toiljs 0.0.34 → 0.0.37

package/docs/cookies.md

@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+# Cookies
+
+A complete HTTP cookie layer for the toiljs server runtime, covering the full
+RFC 6265bis surface (including `SameSite`, the `Partitioned`/CHIPS attribute, and
+the `__Host-` / `__Secure-` prefixes) plus cryptographic signing and encryption.
+
+`Cookie`, `Cookies`, `CookieMap`, `SecureCookies`, and the `SameSite` /
+`CookieEncoding` / `CookiePrefix` enums are **ambient globals**: a handler uses
+them with **no import**, exactly like `crypto`. They are also exported from
+`toiljs/server/runtime` for anyone who prefers an explicit import.
+
+- [How "global, no import" works](#how-global-no-import-works)
+- [Quick start](#quick-start)
+- [The `Cookie` builder](#the-cookie-builder)
+- [The `Cookies` parser and codec](#the-cookies-parser-and-codec)
+- [`CookieMap`](#cookiemap)
+- [`SecureCookies` signing and encryption](#securecookies-signing-and-encryption)
+- [`Request` and `Response` integration](#request-and-response-integration)
+- [`base64url` helpers](#base64url-helpers)
+- [Encoding vs encryption](#encoding-vs-encryption)
+- [Security notes](#security-notes)
+- [Spec compliance](#spec-compliance)
+- [Testing](#testing)
+- [API reference](#api-reference)
+
+---
+
+## How "global, no import" works
+
+The cookie types are declared with ToilScript's `@global` decorator and pulled
+into every server build (re-exported from `toiljs/server/runtime` and
+side-effect-imported by `toiljs/server/runtime/exports`, which every `main.ts`
+re-exports). At compile time the symbols register in the global scope, so a
+handler can write `Cookie.create(...)` or `req.cookie(...)` without importing
+anything.
+
+For the editor, `toiljs create` scaffolds `server/toil-server-env.d.ts` with
+ambient `declare`s for these globals (the toilscript compiler ignores `.d.ts`;
+it only feeds the language service). If you would rather import them:
+
+```ts
+import { Cookie, Cookies, SecureCookies, SameSite } from 'toiljs/server/runtime';
+```
+
+---
+
+## Quick start
+
+```ts
+import { ToilHandler, Request, Response } from 'toiljs/server/runtime';
+
+export class AppHandler extends ToilHandler {
+    public handle(req: Request): Response {
+        // Read (no import needed for Cookie / Cookies / SameSite, they are global).
+        const sid = req.cookie('sid'); // string | null
+
+        // Write a hardened session cookie.
+        return Response.json('{"ok":true}').setCookie(
+            Cookie.create('sid', 'abc123')
+                .httpOnly()
+                .secure()
+                .sameSite(SameSite.Lax)
+                .maxAge(3600)
+                .asHostPrefixed(), // forces Secure + Path=/ + no Domain
+        );
+    }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## The `Cookie` builder
+
+A fluent builder that serializes to one `Set-Cookie` field value. Every setter
+returns the cookie, so calls chain.
+
+```ts
+const c = Cookie.create('id', 'abc123')
+    .domain('example.com')
+    .path('/app')
+    .maxAge(3600)
+    .secure()
+    .httpOnly()
+    .sameSite(SameSite.Lax);
+
+c.serialize();
+// "id=abc123; Domain=example.com; Path=/app; Max-Age=3600; SameSite=Lax; Secure; HttpOnly"
+```
+
+### Fields
+
+| Field | Type | Notes |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `name` | `string` | The cookie name (a token; never encoded). |
+| `value` | `string` | The logical value (encoded per `encoding` on serialize). |
+| `encoding` | `CookieEncoding` | Wire encoding for the value. Default `Percent`. |
+
+### Construction
+
+- `new Cookie(name, value)`
+- `Cookie.create(name, value): Cookie`, a builder-style alias.
