thumbgate 1.27.17 → 1.27.18

package/bin/postinstall.js

@@ -26,21 +26,37 @@ const DASHBOARD_URL = 'https://thumbgate.ai/dashboard?utm_source=npm&utm_medium=
 
 process.stderr.write(`
   ╭─────────────────────────────────────────────────────╮
-  │  ThumbGate installed — 7-day Pro trial is live.     │
+  │  ThumbGate installed.                               │
   │                                                     │
-  │  Start now:  npx thumbgate init                     │
-  │  Updates:    npx thumbgate subscribe you@company.com│
+  │  Every repeat-mistake your agent makes costs        │
+  │  tokens. ThumbGate blocks known-bad tool calls      │
+  │  BEFORE the model sees them — zero tokens spent     │
+  │  on mistakes you've already corrected.              │
   │                                                     │
-  │  Free after trial: 3 rules, 2 captures/day.        │
-  │  Pro ($19/mo): unlimited everything.                │
+  │  Start free (local-only, never expires):            │
+  │    npx thumbgate init                               │
+  │    npx thumbgate stats                              │
+  │                                                     │
+  │  See your gates firing live:                        │
+  │    ${DASHBOARD_URL.slice(0, 47).padEnd(47, ' ')} │
   ╰─────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
 
-  Trial unlocks: unlimited rules, lesson search, DPO export,
-  hosted dashboard. After 7 days, free tier limits apply.
-  Subscribe for the 5-min setup guide + weekly tips:
-  npx thumbgate subscribe you@company.com
+  Pro — ${PRO_PRICE_LABEL}
+    Hosted lesson sync across all your machines.
+    Adapter matrix kept current for Claude Code,
+    Cursor, Codex, Gemini, Amp, Cline, OpenCode.
+    Org dashboard. DPO export. 24×7 ops.
+    Upgrade: ${PRO_CTA_URL}
+    Direct:  ${PRO_MONTHLY_PAYMENT_LINK}
+
+  ⚡ LAUNCH PROMO: 50% off first 3 months with code THUMB50
+    One-click (discount applied): https://buy.stripe.com/eVqeVd62o0aO19v7mb3sI3g
+    Limited to first 50 customers. ${new Date().getMonth() === 6 ? 'July 2026' : ''}
+
+  Team: ${TEAM_PRICE_LABEL}
+    Workflow Hardening Sprint intake:
+    ${WORKFLOW_SPRINT_URL}
 
-  Dashboard: ${DASHBOARD_URL}
-  Keep Pro: ${PRO_CTA_URL}
+  Or run: npx thumbgate pro
 
 `);

