thumbgate 1.27.16 → 1.27.18

package/scripts/gates-engine.js

@@ -3,12 +3,11 @@
 
 const fs = require('fs');
 const path = require('path');
-const os = require('os');
 const crypto = require('crypto');
-const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
+const { execSync, execFileSync } = require('child_process');
 const { loadOptionalModule } = require('./private-core-boundary');
 
-const { isProTier, isInTrialPeriod, FREE_TIER_MAX_GATES, FREE_TIER_DAILY_BLOCKS, todayKey } = require('./rate-limiter');
+const { isProTier, FREE_TIER_MAX_GATES } = require('./rate-limiter');
 const {
   DEFAULT_BASE_BRANCH,
   evaluateOperationalIntegrity,
@@ -20,10 +19,6 @@ const {
   recordDecisionEvaluation,
   recordDecisionOutcome,
 } = require('./decision-journal');
-const {
-  actionFingerprint,
-  sanitizeFeedbackText,
-} = require('./feedback-sanitizer');
 
 /**
  * Computes the SHA-256 hash of an executable binary to prevent path-based bypasses.
@@ -35,12 +30,10 @@ function computeExecutableHash(command) {
     const firstWord = command.trim().split(/\s+/)[0];
     if (!firstWord) return null;
 
-    // Resolve absolute path using 'which'. Use execFileSync (no shell) and pass
-    // firstWord as an argv element, never interpolated into a command string, so
-    // a hostile `command` value cannot inject shell metacharacters here.
+    // Resolve absolute path using 'which'
     let fullPath;
     try {
-      fullPath = execFileSync('which', [firstWord], { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] }).trim();
+      fullPath = execSync(`which ${firstWord}`, { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] }).trim();
     } catch (e) {
       // If 'which' fails, it might be an absolute path or a non-existent command
       fullPath = path.isAbsolute(firstWord) ? firstWord : null;
@@ -58,44 +51,21 @@ const {
   scanHookInput,
   buildSafeSummary,
   redactText,
-  isSafeSecretStorageWrite,
-  SAFE_SECRET_STORAGE_DIRS,
 } = require('./secret-scanner');
 const {
   evaluateSecurityScan,
 } = require('./security-scanner');
-const { evaluatePlanGate } = require('./plan-gate');
-const { getTrajectoryScore } = require('./trajectory-scorer');
-const { evaluateSequenceState } = loadOptionalModule('./sequence-guard', () => ({
-  evaluateSequenceState: () => null,
-}));
 const { getAutoGatesPath } = require('./auto-promote-gates');
 const { recordAuditEvent, auditToFeedback } = require('./audit-trail');
 
 const DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH = path.join(__dirname, '..', 'config', 'gates', 'default.json');
 const DEFAULT_CLAIM_GATES_PATH = path.join(__dirname, '..', 'config', 'gates', 'claim-verification.json');
-
-function resolveThumbgateStateDir() {
-  if (process.env.THUMBGATE_STATE_DIR) return process.env.THUMBGATE_STATE_DIR;
-
-  if (process.env.XDG_STATE_HOME) {
-    return path.join(process.env.XDG_STATE_HOME, 'thumbgate');
-  }
-
-  if (process.env.CODEX_SANDBOX) {
-    return path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'thumbgate');
-  }
-
-  return path.join(process.env.HOME || os.tmpdir(), '.thumbgate');
-}
-
-const STATE_DIR = resolveThumbgateStateDir();
-const STATE_PATH = path.join(STATE_DIR, 'gate-state.json');
-const CONSTRAINTS_PATH = path.join(STATE_DIR, 'session-constraints.json');
-const STATS_PATH = path.join(STATE_DIR, 'gate-stats.json');
-const SESSION_ACTIONS_PATH = path.join(STATE_DIR, 'session-actions.json');
-const CUSTOM_CLAIM_GATES_PATH = path.join(STATE_DIR, 'claim-verification.json');
-const GOVERNANCE_STATE_PATH = path.join(STATE_DIR, 'governance-state.json');
+const STATE_PATH = path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.thumbgate', 'gate-state.json');
+const CONSTRAINTS_PATH = path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.thumbgate', 'session-constraints.json');
+const STATS_PATH = path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.thumbgate', 'gate-stats.json');
+const SESSION_ACTIONS_PATH = path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.thumbgate', 'session-actions.json');
+const CUSTOM_CLAIM_GATES_PATH = path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.thumbgate', 'claim-verification.json');
+const GOVERNANCE_STATE_PATH = path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.thumbgate', 'governance-state.json');
 const TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes
 const SESSION_ACTION_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
 const PROTECTED_APPROVAL_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
@@ -115,127 +85,12 @@ const DEFAULT_PROTECTED_FILE_GLOBS = [
 const EDIT_LIKE_TOOLS = new Set(['Edit', 'Write', 'MultiEdit']);
 const HIGH_RISK_BASH_PATTERN = /\b(?:git\s+(?:add|commit|push)|gh\s+pr\s+(?:create|merge)|npm\s+publish|yarn\s+publish|pnpm\s+publish|rm\s+-rf)\b/i;
 const REMOTE_SIDE_EFFECT_BASH_PATTERN = /\b(?:git\s+push\b|gh\s+pr\s+(?:create|merge|close|reopen|ready|edit)\b|gh\s+release\s+(?:create|delete|edit|upload)\b|npm\s+publish\b|yarn\s+publish\b|pnpm\s+publish\b)\b/i;
-const MAX_COMMAND_SCAN_CHARS = 20000;
 const BOOSTED_RISK_BLOCK_SCORE = 0.8;
 const BOOSTED_RISK_MIN_EXAMPLES = 3;
 const PR_THREAD_RESOLUTION_ACTION = 'pr_thread_resolution_verified_after_commit';
-const HELPER_BYPASS_ACTION = 'helper_script_modified';
-const KNOWLEDGE_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD = 0.7;
-const KNOWLEDGE_CONFLICT_STRICT_BASH_PATTERN = /\b(?:git\s+push\b|gh\s+pr\s+merge\b|gh\s+release\s+(?:create|delete|edit|upload)\b|(?:npm|yarn|pnpm)\s+publish\b|rm\s+-rf\b|git\s+reset\s+--hard\b|git\s+clean\s+-f[a-z]*|railway\s+(?:deploy|up)\b|gcloud\s+(?:run\s+deploy|app\s+deploy)\b|firebase\s+deploy\b|vercel\s+--prod\b|kubectl\s+(?:apply|delete)\b|terraform\s+(?:apply|destroy)\b)\b/i;
-const HELPER_SCRIPT_FILE_PATTERN = /(?:^|\/)(?:scripts|bin|tools|tasks|\.githooks|\.github\/workflows)\/|(?:^|\/)(?:package\.json|Makefile|justfile|Taskfile\.ya?ml)$|\.(?:sh|bash|zsh|fish|js|mjs|cjs|ts|tsx|py|rb|pl|ps1|yml|yaml)$/i;
-const PACKAGE_RUN_PATTERN = /\b(?:npm|yarn|pnpm)\s+run\s+([:@./\w-]+)\b/i;
-const HELPER_EXEC_PATTERN = /(?:^|[;&|]\s*|\b(?:bash|sh|zsh|node|python3?|ruby|perl|tsx|ts-node)\s+)(?:(?:\.?\.?\/)?(?:scripts|bin|tools|tasks|tmp|build|dist|\.tmp|\.cache)\/[^\s;&|]+|\.\/[^\s;&|]+\.(?:sh|bash|zsh|js|mjs|cjs|ts|py|rb|pl|ps1))\b/i;
-const HELPER_WRITE_PATTERN = /\b(?:cat|printf|echo|tee|npm\s+pkg\s+set|jq|node\s+-e|python3?\s+-c)\b[\s\S]{0,300}(?:>|--field|scripts\.|package\.json|(?:scripts|bin|tools|tasks|tmp|build|dist|\.tmp|\.cache)\/[^\s;&|]+|\.(?:sh|js|mjs|cjs|ts|py|rb|pl|ps1))\b/i;
-const NETWORK_OR_PROCESS_BOUNDARY_PATTERN = /\b(?:curl|wget|nc|ncat|socat|ssh|scp|rsync|ftp|python3?\s+-m\s+http\.server|node\s+-e|python3?\s+-c|perl\s+-e|ruby\s+-e|bash\s+-c|sh\s+-c|osascript|open)\b/i;
-const DOWNLOAD_EXEC_CHAIN_PATTERN = /\b(?:curl|wget)\b[\s\S]{0,400}(?:\|\s*(?:bash|sh|zsh)|&&[\s\S]{0,200}\bchmod\s+\+x\b[\s\S]{0,200}&&[\s\S]{0,120}(?:\.\/|bash|sh|node|python3?))/i;
-const DESTRUCTIVE_OR_PRIVILEGE_BOUNDARY_PATTERN = /\b(?:rm\s+-rf|chmod\s+(?:\+x|777)|chown\b|sudo\b|dd\s+if=|mkfs|git\s+reset\s+--hard|git\s+clean\s+-f[a-z]*|kubectl\s+(?:apply|delete)|terraform\s+(?:apply|destroy)|railway\s+(?:deploy|up)|gcloud\s+(?:run\s+deploy|app\s+deploy)|vercel\s+--prod|firebase\s+deploy)\b/i;
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Enforcement posture (CEO decision 2026-06-04): warn-by-default.
-// The firewall ALWAYS fires and logs every decision, but most gates WARN rather
-// than hard-block — only TRULY CATASTROPHIC, irreversible actions hard-block:
-//   - secret exfiltration (handled on its own deny path; never downgraded)
-//   - security-vulnerability / supply-chain denies (own deny path; not downgraded)
-//   - irreversibly destructive filesystem commands (rm -rf class, mkfs, dd to disk,
-//     fork bomb) — kept as hard deny via DESTRUCTIVE_FS_PATTERN below.
-// Everything else (memory-high-risk, workflow-sequence, off-scope, git push, deploy,
-// approval gates) downgrades deny/approve -> warn so legitimate work is never blocked.
-// Opt back into full hard enforcement with THUMBGATE_STRICT_ENFORCEMENT=1.
-// Enforcement posture (CEO decision 2026-06-04): WARN + AUDIT by default.
-// The firewall fires and LOGS every decision, but downgrades deny/approve -> warn so
-// legitimate work is never hard-blocked. We deliberately do NOT try to hard-block
-// arbitrary destructive commands here: a regex "catastrophic floor" is unwinnable
-// (sudo / bash -c / find -exec / eval / base64|sh all evade it) and gives false confidence.
-// HARD enforcement is an explicit opt-in via THUMBGATE_STRICT_ENFORCEMENT=1, which keeps
-// the engine's FULL gate set (its high-risk-command gates catch prefixed/obfuscated forms
-// far better than any single regex). Secret exfiltration and the security-vulnerability
-// scan hard-deny on their OWN paths before this runs, so irreversible data-leak / supply
-// chain risks stay blocked regardless of posture.
-function applyEnforcementPosture(result) {
-  if (!result || (result.decision !== 'deny' && result.decision !== 'approve')) return result;
-  // Full hard enforcement opt-in: keep every deny.
-  if (process.env.THUMBGATE_STRICT_ENFORCEMENT === '1') return result;
-  // Honor the explicit strict-knowledge-conflict opt-in for that gate.
-  if (process.env.THUMBGATE_STRICT_KNOWLEDGE_CONFLICT === '1' && result.gate === 'knowledge-conflict-gate') return result;
-  // Warn-by-default: the gate still fired and is recorded; the action is allowed through
-  // with the warning surfaced instead of hard-blocked, so legitimate work is never blocked.
-  return {
-    ...result,
-    decision: 'warn',
-    warnByDefault: true,
-    message: `${result.message}\n\n⚠️ ThumbGate is in warn-by-default mode — this was flagged and logged, not blocked. Set THUMBGATE_STRICT_ENFORCEMENT=1 to hard-block, or THUMBGATE_HOTFIX_BYPASS=1 to disable checks entirely.`,
-  };
-}
-const BREAK_GLASS_CONDITION = 'thumbgate_break_glass';
-const BREAK_GLASS_SETTINGS_GLOBS = [
-  '.claude/settings.local.json',
-  '.claude/settings.json',
-  '**/.claude/settings.local.json',
-  '**/.claude/settings.json',
-  '.codex/config.toml',
-  '**/.codex/config.toml',
-];
-
-function isRuntimePlanGateEnabled() {
-  return process.env.THUMBGATE_PLAN_GATE === '1' || process.env.THUMBGATE_PLAN_GATE === 'true';
-}
 const PR_THREAD_RESOLUTION_CLAIM_PATTERN = '(?:thread|review|comment).*?(?:resolved|verified|checked|addressed|fixed)|(?:resolved|verified|checked|addressed|fixed).*?(?:thread|review|comment)';
 const PR_THREAD_RESOLUTION_REQUIRED_ACTIONS = ['pr_threads_checked', 'thread_resolution_verified'];
 