+
+### Attribute setters
+
+| Method | Attribute |
+| --- | --- |
+| `domain(v: string)` | `Domain` |
+| `path(v: string)` | `Path` (must begin with `/`) |
+| `maxAge(seconds: i64)` | `Max-Age` (`0` / negative expire immediately) |
+| `expires(epochSeconds: i64)` | `Expires`, formatted as an IMF-fixdate (`Sun, 06 Nov 1994 08:49:37 GMT`) |
+| `expiresRaw(date: string)` | `Expires` verbatim (escape hatch) |
+| `secure(on: bool = true)` | `Secure` |
+| `httpOnly(on: bool = true)` | `HttpOnly` |
+| `sameSite(s: SameSite)` | `SameSite` |
+| `partitioned(on: bool = true)` | `Partitioned` (CHIPS) |
+| `priority(p: string)` | `Priority` (`Low` / `Medium` / `High`) |
+| `extension(av: string)` | An arbitrary extension attribute, appended verbatim |
+| `withEncoding(e: CookieEncoding)` | Choose the value wire encoding |
+
+### Prefixes
+
+- `asSecurePrefixed(): Cookie`, prepends `__Secure-` and forces `Secure`.
+- `asHostPrefixed(): Cookie`, prepends `__Host-` and forces `Secure`, `Path=/`, and no `Domain`.
+- `detectedPrefix(): CookiePrefix`, the prefix detected on the current name (case-insensitive).
+
+### Output
+
+- `serialize(strict: bool = false): string`, returns the `Set-Cookie` value. Lenient by
+  default (always returns a best-effort cookie); pass `strict = true` to throw on
+  a hard validation failure. `Secure` is added automatically when `SameSite=None`
+  or `Partitioned` is set; `Max-Age` is clamped to the 400-day cap; control
+  characters are stripped from the name, value, and attributes.
+- `toString(): string`, alias for `serialize()`.
+- `encodedValue(): string`, the value transformed per `encoding`.
+
+### Validation
+
+`validate(): CookieValidation` checks the cookie against RFC 6265bis and returns
+a structured result:
+
+```ts
+class CookieValidation {
+    valid: bool;
+    errors: Array<string>;
+}
+```
+
+It flags: a non-token name, name+value over 4096 bytes, a `Domain`/`Path` over
+1024 bytes, a `Path` not starting with `/`, a `Raw` value outside `cookie-octet`,
+the `__Host-` / `__Secure-` prefix requirements, `SameSite=None` or `Partitioned`
+without `Secure`, and a `Max-Age` beyond the 400-day cap.
+
+### Attribute serialization order
+
+`name=value` then, when set: `Domain`, `Path`, `Expires`, `Max-Age`, `SameSite`,
+`Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `Partitioned`, `Priority`, then any `extension(...)` values.
+(Attribute order is not significant to user agents; the order is stable so output
+is predictable.)
+
+### Enums
+
+```ts
+enum SameSite { Default, None, Lax, Strict }      // Default omits the attribute
+enum CookieEncoding { Percent, Raw, Base64Url }   // value wire encoding
+enum CookiePrefix { None, Secure, Host }
+```
+
+---
+
+## The `Cookies` parser and codec
+
+Static helpers for the read side and a one-shot serializer.
+
+| Method | Description |
+| --- | --- |
+| `Cookies.parse(cookieHeader: string): CookieMap` | Parse a request `Cookie` header (`a=1; b=2`). Values are percent-decoded; one layer of surrounding quotes is stripped; malformed pairs and empty names are skipped. On a duplicate name the first wins. |
+| `Cookies.get(cookieHeader: string, name: string): string \| null` | Parse and return one value. |
+| `Cookies.serialize(name: string, value: string): string` | One-shot `name=value` with no attributes (percent-encoded). For attributes, build a `Cookie`. |
+| `Cookies.parseSetCookie(setCookie: string): Cookie` | Parse a `Set-Cookie` line back into a `Cookie` (for clients, tests, proxies). Kept verbatim (`CookieEncoding.Raw`) so re-serializing reproduces the wire form. |
+| `Cookies.encodeValue(raw: string): string` | Percent-encode a value (the default `Cookie` encoding). |
+| `Cookies.decodeValue(enc: string): string` | Percent-decode a value (the inverse). |
+
+```ts
+const jar = Cookies.parse('sid=abc123; theme=dark');
+jar.get('sid'); // "abc123"
+
+Cookies.serialize('sid', 'a b'); // "sid=a%20b"
+```
+
+---
+
+## `CookieMap`
+
+The ordered name to value view returned by `Cookies.parse` and `Request.cookies()`.
