thinkwork-cli 0.12.12 → 0.12.16

package/dist/drizzle/0069_compliance_schema.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
+-- 0069_compliance_schema.sql
+--
+-- Phase 3 U1 of the System Workflows revert + Compliance reframe.
+-- Greenfield `compliance.*` Postgres schema for the SOC2 Type 1
+-- evidence-foundation: append-only audit-event log with per-tenant
+-- hash chain (computed app-side by the U4 drainer Lambda), an outbox
+-- table providing same-transaction durability for control-evidence
+-- writes, an opaque actor pseudonym table erasable on GDPR RTBF, and
+-- an export-jobs table for the admin async-export flow.
+--
+-- The 11 Postgres tables that backed System Workflows + Activation
+-- were dropped in Phase 2 U6 (drizzle/0068_drop_system_workflows_and_activation.sql,
+-- shipped via PR #873 + #878). This migration is greenfield in the
+-- new `compliance.*` namespace; nothing is renamed or repointed.
+--
+-- Plan reference:
+--   docs/plans/2026-05-06-011-feat-compliance-audit-event-log-plan.md
+--
+-- Origin brainstorm:
+--   docs/brainstorms/2026-05-06-system-workflows-revert-compliance-reframe-requirements.md
+--
+-- Apply manually:
+--   psql "$DATABASE_URL" -f packages/database-pg/drizzle/0069_compliance_schema.sql
+-- Then verify:
+--   pnpm db:migrate-manual
+--   psql "$DATABASE_URL" -c "\dt compliance.*"
+--
+-- Role separation note: this migration creates the schema and tables
+-- with default permissions. Aurora role provisioning (compliance_writer,
+-- compliance_reader) lands in U2 via Terraform; until then the dev DB's
+-- default app role can read and write `compliance.*` freely. Phase B
+-- writers (U3-U6) and the drainer (U4) are inert pre-U2 — no rows
+-- accumulate in dev before the role lockdown ships.
+--
+-- Markers (consumed by scripts/db-migrate-manual.sh as the post-deploy drift gate):
+--
+-- creates: compliance.audit_outbox
+-- creates: compliance.audit_events
+-- creates: compliance.actor_pseudonym
+-- creates: compliance.export_jobs
+-- creates: compliance.idx_audit_outbox_pending
+-- creates: compliance.idx_audit_outbox_tenant_enqueued
+-- creates: compliance.idx_audit_events_tenant_occurred
+-- creates: compliance.idx_audit_events_tenant_event_type
+-- creates: compliance.idx_audit_events_actor
+-- creates: compliance.idx_audit_events_control_ids
+-- creates: compliance.uq_audit_events_event_id
+-- creates: compliance.uq_audit_events_outbox_id
+-- creates: compliance.uq_audit_outbox_event_id
+-- creates: compliance.idx_actor_pseudonym_user
+-- creates: compliance.idx_actor_pseudonym_email_hash
+-- creates: compliance.idx_export_jobs_tenant_requested
+-- creates: compliance.idx_export_jobs_actor_requested
+-- creates-constraint: compliance.audit_events.audit_events_actor_type_allowed
+-- These two prefix constraints were renamed to *_v2 by 0088 (finance pilot
+-- extended the event_type prefixes). Markers updated to the post-0088 names
+-- so the drift reporter resolves them via pg_constraint; the original names
+-- are guaranteed absent in any DB where 0088 has applied.
+-- creates-constraint: compliance.audit_events.audit_events_event_type_prefix_v2
+-- creates-constraint: compliance.audit_outbox.audit_outbox_event_type_prefix_v2
+-- creates-constraint: compliance.export_jobs.export_jobs_format_allowed
+-- creates-constraint: compliance.export_jobs.export_jobs_status_allowed
+-- creates-constraint: compliance.actor_pseudonym.actor_pseudonym_actor_type_allowed
+-- creates-function: compliance.raise_immutable
+-- creates-trigger: compliance.audit_events.audit_events_block_update
+-- creates-trigger: compliance.audit_events.audit_events_block_delete
+-- creates-trigger: compliance.audit_events.audit_events_block_truncate
+
+\set ON_ERROR_STOP on
+
+BEGIN;
+
+SET LOCAL lock_timeout = '5s';
+SET LOCAL statement_timeout = '60s';
+
+-- Refuse to apply against an unexpected DB. Hand-rolled migrations are
+-- applied by an operator and a stale DATABASE_URL pointing at a non-dev
+-- target would create the schema in the wrong place.
