theokit 0.4.0-beta.0 → 0.4.0

package/dist/chunk-NM4WF3XD.js

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// src/server/realtime/channel-manager.ts
+var ChannelManager = class {
+  rooms = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  wsRooms = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  subscribe(ws, room) {
+    let roomSet = this.rooms.get(room);
+    if (!roomSet) {
+      roomSet = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+      this.rooms.set(room, roomSet);
+    }
+    roomSet.add(ws);
+    let wsSet = this.wsRooms.get(ws);
+    if (!wsSet) {
+      wsSet = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+      this.wsRooms.set(ws, wsSet);
+    }
+    wsSet.add(room);
+  }
+  unsubscribe(ws, room) {
+    this.rooms.get(room)?.delete(ws);
+    if (this.rooms.get(room)?.size === 0) this.rooms.delete(room);
+    this.wsRooms.get(ws)?.delete(room);
+    if (this.wsRooms.get(ws)?.size === 0) this.wsRooms.delete(ws);
+  }
+  broadcast(room, data, exclude) {
+    const clients = this.rooms.get(room);
+    if (!clients) return;
+    const msg = JSON.stringify(data);
+    for (const ws of clients) {
+      if (ws !== exclude) ws.send(msg);
+    }
+  }
+  broadcastAll(data) {
+    const msg = JSON.stringify(data);
+    const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+    for (const clients of this.rooms.values()) {
+      for (const ws of clients) {
+        if (!seen.has(ws)) {
+          ws.send(msg);
+          seen.add(ws);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  getRoomSize(room) {
+    return this.rooms.get(room)?.size ?? 0;
+  }
+  cleanup(ws) {
+    const rooms = this.wsRooms.get(ws);
+    if (rooms) {
+      for (const room of rooms) {
+        this.rooms.get(room)?.delete(ws);
+        if (this.rooms.get(room)?.size === 0) this.rooms.delete(room);
+      }
+    }
+    this.wsRooms.delete(ws);
+  }
+};
+
+export {
+  ChannelManager
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NM4WF3XD.js.map

package/dist/chunk-NM4WF3XD.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/server/realtime/channel-manager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { WebSocketLike } from '../define/define-websocket.js'\n\nexport class ChannelManager {\n  private rooms = new Map<string, Set<WebSocketLike>>()\n  private wsRooms = new Map<WebSocketLike, Set<string>>()\n\n  subscribe(ws: WebSocketLike, room: string): void {\n    let roomSet = this.rooms.get(room)\n    if (!roomSet) {\n      roomSet = new Set()\n      this.rooms.set(room, roomSet)\n    }\n    roomSet.add(ws)\n\n    let wsSet = this.wsRooms.get(ws)\n    if (!wsSet) {\n      wsSet = new Set()\n      this.wsRooms.set(ws, wsSet)\n    }\n    wsSet.add(room)\n  }\n\n  unsubscribe(ws: WebSocketLike, room: string): void {\n    this.rooms.get(room)?.delete(ws)\n    if (this.rooms.get(room)?.size === 0) this.rooms.delete(room)\n\n    this.wsRooms.get(ws)?.delete(room)\n    if (this.wsRooms.get(ws)?.size === 0) this.wsRooms.delete(ws)\n  }\n\n  broadcast(room: string, data: unknown, exclude?: WebSocketLike): void {\n    const clients = this.rooms.get(room)\n    if (!clients) return\n\n    const msg = JSON.stringify(data)\n    for (const ws of clients) {\n      if (ws !== exclude) ws.send(msg)\n    }\n  }\n\n  broadcastAll(data: unknown): void {\n    const msg = JSON.stringify(data)\n    const seen = new Set<WebSocketLike>()\n    for (const clients of this.rooms.values()) {\n      for (const ws of clients) {\n        if (!seen.has(ws)) {\n          ws.send(msg)\n          seen.add(ws)\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  getRoomSize(room: string): number {\n    return this.rooms.get(room)?.size ?? 0\n  }\n\n  cleanup(ws: WebSocketLike): void {\n    const rooms = this.wsRooms.get(ws)\n    if (rooms) {\n      for (const room of rooms) {\n        this.rooms.get(room)?.delete(ws)\n        if (this.rooms.get(room)?.size === 0) this.rooms.delete(room)\n      }\n    }\n    this.wsRooms.delete(ws)\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAEO,IAAM,iBAAN,MAAqB;AAAA,EAClB,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAgC;AAAA,EAC5C,UAAU,oBAAI,IAAgC;AAAA,EAEtD,UAAU,IAAmB,MAAoB;AAC/C,QAAI,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI;AACjC,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS;AACZ,gBAAU,oBAAI,IAAI;AAClB,WAAK,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B;AACA,YAAQ,IAAI,EAAE;AAEd,QAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE;AAC/B,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,cAAQ,oBAAI,IAAI;AAChB,WAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,IAC5B;AACA,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EAChB;AAAA,EAEA,YAAY,IAAmB,MAAoB;AACjD,SAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE;AAC/B,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,SAAS,EAAG,MAAK,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI;AAE5D,SAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,IAAI;AACjC,QAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,EAAG,MAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE;AAAA,EAC9D;AAAA,EAEA,UAAU,MAAc,MAAe,SAA+B;AACpE,UAAM,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI;AACnC,QAAI,CAAC,QAAS;AAEd,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/B,eAAW,MAAM,SAAS;AACxB,UAAI,OAAO,QAAS,IAAG,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,aAAa,MAAqB;AAChC,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/B,UAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAmB;AACpC,eAAW,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AACzC,iBAAW,MAAM,SAAS;AACxB,YAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG;AACjB,aAAG,KAAK,GAAG;AACX,eAAK,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,QACb;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,YAAY,MAAsB;AAChC,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,QAAQ;AAAA,EACvC;AAAA,EAEA,QAAQ,IAAyB;AAC/B,UAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE;AACjC,QAAI,OAAO;AACT,iBAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACxB,aAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE;AAC/B,YAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,SAAS,EAAG,MAAK,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,MAC9D;AAAA,IACF;AACA,SAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE;AAAA,EACxB;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-NPMCKOX4.js

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NPMCKOX4.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-VRHXOKRP.js → chunk-NZXH2LQQ.js}

@@ -1,59 +1,11 @@
-// src/server/http/cookies.ts
-function parseCookieHeader(header) {
-  const map = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-  if (!header) return map;
-  for (const pair of header.split(";")) {
-    const trimmed = pair.trim();
-    const eqIdx = trimmed.indexOf("=");
-    if (eqIdx === -1) continue;
-    const key = trimmed.slice(0, eqIdx);
-    const rawValue = trimmed.slice(eqIdx + 1);
-    let value;
-    try {
-      value = decodeURIComponent(rawValue);
-    } catch {
-      value = rawValue;
-    }
-    map.set(key, value);
-  }
-  return map;
-}
-function getCookie(req, name) {
-  const cookies = parseCookieHeader(req.headers.cookie);
-  const value = cookies.get(name);
-  if (value === void 0) return void 0;
-  if (/(?:%[^0-9A-Fa-f])|(?:%[0-9A-Fa-f]$)/.test(value)) return void 0;
-  return value;
-}
-function setCookie(res, name, value, options) {
-  const opts = {
-    httpOnly: true,
-    secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production",
-    sameSite: "lax",
-    path: "/",
-    ...options
-  };
-  const parts = [`${name}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`];
-  if (opts.httpOnly) parts.push("HttpOnly");
-  if (opts.secure) parts.push("Secure");
-  const sameSiteCanonical = opts.sameSite.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + opts.sameSite.slice(1);
-  parts.push(`SameSite=${sameSiteCanonical}`);
-  if (opts.maxAge !== void 0) parts.push(`Max-Age=${opts.maxAge}`);
-  if (opts.path) parts.push(`Path=${opts.path}`);
-  if (opts.domain) parts.push(`Domain=${opts.domain}`);
-  const existing = res.getHeader("Set-Cookie");
-  let cookies = [];
-  if (Array.isArray(existing)) {
-    cookies = existing.map(String);
-  } else if (existing !== void 0) {
-    cookies = [String(existing)];
-  }
-  cookies.push(parts.join("; "));
-  res.setHeader("Set-Cookie", cookies);
-}
-function deleteCookie(res, name, options) {
-  setCookie(res, name, "", { maxAge: 0, path: options?.path ?? "/" });
-}
+import {
+  appendCookieToHeaders,
+  appendDeleteCookieToHeaders,
+  deleteCookie,
+  getCookie,
+  getCookieFromRequest,
+  setCookie
+} from "./chunk-ZJQ4O76G.js";
 
 // src/server/auth/crypto.ts
 var encoder = new TextEncoder();
@@ -143,17 +95,29 @@ function normalizeSecrets(input) {
   }
   return arr;
 }
+async function encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge) {
+  const envelope = {
+    data,
+    exp: Date.now() + maxAge * 1e3
+  };
+  return encrypt(envelope, secrets[0]);
+}
+async function decryptSessionWithFallback(raw, secrets) {
+  const results = await Promise.all(
+    secrets.map(async (secret, i) => {
+      const env = await decrypt(raw, secret);
+      return env ? { envelope: env, index: i } : null;
+    })
+  );
+  for (const result of results) {
+    if (result) return result;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
 function createSessionManager(config) {
   const secrets = normalizeSecrets(config.secret);
   const cookieName = config.cookieName ?? "theo_session";
   const maxAge = config.maxAge ?? 604800;
-  async function encryptEnvelope(data) {
-    const envelope = {
-      data,
-      exp: Date.now() + maxAge * 1e3
-    };
-    return encrypt(envelope, secrets[0]);
-  }
   function writeCookie(res, token) {
     setCookie(res, cookieName, token, {
       httpOnly: true,
@@ -162,18 +126,6 @@ function createSessionManager(config) {