+Backed by parallel arrays (a request carries a handful of cookies, so a linear
+scan beats hashing and keeps the runtime small).
+
+| Member | Description |
+| --- | --- |
+| `get(name: string): string \| null` | The value, or `null`. |
+| `has(name: string): bool` | Whether the cookie is present. |
+| `names(): Array<string>` | A copy of the names, in encounter order. |
+| `size: i32` | The number of cookies. |
+| `set(name: string, value: string): void` | Insert unless present (keep-first). Used by `parse`; rarely called directly. |
+
+---
+
+## `SecureCookies` signing and encryption
+
+Tamper-proof and confidential cookie values, built on the `crypto` global (no new
+host functions).
+
+- **`SecureCookies.signed(key)`**: HMAC-SHA256. The value stays readable but is
+  bound to the cookie name, so it cannot be tampered with or moved to another
+  cookie. Sealed form: `base64url(value) "." base64url(mac)`.
+- **`SecureCookies.encrypted(key)`**: AES-256-GCM (or AES-128-GCM) with a random
+  96-bit IV and the cookie name as additional authenticated data. The value is
+  confidential and authenticated. Sealed form: `base64url(iv ‖ ciphertext ‖ tag)`.
+
+Keys are caller-supplied raw bytes:
+
+- HMAC: any length (32+ bytes recommended).
+- AES: exactly 16 or 32 bytes (enforced up front; a wrong length is rejected by
+  the factory).
+
+```ts
+// A real app loads a long random secret from config; never hard-code one.
+const key = Uint8Array.wrap(String.UTF8.encode('0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef'));
+
+// Signed (readable, tamper-proof)
+const signer = SecureCookies.signed(key);
+const sealed = signer.sign('session', 'user-42');
+const user = signer.unsign('session', sealed); // "user-42", or null if tampered
+
+// Encrypted (confidential + authenticated)
+const box = SecureCookies.encrypted(key);
+resp.setCookie(box.seal(Cookie.create('secret', 'top-secret').httpOnly()));
+const secret = box.open(req.cookies(), 'secret'); // "top-secret", or null
+```
+
+| Method | Description |
+| --- | --- |
+| `SecureCookies.signed(key: Uint8Array)` | HMAC-SHA256 signer/verifier. |
+| `SecureCookies.encrypted(key: Uint8Array)` | AES-GCM (16- or 32-byte key). |
+| `addKey(key: Uint8Array): SecureCookies` | Add a fallback key for rotation: seal with the first, open with any. |
+| `sign(name, value): string` | Sealed signed value. |
+| `unsign(name, sealed): string \| null` | Verify and recover, or `null`. |
+| `encrypt(name, value): string` | Sealed encrypted value. |
+| `decrypt(name, sealed): string \| null` | Decrypt, or `null`. |
+| `seal(cookie: Cookie): Cookie` | Seal a cookie's value in place (sign or encrypt per the instance mode) and mark it `Raw`. Returns the same cookie. |
+| `open(jar: CookieMap, name): string \| null` | Read and open cookie `name` from a parsed jar. |
+
+**Key rotation:** seal with `keys[0]`; `unsign` / `decrypt` try every key in turn,
+so you can add a new key as the first and keep an old one as a fallback while
+existing cookies age out.
