toolcraft 0.0.341 → 0.0.343

package/composition.json

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "tiny-http-mcp-server",
-      "version": "0.1.63",
+      "version": "0.1.68",
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     {
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "toolcraft",
-      "version": "0.0.341",
+      "version": "0.0.343",
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     {
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "toolcraft-schema",
-      "version": "0.0.341",
+      "version": "0.0.343",
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     {

package/dist/composition.json

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "tiny-http-mcp-server",
-      "version": "0.1.63",
+      "version": "0.1.68",
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     {
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "toolcraft",
-      "version": "0.0.341",
+      "version": "0.0.343",
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     {
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "toolcraft-schema",
-      "version": "0.0.341",
+      "version": "0.0.343",
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     {

package/node_modules/tiny-http-mcp-server/dist/composition.json

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "tiny-http-mcp-server",
-      "version": "0.1.63",
+      "version": "0.1.68",
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     {

package/node_modules/tiny-http-mcp-server/node_modules/mcp-oauth/README.md

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ const verifier = createJwksTokenVerifier({
 - `generateCodeVerifier()` and `generateCodeChallenge(...)`: PKCE helpers.
 - `normalizeStoredOAuthClient(value)`: normalize a saved client identity, full registration and ownership marker.
 - `normalizeOAuthScope(value)`: validate scope syntax and normalize its case-sensitive set.
+- `waitForOAuthOperation(promise, signal?)`: settle the caller on cancellation while continuing to observe host completion.
 - `canonicalizeResourceIndicator(value)`: resource indicator canonicalization.
 - `createJwksTokenVerifier(options)`: JWKS-backed access-token verifier for MCP servers.
 - `OAuthError`: OAuth HTTP error type with status, retryability and known-outcome fields.
@@ -94,6 +95,14 @@ accept the same `redirectUri`, `signal` and `timeoutMs` options. Cancellation,
 timeout and explicit close settle pending code waits and release listeners.
 Always close a successful standalone session in `finally`.
 
+Native provider calls capture request option handles before host work. Unauthorized
+handling also owns complete discovery metadata, presented grant values, rejected
+request headers and the selected challenge error before reading persistence.
+A browser callback cannot redirect a later code exchange by changing caller
+metadata. Metadata loaded from a host session store is copied before clock or
+fetch callbacks, retaining the original refresh endpoint and persisted extensions. Explicit authentication owns metadata when lazy discovery returns;
+the selected discovery method retains its original receiver and live host state.
+
 Provider request inputs accept an optional `signal`. It reaches callback waits,
 registration, token requests and bounded token-body reads. Cancellation retains
 its original reason and does not retry authorization. Native provider calls
@@ -126,7 +135,11 @@ timeoutMs })`. Reset acquires the raw identity backend lock, so it can recover
 corrupt or undecryptable records without reading their old contents. It atomically
 retires the identity's grant and registrations and writes a marker that suppresses
 stale initial grants. The default lock wait is 30 seconds. Other names/profiles
-are untouched, and symlink paths are still refused.
+are untouched, and symlink paths are still refused. Native reset, import and
+transaction callbacks retain their original signal while locks or reconciliation
+wait; replacing a caller handle cannot change subsequent cancellation checks.
+Cancellation after a completed identity write prevents the transaction callback
+from running and retains that already persisted identity.
 
 Configure `client.metadata.scope` to request a precise scope set; broader
 discovery metadata does not override it. Explicit scopes must match the cached
@@ -256,7 +269,11 @@ transient retry or restoration of the original grant. Gateway error pages do not
 Native persisted OAuth reads always reject corrupt encrypted documents and
 invalid stored JSON, with diagnostics that omit decrypted contents. They retain
 the existing record for explicit reset rather than interpreting corruption as
-an absent session and reviving an initial grant. Caller file-backend settings
+an absent session and reviving an initial grant. Persisted access tokens that
+cannot be sent as HTTP headers fail with diagnostics that omit token contents;
+the original record remains available for explicit recovery. Token responses are
+checked before activation or persistence. An unusable rotated access token keeps
+refresh intent pending, preventing rotating-token replay. Caller file-backend settings
 cannot disable this policy.
 
