toga-ai 1.0.724 → 1.0.725

package/knowledge/1.0/apps/worker/workflows/netsuite-duplicate-items-dedup.md

@@ -111,13 +111,27 @@ duplicates** and must be deployed first — see
 - **`UPDATE IGNORE ...; DELETE ... WHERE fk=dupe` permanently DELETES collision rows** and drops its
   helper maps, so prod cannot self-reverse. A reversal needs a **pre-merge snapshot** restored as a
   scratch DB — plan the backup before running any variant of this.
-- **Blast radius of the 2026-08-31 `duplicate_items_merge_ALL_CLIENTS.sql`:** it ran on 17 clients
-  (Masonite, Ncci, Erau, Shrss, Wmchealth, Trividiahealth, Prudential, Miamidade, Browardsheriff,
-  Nychh, Canon, Quad, Compass, Elite, Growrk, Spglobal, Endeavorhealth). At-risk = two-catalog +
-  TOGa Commerce clients like Compass; a **per-client assessment is outstanding**.
+- **Blast radius of the 2026-08-31 `duplicate_items_merge_ALL_CLIENTS.sql` (assessment complete
+  2026-09-01):** it ran on 17 clients (Masonite, Ncci, Erau, Shrss, Wmchealth, Trividiahealth,
+  Prudential, Miamidade, Browardsheriff, Nychh, Canon, Quad, Compass, Elite, Growrk, Spglobal,
+  Endeavorhealth). **Only 2 were damaged — Compass and Quad, both two-catalog TOGa Commerce
+  clients.** The other 15 needed no reversal: 13 single-catalog "Agilant"-only clients were a
+  legitimate within-catalog dedup, NYCHH mixed Etilize + NetSuite in one catalog (no fold
+  possible), and Prudential was cleared (single populated catalog; NULL `assetType` is its normal
+  state). Triage per client with `Catalogs` LEFT JOIN `Items` (empty catalogs still show) + the
+  pipeline signal (`c_etilizeProductId` = store vs `c_netsuiteInternalItemId` = Agilant); a client
+  is damaged only if it has a two-catalog store/procurement design AND catalog-1 was folded into
+  catalog-2 AND storefront/transmit depends on catalog-1. See the Compass
+  [catalog-fold reversal](../../../clients/compass-usa/workflows/catalog-fold-reversal.md) and
+  [Quad catalog-fold reversal](../../../clients/quad/workflows/catalog-fold-reversal.md).
 
 ## Change history
 
+- 2026-09-01 — **Blast-radius assessment complete.** Of the 17 clients the merge ran on, only 2
+  were damaged — Compass and Quad (both two-catalog TOGa Commerce). The other 15 needed no
+  reversal (13 single-catalog "Agilant"-only = legitimate within-catalog dedup; NYCHH mixed
+  Etilize + NetSuite in one catalog; Prudential cleared — single populated catalog, NULL
+  assetType is normal). Added the durable triage method and linked the Quad reversal. (jcardinal)
 - 2026-09-01 — **⚠ Corrected the success claim.** "0 duplicate part numbers" is NOT a clean-run proof
   for a multi-catalog client. This merge is catalog-blind (groups on `UPPER(partNumber)` only), so for
   Compass it folded 199 intentional catalog-1 store items into their Agilant canonical, broke MITS

package/knowledge/INDEX.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ _Auto-generated by `knowledge.js index`. Do not hand-edit._
 
 ## 2.0 framework
 
-- **_underscore** (_Underscore) _(framework core)_ — 73 doc(s) → [2.0/apps/_underscore/INDEX.md](2.0/apps/_underscore/INDEX.md)
+- **_underscore** (_Underscore) _(framework core)_ — 75 doc(s) → [2.0/apps/_underscore/INDEX.md](2.0/apps/_underscore/INDEX.md)
 - **worker2** (Worker) — 58 doc(s) → [2.0/apps/worker2/INDEX.md](2.0/apps/worker2/INDEX.md)
 - **api2** (API) — 25 doc(s) → [2.0/apps/api2/INDEX.md](2.0/apps/api2/INDEX.md)
 - **dbchanges2** (Database Changes) _(framework core)_ — 15 doc(s) → [2.0/apps/dbchanges2/INDEX.md](2.0/apps/dbchanges2/INDEX.md)

package/knowledge/clients/compass-usa/workflows/catalog-fold-reversal.md

@@ -95,19 +95,46 @@ damage.**
 - **Never `UPDATE IGNORE` + delete-leftover for a catalog operation** — it permanently deletes
   collision rows and cannot be reversed. Use FK-checks-ON, fail-loud, single transaction.
 