+
+```ts
+const signer = SecureCookies.signed(newKey).addKey(oldKey);
+```
+
+---
+
+## `Request` and `Response` integration
+
+Because every handler already has a `Request` and returns a `Response`, the most
+common operations live there directly.
+
+**Read (`Request`):**
+
+| Method | Description |
+| --- | --- |
+| `req.cookies(): CookieMap` | All cookies, parsed from the `Cookie` header (cached for the request). |
+| `req.cookie(name: string): string \| null` | One cookie value. |
+
+**Write (`Response`, builder-style):**
+
+| Method | Description |
+| --- | --- |
+| `resp.setCookie(cookie: Cookie): Response` | Append a `Set-Cookie`. Each call adds its own header (cookies are never folded). |
+| `resp.setCookieKV(name, value): Response` | Shorthand for `setCookie(new Cookie(name, value))`. |
+| `resp.clearCookie(name, path = '/', domain = ''): Response` | Append a deletion cookie (empty value, `Max-Age=0`, epoch `Expires`). `path` / `domain` must match the original. |
+
+---
+
+## `base64url` helpers
+
+Unpadded base64url (RFC 4648 §5), used internally by `SecureCookies` and exported
+for convenience. Its alphabet (`A-Z a-z 0-9 - _`) is within the `cookie-octet`
+grammar and invariant under percent-encoding, so encoded values round-trip
+cleanly through the default cookie codec.
+
+| Function | Description |
+| --- | --- |
+| `base64UrlEncode(data: Uint8Array): string` | Encode bytes as unpadded base64url. |
+| `base64UrlDecode(s: string): Uint8Array \| null` | Decode base64url/base64 (padding and whitespace tolerated); `null` on an invalid character or length. |
+
+---
+
+## Encoding vs encryption
+
+Two independent layers, easy to mix up:
+
+- **Encoding** (`CookieEncoding`) is transport-only and reversible by anyone. It
+  keeps an arbitrary value inside the `cookie-octet` grammar.
+  - `Percent` (default): `encodeURIComponent`-style; arbitrary UTF-8 is safe.
+  - `Base64Url`: UTF-8 then base64url.
+  - `Raw`: no transformation (the value must already be valid `cookie-octet`).
+- **Signing / encryption** (`SecureCookies`) is cryptographic. Signing keeps the
+  value readable but tamper-proof; encryption makes it unreadable and
+  authenticated. Both require a secret key.
+
+`SecureCookies.seal` sets the value to its sealed (base64url) form and marks the
+cookie `Raw`, so it passes through the default parse path untouched.
+
+---
+
+## Security notes
+
+- **Panic-free verification.** `unsign` and `decrypt` return `null` on a tampered,
+  truncated, or wrong-key value, never a trap. (`decrypt` reads the host return
+  code directly instead of letting the underlying crypto throw, because the
+  server runs with exceptions disabled.) This makes them safe to call on
+  attacker-controlled input.
+- **Name-binding.** Signing MACs `name + "=" + value`; encryption uses the name as
+  AAD. A sealed value made for one cookie name will not verify or decrypt under
+  another.
+- **Control characters are stripped** from the name, value, and attribute values
+  on serialize, as a defense-in-depth guard against header injection (CR/LF).
+  Control characters are invalid in all of these per the grammar, so nothing
+  legitimate is lost. The default value encoding already neutralizes CR/LF.
+- **Prefixes.** `asHostPrefixed()` / `asSecurePrefixed()` apply and enforce the
+  browser-recognized guarantees; `validate()` reports a name that carries a prefix
+  without satisfying its requirements.
+- **`SameSite=None` and `Partitioned` imply `Secure`** and are emitted with it
+  automatically.
+- **Lifetime is clamped** to the RFC 400-day cap on serialize; sizes are checked by
+  `validate()`.
+- **Local development.** Browsers treat `http://localhost` as a secure context, so
+  `Secure` and `__Host-` cookies work under `toiljs dev` over plain HTTP.
