thinkwork-cli 0.9.0 → 0.9.1

package/dist/terraform/modules/data/compliance-audit-bucket/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,573 @@
+################################################################################
+# Compliance Audit Bucket — Data Module
+#
+# WORM-protected S3 bucket for SOC2 Type 1 tamper-evident audit anchoring.
+# Stores Merkle-anchor evidence (anchors/) and per-tenant proof slices
+# (proofs/). The bucket itself is the substrate; the anchor Lambda (U8a/U8b)
+# is the writer; the audit-verifier CLI (U9) is the reader.
+#
+# Object Lock posture:
+#   - Enabled at create time (one-way commit; cannot be disabled later).
+#   - Default retention = var.retention_days (365 days = SOC2 Type 1 baseline).
+#   - Default mode = GOVERNANCE (var.mode); flip to COMPLIANCE in prod via
+#     tfvars at audit-engagement time. COMPLIANCE is irreversible — even AWS
+#     root cannot delete or shorten retention until it expires.
+#
+# Prefix contract:
+#   - anchors/ — WORM-protected Merkle anchors (subject to default retention).
+#   - proofs/  — per-tenant proof slices written by the anchor Lambda. The
+#                bucket-level lock applies, but U8b sets a shorter per-object
+#                retention because slices are derivable from the chain + anchor.
+#
+# Bucket policy (defense-in-depth):
+#   - EnforceHTTPS: deny any s3:* over plain HTTP.
+#   - DenyDeleteObject: deny s3:DeleteObject and s3:DeleteObjectVersion from
+#     any principal — even bypassing Object Lock can't satisfy this policy.
+#
+# IAM role (anchor Lambda's eventual identity, defined below):
+#   - Allow s3:PutObject + s3:PutObjectRetention + s3:GetObject +
+#     s3:GetObjectRetention on ${bucket}/anchors/* and ${bucket}/proofs/*.
+#   - Allow s3:GetBucketObjectLockConfiguration on ${bucket}.
+#   - Allow kms:GenerateDataKey + kms:Decrypt + kms:DescribeKey on the CMK.
+#   - **Explicit Deny** s3:BypassGovernanceRetention and s3:PutObjectLegalHold
+#     on ${bucket}/* — the explicit deny survives any future broadening of
+#     the role's IAM grants (matches master plan U7 line 517).
+#
+# Inert seam:
+#   - U7 ships the role; no Lambda assumes it until U8a (master plan
+#     Decision #9 — inert→live seam swap).
+#
+# `force_destroy = false` is hardcoded. Object Lock + force_destroy is
+# pathologically incompatible: COMPLIANCE-mode buckets cannot be emptied
+# until retention expires; GOVERNANCE-mode emptying requires
+# s3:BypassGovernanceRetention which we explicitly deny on the Lambda role.
+# Dev cleanup is documented in README.md (admin role + bypass flag).
+################################################################################
+
+resource "aws_s3_bucket" "anchor" {
+  bucket              = var.bucket_name
+  object_lock_enabled = true
+
+  # Hardcoded false — see header comment.
+  force_destroy = false
+
+  tags = {
+    Name      = var.bucket_name
+    Stage     = var.stage
+    Purpose   = "compliance-anchors"
+    Retention = "${var.retention_days}d"
+  }
+}
+
+resource "aws_s3_bucket_versioning" "anchor" {
+  bucket = aws_s3_bucket.anchor.id
+
+  # Object Lock requires versioning. Enabling Object Lock at bucket creation
+  # auto-enables versioning at the AWS level, but the provider model still
+  # expects this resource declared for state tracking and drift detection.
+  versioning_configuration {
+    status = "Enabled"
+  }
+}
+
+resource "aws_s3_bucket_object_lock_configuration" "anchor" {
+  bucket = aws_s3_bucket.anchor.id
+
+  # AWS rejects PutBucketObjectLockConfiguration before versioning is
+  # Enabled. The explicit dependency prevents Terraform from applying both
+  # in parallel and getting a 400 from S3 (InvalidRequest: Versioning must
+  # be Enabled). We use the standalone resource (not the deprecated inline
+  # block on aws_s3_bucket) because the inline form is not drift-detected
+  # by Terraform — see HashiCorp v4.0 S3 refactor blog.
