theokit 0.43.6 → 0.43.12

package/dist/{chunk-GW5H4KB4.js → chunk-FX72VHAE.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   isZodLike
-} from "./chunk-QWBXUZAX.js";
+} from "./chunk-JIL74SFK.js";
 import {
   validateCsrfRequest
 } from "./chunk-TSLSIRBR.js";
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ async function parseBodyInline(request) {
 }
 async function parseBodyFull(request) {
   if (request.method === "GET" || request.method === "HEAD") return void 0;
-  const { parseWebRequestBody } = await import("./body-parser-web-MUWBKZ3F.js");
+  const { parseWebRequestBody } = await import("./body-parser-web-NNEJGX6Y.js");
   try {
     const parsed = await parseWebRequestBody(request);
     if (parsed.json === void 0 && Object.keys(parsed.fields).length === 0 && parsed.files.length === 0) {
@@ -454,4 +454,4 @@ export {
   validateRouteInput,
   executeWebRequest
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-GW5H4KB4.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FX72VHAE.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-5AVPWHUE.js → chunk-HGUZWG2C.js}

@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ function createWorkflowTool(workflow, config) {
 // src/server/agent/acp-tool.ts
 import { spawn } from "child_process";
 import { AcpClient } from "@theokit/agents";
-import { encodeAcpMessage } from "@theokit/agents";
 var NodeAcpTransport = class {
   // stdin=pipe, stdout=pipe, stderr=inherit → the third stream is null.
   proc;
@@ -59,7 +58,9 @@ function defaultTransport(config) {
 }
 function createACPTool(config) {
   if (typeof config.onPermissionRequest !== "function") {
-    throw new Error("[theokit] createACPTool requires onPermissionRequest (security by default \u2014 no default-allow)");
+    throw new Error(
+      "[theokit] createACPTool requires onPermissionRequest (security by default \u2014 no default-allow)"
+    );
   }
   const makeTransport = config.transportFactory ?? defaultTransport;
   return {
@@ -67,7 +68,9 @@ function createACPTool(config) {
     description: config.description,
     inputSchema: {
       type: "object",
-      properties: { message: { type: "string", description: "The task/prompt for the coding agent." } },
+      properties: {
+        message: { type: "string", description: "The task/prompt for the coding agent." }
+      },
       required: ["message"]
     },
     handler: async (input) => {
@@ -325,4 +328,4 @@ export {
   handleMcpStdioLine,
   serveMcpStdio
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-5AVPWHUE.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HGUZWG2C.js.map

package/dist/chunk-HGUZWG2C.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/server/agent/workflow-tool.ts","../src/server/agent/acp-tool.ts","../src/server/agent/vendor-agent-tool.ts","../src/server/agent/code-mode.ts","../src/server/agent/channel-webhook.ts","../src/server/agent/stream-agent-turn-in-process.ts","../src/server/agent/mcp-stdio.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * M26 (ADR-0041) — `createWorkflowTool`: wrap an SDK `Workflow` as a `CustomTool`.\n *\n * THIN adapter. `packages/workflows/` stays G13-forbidden — the workflow ENGINE is the SDK's\n * (`Workflow.create(...).run(input)`). This exposes an already-built `Workflow` to an agent as one\n * callable tool: it validates the tool input, delegates to `workflow.run(input)`, and shapes the\n * result for the model. It calls no LLM, dispatches no tool, and runs no orchestration of its own —\n * the SDK owns all of that (sdk-runtime.md / G2).\n */\nimport { z } from 'zod'\n\nimport { defineAgentTool, type CustomTool } from '../define/define-agent-tool.js'\n\n/**\n * Structural stand-in for the SDK `Workflow` (the adapter never imports the SDK type — keeps the\n * SDK an optional peer). Any object with a `run(input)` resolving to `{ status, output }` matches.\n */\nexport interface WorkflowLike {\n  run(input: unknown): Promise<{ status: string; output: unknown; runId?: string }>\n}\n\n/** Config for {@link createWorkflowTool}. `inputSchema` defaults to an open object. */\nexport interface WorkflowToolConfig {\n  /** Tool name surfaced to the LLM. */\n  name: string\n  /** Tool description surfaced to the LLM. */\n  description: string\n  /** Zod schema for the workflow input (defaults to `z.object({}).passthrough()`). */\n  inputSchema?: z.ZodType\n}\n\n/** Statuses `Workflow.run` reports as a non-success terminal state. */\nconst FAILURE_STATUSES = new Set(['failed', 'error', 'cancelled', 'canceled'])\n\n/**\n * Wrap an SDK `Workflow` as a {@link CustomTool}. Fails fast if `workflow` does not expose a\n * `run()` method (the SDK Workflow contract), so a mis-wired call is caught at definition time, not\n * at the first invocation (error-handling.md).