-## Blast radius — other clients (OUTSTANDING)
+## Blast radius — other clients (ASSESSMENT COMPLETE)
 
 The `duplicate_items_merge_ALL_CLIENTS.sql` ran `USE Client_<X>` on **17 clients**: Masonite,
 Ncci, Erau, Shrss, Wmchealth, Trividiahealth, Prudential, Miamidade, Browardsheriff, Nychh,
 Canon, Quad, **Compass**, Elite, Growrk, Spglobal, Endeavorhealth.
 
-- **Not all are damaged.** The NYCHH run was a legitimate dedup.
-- **At-risk = clients with the two-catalog + TOGa Commerce setup like Compass.** A per-client
-  assessment (customer-scoped, rehearsed) is **outstanding for a future session**.
+**Verdict (assessment complete 2026-09-01): only 2 of 17 were damaged — Compass (reversed prior
+session) and Quad. The other 15 needed no reversal.**
+
+- **13 single-catalog "Agilant"-only clients** (Masonite, Ncci, Erau, Shrss, Wmchealth,
+  Trividiahealth, Miamidade, Browardsheriff, Canon, Elite, Growrk, Spglobal, Endeavorhealth):
+  the merge was a **legitimate within-catalog dedup** — no reversal needed.
+- **NYCHH:** confirmed the legit-dedup pilot — one catalog "Agilant" mixing 221 Etilize +
+  NetSuite items in the **same** catalog, so no cross-catalog fold was possible.
+- **Prudential: CLEARED** — all 50k+ order lines were always on its single populated "Agilant"
+  catalog; its "USA"/"India"/"Ireland" catalogs are empty placeholders; uniform NULL-`assetType`
+  is its **normal** state, not damage.
+- **Quad: DAMAGED** — a two-catalog TOGa Commerce client like Compass, but the damage was
+  **storefront-only** (not an order-transmission outage). Reversed with a self-contained
+  sandbox-sourced patch. See the
+  [Quad catalog-fold reversal](../../quad/workflows/catalog-fold-reversal.md).
 - **Compass Canada was NOT damaged and is structurally immune** — it was not in the merge's
   client list, has a single catalog, and does not use NetSuite (so no dupe-item bug).
 
+**Triage method (durable).** Per `Client_<X>`, compare `Catalogs` LEFT JOIN `Items` (so EMPTY
+catalogs still show) with item counts per catalog plus the pipeline signal
+(`c_etilizeProductId` = Etilize/store vs `c_netsuiteInternalItemId` = NetSuite/Agilant). A
+client is **DAMAGED only if** it has an intentional two-catalog store/procurement design **AND**
+catalog-1 items were folded into catalog-2 **AND** storefront/transmit depends on catalog-1.
+NULL-`assetType` order lines alone are **not** damage (Prudential and Quad show that as normal).
+
 ## Change history
+- 2026-09-01 — **Blast-radius assessment complete.** Resolved the outstanding per-client
+  assessment: only **2 of 17** clients were damaged — Compass (reversed prior session) and Quad
+  (storefront-only, reversed this session). The other 15 needed no reversal: 13 single-catalog
+  "Agilant"-only clients were a legitimate within-catalog dedup, NYCHH mixed Etilize + NetSuite
+  in one catalog (no fold possible), and Prudential was cleared (single populated catalog; NULL
+  assetType is its normal state). Added the durable triage method (Catalogs LEFT JOIN Items +
+  per-catalog pipeline signal) and the damaged-only test. See the
+  [Quad catalog-fold reversal](../../quad/workflows/catalog-fold-reversal.md). (jcardinal)
 - 2026-09-01 — Recorded the root cause of the Compass MITS outage: the ad-hoc cross-client
   `duplicate_items_merge_ALL_CLIENTS.sql` (2026-08-31 ~12:43) folded 199 Compass catalog-1
   store items into their Agilant canonical, producing MITS HTTP 400 (NULL assetType) and SQL