 ## Environment Variables

package/node_modules/tiny-http-mcp-server/node_modules/mcp-oauth/dist/client/default-oauth-client-provider.js

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ export function createDefaultOAuthClientProvider(options) {
     let initialGrantConsumed = false;
     return {
         async authenticate(input) {
+            input = { ...input, ...(input.discover === undefined ? {} : { discover: input.discover.bind(input) }) };
             input.signal?.throwIfAborted();
             assertNoAccessTokenInUrl(input.requestUrl, "Protected resource request URL");
             const resource = canonicalizeResourceIndicator(input.requestUrl);
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ export function createDefaultOAuthClientProvider(options) {
                 return { ...initialGrant.tokens };
             if (input.discover === undefined)
                 return;
-            const discovery = await waitForOAuthOperation(input.discover(), input.signal);
+            const discovery = structuredClone(await waitForOAuthOperation(input.discover(), input.signal));
             input.signal?.throwIfAborted();
             assertRequestMatchesResource(resource, canonicalizeResourceIndicator(discovery.resource));
             session = await ensureAuthorizedSession(resource, discovery, input.fetch, true, false, input.signal);
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ export function createDefaultOAuthClientProvider(options) {
             return { ...session.tokens };
         },
         async authorizeRequest(input) {
+            input = { ...input };
             assertNoAccessTokenInUrl(input.requestUrl, "Protected resource request URL");
             const requestUrl = canonicalizeResourceIndicator(input.requestUrl);
             const session = await ensureAuthorizedSession(requestUrl, undefined, input.fetch, false, false, input.signal);
@@ -113,8 +115,16 @@ export function createDefaultOAuthClientProvider(options) {
             return { ...session.tokens };
         },
         async handleUnauthorized(input) {
+            input = { ...input };
             try {
                 input.signal?.throwIfAborted();
+                const presented = input.presentedTokens == null ? input.presentedTokens : normalizeStoredTokens(input.presentedTokens);
+                if (input.presentedTokens != null && presented === undefined)
+                    throw new Error("OAuth rejected-request provenance does not match its authorization header");
+                const challengeError = input.challenge?.params.error;
+                input = { ...input, discovery: structuredClone(input.discovery),
+                    ...(input.requestHeaders === undefined ? {} : { requestHeaders: new Headers(input.requestHeaders) }),
+                    ...(presented === undefined ? {} : { presentedTokens: presented }) };
                 assertNoAccessTokenInUrl(input.requestUrl, "Protected resource request URL");
                 const requestUrl = canonicalizeResourceIndicator(input.requestUrl);
                 const resource = canonicalizeResourceIndicator(input.discovery.resource);
@@ -126,16 +136,15 @@ export function createDefaultOAuthClientProvider(options) {
                 if (input.presentedTokens !== undefined) {
                     rejectedCurrentGrant = false;
                     if (input.presentedTokens !== null) {
-                        const presented = normalizeStoredTokens(input.presentedTokens);
+                        const presented = input.presentedTokens;
                         const header = input.requestHeaders?.get("Authorization") ?? "";
                         const separator = header.indexOf(" ");
-                        if (presented === undefined || header.slice(0, separator).toLowerCase() !== "bearer" || header.slice(separator + 1).trim() !== presented.accessToken)
+                        if (header.slice(0, separator).toLowerCase() !== "bearer" || header.slice(separator + 1).trim() !== presented.accessToken)
                             throw new Error("OAuth rejected-request provenance does not match its authorization header");
                         presentedTokens = presented;
                         rejectedCurrentGrant = currentTokens !== undefined && sameTokenGrant(currentTokens, presented);
                     }
                 }
-                const challengeError = input.challenge?.params.error;
                 const forceRefresh = rejectedCurrentGrant && (challengeError === "invalid_token" || (input.presentedTokens !== undefined && challengeError === undefined));
                 const session = await ensureAuthorizedSession(resource, {
                     ...input.discovery,
@@ -584,18 +593,24 @@ function normalizeLoadedSession(session) {
     if (session === null) {
         return null;
     }
+    const discovery = structuredClone(session.discovery);
     const refreshState = getOwnEntry(session, "refreshState");
     if (refreshState !== undefined && (refreshState !== "pending" || getOwnEntry(session, "tokens") !== undefined))
         throw new Error("Stored OAuth refresh state is invalid");
     const client = normalizeStoredOAuthClient(getOwnEntry(session, "client"));
     if (client === null) {
-        return { ...session, client: { clientId: "" }, tokens: undefined };
+        return { ...session, discovery, client: { clientId: "" }, tokens: undefined };
     }
-    return {
-        ...session,
-        client,
-        tokens: normalizeStoredTokens(getOwnEntry(session, "tokens"))
-    };
+    const tokens = normalizeStoredTokens(getOwnEntry(session, "tokens"));
+    if (tokens !== undefined) {
+        try {
+            new Headers({ Authorization: `Bearer ${tokens.accessToken}` });
+        }
+        catch {
+            throw new Error("Stored OAuth access token is not a valid HTTP header value");
+        }
+    }
+    return { ...session, discovery, client, tokens };
 }
 function normalizeImportedTokens(value, now) {
     if (!isObjectRecord(value))