\n */\nexport function createWorkflowTool(workflow: WorkflowLike, config: WorkflowToolConfig): CustomTool {\n  const runFn = (workflow as { run?: unknown } | null | undefined)?.run\n  if (typeof runFn !== 'function') {\n    throw new Error(\n      'createWorkflowTool: the SDK does not expose a Workflow (expected an object with a run() method). ' +\n        'Pass a `Workflow.create(...).…build()` instance from @theokit/sdk.',\n    )\n  }\n  // Open object by default so arbitrary workflow inputs pass through un-stripped.\n  const inputSchema = config.inputSchema ?? z.looseObject({})\n\n  return defineAgentTool({\n    name: config.name,\n    description: config.description,\n    inputSchema: inputSchema as z.ZodObject<z.ZodRawShape>,\n    handler: async (input: unknown): Promise<string> => {\n      const run = await workflow.run(input)\n      if (FAILURE_STATUSES.has(run.status)) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `createWorkflowTool(${JSON.stringify(config.name)}): workflow run ${\n            run.runId ? `'${run.runId}' ` : ''\n          }failed with status '${run.status}'.`,\n        )\n      }\n      return typeof run.output === 'string' ? run.output : JSON.stringify(run.output)\n    },\n  })\n}\n","/**\n * M17 (theokit-ai-first) — createACPTool: wrap a coding agent (Claude Code, Amp, Codex) as a tool.\n *\n * Spawns the agent as a subprocess (Node `child_process` — an adapter concern per G8), drives it\n * with the transport-agnostic {@link AcpClient} over newline-delimited JSON-RPC, and returns a\n * `CustomTool`. `onPermissionRequest` is REQUIRED — security by default (no default-allow for file/\n * shell operations). The transport is injectable for tests.\n */\nimport { spawn, type ChildProcessByStdio } from 'node:child_process'\nimport type { Readable, Writable } from 'node:stream'\n\nimport { AcpClient, type AcpTransport } from '@theokit/agents'\nimport type { CustomTool } from '@theokit/sdk'\n\n/** Stdio transport backed by a spawned subprocess (the default for {@link createACPTool}). */\nexport class NodeAcpTransport implements AcpTransport {\n  // stdin=pipe, stdout=pipe, stderr=inherit → the third stream is null.\n  private readonly proc: ChildProcessByStdio<Writable, Readable, null>\n\n  constructor(command: string, args: string[] = [], cwd?: string) {\n    this.proc = spawn(command, args, { cwd, stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'inherit'] })\n  }\n\n  send(line: string): void {\n    this.proc.stdin.write(line)\n  }\n\n  subscribe(onData: (chunk: string) => void): void {\n    this.proc.stdout.on('data', (buf: Buffer) => {\n      onData(buf.toString('utf8'))\n    })\n  }\n\n  close(): void {\n    this.proc.kill()\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface AcpToolConfig {\n  /** Executable for the coding agent (e.g. `claude`, `amp`, `codex`). */\n  command: string\n  /** Command-line arguments. */\n  args?: string[]\n  /** Working directory for the spawned agent. */\n  cwd?: string\n  /** Tool name the model calls. */\n  name: string\n  /** Tool description surfaced to the model. */\n  description: string\n  /**\n   * REQUIRED — decide file/shell permission requests from the coding agent. Security by default:\n   * there is NO default-allow. Return `{ granted: boolean }` (may be async).\n   */\n  onPermissionRequest: (params: unknown) => { granted: boolean } | Promise<{ granted: boolean }>\n  /** Injected transport factory (defaults to spawning via {@link NodeAcpTransport}) — for tests. */\n  transportFactory?: (config: AcpToolConfig) => AcpTransport\n}\n\nfunction defaultTransport(config: AcpToolConfig): AcpTransport {\n  return new NodeAcpTransport(config.command, config.args, config.cwd)\n}\n\n/** Wrap a coding agent as a `CustomTool`. Fails fast if `onPermissionRequest` is missing. */\nexport function createACPTool(config: AcpToolConfig): CustomTool {\n  if (typeof config.onPermissionRequest !