package/knowledge/clients/quad/INDEX.md

@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@
 | [Quad multi-currency item prices & vendor item costs](features/multi-currency-item-pricing.md) | 2.0 | Quad prices the **same item in several currencies** and costs the **same vendor item in the vendor's own currency**, so both listings must show a *set* of amoun | _underscore/Model/Quad/Item.php, _underscore/Model/Quad/VendorItem.php, toga2-supply/src/components/ui/CurrencyAmountLines.tsx, toga2-supply/src/pages/Items/api/itemsApi.ts, toga2-supply/src/pages/VendorItems/api/vendorItemsApi.ts, toga2-supply/src/pages/VendorItems/VendorItemsPage.tsx, dbchanges2/Client_Quad/2026-08-24 - Quad Multi Currency Item Pricing.sql, worker/crons/toga2/quad/Imports/import_items.php |
 | [Quad: PO + ASN email importer (import_po_and_asn.php)](features/po-asn-email-import.md) | 1.0 | Quad Graphics' supplier emails Purchase Order and Advance Shipping Notice CSVs into a monitored Microsoft 365 mailbox. | worker/crons/toga2/quad/import_po_and_asn.php |
 | [Quad Graphics](profile.md) | 2.0 | Quad Graphics is a TOGA 2.0 client on the `_underscore` platform, prod schema `Client_Quad`. |  |
+| [Quad Graphics — reversing the 30-item catalog fold (storefront-assortment recovery)](workflows/catalog-fold-reversal.md) | 2.0 | Quad is the **second and only other** client damaged by the 2026-08-31 catalog-blind `duplicate_items_merge_ALL_CLIENTS.sql`. | test/team/2.0 deployment/quad_catalog_fold_reversal.sql, test/team/2.0 deployment/duplicate_items_merge_ALL_CLIENTS.sql, worker/crons/toga2/quad/workflow/1_transmit_purchase_orders_to_vendors.php |

package/knowledge/clients/quad/profile.md

@@ -16,10 +16,11 @@ project: _Underscore
 client: quad
 type: profile
 status: active
-updated: 2026-08-26
+updated: 2026-09-01
 owners: ["jcardinal", "bala", "apeterson", "ajean"]
 files: []
 related:
+  - ./workflows/catalog-fold-reversal.md
   - ./features/po-asn-email-import.md
   - ./features/enter-po-details-vendor-selection-ev12.md
   - ../../2.0/apps/_underscore/features/sales-order-po-number-sourcing.md
@@ -134,4 +135,11 @@ Client-specific DB change-sets live in `dbchanges2/Client_Quad/`.
   `acl['vendor-items']['navigation-edit-on-vendor-items']` (`Core.AclActions` id 7 on record 19);
   Quad had id 5 only. Granted id 7 to role 7 (Global Admin). UI gate only — record 19 already
   granted role 1 full CRUD.
+- **Two-catalog TOGa Commerce client (like Compass).** Catalog 1 "Quad" = storefront (Etilize,
+  carries `assetType`); catalog 2 "Agilant" = procurement (NetSuite, NULL `assetType`). Unlike
+  Compass, the storefront customer `customerId = 8` has its **orders on Agilant by design**, so
+  the "Quad" catalog is display-only. This is why the 2026-08-31 catalog-blind merge damaged
+  Quad's **storefront only** (not orders/transmit), and Quad was the **only other client besides
+  Compass** that needed a reversal. See
+  [Quad catalog-fold reversal](./workflows/catalog-fold-reversal.md).
 - This profile is a starting point; expand as more Quad-specific behavior is captured.