package/config/gate-templates.json

@@ -157,18 +157,6 @@
       "roi": "Connects prevention with remediation: what credential lived where, who touched it, and whether rotation is required.",
       "rollout": "Use with incident-response runbooks and secrets scanner output from GitGuardian or internal tooling."
     },
-    {
-      "id": "require-local-dependency-vulnerability-scan",
-      "name": "Require local dependency vulnerability scan before installation",
-      "category": "Supply Chain Safety",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "high",
-      "pattern": "(npm install|pnpm add|yarn add|bun add|npm i|pnpm i|yarn i).*(vulnerable|cve|high|critical|osv|cve-lite)",
-      "problem": "Blocks package installations that introduce dependencies containing known high-severity or critical vulnerabilities (CVEs) before they are written to the lockfile.",
-      "roi": "Prevents AI agents from introducing vulnerable packages into the workspace. Complements zero-egress local-first scanning toolings (like OWASP CVE Lite CLI) directly at the terminal level.",
-      "rollout": "Enable on every repo where agents can install dependencies or modify lockfiles."
-    },
     {
       "id": "require-section-tree-before-multimodal-answer",
       "name": "Require section tree before multimodal answers",
@@ -337,18 +325,6 @@
       "roi": "Prevents expensive long-context inference rollouts from reusing stale cache state or corrupting speculative decode paths.",
       "rollout": "Enable before raising context windows, switching cache implementations, or deploying ShadowRadix-style prefix caching."
     },
-    {
-      "id": "require-hybrid-inference-routing-approval",
-      "name": "Require approval for hybrid cloud escalation on sensitive data",
-      "category": "Hybrid Inference Governance",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "high",
-      "pattern": "(hybrid|local-cloud|perplexity.*hybrid|personal computer).*(escalat|cloud|send to cloud|route to server).*(sensitive|secret|pii|customer|confidential|codebase)",
-      "problem": "Hybrid local-cloud orchestrators (e.g. Perplexity Computex 2026) must not silently escalate sensitive context (code, feedback, lessons, PII) to cloud models without explicit approval or local-only enforcement.",
-      "roi": "High: Prevents data exfil in agentic workflows while still allowing hybrid cost/privacy wins. Critical as more agents adopt local-cloud routing (Personal Computer, AI PCs). Captures high-value feedback for custom hybrid rules.",
-      "rollout": "Start as block for paths matching secrets/env/customer data; promote to warn after baseline hybrid agent sessions. Pair with perplexity/hybrid-* model candidates and adapters/perplexity/HYBRID.md."
-    },
     {
       "id": "checkpoint-speculative-decoding-acceptance",
       "name": "Checkpoint speculative decoding acceptance",
@@ -468,198 +444,6 @@
       "problem": "Blocks background agents from cloning, building, testing, or publishing unless they run in an isolated durable environment with logs.",
       "roi": "Lets the team pursue unattended revenue and engineering workflows without turning local developer machines into the execution boundary.",
       "rollout": "Enable for every agent that can run tests, push branches, deploy, publish content, change billing, or touch customer data."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "block-unauthorized-practice-of-law",
-      "name": "Block unauthorized practice of law",
-      "category": "Legal Intake Safety",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "critical",
-      "pattern": "(outcome prediction|jurisdictional recommendation|[Yy]ou\\s+(should|could|might)\\s+(file|sue|claim)|strong case|likely\\s+(prevail|win|succeed))",
-      "problem": "Stops advice-shaped intake replies under ABA Rule 5.5.",
-      "roi": "Prevents malpractice exposure before delivery.",
-      "rollout": "Enable on every AI intake channel."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "require-conflict-check-before-intake",
-      "name": "Require conflict check before intake continues",
-      "category": "Legal Intake Safety",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "critical",
-      "pattern": "(collect_case_facts|schedule_consultation|intake_continue).*(missing|no|unchecked).*(conflict|adverse[_-]party|clearance)",
-      "problem": "Requires adverse-party clearance before sensitive facts.",
-      "roi": "Catches conflicts before privileged facts cross ethical walls.",
-      "rollout": "Use the firm's conflicts API or a synthetic pilot fixture."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "block-privileged-content-egress",
-      "name": "Block privileged content egress",
-      "category": "Legal Intake Safety",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "critical",
-      "pattern": "(send_email|api_call|external_request|schedule|crm_update).*(privileged|attorney[_-]client|work[_-]product|matter[_-]id|confidential)",
-      "problem": "Blocks outbound actions with privilege markers.",
-      "roi": "Prevents single-action privilege waiver.",
-      "rollout": "Define markers, start with hard block, then add in-tenant reroute."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "require-approved-disclaimer-before-response",
-      "name": "Require approved disclaimer before response",
-      "category": "Legal Intake Safety",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "high",
-      "pattern": "(intake_response|client_reply).*((missing|no)\\s*(disclaimer|disclosure|non[_-]engagement)|(disclaimer|disclosure|non[_-]engagement)\\s*[:=]?\\s*(missing|none|no))",
-      "problem": "Requires firm-approved non-engagement language.",
-      "roi": "Reduces inadvertent client-relationship risk.",
-      "rollout": "Load approved disclaimer during pilot."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "restrict-model-endpoint-to-approved-list",
-      "name": "Restrict model endpoint to approved list",
-      "category": "Legal Intake Safety",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "high",
-      "pattern": "(model_call|llm_request|api_endpoint).*(unapproved|unknown|public|consumer)",
-      "problem": "Blocks unapproved model endpoints.",
-      "roi": "Keeps data inside approved vendor boundaries.",
-      "rollout": "Allowlist endpoints during pilot."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "require-attorney-review-before-routing",
-      "name": "Require attorney review before case routing",
-      "category": "Legal Intake Safety",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "high",
-      "pattern": "(route_to_attorney|assign_practice_area|schedule_consultation).*(no|missing).*(review|approval|supervisor)",
-      "problem": "Requires review before routing or scheduling.",
-      "roi": "Prevents bad prospect routing.",
-      "rollout": "Start strict; relax after pilot evidence."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "block-dynamic-tool-creation-without-approval",
-      "name": "Block dynamic tool creation without approval",
-      "category": "Claw-Style Enterprise Agent Governance",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "critical",
-      "pattern": "(claw|enterpriseclaw|dynamic tool|runtime tool|create_tool|self.*evolving).*(create|generate|define).*(tool|action|capability|script)",
-      "problem": "Claw-style agents (Automation Anywhere EnterpriseClaw, inspired by Nvidia OpenShell) can create tools at runtime. This must be gated to prevent arbitrary code execution or exfil.",
-      "roi": "High: Prevents one of the most dangerous capabilities of autonomous enterprise agents while allowing safe dynamic extension under governance. Directly addresses the 'governance catching up' gap called out in coverage.",
-      "rollout": "Block by default for claw agents; allowlist specific safe tool patterns after review. Capture feedback on every dynamic creation attempt."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "require-review-for-screen-ui-interaction",