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+  IF current_database() != 'thinkwork' THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'wrong database: %, expected thinkwork', current_database();
+  END IF;
+END $$;
+
+CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS compliance;
+COMMENT ON SCHEMA compliance IS
+  'SOC2 audit-event log + tamper evidence. App role writes to audit_outbox; drainer writes to audit_events; admin role reads. See docs/plans/2026-05-06-011-feat-compliance-audit-event-log-plan.md.';
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- compliance.audit_outbox
+--
+-- Same-transaction durability tier for control-evidence writes (R6).
+-- A resolver or handler inserts here inside its primary `db.transaction`;
+-- if the originating action commits, the outbox row is visible. The U4
+-- single-writer drainer Lambda (reserved-concurrency=1) polls
+-- `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED LIMIT 1`, computes per-tenant prev_hash +
+-- event_hash, writes to audit_events keyed on outbox_id (UNIQUE), and
+-- marks drained_at. Idempotent on outbox_id replay.
+--
+-- The full envelope (R5) is stored here so the drainer is a pure
+-- chain-and-copy operation; outbox rows are not summary records but
+-- the canonical pre-chain representation.
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS compliance.audit_outbox (
+  outbox_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
+  event_id uuid NOT NULL,
+  tenant_id uuid NOT NULL,
+  occurred_at timestamp with time zone NOT NULL,
+  enqueued_at timestamp with time zone NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  drained_at timestamp with time zone,
+  drainer_error text,
+  actor text NOT NULL,
+  actor_type text NOT NULL,
+  source text NOT NULL,
+  event_type text NOT NULL,
+  resource_type text,
+  resource_id text,
+  action text,
+  outcome text,
+  request_id text,
+  thread_id uuid,
+  agent_id uuid,
+  payload jsonb NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
+  payload_schema_version integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+  control_ids text[] NOT NULL DEFAULT ARRAY[]::text[],
+  payload_redacted_fields text[] NOT NULL DEFAULT ARRAY[]::text[],
+  payload_oversize_s3_key text,
+  CONSTRAINT audit_outbox_event_type_prefix CHECK (
+    event_type ~ '^(auth|user|agent|mcp|workspace|data|policy|approval)\.'
+  )
+);
+
+COMMENT ON TABLE compliance.audit_outbox IS
+  'Pre-chain durability tier. Writers insert in caller transaction; U4 drainer Lambda single-writer polls FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED, computes per-tenant chain, inserts to audit_events.';
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_audit_outbox_event_id
+  ON compliance.audit_outbox (event_id);
+
+-- Partial index over un-drained rows so the drainer's poll query stays
+-- O(N pending) regardless of total outbox volume.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_outbox_pending
+  ON compliance.audit_outbox (enqueued_at)
+  WHERE drained_at IS NULL;
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_outbox_tenant_enqueued
+  ON compliance.audit_outbox (tenant_id, enqueued_at);
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- compliance.audit_events
+--
+-- Append-only audit-event log (R5). Per-tenant hash chain via prev_hash
+-- + event_hash, both computed app-side by the U4 drainer Lambda. INSERT
+-- is the only legal mutation; UPDATE and DELETE are rejected by the
+-- compliance.raise_immutable() trigger below as defense-in-depth on top
+-- of the role grants U2 ships.
+--
+-- The 22-field envelope plus payload_oversize_s3_key (oversized payloads
+-- spill to S3 with the key reference recorded here) and outbox_id (link
+-- back to the originating outbox row, idempotency key for drainer
+-- replay).
+--
+-- prev_hash is nullable: the genesis event in each tenant's chain has
+-- no prior hash. event_hash is non-nullable: every row commits to its
+-- own hash so the chain is verifiable from any anchor backwards.