package/knowledge/clients/quad/workflows/catalog-fold-reversal.md

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+---
+title: Quad Graphics — reversing the 30-item catalog fold (storefront-assortment recovery)
+framework: "2.0"
+project: _Underscore
+client: quad
+type: workflow
+status: active
+updated: 2026-09-01
+owners: ["jcardinal"]
+files:
+  - test/team/2.0 deployment/quad_catalog_fold_reversal.sql
+  - test/team/2.0 deployment/duplicate_items_merge_ALL_CLIENTS.sql
+  - worker/crons/toga2/quad/workflow/1_transmit_purchase_orders_to_vendors.php
+related:
+  - ../../compass-usa/workflows/catalog-fold-reversal.md
+  - ../../compass-usa/features/item-catalogs-and-duplicate-items.md
+  - ../../../1.0/apps/worker/workflows/netsuite-duplicate-items-dedup.md
+  - ../profile.md
+---
+
+## Summary
+
+Quad is the **second and only other** client damaged by the 2026-08-31 catalog-blind
+`duplicate_items_merge_ALL_CLIENTS.sql`. Like Compass, Quad is a **two-catalog TOGa Commerce**
+client, so the merge folded catalog-1 store items into their catalog-2 Agilant twins. But
+**Quad's damage shape is different from Compass's** — it was **storefront-only**, not an
+order-transmission outage. This workflow records the damage and the self-contained reversal.
+See the [Compass catalog-fold reversal](../../compass-usa/workflows/catalog-fold-reversal.md)
+for the shared playbook this refines.
+
+## Quad's catalog model (why the merge damaged it)
+
+- **Catalog 1 "Quad"** — the storefront catalog. Etilize/store items, carries
+  `assetType`/classification.
+- **Catalog 2 "Agilant"** — the procurement catalog. NetSuite items, **NULL `assetType`**.
+- **`customerId = 8` IS the Quad storefront customer, but its ORDER LINES correctly resolve to
+  catalog-2 Agilant** (verified identical prod vs client-sandbox: ~8040 Agilant / 8 Quad on
+  both sides). So Quad's customer→catalog rule **differs from Compass**: the store customer's
+  *orders* live on Agilant; the "Quad" catalog is **storefront display**. This is why orders
+  were **not** damaged for Quad, unlike Compass (whose store customer belonged on catalog-1 and
+  whose MITS transmit broke).
+
+## What broke — storefront only
+
+The merge deleted **30 catalog-1 "Quad" store items** (each had an Agilant `partNumber` twin)
+and re-pointed their references onto **NULL-`assetType` Agilant** items. Corrupted storefront
+references:
+
+- **48** `AssortmentItems` tiles
+- **1185** `ItemFeatures`
+- **49** `ItemPrices`
+- **79** `ItemImages`
+- **32** `Personas_Items`
+- **49** `VendorItems`
+- **1** `SalesOrderItem`
+
+**What did NOT break:**
+
+- **Orders** — `customerId = 8` lines were already on Agilant by design (see catalog model).
+- **PO → vendor transmit** (`worker/crons/toga2/quad/workflow/1_transmit_purchase_orders_to_vendors.php`)
+  — multi-vendor items went **DOWN 176 → 154** (the merge reduced them; no VendorItem fusion,
+  so no SQL 1242 exposure — contrast Compass).
+
+**Source of truth for the correct state = a client-sandbox copy of `Client_Quad`** (id-space
+aligned with prod, verified): 100% of `AssortmentItems` sit on catalog "Quad"; prod had 48
+wrongly on Agilant. No recent prod backup existed.
+
+## The reversal (self-contained, sandbox-sourced)
+
+Deliverable: `test/team/2.0 deployment/quad_catalog_fold_reversal.sql` — rehearsed,
+CTO-reviewed (**AGREE**), applied to prod.
+
+1. **Reinsert the 30 deleted catalog-1 `Items` verbatim from the sandbox at their original
+   ids.** The patch is **self-contained** — no cross-DB references; the sandbox rows are
+   inlined.
+2. **Move the merge-relocated child rows back off the Agilant canonical** by one of two proven
+   mechanisms:
+   - **(a) Precise move by row `uuid`** — for tables whose canonical (Agilant) item
+     legitimately keeps its **own** native/sibling rows: `ItemImages`, `VendorItems`,