       path: "/"
     });
   }
-  async function decryptWithFallback(raw) {
-    const results = await Promise.all(
-      secrets.map(async (secret, i) => {
-        const env = await decrypt(raw, secret);
-        return env ? { envelope: env, index: i } : null;
-      })
-    );
-    for (const result of results) {
-      if (result) return result;
-    }
-    return null;
-  }
   return {
     async getSession(req) {
       const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(req);
@@ -182,7 +134,7 @@ function createSessionManager(config) {
     async getSessionWithMeta(req) {
       const raw = getCookie(req, cookieName);
       if (!raw) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } };
-      const decoded = await decryptWithFallback(raw);
+      const decoded = await decryptSessionWithFallback(raw, secrets);
       if (!decoded) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } };
       if (decoded.envelope.exp < Date.now()) {
         return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: false } };
@@ -193,7 +145,7 @@ function createSessionManager(config) {
       };
     },
     async createSession(res, data) {
-      const token = await encryptEnvelope(data);
+      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge);
       writeCookie(res, token);
     },
     destroySession(res) {
@@ -202,12 +154,65 @@ function createSessionManager(config) {
     async rotateSession(req, res) {
       const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(req);
       if (data === null) return null;
-      const token = await encryptEnvelope(data);
+      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge);
       writeCookie(res, token);
       return data;
     }
   };
 }
+function createSessionManagerWeb(config) {
+  const secrets = normalizeSecrets(config.secret);
+  const cookieName = config.cookieName ?? "theo_session";
+  const maxAge = config.maxAge ?? 604800;
+  function writeCookieWeb(target, token) {
+    appendCookieToHeaders(target, cookieName, token, {
+      httpOnly: true,
+      sameSite: "lax",
+      maxAge,
+      path: "/"
+    });
+  }
+  return {
+    async getSession(request) {
+      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(request);
+      return data;
+    },
+    async getSessionWithMeta(request) {
+      const raw = getCookieFromRequest(request, cookieName);
+      if (raw === void 0) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } };
+      const decoded = await decryptSessionWithFallback(raw, secrets);
+      if (!decoded) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } };
+      if (decoded.envelope.exp < Date.now()) {
+        return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: false } };
+      }
+      return {
+        data: decoded.envelope.data,
+        meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: decoded.index > 0 }
+      };
+    },
+    async createSession(target, data) {
+      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge);
+      writeCookieWeb(target, token);
+    },
+    destroySession(target) {
+      appendDeleteCookieToHeaders(target, cookieName);
+    },
+    async rotateSession(request, target) {
+      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(request);
+      if (data === null) return null;
+      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge);
+      writeCookieWeb(target, token);
+      return data;
+    }
+  };
+}
+async function rotateIfNeededWeb(sm, request, target) {
+  const { data, meta } = await sm.getSessionWithMeta(request);
+  if (data !== null && meta.needsReencrypt) {
+    await sm.createSession(target, data);
+  }
+  return data;
+}
 async function rotateIfNeeded(sm, req, res) {
   const { data, meta } = await sm.getSessionWithMeta(req);
   if (data !== null && meta.needsReencrypt) {
@@ -573,14 +578,12 @@ async function discoverOidcProvider(issuer) {
 }
 
 export {
-  parseCookieHeader,
-  getCookie,
-  setCookie,
-  deleteCookie,
   encrypt,
   decrypt,
   _resetKeyCacheForTests,
   createSessionManager,
+  createSessionManagerWeb,
+  rotateIfNeededWeb,
   rotateIfNeeded,
   assertProductionSecret,
   generateTotp,
@@ -598,4 +601,4 @@ export {
   clearOidcCache,
   discoverOidcProvider
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VRHXOKRP.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NZXH2LQQ.js.map