-function commandScanText(command) {
-  return String(command || '').slice(0, MAX_COMMAND_SCAN_CHARS);
-}
-
-function commandWords(command) {
-  return commandScanText(command).toLowerCase().split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean);
-}
-
-function commandContainsSequence(words, sequence) {
-  if (!Array.isArray(words) || !Array.isArray(sequence) || sequence.length === 0) return false;
-  for (let i = 0; i <= words.length - sequence.length; i += 1) {
-    let matched = true;
-    for (let j = 0; j < sequence.length; j += 1) {
-      if (words[i + j] !== sequence[j]) {
-        matched = false;
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-    if (matched) return true;
-  }
-  return false;
-}
-
-function commandHasPostMethod(words) {
-  for (let i = 0; i < words.length; i += 1) {
-    const word = words[i];
-    if ((word === '-x' || word === '--method') && words[i + 1] === 'post') return true;
-    if (word === '--method=post' || word === '-xpost') return true;
-  }
-  return false;
-}
-
-function isGhApiPrCreateCommand(command) {
-  const words = commandWords(command);
-  if (!commandContainsSequence(words, ['gh', 'api'])) return false;
-  const hasPullsEndpoint = words.some((word) => word === '/pulls' || word.endsWith('/pulls'));
-  if (!hasPullsEndpoint) return false;
-  const fieldFlags = new Set(['-f', '--field', '--raw-field']);
-  const hasFieldWrite = words.some((word) => (
-    fieldFlags.has(word) ||
-    word.startsWith('-f=') ||
-    word.startsWith('--field=') ||
-    word.startsWith('--raw-field=')
-  ));
-  return hasFieldWrite || commandHasPostMethod(words);
-}
-
-function isRecursiveChmodCommand(command) {
-  const words = commandWords(command);
-  const chmodIndex = words.indexOf('chmod');
-  if (chmodIndex === -1) return false;
-  return words.slice(chmodIndex + 1).includes('-r') || words.slice(chmodIndex + 1).some((word) => word.includes('r') && word.startsWith('-'));
-}
-
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Config loading
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -332,27 +187,6 @@ function sanitizeGlobList(globs) {
   return [...new Set(globs.map((glob) => normalizeGlob(glob)).filter(Boolean))];
 }
 
-// Affected files are compared as repo-relative paths (git --name-only output and
-// inline paths are relative to the repo root). A caller who passes an ABSOLUTE
-// allowedPath (e.g. "/Users/me/proj/src/**") therefore declares a glob that can never
-// match — a silent no-op scope. When repoPath is known, rebase absolute globs that
-// live under it to the repo-relative form so the scope actually applies. Globs already
-// relative, or absolute but outside repoPath, are returned unchanged.
-function rebaseGlobsToRepoRoot(globs, repoPath) {
-  // normalizeGlob strips both leading AND trailing slashes, so a repoPath with a
-  // trailing slash ("/Users/me/proj/") still matches the repo-relative globs.
-  const repoRel = normalizeGlob(repoPath);
-  if (!repoRel) return globs;
-  return globs.map((glob) => {
-    if (glob === repoRel) return '**';
-    if (glob.startsWith(`${repoRel}/`)) {
-      const rebased = glob.slice(repoRel.length + 1);
-      return rebased || '**';
-    }
-    return glob;
-  });
-}
-
 function globToRegExp(glob) {
   const normalized = normalizeGlob(glob);
   let pattern = '^';
@@ -406,9 +240,6 @@ function loadGovernanceState() {
     branchGovernance: raw && raw.branchGovernance && typeof raw.branchGovernance === 'object'
       ? raw.branchGovernance
       : null,
-    workflowContract: raw && raw.workflowContract && typeof raw.workflowContract === 'object'
-      ? raw.workflowContract
-      : null,
   };
   const now = Date.now();
   const activeApprovals = state.protectedApprovals.filter((entry) => {
@@ -428,7 +259,6 @@ function saveGovernanceState(state) {
     taskScope: state && state.taskScope ? state.taskScope : null,
     protectedApprovals: Array.isArray(state && state.protectedApprovals) ? state.protectedApprovals : [],
     branchGovernance: state && state.branchGovernance ? state.branchGovernance : null,
-    workflowContract: state && state.workflowContract ? state.workflowContract : null,
   };
   saveJSON(module.exports.GOVERNANCE_STATE_PATH, next);
 }
@@ -440,39 +270,33 @@ function setTaskScope(scopeInput = {}) {
       taskScope: null,
       protectedApprovals: currentState.protectedApprovals,
       branchGovernance: currentState.branchGovernance,
-      workflowContract: null,
     };
     saveGovernanceState(cleared);
-    refreshLocalOnlyConstraint(cleared);
     return null;
   }
 
-  const repoPath = String(scopeInput.repoPath || '').trim() || null;
-  const allowedPaths = rebaseGlobsToRepoRoot(sanitizeGlobList(scopeInput.allowedPaths), repoPath);
+  const allowedPaths = sanitizeGlobList(scopeInput.allowedPaths);
   if (allowedPaths.length === 0) {
     throw new Error('allowedPaths must be a non-empty array');
   }
 
-  const protectedPaths = rebaseGlobsToRepoRoot(sanitizeGlobList(
+  const protectedPaths = sanitizeGlobList(
     Array.isArray(scopeInput.protectedPaths) && scopeInput.protectedPaths.length > 0
       ? scopeInput.protectedPaths
       : DEFAULT_PROTECTED_FILE_GLOBS
-  ), repoPath);
+  );
   const taskScope = {
     taskId: String(scopeInput.taskId || '').trim() || null,
     summary: String(scopeInput.summary || '').trim() || null,
     allowedPaths,
     protectedPaths,
     localOnly: scopeInput.localOnly === true,
-    repoPath,
+    repoPath: String(scopeInput.repoPath || '').trim() || null,
     createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
     timestamp: Date.now(),
   };
   const state = loadGovernanceState();
   state.taskScope = taskScope;
-  state.workflowContract = scopeInput.workflowContract && typeof scopeInput.workflowContract === 'object'
-    ? scopeInput.workflowContract
-    : null;
   saveGovernanceState(state);
   if (taskScope.localOnly) {
     setConstraint('local_only', true);
@@ -508,44 +332,11 @@ function approveProtectedAction(input = {}) {
   return entry;
 }
 
-function breakGlassEmergency(input = {}) {
-  const reason = String(input.reason || '').trim();
-  if (!reason) {
-    throw new Error('reason is required');
-  }
-
-  const ttlMs = Math.min(clampTtlMs(input.ttlMs, TTL_MS), TTL_MS);
-  const evidence = `BREAK GLASS: ${reason}`;
-  const gates = ['pr_create_allowed', 'pr_threads_checked', BREAK_GLASS_CONDITION];
-  const satisfied = {};
-  for (const gateId of gates) {
-    satisfied[gateId] = satisfyCondition(gateId, evidence);
-  }
-
-  const approval = approveProtectedAction({
-    pathGlobs: BREAK_GLASS_SETTINGS_GLOBS,
-    reason: evidence,
-    evidence,
-    ttlMs,
-  });
-
-  return {
-    ok: true,
-    reason,
-    ttlMs,
-    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + ttlMs).toISOString(),
-    satisfied,
-    approval,
-    settingsGlobs: BREAK_GLASS_SETTINGS_GLOBS.slice(),
-  };
-}
-
 function setBranchGovernance(input = {}) {
   if (input && input.clear === true) {
     const state = loadGovernanceState();
     state.branchGovernance = null;
     saveGovernanceState(state);
-    refreshLocalOnlyConstraint(state);
     return null;
   }
 
@@ -596,24 +387,6 @@ function setConstraint(key, value) {
   return constraints[key];
 }
 