-      "name": "Require review for screen/UI interaction by agents",
-      "category": "Claw-Style Enterprise Agent Governance",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "high",
-      "pattern": "(claw|screen|ui|computer use|mouse|keyboard|click|type|interact).*(screen|desktop|app|gui|human.*like)",
-      "problem": "Claw-style agents interact directly with computer screens and apps like a human operator. This creates high risk of unintended actions, data leaks via UI, or compliance violations.",
-      "roi": "Prevents agent-driven UI automation from bypassing existing controls. Essential for enterprise RPA + AI agent convergence (Automation Anywhere core).",
-      "rollout": "Require human-in-loop or explicit policy approval for any claw screen interaction on production systems. Log all such actions for audit."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "enforce-agent-identity-separation",
-      "name": "Enforce separate agent identity and audit trail",
-      "category": "Claw-Style Enterprise Agent Governance",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "high",
-      "pattern": "(agent identity|agent.*credential|human.*credential|impersonat|audit.*agent|agent.*audit).*(missing|no|same as human|not separated)",
-      "problem": "Claw agents (and partners like Okta in EnterpriseClaw) require first-class agent identities separate from humans so actions are auditable as agent actions, not human ones. Using human creds hides responsibility.",
-      "roi": "Critical for compliance, forensics, and feedback loops. Enables proper capture of agent-specific lessons and prevention rules. Matches industry push (Okta, etc.).",
-      "rollout": "Block any claw or autonomous agent action that authenticates as a human user. Require dedicated agent service accounts / identities with scoped permissions."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "gate-claw-file-system-access",
-      "name": "Gate claw-style agent file system access",
-      "category": "Claw-Style Enterprise Agent Governance",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "critical",
-      "pattern": "(claw|file system|fs access|read file|write file|list dir|device access).*(local|shared|on-prem|airgap)",
-      "problem": "Claw agents have broad device-level (local/shared) file system access. Must be strictly gated, especially in on-prem/air-gapped enterprise environments where most data lives.",
-      "roi": "Directly supports the hybrid/on-prem reality emphasized in EnterpriseClaw coverage. Prevents broad access from becoming broad exfil or corruption. Ties to ThumbGate's existing path globs and protected files.",
-      "rollout": "Use existing protected-paths + new claw-specific rules. Start with read-only for most, explicit approval for writes on sensitive dirs."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "block-unauthorized-multi-channel-posts",
-      "name": "Block unauthorized multi-channel posts by Hermes Agent",
-      "category": "Nous Research Hermes Agent Governance",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "high",
-      "pattern": "(slack|telegram|discord|signal|whatsapp|send_message|post_message|channel_post).*(credentials|api_key|token|auth|password|unreviewed|unapproved)",
-      "problem": "Hermes Agent can post directly to messaging platforms. This gate prevents leaked credentials or unapproved messages from being posted publicly.",
-      "roi": "High: Prevents public-facing compliance violations, credential leaks, and messaging spam across Telegram, Slack, and Discord.",
-      "rollout": "Enable by default for agents connected to external communication channels."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "prevent-infinite-skill-synthesis-loops",
-      "name": "Prevent infinite skill synthesis loops",
-      "category": "Nous Research Hermes Agent Governance",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "medium",
-      "pattern": "(hermes|skill synthesis|write skill|synthesize skill|evolve skill|self-improve).*(loop|repeated|stuck|regenerate|no progress)",
-      "problem": "Hermes Agent can get stuck repeatedly rewriting or generating the same skills in Markdown format without resolving the user's core task.",
-      "roi": "Reduces token burn and infinite loop execution loops by gating repeated skill write attempts.",
-      "rollout": "Warn/block when skill edits occur more than 3 times within the same session context."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "validate-synthesized-skills-against-rules",
-      "name": "Validate synthesized skills against prevention rules",
-      "category": "Nous Research Hermes Agent Governance",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "critical",
-      "pattern": "(write skill|synthesize skill|create skill|update skill).*(override|bypass|ignore|violate).*(prevention rule|gate|thumbgate)",
-      "problem": "Hermes Agent's self-improvement loop can write new skills that conflict with or attempt to bypass established ThumbGate prevention rules.",
-      "roi": "Preserves security invariants by ensuring that synthesized skills never write code patterns blocked by active ThumbGate rules.",
-      "rollout": "Scan synthesized skill markdown content for pattern overlap with active prevention rules before writing to the skills directory."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "require-human-in-the-loop-pause",
-      "name": "Enforce Human-in-the-Loop pause for critical decisions",
-      "category": "AI Engineering Stack Safety",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "high",
-      "pattern": "(agent_sdk|openrouter_sdk|human_in_loop|auto_resolve).*(auto_resolve|bypass|skip_pause|critical_action)",
-      "problem": "Prevents autonomous agents using the Agent SDK from auto-resolving critical decisions (such as model migration, credential rotations, or financial transactions) without pausing for explicit human approval.",
-      "roi": "Ensures human oversight remains functional on highest-risk actions, preventing the agent from acting entirely unsupervised on critical gates.",
-      "rollout": "Turn on for all production deployments utilizing OpenRouter or other Agent SDKs with auto-resolve capabilities."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "careful-mode",
-      "name": "Enforce careful mode for destructive commands",
-      "category": "On-Demand Dynamic Gating",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "critical",
-      "pattern": "(rm\\s+-rf|drop\\s+table|force-push|git\\s+push\\s+-[fF]|git\\s+push\\s+--force|kubectl\\s+delete)",
-      "problem": "Blocks dangerous or destructive command sequences (rm -rf, DROP TABLE, force-push, kubectl delete) during sessions where careful mode is activated.",
-      "roi": "Protects production environments and main branches from accidental destructive commands executed by autonomous agents.",
-      "rollout": "Enable dynamically on-demand using /careful or env overrides when executing in sensitive or production workspaces."
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "freeze-mode",
-      "name": "Freeze directory edits",
-      "category": "On-Demand Dynamic Gating",
-      "signal": "👎",
-      "defaultAction": "block",
-      "severity": "high",
-      "pattern": "^freeze_edit_outside_path.*",
-      "problem": "Blocks any file edit or write tool call that is not within a specified active/target directory.",
-      "roi": "Restricts agent edits to a controlled workspace, preventing scope drift, accidental modification of configuration or source files, and unwanted global refactors during focused task debugging.",
-      "rollout": "Enable dynamically on-demand using /freeze to specify the only path(s) the agent is allowed to write to during the session."
     }
   ]
 }

