depth > 0 && socketIn(path, depth - 1)) {
+                    masks.add(path);
+                    found = true;
+                }
+            }
+            return found;
+        };
+        socketIn(tmp, 1);
+    }
+    return [...masks].sort();
+}
+/**
+ * What each agent's fence gives it, by permission mode: the one table README's "What an agent can reach" shows
+ * (fenceSummaryMarkdown; a test holds them equal).
+ */
+export const FENCE_SUMMARY = [
+    {
+        agent: "**Codex / OpenRouter** (any OS)",
+        auto: "Codex's sandbox with the fence: writes only the checkout, its Git data and the project's caches (anywhere outside the fence, under a project set to write anywhere); no network",
+        full: "the same writes, with the fence; its commands reach the network only when the project's network is open",
+    },
+    {
+        agent: "**Claude, Gemini, ACP agents**",
+        auto: "macOS: inside a Seatbelt sandbox that denies the fence and writes only the checkout, its Git data, the project's caches, the run's temp folder and the agent's own session files. Linux: the same in bubblewrap, with a /tmp of its own. Neither (Windows, or Linux without bubblewrap): the build doesn't start, unless an instance operator allows unconfined agents",
+        full: "same",
+    },
+];
+/** FENCE_SUMMARY as README's markdown table. */
+export function fenceSummaryMarkdown() {
+    return ["| | Auto | Full access |", "|---|---|---|", ...FENCE_SUMMARY.map(row => `| ${row.agent} | ${row.auto} | ${row.full} |`)].join("\n");
 }

package/dist/agent-pulse.js

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import { closeSync, constants, fstatSync, openSync, readSync, statSync, unlinkSy
 import { join } from "node:path";
 import { ingestStatus, markStuck, noteDiff, noteTranscript, NOTE_MAX, pageQuestions, QUESTION_KEY, QUESTION_MAX, QUESTIONS_OPEN_MAX, QUESTIONS_PER_ATTEMPT } from "./agent-board.js";
 import { readVerifiedArtifact } from "./evidence.js";
-import { liveLogPath, sanitizeTranscriptLine } from "./live.js";
+import { legacyLiveLogPath, liveLogPath, sanitizeTranscriptLine } from "./live.js";
 import { observeWorktree, parseBaseTreeSnapshot, PEEK_LIMITS } from "./peek.js";
 /** The whole file may grow this far; past it, nothing more is read. */
 export const STATUS_FILE_CAP = 256 * 1024;
@@ -168,7 +168,14 @@ export async function changedFileCount(worktree, base) {
  */
 export function pulseAgentBoard(store, state, now) {
     try {
-        const bytes = statSync(liveLogPath(state.root, state.run)).size;
+        // The records file every run writes now, else a legacy text file.
+        let bytes;
+        try {
+            bytes = statSync(liveLogPath(state.root, state.run)).size;
+        }
+        catch {
+            bytes = statSync(legacyLiveLogPath(state.root, state.run)).size;
+        }
         noteTranscript(store, state.run, state.attemptKey, bytes, now);
     }
     catch { /* no live log: the activity row still counts */ }

package/dist/agent-state-words.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/**
+ * The agent states' words, tones and counts (docs/plans/agents-cockpit.md §1), with nothing the browser can't load:
+ * agent-state.ts derives the states; the console's pages and the sidebar say them with these.
+ */
+/** The display states, strongest first: a roll-up takes the first one any member has. */
+export declare const DISPLAY_STATES: readonly ["needs-you", "failed", "stuck", "paused", "working", "waiting", "done", "idle"];
+export type DisplayState = (typeof DISPLAY_STATES)[number];
+export declare const STATE_WORDS: Record<DisplayState, string>;
+/** For someone who may not act on it: the obligation is still there, and still counts. */
+export declare const NEEDS_SOMEONE = "Needs someone";
+/** Each state's tone, for the console's one palette (attention, problem, live, ready, done, muted). */
+export declare const STATE_TONE: Record<DisplayState, "attention" | "problem" | "live" | "ready" | "done" | "muted">;
+export type StateCounts = Record<DisplayState, number>;
+export declare const NO_COUNTS: StateCounts;
+/** The strongest state among counts, and the counts themselves. Nothing counted is idle. */
+export declare function rollUp(counts: StateCounts): {
+    state: DisplayState;
+    counts: StateCounts;
+};

package/dist/agent-state-words.js

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/**
+ * The agent states' words, tones and counts (docs/plans/agents-cockpit.md §1), with nothing the browser can't load:
+ * agent-state.ts derives the states; the console's pages and the sidebar say them with these.
+ */
+/** The display states, strongest first: a roll-up takes the first one any member has. */
+export const DISPLAY_STATES = ["needs-you", "failed", "stuck", "paused", "working", "waiting", "done", "idle"];
+export const STATE_WORDS = {
+    "needs-you": "Needs you", failed: "Failed", stuck: "Stuck", paused: "Paused", working: "Working", waiting: "Waiting", done: "Done", idle: "Idle",
+};
+/** For someone who may not act on it: the obligation is still there, and still counts. */
+export const NEEDS_SOMEONE = "Needs someone";
+/** Each state's tone, for the console's one palette (attention, problem, live, ready, done, muted). */
+export const STATE_TONE = {
+    "needs-you": "attention", failed: "problem", stuck: "problem", paused: "muted", working: "live", waiting: "muted", done: "ready", idle: "muted",
+};
+export const NO_COUNTS = Object.freeze({ "needs-you": 0, failed: 0, stuck: 0, paused: 0, working: 0, waiting: 0, done: 0, idle: 0 });
+/** The strongest state among counts, and the counts themselves. Nothing counted is idle. */
+export function rollUp(counts) {
+    return { state: DISPLAY_STATES.find(state => state !== "idle" && counts[state] > 0) ?? "idle", counts };
+}