-function clearConstraint(key) {
-  const constraints = loadConstraints();
-  delete constraints[key];
-  saveConstraints(constraints);
-}
-
-function refreshLocalOnlyConstraint(governanceState = loadGovernanceState()) {
-  const localOnlyActive = Boolean(
-    (governanceState.taskScope && governanceState.taskScope.localOnly) ||
-    (governanceState.branchGovernance && governanceState.branchGovernance.localOnly)
-  );
-  if (localOnlyActive) {
-    setConstraint('local_only', true);
-  } else {
-    clearConstraint('local_only');
-  }
-}
-
 function isConditionSatisfied(conditionId) {
   const state = loadState();
   const entry = state[conditionId];
@@ -653,29 +426,7 @@ function loadStats() {
 
 function saveStats(stats) { saveJSON(module.exports.STATS_PATH, stats); }
 
-function buildGateActionFingerprint(gateId, options = {}) {
-  if (options.actionFingerprint) return String(options.actionFingerprint);
-  const toolName = options.toolName || options.tool_name || '';
-  const toolInput = options.toolInput || options.tool_input || {};
-  const parts = [toolName];
-  if (typeof toolInput === 'string') {
-    parts.push(toolInput);
-  } else if (toolInput && typeof toolInput === 'object') {
-    parts.push(
-      toolInput.command || '',
-      toolInput.cmd || '',
-      toolInput.file_path || '',
-      toolInput.path || '',
-      toolInput.description || '',
-      toolInput.prompt || '',
-      toolInput.pattern || '',
-    );
-    if (Array.isArray(toolInput.affectedFiles)) parts.push(...toolInput.affectedFiles);
-  }
-  return actionFingerprint(parts);
-}
-
-function recordStat(gateId, action, gate, options = {}) {
+function recordStat(gateId, action, gate) {
   const stats = loadStats();
   if (action === 'block') stats.blocked = (stats.blocked || 0) + 1;
   else if (action === 'warn') stats.warned = (stats.warned || 0) + 1;
@@ -688,29 +439,6 @@ function recordStat(gateId, action, gate, options = {}) {
   else if (action === 'warn') stats.byGate[gateId].warned += 1;
   else if (action === 'approve') stats.byGate[gateId].pendingApproval = (stats.byGate[gateId].pendingApproval || 0) + 1;
   else if (action === 'log') stats.byGate[gateId].logged = (stats.byGate[gateId].logged || 0) + 1;
-
-  // Track same-action recurrence within a session for first-time fix rate.
-  // Gate-only recurrence over-counts noisy gates; repeats require a stable,
-  // sanitized action fingerprint.
-  if (action === 'block' || action === 'warn') {
-    if (!stats.sessionFiredGates) stats.sessionFiredGates = {};
-    if (!stats.sessionFiredActions) stats.sessionFiredActions = {};
-    const sessionKey = `session_${Math.floor(Date.now() / SESSION_ACTION_TTL_MS)}`;
-    if (!stats.sessionFiredGates[sessionKey]) stats.sessionFiredGates[sessionKey] = {};
-    stats.sessionFiredGates[sessionKey][gateId] = true;
-
-    const fingerprint = buildGateActionFingerprint(gateId, options);
-    if (fingerprint) {
-      if (!stats.sessionFiredActions[sessionKey]) stats.sessionFiredActions[sessionKey] = {};
-      if (!stats.sessionFiredActions[sessionKey][gateId]) stats.sessionFiredActions[sessionKey][gateId] = {};
-      if (stats.sessionFiredActions[sessionKey][gateId][fingerprint]) {
-        stats.recurringBlocks = (stats.recurringBlocks || 0) + 1;
-      } else {
-        stats.sessionFiredActions[sessionKey][gateId][fingerprint] = true;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
   saveStats(stats);
   // Track lesson freshness when an auto-promoted gate fires
   if (gate && gate.sourceLessonId) {
@@ -724,69 +452,6 @@ function recordStat(gateId, action, gate, options = {}) {
   }
 }
 
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Free-tier daily block cap
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * Count today's gate blocks from stats. Free tier gets FREE_TIER_DAILY_BLOCKS
- * blocks/day. After the limit, deny → warn + upgrade CTA so the action proceeds
- * but the user sees they lost protection.
- */
-function getTodayBlockCount() {
-  const stats = loadStats();
-  const today = todayKey();
-  if (!stats.dailyBlocks || !stats.dailyBlocks[today]) return 0;
-  return stats.dailyBlocks[today];
-}
-
-function incrementTodayBlockCount() {
-  const stats = loadStats();
-  const today = todayKey();
-  if (!stats.dailyBlocks) stats.dailyBlocks = {};
-  // Clean old dates (keep only last 7 days to prevent unbounded growth)
-  const keys = Object.keys(stats.dailyBlocks);
-  if (keys.length > 7) {
-    keys.sort();
-    for (const k of keys.slice(0, keys.length - 7)) {
-      delete stats.dailyBlocks[k];
-    }
-  }
-  stats.dailyBlocks[today] = (stats.dailyBlocks[today] || 0) + 1;
-  saveStats(stats);
-  return stats.dailyBlocks[today];
-}
-
-/**
- * If the user is free-tier and has exceeded daily block limit, downgrade
- * a deny result to a warn with an upgrade CTA. Returns null if no cap applies.
- */
-function applyDailyBlockCap(denyResult) {
-  // Pro, trial, CI, and THUMBGATE_NO_RATE_LIMIT users are uncapped
-  if (isProTier()) return null;
-  if (process.env.CI || process.env.GITHUB_ACTIONS) return null;
-
-  const todayCount = getTodayBlockCount();
-  if (todayCount < FREE_TIER_DAILY_BLOCKS) {
-    // Under limit: allow the block, increment counter
-    incrementTodayBlockCount();
-    return null;
-  }
-
-  // Over limit: downgrade deny → warn with upgrade CTA
-  const remaining = 0;
-  return {
-    decision: 'warn',
-    gate: denyResult.gate,
-    message: `⚠️ ${denyResult.message}\n\n🔓 Daily protection limit reached (${FREE_TIER_DAILY_BLOCKS}/${FREE_TIER_DAILY_BLOCKS} blocks used). This action was allowed through. Upgrade for unlimited protection: https://thumbgate.ai/go/pro`,
-    severity: denyResult.severity,
-    reasoning: (denyResult.reasoning || []).concat([
-      `Free-tier daily block limit (${FREE_TIER_DAILY_BLOCKS}) exceeded — deny downgraded to warn`,
-    ]),
-    dailyBlockCapApplied: true,
-  };
-}
-
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Reasoning chain builder
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -842,26 +507,9 @@ function toRepoRelativePath(filePath, repoRoot) {
   const value = String(filePath || '').trim();
   if (!value) return '';
   if (repoRoot && path.isAbsolute(value)) {
-    const candidates = [[path.resolve(repoRoot), path.resolve(value)]];
-    try {
-      const rootReal = fs.realpathSync.native(repoRoot);
-      let valueReal = null;
-      try {
-        valueReal = fs.realpathSync.native(value);
-      } catch {
-        const parentReal = fs.realpathSync.native(path.dirname(value));
-        valueReal = path.join(parentReal, path.basename(value));
-      }
-      candidates.push([rootReal, valueReal]);
-    } catch {
-      // Fall back to lexical path comparison below.
-    }
-
-    for (const [rootCandidate, valueCandidate] of candidates) {
-      const relative = path.relative(rootCandidate, valueCandidate);
-      if (!relative.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(relative)) {
-        return normalizePosix(relative);
-      }
+    const relative = path.relative(repoRoot, value);
+    if (!relative.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(relative)) {
+      return normalizePosix(relative);
     }
   }
   return normalizePosix(value);
@@ -940,7 +588,7 @@ function extractAffectedFiles(toolName, toolInput = {}) {
       }
     }
 
-    if (/\bgit\s+push\b/i.test(command) || /\bgh\s+pr\s+(?:create|merge)\b/i.test(command) || isGhApiPrCreateCommand(command)) {
+    if (/\bgit\s+push\b/i.test(command) || /\bgh\s+pr\s+(?:create|merge)\b/i.test(command)) {
       for (const filePath of getBranchDiffFiles(repoRoot)) {
         files.add(normalizePosix(filePath));
       }
@@ -959,7 +607,6 @@ function isHighRiskAction(toolName, toolInput = {}, affectedFiles = []) {
   const command = String(toolInput.command || '');
   // Original high-risk pattern (git writes, publishes, destructive ops)
   if (HIGH_RISK_BASH_PATTERN.test(command)) return true;
-  if (isGhApiPrCreateCommand(command)) return true;
   // Broadened: any Bash command that modifies files or has side effects.
   // Excludes pure read/analysis commands (node --test, cat, ls, echo, etc.)
   // to avoid false positives on benign operations.
@@ -1197,8 +844,7 @@ function getLocalOnlyScopeSources(governanceState = {}, constraints = {}) {
 
 function isRemoteSideEffectCommand(toolName, toolInput = {}) {
   if (toolName !== 'Bash') return false;
-  const command = String(toolInput.command || '');
-  return REMOTE_SIDE_EFFECT_BASH_PATTERN.test(command) || isGhApiPrCreateCommand(command);
+  return REMOTE_SIDE_EFFECT_BASH_PATTERN.test(String(toolInput.command || ''));
 }
 
 function evaluateLocalOnlyRemoteSideEffectGate(toolName, toolInput = {}, governanceState = {}, constraints = {}) {
@@ -1220,127 +866,8 @@ function evaluateLocalOnlyRemoteSideEffectGate(toolName, toolInput = {}, governa
   };
 }
 
