theus-cli-linux-arm64 1.2.2 → 1.4.0

package/vendor/higiene-motor/server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,1059 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""HTTP service exposing the watermarks-remover cleaning pipeline.
+
+Stdlib-only. The agent skill and any web app can call it over HTTP instead of
+running the CLI scripts locally.
+
+Endpoints:
+    GET  /health         -> {"ok": true, "version": ...}
+    GET  /capabilities   -> which optional tools / pixel backends are present
+    GET  /openapi.json   -> dynamically generated OpenAPI 3.0.3 spec
+    POST /inspect        -> {"file": <base64>, "name": "x.png"} -> findings JSON
+    POST /detect         -> {"file": <base64>, "name": "x.txt"} -> watermark detector reports
+    POST /clean          -> {"file": <base64>, "name": "x.png", "options": {...}}
+                         -> {"cleaned": <base64>, "report": {...}}
+    POST /inspect/batch  -> {"files": [{"file": <base64>, "name": "x.png"}, ...]}
+                         -> {"results": [{"name", "ok", "kind", "report", "suspicious"}, ...]}
+    POST /detect/batch   -> {"files": [{"file": <base64>, "name": "x.txt"}, ...]}
+                         -> {"results": [{"name", "ok", "kind", "detections", "report"}, ...]}
+    POST /clean/batch    -> {"files": [{"file": <base64>, "name": "x.png", "options": {...}}, ...]}
+                         -> {"results": [{"name", "ok", "kind", "cleaned", "report"}, ...]}
+
+Batch endpoints loop the same single-file pipeline as /inspect, /detect, and /clean; a
+per-file failure (unknown format, oversized name, bad option) shows up as
+that entry's "ok": false with an "error" string and never aborts the rest of
+the batch. Capped at WATERMARKS_MAX_BATCH_FILES entries per request (default
+50) — the existing MAX_BODY_BYTES envelope cap still bounds total payload
+size the same as a single-file request.
+
+Hardening mirrors the CLIs: input size caps, binary-as-text guard, atomic
+writes, loopback-only bind by default, optional bearer API key. Run it as an
+unprivileged user (the Docker image does). Intended for a trusted network;
+expose through a reverse proxy if reachable from untrusted clients.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import binascii
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from functools import cache
+from http import HTTPStatus
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+
+from av_meta import clean_av, inspect_av
+from common import (
+    MAX_INPUT_BYTES,
+    eprint,
+    looks_binary,
+    subprocess_creationflags,
+    subprocess_preexec_fn,
+    which,
+)
+from container_meta import DEEP_IMAGE_MODES, clean_container, inspect_container
+from format_dispatch import classify_bytes
+from image_meta import clean_image, inspect_image, run_synthid_score
+from score_stylometry import score_text_stylometry
+from text_detectors import detector_status, run_all_text_detectors, run_text_detectors
+from text_unicode import clean_text, inspect_text
+
+VERSION = os.environ.get("WATERMARKS_SERVER_VERSION", "dev")
+
+# Optional bearer token: when set, every request must send
+# `Authorization: Bearer <key>`. Empty means no auth (default).
+API_KEY = os.environ.get("WATERMARKS_SERVER_API_KEY", "").strip()
+
+# Body cap for the JSON envelope. Base64 inflates by 4/3, so the decoded file
+# stays well under MAX_INPUT_BYTES for the same cap.
+MAX_BODY_BYTES = MAX_INPUT_BYTES + (MAX_INPUT_BYTES >> 1)
+
+# Per-request file count cap for /inspect/batch and /clean/batch. MAX_BODY_BYTES
+# already bounds total payload size; this bounds worst-case CPU/thread time from
+# a request packing many tiny files into one call.
+MAX_BATCH_FILES = int(os.environ.get("WATERMARKS_MAX_BATCH_FILES", "50"))
+
+ALLOWED_CLEAN_OPTIONS = {
+    "nfkc": bool,
+    "aggressive_homoglyphs": bool,
+    "keep_non_ai_metadata": bool,
+    "also_layer_a_text": bool,
+    "remove_pixel": str,
+    "strip_all_metadata": bool,
+    "detect_before": bool,
+    "detect_after": bool,
+    "deep_images": str,
+}
+
+
+@cache
+def _ghostscript_usable() -> bool:
+    """True when a Ghostscript binary is present and runnable.