== 'function') {\n    throw new Error(\n      '[theokit] createACPTool requires onPermissionRequest (security by default — no default-allow)',\n    )\n  }\n  const makeTransport = config.transportFactory ?? defaultTransport\n  return {\n    name: config.name,\n    description: config.description,\n    inputSchema: {\n      type: 'object',\n      properties: {\n        message: { type: 'string', description: 'The task/prompt for the coding agent.' },\n      },\n      required: ['message'],\n    },\n    handler: async (input: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<string> => {\n      const message = typeof input.message === 'string' ? input.message : ''\n      const client = new AcpClient(makeTransport(config))\n      client.onRequest('session/request_permission', (params) => config.onPermissionRequest(params))\n      const result = (await client.request('session/prompt', { message })) as { text?: string }\n      return result.text ?? ''\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n// M56: the `encodeAcpMessage` re-export had no consumer — callers building custom transports\n// import it from `@theokit/agents` directly, which is where it is defined.\n","/**\n * M28 (ADR-0041) — `createVendorAgentTool`: expose a third-party agent SDK (Claude Agent SDK,\n * OpenAI, Cursor) behind a uniform `CustomTool`, mirroring the M17 ACP pattern.\n *\n * The vendor RUNTIME stays theirs — TheoKit only wires. The vendor client is INJECTED (the real\n * vendor SDK client in prod, a fake in tests), so no vendor dependency enters core; vendor-specific\n * client packages belong under `@theokit/agent-*`, never here. This calls no LLM of its own and runs\n * no loop — it delegates each prompt to `client.query(...)` (sdk-runtime.md / G2). Resume is threaded\n * via the vendor's own session id.\n */\nimport type { CustomTool } from '../define/define-agent-tool.js'\n\n/**\n * Structural contract a vendor agent client must satisfy (the adapter never imports a vendor type).\n * `query` runs one turn; `resumeSessionId` continues a prior vendor session; the returned\n * `sessionId` identifies the session to resume next.\n */\nexport interface VendorAgentClient {\n  query(\n    prompt: string,\n    opts?: { resumeSessionId?: string },\n  ): Promise<{ text: string; sessionId?: string }>\n}\n\n/** Config for {@link createVendorAgentTool}. */\nexport interface VendorAgentToolConfig {\n  /** Vendor label (e.g. `claude`, `openai`, `cursor`). Drives the default tool name. */\n  vendor: string\n  /** The injected vendor client (real SDK client in prod, a fake in tests). */\n  client: VendorAgentClient\n  /** Tool name the model calls (defaults to `<vendor>_agent`). */\n  name?: string\n  /** Tool description surfaced to the model (defaults to a one-line delegate hint). */\n  description?: string\n  /**\n   * Side-channel callback invoked with the vendor session id after each turn — lets the app capture\n   * it for a later resume WITHOUT leaking session bookkeeping into the model's view of the result.\n   */\n  onSession?: (sessionId: string) => void\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap a vendor agent SDK as a {@link CustomTool}. Fails fast if `vendor` is empty or the client\n * does not expose `query()` (error-handling.md) — a mis-wired call is caught at definition time.\n */\nexport function createVendorAgentTool(config: VendorAgentToolConfig): CustomTool {\n  if (!config.vendor || config.vendor.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error('createVendorAgentTool: `vendor` is required (e.g. \"claude\", \"openai\").')\n  }\n  const queryFn = (config.client as { query?: unknown } | null | undefined)?.query\n  if (typeof queryFn !== 'function') {\n    throw new Error(\n      `createVendorAgentTool(${JSON.stringify(config.vendor)}): the vendor client does not expose a query() method. ` +\n        'Pass the vendor SDK client (or a @theokit/agent-* wrapper).',\n    )\n  }\n\n  const name = config.name ?? `${config.vendor}_agent`\n  const description =\n    config.description ?? `Delegate a task to the ${config.vendor} agent and return its answer.`\n\n  return {\n    name,\n    description,\n    inputSchema: {\n      type: 'object',\n      properties: {\n        prompt: { type: 'string', description: 'The task/prompt for the vendor agent.' },\n        resumeSessionId: {\n          type: 'string',\n          description: 'Optional vendor session id to resume a prior conversation.',\n        },\n      },\n      required: ['prompt'],\n    },\n    handler: async (input: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<string> => {\n      const prompt = typeof input.prompt === 'string' ? input.prompt : ''\n      const resumeSessionId =\n        typeof input.resumeSessionId === 'string' ? input.resumeSessionId : undefined\n      const result = await config.client.query(\n        prompt,\n        resumeSessionId !== undefined ? { resumeSessionId } : undefined,\n      )\n      if (result.sessionId !