package/node_modules/tiny-http-mcp-server/node_modules/mcp-oauth/dist/client/resource-bound-store.js

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ export function createResourceBoundOAuthStores(options, namespace, identity) {
         }
     };
     async function replace(record, options) {
+        options = { ...options };
         options.signal?.throwIfAborted();
         const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 30_000;
         if (!Number.isSafeInteger(timeoutMs) || timeoutMs < 1 || timeoutMs > 2_147_483_647)
@@ -124,6 +125,7 @@ export function createResourceBoundOAuthStores(options, namespace, identity) {
     }
     result.sessionStore = {
         async withLock(resource, operation, options) {
+            options = { ...options };
             if (store.withLock === undefined)
                 throw new Error("OAuth resource identity backend must support transaction locks");
             return store.withLock(async () => {

package/node_modules/tiny-http-mcp-server/node_modules/mcp-oauth/dist/client/token-endpoint.js

@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@ async function requestTokens(input) {
         throw new Error("OAuth token response missing access_token");
     }
     const normalizedAccessToken = accessToken.trim();
+    try {
+        new Headers({ Authorization: `Bearer ${normalizedAccessToken}` });
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new Error("OAuth token response access_token is not a valid HTTP header value");
+    }
     const tokenType = normalizeBearerTokenType(getOwnEntry(payload, "token_type"));
     if (tokenType === null) {
         throw new Error("OAuth token response missing token_type=Bearer");

package/node_modules/tiny-http-mcp-server/node_modules/mcp-oauth/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 export { normalizeOAuthScope } from "./client/scope.js";
+export { waitForOAuthOperation } from "./client/cancellable-operation.js";
 export { parseOAuthTokenGrant } from "./client/token-grant.js";
 export type { OAuthTokenGrantImportOptions } from "./client/token-grant.js";
 export { createAuthStoreSessionStore, } from "./client/auth-store-session-store.js";

package/node_modules/tiny-http-mcp-server/node_modules/mcp-oauth/dist/index.js

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 export { normalizeOAuthScope } from "./client/scope.js";
+export { waitForOAuthOperation } from "./client/cancellable-operation.js";
 export { parseOAuthTokenGrant } from "./client/token-grant.js";
 export { createAuthStoreSessionStore, } from "./client/auth-store-session-store.js";
 export { createResourceBoundOAuthStores } from "./client/resource-bound-store.js";

package/node_modules/tiny-http-mcp-server/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "tiny-http-mcp-server",
-  "version": "0.1.63",
+  "version": "0.1.68",
   "description": "Minimal MCP server over HTTP built on tiny-stdio-mcp-server",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.js",