package/config/gates/claim-verification.json

@@ -24,18 +24,6 @@
       "requiredActions": ["on_device_verified"],
       "message": "You claimed on-device verification without evidence. Capture the proof first, then call track_action('on_device_verified').",
       "createdAt": 1774972800000
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "(github|repo|repository).*(about|metadata|description|topics?).*(updated|verified|fixed|match(?:es|ed)?)|(about|metadata|description|topics?).*(updated|verified|fixed|match(?:es|ed)?).*(github|repo|repository)",
-      "requiredActions": ["github_metadata_verified"],
-      "message": "You claimed GitHub repository metadata was updated or verified without source-of-truth evidence. Read it back with gh api/gh repo view and rendered HTML, then call track_action('github_metadata_verified').",
-      "createdAt": 1780677400000
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "(money|payment|charge|checkout|revenue|price|pricing|invoice|billing|tax|sales tax|inventory|stock|permission|access|customer-facing|customer facing).*(correct|accurate|verified|valid|matches|working|fixed|resolved|calculated|configured)|(correct|accurate|verified|valid|matches|working|fixed|resolved|calculated|configured).*(money|payment|charge|checkout|revenue|price|pricing|invoice|billing|tax|sales tax|inventory|stock|permission|access|customer-facing|customer facing)",
-      "requiredActions": ["commercial_truth_verified"],
-      "message": "You claimed a commercial-data fact (money, tax, inventory, permissions, or customer-facing state) without external source-of-truth evidence. Read the authoritative system first, then call track_action('commercial_truth_verified').",
-      "createdAt": 1781640000000
     }
   ]
 }