-function helperRiskReasons(text) {
-  const value = String(text || '');
-  const reasons = [];
-  if (DOWNLOAD_EXEC_CHAIN_PATTERN.test(value)) reasons.push('download-then-execute chain');
-  if (NETWORK_OR_PROCESS_BOUNDARY_PATTERN.test(value)) reasons.push('network/process boundary');
-  if (DESTRUCTIVE_OR_PRIVILEGE_BOUNDARY_PATTERN.test(value)) reasons.push('destructive/privileged side effect');
-  if (/\b(?:child_process|spawn\(|exec\(|execFile\(|subprocess|ProcessBuilder)\b/i.test(value)) {
-    reasons.push('process spawn');
-  }
-  return [...new Set(reasons)];
-}
-
-function readPackageScript(repoRoot, scriptName) {
-  if (!repoRoot || !scriptName) return '';
-  try {
-    const packagePath = path.join(repoRoot, 'package.json');
-    if (!fs.existsSync(packagePath)) return '';
-    const { scripts = {} } = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packagePath, 'utf8')) || {};
-    return typeof scripts[scriptName] === 'string' ? scripts[scriptName] : '';
-  } catch {
-    return '';
-  }
-}
-
-function recordHelperScriptWrite(toolName, toolInput = {}) {
-  if (process.env.THUMBGATE_HELPER_BYPASS_GUARD === '0') return null;
-
-  const affected = extractAffectedFiles(toolName, toolInput);
-  const affectedFiles = affected.files || [];
-  const command = String(toolInput.command || '');
-  const actionContext = extractActionContext(toolName, toolInput);
-  const helperFiles = affectedFiles.filter((filePath) => HELPER_SCRIPT_FILE_PATTERN.test(normalizePosix(filePath)));
-  const packageScriptTouched = affectedFiles.some((filePath) => normalizePosix(filePath) === 'package.json') || /\bpackage\.json\b|\bscripts\./i.test(actionContext);
-  const commandWrite = toolName === 'Bash' && HELPER_WRITE_PATTERN.test(command);
-
-  if (helperFiles.length === 0 && !packageScriptTouched && !commandWrite) return null;
-
-  const riskText = [
-    actionContext,
-    command,
-    helperFiles.join(' '),
-    packageScriptTouched ? 'package.json scripts' : '',
-  ].filter(Boolean).join('\n');
-  const reasons = helperRiskReasons(riskText);
-
-  const metadata = {
-    repoRoot: affected.repoRoot || resolveRepoRoot(toolInput) || null,
-    helperFiles,
-    packageScriptTouched,
-    reasons,
-  };
-  trackAction(HELPER_BYPASS_ACTION, metadata);
-  return metadata;
-}
-
-function evaluateStatefulHelperBypassGate(toolName, toolInput = {}) {
-  if (process.env.THUMBGATE_HELPER_BYPASS_GUARD === '0') return null;
-  if (toolName !== 'Bash') {
-    recordHelperScriptWrite(toolName, toolInput);
-    return null;
-  }
-
-  const command = String(toolInput.command || '').trim();
-  if (!command) return null;
-
-  if (DOWNLOAD_EXEC_CHAIN_PATTERN.test(command)) {
-    return {
-      decision: 'deny',
-      gate: 'stateful-helper-script-bypass',
-      message: 'Download-then-execute chains are blocked before the real action moves below the visible tool call.',
-      severity: 'critical',
-      reasoning: [
-        `Command matched download/execute chain: ${command.slice(0, 180)}`,
-        'PreToolUse must review the whole action chain, not only the first low-risk command',
-      ],
-    };
-  }
-
-  const writeMetadata = recordHelperScriptWrite(toolName, toolInput);
-  const actions = listSessionActions();
-  const recentWrite = actions[HELPER_BYPASS_ACTION];
-  const recentMetadata = recentWrite && recentWrite.metadata && typeof recentWrite.metadata === 'object'
-    ? recentWrite.metadata
-    : null;
-
-  const scriptMatch = command.match(PACKAGE_RUN_PATTERN);
-  const scriptName = scriptMatch ? scriptMatch[1] : '';
-  const repoRoot = resolveRepoRoot(toolInput);
-  const packageScript = scriptName ? readPackageScript(repoRoot, scriptName) : '';
-  const commandBoundaryReasons = helperRiskReasons(`${command}\n${packageScript}`);
-  const executesRecentHelper = HELPER_EXEC_PATTERN.test(command);
-  const runsRecentPackageScript = Boolean(scriptName && recentMetadata && recentMetadata.packageScriptTouched);
-  const recentReasons = recentMetadata && Array.isArray(recentMetadata.reasons) ? recentMetadata.reasons : [];
-  const writeRiskReasons = writeMetadata && Array.isArray(writeMetadata.reasons) ? writeMetadata.reasons : [];
-  const correlatedReasons = [...new Set([...recentReasons, ...writeRiskReasons, ...commandBoundaryReasons])];
-
-  if (
-    (executesRecentHelper || runsRecentPackageScript) &&
-    (recentMetadata || writeMetadata) &&
-    correlatedReasons.length > 0
-  ) {
-    const target = scriptName ? `package script "${scriptName}"` : 'recent helper script';
-    return {
-      decision: 'deny',
-      gate: 'stateful-helper-script-bypass',
-      message: `A recently modified ${target} now crosses a risky boundary. Review it or constrain cwd, network, process, and writable paths before execution.`,
-      severity: 'critical',
-      reasoning: [
-        `Recent helper/package modification: ${(recentMetadata && recentMetadata.helperFiles || []).join(', ') || (recentMetadata && recentMetadata.packageScriptTouched ? 'package.json scripts' : 'current command write')}`,
-        `Execution command: ${command.slice(0, 180)}`,
-        `Risk reasons: ${correlatedReasons.join(', ')}`,
-        'This blocks the helper-script/package-script bypass class raised in external review',
-      ],
-    };
-  }
-
-  return null;
-}
-
 function recordStructuralGateBlock(toolName, toolInput, result) {
-  recordStat(result.gate, 'block', null, { toolName, toolInput });
+  recordStat(result.gate, 'block');
   const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({
     toolName,
     toolInput,
@@ -1371,25 +898,6 @@ function shouldEnforceTaskScope(gate, governanceState, toolName, toolInput = {},
   return isScopeEnforcedAction(toolName, toolInput, affectedFiles);
 }
 
-function isAgentHookSettingsFile(filePath) {
-  return matchesAnyGlob(filePath, BREAK_GLASS_SETTINGS_GLOBS);
-}
-
-function isBreakGlassSettingsBypass(gate, affectedFiles) {
-  if (!gate || !['task-scope-edit-boundary', 'protected-file-approval-required'].includes(gate.id)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  if (!isConditionSatisfied(BREAK_GLASS_CONDITION)) return false;
-  return Array.isArray(affectedFiles) && affectedFiles.length > 0 && affectedFiles.every(isAgentHookSettingsFile);
-}
-
-function isBreakGlassSettingsRecoveryAction(toolName, toolInput = {}) {
-  if (!EDIT_LIKE_TOOLS.has(toolName)) return false;
-  if (!isConditionSatisfied(BREAK_GLASS_CONDITION)) return false;
-  const affectedFiles = extractAffectedFiles(toolName, toolInput).files;
-  return affectedFiles.length > 0 && affectedFiles.every(isAgentHookSettingsFile);
-}
-
 function formatFileList(files, limit = 5) {
   const items = Array.isArray(files) ? files.filter(Boolean) : [];
   if (items.length === 0) return 'none';
@@ -1598,19 +1106,8 @@ function checkWhenClause(when, constraints) {
   if (!when || !when.constraints) return true;
   
   for (const [key, expectedValue] of Object.entries(when.constraints)) {
-    let value;
-    if (key === 'careful_mode') {
-      const isEnvTrue = process.env.THUMBGATE_CAREFUL_MODE === '1' || 
-                       String(process.env.THUMBGATE_CAREFUL_MODE).toLowerCase() === 'true';
-      value = isEnvTrue || (constraints[key] && constraints[key].value === expectedValue);
-    } else if (key === 'freeze_mode') {
-      value = Boolean(process.env.THUMBGATE_FREEZE_PATHS) || 
-              (constraints[key] && constraints[key].value !== false && constraints[key].value !== null && constraints[key].value !== undefined);
-    } else {
-      const constraint = constraints[key];
-      value = constraint && constraint.value === expectedValue;
-    }
-    if (!value) {
+    const constraint = constraints[key];
+    if (!constraint || constraint.value !== expectedValue) {
       return false;
     }
   }
@@ -1618,69 +1115,11 @@ function checkWhenClause(when, constraints) {
 }
 
 function matchGate(gate, toolName, toolInput = {}) {
-  let matchText = toolInput.command || toolInput.file_path || toolInput.path || '';
-
-  // Claw/hybrid support: enrich matchText with claw metadata (for EnterpriseClaw/OpenShell/Perplexity hybrid agents)
-  const clawCtx = toolInput.clawContext || toolInput._claw || (toolInput.agentId ? {
-    actionType: toolInput.actionType || 'unknown',
-    agentId: toolInput.agentId || 'unknown',
-    hybridRoute: toolInput.hybridRoute || 'unknown',
-    screenInteraction: !!toolInput.screenInteraction,
-    fileAccess: !!toolInput.fileAccess,
-  } : null);
-
-  if (clawCtx) {
-    const actionType = clawCtx.actionType || clawCtx.claw_action_type || 'unknown';
-    const parts = [
-      matchText,
-      `claw_style: true`,
-      `agent_identity: ${clawCtx.agentId || 'unknown'}`,
-      `claw_action_type: ${actionType}`,
-      `hybrid_route: ${clawCtx.hybridRoute || 'unknown'}`,
-    ];
-
-    if (clawCtx.screenInteraction || actionType.includes('screen')) {
-      parts.push('screen_interaction');
-      parts.push('interact screen');
-    }
-    if (clawCtx.fileAccess || actionType.includes('file') || actionType.includes('fs')) {
-      parts.push('file_system_access');
-      parts.push('local device file system access');
-    }
-    if (actionType === 'dynamic-tool-creation' || actionType.includes('create-tool') || actionType.includes('define-tool')) {
-      parts.push('create tool');
-    }
-
-    matchText = parts.filter(Boolean).join(' | ');
-  }
-
+  const matchText = toolInput.command || toolInput.file_path || toolInput.path || '';
   const affected = extractAffectedFiles(toolName, toolInput);
   const affectedFiles = affected.files;
   const repoRoot = affected.repoRoot;
   const governanceState = loadGovernanceState();
-  const constraints = loadConstraints();
-
-  if (gate.id === 'on-demand-freeze-mode' || (gate.when && gate.when.constraints && gate.when.constraints.freeze_mode)) {
-    let freezePaths = [];
-    if (process.env.THUMBGATE_FREEZE_PATHS) {
-      freezePaths = process.env.THUMBGATE_FREEZE_PATHS.split(',').map(p => p.trim()).filter(Boolean);
-    } else if (constraints.freeze_mode && typeof constraints.freeze_mode.value === 'string') {
-      freezePaths = constraints.freeze_mode.value.split(',').map(p => p.trim()).filter(Boolean);
-    } else if (constraints.freeze_mode && Array.isArray(constraints.freeze_mode.value)) {
-      freezePaths = constraints.freeze_mode.value;
-    } else if (governanceState.taskScope && Array.isArray(governanceState.taskScope.allowedPaths)) {
-      freezePaths = governanceState.taskScope.allowedPaths;
-    }
-
-    if (freezePaths.length > 0) {
-      const outsideFiles = affectedFiles.filter((filePath) => !matchesAnyGlob(filePath, freezePaths));
-      if (outsideFiles.length > 0) {
-        return { matched: true, matchText, affectedFiles };
-      } else {
-        return { matched: false, matchText, affectedFiles };
-      }
-    }
-  }
 