+  depends_on = [aws_s3_bucket_versioning.anchor]
+
+  # Production stages must run COMPLIANCE mode. GOVERNANCE-mode in prod
+  # would let any principal with s3:BypassGovernanceRetention shorten or
+  # delete retention windows — the auditor question "can anyone bypass
+  # this?" gets the wrong answer. README documents the cutover playbook
+  # (one-line tfvars change at audit-engagement time). This precondition
+  # closes the operator-memory gap by failing the plan instead of silently
+  # shipping a misconfigured bucket.
+  lifecycle {
+    precondition {
+      condition     = !(contains(["prod", "production"], var.stage) && var.mode == "GOVERNANCE")
+      error_message = "var.mode must be COMPLIANCE for prod stages (var.stage = '${var.stage}'). See terraform/modules/data/compliance-audit-bucket/README.md COMPLIANCE-mode cutover playbook. Override at audit-engagement time via the composite-root tfvars compliance_anchor_object_lock_mode = \"COMPLIANCE\"."
+    }
+    # Phase 3 U8b — block COMPLIANCE on non-prod by default (Decision #18).
+    # COMPLIANCE bytes are unrecoverable for the full retention window even by
+    # AWS root, so a typo'd stage name producing a dev-bucket COMPLIANCE
+    # cluster is a one-way disaster. The operator sets
+    # `allow_compliance_in_non_prod = true` in tfvars on the specific
+    # non-prod stage where COMPLIANCE is intentional (e.g., a staging
+    # rehearsal stage during audit prep).
+    precondition {
+      condition     = !(!contains(["prod", "production"], var.stage) && var.mode == "COMPLIANCE") || var.allow_compliance_in_non_prod
+      error_message = "var.mode = \"COMPLIANCE\" on non-prod stage '${var.stage}' is blocked by default. COMPLIANCE bytes are unrecoverable for the full ${var.retention_days}-day retention window. To intentionally enable on this stage, set `allow_compliance_in_non_prod = true` in tfvars. See terraform/modules/data/compliance-audit-bucket/README.md."
+    }
+  }
+
+  rule {
+    default_retention {
+      mode = var.mode
+      days = var.retention_days
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+resource "aws_s3_bucket_server_side_encryption_configuration" "anchor" {
+  bucket = aws_s3_bucket.anchor.id
+
+  # Resource-level precondition: belt-and-suspenders alongside the variable
+  # validation. If module.kms.key_arn is ever empty (e.g., create_kms_key =
+  # false somewhere upstream without an existing_kms_key_arn), fail at plan
+  # time, not apply time.
+  lifecycle {
+    precondition {
+      condition     = length(var.kms_key_arn) > 0
+      error_message = "kms_key_arn must be non-empty — check that module.kms is enabled in the composite root."
+    }
+  }
+
+  rule {
+    apply_server_side_encryption_by_default {
+      sse_algorithm     = "aws:kms"
+      kms_master_key_id = var.kms_key_arn
+    }
+
+    # Bucket Key reduces KMS request volume by up to 99%. With Bucket Key
+    # enabled, the KMS encryption context is the bucket ARN, not the
+    # object ARN — relevant if a future per-object encryption-context
+    # condition lands.
+    bucket_key_enabled = true
+  }
+}
+
+resource "aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block" "anchor" {
+  bucket = aws_s3_bucket.anchor.id
+
+  block_public_acls       = true
+  block_public_policy     = true
+  ignore_public_acls      = true
+  restrict_public_buckets = true
+}
+
+resource "aws_s3_bucket_lifecycle_configuration" "anchor" {
+  bucket = aws_s3_bucket.anchor.id
+
+  # Object Lock requires versioning, which the lifecycle config interacts
+  # with via noncurrent_version_*. Sequence after versioning to avoid the
+  # provider's "must enable versioning before lifecycle on a versioned
+  # bucket" warning on first apply.