package/node_modules/tiny-mcp-client/README.md

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ const transport = new HttpTransport({
 });
 ```
 
-You can also call `discoverOAuthMetadata(resourceUrl, options)` directly, or instantiate `OAuthMetadataDiscovery` with a custom `fetch` implementation and shared cache. Lookup options accept `signal`; cancellation stops metadata fetches and body reads without trying another discovery candidate.
+You can also call `discoverOAuthMetadata(resourceUrl, options)` directly, or instantiate `OAuthMetadataDiscovery` with a custom `fetch` implementation and shared cache. An explicit `resourceMetadataUrl` requires fresh network discovery without reading either cache; validated results still populate both caches. Lookup options accept `signal`; cancellation stops metadata fetches and body reads without trying another discovery candidate. It also settles while shared-cache reads, writes or eviction wait. Host cache work may finish afterward; its late rejection remains observed, and canceled discovery does not start another candidate.
 
 OAuth provider inputs receive the originating request's `signal`, covering header authorization and unauthorized handling. Modern request cancellation stops its OAuth work while leaving other requests usable; transport disposal cancels all pending OAuth operations. The default provider propagates this signal to callback, registration and token work. Custom providers must observe it for their own operations.
 

package/node_modules/tiny-mcp-client/dist/index.js

@@ -3405,6 +3405,24 @@ function normalizeOAuthScope(scope) {
   return normalized || void 0;
 }
 
+// ../mcp-oauth/dist/client/cancellable-operation.js
+async function waitForOAuthOperation(operation, signal) {
+  if (signal === void 0)
+    return operation;
+  let abort;
+  try {
+    return await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      abort = () => reject(signal.reason);
+      signal.addEventListener("abort", abort, { once: true });
+      operation.then(resolve, reject);
+      if (signal.aborted)
+        abort();
+    });
+  } finally {
+    signal.removeEventListener("abort", abort);
+  }
+}
+
 // ../mcp-oauth/dist/client/bounded-json.js
 function copyBoundedOAuthJson(value, message) {
   const invalid = () => new Error(message);
@@ -4793,6 +4811,7 @@ function createResourceBoundOAuthStores(options, namespace, identity) {
     }
   };
   async function replace(record2, options2) {
+    options2 = { ...options2 };
     options2.signal?.throwIfAborted();
     const timeoutMs = options2.timeoutMs ?? 3e4;
     if (!Number.isSafeInteger(timeoutMs) || timeoutMs < 1 || timeoutMs > 2147483647)
@@ -4858,6 +4877,7 @@ function createResourceBoundOAuthStores(options, namespace, identity) {
   }
   result.sessionStore = {
     async withLock(resource, operation, options2) {
+      options2 = { ...options2 };
       if (store.withLock === void 0)
         throw new Error("OAuth resource identity backend must support transaction locks");
       return store.withLock(async () => {
@@ -5114,6 +5134,11 @@ async function requestTokens(input) {
     throw new Error("OAuth token response missing access_token");
   }
   const normalizedAccessToken = accessToken.trim();
+  try {
+    new Headers({ Authorization: `Bearer ${normalizedAccessToken}` });
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error("OAuth token response access_token is not a valid HTTP header value");
+  }
   const tokenType = normalizeBearerTokenType(getOwnEntry5(payload, "token_type"));
   if (tokenType === null) {
     throw new Error("OAuth token response missing token_type=Bearer");
@@ -5197,24 +5222,6 @@ function normalizeBearerTokenType(value) {
   return value.toLowerCase() === "bearer" ? "Bearer" : null;
 }
 
-// ../mcp-oauth/dist/client/cancellable-operation.js
-async function waitForOAuthOperation(operation, signal) {
-  if (signal === void 0)
-    return operation;
-  let abort;
-  try {
-    return await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-      abort = () => reject(signal.reason);
-      signal.addEventListener("abort", abort, { once: true });
-      operation.then(resolve, reject);
-      if (signal.aborted)
-        abort();
-    });
-  } finally {
-    signal.removeEventListener("abort", abort);
