toga-ai 1.0.257 → 1.0.258

package/knowledge/1.0/apps/tools/features/saml-sso-auth.md

@@ -36,10 +36,13 @@ auto-created.
 ## How it works
 
 ### Wiring overview
-- **`/sso/initiate`** (`mvc/sso/initiate/get.php`) — guards `isLoggedIn`, reads `config[saml]`,
-  calls `App_Sso::initiate([...])` and `App_MVC::routeTo($url); exit;`. Initiation now uses the
-  reusable 1.0 [`App_Sso`](../../library/features/app-sso-initiation.md) library class (no longer a
-  placeholder).
+- **`/sso/initiate`** (`mvc/sso/initiate/get.php`) — guards `isLoggedIn`, reads `config[saml]`
+  for the IdP/ACS urls + `domain_uuid`, sources the **rotating shared secret from `Core.Parameters`
+  via `App_Auth::currentApiSecret()`** (NOT from config — see below), calls `App_Sso::initiate([...])`
+  passing `'apiSecretAccessToken' => App_Auth::currentApiSecret()`, then `App_MVC::routeTo($url); exit;`.
+  Initiation uses the reusable 1.0 [`App_Sso`](../../library/features/app-sso-initiation.md) library
+  class (no longer a placeholder). The secret encrypts the RelayState — see the non-empty-token
+  gotcha below.
 - **`/sso`** (`mvc/sso/get.php`) — the handoff consumer (below).
 - **Core.Domains** — a fixed-uuid row registers this app's return domain so the gateway resolves
   client/environment/return URL: `uuid 2927bc15-e347-4358-a430-fb28f9446d27`, `clientId 1` (True),
@@ -59,18 +62,29 @@ auto-created.
    and that both decrypted values match a UUID regex.
 4. Load the active Client_True user: `WHERE uuid = ? AND isActive = 1`. No match → fail closed.
 
-### Handoff key sourcing (`handoffKeys()` → `Core.Parameters`)
-The shared secret is **rotated regularly**, so the static `config.*.ini [saml]` token goes stale —
+### Handoff key sourcing (`handoffKeys()` → `Core.Parameters`) — used by BOTH SSO legs
+The shared secret is **rotated regularly**, so any static `config.*.ini [saml]` copy goes stale —
 that staleness was exactly why `decryptHandoffValue()` returned `false` and production login failed
 (the payload decoded to the correct iv+base64 shape; it was a **key** mismatch, not a format bug).
-- `App_Auth::handoffKeys()` (new private helper) `SELECT \`key\`,\`value\` FROM Parameters WHERE
+**Both SSO legs must source the secret from `Core.Parameters` at runtime** — the initiate leg
+encrypts the RelayState with it, the consumer leg decrypts the handoff with it. A config-only copy
+silently breaks SSO on the next rotation.
+- `App_Auth::handoffKeys()` (private helper) `SELECT \`key\`,\`value\` FROM Parameters WHERE
   \`key\` IN ('API_SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN','API_SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN_PREVIOUS')` over the **`db_toga2core`**
   connection (2.0 PROD Core DB; `const CORE_DB = 'db_toga2core'`). Result is **cached per request**.
   `\`key\`` and `\`value\`` are SQL reserved words → **must be backticked**.
-- `decryptHandoffValue()` then tries the current key, falling back to previous (rotation window).
-  Its **public signature is unchanged** — only `mvc/sso/get.php` calls it.
-- The old `[saml] api_secret_access_token` / `_previous` config values are now **dead** (removable).
-  `[saml] true_client_uuid` is **still used** (`sso/get.php:80-84`) and stays.
+- **Consumer leg** (`mvc/sso/get.php`): `decryptHandoffValue()` tries the current key, falling back
+  to previous (rotation window). Its **public signature is unchanged**.
+- **Initiate leg** (`mvc/sso/initiate/get.php`): calls **`App_Auth::currentApiSecret()`** (public;
+  reuses the cached `handoffKeys()` lookup, returns the current `API_SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN`) and passes
+  it to `App_Sso::initiate(['apiSecretAccessToken' => …])` to encrypt the RelayState.
+- **Do NOT remove `[saml] api_secret_access_token` / `_previous` from config.** ⚠ An earlier capture
+  this session wrongly called these "dead/removable" — that guidance **broke SSO**: the initiate leg
+  still read the config token, so removing it made `App_Sso::initiate()` throw on an empty token
+  (`/login?error=1`). The fix moved the initiate leg to `Core.Parameters` too; the config copies are
+  now genuinely unused, but the durable rule is that the **only source of truth is `Core.Parameters`**.
+- **`[saml] true_client_uuid` is still read from config** (`sso/get.php:80-84`) and **must NOT be
+  removed**. The IdP/ACS urls and `domain_uuid` also stay in config.
 - See [Core.Parameters key/value store](#coreparameters-key-value-store) for the table shape and
   which DB cluster it lives on.
 