   if (Array.isArray(gate.toolNames) && gate.toolNames.length > 0 && !gate.toolNames.includes(toolName)) {
     return { matched: false, matchText, affectedFiles };
@@ -1690,12 +1129,6 @@ function matchGate(gate, toolName, toolInput = {}) {
     try {
       const regex = new RegExp(gate.pattern);
       if (!regex.test(matchText)) return { matched: false, matchText, affectedFiles };
-      if (gate.id === 'permission-change-approval' && isSafeLocalCredentialHardeningCommand(toolName, toolInput)) {
-        return { matched: false, matchText, affectedFiles };
-      }
-      if (isBreakGlassSettingsBypass(gate, affectedFiles)) {
-        return { matched: false, matchText, affectedFiles };
-      }
     } catch {
       return { matched: false, matchText, affectedFiles };
     }
@@ -1713,9 +1146,6 @@ function matchGate(gate, toolName, toolInput = {}) {
 
   let taskScopeViolation = null;
   if (gate.requireTaskScope) {
-    if (isBreakGlassSettingsBypass(gate, affectedFiles)) {
-      return { matched: false, matchText, affectedFiles };
-    }
     if (!shouldEnforceTaskScope(gate, governanceState, toolName, toolInput, affectedFiles)) {
       return { matched: false, matchText, affectedFiles };
     }
@@ -1725,9 +1155,6 @@ function matchGate(gate, toolName, toolInput = {}) {
 
   let protectedApprovalViolation = null;
   if (gate.requireProtectedApproval) {
-    if (isBreakGlassSettingsBypass(gate, affectedFiles)) {
-      return { matched: false, matchText, affectedFiles };
-    }
     const protectedGlobs = sanitizeGlobList(
       Array.isArray(gate.protectedGlobs) && gate.protectedGlobs.length > 0
         ? gate.protectedGlobs
@@ -1767,40 +1194,9 @@ function matchesGate(gate, toolName, toolInput) {
   return matchGate(gate, toolName, toolInput).matched;
 }
 
-function isSafeLocalCredentialHardeningCommand(toolName, toolInput = {}) {
-  if (toolName !== 'Bash') return false;
-  const command = String(toolInput.command || '').trim();
-  if (!command || isRecursiveChmodCommand(command)) return false;
-  if (/[;&|`$()<>*?[\]{}]/.test(command)) return false;
-
-  const match = command.match(/(?:^|\s)chmod\s+(?:-[fv]\s+)?0?([46]00)\s+(['"]?)(\S+)\2\s*$/i);
-  if (!match) return false;
-
-  const target = match[3];
-  if (!target || target === '/' || target === '~') return false;
-  if (target.includes('..')) return false;
-
-  const normalized = target.replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, '').toLowerCase();
-  const looksLikeCredentialPath = /(?:^|\/)(?:\.config|\.ssh|\.gnupg|\.aws|\.gcloud|\.gemini|\.resume_secrets|\.thumbgate|secrets?|credentials?)(?:\/|$)/.test(normalized)
-    || /(?:key|secret|token|credential|gemini|gcloud|google|operator).*\.(?:json|pem|key|env)$/i.test(normalized)
-    || /\.(?:pem|key)$/i.test(normalized);
-
-  return looksLikeCredentialPath;
-}
-
 function evaluateMemoryGuard(toolName, toolInput = {}) {
   const affected = extractAffectedFiles(toolName, toolInput);
   const affectedFiles = affected.files;
-  if (isSafeSecretStorageWrite(toolName, toolInput, process.cwd())) {
-    return null;
-  }
-  // Hardening a credential file's permissions (chmod 600 on a key/secret path) is
-  // a safety action, not a risk. The same exemption already guards the
-  // permission-change-approval gate; without it here, `chmod 600 ~/.resume_secrets/key`
-  // gets hard-denied by recurring-negative-memory matching — the opposite of intent.
-  if (isSafeLocalCredentialHardeningCommand(toolName, toolInput)) {
-    return null;
-  }
   if (!isHighRiskAction(toolName, toolInput, affectedFiles)) {
     return null;
   }
@@ -1814,10 +1210,7 @@ function evaluateMemoryGuard(toolName, toolInput = {}) {
   }
 
   const command = String(toolInput.command || '');
-  const isPrCreateCommand = toolName === 'Bash' && (
-    /\bgh\s+pr\s+create\b/i.test(command) || isGhApiPrCreateCommand(command)
-  );
-  if (isPrCreateCommand && isConditionSatisfied('pr_create_allowed')) {
+  if (toolName === 'Bash' && /\bgh\s+pr\s+create\b/i.test(command) && isConditionSatisfied('pr_create_allowed')) {
     const branchGovernanceViolation = buildBranchGovernanceViolation(
       governanceState,
       toolInput,
@@ -1830,10 +1223,7 @@ function evaluateMemoryGuard(toolName, toolInput = {}) {
     }
   }
 
-  if (toolName === 'Bash' && (
-    /\b(?:gh\s+pr\s+(?:create|merge)|gh\s+release\s+create|git\s+tag\b|(?:npm|yarn|pnpm)\s+publish\b)\b/i.test(command) ||
-    isGhApiPrCreateCommand(command)
-  )) {
+  if (toolName === 'Bash' && /\b(?:gh\s+pr\s+(?:create|merge)|gh\s+release\s+create|git\s+tag\b|(?:npm|yarn|pnpm)\s+publish\b)\b/i.test(command)) {
     const branchGovernanceViolation = buildBranchGovernanceViolation(
       governanceState,
       toolInput,
@@ -1871,14 +1261,7 @@ function evaluateMemoryGuard(toolName, toolInput = {}) {
     filePath: toolInput.file_path || toolInput.path || null,
     affectedFiles,
   });
-  // Claw/hybrid support: pass context if agent provides claw metadata (for EnterpriseClaw/OpenShell/Perplexity hybrid agents)
-  let guard;
-  if (toolInput && (toolInput.clawContext || toolInput._claw || toolInput.hybridRoute || toolInput.agentId)) {
-    const clawCtx = toolInput.clawContext || toolInput._claw || { actionType: toolInput.actionType || 'unknown', agentId: toolInput.agentId || 'unknown', hybridRoute: toolInput.hybridRoute || 'unknown' };
-    guard = hybrid.evaluateClawPretool ? hybrid.evaluateClawPretool(toolName, serializedInput, clawCtx) : hybrid.evaluatePretool(toolName, serializedInput);
-  } else {
-    guard = hybrid.evaluatePretool(toolName, serializedInput);
-  }
+  const guard = hybrid.evaluatePretool(toolName, serializedInput);
   if (!guard || guard.mode === 'allow') {
     return null;
   }
@@ -2016,26 +1399,10 @@ async function evaluateGatesAsync(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
   if (localOnlyRemoteSideEffectGate) {
     return recordStructuralGateBlock(toolName, toolInput, localOnlyRemoteSideEffectGate);
   }
-  const statefulHelperBypassGate = evaluateStatefulHelperBypassGate(toolName, toolInput);
-  if (statefulHelperBypassGate) {
-    return recordStructuralGateBlock(toolName, toolInput, statefulHelperBypassGate);
-  }
-  if (isBreakGlassSettingsRecoveryAction(toolName, toolInput)) {
-    recordAuditEvent({
-      toolName,
-      toolInput,
-      decision: 'allow',
-      gateId: BREAK_GLASS_CONDITION,
-      message: 'Break-glass recovery allowed hook settings edit',
-      severity: 'high',
-      source: 'gates-engine',
-    });
-    return null;
-  }
 
   const pendingThreadResolutionGate = evaluatePendingPrThreadResolutionGate(toolName, toolInput);
   if (pendingThreadResolutionGate) {
-    recordStat(pendingThreadResolutionGate.gate, 'block', null, { toolName, toolInput });
+    recordStat(pendingThreadResolutionGate.gate, 'block');
     const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({
       toolName,
       toolInput,
@@ -2051,7 +1418,7 @@ async function evaluateGatesAsync(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
 
   const boostedRiskGuard = evaluateBoostedRiskTagGuard(toolName, toolInput);
   if (boostedRiskGuard) {
-    recordStat(boostedRiskGuard.gate, 'block', null, { toolName, toolInput });
+    recordStat(boostedRiskGuard.gate, 'block');
     const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({
       toolName,
       toolInput,
@@ -2065,23 +1432,6 @@ async function evaluateGatesAsync(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
     return boostedRiskGuard;
   }
 
-  // Tier 1b: Planning and Trajectory (v1.26.0 - CodeRabbit Pattern).
-  // Keep runtime enforcement explicit so advisory planning checks do not mask
-  // higher-priority deny/approve gates in established workflows.
-  if (isRuntimePlanGateEnabled()) {
-    const planGate = evaluatePlanGate(toolName, toolInput);
-    if (planGate) {
-      recordStat(planGate.gate, planGate.decision === 'deny' ? 'block' : 'warn', null, { toolName, toolInput });
-      return planGate;
-    }
-
-    const trajectory = getTrajectoryScore();
-    if (trajectory.isDrifting) {
-      recordStat('strategic-drift', 'block', null, { toolName, toolInput });
-      return { decision: 'deny', gate: 'strategic-drift', message: trajectory.message, severity: 'high' };
-    }
-  }
-
   // Fast-path: feedback/recall tools skip metric gates entirely (avoids Stripe API calls)
   const METRIC_SKIP_TOOLS = ['capture_feedback', 'feedback_stats', 'recall', 'feedback_summary', 'prevention_rules'];
   const skipMetrics = METRIC_SKIP_TOOLS.includes(toolName);
@@ -2127,39 +1477,23 @@ async function evaluateGatesAsync(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
     });
 
     if (gate.action === 'block') {
-      const denyResult = { decision: 'deny', gate: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, reasoning };
-      // Free-tier daily block cap: after N blocks/day, deny → warn + upgrade CTA
-      const cappedResult = applyDailyBlockCap(denyResult);
-      if (cappedResult) {
-        recordStat(gate.id, 'warn', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
-        const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'warn', gateId: gate.id, message: cappedResult.message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine', dailyBlockCapApplied: true });
-        auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
-        return cappedResult;
-      }
-      recordStat(gate.id, 'block', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
+      recordStat(gate.id, 'block', gate);
+      const result = { decision: 'deny', gate: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, reasoning };
       const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'deny', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
       auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
-      return denyResult;
+      return result;
     }
 
     if (gate.action === 'approve') {
-      const approvalEnabled = process.env.THUMBGATE_APPROVAL_GATES !== '0';
-      if (approvalEnabled) {
-        recordStat(gate.id, 'approve', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
-        const result = { decision: 'approve', gate: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, reasoning, requiresApproval: true };
-        const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'approve', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
-        auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
-        return result;
-      }
-      recordStat(gate.id, 'warn', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
-      const result = { decision: 'warn', gate: gate.id, message: `[approval gate disabled] ${message}`, severity: gate.severity, reasoning };
-      const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'warn', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
+      recordStat(gate.id, 'approve', gate);
+      const result = { decision: 'approve', gate: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, reasoning, requiresApproval: true };
+      const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'approve', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
       auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
       return result;
     }
 
     if (gate.action === 'log') {
-      recordStat(gate.id, 'log', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
+      recordStat(gate.id, 'log', gate);
       const result = { decision: 'log', gate: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, reasoning, logged: true };
       const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'log', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
       auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
@@ -2168,7 +1502,7 @@ async function evaluateGatesAsync(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
     }
 
     if (gate.action === 'warn') {
-      recordStat(gate.id, 'warn', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
+      recordStat(gate.id, 'warn', gate);
       const result = { decision: 'warn', gate: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, reasoning };
       const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'warn', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
       auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
@@ -2176,15 +1510,14 @@ async function evaluateGatesAsync(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
     }
   }
 