+  depends_on = [aws_s3_bucket_versioning.anchor]
+
+  rule {
+    id     = "anchor-glacier-ir"
+    status = "Enabled"
+
+    # Scope to anchors/ — long-lived WORM evidence is the only thing worth
+    # transitioning. proofs/ is short-lived per-tenant slice data (U8b
+    # owns retention semantics there) and small enough that Glacier IR's
+    # 90-day billing minimum eats any savings.
+    filter {
+      prefix = "anchors/"
+    }
+
+    transition {
+      days          = 90
+      storage_class = "GLACIER_IR"
+    }
+
+    # Defense for hypothetical overwrite events (anchors are append-only by
+    # design but versioning is on). 90-day floor matches the Glacier IR
+    # billing minimum.
+    noncurrent_version_transition {
+      noncurrent_days = 90
+      storage_class   = "GLACIER_IR"
+    }
+
+    # **No** expiration. Object Lock retention is the deletion gate. Post-
+    # 365-day disposition (anchors become deletable but won't auto-delete)
+    # is deferred to a follow-up after SOC2 auditor guidance — see plan
+    # Scope Boundaries.
+  }
+}
+
+resource "aws_s3_bucket_policy" "anchor" {
+  bucket = aws_s3_bucket.anchor.id
+
+  # aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block must apply first; otherwise account-
+  # level BPA defaults can intermittently reject the bucket-policy PUT with
+  # AccessDenied during initial apply.
+  depends_on = [aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block.anchor]
+
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [
+      {
+        Sid       = "EnforceHTTPS"
+        Effect    = "Deny"
+        Principal = "*"
+        Action    = "s3:*"
+        Resource = [
+          aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn,
+          "${aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn}/*",
+        ]
+        Condition = {
+          Bool = {
+            "aws:SecureTransport" = "false"
+          }
+        }
+      },
+      {
+        # Defense-in-depth against accidental or malicious object deletes.
+        # The anchor Lambda role's allow grants do NOT include any Delete
+        # action; this policy prevents any other principal (including a
+        # principal that gains s3:BypassGovernanceRetention via a future
+        # role broadening) from removing audit evidence. Master plan
+        # U7 line 518.
+        Sid       = "DenyDeleteObject"
+        Effect    = "Deny"
+        Principal = "*"
+        Action = [
+          "s3:DeleteObject",
+          "s3:DeleteObjectVersion",
+        ]
+        Resource = "${aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn}/*"
+      },
+      {
+        # Defense-in-depth against bucket-level deletion. Object Lock
+        # protects the *contents*; this protects the *container* for the
+        # post-retention window when objects become deletable. We do NOT
+        # deny PutBucketPolicy / DeleteBucketPolicy here because Terraform
+        # itself calls PutBucketPolicy to manage this resource — denying
+        # it would lock out future module updates. Policy-rewrite defense
+        # belongs at the IAM-policy layer on the deploying principal, not
+        # at the bucket-policy layer.
+        Sid       = "DenyBucketDelete"
+        Effect    = "Deny"
+        Principal = "*"
+        Action = [
+          "s3:DeleteBucket",
+        ]
+        Resource = aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn
+      },
+    ]
+  })
+}
+
+################################################################################
+# IAM role for the anchor Lambda (U8a/U8b assumes this role).
+#
+# **Inert in U7.** No Lambda function references this role yet; U8a wires
+# the function. The role exists so U7 ships a complete, atomic infrastructure
+# unit (master plan U7 file list).
+################################################################################
+
+resource "aws_iam_role" "anchor_lambda" {
+  name = "thinkwork-${var.stage}-compliance-anchor-lambda-role"
+
+  # Phase 3 U8a — `aws:SourceArn` pin via string-construction to avoid
+  # the circular dependency between this trust policy and the anchor
+  # Lambda function (defined in lambda-api/handlers.tf, which depends on
+  # this role's ARN). The function name follows the predictable pattern
+  # `thinkwork-${stage}-api-compliance-anchor` so the literal ARN is
+  # known at plan time.
+  #
+  # `StringEquals` (NOT `StringEqualsIfExists`) so a missing/empty
+  # SourceArn on the AssumeRole call DENIES rather than no-ops.