@@ -115,6 +129,19 @@ removed.
   preloader and runs `App_Page::flushCapture()` (`ob_end_flush + flush`, `library/app/page.php:213`)
   **before** `body()/App_MVC::loadFile()` runs the mvc page. Fixed with the same
   `if (!headers_sent()) { http_response_code(401); }` guard (matches `App_MVC::routeTo`'s own check).
+- **`App_Sso::initiate()` hard-requires a non-empty `apiSecretAccessToken`** (`library/app/sso.php:64-65`,
+  `empty()` guard → `InvalidArgumentException`; the token encrypts the RelayState). An empty/absent token
+  surfaces as a redirect to **`/login?error=1` ("Sign in failed. Please try again.")** — the initiate leg
+  catches the exception (`sso/initiate/get.php:30-34`) and routes to `/login?error=1`. This fails
+  **before** the IdP round-trip, so it never reaches the consumer's **"Authentication failed"**
+  (`tools_ssoFail`) page. **The two error UIs tell you which leg failed:** `/login?error=1` = initiate
+  (RelayState encryption / token), "Authentication failed" = consumer (decrypt). This was the
+  2026-06-30 regression — removing the config token per the (wrong) earlier note made initiate throw.
+- **Both legs depend on `db_toga2core` + a populated `Core.Parameters` token.** If `[database_toga2core]`
+  is not configured, `currentApiSecret()`/`handoffKeys()` runs `App_Database::query` against an
+  unregistered alias and **throws**. Because initiate only catches `InvalidArgumentException`/`RuntimeException`,
+  that surfaces as a **500** — not the login banner. **Diagnostic:** a 500 at initiate = missing
+  `db_toga2core`; `/login?error=1` = empty/absent `API_SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN`.
 - **No app-side replay defense.** The handoff token carries no nonce/timestamp the app verifies.
   Recommend the gateway embed `iat` + `jti`.
 
@@ -140,8 +167,11 @@ from the 1.0 prod-cluster and from the 2.0 client cluster that backs `db_true`/`
 `db_toga2core`, dbname `Core`, the prod core cluster host (`production-core-cluster…us-west-2…`),
 needed in **each** `config.*.ini` so the handoff keys can be read at runtime (developer is adding
 creds). `[saml]`: `true_client_uuid` (still used), `client_authentication_uuid`, `domain_uuid`,
-plus the IdP/ACS urls used by initiation; `[internal]` `dev_mode`. The old `[saml]
-api_secret_access_token` / `_previous` are now **dead** (superseded by `Core.Parameters`).
+plus the IdP/ACS urls used by initiation; `[internal]` `dev_mode`. `[saml] api_secret_access_token` /
+`_previous` are **superseded by `Core.Parameters`** (the only source of truth for BOTH legs) — but do
+**not** treat them as freely removable: removing the config token while the initiate leg still read it
+is what caused the 2026-06-30 `/login?error=1` regression. `[saml] true_client_uuid` is **still read
+from config** and must stay.
 
 **Secret location.** Rotating secrets are now sourced from `Core.Parameters` **at runtime** rather
 than static config — an improvement over the old committed `config.production.ini [saml]` tokens.
@@ -150,6 +180,7 @@ remains (already noted in tools knowledge) — **flag for rotation.** Document *
 never the values.
 
 ## Change history
+- 2026-06-30 — Fixed SSO "Sign in failed" (`/login?error=1`) regression and **corrected the earlier wrong "config tokens are removable" note**. The prior fix moved only the consumer/decrypt leg to `Core.Parameters` and advised the `[saml] api_secret_access_token` was removable — but the **initiate** leg (`mvc/sso/initiate/get.php`) still read it from config, so removing it made `App_Sso::initiate()` throw on an empty token (`library/app/sso.php:64-65`) → `/login?error=1`. Fix: **both** legs now source the rotating secret from `Core.Parameters` — added public `App_Auth::currentApiSecret()` (reuses cached `handoffKeys()`), and `sso/initiate/get.php` passes it instead of the config value. Documented the non-empty-token requirement, the `/login?error=1` (initiate) vs "Authentication failed" (consumer) leg distinction, the `true_client_uuid`-stays-in-config rule, and the `db_toga2core`-missing→500 diagnostic. `php -l` clean on both files. (jcardinal)
 - 2026-06-30 — Fixed prod SSO login failure: handoff decrypt keys now sourced from `Core.Parameters` (rotated `API_SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN`/`_PREVIOUS`) via new `App_Auth::handoffKeys()` over `db_toga2core` (per-request cached, current→previous fallback), instead of the stale committed `config [saml]` tokens — the stale key was the root cause. Added `[database_toga2core]` connection requirement to every config and documented the AES-256-CBC crypto format. Fixed `tools_ssoFail()` 500→intended 401: `http_response_code(401)` fataled on headers-already-sent (preloader flushes before mvc page runs); guarded with `!headers_sent()`. (jcardinal)
 - 2026-06-26 — Wired up real SSO initiation via the new 1.0 `App_Sso` library class (`/sso/initiate`), replacing the `initiation_url` placeholder; registered the fixed-uuid Core.Domains return row (dbchanges2 `2026-06-26a`); fixed the `session_regenerate_id` headers-already-sent fatal (guarded with `!headers_sent()`) and documented the mid-render failure-path limitation; collapsed home → `/login` to one-step sign-in; noted prod secrets live in `config.production.ini [saml]` (jcardinal)
 - 2026-06-25 — Built App_Auth: SAML `?saml=` handoff consumer with dual-key decrypt, hash_equals client-uuid check, fail-closed 401, persona-cached session (HttpOnly+SameSite=Lax), and a double-gated dev bypass. Initiation + replay defense left as open items (jcardinal)

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "toga-ai",
-  "version": "1.0.257",
+  "version": "1.0.258",
   "description": "TOGA Technology Team Claude Knowledge System — shared AI coding harness with skills, knowledge base CLI, and project installer for Claude Code.",
   "keywords": [
     "claude",