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS compliance.audit_events (
+  event_id uuid PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+  outbox_id uuid NOT NULL,
+  tenant_id uuid NOT NULL,
+  occurred_at timestamp with time zone NOT NULL,
+  recorded_at timestamp with time zone NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  actor text NOT NULL,
+  actor_type text NOT NULL,
+  source text NOT NULL,
+  event_type text NOT NULL,
+  resource_type text,
+  resource_id text,
+  action text,
+  outcome text,
+  request_id text,
+  thread_id uuid,
+  agent_id uuid,
+  payload jsonb NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
+  payload_schema_version integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+  control_ids text[] NOT NULL DEFAULT ARRAY[]::text[],
+  payload_redacted_fields text[] NOT NULL DEFAULT ARRAY[]::text[],
+  payload_oversize_s3_key text,
+  prev_hash char(64),
+  event_hash char(64) NOT NULL,
+  CONSTRAINT audit_events_actor_type_allowed CHECK (
+    actor_type IN ('user', 'system', 'agent')
+  ),
+  CONSTRAINT audit_events_event_type_prefix CHECK (
+    event_type ~ '^(auth|user|agent|mcp|workspace|data|policy|approval)\.'
+  )
+);
+
+COMMENT ON TABLE compliance.audit_events IS
+  'Append-only audit-event log. Written ONLY by the U4 drainer Lambda. INSERT-only by role + immutability triggers. Per-tenant hash chain (prev_hash, event_hash). Tamper evidence anchored periodically by U8 to S3 Object Lock.';
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_audit_events_event_id
+  ON compliance.audit_events (event_id);
+
+-- outbox_id UNIQUE provides drainer-replay idempotency: a re-invocation
+-- on the same outbox row attempts an INSERT that conflicts and is
+-- handled by ON CONFLICT (outbox_id) DO NOTHING in the drainer.
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_audit_events_outbox_id
+  ON compliance.audit_events (outbox_id);
+
+-- Per-tenant time-ordered listing — admin Events list default sort.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_events_tenant_occurred
+  ON compliance.audit_events (tenant_id, occurred_at DESC);
+
+-- Filter by event_type (R8) often combined with tenant + time.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_events_tenant_event_type
+  ON compliance.audit_events (tenant_id, event_type, occurred_at DESC);
+
+-- Filter by actor (R8) — actor stored as opaque text id.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_events_actor
+  ON compliance.audit_events (actor);
+
+-- Control-evidence exports filter by control_ids[] (e.g. CC6.1, CC8.1).
+-- GIN supports `control_ids @> ARRAY['CC6.1']` membership lookups.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_events_control_ids
+  ON compliance.audit_events USING GIN (control_ids);
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- compliance.actor_pseudonym
+--
+-- GDPR right-to-be-forgotten enabler (Decision #5). The audit chain
+-- hashes the opaque `actor` text id, never PII. This table maps
+-- actor_id → user_id + email_hash. RTBF erasure deletes the pseudonym
+-- row; the chain remains valid (no audit_events row mutates) but
+-- actor → person resolution is lost. EDPB recognizes this as effective
+-- erasure when re-identification is no longer reasonably possible.
+--
+-- email_hash is sha256 of the lowercased email — supports typeahead
+-- lookup in the admin Events list filter without storing plaintext.
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS compliance.actor_pseudonym (
+  actor_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
+  user_id uuid,
+  email_hash char(64),
+  actor_type text NOT NULL,
+  display_name text,
+  created_at timestamp with time zone NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  CONSTRAINT actor_pseudonym_actor_type_allowed CHECK (
+    actor_type IN ('user', 'system', 'agent')
+  )
+);
+
+COMMENT ON TABLE compliance.actor_pseudonym IS
+  'Opaque actor_id ↔ user_id + email_hash mapping. GDPR RTBF: deleting a row breaks actor→person resolution while leaving the audit chain intact. Hash chain hashes actor_id, never PII.';
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_actor_pseudonym_user
+  ON compliance.actor_pseudonym (user_id)
+  WHERE user_id IS NOT NULL;
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_actor_pseudonym_email_hash
+  ON compliance.actor_pseudonym (email_hash)
+  WHERE email_hash IS NOT NULL;
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- compliance.export_jobs
+--
+-- Async CSV/JSON export tracking (R9, U11). createAuditExport mutation
+-- inserts a queued row, sends an SQS message, and returns job_id. The
+-- export-runner Lambda transitions queued → running → complete (or
+-- failed), writes the multipart upload to a non-Object-Lock S3 prefix,
+-- and publishes a 15-minute presigned URL.