package/dist/chunk-NZXH2LQQ.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/server/auth/crypto.ts","../src/server/auth/session.ts","../src/server/_internal/encoding.ts","../src/server/auth/auth-totp.ts","../src/server/auth/auth-backup-codes.ts","../src/server/auth/auth-throttle.ts","../src/server/auth/oauth-pkce.ts","../src/server/auth/oauth-state.ts","../src/server/auth/oidc-discovery.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// AES-GCM-256 token encryption with cached key derivation.\n//\n// CR-002 fixes:\n//   - KDF: HKDF (RFC 5869) over the raw secret, not raw SHA-256.\n//     HKDF binds the application context (\"theo-session-v1\") into the\n//     derived key so the same secret used elsewhere cannot decrypt these\n//     tokens. SHA-256 of the raw secret has neither domain separation nor\n//     proper key-stretching guarantees.\n//   - Cache: derived `CryptoKey` is memoized per (secret, info) tuple.\n//     Pre-fix, every encrypt/decrypt re-ran SHA-256 + importKey, which (a)\n//     burned CPU on every authenticated request and (b) made\n//     `decryptWithFallback` leak rotation-array position via timing.\n//   - Buffer typing: `Uint8Array` flows directly into Web Crypto\n//     (`BufferSource`-compatible). The previous `as unknown as ArrayBuffer`\n//     double-cast (CR-016) is removed.\n\nconst encoder = new TextEncoder()\nconst decoder = new TextDecoder()\n\nconst HKDF_INFO_DEFAULT = encoder.encode('theo-session-v1')\nconst HKDF_SALT_EMPTY = new Uint8Array(0)\n\n// Memoize derived keys. Bounded by the number of distinct secrets the app\n// ever uses (typically 1 in steady state, 2-5 during rotation). Map-based\n// so distinct secrets do not evict each other.\nconst keyCache = new Map<string, Promise<CryptoKey>>()\n\nasync function deriveKey(secret: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const cached = keyCache.get(secret)\n  if (cached) return cached\n\n  const derive = (async () => {\n    const keyMaterial = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n      'raw',\n      encoder.encode(secret),\n      { name: 'HKDF' },\n      false,\n      ['deriveKey'],\n    )\n    return crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n      { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt: HKDF_SALT_EMPTY, info: HKDF_INFO_DEFAULT },\n      keyMaterial,\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n      false,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  })()\n\n  keyCache.set(secret, derive)\n  // If derivation fails (invalid secret), evict so a retry can try fresh.\n  derive.catch(() => {\n    keyCache.delete(secret)\n  })\n  return derive\n}\n\nfunction toBase64Url(data: Uint8Array): string {\n  return Buffer.from(data).toString('base64url')\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a base64url string into a `Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>`. The explicit\n * generic matters: Web Crypto APIs expect `BufferSource`, and TS 5.7+\n * tightened `Uint8Array` to `Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>` which includes\n * `SharedArrayBuffer`. Returning the narrower generic lets the value pass\n * `crypto.subtle.decrypt` without `as` casts (CR-016 follow-through).\n */\nfunction fromBase64Url(str: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {\n  const buf = Buffer.from(str, 'base64url')\n  const copy = new Uint8Array(buf.length)\n  copy.set(buf)\n  return copy\n}\n\n// The `T` generic exists so call sites get type-safe round-tripping\n// (`encrypt<Session>(s, ...)` pairs with `decrypt<Session>(...)`); the\n// runtime body just stringifies `data`, hence T does not appear in the\n// signature beyond the argument.\n// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unnecessary-type-parameters -- T documents the round-trip contract with decrypt<T>\nexport async function encrypt<T>(data: T, secret: string): Promise<string> {\n  const key = await deriveKey(secret)\n  const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  const plaintext = encoder.encode(JSON.stringify(data))\n  const ciphertext = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv }, key, plaintext),\n  )\n  return `${toBase64Url(iv)}:${toBase64Url(ciphertext)}`\n}\n\nexport async function decrypt<T>(token: string, secret: string): Promise<T | null> {\n  try {\n    const parts = token.split(':')\n    if (parts.length !== 2) return null\n\n    const iv = fromBase64Url(parts[0])\n    const ciphertext = fromBase64Url(parts[1])\n    const key = await deriveKey(secret)\n\n    const plaintext = await crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv }, key, ciphertext)\n    return JSON.parse(decoder.decode(plaintext)) as T\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reset the derived-key cache. Test helper — never call from production code.\n * Used by Vitest to guarantee isolation between tests that use distinct\n * secrets and want to confirm the derivation path runs.\n */\nexport function _resetKeyCacheForTests(): void {\n  keyCache.clear()\n}\n","import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http'\n\nimport {\n  getCookie,\n  setCookie,\n  deleteCookie,\n  getCookieFromRequest,\n  appendCookieToHeaders,\n  appendDeleteCookieToHeaders,\n} from '../http/cookies.js'\n\nimport { encrypt, decrypt } from './crypto.js'\n\nexport interface SessionConfig {\n  /**\n   * Session secret. Either a single string (legacy) or an array of strings\n   * where index 0 is the newest. The array form enables dual-key rotation\n   * (T3.1 / ADR D5): encrypt always uses `secrets[0]`, decrypt walks the\n   * array, transparent re-encrypt on legacy hits (T3.2).