toga-ai 1.0.995 → 1.0.997

package/knowledge/2.0/apps/api2/features/api-payload-interceptors.md

@@ -250,14 +250,14 @@ The reverse direction: not "queue a worker from an interceptor" but **"run the p
 ### Own-row guards in a PRE interceptor
 
 A PRE hook that limits a user to their own rows must close four bypasses — each found by review on the `user-global-settings` guard (TRUE-82613):
-1. **Alias keys.** api2 maps `user` / `setting` (FK objects) onto `userId` / `settingId` **after** PRE runs, so a hook that only checks `$payload->userId` is skipped by sending `user: {uuid}`. **Allowlist the payload keys** and reject anything else.
+1. **Alias keys.** api2 maps `user` / `setting` (FK objects) onto `userId` / `settingId` **after** PRE runs, so a hook that only checks `$payload->userId` is skipped by sending `user: {uuid}`. **Allowlist the payload keys, verify every alias that is sent** (`user` must resolve to the caller; `setting` must resolve to an allowed setting, and on PUT/PATCH to the row's own setting), then `unset` all of `userId`, `settingId`, `user`, `setting` so api2 cannot remap them. Reject any other key. Refusing the aliases outright breaks real clients (TOGa Commerce sends `user: {uuid}`, `setting: {slug}`).
 2. **Parent routes.** On `POST /v2/users/<uuid>/user-global-settings` api2 overwrites the FK the hook stamped with the parent's id **after** the hook. Refuse any POST with a parent segment.
 3. **PRE runs BEFORE the field-level write ACL check** — the hook cannot count on the ACL to have rejected a field yet.
 4. **PUT/PATCH carry no owner in the body.** Load the row by `$api->recordUuid`, refuse not-own rows, refuse changes to the owner/type columns, then `unset` them before the save.
 
 Refuse API-key callers when the rule is "the signed-in user" (no user on the token). Throw `_Exception_Validation` (400); use **one** message for "not yours" and "not allowed" so the response does not reveal whether a row exists.
 
-**Reference implementation:** `_Model_Client_UserGlobalSetting::prePost/prePut/prePatch` (Core.Records **279**), rows in `dbchanges2/Core/2026-10-09a - UserGlobalSettingsInterceptors.sql` (`clientId` + `apiId` NULL → **every tenant, every API**). Keys: POST `settingId, value`; PUT/PATCH `userId, settingId, value`. Only the language setting (Core.Settings id 2) is writable; `value` must be a code in the **client** `Languages` table (`_Model_Client_Language` — there is no Core Languages table and no active flag). POST stamps `userId` to the caller and refuses a second language row. No ACL grant ships with it yet.
+**Reference implementation:** `_Model_Client_UserGlobalSetting::prePost/prePut/prePatch` (Core.Records **279**), rows in `dbchanges2/Core/2026-10-09a - UserGlobalSettingsInterceptors.sql` (`clientId` + `apiId` NULL → **every tenant, every API**). Keys: `userId`/`user`, `settingId`/`setting`, `value` (aliases verified, then unset). Writable settings (by Core.Settings slug): **language** (value = a code in the **client** `Languages` table, `_Model_Client_Language`), **persona** (value = `Personas.number` of a persona assigned to the caller in `Users_Personas`), **currency** (value = uuid of a currency linked to one of the caller's personas via `Personas_Currencies`). `setting` may be sent as slug, uuid, id, or an object holding one of them. POST stamps `userId` to the caller and refuses a second row for the same user and setting. No ACL grant ships with it yet.
 
 **Known own-row holes (open, not fixed — 2026-10-09):**
 - `Client_CompassCanada/2026-01-15 - UserGlobalSettingsAcl.sql` grants UserGlobalSettings writes with no own-row check.

package/knowledge/standalone/apps/forward/architecture.md

@@ -86,5 +86,5 @@ Treat this as obfuscation only. Anything genuinely sensitive must not rely on it
 - New **encrypted** domains require a code change (`$encryptedDomains` in `index.php`), not just a `forward.ini` edit.
 - `index.php` only runs on a map miss, so a bad/over-broad `forward.ini` host-only line can shadow paths you expected PHP to handle.
 - **EB rejects bundles over 500 MB** ("The artifact is empty or exceeds the maximum size supported by AWS Elastic Beanstalk"), and the CodePipeline EB deploy ignores `.ebignore`. Never commit large static assets here — that broke every deploy from 2026-10-08 until demos moved to S3.
-- **Git history still holds ~500 MB of old demo blobs.** Removing them needs a history rewrite + force-push — deferred; developer's call.
+- **Git history was rewritten on 2026-10-09** (`git filter-repo`) to drop ~500 MB of old demo blobs; a clone is now ~39 MB. Any clone made before that date must be deleted and re-cloned — pulling into it brings the old history back. GitHub's `refs/pull/1/head` and `refs/pull/2/head` still point at old commits (GitHub blocks pushes to them).
 - **Removing a top-level folder:** first check no Route 53 name pointing at forward EB has a first label matching it (local directory handler). Checked for the 2026-10-09 removal; `togadesk.beta.agilantsolutions.com` is redirected by `forward.ini` first.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "toga-ai",
-  "version": "1.0.995",
+  "version": "1.0.997",
   "description": "TOGA Technology Team Claude Knowledge System — shared AI coding harness with skills, knowledge base CLI, and project installer for Claude Code.",
   "keywords": [
     "claude",