+--
+-- 90-day max date range and 10/hour/admin rate limit are enforced at
+-- the resolver layer (U11), not in the schema. The schema permits any
+-- filter shape but the GraphQL mutation rejects out-of-bounds requests
+-- before the row lands.
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS compliance.export_jobs (
+  job_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
+  tenant_id uuid NOT NULL,
+  requested_by_actor_id uuid NOT NULL,
+  filter jsonb NOT NULL,
+  format text NOT NULL,
+  status text NOT NULL DEFAULT 'queued',
+  s3_key text,
+  presigned_url text,
+  presigned_url_expires_at timestamp with time zone,
+  job_error text,
+  requested_at timestamp with time zone NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  started_at timestamp with time zone,
+  completed_at timestamp with time zone,
+  CONSTRAINT export_jobs_format_allowed CHECK (
+    format IN ('csv', 'json')
+  ),
+  CONSTRAINT export_jobs_status_allowed CHECK (
+    status IN ('queued', 'running', 'complete', 'failed')
+  )
+);
+
+COMMENT ON TABLE compliance.export_jobs IS
+  'Admin async-export job tracking. createAuditExport mutation enforces 90-day max range + 10/hour/admin rate limit before insert. export-runner Lambda streams CSV/NDJSON to S3 + publishes 15min presigned URL.';
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_export_jobs_tenant_requested
+  ON compliance.export_jobs (tenant_id, requested_at DESC);
+
+-- Rate-limit check at the resolver layer queries by (tenant, actor, recent window).
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_export_jobs_actor_requested
+  ON compliance.export_jobs (tenant_id, requested_by_actor_id, requested_at DESC);
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Immutability trigger function + per-table triggers
+--
+-- Defense-in-depth on top of the role grants U2 ships. Even if the
+-- writer role is mis-granted UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE on audit_events
+-- (config drift, mistaken break-glass grant, future privileged role),
+-- the triggers RAISE EXCEPTION before the change applies.
+--
+-- TRUNCATE bypasses BEFORE DELETE triggers in Postgres — it has its own
+-- BEFORE TRUNCATE trigger that fires FOR EACH STATEMENT. Without the
+-- truncate trigger, an actor with TRUNCATE privilege could wipe the
+-- entire audit log without producing the immutability error. The
+-- trigger function below switches on TG_OP so a single function serves
+-- ROW-level (UPDATE/DELETE) and STATEMENT-level (TRUNCATE) firings.
+--
+-- DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS + CREATE TRIGGER is the portable idempotent
+-- pattern; CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER is Postgres 14+ but DROP IF EXISTS
+-- works identically on every supported version.
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION compliance.raise_immutable()
+RETURNS TRIGGER
+LANGUAGE plpgsql
+AS $$
+BEGIN
+  IF TG_OP = 'TRUNCATE' THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'compliance.audit_events rows are immutable (TRUNCATE blocked)';
+  END IF;
+  RAISE EXCEPTION 'compliance.audit_events rows are immutable (event_id=%)', COALESCE(OLD.event_id::text, NEW.event_id::text);
+END;
+$$;
+
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_events_block_update ON compliance.audit_events;
+CREATE TRIGGER audit_events_block_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON compliance.audit_events
+FOR EACH ROW
+EXECUTE FUNCTION compliance.raise_immutable();
+
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_events_block_delete ON compliance.audit_events;
+CREATE TRIGGER audit_events_block_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON compliance.audit_events
+FOR EACH ROW
+EXECUTE FUNCTION compliance.raise_immutable();
+
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_events_block_truncate ON compliance.audit_events;
+CREATE TRIGGER audit_events_block_truncate
+BEFORE TRUNCATE ON compliance.audit_events
+FOR EACH STATEMENT
+EXECUTE FUNCTION compliance.raise_immutable();
+
+COMMIT;

package/dist/drizzle/0070_compliance_aurora_roles.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+-- 0070_compliance_aurora_roles.sql
+--
+-- Phase 3 U2 of the System Workflows revert + Compliance reframe.
+-- Provisions the three Aurora roles that scope per-tier access to the
+-- compliance.* schema introduced in U1 (drizzle/0069_compliance_schema.sql,
+-- merged via PR #880):
+--
+--   - compliance_writer:   USAGE on schema + INSERT only on audit_outbox
+--                          and export_jobs. Used by Yoga resolvers and
+--                          Lambda handlers via the U3 emitAuditEvent
+--                          helper.