+
+    Cached and guarded like _tool_usable: /capabilities is polled, and probing
+    spawns a process every time otherwise.
+    """
+    from container_meta import which_ghostscript
+
+    gs = which_ghostscript()
+    if not gs:
+        return False
+    try:
+        r = subprocess.run(
+            [gs, "--version"],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            timeout=10,
+            check=False,
+            preexec_fn=subprocess_preexec_fn,
+            creationflags=subprocess_creationflags,
+        )
+        return r.returncode == 0
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+
+
+def _json_ok(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+# Flag that makes each tool print its version and exit 0. They disagree:
+# exiftool treats `--version` as an unknown option and prints usage instead.
+_VERSION_FLAG = {"c2patool": "--version", "exiftool": "-ver", "qpdf": "--version"}
+
+
+@cache
+def _tool_usable(cmd: str) -> bool:
+    """True only when the tool is on PATH *and* can actually execute.
+
+    `which` alone answers the wrong question. A binary built for another
+    architecture sits on PATH and still dies before main() -- the published
+    image pins a multi-arch base digest, so an arm64 host gets an arm64 image
+    carrying the x86_64-only c2patool release. Advertising that as available
+    is what lets a probe which never ran read as a clean verdict downstream.
+
+    Cached: a container's tool set cannot change while the process lives.
+    """
+    path = which(cmd)
+    if not path:
+        return False
+    try:
+        r = subprocess.run(
+            [path, _VERSION_FLAG.get(cmd, "--version")],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            timeout=10,
+            preexec_fn=subprocess_preexec_fn,
+            check=False,
+            creationflags=subprocess_creationflags,
+        )
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    return r.returncode == 0
+
+
+def capabilities() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "version": VERSION,
+        "tools": {
+            "c2patool": _tool_usable("c2patool"),
+            "exiftool": _tool_usable("exiftool"),
+            "qpdf": _tool_usable("qpdf"),
+            "ghostscript": _ghostscript_usable(),
+        },
+        "pixel_backends": {
+            "ctrlregen": bool(os.environ.get("NOAI_WATERMARK_DIR")),
+            "diffusion": bool(os.environ.get("MARKDIFFUSION_DIR")),
+        },
+        "scorers": {
+            "synthid": bool(os.environ.get("REVERSE_SYNTHID_DIR")),
+            "synthid_http": bool(os.environ.get("WATERMARKS_SYNTHID_SCORER_URL")),
+            "stylometry": True,
+        },
+        "text_detectors": detector_status(),
+        "harnesses": {
+            "markllm": bool(os.environ.get("MARKLLM_DIR")),
+        },
+    }
+
+
+# OpenAPI generation. The spec is built from this single declarative table
+# plus live runtime values (version, auth, allowed options), so it can never
+# drift from the endpoints the handler actually serves. Served at /openapi.json.
+
+
+def _schema(**props: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return props
+
+
+def _file_request(extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    schema: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "type": "object",
+        "required": ["file"],
+        "properties": {
+            "file": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "Base64-encoded file bytes",
+                "example": "SGVsbG8gd29ybGQ=",
+            },
+            "name": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "Original filename (extension drives format routing)",
+                "example": "notes.md",
+            },
+        },
+    }
+    if extra:
+        schema["properties"].update(extra["properties"])
+        schema["required"] = schema["required"] + extra.get("required", [])
+    return schema
+
+
+def _clean_request_schema() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    options: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for key, kind in ALLOWED_CLEAN_OPTIONS.items():
+        if kind is bool:
+            options[key] = _schema(type="boolean")
+        else:
+            options[key] = _schema(type="string")
+    return _file_request(
+        {
+            "properties": {
+                "options": _schema(type="object", properties=options, additionalProperties=False)
+            },
+        }
+    )
+
+
+_OPENAPI_PATHS: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
+    "/health": {
+        "get": {
+            "summary": "Liveness and version",
+            "responses": {
+                "200": _schema(
+                    type="object",
+                    properties={"ok": _schema(type="boolean"), "version": _schema(type="string")},
+                )
+            },
+        }
+    },
+    "/capabilities": {
+        "get": {
+            "summary": "Which optional tools and heavy backends are available",
+            "responses": {
+                "200": _schema(
+                    type="object",
+                    properties={
+                        "ok": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                        "version": _schema(type="string"),
+                        "tools": _schema(
+                            type="object",
+                            properties={
+                                k: _schema(type="boolean")
+                                for k in ("c2patool", "exiftool", "qpdf", "ghostscript")
+                            },
+                        ),
+                        "pixel_backends": _schema(
+                            type="object",
+                            properties={
+                                k: _schema(type="boolean") for k in ("ctrlregen", "diffusion")
+                            },
+                        ),
+                        "scorers": _schema(
+                            type="object",
+                            properties={
+                                "synthid": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                                "synthid_http": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                                "stylometry": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                            },
