thumbgate 0.9.10

package/scripts/agent-security-hardening.js

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * Agent Security Hardening — credential tracking, privilege escalation detection,
+ * dependency attestation gate.
+ *
+ * Closes the gaps from the agentic security video:
+ * 1. Session-scoped credential attestation — track what creds each agent uses
+ * 2. Privilege escalation detection — flag agents invoking tools outside their MCP profile
+ * 3. Dependency attestation gate — block agents from installing unvetted packages
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const { resolveFeedbackDir } = require('./feedback-paths');
+
+function getFeedbackDir() { return resolveFeedbackDir(); }
+function ensureDir(fp) { const d = path.dirname(fp); if (!fs.existsSync(d)) fs.mkdirSync(d, { recursive: true }); }
+function readJsonl(fp) { if (!fs.existsSync(fp)) return []; const raw = fs.readFileSync(fp, 'utf-8').trim(); if (!raw) return []; return raw.split('\n').map((l) => { try { return JSON.parse(l); } catch { return null; } }).filter(Boolean); }
+
+const CRED_LOG = 'credential-attestations.jsonl';
+const ESCALATION_LOG = 'escalation-events.jsonl';
+const DEP_LOG = 'dependency-attestations.jsonl';
+
+function getCredLogPath() { return path.join(getFeedbackDir(), CRED_LOG); }
+function getEscalationLogPath() { return path.join(getFeedbackDir(), ESCALATION_LOG); }
+function getDepLogPath() { return path.join(getFeedbackDir(), DEP_LOG); }
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 1. Session-Scoped Credential Attestation
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Record what credential an agent used for a tool call.
+ * Creates an audit trail: agent → credential → tool → timestamp.
+ */
+function attestCredential({ agentId, credentialType, credentialId, toolName, scope, sessionId } = {}) {
+  const entry = {
+    id: `cred_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+    agentId: agentId || 'unknown',
+    credentialType: credentialType || 'unknown', // 'api_key', 'oauth_token', 'session_token', 'mcp_auth'
+    credentialId: credentialId ? credentialId.slice(0, 8) + '***' : 'unknown', // truncated for safety
+    toolName: toolName || 'unknown',
+    scope: scope || 'default',
+    sessionId: sessionId || null,
+  };
+  const logPath = getCredLogPath();
+  ensureDir(logPath);
+  fs.appendFileSync(logPath, JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
+  return entry;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get credential usage summary for audit.
+ */
+function getCredentialAudit({ periodHours = 24 } = {}) {
+  const entries = readJsonl(getCredLogPath());
+  const cutoff = Date.now() - periodHours * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+  const recent = entries.filter((e) => new Date(e.timestamp).getTime() > cutoff);
+
+  const byAgent = {};
+  const byCredType = {};
+  for (const e of recent) {
+    if (!byAgent[e.agentId]) byAgent[e.agentId] = { tools: new Set(), credTypes: new Set(), count: 0 };
+    byAgent[e.agentId].tools.add(e.toolName);
+    byAgent[e.agentId].credTypes.add(e.credentialType);
+    byAgent[e.agentId].count++;
+    byCredType[e.credentialType] = (byCredType[e.credentialType] || 0) + 1;
+  }
+
+  // Serialize Sets
+  const agents = Object.entries(byAgent).map(([id, data]) => ({
+    agentId: id, tools: [...data.tools], credTypes: [...data.credTypes], callCount: data.count,
+  }));
+
+  return { periodHours, total: recent.length, agents, byCredType };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 2. Privilege Escalation Detection
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// MCP profile tool allowlists (loaded from config or defaults)
+const PROFILE_ALLOWLISTS = {
+  essential: new Set(['capture_feedback', 'recall', 'search_lessons', 'search_thumbgate', 'prevention_rules', 'enforcement_matrix', 'feedback_stats', 'estimate_uncertainty', 'org_dashboard']),
+  readonly: new Set(['recall', 'feedback_summary', 'search_lessons', 'verify_claim', 'gate_stats', 'search_thumbgate', 'feedback_stats', 'estimate_uncertainty', 'org_dashboard']),
+  locked: new Set(['feedback_summary', 'search_lessons', 'diagnose_failure', 'list_intents', 'plan_intent', 'list_harnesses', 'verify_claim']),
+  commerce: new Set(['capture_feedback', 'recall', 'search_thumbgate', 'commerce_recall', 'track_action', 'verify_claim', 'feedback_stats']),
+};
+
+/**
+ * Check if a tool call is within the agent's MCP profile scope.
+ * Detects privilege escalation when agent tries to use tools outside its profile.