-  const skipAdvisoryGuards = isSafeSecretStorageWrite(toolName, toolInput, process.cwd());
-  const sentinelReport = skipAdvisoryGuards ? null : evaluateWorkflowSentinel(toolName, toolInput, {
+  const sentinelReport = evaluateWorkflowSentinel(toolName, toolInput, {
     governanceState,
   });
   const sentinelDecision = recordSentinelDecision(sentinelReport, toolName, toolInput);
   const memoryGuard = evaluateMemoryGuard(toolName, toolInput);
   if (memoryGuard) {
     const enrichedMemoryGuard = enrichResultWithSentinel(memoryGuard, sentinelReport);
-    recordStat(enrichedMemoryGuard.gate, 'block', null, { toolName, toolInput });
+    recordStat(enrichedMemoryGuard.gate, 'block');
     recordMemoryGuardDecision(sentinelDecision, enrichedMemoryGuard);
     const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({
       toolName,
@@ -2201,7 +1534,7 @@ async function evaluateGatesAsync(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
 
   if (sentinelReport && sentinelReport.decision !== 'allow') {
     const sentinelResult = buildSentinelGateResult(sentinelReport);
-    recordStat(sentinelResult.gate, sentinelResult.decision === 'deny' ? 'block' : 'warn', null, { toolName, toolInput });
+    recordStat(sentinelResult.gate, sentinelResult.decision === 'deny' ? 'block' : 'warn');
     recordSentinelBlockDecision(sentinelDecision, sentinelResult);
     const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({
       toolName,
@@ -2247,26 +1580,10 @@ function evaluateGates(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
   if (localOnlyRemoteSideEffectGate) {
     return recordStructuralGateBlock(toolName, toolInput, localOnlyRemoteSideEffectGate);
   }
-  const statefulHelperBypassGate = evaluateStatefulHelperBypassGate(toolName, toolInput);
-  if (statefulHelperBypassGate) {
-    return recordStructuralGateBlock(toolName, toolInput, statefulHelperBypassGate);
-  }
-  if (isBreakGlassSettingsRecoveryAction(toolName, toolInput)) {
-    recordAuditEvent({
-      toolName,
-      toolInput,
-      decision: 'allow',
-      gateId: BREAK_GLASS_CONDITION,
-      message: 'Break-glass recovery allowed hook settings edit',
-      severity: 'high',
-      source: 'gates-engine',
-    });
-    return null;
-  }
 
   const pendingThreadResolutionGate = evaluatePendingPrThreadResolutionGate(toolName, toolInput);
   if (pendingThreadResolutionGate) {
-    recordStat(pendingThreadResolutionGate.gate, 'block', null, { toolName, toolInput });
+    recordStat(pendingThreadResolutionGate.gate, 'block');
     const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({
       toolName,
       toolInput,
@@ -2282,7 +1599,7 @@ function evaluateGates(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
 
   const boostedRiskGuard = evaluateBoostedRiskTagGuard(toolName, toolInput);
   if (boostedRiskGuard) {
-    recordStat(boostedRiskGuard.gate, 'block', null, { toolName, toolInput });
+    recordStat(boostedRiskGuard.gate, 'block');
     const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({
       toolName,
       toolInput,
@@ -2296,23 +1613,6 @@ function evaluateGates(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
     return boostedRiskGuard;
   }
 
-  // Tier 1b: Planning and Trajectory (v1.26.0 - CodeRabbit Pattern).
-  // Keep runtime enforcement explicit so advisory planning checks do not mask
-  // higher-priority deny/approve gates in established workflows.
-  if (isRuntimePlanGateEnabled()) {
-    const planGate = evaluatePlanGate(toolName, toolInput);
-    if (planGate) {
-      recordStat(planGate.gate, planGate.decision === 'deny' ? 'block' : 'warn', null, { toolName, toolInput });
-      return planGate;
-    }
-
-    const trajectory = getTrajectoryScore();
-    if (trajectory.isDrifting) {
-      recordStat('strategic-drift', 'block', null, { toolName, toolInput });
-      return { decision: 'deny', gate: 'strategic-drift', message: trajectory.message, severity: 'high' };
-    }
-  }
-
   for (const gate of config.gates) {
     const matchDetails = matchGate(gate, toolName, toolInput);
     if (!matchDetails.matched) continue;
@@ -2331,39 +1631,23 @@ function evaluateGates(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
     const reasoning = buildReasoning(gate, toolName, toolInput, matchDetails);
 
     if (gate.action === 'block') {
-      const denyResult = { decision: 'deny', gate: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, reasoning };
-      // Free-tier daily block cap: after N blocks/day, deny → warn + upgrade CTA
-      const cappedResult = applyDailyBlockCap(denyResult);
-      if (cappedResult) {
-        recordStat(gate.id, 'warn', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
-        const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'warn', gateId: gate.id, message: cappedResult.message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine', dailyBlockCapApplied: true });
-        auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
-        return cappedResult;
-      }
-      recordStat(gate.id, 'block', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
+      recordStat(gate.id, 'block', gate);
+      const result = { decision: 'deny', gate: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, reasoning };
       const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'deny', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
       auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
-      return denyResult;
+      return result;
     }
 
     if (gate.action === 'approve') {
-      const approvalEnabled = process.env.THUMBGATE_APPROVAL_GATES !== '0';
-      if (approvalEnabled) {
-        recordStat(gate.id, 'approve', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
-        const result = { decision: 'approve', gate: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, reasoning, requiresApproval: true };
-        const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'approve', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
-        auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
-        return result;
-      }
-      recordStat(gate.id, 'warn', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
-      const result = { decision: 'warn', gate: gate.id, message: `[approval gate disabled] ${message}`, severity: gate.severity, reasoning };
-      const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'warn', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
+      recordStat(gate.id, 'approve', gate);
+      const result = { decision: 'approve', gate: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, reasoning, requiresApproval: true };
+      const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'approve', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
       auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
       return result;
     }
 
     if (gate.action === 'log') {
-      recordStat(gate.id, 'log', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
+      recordStat(gate.id, 'log', gate);
       const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'log', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
       auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
       // 'log' action allows the tool call to proceed — continue to next gate
@@ -2371,7 +1655,7 @@ function evaluateGates(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
     }
 
     if (gate.action === 'warn') {
-      recordStat(gate.id, 'warn', gate, { toolName, toolInput });
+      recordStat(gate.id, 'warn', gate);
       const result = { decision: 'warn', gate: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, reasoning };
       const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({ toolName, toolInput, decision: 'warn', gateId: gate.id, message, severity: gate.severity, source: 'gates-engine' });
       auditToFeedback(auditRecord);
@@ -2379,15 +1663,14 @@ function evaluateGates(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
     }
   }
 
-  const skipAdvisoryGuards = isSafeSecretStorageWrite(toolName, toolInput, process.cwd());
-  const sentinelReport = skipAdvisoryGuards ? null : evaluateWorkflowSentinel(toolName, toolInput, {
+  const sentinelReport = evaluateWorkflowSentinel(toolName, toolInput, {
     governanceState,
   });
   const sentinelDecision = recordSentinelDecision(sentinelReport, toolName, toolInput);
   const memoryGuard = evaluateMemoryGuard(toolName, toolInput);
   if (memoryGuard) {
     const enrichedMemoryGuard = enrichResultWithSentinel(memoryGuard, sentinelReport);
-    recordStat(enrichedMemoryGuard.gate, 'block', null, { toolName, toolInput });
+    recordStat(enrichedMemoryGuard.gate, 'block');
     recordMemoryGuardDecision(sentinelDecision, enrichedMemoryGuard);
     const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({
       toolName,
@@ -2404,7 +1687,7 @@ function evaluateGates(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
 
   if (sentinelReport && sentinelReport.decision !== 'allow') {
     const sentinelResult = buildSentinelGateResult(sentinelReport);
-    recordStat(sentinelResult.gate, sentinelResult.decision === 'deny' ? 'block' : 'warn', null, { toolName, toolInput });
+    recordStat(sentinelResult.gate, sentinelResult.decision === 'deny' ? 'block' : 'warn');
     recordSentinelBlockDecision(sentinelDecision, sentinelResult);
     const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({
       toolName,
@@ -2424,43 +1707,14 @@ function evaluateGates(toolName, toolInput, configPath) {
   return null;
 }
 