== undefined && config.onSession) config.onSession(result.sessionId)\n      return result.text\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * M29 (ADR-0041) — `createCodeMode`: expose a set of tools to agent-authored code run inside an\n * ISOLATION boundary, so the agent composes tools programmatically instead of one call at a time.\n *\n * Security posture (the whole point of this feature):\n *  - The isolation boundary (`sandbox`) is **injected**, never hand-rolled here (Top-risk 1). The app\n *    supplies a vetted sandbox — isolated-vm, QuickJS-WASM, or a locked-down worker. TheoKit core\n *    ships no VM and adds no sandbox dependency (same posture as the injected deploy adapter / the\n *    M17 transport). `node:vm` is NOT a security boundary and MUST NOT be used as the sandbox.\n *  - TheoKit owns the **restricted API** (only the declared tools are reachable from the code — no\n *    `fs`, `process`, `require`, or network unless a declared, permission-gated tool provides it) and\n *    the **mandatory permission gate**: every tool call from the code passes `onPermissionRequest`\n *    first, and there is NO default-allow (mirrors M17 `onPermissionRequest`).\n *\n * Threat model (summary): a malicious model could author code that (a) calls a dangerous tool, or\n * (b) tries to reach a host capability. (a) is stopped by the permission gate (deny → the API call\n * throws). (b) is stopped by the injected sandbox (the restricted API is the ONLY surface the code\n * sees). If the app injects a weak sandbox, (b) is on the app — hence the vetted-sandbox requirement.\n */\nimport type { CustomTool } from '../define/define-agent-tool.js'\n\n/** The restricted API handed to sandboxed code: declared tool names → permission-gated callables. */\nexport type CodeModeApi = Record<string, (args: unknown) => Promise<unknown>>\n\n/** The injected isolation boundary. The app supplies a vetted implementation. */\nexport interface Sandbox {\n  /** Run `code` with access to ONLY `api` (the restricted tool surface). Resolve the code's result. */\n  run(code: string, api: CodeModeApi): Promise<unknown>\n}\n\n/** A permission decision for one tool call from sandboxed code. */\nexport interface CodeModePermission {\n  granted: boolean\n  /** Optional reason surfaced to the model on denial. */\n  reason?: string\n}\n\nexport interface CodeModeConfig {\n  /** The tools reachable from the code (the restricted API). */\n  tools: CustomTool[]\n  /** The injected isolation boundary (vetted sandbox — NEVER node:vm). */\n  sandbox: Sandbox\n  /**\n   * REQUIRED — decide each tool call the code attempts. Security by default: NO default-allow.\n   * Return `{ granted }` (may be async). Mirrors M17 `onPermissionRequest`.\n   */\n  onPermissionRequest: (req: {\n    tool: string\n    args: unknown\n  }) => CodeModePermission | Promise<CodeModePermission>\n  /** Tool name the model calls (default `run_code`). */\n  name?: string\n  /** Tool description surfaced to the model. */\n  description?: string\n}\n\n/** Thrown when the permission gate denies a tool call from sandboxed code. */\nexport class CodeModePermissionDeniedError extends Error {\n  constructor(tool: string, reason?: string) {\n    const suffix = reason ? `: ${reason}` : ''\n    super(`code-mode: tool '${tool}' denied by permission gate${suffix}`)\n    this.name = 'CodeModePermissionDeniedError'\n  }\n}\n\n/** M40 (ADR-0049) — render a tool's JSON-Schema input as a readable arg shape, e.g. `{ limit: number, region?: string }`. */\nfunction describeToolInput(inputSchema: Record<string, unknown>): string {\n  const props = (inputSchema.properties as Record<string, { type?: unknown }> | undefined) ?? {}\n  const required = new Set((inputSchema.required as string[] | undefined) ?? [])\n  const entries = Object.entries(props).map(([key, spec]) => {\n    // Complex Zod types (union/intersection/enum) may emit no top-level `type` → 'unknown' (safe).\n    const type = typeof spec.type === 'string' ? spec.type : 'unknown'\n    return `${key}${required.has(key) ? '' : '?'}: ${type}`\n  })\n  return entries.length > 0 ? `{ ${entries.join(', ')} }` : '{}'\n}\n\n/**\n * M40 (ADR-0049) — generate the model-facing instructions from the SAME `tools` allow-list\n * `createCodeMode` captures (DRY — cannot drift from the api surface it describes). Teaches the model\n * that its code runs in a sandbox, the available `api.<name>(input)` calls (ONLY this allow-list —\n * least-privilege scoping), and the return contract. Add it to the agent's system prompt.\n */\nfunction generateCodeModeInstructions(tools: CustomTool[], toolName: string): string {\n  const calls = tools\n    .map((t) => `- \\`await api.