package/config/gates/default.json

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
       "id": "task-scope-required",
       "layer": "Decisions",
       "toolNames": ["Bash"],
-      "pattern": "^(git\\s+(add|commit|push)|gh\\s+pr\\s+(create|merge)|gh\\s+api\\b(?=.*(?:/pulls\\b|repos/[^\\s]+/[^\\s]+/pulls\\b))(?=.*(?:-f\\b|--field\\b|-F\\b|--raw-field\\b|--method\\s+POST\\b|-X\\s+POST\\b))|gh\\s+release\\s+create|git\\s+tag\\b|npm\\s+publish|yarn\\s+publish|pnpm\\s+publish)",
+      "pattern": "^(git\\s+(add|commit|push)|gh\\s+pr\\s+(create|merge)|gh\\s+release\\s+create|git\\s+tag\\b|npm\\s+publish|yarn\\s+publish|pnpm\\s+publish)",
       "requireTaskScope": true,
       "action": "block",
       "message": "Git write, PR, release, and publish operations require an explicit task scope.",
@@ -72,15 +72,6 @@
       "message": "PR creation requires explicit 'pr_create_allowed' satisfaction with evidence of user permission.",
       "severity": "high"
     },
-    {
-      "id": "gh-api-pr-create-restricted",
-      "layer": "Identity",
-      "pattern": "gh\\s+api\\b(?=.*(?:/pulls\\b|repos/[^\\s]+/[^\\s]+/pulls\\b))(?=.*(?:-f\\b|--field\\b|-F\\b|--raw-field\\b|--method\\s+POST\\b|-X\\s+POST\\b))",
-      "action": "block",
-      "unless": "pr_create_allowed",
-      "message": "GitHub API PR creation requires explicit 'pr_create_allowed' satisfaction with evidence of user permission. Use the same approval path as gh pr create.",
-      "severity": "high"
-    },
     {
       "id": "gh-pr-merge-restricted",
       "layer": "Identity",
@@ -94,7 +85,7 @@
       "id": "branch-governance-required",
       "layer": "Decisions",
       "toolNames": ["Bash"],
-      "pattern": "^(gh\\s+pr\\s+(create|merge)|gh\\s+api\\b(?=.*(?:/pulls\\b|repos/[^\\s]+/[^\\s]+/pulls\\b))(?=.*(?:-f\\b|--field\\b|-F\\b|--raw-field\\b|--method\\s+POST\\b|-X\\s+POST\\b))|gh\\s+release\\s+create|git\\s+tag\\b|npm\\s+publish|yarn\\s+publish|pnpm\\s+publish)",
+      "pattern": "^(gh\\s+pr\\s+(create|merge)|gh\\s+release\\s+create|git\\s+tag\\b|npm\\s+publish|yarn\\s+publish|pnpm\\s+publish)",
       "requireBranchGovernance": true,
       "action": "block",
       "message": "PR, release, and publish actions require explicit branch governance.",
@@ -377,26 +368,6 @@
       "message": "Self-protection: agent cannot modify hook registrations.",
       "severity": "critical",
       "compliance": ["NIST-AC-3", "OWASP-A01", "SOC2-CC6.1"]
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "on-demand-careful-mode",
-      "layer": "Execution",
-      "toolNames": ["Bash"],
-      "pattern": "(rm\\s+-rf|drop\\s+table|force-push|git\\s+push\\s+-[fF]|git\\s+push\\s+--force|kubectl\\s+delete)",
-      "action": "block",
-      "when": { "constraints": { "careful_mode": true } },
-      "message": "Careful mode is active. Dangerous command is blocked.",
-      "severity": "critical"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "on-demand-freeze-mode",
-      "layer": "Decisions",
-      "toolNames": ["Edit", "Write", "MultiEdit"],
-      "pattern": ".*",
-      "action": "block",
-      "when": { "constraints": { "freeze_mode": true } },
-      "message": "Freeze mode is active. Edits outside the frozen directory are blocked.",
-      "severity": "high"
     }
   ]
 }