+  assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [{
+      Effect    = "Allow"
+      Principal = { Service = "lambda.amazonaws.com" }
+      Action    = "sts:AssumeRole"
+      Condition = {
+        StringEquals = {
+          "aws:SourceAccount" = var.account_id
+          "aws:SourceArn"     = "arn:aws:lambda:${var.region}:${var.account_id}:function:thinkwork-${var.stage}-api-compliance-anchor"
+        }
+      }
+    }]
+  })
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "anchor_basic" {
+  role       = aws_iam_role.anchor_lambda.name
+  policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole"
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "anchor_s3_allow" {
+  name = "anchor-s3"
+  role = aws_iam_role.anchor_lambda.id
+
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [
+      {
+        # Object-side actions — path-scoped to the two prefixes we use.
+        # The wildcard inside the prefix is intentional (per-cadence object
+        # keys vary), but the prefix itself is fixed.
+        Sid    = "AnchorObjectsAllow"
+        Effect = "Allow"
+        Action = [
+          "s3:PutObject",
+          "s3:PutObjectRetention",
+          "s3:GetObject",
+          "s3:GetObjectRetention",
+        ]
+        Resource = [
+          "${aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn}/anchors/*",
+          "${aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn}/proofs/*",
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        # Bucket-side action — read-only metadata about Object Lock config
+        # (the Lambda verifies the bucket is locked before writing).
+        Sid    = "AnchorBucketAllow"
+        Effect = "Allow"
+        Action = [
+          "s3:GetBucketObjectLockConfiguration",
+        ]
+        Resource = aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn
+      },
+      {
+        # **Explicit Deny** — survives a future broadening of the role's
+        # IAM grants. Without this, a permissions-boundary change, an
+        # AWS-managed-policy attachment containing s3:*, or an SCP grant
+        # could silently re-enable WORM bypass. Master plan U7 line 517.
+        Sid    = "DenyWormBypass"
+        Effect = "Deny"
+        Action = [
+          "s3:BypassGovernanceRetention",
+          "s3:PutObjectLegalHold",
+        ]
+        Resource = "${aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn}/*"
+      },
+    ]
+  })
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "anchor_kms" {
+  name = "anchor-kms"
+  role = aws_iam_role.anchor_lambda.id
+
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [
+      {
+        Sid    = "AnchorKmsAllow"
+        Effect = "Allow"
+        # SSE-KMS PutObject (envelope encryption) needs only GenerateDataKey.
+        # DescribeKey is the SDK pre-flight check some clients perform.
+        # `kms:Decrypt` was removed in U8b — the anchor Lambda only writes;
+        # the verifier (U9, separate role) is the read path. Least-privilege.
+        Action = [
+          "kms:GenerateDataKey",
+          "kms:DescribeKey",
+        ]
+        Resource = var.kms_key_arn
+      },
+    ]
+  })
+}
+
+# Phase 3 U8a — Secrets Manager read for the two compliance Aurora roles
+# the anchor Lambda connects as (compliance_reader for SELECT,
+# compliance_drainer for UPDATE on tenant_anchor_state).
+#
+# Note: today the compliance secrets use `aws/secretsmanager` (default
+# AWS-managed key) so no explicit KMS Decrypt grant is needed. If a
+# future hardening pass migrates the secrets to a customer-managed CMK,
+# add `kms:Decrypt` on that CMK to this role — the failure mode is a
+# confusing AccessDeniedException from KMS, not Secrets Manager.
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "anchor_secrets" {
+  name = "anchor-secrets"
+  role = aws_iam_role.anchor_lambda.id
+
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [
+      {
+        Sid    = "AnchorSecretsAllow"
+        Effect = "Allow"
+        Action = ["secretsmanager:GetSecretValue"]
+        Resource = [
+          var.compliance_reader_secret_arn,
+          var.compliance_drainer_secret_arn,
+        ]
+      },
+    ]
+  })
+}
+
+# Phase 3 U8a — CloudWatch PutMetricData for the watchdog heartbeat
+# (Decision #16) and U8b's live ComplianceAnchorGap. Namespace-scoped
+# via condition so the role cannot publish into other namespaces.