\n   *\n   * EC-1: array length capped at 5 — enforced via throw at construction.\n   */\n  secret: string | string[]\n  cookieName?: string\n  maxAge?: number\n}\n\ninterface SessionEnvelope<T> {\n  data: T\n  exp: number\n}\n\nexport interface SessionMeta {\n  /** Index of the secret that decrypted the session. 0 = newest; > 0 = legacy. */\n  secretIndex: number\n  /** True when the decrypt used a legacy secret and the cookie should be re-encrypted. */\n  needsReencrypt: boolean\n}\n\nexport interface SessionManager<TSession> {\n  getSession(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<TSession | null>\n  /**\n   * T3.2 — Variant of `getSession` that surfaces decrypt metadata.\n   * Used by `api-middleware.ts` to wire transparent re-encrypt BEFORE\n   * the handler runs (so streaming SSR routes don't miss the Set-Cookie\n   * window — EC-4).\n   */\n  getSessionWithMeta(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<{ data: TSession | null; meta: SessionMeta }>\n  createSession(res: ServerResponse, data: TSession): Promise<void>\n  destroySession(res: ServerResponse): void\n  /**\n   * T3.3 — OWASP A07:2021 session fixation mitigation. Re-encrypts the\n   * current session with a fresh IV and refreshed expiry. No-op when no\n   * session is present.\n   */\n  rotateSession(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): Promise<TSession | null>\n}\n\n/**\n * EC-1 — array length cap. Enforced via throw at construction. Silent\n * truncation would create false sense of rotation; silent acceptance\n * would create unbounded CPU on legacy decrypt walks.\n */\nconst MAX_SECRETS = 5\n\n/**\n * Validate + normalize the secret config into a non-empty array of\n * strings ≥ 32 chars each.\n */\nfunction normalizeSecrets(input: string | string[]): string[] {\n  const arr = Array.isArray(input) ? input.slice() : [input]\n  if (arr.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error('Session secret must be non-empty (received an empty array)')\n  }\n  if (arr.length > MAX_SECRETS) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Session secret array exceeds maximum of ${MAX_SECRETS} entries — drop the oldest before adding a new one (received ${arr.length})`,\n    )\n  }\n  const wasArray = Array.isArray(input)\n  for (let i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) {\n    const s = arr[i]\n    if (typeof s !== 'string' || s.length < 32) {\n      const where = wasArray ? ` at index ${i}` : ''\n      throw new Error(`Session secret${where} must be at least 32 characters for secure encryption`)\n    }\n  }\n  return arr\n}\n\n/**\n * T5a.2 Phase D slice 3/3 — module-level pure helpers extracted so\n * `createSessionManager` (IncomingMessage path) and\n * `createSessionManagerWeb` (Web path) share the same encryption +\n * dual-key rotation logic without code duplication (sonarjs\n * no-identical-functions). Both wrappers pass `secrets` + `maxAge`\n * captured from their respective factory scope.\n */\nasync function encryptSessionEnvelope(\n  data: unknown,\n  secrets: string[],\n  maxAge: number,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const envelope: SessionEnvelope<unknown> = {\n    data,\n    exp: Date.now() + maxAge * 1000,\n  }\n  return encrypt(envelope, secrets[0]) // newest\n}\n\n/**\n * CR-002 constant-time: try EVERY rotation entry in parallel, then pick\n * the newest match. Sequential early-exit leaked rotation position via\n * timing (success on entry 0 returned in ~3 ms; success on entry 4 in\n * ~15 ms). Running in parallel binds wall-clock to the slowest single\n * attempt, independent of which entry actually matched. With derived-key\n * cache (CR-002 in crypto.ts), the CPU multiplier per request is ~0\n * after the first request per secret.\n */\nasync function decryptSessionWithFallback<TSession>(\n  raw: string,\n  secrets: string[],\n): Promise<{ envelope: SessionEnvelope<TSession>; index: number } | null> {\n  const results = await Promise.all(\n    secrets.map(async (secret, i) => {\n      const env = await decrypt<SessionEnvelope<TSession>>(raw, secret)\n      return env ? { envelope: env, index: i } : null\n    }),\n  )\n  for (const result of results) {\n    if (result) return result\n  }\n  return null\n}\n\nexport function createSessionManager<TSession>(config: SessionConfig): SessionManager<TSession> {\n  const secrets = normalizeSecrets(config.secret)\n  const cookieName = config.cookieName ?? 'theo_session'\n  const maxAge = config.maxAge ?? 