${t.name}(${describeToolInput(t.inputSchema)})\\` — ${t.description}`)\n    .join('\\n')\n  return [\n    `The \\`${toolName}\\` tool runs your code in a sandbox. Your code may call ONLY these functions (each bridges to a real, validated tool on the host):`,\n    calls,\n    'Write an async function body that composes these calls and return exactly ONE structured result. Prefer `Promise.all` for independent calls; do arithmetic and aggregation in code, not in prose.',\n  ].join('\\n\\n')\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a code-mode tool + its generated model instructions (M40 / ADR-0049). Fails fast if\n * `onPermissionRequest` or `sandbox` is missing (security by default). `tool` takes `{ code }`,\n * assembles the permission-gated restricted API from `tools`, runs the code in the injected sandbox,\n * and returns the code's result. `instructions` (add it to the agent's system prompt) teaches the\n * model the sandboxed-code contract + the available `api.<name>(input)` calls.\n */\nexport function createCodeMode(config: CodeModeConfig): { tool: CustomTool; instructions: string } {\n  if (typeof config.onPermissionRequest !== 'function') {\n    throw new Error(\n      'createCodeMode requires onPermissionRequest (security by default — no default-allow for any tool).',\n    )\n  }\n  const sandboxRun = (config.sandbox as { run?: unknown } | null | undefined)?.run\n  if (typeof sandboxRun !== 'function') {\n    throw new Error(\n      'createCodeMode requires an injected `sandbox` with a run() method (a vetted isolation boundary — never node:vm).',\n    )\n  }\n  // M40 — an empty allow-list is a config mistake: the restricted API (and the generated\n  // instructions) would be empty, and the code could call nothing. Fail fast.\n  if (config.tools.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'createCodeMode requires a non-empty tools[] — the restricted API would be empty.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Assemble the restricted API: each declared tool becomes a permission-gated callable.\n  const api: CodeModeApi = {}\n  for (const tool of config.tools) {\n    api[tool.name] = async (args: unknown): Promise<unknown> => {\n      const decision = await config.onPermissionRequest({ tool: tool.name, args })\n      if (!decision.granted) throw new CodeModePermissionDeniedError(tool.name, decision.reason)\n      return tool.handler(args as Record<string, unknown>)\n    }\n  }\n\n  const name = config.name ?? 'run_code'\n  const tool: CustomTool = {\n    name,\n    description:\n      config.description ??\n      'Run code that composes the available tools. Only the declared tools are callable.',\n    inputSchema: {\n      type: 'object',\n      properties: { code: { type: 'string', description: 'The code to run in the sandbox.' } },\n      required: ['code'],\n    },\n    handler: async (input: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<string> => {\n      const code = typeof input.code === 'string' ? input.code : ''\n      const result = await config.sandbox.run(code, api)\n      return typeof result === 'string' ? result : JSON.stringify(result)\n    },\n  }\n  return { tool, instructions: generateCodeModeInstructions(config.tools, name) }\n}\n","/**\n * M27 (ADR-0041) — channel webhook routes: `POST /api/agents/<name>/channels/<platform>/webhook`.\n *\n * Auto-generates a per-platform inbound webhook endpoint that VALIDATES the platform signature\n * (reusing the existing webhook `VerifyFn` providers — Slack/Telegram/Discord — never a hand-rolled\n * scheme) and hands the parsed payload to an injected `onMessage` seam. The seam is where an app\n * wires the SDK gateway package (`@theokit/gateway-*`) that translates the payload into an agent\n * turn — TheoKit provides the route + signature gate, NOT the gateway's parsing (G2 / it does not\n * reimplement the gateway).\n */\nimport type { VerifyFn } from '../webhook/webhook-types.js'\n\nconst CHANNEL_PATH = /^\\/api\\/agents\\/([^/]+)\\/channels\\/([^/]+)\\/webhook$/\n\n/** Parsed `{ agent, platform }` from a channel webhook path, or `null` when it doesn't match. */\nexport function parseChannelPath(urlPath: string): { agent: string; platform: string } | null {\n  const match = CHANNEL_PATH.exec(urlPath)\n  if (!match) return null\n  return { agent: decodeURIComponent(match[1]), platform: decodeURIComponent(match[2]) }\n}\n\n/** True when `urlPath` targets a channel webhook (dev/prod routing branches on this). */\nexport function isChannelPath(urlPath: string): boolean {\n  return CHANNEL_PATH.test(urlPath)\n}\n\n/** The inbound message handed to the app after signature validation passes. */\nexport interface ChannelMessage {\n  agent: string\n  platform: string\n  /** The parsed JSON payload from the platform (the gateway translates this to an agent turn). */\n  payload: unknown\n}\n\nexport interface ChannelWebhookConfig {\n  /** Per-platform signature validators (e.g. `{ slack: slack({...