-// Turn a secret-exfiltration block into actionable guidance that names the
-// safe path, instead of a dead-end that drives agents toward brittle
-// workarounds (e.g. writing secrets to /tmp). The vault dirs referenced here
-// are the SAME constant the scanner whitelists, so the hint can never drift
-// from enforcement.
-function buildSecretRemediation(toolName = '', toolInput = {}) {
-  const vaultDirs = (SAFE_SECRET_STORAGE_DIRS || []).map((dir) => `~/${dir}`);
-  const primaryVault = vaultDirs[0] || '~/.resume_secrets';
-  const vaultList = vaultDirs.join(', ') || primaryVault;
-
-  if (EDIT_LIKE_TOOLS && EDIT_LIKE_TOOLS.has(toolName)) {
-    const target = toolInput.file_path || toolInput.path || toolInput.filePath || toolInput.target_path;
-    const where = target ? ` (you targeted ${redactText(String(target))})` : '';
-    return `To store this secret safely, write it with the Write/Edit tool to a file under ${vaultList}${where}. `
-      + `Those locations are whitelisted for secret storage and will NOT be blocked. `
-      + `Do not route around this by writing to /tmp or another path — that leaves the secret in a world-readable location and does not make it safe.`;
-  }
-
-  if (toolName === 'Bash') {
-    return `Do not inline a live secret literal into a shell command — it leaks into shell history and process args. `
-      + `Instead, store the value with the Write tool to a file under ${vaultList}, then reference it via an environment variable or by reading that file at runtime.`;
-  }
-
-  return `Store secrets in the whitelisted vault (${vaultList}) using the Write tool rather than passing the literal through this action.`;
-}
-
-function buildSecretGuardResult(scanResult, context = {}) {
-  const remediation = buildSecretRemediation(context.toolName, context.toolInput || {});
-  const summary = buildSafeSummary(
-    scanResult.findings,
-    'Blocked because the action appears to expose secret material'
-  );
+function buildSecretGuardResult(scanResult) {
   return {
     decision: 'deny',
     gate: 'secret-exfiltration',
-    message: `${summary}. ${remediation}`,
-    remediation,
+    message: buildSafeSummary(
+      scanResult.findings,
+      'Blocked because the action appears to expose secret material'
+    ),
     severity: 'critical',
     secretScan: {
       provider: scanResult.provider,
@@ -2539,15 +1793,9 @@ function evaluateSecretGuard(input = {}) {
   if (!scanResult.detected) {
     return null;
   }
-  recordStat('secret-exfiltration', 'block', null, {
-    toolName: input.tool_name || input.toolName || 'unknown',
-    toolInput: input.tool_input || {},
-  });
+  recordStat('secret-exfiltration', 'block');
   recordSecretViolation(input, scanResult);
-  const result = buildSecretGuardResult(scanResult, {
-    toolName: input.tool_name || input.toolName,
-    toolInput: input.tool_input || {},
-  });
+  const result = buildSecretGuardResult(scanResult);
   // Audit trail: record secret guard denial
   const auditRecord = recordAuditEvent({
     toolName: input.tool_name || input.toolName || 'unknown',
@@ -2563,55 +1811,15 @@ function evaluateSecretGuard(input = {}) {
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-function isApprovalGatesEnabled() {
-  return process.env.THUMBGATE_APPROVAL_GATES !== '0';
-}
-
 // PreToolUse hook interface (stdin/stdout JSON)
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-function buildPreToolUseOutput(fields = {}) {
-  return {
-    hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
-    ...fields,
-  };
-}
-
 function buildReminderOutput(context) {
-  return buildPreToolUseOutput({
+  return {
     additionalContext: context,
     systemReminder: context,
     thumbgateSystemReminder: context,
-  });
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Upgrade nudge: surfaces Pro value at usage milestones and trial expiry.
-// Block-action Pro CTA: brief upgrade mention after a deny/warn decision.
-// Highest-intent moment — user just saw ThumbGate save them from a mistake.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-function buildBlockActionProCta() {
-  try {
-    if (process.env.THUMBGATE_NO_NUDGE === '1') return null;
-    if (process.env.CI || process.env.GITHUB_ACTIONS) return null;
-    if (isProTier()) return null;
-    if (isInTrialPeriod()) return null; // Already have full access
-
-    const stats = loadStats();
-    const totalBlocks = stats.blocked || 0;
-    if (totalBlocks < 5) return null; // Too early — let them experience the product
-
-    if (totalBlocks < 25) {
-      return '\n\n💡 Pro: keep this rule synced across laptops, CI, containers, and agent runtimes → thumbgate.ai/go/pro';
-    }
-    if (totalBlocks < 100) {
-      return `\n\n💡 ${totalBlocks} actions blocked. Pro keeps these lessons/rules synced everywhere → thumbgate.ai/go/pro ($19/mo)`;
-    }
-    return `\n\n💡 ${totalBlocks} mistakes caught. Your team could use shared hosted enforcement → thumbgate.ai/go/pro`;
-  } catch (_) {
-    return null;
-  }
+  };
 }
 
 function formatOutput(result, behavioralContext) {
@@ -2630,28 +1838,13 @@ function formatOutput(result, behavioralContext) {
     : '';
 
   if (result.decision === 'deny') {
-    const reminder = behavioralContext ? buildReminderOutput(behavioralContext) : {};
-    const reminderSuffix = behavioralContext ? `\n\nSystem reminder:\n${behavioralContext}` : '';
-    const proCta = buildBlockActionProCta() || '';
-    return JSON.stringify({
-      hookSpecificOutput: {
-        hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
-        ...reminder,
-        permissionDecision: 'deny',
-        permissionDecisionReason: `[GATE:${result.gate}] ${result.message}${reasoningSuffix}${reminderSuffix}${proCta}`,
-      },
-    });
-  }
-
-  if (result.decision === 'approve') {
     const reminder = behavioralContext ? buildReminderOutput(behavioralContext) : {};
     const reminderSuffix = behavioralContext ? `\n\nSystem reminder:\n${behavioralContext}` : '';
     return JSON.stringify({
       hookSpecificOutput: {
-        hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
         ...reminder,
         permissionDecision: 'deny',
-        permissionDecisionReason: `[GATE:${result.gate}] APPROVAL REQUIRED: ${result.message} — Ask the human to confirm this action before proceeding.${reasoningSuffix}${reminderSuffix}`,
+        permissionDecisionReason: `[GATE:${result.gate}] ${result.message}${reasoningSuffix}${reminderSuffix}`,
       },
     });
   }
@@ -2661,7 +1854,6 @@ function formatOutput(result, behavioralContext) {
     const context = `[GATE:${result.gate}] WARNING: ${result.message}${reasoningSuffix}${extra}`;
     return JSON.stringify({
       hookSpecificOutput: {
-        hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
         additionalContext: context,
         ...(behavioralContext ? {
           systemReminder: behavioralContext,
@@ -2785,7 +1977,9 @@ function buildRecentCorrectiveActionsContext(options = {}) {
 function buildRelevantLessonContext(toolName, toolInput) {
   if (!toolName) return null;
 
-  const { retrieveRelevantLessons, calculateRetrievalEntropy, filterTopP } = loadOptionalModule("./lesson-retrieval", () => ({ retrieveRelevantLessons: () => [], calculateRetrievalEntropy: () => 0, filterTopP: (l) => l }));
+  const { retrieveRelevantLessons } = loadOptionalModule('./lesson-retrieval', () => ({
+    retrieveRelevantLessons: () => [],
+  }));
 
   // Extract a searchable action context from the tool input
   const actionContext = extractActionContext(toolName, toolInput);
@@ -2793,113 +1987,32 @@ function buildRelevantLessonContext(toolName, toolInput) {
 
   try {
     const lessons = retrieveRelevantLessons(toolName, actionContext, { maxResults: 3 });
+    // retrieveRelevantLessons already filters at relevanceScore > 0.1 internally;
+    // any negative lesson that survives retrieval is relevant enough to surface.
+    const negative = lessons.filter((l) => l.signal === 'negative');
+    if (negative.length === 0) return null;
+
+    const formatted = negative.map((l) => {
+      const title = (l.title || '').replace(/^MISTAKE:\s*/, '').slice(0, 140);
+      const advice = extractAvoidanceAdvice(l.content);
+      return advice ? `  • ${title}\n    → ${advice}` : `  • ${title}`;
+    });
 
-    const entropy = calculateRetrievalEntropy(lessons);
-    if (entropy > KNOWLEDGE_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD) {
-      return buildKnowledgeConflictContext(toolName, toolInput, lessons, entropy);
-    }
-    return formatNegativeLessonContext(lessons);
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Async counterpart of buildRelevantLessonContext: uses HYBRID (dense embeddings +
- * lexical) retrieval so the agent is warned about semantically-related past mistakes
- * even when they share no keywords with the current action. Wired into runAsync.
- * Degrades to the lexical result automatically when no embedder is available.
- */
-async function buildRelevantLessonContextAsync(toolName, toolInput) {
-  if (!toolName) return null;
-
-  const { retrieveRelevantLessonsAsync, retrieveRelevantLessons, calculateRetrievalEntropy } = loadOptionalModule(
-    './lesson-retrieval',
-    () => ({ retrieveRelevantLessonsAsync: null, retrieveRelevantLessons: () => [], calculateRetrievalEntropy: () => 0 }),
-  );
-
-  const actionContext = extractActionContext(toolName, toolInput);
-  if (!actionContext) return null;
-
-  try {
-    const lessons = retrieveRelevantLessonsAsync
-      ? await retrieveRelevantLessonsAsync(toolName, actionContext, { maxResults: 3 })
-      : retrieveRelevantLessons(toolName, actionContext, { maxResults: 3 });
-    
-    // Knowledge Conflict Detection: if retrieved lessons have high sentiment entropy,
-    // it indicates conflicting past evidence. Warn by default; hard-block only in
-    // strict mode for external/destructive side-effect commands.
-    const entropy = calculateRetrievalEntropy(lessons);
-    if (entropy > KNOWLEDGE_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD) {
-      return buildKnowledgeConflictContext(toolName, toolInput, lessons, entropy);
-    }
-
-    return formatNegativeLessonContext(lessons);
+    return `[ThumbGate] Past mistakes relevant to this action — read before proceeding:\n${formatted.join('\n')}`;
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
 }
 