-  }
-}
-
 // ../mcp-oauth/dist/client/session-transaction.js
 var queues = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
 async function withOAuthSessionTransaction(store, resource, operation, options = {}) {
@@ -5328,6 +5335,7 @@ function createDefaultOAuthClientProvider(options) {
   let initialGrantConsumed = false;
   return {
     async authenticate(input) {
+      input = { ...input, ...input.discover === void 0 ? {} : { discover: input.discover.bind(input) } };
       input.signal?.throwIfAborted();
       assertNoAccessTokenInUrl(input.requestUrl, "Protected resource request URL");
       const resource = canonicalizeResourceIndicator(input.requestUrl);
@@ -5338,7 +5346,7 @@ function createDefaultOAuthClientProvider(options) {
         return { ...initialGrant.tokens };
       if (input.discover === void 0)
         return;
-      const discovery = await waitForOAuthOperation(input.discover(), input.signal);
+      const discovery = structuredClone(await waitForOAuthOperation(input.discover(), input.signal));
       input.signal?.throwIfAborted();
       assertRequestMatchesResource(resource, canonicalizeResourceIndicator(discovery.resource));
       session = await ensureAuthorizedSession(resource, discovery, input.fetch, true, false, input.signal);
@@ -5347,6 +5355,7 @@ function createDefaultOAuthClientProvider(options) {
       return { ...session.tokens };
     },
     async authorizeRequest(input) {
+      input = { ...input };
       assertNoAccessTokenInUrl(input.requestUrl, "Protected resource request URL");
       const requestUrl = canonicalizeResourceIndicator(input.requestUrl);
       const session = await ensureAuthorizedSession(requestUrl, void 0, input.fetch, false, false, input.signal);
@@ -5363,8 +5372,19 @@ function createDefaultOAuthClientProvider(options) {
       return { ...session.tokens };
     },
     async handleUnauthorized(input) {
+      input = { ...input };
       try {
         input.signal?.throwIfAborted();
+        const presented = input.presentedTokens == null ? input.presentedTokens : normalizeStoredTokens(input.presentedTokens);
+        if (input.presentedTokens != null && presented === void 0)
+          throw new Error("OAuth rejected-request provenance does not match its authorization header");
+        const challengeError = input.challenge?.params.error;
+        input = {
+          ...input,
+          discovery: structuredClone(input.discovery),
+          ...input.requestHeaders === void 0 ? {} : { requestHeaders: new Headers(input.requestHeaders) },
+          ...presented === void 0 ? {} : { presentedTokens: presented }
+        };
         assertNoAccessTokenInUrl(input.requestUrl, "Protected resource request URL");
         const requestUrl = canonicalizeResourceIndicator(input.requestUrl);
         const resource = canonicalizeResourceIndicator(input.discovery.resource);
@@ -5376,16 +5396,15 @@ function createDefaultOAuthClientProvider(options) {
         if (input.presentedTokens !== void 0) {
           rejectedCurrentGrant = false;
           if (input.presentedTokens !== null) {
-            const presented = normalizeStoredTokens(input.presentedTokens);
+            const presented2 = input.presentedTokens;
             const header = input.requestHeaders?.get("Authorization") ?? "";
             const separator = header.indexOf(" ");
-            if (presented === void 0 || header.slice(0, separator).toLowerCase() !== "bearer" || header.slice(separator + 1).trim() !== presented.accessToken)
+            if (header.slice(0, separator).toLowerCase() !== "bearer" || header.slice(separator + 1).trim() !== presented2.accessToken)
               throw new Error("OAuth rejected-request provenance does not match its authorization header");
-            presentedTokens = presented;
-            rejectedCurrentGrant = currentTokens !== void 0 && sameTokenGrant(currentTokens, presented);
+            presentedTokens = presented2;
+            rejectedCurrentGrant = currentTokens !== void 0 && sameTokenGrant(currentTokens, presented2);
           }
         }
-        const challengeError = input.challenge?.params.error;
         const forceRefresh = rejectedCurrentGrant && (challengeError === "invalid_token" || input.presentedTokens !== void 0 && challengeError === void 0);
