toga-ai 1.0.236 → 1.0.237
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| [Tools — Developers Folder (UUID & Password Generators)](features/developer-tools.md) | The first two tools shipped in the Tools app, both under the **Developers** folder and gated to personas **Development Team** / **TOGa Technology**. | tools/mvc/developers/uuid/get.php, tools/mvc/developers/password/get.php |
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| [Tools MVC — Routing, CSRF & App_Database Access Patterns](features/mvc-data-access-patterns.md) | The load-bearing 1.0 (`App_`) framework conventions a developer needs when adding a page to the Tools app — URL routing, CSRF, and DB access through `App_Databa | tools/_/app/nav.php, tools/mvc/get.php |
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| [Tools Persona-Gated Navigation (App_Nav)](features/persona-gated-navigation.md) | `App_Nav` is the Tools app's two-level, **persona-gated** navigation. | tools/_/app/nav.php, tools/mvc/get.php |
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| [Tools SAML SSO Consumer & Persona-Gated Auth (App_Auth)](features/saml-sso-auth.md) | `App_Auth` is the Tools app's authentication layer: it consumes the SAML gateway `?saml=` handoff (see the 2.0 SAML downstream integration contract), establishe | tools/_/app/auth.php, tools/mvc/sso/initiate/get.php, tools/mvc/sso/get.php, tools/mvc/login/get.php, tools/mvc/login/post.php, tools/mvc/logout/get.php, tools/mvc/get.php, tools/config.production.ini |
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| [Tools SAML SSO Consumer & Persona-Gated Auth (App_Auth)](features/saml-sso-auth.md) | `App_Auth` is the Tools app's authentication layer: it consumes the SAML gateway `?saml=` handoff (see the 2.0 SAML downstream integration contract), establishe | tools/_/app/auth.php, tools/mvc/sso/initiate/get.php, tools/mvc/sso/get.php, tools/mvc/login/get.php, tools/mvc/login/post.php, tools/mvc/logout/get.php, tools/mvc/get.php, tools/config.production.ini, tools/config.local.ini |
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| [Talos Pricing UI (Onboarding, Dashboard, Benchmarks, Cost Factors + Estimator)](features/talos-pricing-ui.md) | The 1.0 (tools app) face of the **Talos Pricing Platform** — a "Talos Pricing" nav folder with four pages plus a client-side estimate engine. | tools/_/app/nav.php, tools/_/app/talos/estimator.php, tools/mvc/talos/onboarding/get.php, tools/mvc/talos/onboarding/post.php, tools/mvc/talos/pricing/get.php, tools/mvc/talos/benchmarks/get.php, tools/mvc/talos/factors/get.php, tools/mvc/talos/factors/post.php, tools/assets/css/style.css |
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| [Deploying Tools to Elastic Beanstalk (PHP 8.5 / Amazon Linux 2023)](workflows/deploy-to-elastic-beanstalk-al2023.md) | How the **Tools** 1.0 app boots on Elastic Beanstalk running `PHP 8.5 on 64bit Amazon Linux 2023/4.13.1 (aarch64)`. | tools/.ebextensions/004_http_to_https.config, tools/.ebextensions/006_mount-s3fs.config, tools/.ebextensions/007_setup_export_cache_folders.config, tools/.ebextensions/008_setup_ldap.config, tools/.ebextensions/009_setup_phpini.config, tools/.ebextensions/020_setup_git_libraries.config, tools/.ebextensions/050_register_instance_to_shared_application_load_balancer.config, tools/ebs/git.json |
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@@ -6,13 +6,14 @@ project: Tools
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client: shared
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type: feature
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status: active
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updated: 2026-06-
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updated: 2026-06-30
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owners: [jcardinal]
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files:
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- tools/_/app/nav.php
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- tools/mvc/get.php
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related:
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- ./persona-gated-navigation.md
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- ./saml-sso-auth.md
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- ../architecture.md
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- ../../library/features/mvc-page-pattern-and-app-skeleton.md
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---
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@@ -69,9 +70,26 @@ $res = App_Database::query($sql, 'db_team');
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$rows = App_Database::buildArrayOfRows($res, false);
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```
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## Gotcha — a page CANNOT set HTTP status/headers (preloader already flushed)
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`App_FrameworkIndex::render()` turns on the preloader and calls `App_Page::flushCapture()`
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(`ob_end_flush + flush`, `library/app/page.php:213`) **before** `body() → App_MVC::loadFile()` runs
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your mvc page. So by the time any page executes, **headers are already sent**. Calling
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`http_response_code()`, `header()`, or `session_regenerate_id()` from inside a page **fatals**
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("headers already sent"), and the error handler escalates that to an uncaught `ErrorException` → a
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bare **500**. Always guard:
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```php
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if (!headers_sent()) { http_response_code(401); } // matches App_MVC::routeTo's own check
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```
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`establishSession()` (auth.php) guards `session_regenerate_id` for the same reason; the SSO failure
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path hit this too — see [saml-sso-auth](./saml-sso-auth.md). The clean long-term fix is to handle
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status-setting routes **before any output** and `exit`.