package/config/github-about.json

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 {
   "repo": "IgorGanapolsky/ThumbGate",
   "repositoryUrl": "https://github.com/IgorGanapolsky/ThumbGate",
-  "homepageUrl": "https://thumbgate.ai",
+  "homepageUrl": "https://thumbgate-production.up.railway.app",
   "githubDescription": "Agent governance for ThumbGate: 👍/👎 become Pre-Action Checks that block repeat mistakes before code, money, or customer systems change.",
-  "metaDescription": "Stripe Connect integration engineering for ticketing and marketplace platforms — Pretix plugin shipped to Hilltown Media. ThumbGate is also the pre-action governance runtime for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Gemini CLI): 👍 thumbs up and 👎 thumbs down feedback become history-aware lessons, shared lessons and org visibility, and PreToolUse checks that block repeated mistakes before code, money, or customer systems change. Perfect for vibe coding and human-in-the-loop workflows.",
+  "metaDescription": "Stop paying for the same AI mistake twice. ThumbGate is machine-speed pre-action defense for AI coding agents and vibe coding workflows: 👍 thumbs up and 👎 thumbs down become history-aware lessons, shared lessons and org visibility, actionable remediations, agent surface inventory, and Pre-Action Checks that block repeat mistakes before the next tool call across Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Gemini, Amp, Cline, and OpenCode.",
   "topics": [
     "thumbgate",
     "pre-action-checks",

package/config/mcp-allowlists.json

@@ -4,9 +4,6 @@
     "default": [
       "recall",
       "unified_context",
-      "set_task_scope",
-      "get_scope_state",
-      "satisfy_gate",
       "capture_feedback",
       "open_feedback_session",
       "append_feedback_context",
@@ -39,13 +36,13 @@
       "context_provenance",
       "commerce_recall",
       "generate_skill",
+      "satisfy_gate",
+      "set_task_scope",
+      "get_scope_state",
       "set_branch_governance",
       "get_branch_governance",
       "approve_protected_action",
       "track_action",
-      "detect_noop",
-      "record_action_receipt",
-      "get_action_receipts",
       "verify_claim",
       "check_operational_integrity",
       "workflow_sentinel",
@@ -71,19 +68,15 @@
       "perplexity_search",
       "perplexity_ask",
       "perplexity_research",
-      "perplexity_reason",
-      "suggest_fix"
+      "perplexity_reason"
     ],
     "essential": [
-      "recall",
-      "unified_context",
-      "set_task_scope",
-      "get_scope_state",
-      "satisfy_gate",
       "capture_feedback",
       "open_feedback_session",
       "append_feedback_context",
       "finalize_feedback_session",
+      "recall",
+      "unified_context",
       "search_lessons",
       "retrieve_lessons",
       "search_thumbgate",
@@ -96,6 +89,8 @@
       "plan_chatgpt_ads_readiness",
       "reflect_on_feedback",
       "prevention_rules",
+      "set_task_scope",
+      "get_scope_state",
       "set_branch_governance",
       "get_branch_governance",
       "approve_protected_action",
@@ -109,8 +104,7 @@
       "report_product_issue",
       "require_evidence_for_claim",
       "session_report",
-      "generate_operator_artifact",
-      "suggest_fix"
+      "generate_operator_artifact"
     ],
     "commerce": [
       "capture_feedback",
@@ -129,8 +123,7 @@
       "workflow_sentinel",
       "prevention_rules",
       "feedback_stats",
-      "feedback_summary",
-      "suggest_fix"
+      "feedback_summary"
     ],
     "readonly": [
       "recall",
@@ -171,8 +164,7 @@
       "session_report",
       "generate_operator_artifact",
       "perplexity_search",
-      "perplexity_ask",
-      "suggest_fix"
+      "perplexity_ask"
     ],
     "dispatch": [
       "recall",
@@ -212,8 +204,7 @@
       "session_report",
       "generate_operator_artifact",
       "perplexity_search",
-      "perplexity_ask",
-      "suggest_fix"
+      "perplexity_ask"
     ],
     "locked": [
       "feedback_summary",
@@ -237,8 +228,7 @@
       "workflow_sentinel",
       "settings_status",
       "native_messaging_audit",
-      "generate_operator_artifact",
-      "suggest_fix"
+      "generate_operator_artifact"
     ]
   }
 }

package/config/merge-quality-checks.json

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
     "CodeQL",
     "Analyze JavaScript (javascript-typescript)",
     "Verify changeset",
+    "SonarCloud Code Analysis",
     "GitGuardian Security Checks",
     "Socket Security: Project Report",
     "Socket Security: Pull Request Alerts"