+                        ),
+                        "harnesses": _schema(
+                            type="object", properties={"markllm": _schema(type="boolean")}
+                        ),
+                        "text_detectors": _schema(
+                            type="object",
+                            additionalProperties=_schema(type="boolean"),
+                        ),
+                    },
+                )
+            },
+        }
+    },
+    "/openapi.json": {
+        "get": {
+            "summary": "This OpenAPI 3.0.3 document, generated dynamically",
+            "responses": {
+                "200": _schema(type="object", description="An OpenAPI 3.0.3 document"),
+            },
+        }
+    },
+    "/inspect": {
+        "post": {
+            "summary": "Inspect a file for AI provenance marks (text / image / container auto-routed)",
+            "requestBody": _schema(
+                required=True,
+                content={
+                    "application/json": _schema(
+                        schema=_file_request(
+                            {
+                                "properties": {
+                                    "detect": _schema(
+                                        type="boolean",
+                                        description=(
+                                            "Also run configured text watermark detectors "
+                                            "(opt-in; may call vendor APIs and send text "
+                                            "to them)"
+                                        ),
+                                    )
+                                },
+                                "required": [],
+                            }
+                        )
+                    )
+                },
+            ),
+            "responses": {
+                "200": _schema(
+                    type="object",
+                    properties={
+                        "ok": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                        "kind": _schema(type="string", enum=["text", "image", "container", "av"]),
+                        "suspicious": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                        "report": _schema(type="object"),
+                    },
+                )
+            },
+        }
+    },
+    "/clean": {
+        "post": {
+            "summary": "Clean a file; returns the cleaned bytes and an actions/stats report",
+            "requestBody": _schema(
+                required=True,
+                content={"application/json": _schema(schema=_clean_request_schema())},
+            ),
+            "responses": {
+                "200": _schema(
+                    type="object",
+                    properties={
+                        "ok": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                        "kind": _schema(type="string", enum=["text", "image", "container", "av"]),
+                        "cleaned": _schema(
+                            type="string", description="Base64-encoded cleaned file bytes"
+                        ),
+                        "report": _schema(type="object"),
+                    },
+                )
+            },
+        }
+    },
+    "/detect": {
+        "post": {
+            "summary": "Run watermark detectors on a file (text: vendor/statistical; image: SynthID score)",
+            "requestBody": _schema(
+                required=True,
+                content={"application/json": _schema(schema=_file_request())},
+            ),
+            "responses": {
+                "200": _schema(
+                    type="object",
+                    properties={
+                        "ok": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                        "kind": _schema(type="string", enum=["text", "image", "container", "av"]),
+                        "detections": _schema(type="array", items=_schema(type="object")),
+                    },
+                )
+            },
+        }
+    },
+    "/inspect/batch": {
+        "post": {
+            "summary": f"Inspect up to {MAX_BATCH_FILES} files in one request",
+            "requestBody": _schema(
+                required=True,
+                content={
+                    "application/json": _schema(
+                        schema=_schema(
+                            type="object",
+                            required=["files"],
+                            properties={"files": _schema(type="array", items=_file_request())},
+                        )
+                    )
+                },
+            ),
+            "responses": {
+                "200": _schema(
+                    type="object",
+                    properties={
+                        "ok": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                        "results": _schema(
+                            type="array",
+                            items=_schema(
+                                type="object",
+                                properties={
+                                    "name": _schema(type="string"),
+                                    "ok": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                                    "kind": _schema(
+                                        type="string",
+                                        enum=["text", "image", "container", "av", "unknown"],
+                                    ),
+                                    "suspicious": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                                    "report": _schema(type="object"),
+                                    "error": _schema(type="string"),
+                                },
+                            ),
+                        ),
+                    },
+                )
+            },
+        }
+    },
+    "/detect/batch": {
+        "post": {
+            "summary": f"Run watermark detectors on up to {MAX_BATCH_FILES} files in one request",