}), telegram: telegram({...}) }`). */\n  validators: Record<string, VerifyFn>\n  /** Handoff seam — wire the SDK gateway / agent here. Invoked only after signature validation. */\n  onMessage: (message: ChannelMessage) => void | Promise<void>\n}\n\nfunction jsonError(status: number, code: string, message: string): Response {\n  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: { code, message } }), {\n    status,\n    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * Handle one channel webhook request. Returns:\n *   404 UNKNOWN_PLATFORM — no validator configured for `<platform>`\n *   400 BAD_REQUEST      — path is not a channel webhook, or the body is not JSON\n *   401 INVALID_SIGNATURE — the platform signature check failed (negative case)\n *   200 { ok: true }     — validated + handed to `onMessage`\n */\nexport async function handleChannelWebhook(\n  request: Request,\n  urlPath: string,\n  config: ChannelWebhookConfig,\n): Promise<Response> {\n  const parsed = parseChannelPath(urlPath)\n  if (parsed === null) {\n    return jsonError(\n      400,\n      'BAD_REQUEST',\n      'Path must be /api/agents/<name>/channels/<platform>/webhook.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (!Object.hasOwn(config.validators, parsed.platform)) {\n    return jsonError(\n      404,\n      'UNKNOWN_PLATFORM',\n      `No validator configured for platform '${parsed.platform}'.`,\n    )\n  }\n  const verify = config.validators[parsed.platform]\n\n  // Validate the signature against a CLONE so the body stays readable for the payload parse.\n  const verifyResult = await verify(request.clone())\n  if (!verifyResult.ok) {\n    return jsonError(\n      401,\n      'INVALID_SIGNATURE',\n      `Signature validation failed: ${verifyResult.reason}`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  let payload: unknown\n  try {\n    payload = await request.json()\n  } catch {\n    return jsonError(400, 'BAD_REQUEST', 'Request body must be JSON.')\n  }\n\n  await config.onMessage({ agent: parsed.agent, platform: parsed.platform, payload })\n  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ ok: true }), {\n    status: 200,\n    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },\n  })\n}\n","/**\n * M35 (multi-surface) — the in-process agent-turn seam (Model A).\n *\n * The FRAMEWORK-owned sibling of the HTTP `mountAgent` and the stdout `runAgentInTerminal`: it runs a\n * compiled agent with the SAME `compileAgentModule` + SAME `streamAgentUIMessages` (G2 — reuses the\n * SDK runtime, reimplements nothing), but returns the raw `UIMessageChunk` generator so ANY consumer\n * drives it directly — the Ink TUI (M35), a Tauri window (M36), or a test — in a SINGLE process with\n * NO HTTP loopback, NO port, and NO CSRF (there is no network boundary to defend).\n *\n * The ONLY difference from the HTTP mount is HITL resolution: the mount pauses the run and resolves\n * the approval via a SECOND HTTP request to `/approve/:id` (the approval registry). In-process there\n * is no second request — the caller resolves the approval INLINE via `awaitApproval` (e.g. the Ink\n * TUI's y/n prompt). The gated-tool map is `compiled.hitl` verbatim, so the pause semantics are\n * byte-identical to the HTTP path; only the resolver differs. Parity with the mount is by\n * construction: both compile the module, resolve function-form skills, and call `streamAgentUIMessages`\n * with the same `{ message, sessionId, hitl }`.\n *\n * Consumers WILL still receive `tool-approval-request` chunks from the returned generator — they are\n * INFORMATIONAL (render them or ignore them). The authoritative human gate is `awaitApproval`, which\n * the SDK awaits BEFORE the gated tool runs; the chunk is not the gate.