+ */
+function detectPrivilegeEscalation({ agentId, toolName, mcpProfile } = {}) {
+  const profile = mcpProfile || 'essential';
+  const allowlist = PROFILE_ALLOWLISTS[profile];
+
+  // If profile unknown or no allowlist, can't detect escalation
+  if (!allowlist) return { escalation: false, reason: 'unknown profile' };
+
+  const isAllowed = allowlist.has(toolName);
+
+  if (!isAllowed) {
+    const event = {
+      id: `esc_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+      agentId: agentId || 'unknown',
+      toolName: toolName || 'unknown',
+      mcpProfile: profile,
+      severity: 'warning',
+      message: `Agent "${agentId}" attempted to use "${toolName}" which is outside "${profile}" profile scope`,
+    };
+    const logPath = getEscalationLogPath();
+    ensureDir(logPath);
+    fs.appendFileSync(logPath, JSON.stringify(event) + '\n');
+    return { escalation: true, event };
+  }
+
+  return { escalation: false };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get escalation event stats.
+ */
+function getEscalationStats({ periodHours = 24 } = {}) {
+  const entries = readJsonl(getEscalationLogPath());
+  const cutoff = Date.now() - periodHours * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+  const recent = entries.filter((e) => new Date(e.timestamp).getTime() > cutoff);
+
+  const byAgent = {};
+  const byTool = {};
+  for (const e of recent) {
+    byAgent[e.agentId] = (byAgent[e.agentId] || 0) + 1;
+    byTool[e.toolName] = (byTool[e.toolName] || 0) + 1;
+  }
+
+  return { total: recent.length, byAgent, byTool, periodHours };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 3. Dependency Attestation Gate
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const BLOCKED_PACKAGES = new Set([
+  'event-stream', // known supply chain attack
+  'ua-parser-js', // compromised in 2021
+  'coa', // compromised in 2021
+  'rc', // compromised in 2021
+]);
+
+const TRUSTED_SCOPES = new Set(['@anthropic-ai', '@types', '@babel', '@eslint']);
+
+/**
+ * Check if a dependency install should be allowed.
+ * Blocks known-compromised packages and unscoped packages without attestation.
+ */
+function attestDependency({ packageName, version, agentId, action } = {}) {
+  const pkg = packageName || '';
+  const act = action || 'install'; // 'install', 'update', 'remove'
+
+  const findings = [];
+  let allowed = true;
+
+  // Check blocked list
+  if (BLOCKED_PACKAGES.has(pkg)) {
+    findings.push({ rule: 'blocked_package', message: `"${pkg}" is a known-compromised package`, severity: 'critical' });
+    allowed = false;
+  }
+
+  // Check for suspicious patterns
+  if (pkg.includes('..') || pkg.includes('/') && !pkg.startsWith('@')) {
+    findings.push({ rule: 'suspicious_path', message: `"${pkg}" has suspicious path characters`, severity: 'warning' });
+    allowed = false;
+  }
+
+  // Check version pinning
+  if (version && /^[>~^]/.test(version)) {
+    findings.push({ rule: 'unpinned_version', message: `Version "${version}" is not pinned — use exact version`, severity: 'warning' });
+  }
+
+  // Trusted scope bonus
+  const isTrustedScope = TRUSTED_SCOPES.has(pkg.split('/')[0]);
+
+  const event = {
+    id: `dep_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+    packageName: pkg,
+    version: version || 'latest',
+    agentId: agentId || 'unknown',
+    action: act,
+    allowed,
+    isTrustedScope,
+    findings,
+  };
+
+  const logPath = getDepLogPath();
+  ensureDir(logPath);
+  fs.appendFileSync(logPath, JSON.stringify(event) + '\n');
+
+  return { allowed, findings, isTrustedScope, event };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get dependency attestation stats.
+ */
+function getDepAttestationStats({ periodHours = 24 } = {}) {
+  const entries = readJsonl(getDepLogPath());
+  const cutoff = Date.now() - periodHours * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+  const recent = entries.filter((e) => new Date(e.timestamp).getTime() > cutoff);
+
+  return {
+    total: recent.length,
+    allowed: recent.filter((e) => e.allowed).length,
+    blocked: recent.filter((e) => !e.allowed).length,
+    findings: recent.reduce((sum, e) => sum + (e.findings || []).length, 0),
+    periodHours,
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  attestCredential, getCredentialAudit, getCredLogPath,
+  detectPrivilegeEscalation, getEscalationStats, getEscalationLogPath, PROFILE_ALLOWLISTS,
+  attestDependency, getDepAttestationStats, getDepLogPath, BLOCKED_PACKAGES, TRUSTED_SCOPES,
+};