+            "requestBody": _schema(
+                required=True,
+                content={
+                    "application/json": _schema(
+                        schema=_schema(
+                            type="object",
+                            required=["files"],
+                            properties={"files": _schema(type="array", items=_file_request())},
+                        )
+                    )
+                },
+            ),
+            "responses": {
+                "200": _schema(
+                    type="object",
+                    properties={
+                        "ok": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                        "results": _schema(
+                            type="array",
+                            items=_schema(
+                                type="object",
+                                properties={
+                                    "name": _schema(type="string"),
+                                    "ok": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                                    "kind": _schema(
+                                        type="string",
+                                        enum=["text", "image", "container", "av"],
+                                    ),
+                                    "detections": _schema(
+                                        type="array", items=_schema(type="object")
+                                    ),
+                                    "report": _schema(type="object"),
+                                    "error": _schema(type="string"),
+                                },
+                            ),
+                        ),
+                    },
+                )
+            },
+        }
+    },
+    "/clean/batch": {
+        "post": {
+            "summary": f"Clean up to {MAX_BATCH_FILES} files in one request",
+            "requestBody": _schema(
+                required=True,
+                content={
+                    "application/json": _schema(
+                        schema=_schema(
+                            type="object",
+                            required=["files"],
+                            properties={
+                                "files": _schema(type="array", items=_clean_request_schema())
+                            },
+                        )
+                    )
+                },
+            ),
+            "responses": {
+                "200": _schema(
+                    type="object",
+                    properties={
+                        "ok": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                        "results": _schema(
+                            type="array",
+                            items=_schema(
+                                type="object",
+                                properties={
+                                    "name": _schema(type="string"),
+                                    "ok": _schema(type="boolean"),
+                                    "kind": _schema(
+                                        type="string", enum=["text", "image", "container", "av"]
+                                    ),
+                                    "cleaned": _schema(type="string"),
+                                    "report": _schema(type="object"),
+                                    "error": _schema(type="string"),
+                                },
+                            ),
+                        ),
+                    },
+                )
+            },
+        }
+    },
+}
+
+_ERROR_SCHEMA = _schema(
+    type="object",
+    properties={"ok": _schema(type="boolean", enum=[False]), "error": _schema(type="string")},
+)
+_COMMON_ERRORS = {
+    "400": {
+        "description": "Bad request",
+        "content": {"application/json": {"schema": _ERROR_SCHEMA}},
+    },
+    "401": {
+        "description": "Missing/invalid bearer token",
+        "content": {"application/json": {"schema": _ERROR_SCHEMA}},
+    },
+    "404": {"description": "Not found", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": _ERROR_SCHEMA}}},
+    "413": {
+        "description": "Request body too large",
+        "content": {"application/json": {"schema": _ERROR_SCHEMA}},
+    },
+    "500": {
+        "description": "Internal error",
+        "content": {"application/json": {"schema": _ERROR_SCHEMA}},
+    },
+}
+
+
+def openapi_spec() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    paths: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for path, ops in _OPENAPI_PATHS.items():
+        for method, op in ops.items():
+            responses = dict(_COMMON_ERRORS)
+            for status, body in op["responses"].items():
+                responses[status] = {
+                    "description": "Success",
+                    "content": {"application/json": {"schema": body}},
+                }
+            paths.setdefault(path, {})[method] = {
+                "summary": op["summary"],
+                "responses": responses,
+                **((op.get("requestBody") and {"requestBody": op["requestBody"]}) or {}),
+            }
+
+    spec: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "openapi": "3.0.3",
+        "info": {
+            "title": "watermarks-remover service",
+            "version": VERSION,
+            "description": "Strip multi-vendor AI provenance marks (Unicode, C2PA/EXIF/XMP, containers). "
+            "Files are passed base64-encoded in JSON; cleaned bytes come back base64-encoded.",
+        },
+        "paths": paths,
+    }
+    if API_KEY:
+        spec["components"] = {
+            "securitySchemes": {
+                "bearerAuth": {"type": "http", "scheme": "bearer"},
+            }
+        }
+        spec["security"] = [{"bearerAuth": []}]
+    return spec
+
+
+def _safe_name(name: str) -> str:
+    """Reduce a client-supplied filename to a bare basename safe for temp use.
+
+    CodeQL (uncontrolled data in path expression): a name like '../../x'
+    would otherwise let the write below escape the request temp dir. Fold
+    Windows separators too, and fall back to a neutral name for '.', '..' or
+    empty results.