604800 // 7 days\n\n  function writeCookie(res: ServerResponse, token: string): void {\n    setCookie(res, cookieName, token, {\n      httpOnly: true,\n      sameSite: 'lax',\n      maxAge,\n      path: '/',\n    })\n  }\n\n  return {\n    async getSession(req) {\n      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(req)\n      return data\n    },\n\n    async getSessionWithMeta(req) {\n      const raw = getCookie(req, cookieName)\n      if (!raw) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      const decoded = await decryptSessionWithFallback<TSession>(raw, secrets)\n      if (!decoded) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      if (decoded.envelope.exp < Date.now()) {\n        return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      }\n      return {\n        data: decoded.envelope.data,\n        meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: decoded.index > 0 },\n      }\n    },\n\n    async createSession(res, data) {\n      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge)\n      writeCookie(res, token)\n    },\n\n    destroySession(res) {\n      deleteCookie(res, cookieName)\n    },\n\n    async rotateSession(req, res) {\n      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(req)\n      if (data === null) return null\n      // Fresh IV per encrypt call (Web Crypto guarantee — see crypto.ts)\n      // + refreshed expiry. Last write wins for the cookie value.\n      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge)\n      writeCookie(res, token)\n      return data\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * T5a.2 Phase D slice 3/3 — Web-Standards session manager.\n *\n * Mirror of `SessionManager<TSession>` for the Web `Request` + `Headers`\n * shape. Same `SessionConfig`, same encryption (`encrypt`/`decrypt` from\n * `./crypto.js`), same dual-key rotation logic (CR-002 constant-time\n * decrypt fallback walk + transparent re-encrypt), same OWASP A07\n * `rotateSession` invariant.\n *\n * **Signature differences vs `SessionManager`:**\n *   - Read methods take `Request` (instead of `IncomingMessage`).\n *   - Write methods take a `Headers` instance to mutate (instead of\n *     `ServerResponse`) — caller passes the headers they're building\n *     for their `Response` constructor.\n *\n * Uses `getCookieFromRequest` / `appendCookieToHeaders` /\n * `appendDeleteCookieToHeaders` from Phase B slice 6/6.\n */\nexport interface SessionManagerWeb<TSession> {\n  getSession(request: Request): Promise<TSession | null>\n  getSessionWithMeta(request: Request): Promise<{ data: TSession | null; meta: SessionMeta }>\n  createSession(target: Headers, data: TSession): Promise<void>\n  destroySession(target: Headers): void\n  rotateSession(request: Request, target: Headers): Promise<TSession | null>\n}\n\nexport function createSessionManagerWeb<TSession>(\n  config: SessionConfig,\n): SessionManagerWeb<TSession> {\n  const secrets = normalizeSecrets(config.secret)\n  const cookieName = config.cookieName ?? 'theo_session'\n  const maxAge = config.maxAge ?? 604800 // 7 days\n\n  function writeCookieWeb(target: Headers, token: string): void {\n    appendCookieToHeaders(target, cookieName, token, {\n      httpOnly: true,\n      sameSite: 'lax',\n      maxAge,\n      path: '/',\n    })\n  }\n\n  return {\n    async getSession(request) {\n      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(request)\n      return data\n    },\n\n    async getSessionWithMeta(request) {\n      const raw = getCookieFromRequest(request, cookieName)\n      if (raw === undefined) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      const decoded = await decryptSessionWithFallback<TSession>(raw, secrets)\n      if (!decoded) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      if (decoded.envelope.exp < Date.now()) {\n        return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      }\n      return {\n        data: decoded.envelope.data,\n        meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: decoded.index > 0 },\n      }\n    },\n\n    async createSession(target, data) {\n      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge)\n      writeCookieWeb(target, token)\n    },\n\n    destroySession(target) {\n      appendDeleteCookieToHeaders(target, cookieName)\n    },\n\n    async rotateSession(request, target) {\n      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(request)\n      if (data === null) return null\n      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge)\n      writeCookieWeb(target, token)\n      return data\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * T5a.2 Phase D slice 3/3 — Web-Standards transparent re-encrypt helper.\n *\n * Mirror of `rotateIfNeeded(sm, req, res)` for the Web Request + Headers\n * shape. Reads session via `getSessionWithMeta`; if the cookie was\n * decrypted with a legacy secret (index > 0), re-issues the cookie with\n * the newest secret via `createSession(target, data)`.\n *\n * **EC-4 honest framing:** unlike the IncomingMessage path where the\n * timing constraint is \"before `res.writeHead` fires\", the Web Request\n * path's constraint is \"before the `Response` object is constructed and\n * returned to the runtime\". Caller MUST invoke `rotateIfNeededWeb`\n * BEFORE building the final `Response(body, { headers: target })` so the\n * re-encrypted Set-Cookie lands on the wire.