\n */\nimport {\n  compileAgentModule,\n  resolveEnabledSkills,\n  streamAgentUIMessages,\n  type HitlDecision,\n  type HumanInTheLoopOptions,\n} from '@theokit/agents'\nimport type { UIMessageChunk } from 'ai'\n\n/** An inline approval request handed to the caller's `awaitApproval` (the Ink/Tauri prompt). */\nexport interface InProcessApprovalRequest {\n  approvalId: string\n  toolName: string\n  opts: HumanInTheLoopOptions\n}\n\n/** Resolve one gated-tool approval inline (approve/deny, or a structured {@link HitlDecision}). */\nexport type InProcessAwaitApproval = (\n  req: InProcessApprovalRequest,\n) => Promise<boolean | HitlDecision>\n\nexport interface StreamAgentTurnInProcessInput {\n  message: string\n  /**\n   * M35 (multimodal) — images to send alongside the text. Threaded to the SDK's structured\n   * `SDKUserMessage { text, images }` send form. Absent ⇒ the string send path is byte-unchanged.\n   */\n  images?: Parameters<typeof streamAgentUIMessages>[2]['images']\n  /** Resume key; a fresh id per run when omitted. */\n  sessionId?: string\n  /**\n   * Inline HITL resolver — required IFF the agent has `@HumanInTheLoop`-gated tools. Omitting it for a\n   * gated agent is a fail-fast error, never a silent bypass (Rule 8, the #99 lesson).\n   */\n  awaitApproval?: InProcessAwaitApproval\n  /** Labels a fail-fast `AgentDefinitionError` (the file path). */\n  source?: string\n  /** Abort signal forwarded to the SDK stream (client disconnect / window close). */\n  signal?: AbortSignal\n}\n\n/** Injectable stream fn (defaults to the real SDK bridge) — lets tests drive a deterministic stream. */\nexport interface StreamAgentTurnDeps {\n  stream: typeof streamAgentUIMessages\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown when a gated agent is run in-process without an `awaitApproval` resolver. Refusing loudly is\n * the correct posture: silently running a `@HumanInTheLoop`-gated tool with no human gate is exactly\n * the #99 class of bug. Typed so callers can catch it distinctly.\n */\nexport class InProcessApprovalRequiredError extends Error {\n  constructor(toolNames: readonly string[]) {\n    super(\n      `Agent has HITL-gated tool(s) [${toolNames.join(', ')}] but no \\`awaitApproval\\` resolver was ` +\n        `supplied to streamAgentTurnInProcess. In-process runs must resolve approvals inline — pass ` +\n        `awaitApproval, or remove the gate. Refused (fail-closed).`,\n    )\n    this.name = 'InProcessApprovalRequiredError'\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Run a compiled agent in-process and return its `UIMessageChunk` stream. `apiKey` is resolved by the\n * caller (same contract as the HTTP mount). Validation + compile happen SYNCHRONOUSLY (so a gated\n * agent without a resolver throws at call time, not lazily on first iteration); the returned value is\n * the SDK's `streamAgentUIMessages` generator.\n */\nexport function streamAgentTurnInProcess(\n  mod: unknown,\n  apiKey: string,\n  input: StreamAgentTurnInProcessInput,\n  deps: StreamAgentTurnDeps = { stream: streamAgentUIMessages },\n): AsyncGenerator<UIMessageChunk> {\n  const compiled = compileAgentModule(mod, input.source)\n  const gated = compiled.hitl\n\n  // Fail-fast BEFORE building the stream: a gated agent with no inline resolver would silently bypass\n  // the human gate (the #99 class of bug). Refuse loudly (Rule 8, fail-closed).\n  if (gated && gated.size > 0 && !input.awaitApproval) {\n    throw new InProcessApprovalRequiredError([...gated.keys()])\n  }\n  const resolve = input.awaitApproval\n\n  // Mirror mount-agent's HITL wiring cast-free (structural inference); absent gate ⇒ the non-HITL\n  // stream path (M2), unchanged. The SDK calls (approvalId, opts, toolName); route to the caller.\n  const hitl =\n    gated && gated.size > 0 && resolve\n      ? {\n          gated,\n          awaitApproval: (approvalId: string, opts: HumanInTheLoopOptions, toolName: string) =>\n            resolve({ approvalId, toolName, opts }),\n        }\n      : undefined\n\n  const sessionId = input.sessionId ?? crypto.randomUUID()\n\n  // Resolve function-form skills (`defineAgent({ skills: (ctx) => [...] })`) BEFORE streaming — exact\n  // parity with mount-agent. Done INSIDE the returned generator so the synchronous fail-fast above is\n  // preserved (the caller still gets a plain `AsyncGenerator`, no `await` at the call site). A static\n  // skill list leaves `skillsResolver` undefined and this is a no-op.\n  return (async function* () {\n    if (compiled.skillsResolver) {\n      const enabled = await resolveEnabledSkills(compiled.skillsResolver, compiled.runContext ?? {})\n      if (enabled !== undefined) compiled.skills = { enabled, autoInject: true }\n    }\n    yield* deps.stream(compiled, apiKey, {\n      message: input.message,\n      // M35 — pass images through so the SDK send uses the structured `{ text, images }` form.\n      ...(input.images !