+    """
+    base = Path(name.replace("\\", "/")).name
+    if base in ("", ".", ".."):
+        return "input"
+    return base
+
+
+def _tmp_path(tmpdir: Path, *parts: str) -> Path:
+    """Join *parts* under *tmpdir* and refuse anything that escapes it.
+
+    Defense-in-depth for the CodeQL "uncontrolled data in path expression"
+    findings: even if a caller slips a separator through, the write can never
+    land outside the request temp dir.
+    """
+    path = tmpdir.joinpath(*parts)
+    if path.parent != tmpdir:
+        raise ValueError("unsafe filename")
+    return path
+
+
+def _decode_input(body: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[bytes, str]:
+    raw = body.get("file")
+    if not isinstance(raw, str):
+        raise ValueError("missing string field 'file' (base64-encoded bytes)")
+    name = body.get("name")
+    if name is not None and not isinstance(name, str):
+        raise ValueError("'name' must be a string")
+    try:
+        data = base64.b64decode(raw, validate=True)
+    except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
+        raise ValueError("'file' is not valid base64") from None
+    return data, _safe_name(name or "")
+
+
+def _parse_clean_options(options: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if options is None:
+        return {}
+    if not isinstance(options, dict):
+        raise ValueError("'options' must be an object")
+    for key, value in options.items():
+        if key not in ALLOWED_CLEAN_OPTIONS:
+            raise ValueError(f"unknown option: {key}")
+        expected_type = ALLOWED_CLEAN_OPTIONS[key]
+        if not isinstance(value, expected_type):
+            type_name = "boolean" if expected_type is bool else "string"
+            raise ValueError(f"option {key!r} must be a {type_name}")
+    # An unrecognised deep_images value used to fall back to "auto", which turns
+    # a request for lossless cleaning into one that may recompress. Reject it
+    # here, where every caller -- single file and batch alike -- passes through.
+    deep_images = options.get("deep_images")
+    if deep_images is not None and deep_images not in DEEP_IMAGE_MODES:
+        raise ValueError(f"option 'deep_images' must be one of {sorted(DEEP_IMAGE_MODES)}")
+    return options
+
+
+def _batch_items(
+    body: dict[str, Any],
+) -> list[tuple[str, bytes, dict[str, Any], str | None]]:
+    """Decode a batch request's 'files' array into (name, data, options, error) tuples.
+
+    A malformed individual entry (bad base64, unknown option) becomes an error
+    string paired with that entry rather than raising, so one bad file never
+    aborts the rest of the batch. Only 'files' itself being missing, empty, or
+    over MAX_BATCH_FILES raises — that is a malformed request, not a per-file
+    problem.
+    """
+    files = body.get("files")
+    if not isinstance(files, list):
+        raise ValueError("missing array field 'files'")
+    if not files:
+        raise ValueError("'files' must not be empty")
+    if len(files) > MAX_BATCH_FILES:
+        raise ValueError(f"'files' exceeds the {MAX_BATCH_FILES}-file batch limit")
+
+    items: list[tuple[str, bytes, dict[str, Any], str | None]] = []
+    for entry in files:
+        if not isinstance(entry, dict):
+            items.append(("", b"", {}, "each entry in 'files' must be an object"))
+            continue
+        try:
+            data, name = _decode_input(entry)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            fallback_name = entry.get("name") if isinstance(entry.get("name"), str) else ""
+            items.append((fallback_name, b"", {}, str(e)))
+            continue
+        try:
+            options = _parse_clean_options(entry.get("options"))
+        except ValueError as e:
+            items.append((name, b"", {}, str(e)))
+            continue
+        items.append((name, data, options, None))
+    return items
+
+
+def _inspect_payload(data: bytes, name: str, run_detect: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    kind = classify_bytes(data, Path(name).suffix)
+    if kind == "unknown":
+        return {
+            "ok": True,
+            "kind": "unknown",
+            "report": {"note": "unrecognized format; use a filename with a known extension"},
+            "suspicious": False,
+        }
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="wm-inspect-") as tmp:
+        path = _tmp_path(Path(tmp), name or "input")
+        path.write_bytes(data)
+        if kind == "text":
+            if looks_binary(data):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    "refusing to inspect bytes that look like a binary container as text"
+                )
+            raw_text = data.decode("utf-8", errors="surrogateescape")
+            report = inspect_text(raw_text).to_dict()
+            s_rep = score_text_stylometry(raw_text, path=name or "<text>")
+            report["stylometry"] = s_rep.to_dict()
+            if run_detect:
+                report["text_detectors"] = run_all_text_detectors(raw_text)
+        elif kind == "image":
+            report = inspect_image(path).to_dict()