+     `SalesOrderItems`, and (after CTO review) `AssortmentItems`, `ItemPrices`,
+     `Personas_Items`. Moving by uuid touches only the rows that were actually relocated.
+   - **(b) Map-move** (`itemId` canon→dupe via a dupe→canon map) — used **ONLY for
+     `ItemFeatures`**, safe by a data-model invariant: **nothing writes `ItemFeatures` onto
+     catalog-2 items** (the Etilize feed targets catalog-1; NetSuite creates catalog-2 items
+     with no features; the sync is stopped; sandbox canon-native `ItemFeatures` = 0).
+   - **`VendorItemCosts` ride along unchanged** (VendorItems are moved, not deleted).
+
+## Safety model (refines the Compass playbook)
+
+- **Single transaction, `FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS = 1`, NO `UPDATE IGNORE`, `COMMIT` left
+  commented.**
+- **8 fail-loud CASE-based guards** — abort via a subquery-returns-row → forced error 1242.
+- **Row-count-conservation guards** using pre-run `@vars`.
+- **A preflight PK-absence guard.**
+- **Rehearsed on a LOCAL `Client_Quad` freshly restored from prod** — repeatable because the
+  commented `COMMIT` + rollback-on-disconnect leaves the DB unchanged.
+- **Perturbation-tested** — pre-inserted a restore id and confirmed the preflight guard aborts.
+- **CTO review drove the hardening** of the four blind guards from count-equality to
+  identity-based uuid moves.
+
+## Critical rules / gotchas
+
+- **NULL `assetType` on order lines ALONE is NOT proof of catalog-fold damage.** Quad (and
+  Prudential) show 100% NULL-`assetType` Agilant order lines as their **normal** state. Damage
+  requires the two-catalog store/procurement split **AND** storefront/transmit dependence on
+  catalog-1.
+- **The merge's damage is client-specific in SHAPE.** Compass = order-transmission break (MITS
+  HTTP 400 / SQL 1242); Quad = storefront-assortment corruption only. **Assess each client's
+  actual dependency; do not assume Compass's failure mode.**
+- **MySQL reversal/rehearsal mechanics:**
+  - Temp-table `uuid` columns need `COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci` (or an explicit COLLATE on the
+    join) to match the real tables.
+  - A `TEMPORARY` table **cannot be referenced twice in one query** — inline id-lists in guards
+    instead.
+  - A `QUOTE()`-generated multi-row `INSERT` can **silently drop a trailing field** for rows
+    with several trailing NULLs — **validate field counts before running.**
+
+## Change history
+
+- 2026-09-01 — Recorded Quad as the second (and only other) client damaged by the catalog-blind
+  `duplicate_items_merge_ALL_CLIENTS.sql`. Documented Quad's two-catalog model (store customer
+  `customerId=8` orders live on Agilant by design, so orders were NOT damaged — unlike Compass),
+  the storefront-only damage (30 deleted catalog-1 items; 48 AssortmentItems / 1185 ItemFeatures
+  / 49 ItemPrices / 79 ItemImages / 32 Personas_Items / 49 VendorItems / 1 SalesOrderItem
+  re-pointed onto NULL-assetType Agilant), and the self-contained sandbox-sourced reversal
+  (`quad_catalog_fold_reversal.sql`): reinsert 30 items verbatim at original ids, then move child
+  rows back by uuid (precise) or by map (ItemFeatures only, safe by the no-features-on-catalog-2
+  invariant). Safety model: single transaction, FK-checks ON, no UPDATE IGNORE, 8 fail-loud CASE
+  guards, count-conservation guards, preflight PK guard; rehearsed on a prod-restored local,
+  perturbation-tested, CTO-reviewed AGREE. (jcardinal)

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "toga-ai",
-  "version": "1.0.724",
+  "version": "1.0.725",
   "description": "TOGA Technology Team Claude Knowledge System — shared AI coding harness with skills, knowledge base CLI, and project installer for Claude Code.",
   "keywords": [
     "claude",