+
+When putting untrusted input into a cookie **name** or **attribute** (rather than
+the value, which is encoded by default), check `validate()` or use
+`serialize(true)`.
+
+---
+
+## Spec compliance
+
+Implements RFC 6265bis (HTTP State Management) and the `Partitioned` (CHIPS)
+companion: the `cookie-name` token and `cookie-value` `cookie-octet` grammars,
+the `Expires` / `Max-Age` / `Domain` / `Path` / `Secure` / `HttpOnly` /
+`SameSite` / `Partitioned` attributes plus `Priority` and arbitrary extensions,
+the `__Host-` / `__Secure-` prefixes (matched case-insensitively), the 4096-byte
+name+value and 1024-byte attribute limits, the 400-day lifetime cap, the
+`SameSite=None` ⇒ `Secure` rule, and the requirement that each cookie occupy its
+own `Set-Cookie` header (never folded).
+
+---
+
+## Testing
+
+- Pure cookie logic (builder, parser, codec, validation, `Request` / `Response`
+  integration) is unit-tested with as-pect in `test/assembly/cookie.spec.ts`
+  (`npm run test:server`).
+- `SecureCookies` is exercised end-to-end against the real toilscript-compiled
+  wasm with the Node-backed crypto host in `test/devserver.test.ts`
+  (`npm test`). It is tested there rather than under as-pect because the as-pect
+  compiler does not ship the toilscript crypto standard library.
+
+A live demo (every attribute's serialized output, set/inspect/clear, and an
+interactive sign/encrypt) is in the example app: run `toiljs dev` in
+`examples/basic` and open `/cookies`. The backend lives in
+`examples/basic/server/core/AppHandler.ts`.
+
+---
+
+## API reference
+
+```ts
+// Globals (also exported from 'toiljs/server/runtime')
+
+enum SameSite { Default, None, Lax, Strict }
+enum CookieEncoding { Percent, Raw, Base64Url }
+enum CookiePrefix { None, Secure, Host }
+
+class CookieValidation {
+    valid: bool;
+    errors: Array<string>;
+}
+
+class Cookie {
+    name: string;
+    value: string;
+    encoding: CookieEncoding;
+    static create(name: string, value: string): Cookie;
+    domain(v: string): Cookie;
+    path(v: string): Cookie;
+    maxAge(seconds: i64): Cookie;
+    expires(epochSeconds: i64): Cookie;
+    expiresRaw(date: string): Cookie;
+    secure(on?: bool): Cookie;
+    httpOnly(on?: bool): Cookie;
+    sameSite(s: SameSite): Cookie;
+    partitioned(on?: bool): Cookie;
+    priority(p: string): Cookie;
+    extension(av: string): Cookie;
+    withEncoding(e: CookieEncoding): Cookie;
+    asSecurePrefixed(): Cookie;
+    asHostPrefixed(): Cookie;
+    detectedPrefix(): CookiePrefix;
+    encodedValue(): string;
+    validate(): CookieValidation;
+    serialize(strict?: bool): string;
+    toString(): string;
+}
+
+class CookieMap {
+    get(name: string): string | null;
+    has(name: string): bool;
+    names(): Array<string>;
+    size: i32;
+    set(name: string, value: string): void;
+}
+
+class Cookies {
+    static parse(cookieHeader: string): CookieMap;
+    static get(cookieHeader: string, name: string): string | null;
+    static serialize(name: string, value: string): string;
+    static parseSetCookie(setCookie: string): Cookie;
+    static encodeValue(raw: string): string;
+    static decodeValue(enc: string): string;
+}
+
+class SecureCookies {
+    static signed(key: Uint8Array): SecureCookies;
+    static encrypted(key: Uint8Array): SecureCookies;
+    addKey(key: Uint8Array): SecureCookies;
+    sign(name: string, value: string): string;
+    unsign(name: string, sealed: string): string | null;
+    encrypt(name: string, value: string): string;
+    decrypt(name: string, sealed: string): string | null;
+    seal(cookie: Cookie): Cookie;
+    open(jar: CookieMap, name: string): string | null;
+}
+
+function base64UrlEncode(data: Uint8Array): string;
+function base64UrlDecode(s: string): Uint8Array | null;
+
+// On Request
+req.cookies(): CookieMap;
+req.cookie(name: string): string | null;
+
+// On Response (builder-style)
+resp.setCookie(cookie: Cookie): Response;
+resp.setCookieKV(name: string, value: string): Response;
+resp.clearCookie(name: string, path?: string, domain?: string): Response;
+```

package/docs/crypto.md

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+# Web Crypto
+
+The guest gets a synchronous Web Crypto surface through the ambient `crypto`
+global, backed by host functions. It mirrors the browser `crypto` /
+`crypto.subtle` API but **without Promises** — ToilScript has no `async`, so
+every call returns its result directly. Keys are opaque per-request handles in a
+host keystore; a `CryptoKey` is valid only for the request that created it.