+#
+# **Note on least-privilege:** the anchor Lambda itself never emits
+# metrics in U8a (only the watchdog does, via the shared lambda role's
+# compliance_watchdog_metrics policy). This grant on the U7 anchor role
+# is pre-plumbed for U8b — at which point the anchor Lambda may emit
+# its own metrics around the live S3 path. If U8b doesn't end up
+# needing it, this policy can be removed in U8b's PR.
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "anchor_cloudwatch_metrics" {
+  name = "anchor-cloudwatch-metrics"
+  role = aws_iam_role.anchor_lambda.id
+
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [
+      {
+        Sid      = "AnchorMetricsAllow"
+        Effect   = "Allow"
+        Action   = ["cloudwatch:PutMetricData"]
+        Resource = "*"
+        Condition = {
+          StringEquals = {
+            "cloudwatch:namespace" = "Thinkwork/Compliance"
+          }
+        }
+      },
+    ]
+  })
+}
+
+################################################################################
+# Phase 3 U8b — Sibling IAM role for the anchor watchdog Lambda.
+#
+# The watchdog moves OFF the shared `aws_iam_role.lambda` (which is bound
+# to ~60 unrelated handlers) onto a dedicated role. Two reasons:
+#   1. Least privilege — the watchdog needs s3:ListBucket + s3:GetObject
+#      against the WORM bucket, plus kms:DescribeKey on the CMK. Adding
+#      those grants to the shared lambda role widens the blast radius for
+#      every other handler.
+#   2. KMS posture — the watchdog gets `kms:DescribeKey` ONLY (NOT
+#      `kms:Decrypt`). Watchdog never reads object bodies; it issues
+#      ListObjectsV2 + LastModified metadata only. Decrypt-less is the
+#      correct boundary (Decision #5 / SEC-U8B-003).
+#
+# Policy boundary mirrors the anchor role: s3:* path-scoped to anchors/
+# (the watchdog only inspects the anchors/ prefix), explicit Deny on
+# s3:BypassGovernanceRetention + s3:PutObjectLegalHold + every Delete
+# action so a future broadening cannot turn the watchdog into a deletion
+# vector.
+################################################################################
+
+resource "aws_iam_role" "anchor_watchdog_lambda" {
+  name = "thinkwork-${var.stage}-compliance-anchor-watchdog"
+
+  # `aws:SourceArn` pin via string-construction — the watchdog Lambda's
+  # ARN follows the same predictable pattern as the anchor's, so we can
+  # tighten the trust policy without a circular dependency.
+  assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [{
+      Effect    = "Allow"
+      Principal = { Service = "lambda.amazonaws.com" }
+      Action    = "sts:AssumeRole"
+      Condition = {
+        StringEquals = {
+          "aws:SourceAccount" = var.account_id
+          "aws:SourceArn"     = "arn:aws:lambda:${var.region}:${var.account_id}:function:thinkwork-${var.stage}-api-compliance-anchor-watchdog"
+        }
+      }
+    }]
+  })
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "anchor_watchdog_basic" {
+  role       = aws_iam_role.anchor_watchdog_lambda.name
+  policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole"
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "anchor_watchdog_s3" {
+  name = "anchor-watchdog-s3"
+  role = aws_iam_role.anchor_watchdog_lambda.id
+
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [
+      {
+        # Bucket-scoped ListBucket — prefix-conditioned so the watchdog
+        # cannot enumerate proofs/ (which carries per-tenant metadata that
+        # need not be visible to a metrics-only path).
+        Sid      = "WatchdogListBucket"
+        Effect   = "Allow"
+        Action   = ["s3:ListBucket"]
+        Resource = aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn
+        Condition = {
+          StringLike = {
+            "s3:prefix" = ["anchors/", "anchors/*"]
+          }
+        }
+      },
+      {
+        # GetObject grant on anchors/* is reserved for future HeadObject
+        # hardening — U8b's path uses ListObjectsV2 metadata only and
+        # never fetches body bytes. Granting now avoids re-running the
+        # IAM role-policy update on a hot-path the day we add HeadObject.