-/**
- * Shared formatter: render the negative (mistake) lessons that survived retrieval
- * into the PreToolUse warning block. Retrieval already filters by relevance, so any
- * negative lesson present is relevant enough to surface.
- */
-function formatNegativeLessonContext(lessons) {
-  const negative = (lessons || []).filter((l) => l.signal === 'negative');
-  if (negative.length === 0) return null;
-
-  const formatted = negative.map((l) => {
-    const title = (l.title || '').replace(/^MISTAKE:\s*/, '').slice(0, 140);
-    const advice = extractAvoidanceAdvice(l.content);
-    return advice ? `  • ${title}\n    → ${advice}` : `  • ${title}`;
-  });
-
-  return `[ThumbGate] Past mistakes relevant to this action — read before proceeding:\n${formatted.join('\n')}`;
-}
-
-function isStrictKnowledgeConflictMode() {
-  return process.env.THUMBGATE_STRICT_KNOWLEDGE_CONFLICT === '1'
-    || process.env.THUMBGATE_STRICT_KNOWLEDGE_CONFLICT === 'true';
-}
-
-function isKnowledgeConflictHardBlockAction(toolName, toolInput = {}) {
-  if (!isStrictKnowledgeConflictMode()) return false;
-  if (EDIT_LIKE_TOOLS.has(toolName)) return true;
-  if (toolName !== 'Bash') return false;
-  return KNOWLEDGE_CONFLICT_STRICT_BASH_PATTERN.test(String(toolInput.command || ''));
-}
-
-function buildKnowledgeConflictContext(toolName, toolInput, lessons, entropy) {
-  const lessonContext = formatNegativeLessonContext(lessons);
-  const message = `Knowledge conflict warning: retrieved lessons disagree for this action (entropy ${entropy}). Treat the reminders below as cautionary context, but do not stop unrelated work solely because memory is noisy.`;
-
-  if (isKnowledgeConflictHardBlockAction(toolName, toolInput)) {
-    recordStat('retrieval_entropy_high', 'block', null, { toolName, toolInput });
-    return {
-      decision: 'deny',
-      gate: 'knowledge-conflict-gate',
-      message: `✗ THUMBGATE: ${message} Strict mode is enabled for destructive or external side-effect actions; verify intent or narrow the task before proceeding.`,
-      severity: 'high',
-    };
-  }
-
-  recordStat('retrieval_entropy_high', 'warn', null, { toolName, toolInput });
-  return mergeContextStrings(`[ThumbGate] ${message}`, lessonContext);
-}
-
 function extractActionContext(toolName, toolInput) {
   if (!toolInput) return toolName;
   const parts = [toolName];
   if (toolInput.command) parts.push(String(toolInput.command).slice(0, 400));
   if (toolInput.file_path) parts.push(String(toolInput.file_path));
-  if (toolInput.content) parts.push(String(toolInput.content).slice(0, 600));
-  if (toolInput.new_string) parts.push(String(toolInput.new_string).slice(0, 600));
-  if (toolInput.old_string) parts.push(String(toolInput.old_string).slice(0, 240));
   if (toolInput.description) parts.push(String(toolInput.description).slice(0, 200));
   if (toolInput.prompt) parts.push(String(toolInput.prompt).slice(0, 400));
   if (toolInput.pattern) parts.push(String(toolInput.pattern).slice(0, 200));
-  return sanitizeFeedbackText(parts.filter(Boolean).join(' ')) || toolName;
+  return parts.filter(Boolean).join(' ');
 }
 
 function extractAvoidanceAdvice(content) {
@@ -2928,13 +2041,6 @@ async function runAsync(input) {
 
   const toolName = input.tool_name || '';
   const toolInput = input.tool_input || {};
-  const safeSecretStorageWrite = isSafeSecretStorageWrite(toolName, toolInput, process.cwd());
-
-  const sequenceGuard = evaluateSequenceState(toolName, toolInput);
-  if (sequenceGuard && sequenceGuard.decision === 'deny') {
-    return formatOutput(applyEnforcementPosture(sequenceGuard));
-  }
-
   const result = await evaluateGatesAsync(toolName, toolInput);
 
   // Attach security warnings to allow/warn results
@@ -2947,18 +2053,11 @@ async function runAsync(input) {
     }
   }
 
-  
-  const behavioralContext = safeSecretStorageWrite ? null : buildBehavioralContext();
-  const lessonContext = safeSecretStorageWrite ? null : await buildRelevantLessonContextAsync(toolName, toolInput);
-  
-  if (lessonContext && lessonContext.decision === "deny") {
-    return formatOutput(applyEnforcementPosture(lessonContext));
-  }
-  
+  const behavioralContext = buildBehavioralContext();
+  const lessonContext = buildRelevantLessonContext(toolName, toolInput);
   const recentContext = buildRecentCorrectiveActionsContext();
   const combinedContext = mergeContextStrings(lessonContext, recentContext, behavioralContext);
-  return formatOutput(applyEnforcementPosture(result), combinedContext);
-
+  return formatOutput(result, combinedContext);
 }
 
 function run(input) {
@@ -2975,13 +2074,6 @@ function run(input) {
 
   const toolName = input.tool_name || '';
   const toolInput = input.tool_input || {};
-  const safeSecretStorageWrite = isSafeSecretStorageWrite(toolName, toolInput, process.cwd());
-
-  const sequenceGuard = evaluateSequenceState(toolName, toolInput);
-  if (sequenceGuard && sequenceGuard.decision === 'deny') {
-    return formatOutput(applyEnforcementPosture(sequenceGuard));
-  }
-
   const result = evaluateGates(toolName, toolInput);
 
   // Attach security warnings to allow/warn results
@@ -2994,18 +2086,11 @@ function run(input) {
     }
   }
 
-  
-  const behavioralContext = safeSecretStorageWrite ? null : buildBehavioralContext();
-  const lessonContext = safeSecretStorageWrite ? null : buildRelevantLessonContext(toolName, toolInput);
-  
-  if (lessonContext && lessonContext.decision === "deny") {
-    return formatOutput(applyEnforcementPosture(lessonContext));
-  }
-  
+  const behavioralContext = buildBehavioralContext();
+  const lessonContext = buildRelevantLessonContext(toolName, toolInput);
   const recentContext = buildRecentCorrectiveActionsContext();
   const combinedContext = mergeContextStrings(lessonContext, recentContext, behavioralContext);
-  return formatOutput(applyEnforcementPosture(result), combinedContext);
-
+  return formatOutput(result, combinedContext);
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -3138,84 +2223,7 @@ function registerClaimGate(claimPattern, requiredActions, blockMessage) {
   return entry;
 }
 
-function normalizeStringArray(value) {
-  if (!Array.isArray(value)) return [];
-  return Array.from(new Set(
-    value
-      .map((item) => String(item || '').trim())
-      .filter(Boolean)
-  ));
-}
-
-function normalizeGoalContract(goalContract) {
-  if (!goalContract || typeof goalContract !== 'object' || Array.isArray(goalContract)) {
-    return null;
-  }
-
-  const goal = String(goalContract.goal || '').trim();
-  const doneWhen = normalizeStringArray(goalContract.doneWhen);
-  const requiredActions = normalizeStringArray(goalContract.proveBy);
-  const mustNotChange = normalizeStringArray(goalContract.mustNotChange);
-  const handoff = {
-    workerAgent: String(goalContract.workerAgent || '').trim() || null,
-    reviewerAgent: String(goalContract.reviewerAgent || '').trim() || null,
-    orchestratorAgent: String(goalContract.orchestratorAgent || '').trim() || null,
-  };
-
-  const matched = Boolean(
-    goal ||
-    doneWhen.length > 0 ||
-    requiredActions.length > 0 ||
-    mustNotChange.length > 0 ||
-    handoff.workerAgent ||
-    handoff.reviewerAgent ||
-    handoff.orchestratorAgent
-  );
-
-  if (!matched) return null;
-
-  return {
-    goal: goal || null,
-    doneWhen,
-    requiredActions,
-    mustNotChange,
-    handoff,
-  };
-}
-
-function evaluateGoalContract(goalContract, actions = loadSessionActions()) {
-  const normalized = normalizeGoalContract(goalContract);
-  if (!normalized) {
-    return {
-      matched: false,
-      passed: true,
-      goal: null,
-      doneWhen: [],
-      requiredActions: [],
-      missingActions: [],
-      mustNotChange: [],
-      handoff: {
-        workerAgent: null,
-        reviewerAgent: null,
-        orchestratorAgent: null,
-      },
-    };
-  }
-
-  const missingActions = normalized.requiredActions.filter((actionId) => !actions[actionId]);
-  return {
-    matched: true,
-    passed: missingActions.length === 0,
-    goal: normalized.goal,
-    doneWhen: normalized.doneWhen,
-    requiredActions: normalized.requiredActions,
-    missingActions,
-    mustNotChange: normalized.mustNotChange,
-    handoff: normalized.handoff,
-  };
-}
-
-function verifyClaimEvidence(claimText, options = {}) {
+function verifyClaimEvidence(claimText) {
   const normalizedClaimText = String(claimText || '').trim();
   if (!normalizedClaimText) {
     throw new Error('claimText is required');
@@ -3243,23 +2251,9 @@ function verifyClaimEvidence(claimText, options = {}) {
     });
   }
 
-  const goalContract = evaluateGoalContract(options.goalContract, actions);
-  if (goalContract.matched) {
-    checks.push({
-      claim: 'goal_contract',
-      passed: goalContract.passed,
-      missing: goalContract.missingActions,
-      message: goalContract.passed
-        ? 'Goal contract evidence present'
-        : `Goal contract requires evidence: ${goalContract.missingActions.join(', ')}`,
-      goalContract,
-    });
-  }
-
   return {
     verified: checks.every((check) => check.passed),
     checks,
-    goalContract,
   };
 }
 
@@ -3279,7 +2273,6 @@ module.exports = {
   setTaskScope,
   setBranchGovernance,
   approveProtectedAction,
-  breakGlassEmergency,
   getScopeState,
   getBranchGovernanceState,
   isConditionSatisfied,
@@ -3296,7 +2289,6 @@ module.exports = {
   evaluateGatesAsync,
   computeExecutableHash,
   formatOutput,
-  isApprovalGatesEnabled,
   run,
   runAsync,
   trackAction,
@@ -3305,8 +2297,6 @@ module.exports = {
   clearSessionActions,
   loadClaimGates,
   registerClaimGate,
-  normalizeGoalContract,
-  evaluateGoalContract,
   verifyClaimEvidence,
   DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH,
   DEFAULT_CLAIM_GATES_PATH,
@@ -3323,7 +2313,6 @@ module.exports = {
   buildBehavioralContext,
   buildRecentCorrectiveActionsContext,
   buildRelevantLessonContext,
-  buildRelevantLessonContextAsync,
   extractActionContext,
   extractAvoidanceAdvice,
   mergeContextStrings,
@@ -3338,16 +2327,7 @@ module.exports = {
   getLocalOnlyScopeSources,
   isRemoteSideEffectCommand,
   evaluateLocalOnlyRemoteSideEffectGate,
-  recordHelperScriptWrite,
-  evaluateStatefulHelperBypassGate,
-  isAgentHookSettingsFile,
-  isBreakGlassSettingsRecoveryAction,
   PR_THREAD_RESOLUTION_ACTION,
-  HELPER_BYPASS_ACTION,
-  buildBlockActionProCta,
-  applyDailyBlockCap,
-  getTodayBlockCount,
-  incrementTodayBlockCount,
 };
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------