+--   - compliance_drainer:  USAGE + SELECT/UPDATE on audit_outbox + SELECT
+--                          on actor_pseudonym + INSERT only on
+--                          audit_events. Used exclusively by the U4
+--                          single-writer outbox drainer Lambda
+--                          (reserved-concurrency=1).
+--   - compliance_reader:   USAGE + SELECT-only on all four compliance.*
+--                          tables. Used by the graphql-http Lambda for
+--                          the U10 admin Compliance section read paths.
+--
+-- Plan reference:
+--   docs/plans/2026-05-07-001-feat-compliance-u2-aurora-roles-plan.md
+--   docs/plans/2026-05-06-011-feat-compliance-audit-event-log-plan.md
+--
+-- Apply manually:
+--   The bootstrap helper script wraps this file with psql variable
+--   substitution + Secrets Manager population:
+--     STAGE=dev bash scripts/bootstrap-compliance-roles.sh
+--   Direct apply (advanced — must supply all three passwords):
+--     psql "$DATABASE_URL" \
+--       -v writer_pass="$COMPLIANCE_WRITER_PASS" \
+--       -v drainer_pass="$COMPLIANCE_DRAINER_PASS" \
+--       -v reader_pass="$COMPLIANCE_READER_PASS" \
+--       -f packages/database-pg/drizzle/0070_compliance_aurora_roles.sql
+--
+-- The DO $$ ... $$ blocks make role creation idempotent (re-running with
+-- new passwords runs ALTER ROLE; re-running with same passwords is a
+-- no-op). GRANT statements are inherently idempotent in PostgreSQL.
+--
+-- Markers (consumed by scripts/db-migrate-manual.sh as the post-deploy drift gate):
+--
+-- creates-role: compliance_writer
+-- creates-role: compliance_drainer
+-- creates-role: compliance_reader
+
+\set ON_ERROR_STOP on
+
+BEGIN;
+
+SET LOCAL lock_timeout = '5s';
+SET LOCAL statement_timeout = '60s';
+SET LOCAL "thinkwork.writer_pass" = :'writer_pass';
+SET LOCAL "thinkwork.drainer_pass" = :'drainer_pass';
+SET LOCAL "thinkwork.reader_pass" = :'reader_pass';
+
+-- Refuse to apply against an unexpected DB. Hand-rolled migrations are
+-- applied by an operator and a stale DATABASE_URL pointing at a non-dev
+-- target would create roles in the wrong cluster.
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+  IF current_database() != 'thinkwork' THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'wrong database: %, expected thinkwork', current_database();
+  END IF;
+END $$;
+
+-- Refuse to apply if the U1 compliance schema is missing. PostgreSQL
+-- CREATE ROLE is NOT transactional — it commits to pg_authid before the
+-- subsequent GRANT statements run, so a 0070 apply against a database
+-- without 0069 would leave three roles with passwords but zero grants.
+-- The drift gate then probes pg_roles and reports APPLIED, masking the
+-- partial state. This guard converts the silent partial failure into a
+-- hard stop before any role creation.
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT FROM information_schema.schemata WHERE schema_name = 'compliance') THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'compliance schema missing: apply drizzle/0069_compliance_schema.sql first (U1, PR #880)';
+  END IF;
+END $$;
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Role creation (idempotent)
+--
+-- Each block creates the role if missing, otherwise rotates the password
+-- via ALTER ROLE. CREATE ROLE has no IF NOT EXISTS form prior to PG 16,
+-- so the DO $$ ... pg_roles existence check is the portable idempotent
+-- pattern. ALTER ROLE on the same role with the same password is a
+-- no-op, so re-running with stable passwords is safe.