+        Sid      = "WatchdogGetAnchor"
+        Effect   = "Allow"
+        Action   = ["s3:GetObject"]
+        Resource = "${aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn}/anchors/*"
+      },
+      {
+        # Defense-in-depth: even though the role's allow grants do not
+        # include any Delete or Bypass action, an explicit Deny survives
+        # any future role broadening (e.g., AWS-managed-policy attachment).
+        Sid    = "WatchdogDenyMutations"
+        Effect = "Deny"
+        Action = [
+          "s3:DeleteObject",
+          "s3:DeleteObjectVersion",
+          "s3:PutObject",
+          "s3:PutObjectRetention",
+          "s3:PutObjectLegalHold",
+          "s3:BypassGovernanceRetention",
+        ]
+        Resource = "${aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn}/*"
+      },
+    ]
+  })
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "anchor_watchdog_kms" {
+  name = "anchor-watchdog-kms"
+  role = aws_iam_role.anchor_watchdog_lambda.id
+
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [
+      {
+        # `kms:DescribeKey` ONLY — the watchdog never reads object bodies
+        # so it never needs `kms:Decrypt`. SEC-U8B-003.
+        Sid      = "WatchdogKmsDescribe"
+        Effect   = "Allow"
+        Action   = ["kms:DescribeKey"]
+        Resource = var.kms_key_arn
+      },
+    ]
+  })
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "anchor_watchdog_cloudwatch_metrics" {
+  name = "anchor-watchdog-cloudwatch-metrics"
+  role = aws_iam_role.anchor_watchdog_lambda.id
+
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [
+      {
+        Sid      = "WatchdogMetricsAllow"
+        Effect   = "Allow"
+        Action   = ["cloudwatch:PutMetricData"]
+        Resource = "*"
+        Condition = {
+          StringEquals = {
+            "cloudwatch:namespace" = "Thinkwork/Compliance"
+          }
+        }
+      },
+    ]
+  })
+}

package/dist/terraform/modules/data/compliance-audit-bucket/outputs.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+################################################################################
+# Compliance Audit Bucket — Outputs
+################################################################################
+
+output "bucket_name" {
+  description = "Name (id) of the compliance audit-anchor S3 bucket."
+  value       = aws_s3_bucket.anchor.id
+}
+
+output "bucket_arn" {
+  description = "ARN of the compliance audit-anchor S3 bucket."
+  value       = aws_s3_bucket.anchor.arn
+}
+
+output "lambda_role_arn" {
+  description = "ARN of the IAM role the anchor Lambda (U8a/U8b) will assume. Inert in U7 — no Lambda function references this yet."
+  value       = aws_iam_role.anchor_lambda.arn
+}
+
+output "lambda_role_name" {
+  description = "Name of the IAM role the anchor Lambda assumes. Used by sibling app-tier modules that need to attach inline policies (e.g., DLQ SendMessage) to this role without re-deriving the name from the ARN."
+  value       = aws_iam_role.anchor_lambda.name
+}
+
+output "watchdog_role_arn" {
+  description = "ARN of the sibling IAM role the watchdog Lambda assumes (Phase 3 U8b). Decrypt-less: kms:DescribeKey only on the bucket CMK; s3:ListBucket prefix-scoped to anchors/."
+  value       = aws_iam_role.anchor_watchdog_lambda.arn
+}
+
+output "watchdog_role_name" {
+  description = "Name of the sibling watchdog IAM role. Used by app-tier modules that may need to attach future inline policies (e.g., DLQ SendMessage) without re-deriving the name from the ARN."
+  value       = aws_iam_role.anchor_watchdog_lambda.name
+}
+
+output "kms_key_arn" {
+  description = "Pass-through of var.kms_key_arn so app-tier modules can wire the CMK ARN into the anchor Lambda's COMPLIANCE_ANCHOR_KMS_KEY_ARN env var without taking a second dependency on module.kms."
+  value       = var.kms_key_arn
+}
+
+output "object_lock_mode" {
+  description = "Pass-through of var.mode so app-tier modules can wire the Object Lock mode into the anchor Lambda's COMPLIANCE_ANCHOR_OBJECT_LOCK_MODE env var. Whatever the bucket is locked to is what the per-object writes assert."
+  value       = var.mode
+}