\n */\nexport async function rotateIfNeededWeb<TSession>(\n  sm: SessionManagerWeb<TSession>,\n  request: Request,\n  target: Headers,\n): Promise<TSession | null> {\n  const { data, meta } = await sm.getSessionWithMeta(request)\n  if (data !== null && meta.needsReencrypt) {\n    await sm.createSession(target, data)\n  }\n  return data\n}\n\n/**\n * T3.2 — Transparent re-encrypt helper (EC-4 timing-safe wrapper).\n *\n * Call this in your `createContext` (before any rendering / streaming\n * starts). It:\n *   1. Reads the session via `getSessionWithMeta`.\n *   2. If the cookie was decrypted with a legacy secret (index > 0), it\n *      immediately re-issues the cookie with `secrets[0]` so the next\n *      request lands on the newest key.\n *   3. Returns the session data (or null) for use downstream.\n *\n * EC-4: this MUST run before `renderToPipeableStream` / `res.writeHead`\n * fires. Calling it inside an SSR component or handler body that has\n * already streamed bytes makes the re-encrypt a silent no-op (Set-Cookie\n * is locked once headers commit), trapping users on the legacy secret\n * forever once it's removed from the array.\n */\nexport async function rotateIfNeeded<TSession>(\n  sm: SessionManager<TSession>,\n  req: IncomingMessage,\n  res: ServerResponse,\n): Promise<TSession | null> {\n  const { data, meta } = await sm.getSessionWithMeta(req)\n  if (data !== null && meta.needsReencrypt) {\n    await sm.createSession(res, data)\n  }\n  return data\n}\n\n/**\n * EC-2 — Production secret guard. Refuses to boot when `NODE_ENV === 'production'`\n * AND the secret is too short (< 32 chars) OR matches a known placeholder.\n *\n * Accepts a single secret OR an array. In array form, each entry is validated\n * independently — a single bad entry refuses boot with an index-qualified message.\n */\nconst PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN = /CHANGE_ME|demo[-_]|placeholder/i\n\nexport function assertProductionSecret(secret: string | string[]): void {\n  const arr = Array.isArray(secret) ? secret : [secret]\n  const isProd = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) {\n    const s = arr[i]\n    const isPlaceholder = PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN.test(s)\n    const isTooShort = s.length < 32\n    const prefix = arr.length > 1 ? `Session secret at index ${i}` : 'Session secret'\n\n    if (isProd) {\n      if (isTooShort) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `${prefix} too short for production (${s.length} chars; minimum 32). ` +\n            `Set a 32+ random char secret in your env (e.g., \\`openssl rand -hex 32\\`).`,\n        )\n      }\n      if (isPlaceholder) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `${prefix} looks like a placeholder (\"${s.slice(0, 16)}…\") and NODE_ENV is \"production\". ` +\n            `Replace it with a 32+ random char secret (e.g., \\`openssl rand -hex 32\\`) before deploying.`,\n        )\n      }\n      continue\n    }\n    if (isPlaceholder || isTooShort) {\n      console.warn(\n        `[theokit] WARNING: ${prefix.toLowerCase()} is a placeholder or too short. ` +\n          `This is OK for dev, but the production server will REFUSE to boot until you replace it.`,\n      )\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Shared encoding utilities for crypto-adjacent code.\n *\n * CR-020 DRY: `base64urlEncode` was duplicated across `oauth-pkce.ts` and\n * `oauth-state.ts`. Duplication in cryptographic helpers is a bug class —\n * a future RFC-driven tweak (e.g., padding semantics) would diverge across\n * files. Centralizing the single canonical implementation eliminates that\n * vector.\n *\n * Module is intentionally under `_internal/` so it is **not** part of the\n * public API surface. Consumers outside `packages/theo/src/server` must\n * not import from here.\n */\n\n/**\n * RFC 4648 §5 — base64url-encode bytes without padding. Used wherever an\n * RFC requires URL-safe base64 (PKCE per RFC 7636 §4.1, JWT per RFC 7515,\n * etc.). Pure function — does not mutate `bytes`.\n */\nexport function base64urlEncode(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let s = ''\n  for (const b of bytes) s += String.fromCharCode(b)\n  // The `=+$` trailing-padding regex is bounded (at most 2 chars for\n  // base64). sonarjs flags the `+` quantifier conservatively, but the\n  // input is the output of `btoa()` — a string with at most 2 trailing\n  // `=` characters by spec.\n  // eslint-disable-next-line sonarjs/slow-regex -- bounded trailing-padding pattern (max 2 chars)\n  return btoa(s).replace(/\\+/g, '-').replace(/\\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '')\n}\n\n/**\n * Constant-time string equality.\n *\n * CR-012: prior implementations early-exited on length mismatch\n * (`if (a.length !== b.length) return false`). That early exit leaks\n * the comparison-target length via wall-clock timing — observable when\n * the secret length is itself sensitive (length-based bucket assignment,\n * variable-length nonces). This implementation always iterates\n * `max(a.length, b.length)` characters, OR-folding mismatches into a\n * single accumulator that is checked once at the end.