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'compliance_writer') THEN
+    EXECUTE format('CREATE ROLE compliance_writer WITH LOGIN PASSWORD %L', current_setting('thinkwork.writer_pass'));
+  ELSE
+    EXECUTE format('ALTER ROLE compliance_writer WITH LOGIN PASSWORD %L', current_setting('thinkwork.writer_pass'));
+  END IF;
+END $$;
+
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'compliance_drainer') THEN
+    EXECUTE format('CREATE ROLE compliance_drainer WITH LOGIN PASSWORD %L', current_setting('thinkwork.drainer_pass'));
+  ELSE
+    EXECUTE format('ALTER ROLE compliance_drainer WITH LOGIN PASSWORD %L', current_setting('thinkwork.drainer_pass'));
+  END IF;
+END $$;
+
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+  IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'compliance_reader') THEN
+    EXECUTE format('CREATE ROLE compliance_reader WITH LOGIN PASSWORD %L', current_setting('thinkwork.reader_pass'));
+  ELSE
+    EXECUTE format('ALTER ROLE compliance_reader WITH LOGIN PASSWORD %L', current_setting('thinkwork.reader_pass'));
+  END IF;
+END $$;
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Schema-level USAGE for all three roles
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA compliance TO compliance_writer, compliance_drainer, compliance_reader;
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- compliance_writer — INSERT only on audit_outbox + export_jobs
+--
+-- The U3 emitAuditEvent helper inserts into audit_outbox in the caller's
+-- transaction. The U11 createAuditExport mutation inserts into
+-- export_jobs. Writer has no SELECT, no UPDATE, no DELETE, no access to
+-- audit_events (only the drainer writes there) or actor_pseudonym (read
+-- via the reader role for typeahead lookups in the admin UI).
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+GRANT INSERT ON compliance.audit_outbox TO compliance_writer;
+GRANT INSERT ON compliance.export_jobs TO compliance_writer;
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- compliance_drainer — pulls outbox, computes hash chain, writes audit_events
+--
+-- SELECT + UPDATE on audit_outbox: poll FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED, mark
+-- drained_at on success, write drainer_error on failure.
+-- SELECT on actor_pseudonym: needed if the drainer canonicalizes the
+-- payload with actor_id resolution (Decision #5 in the master plan
+-- keeps actor_id opaque in audit rows; pseudonym lookup is read-only).
+-- INSERT on audit_events: append-only chained log.
+--
+-- No DELETE/TRUNCATE on any table — drainer never removes outbox rows
+-- (drained_at marker is the soft-tombstone) and never modifies historical
+-- audit events. The U1 immutability triggers are belt-and-suspenders on
+-- top of this grant boundary.
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+GRANT SELECT, UPDATE ON compliance.audit_outbox TO compliance_drainer;
+GRANT SELECT ON compliance.actor_pseudonym TO compliance_drainer;
+GRANT INSERT ON compliance.audit_events TO compliance_drainer;
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- compliance_reader — SELECT-only on all four tables
+--
+-- The U10 admin Compliance section reads via this role: events list,
+-- detail drawer, exports filter resolution, verification status panel,
+-- pseudonym typeahead resolution. No write surface; the U11 export
+-- mutation flow uses compliance_writer for the export_jobs INSERT and
+-- only reads via this role.
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+GRANT SELECT ON compliance.audit_outbox TO compliance_reader;
+GRANT SELECT ON compliance.audit_events TO compliance_reader;
+GRANT SELECT ON compliance.actor_pseudonym TO compliance_reader;
+GRANT SELECT ON compliance.export_jobs TO compliance_reader;
+
+COMMIT;

package/dist/drizzle/0072_threads_computer_ownership.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-- Add nullable Computer ownership to Threads for the feature-flagged
+-- ThinkWork Computer cutover.
+--
+-- Apply manually:
+--   psql "$DATABASE_URL" -f packages/database-pg/drizzle/0072_threads_computer_ownership.sql
+--
+-- creates-column: public.threads.computer_id
+-- creates: public.idx_threads_computer
+
+\set ON_ERROR_STOP on
+
+BEGIN;
+
+SET LOCAL lock_timeout = '5s';
+SET LOCAL statement_timeout = '120s';
+
+ALTER TABLE public.threads
+  ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS computer_id uuid REFERENCES public.computers(id);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_threads_computer
+  ON public.threads (tenant_id, computer_id)
+  WHERE computer_id IS NOT NULL;
+
+COMMIT;

package/dist/drizzle/0073_compliance_tenant_anchor_state.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+-- 0073_compliance_tenant_anchor_state.sql
+--
+-- Phase 3 U8a of the System Workflows revert + Compliance reframe.
+-- (Originally drafted as 0071 but renumbered to 0073 to avoid collision
+-- with the unrelated 0071_connector_computer_dispatch_target.sql that
+-- shipped on origin/main concurrently with this work.)