+
+```ts
+const mac = crypto.hmacSha256(key, message); // Uint8Array
+const id  = crypto.randomUUID();             // string
+```
+
+This is also what [`SecureCookies`](./cookies.md) and
+[`AuthService`](./auth.md) are built on, so most apps use crypto indirectly.
+
+## `crypto` namespace
+
+Convenience helpers (all synchronous):
+
+| Function | Signature | Notes |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `getRandomValues` | `(array: Uint8Array): void` | Fill with CSPRNG bytes. |
+| `randomUUID` | `(): string` | RFC 4122 v4 UUID. |
+| `sha1` / `sha256` / `sha384` / `sha512` | `(data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array` | One-shot digests. |
+| `sha1Text` … `sha512Text` | `(s: string): Uint8Array` | UTF-8 encode then digest. |
+| `hmacSha256` | `(key: Uint8Array, msg: Uint8Array): Uint8Array` | One-shot HMAC-SHA256. |
+| `hmacSha256Text` | `(key: Uint8Array, msg: string): Uint8Array` | HMAC-SHA256 over a UTF-8 string. |
+| `toHex` | `(bytes: Uint8Array): string` | Lowercase hex. |
+| `subtle` | `SubtleCrypto` | The full primitive surface (below). |
+
+## `crypto.subtle`
+
+| Method | Signature |
+| --- | --- |
+| `digest` | `digest(algorithm: string, data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array` |
+| `importKey` | `importKey(format: string, keyData: Uint8Array, algorithm: AlgorithmParams, extractable: bool, usages: i32): CryptoKey` |
+| `exportKey` | `exportKey(format: string, key: CryptoKey): Uint8Array` |
+| `encrypt` | `encrypt(algorithm: AlgorithmParams, key: CryptoKey, data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array` |
+| `decrypt` | `decrypt(algorithm: AlgorithmParams, key: CryptoKey, data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array` |
+| `sign` | `sign(algorithm: AlgorithmParams, key: CryptoKey, data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array` |
+| `verify` | `verify(algorithm: AlgorithmParams, key: CryptoKey, signature: Uint8Array, data: Uint8Array): bool` |
+| `deriveBits` | `deriveBits(algorithm: AlgorithmParams, baseKey: CryptoKey, length: i32): Uint8Array` |
+| `deriveKey` | `deriveKey(algorithm, baseKey, lengthBits, derivedKeyAlgorithm, extractable, usages): CryptoKey` |
+
+`digest` takes a named algorithm string (`"SHA-1"`, `"SHA-256"`, `"SHA-384"`,
+`"SHA-512"`, `"SHA3-256"`, `"SHA3-384"`, `"SHA3-512"`). `verify` returns a bool
+(it does not throw on a mismatch). Formats are `raw`, `pkcs8`, `spki`; **`jwk`
+is not supported**.