         const session = await ensureAuthorizedSession(resource, {
           ...input.discovery,
@@ -5818,18 +5837,23 @@ function normalizeLoadedSession(session) {
   if (session === null) {
     return null;
   }
+  const discovery = structuredClone(session.discovery);
   const refreshState = getOwnEntry6(session, "refreshState");
   if (refreshState !== void 0 && (refreshState !== "pending" || getOwnEntry6(session, "tokens") !== void 0))
     throw new Error("Stored OAuth refresh state is invalid");
   const client = normalizeStoredOAuthClient(getOwnEntry6(session, "client"));
   if (client === null) {
-    return { ...session, client: { clientId: "" }, tokens: void 0 };
+    return { ...session, discovery, client: { clientId: "" }, tokens: void 0 };
   }
-  return {
-    ...session,
-    client,
-    tokens: normalizeStoredTokens(getOwnEntry6(session, "tokens"))
-  };
+  const tokens = normalizeStoredTokens(getOwnEntry6(session, "tokens"));
+  if (tokens !== void 0) {
+    try {
+      new Headers({ Authorization: `Bearer ${tokens.accessToken}` });
+    } catch {
+      throw new Error("Stored OAuth access token is not a valid HTTP header value");
+    }
+  }
+  return { ...session, discovery, client, tokens };
 }
 function normalizeImportedTokens(value, now) {
   if (!isObjectRecord3(value))
@@ -6400,6 +6424,20 @@ function validateCachedDiscovery(value, resource) {
     authorizationServerMetadata
   });
 }
+async function waitForCache(operation, signal) {
+  if (signal === void 0) return operation;
+  let abort;
+  try {
+    return await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      abort = () => reject(signal.reason);
+      signal.addEventListener("abort", abort, { once: true });
+      Promise.resolve(operation).then(resolve, reject);
+      if (signal.aborted) abort();
+    });
+  } finally {
+    signal.removeEventListener("abort", abort);
+  }
+}
 var OAuthMetadataDiscovery = class {
   fetchImpl;
   cache;
@@ -6436,7 +6474,7 @@ var OAuthMetadataDiscovery = class {
     if (memoryCachedResult !== void 0 && resourceMetadataUrl === void 0) {
       return structuredClone(memoryCachedResult);
     }
-    const sharedCachedResult = await this.cache?.get(cacheKey);
+    const sharedCachedResult = resourceMetadataUrl === void 0 ? await waitForCache(this.cache?.get(cacheKey), signal) : void 0;
     signal?.throwIfAborted();
     if (sharedCachedResult !== null && sharedCachedResult !== void 0 && resourceMetadataUrl === void 0) {
       try {
@@ -6444,7 +6482,7 @@ var OAuthMetadataDiscovery = class {
         this.memoryCache.set(cacheKey, structuredClone(result));
         return result;
       } catch {
-        await this.cache?.delete?.(cacheKey);
+        await waitForCache(this.cache?.delete?.(cacheKey), signal);
       }
     }
     const { location: resourceMetadataLocation, metadata: resourceMetadata } = await this.discoverProtectedResource(cacheKey, resourceMetadataUrl, signal);
@@ -6467,7 +6505,7 @@ var OAuthMetadataDiscovery = class {
             authorizationServerMetadata
           };
           this.memoryCache.set(cacheKey, structuredClone(result));
-          await this.cache?.set(cacheKey, structuredClone(result));
+          await waitForCache(this.cache?.set(cacheKey, structuredClone(result)), signal);
           return result;
         } catch (error) {
           signal?.throwIfAborted();

package/node_modules/tiny-stdio-mcp-server/dist/composition.json

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "toolcraft-schema",
-      "version": "0.0.341",
+      "version": "0.0.343",
       "license": "MIT"
     }
   ]

package/node_modules/toolcraft-schema/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "toolcraft-schema",
-  "version": "0.0.341",
+  "version": "0.0.343",
   "license": "MIT",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.js",

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "toolcraft",
-  "version": "0.0.341",
+  "version": "0.0.343",
   "license": "MIT",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@
     "yaml"
   ],
   "optionalDependencies": {
-    "toolcraft-schema": "0.0.341",
+    "toolcraft-schema": "0.0.343",
     "toolcraft-design": "*",
     "@poe-code/frontmatter": "*",
     "@poe-code/agent-mcp-config": "*",