== undefined ? { images: input.images } : {}),\n      sessionId,\n      hitl,\n      signal: input.signal,\n    })\n  })()\n}\n","/**\n * MCP stdio transport (M16 follow-up) — expose a TheoKit agent as an MCP server over stdin/stdout,\n * the sibling of the M16 HTTP route (`POST /api/agents/<name>/mcp`). A desktop MCP client (e.g.\n * Claude Desktop) spawns `theokit mcp <agent>` and speaks newline-delimited JSON-RPC over the pipe.\n *\n * This is a TRANSPORT over the framework's OWN {@link handleMcpJsonRpc} — it reuses the exact handler\n * the HTTP route uses; it calls no LLM, spawns no MCP client, and reimplements no runtime (G2 /\n * sdk-runtime.md). Distinct from the SDK's MCP CLIENT stdio (which spawns external MCP servers via\n * `mcpServers` command/args) — that stays SDK-side. Here TheoKit is the SERVER. The framework-side\n * placement of this server-exposure transport is recorded in ADR-0042 (refining ADR-0040's M16 note).\n */\nimport type { AppResource } from './mcp-app-resources.js'\nimport { handleMcpJsonRpc } from './mcp-handler.js'\n\n/**\n * Handle one newline-delimited JSON-RPC line. Returns the response line to write to stdout, or\n * `null` for a blank line (nothing to emit). A malformed JSON line yields a `-32700` (Parse error)\n * envelope — never throws, so the stdio loop never dies on bad input.\n */\nexport async function handleMcpStdioLine(\n  line: string,\n  mod: unknown,\n  name: string,\n  appResources: readonly AppResource[] = [],\n): Promise<string | null> {\n  const trimmed = line.trim()\n  if (trimmed.length === 0) return null\n  let body: unknown\n  try {\n    body = JSON.parse(trimmed)\n  } catch {\n    return JSON.stringify({\n      jsonrpc: '2.0',\n      id: null,\n      error: { code: -32700, message: 'Parse error' },\n    })\n  }\n  const response = await handleMcpJsonRpc(mod, name, body, appResources)\n  const payload: unknown = await response.json()\n  return JSON.stringify(payload)\n}\n\n/** A minimal readable line source (an async iterable of lines) + a writable sink. */\nexport interface StdioStreams {\n  /** Async iterable of newline-delimited input lines (e.g. `readline.createInterface({ input })`). */\n  lines: AsyncIterable<string>\n  /** Write a response line (the caller appends no newline). */\n  write: (line: string) => void\n}\n\n/**\n * Drive the MCP stdio server loop: for each input line, dispatch via {@link handleMcpStdioLine} and\n * write the response line (with a trailing `\\n`). 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package/dist/{chunk-UNLG36Z5.js → chunk-IE6C4KZX.js}

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 import "tsx/esm";
 import {
   getApprovalRegistry
-} from "./chunk-M6NMS5LR.js";
+} from "./chunk-TDNNBLGW.js";
 import {
   TheoError,
   serverErrorToEnvelope
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ function randomRequestId() {
 function broadcastToDevtoolsCore(info, headers, stashedBody) {
   void Promise.all([
     import("./broadcast-LUMOJIJT.js"),
-    import("./build-request-body-preview-QMWD2IXK.js")
+    import("./build-request-body-preview-XPZ2GYMG.js")
   ]).then(([{ broadcastRequest }, { buildRequestBodyPreview }]) => {
     const bodyInfo = buildRequestBodyPreview(stashedBody);
     broadcastRequest({
@@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ function writeSerialized(res, serialized) {
 async function emitActionCallTelemetry(name, startedAt, input, outcome) {
   if (!__IS_DEV) return;
   try {
-    const mod = await import("./dispatcher-EJHL6JMJ.js");
+    const mod = await import("./dispatcher-KMZBGMM5.js");
     mod.dispatcher.onActionCall({
       // eslint-disable-next-line sonarjs/pseudo-random -- non-secret correlation id
       id: `act-${String(Date.now())}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
@@ -2272,9 +2272,14 @@ function resolveDiscoveryCwd(compiled, projectRoot) {
   const optedIn = (compiled.settingSources?.length ?? 0) > 0;
   return projectRoot !== void 0 && optedIn ? projectRoot : void 0;
 }
+function trimTrailingSlashes(value) {
+  let end = value.length;
+  while (end > 0 && value[end - 1] === "/") end -= 1;
+  return value.slice(0, end);
+}
 function resolveSessionBaseDir(projectRoot) {
   if (projectRoot === void 0) return void 0;
-  return `${projectRoot.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/.data/agent-sessions`;
+  return `${trimTrailingSlashes(projectRoot)}/.data/agent-sessions`;
 }
 
 // src/server/scan/module-loader.ts
@@ -2402,4 +2407,4 @@ export {
   applySecurityHeaders,
   generateNonce
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-UNLG36Z5.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IE6C4KZX.js.map