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## Autoloader
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`App_Foo_Bar` → `app/foo/bar.php`, **all lowercase** (per the library CLAUDE.md). E.g.
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`App_Talos_Estimator` → `_/app/talos/estimator.php`.
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## Change history
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- 2026-06-30 — Added the preloader-flush gotcha: pages run after `App_Page::flushCapture()` flushes the output buffer, so `http_response_code`/`header`/`session_regenerate_id` from inside a page fatal on headers-already-sent (escalates to a 500) — guard with `!headers_sent()`. Surfaced by the SSO failure-path 500 fix. (jcardinal)
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- 2026-06-29 — Documented tools MVC routing (GET→get.php / POST→post.php; writes via mvc/<route>/post.php, not the legacy actionHandler path), Origin/Referer CSRF (no token field), `App_Database` query/row/txn API + `sqlEscape()` name, the by-reference row-helper warning gotcha, the persona-narrowing gotcha, and the lowercase autoloader mapping. Discovered building the Talos Pricing UI. (jcardinal)
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client: shared
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type: feature
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status: active
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updated: 2026-06-
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updated: 2026-06-30
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owners: [jcardinal]
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files:
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- tools/_/app/auth.php
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- tools/mvc/logout/get.php
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- tools/mvc/get.php
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- tools/config.production.ini
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- tools/config.local.ini
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related:
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- ../architecture.md
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- ../../library/features/app-sso-initiation.md
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### Consuming the `?saml=` handoff (`mvc/sso/get.php` → `App_Auth`)
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1. Length-guard `$_GET['saml']`, then base64-decode → `json_decode` → read `payload.client`
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and `payload.user`.
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2. Decrypt each with `App_String::decryptWithKey()`
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with a **dual-key
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rotation
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2. Decrypt each with `App_String::decryptWithKey()` (AES-256-CBC; see crypto format below) via
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`App_Auth::decryptHandoffValue()`, with a **current → previous dual-key fallback** so an
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in-flight gateway key rotation still decodes. **Keys come from `Core.Parameters` at runtime,
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not from config** — see "Handoff key sourcing" below. This interoperates byte-for-byte with
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the 2.0 `_String::encryptWithKey()` that produced the token.
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3. Validate the decrypted **client uuid == configured `true_client_uuid`** via `hash_equals`,
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and that both decrypted values match a UUID regex.
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4. Load the active Client_True user: `WHERE uuid = ? AND isActive = 1`. No match → fail closed.
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### Handoff key sourcing (`handoffKeys()` → `Core.Parameters`)
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The shared secret is **rotated regularly**, so the static `config.*.ini [saml]` token goes stale —
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that staleness was exactly why `decryptHandoffValue()` returned `false` and production login failed
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(the payload decoded to the correct iv+base64 shape; it was a **key** mismatch, not a format bug).
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- `App_Auth::handoffKeys()` (new private helper) `SELECT \`key\`,\`value\` FROM Parameters WHERE
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\`key\` IN ('API_SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN','API_SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN_PREVIOUS')` over the **`db_toga2core`**
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connection (2.0 PROD Core DB; `const CORE_DB = 'db_toga2core'`). Result is **cached per request**.
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`\`key\`` and `\`value\`` are SQL reserved words → **must be backticked**.
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- `decryptHandoffValue()` then tries the current key, falling back to previous (rotation window).
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Its **public signature is unchanged** — only `mvc/sso/get.php` calls it.
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- The old `[saml] api_secret_access_token` / `_previous` config values are now **dead** (removable).
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`[saml] true_client_uuid` is **still used** (`sso/get.php:80-84`) and stays.
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- See [Core.Parameters key/value store](#coreparameters-key-value-store) for the table shape and
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which DB cluster it lives on.
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### Session establishment (`establishSession()`)
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- Calls `session_regenerate_id(true)` **guarded by `if (!headers_sent())`** (see gotcha), then
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caches the user and **persona names** in `$_SESSION`.
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**inside** the page render (`frameworkindex → body → loadFile`) after `common/header.php` has
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emitted output, so `session_regenerate_id(true)` fatals ("cannot be regenerated after headers
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already sent"). Fixed by guarding with `if (!headers_sent())`. **Known architectural limitation:**
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the proper long-term fix is to route `/sso` **before any output** and `exit`. Any 1.0 app adopting
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this consumer pattern inherits this — see [App_Sso](../../library/features/app-sso-initiation.md)
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and the [preloader-flush gotcha](./mvc-data-access-patterns.md) for the general rule.