+        elif kind == "av":
+            report = inspect_av(path).to_dict()
+        else:
+            report = inspect_container(path).to_dict()
+    detected_wm = any(
+        entry.get("available") and entry.get("is_watermarked")
+        for entry in report.get("text_detectors") or []
+    )
+    suspicious = (
+        bool(report.get("suspicious_total"))
+        or bool(report.get("has_c2pa") or report.get("has_ai_metadata"))
+        or bool(report.get("stylometry", {}).get("score", 0.0) >= 0.65)
+        or detected_wm
+    )
+    return {"ok": True, "kind": kind, "report": report, "suspicious": suspicious}
+
+
+def _detect_payload(data: bytes, name: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    kind = classify_bytes(data, Path(name).suffix)
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="wm-detect-") as tmp:
+        path = _tmp_path(Path(tmp), name or "input")
+        path.write_bytes(data)
+        if kind == "text":
+            if looks_binary(data):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    "refusing to detect bytes that look like a binary container as text"
+                )
+            raw_text = data.decode("utf-8", errors="surrogateescape")
+            detections: list[dict[str, Any]] = run_all_text_detectors(raw_text)
+            s_rep = score_text_stylometry(raw_text, path=name or "<text>")
+            detections.append({"detector": "stylometry", "available": True, **s_rep.to_dict()})
+            return {"ok": True, "kind": kind, "detections": detections}
+        elif kind == "image":
+            score = run_synthid_score(path)
+            if score is None:
+                score = {
+                    "detector": "synthid",
+                    "available": False,
+                    "error": (
+                        "no SynthID scorer configured (set "
+                        "WATERMARKS_SYNTHID_SCORER_URL or REVERSE_SYNTHID_DIR)"
+                    ),
+                }
+            else:
+                score.setdefault("detector", "synthid")
+            detections = [score]
+            return {"ok": True, "kind": kind, "detections": detections}
+        elif kind == "av":
+            return {
+                "ok": True,
+                "kind": kind,
+                "detections": [],
+                "report": inspect_av(path).to_dict(),
+            }
+        else:
+            detections = []
+            report = inspect_container(path).to_dict()
+            return {
+                "ok": True,
+                "kind": kind,
+                "detections": detections,
+                "report": report,
+            }
+
+
+def _clean_payload(data: bytes, name: str, options: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    kind = classify_bytes(data, Path(name).suffix)
+    if kind == "unknown":
+        raise ValueError(
+            "unrecognized file format; use a filename with a known extension "
+            "(e.g. notes.txt) or a supported image/container name"
+        )
+
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="wm-clean-") as tmp:
+        tmpdir = Path(tmp)
+        src = _tmp_path(tmpdir, name or "input")
+        src.write_bytes(data)
+        if kind == "text":
+            if looks_binary(data):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    "refusing to clean bytes that look like a binary container as text"
+                )
+            text = data.decode("utf-8", errors="surrogateescape")
+            detect_before = bool(options.get("detect_before"))
+            detect_after = bool(options.get("detect_after"))
+            detector_reports: dict[str, Any] = {}
+            if detect_before:
+                detector_reports["before"] = run_text_detectors(text)
+            cleaned, stats = clean_text(
+                text,
+                nfkc=bool(options.get("nfkc")),
+                aggressive_homoglyphs=bool(options.get("aggressive_homoglyphs")),
+            )
+            if detect_after:
+                detector_reports["after"] = run_text_detectors(cleaned)
+            cleaned_bytes = cleaned.encode("utf-8", errors="surrogateescape")
+            report: dict[str, Any] = {"kind": "text", "stats": stats, "length": len(cleaned)}
+            if detector_reports:
+                report["text_detectors"] = detector_reports
+        elif kind == "image":
+            ext = Path(name).suffix
+            if not ext:
+                from image_meta import detect_format
+
+                fmt_name = detect_format(data)
+                ext = f".{fmt_name}" if fmt_name != "unknown" else ".png"
+            dest = _tmp_path(tmpdir, f"out{ext}")
+            strip_all = not bool(options.get("keep_non_ai_metadata"))
+            if "strip_all_metadata" in options:
+                strip_all = bool(options["strip_all_metadata"])
+            remove_pixel = options.get("remove_pixel")
+            if remove_pixel not in (None, "ctrlregen", "diffusion"):
+                raise ValueError("remove_pixel must be one of: ctrlregen, diffusion")
+            result = clean_image(
+                src,
+                dest,
+                strip_all_metadata=strip_all,