+
+### Algorithm parameter classes
+
+`crypto` and `crypto.subtle` are ambient globals (no import). The params classes
+and the `ALG_*` / `USAGE_*` / `FMT_*` / `CURVE_*` constants and the `CryptoKey`
+type are imported from the `'crypto'` module:
+
+```ts
+import { AesGcmParams, HmacImportParams, ALG_SHA_256, USAGE_SIGN } from 'crypto';
+```
+
+Each algorithm has a small params class you pass to `importKey`/`sign`/etc.:
+
+| Class | Constructor |
+| --- | --- |
+| `AesGcmParams` | `(iv, additionalData?, tagLength = 128)` |
+| `AesCbcParams` | `(iv)` |
+| `AesCtrParams` | `(counter, length = 128)` |
+| `HmacImportParams` | `(hash)` |
+| `HmacParams` | `()` |
+| `Pbkdf2Params` | `(hash, salt, iterations)` |
+| `HkdfParams` | `(hash, salt, info?)` |
+| `EcdsaParams` | `(hash)` |
+| `EcKeyImportParams` | `(alg, namedCurve)` |
+| `Ed25519Params` | `()` |
+| `X25519ImportParams` | `()` |
+| `EcdhParams` | `(alg, publicKeyHandle)` |
+
+### Constants
+
+- **Hashes / algorithms:** `ALG_SHA_1`, `ALG_SHA_256`, `ALG_SHA_384`,
+  `ALG_SHA_512`, `ALG_SHA3_256/384/512`, `ALG_AES_GCM`, `ALG_AES_CBC`,
+  `ALG_AES_CTR`, `ALG_HMAC`, `ALG_ECDSA`, `ALG_ED25519`, `ALG_ECDH`, `ALG_HKDF`,
+  `ALG_PBKDF2`.
+- **Key formats:** `FMT_RAW`, `FMT_PKCS8`, `FMT_SPKI` (`FMT_JWK` is rejected).
+- **Usages (bitmask):** `USAGE_ENCRYPT`, `USAGE_DECRYPT`, `USAGE_SIGN`,
+  `USAGE_VERIFY`, `USAGE_DERIVE_KEY`, `USAGE_DERIVE_BITS`, `USAGE_WRAP_KEY`,
+  `USAGE_UNWRAP_KEY` — OR them together.
+- **Named curves:** `CURVE_P256`, `CURVE_P384` (`CURVE_P521` is not supported).
+
+### `CryptoKey`
+
+An opaque handle plus metadata: `handle: i32`, `type: string`
+(`secret`/`public`/`private`), `extractable: bool`, `algorithm: i32`,
+`usages: i32`, with `algorithmName()` and `hasUsage(u)`. A key is valid only for
+the request that imported it.
+
+## Examples
+
+HMAC-SHA256 (one-shot):
+
+```ts
+const mac = crypto.hmacSha256(key, message);
+const hex = crypto.toHex(mac);
+```
+
+AES-256-GCM via `subtle`:
+
+```ts
+const key = new Uint8Array(32); crypto.getRandomValues(key);
+const iv  = new Uint8Array(12); crypto.getRandomValues(iv);
+
+const k  = crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', key, new AesGcmParams(iv, aad, 128), false, USAGE_ENCRYPT);
+const ct = crypto.subtle.encrypt(new AesGcmParams(iv, aad, 128), k, plaintext);
+```
+
+## Post-quantum verify
+
+The host also exposes ML-DSA-44 (FIPS 204) signature verification as
+`crypto.mldsa_verify`. It is verify-only — the host never holds a secret key — and
+underpins the [auth primitive](./auth.md). Most code reaches it through
+`AuthService.verifyLogin(publicKey, message, signature)` rather than calling the
+import directly. Public key is 1312 bytes, signature 2420 bytes, with a FIPS 204
+domain-separation context.
+
+## Limitations
+
+- **No Promises** — every call is synchronous.
+- **No RSA** and **no JWK** key format.
+- **P-521** is not supported (P-256 and P-384 are).
+- Signature *generation* for ML-DSA is client-side only; the server verifies.