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- **Failure path also fataled → fixed (2026-06-30).** `tools_ssoFail()` called
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`http_response_code(401)` to render the "Authentication failed" page, which itself fataled with
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"headers already sent" and the error handler escalated it to an uncaught `ErrorException` → a bare
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**500** instead of the intended 401 page. Root cause: `App_FrameworkIndex::render()` turns on the
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preloader and runs `App_Page::flushCapture()` (`ob_end_flush + flush`, `library/app/page.php:213`)
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**before** `body()/App_MVC::loadFile()` runs the mvc page. Fixed with the same
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`if (!headers_sent()) { http_response_code(401); }` guard (matches `App_MVC::routeTo`'s own check).
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- **No app-side replay defense.** The handoff token carries no nonce/timestamp the app verifies.
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Recommend the gateway embed `iat` + `jti`.
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## Crypto format (`App_String::encryptWithKey` / `decryptWithKey`)
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`library/app/string.php:1075-1094`, AES-256-CBC: `encryptWithKey` returns
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`base64( iv . openssl_encrypt(..., flag 0) )` — i.e. a base64 envelope whose body is the raw IV
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followed by openssl's own base64 ciphertext; `decryptWithKey` reverses it. **Interoperable
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byte-for-byte with the 2.0 `_String::decryptWithKey()`** that the SAML gateway uses to produce the
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handoff token. The 2026-06-30 login failure decoded to the exact expected iv+base64 shape, proving
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the issue was a stale **key**, not a cipher/format mismatch.
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## Core.Parameters key/value store
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The platform's rotating key/value parameter store, on the **2.0 PROD Core DB** (`Core` schema).
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Columns: `id`, `uuid`, `\`key\`` (UNIQUE), `\`value\`` — `key`/`value` are reserved words and **must
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be backticked**. Holds the SSO/API shared secrets `API_SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN` and
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`API_SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN_PREVIOUS`. The tools app reaches it via the **`db_toga2core`** connection
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(`[database_toga2core]`, dbname `Core`, prod core cluster in `us-west-2`) — a cluster **distinct**
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from the 1.0 prod-cluster and from the 2.0 client cluster that backs `db_true`/`Client_True`.
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## Config keys
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`[database_true]` (read-only Client_True);
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`[database_true]` (read-only Client_True); **`[database_toga2core]`** — new requirement: alias
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`db_toga2core`, dbname `Core`, the prod core cluster host (`production-core-cluster…us-west-2…`),
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needed in **each** `config.*.ini` so the handoff keys can be read at runtime (developer is adding
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creds). `[saml]`: `true_client_uuid` (still used), `client_authentication_uuid`, `domain_uuid`,
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plus the IdP/ACS urls used by initiation; `[internal]` `dev_mode`. The old `[saml]
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api_secret_access_token` / `_previous` are now **dead** (superseded by `Core.Parameters`).
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**Secret location.** Rotating secrets are now sourced from `Core.Parameters` **at runtime** rather
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than static config — an improvement over the old committed `config.production.ini [saml]` tokens.
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A **pre-existing reused plaintext DB password** across the `config.*.ini [database_*]` sections
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remains (already noted in tools knowledge) — **flag for rotation.** Document **where** secrets live,
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never the values.
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## Change history
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- 2026-06-30 — Fixed prod SSO login failure: handoff decrypt keys now sourced from `Core.Parameters` (rotated `API_SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN`/`_PREVIOUS`) via new `App_Auth::handoffKeys()` over `db_toga2core` (per-request cached, current→previous fallback), instead of the stale committed `config [saml]` tokens — the stale key was the root cause. Added `[database_toga2core]` connection requirement to every config and documented the AES-256-CBC crypto format. Fixed `tools_ssoFail()` 500→intended 401: `http_response_code(401)` fataled on headers-already-sent (preloader flushes before mvc page runs); guarded with `!headers_sent()`. (jcardinal)
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- 2026-06-26 — Wired up real SSO initiation via the new 1.0 `App_Sso` library class (`/sso/initiate`), replacing the `initiation_url` placeholder; registered the fixed-uuid Core.Domains return row (dbchanges2 `2026-06-26a`); fixed the `session_regenerate_id` headers-already-sent fatal (guarded with `!headers_sent()`) and documented the mid-render failure-path limitation; collapsed home → `/login` to one-step sign-in; noted prod secrets live in `config.production.ini [saml]` (jcardinal)
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- 2026-06-25 — Built App_Auth: SAML `?saml=` handoff consumer with dual-key decrypt, hash_equals client-uuid check, fail-closed 401, persona-cached session (HttpOnly+SameSite=Lax), and a double-gated dev bypass. Initiation + replay defense left as open items (jcardinal)
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package/package.json
CHANGED