+                remove_pixel=remove_pixel,
+            )
+            if bool(options.get("detect_before")) and result.get("synthid_before") is None:
+                result["synthid_before"] = run_synthid_score(src)
+            if bool(options.get("detect_after")) and result.get("synthid_after") is None:
+                result["synthid_after"] = run_synthid_score(dest)
+            cleaned_bytes = dest.read_bytes()
+            report = {"kind": "image", **result}
+        elif kind == "av":
+            dest = _tmp_path(tmpdir, f"out{Path(name).suffix or '.bin'}")
+            strip_all = not bool(options.get("keep_non_ai_metadata"))
+            if "strip_all_metadata" in options:
+                strip_all = bool(options["strip_all_metadata"])
+            result = clean_av(src, dest, strip_all_metadata=strip_all)
+            cleaned_bytes = dest.read_bytes()
+            report = {"kind": "av", **result}
+        else:
+            ext = Path(name).suffix
+            container_fmt = None
+            if not ext:
+                from container_meta import detect_container_format
+
+                container_fmt = detect_container_format(Path("input"), data)
+                ext_map = {
+                    "svg": ".svg",
+                    "pdf": ".pdf",
+                    "docx": ".docx",
+                    "xlsx": ".xlsx",
+                    "pptx": ".pptx",
+                    "odt": ".odt",
+                    "epub": ".epub",
+                    "html": ".html",
+                    "markdown": ".md",
+                }
+                ext = ext_map.get(container_fmt, "")
+            dest = _tmp_path(tmpdir, f"out{ext}")
+            result = clean_container(
+                src,
+                dest,
+                fmt=container_fmt,
+                also_layer_a_text=bool(options.get("also_layer_a_text", True)),
+                deep_images=str(options.get("deep_images", "auto")),
+            )
+            cleaned_bytes = dest.read_bytes()
+            report = {"kind": "container", **result}
+        report.pop("input", None)
+        report.pop("output", None)
+
+    return {
+        "ok": True,
+        "kind": kind,
+        "cleaned": base64.b64encode(cleaned_bytes).decode("ascii"),
+        "report": report,
+    }
+
+
+class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    server_version = f"watermarks-remover/{VERSION}"
+
+    def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: object) -> None:
+        eprint(f"{self.address_string()} - {fmt % args}")
+
+    def _authorized(self) -> bool:
+        if not API_KEY:
+            return True
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        return header == f"Bearer {API_KEY}"
+
+    def _read_json(self) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        raw = self.headers.get("Content-Length")
+        if raw is None or not raw.isdigit():
+            return None
+        length = int(raw)
+        if length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
+            return None
+        try:
+            body = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, OSError):
+            return None
+        if not isinstance(body, dict):
+            return None
+        return body
+
+    def _respond(self, status: int, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        data = _json_ok(payload)
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        path = urlparse(self.path).path
+        if not self._authorized():
+            self._respond(HTTPStatus.UNAUTHORIZED, {"ok": False, "error": "unauthorized"})
+            return
+        if path == "/health":
+            self._respond(HTTPStatus.OK, {"ok": True, "version": VERSION})
+        elif path == "/capabilities":
+            self._respond(HTTPStatus.OK, {"ok": True, **capabilities()})
+        elif path == "/openapi.json":
+            self._respond(HTTPStatus.OK, openapi_spec())
+        else:
+            self._respond(HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND, {"ok": False, "error": "not found"})
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        path = urlparse(self.path).path
+        if not self._authorized():
+            self._respond(HTTPStatus.UNAUTHORIZED, {"ok": False, "error": "unauthorized"})
+            return
+        if path not in (
+            "/inspect",
+            "/clean",
+            "/detect",
+            "/inspect/batch",
+            "/detect/batch",
+            "/clean/batch",
+        ):
+            self._respond(HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND, {"ok": False, "error": "not found"})
+            return
+        body = self._read_json()
+        if body is None:
+            raw_len = self.headers.get("Content-Length")
+            oversized = raw_len is not None and raw_len.isdigit() and int(raw_len) > MAX_BODY_BYTES
+            self._respond(
+                HTTPStatus.REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE if oversized else HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST,
+                {"ok": False, "error": "invalid request body"},
+            )