+-- Adds the per-tenant high-water-mark table the anchor Lambda uses to
+-- track which audit_events have been included in a Merkle anchor.
+--
+-- Schema:
+--   compliance.tenant_anchor_state(
+--     tenant_id                   uuid PRIMARY KEY,
+--     last_anchored_recorded_at   timestamptz,
+--     last_anchored_event_id      uuid,
+--     last_cadence_id             uuid,
+--     updated_at                  timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+--   )
+--
+-- Anchor advance: at each cadence, the Lambda updates each tenant's row
+-- with the maximum recorded_at across the events included in the cadence
+-- (and the corresponding event_id for tie-breaking on equal timestamps).
+-- The next cadence's chain-head SELECT uses
+-- `recorded_at > last_anchored_recorded_at` (or > '-infinity' for
+-- never-anchored tenants).
+--
+-- Role grants:
+--   compliance_drainer gets SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE (not DELETE) on the new
+--   table. Per master plan U8a Decision #5, the anchor Lambda reuses the
+--   compliance_drainer role for tenant_anchor_state writes rather than
+--   provisioning a 4th Aurora role. The anchor Lambda runs reserved-
+--   concurrency=1 (matching the drainer pattern), so the role widening
+--   is bounded to one concurrent writer.
+--
+-- Plan reference:
+--   docs/plans/2026-05-07-010-feat-compliance-u8a-anchor-lambda-inert-plan.md
+--   docs/plans/2026-05-06-011-feat-compliance-audit-event-log-plan.md
+--
+-- Apply manually (operator step before merging — drift gate currently
+-- disabled per #905):
+--   psql "$DATABASE_URL" -f packages/database-pg/drizzle/0073_compliance_tenant_anchor_state.sql
+--
+-- Markers (consumed by scripts/db-migrate-manual.sh as the post-deploy drift gate):
+--
+-- creates: compliance.tenant_anchor_state
+-- creates: compliance.idx_tenant_anchor_state_updated_at
+
+\set ON_ERROR_STOP on
+
+BEGIN;
+
+SET LOCAL lock_timeout = '5s';
+SET LOCAL statement_timeout = '60s';
+
+-- Database guard — ensures we never accidentally apply to a wrong-named
+-- database. Mirrors 0069 + 0070 prologue.
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+  IF current_database() NOT IN ('thinkwork', 'postgres') THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'Wrong database: %, expected thinkwork or postgres', current_database();
+  END IF;
+END $$;
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- compliance.tenant_anchor_state
+--
+-- One row per tenant. The anchor Lambda updates last_anchored_recorded_at
+-- with the maximum recorded_at across the events included in the latest
+-- Merkle cadence's tenant slice (tie-broken by event_id for equal
+-- timestamps). Seeded lazily on first anchor — never-anchored tenants
+-- have no row, and the chain-head SELECT uses
+-- COALESCE(last_anchored_recorded_at, '-infinity'::timestamptz) so they
+-- still surface every event.
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS compliance.tenant_anchor_state (
+  tenant_id                   uuid PRIMARY KEY,
+  last_anchored_recorded_at   timestamptz,
+  last_anchored_event_id      uuid,
+  last_cadence_id             uuid,
+  updated_at                  timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+
+-- Index for the watchdog's eventual "oldest un-anchored tenant" query
+-- (U8b consumes this; U8a creates it inert).
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tenant_anchor_state_updated_at
+  ON compliance.tenant_anchor_state (updated_at);
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Grants
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-- USAGE on schema is already granted to compliance_drainer in 0070; this
+-- restatement is for clarity (idempotent in PostgreSQL).
+GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA compliance TO compliance_drainer;
+
+-- The anchor Lambda needs SELECT (read latest seq), INSERT (seed first
+-- row per tenant), UPDATE (advance high-water-mark). No DELETE — this
+-- table is append-or-update-only.
+GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE ON compliance.tenant_anchor_state TO compliance_drainer;
+
+-- compliance_reader gets SELECT for the eventual U10 admin Compliance UI
+-- (showing per-tenant anchor lag). Read-only by intent.
+GRANT SELECT ON compliance.tenant_anchor_state TO compliance_reader;
+
+COMMIT;