+            return
+        try:
+            if path == "/inspect/batch":
+                self._handle_inspect_batch(body)
+            elif path == "/detect/batch":
+                self._handle_detect_batch(body)
+            elif path == "/clean/batch":
+                self._handle_clean_batch(body)
+            else:
+                data, name = _decode_input(body)
+                if path == "/inspect":
+                    self._handle_inspect(data, name, body)
+                elif path == "/detect":
+                    self._handle_detect(data, name)
+                else:
+                    self._handle_clean(data, name, body)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            self._respond(HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, {"ok": False, "error": str(e)})
+        except Exception as e:
+            eprint(f"error handling {path}: {e!r}")
+            self._respond(
+                HTTPStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, {"ok": False, "error": "internal error"}
+            )
+
+    def _handle_inspect(self, data: bytes, name: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        run_detect = body.get("detect") is True
+        self._respond(HTTPStatus.OK, _inspect_payload(data, name, run_detect))
+
+    def _handle_inspect_batch(self, body: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        items = _batch_items(body)
+        run_detect = body.get("detect") is True
+        results = []
+        for name, data, _options, error in items:
+            if error is not None:
+                results.append({"name": name, "ok": False, "error": error})
+                continue
+            try:
+                payload = _inspect_payload(data, name, run_detect)
+            except ValueError as e:
+                results.append({"name": name, "ok": False, "error": str(e)})
+                continue
+            results.append({"name": name, **payload})
+        self._respond(HTTPStatus.OK, {"ok": True, "results": results})
+
+    def _handle_detect(self, data: bytes, name: str) -> None:
+        self._respond(HTTPStatus.OK, _detect_payload(data, name))
+
+    def _handle_detect_batch(self, body: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        items = _batch_items(body)
+        results = []
+        for name, data, _options, error in items:
+            if error is not None:
+                results.append({"name": name, "ok": False, "error": error})
+                continue
+            try:
+                payload = _detect_payload(data, name)
+            except ValueError as e:
+                results.append({"name": name, "ok": False, "error": str(e)})
+                continue
+            results.append({"name": name, **payload})
+        self._respond(HTTPStatus.OK, {"ok": True, "results": results})
+
+    def _handle_clean(self, data: bytes, name: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        options = _parse_clean_options(body.get("options"))
+        self._respond(HTTPStatus.OK, _clean_payload(data, name, options))
+
+    def _handle_clean_batch(self, body: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        items = _batch_items(body)
+        results = []
+        for name, data, options, error in items:
+            if error is not None:
+                results.append({"name": name, "ok": False, "error": error})
+                continue
+            try:
+                payload = _clean_payload(data, name, options)
+            except ValueError as e:
+                results.append({"name": name, "ok": False, "error": str(e)})
+                continue
+            results.append({"name": name, **payload})
+        self._respond(HTTPStatus.OK, {"ok": True, "results": results})
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    global API_KEY  # noqa: PLW0603 — CLI overrides env
+    p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    p.add_argument("--host", default=os.environ.get("WATERMARKS_SERVER_HOST", "127.0.0.1"))
+    p.add_argument(
+        "--port", type=int, default=int(os.environ.get("WATERMARKS_SERVER_PORT", "8765"))
+    )
+    p.add_argument("--api-key", default=API_KEY, help="require this bearer token (default: none)")
+    p.add_argument("-V", "--version", action="store_true", help="print version and exit")
+    args = p.parse_args()
+
+    if args.version:
+        print(VERSION)
+        return 0
+
+    API_KEY = args.api_key
+
+    if args.host not in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"):
+        eprint(f"warning: binding {args.host} — intended for a trusted network only")
+    if API_KEY:
+        eprint("API key required for requests")
+    else:
+        eprint("warning: no API key set — only bind to loopback or a trusted network")
+
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer((args.host, args.port), Handler)
+    eprint(f"watermarks-remover service {VERSION} on http://{args.host}:{args.port}")
+    try:
+        server.serve_forever()
+    except KeyboardInterrupt:
+        eprint("shutting down")
+        server.shutdown()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())