\n *\n * Returns `false` for empty inputs as a defensive default — never accept\n * \"both empty\" as a match.\n */\nexport function constantTimeEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  if (typeof a !== 'string' || typeof b !== 'string') return false\n  if (a.length === 0 || b.length === 0) return false\n\n  const maxLen = Math.max(a.length, b.length)\n  let diff = a.length ^ b.length\n  for (let i = 0; i < maxLen; i++) {\n    // charCodeAt returns NaN for out-of-range indices; (NaN ^ x) is x, so we\n    // explicitly substitute 0 to keep the OR-fold meaningful.\n    const ca = i < a.length ? a.charCodeAt(i) : 0\n    const cb = i < b.length ? b.charCodeAt(i) : 0\n    diff |= ca ^ cb\n  }\n  return diff === 0\n}\n","/**\n * T6.2 — RFC 6238 TOTP primitive.\n *\n * Reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6238\n * HMAC-based one-time password (HOTP) base: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4226\n *\n * Pure-function, dependency-free implementation via Web Crypto. Secrets\n * may be passed as Uint8Array (preferred) or base32 string.\n *\n * SECURITY NOTES (documented per EC-13):\n *   - TOTP secrets are equivalent to passwords. Encrypt at rest using a\n *     separate KMS key from the session secret. If your DB leaks, ALL\n *     2FA codes are compromised — rotate by forcing all users to re-enroll.\n *   - Use `verifyTotp` constant-time (we use crypto.timingSafeEqual internally).\n */\n\n// CR-012 fix: use the shared constant-time helper that does not early-exit\n// on length mismatch (the previous local version did, leaking the digit\n// count via timing).\nimport { constantTimeEquals } from '../_internal/encoding.js'\n\n/** Supported HMAC algorithms per RFC 6238 §1.2. Default SHA-1. */\nexport type TotpAlgorithm = 'SHA-1' | 'SHA-256' | 'SHA-512'\n\nexport interface TotpOptions {\n  /** Shared secret — bytes (preferred) OR base32 string. */\n  secret: Uint8Array | string\n  /** Time step in seconds. Default 30 (RFC 6238 §5.2 recommended). */\n  step?: number\n  /** Code length: 6, 7, or 8 digits. Default 6. */\n  digits?: 6 | 7 | 8\n  /** HMAC algorithm. Default SHA-1 (RFC default). */\n  algorithm?: TotpAlgorithm\n  /** Time in ms since epoch. Default Date.now(). */\n  time?: number\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyTotpOptions extends TotpOptions {\n  /**\n   * Drift tolerance in number of steps on each side. Default 1\n   * (RFC 6238 §5.2 recommends ±1 step = 90s total window).\n   */\n  window?: number\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_STEP = 30\nconst DEFAULT_DIGITS = 6\nconst DEFAULT_ALGORITHM: TotpAlgorithm = 'SHA-1'\n\n/** Decode base32 (RFC 4648, no padding) to bytes. Throws on invalid input. */\nfunction base32Decode(s: string): Uint8Array {\n  const alphabet = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567'\n  // Trailing `=` is bounded by spec to 0..6 chars; `\\s+` collapses runs\n  // of whitespace. Input length is the user's TOTP secret (10..50 chars\n  // typical), so super-linear backtracking cannot escalate.\n  // eslint-disable-next-line sonarjs/slow-regex -- bounded inputs (TOTP secrets are short)\n  const clean = s.toUpperCase().replace(/=+$/, '').replace(/\\s+/g, '')\n  if (!/^[A-Z2-7]+$/.test(clean)) {\n    throw new Error('Invalid base32 secret')\n  }\n  const bits: number[] = []\n  for (const c of clean) {\n    const idx = alphabet.indexOf(c)\n    for (let i = 4; i >= 0; i--) bits.push((idx >> i) & 1)\n  }\n  // Trim trailing partial byte\n  const fullBytes = Math.floor(bits.length / 8)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(fullBytes)\n  for (let i = 0; i < fullBytes; i++) {\n    let v = 0\n    for (let j = 0; j < 8; j++) v = (v << 1) | bits[i * 8 + j]\n    out[i] = v\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/** Encode bytes to base32 (RFC 4648, no padding). */\nfunction base32Encode(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  const alphabet = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567'\n  let out = ''\n  let buffer = 0\n  let bits = 0\n  for (const b of bytes) {\n    buffer = (buffer << 8) | b\n    bits += 8\n    while (bits >= 5) {\n      out += alphabet[(buffer >> (bits - 5)) & 0x1f]\n      bits -= 5\n    }\n  }\n  if (bits > 0) out += alphabet[(buffer << (5 - bits)) & 0x1f]\n  return out\n}\n\nfunction normalizeSecret(secret: Uint8Array | string): Uint8Array {\n  if (typeof secret === 'string') return base32Decode(secret)\n  return secret\n}\n\n/** Counter (8-byte big-endian) from time in ms / step in seconds. */\nfunction counterBytes(timeMs: number, stepSec: number): Uint8Array {\n  const counter = Math.floor(timeMs / 1000 / stepSec)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(8)\n  // Two 32-bit halves (Number can safely represent up to 2^53; OK until year 285,000+)\n  const hi = Math.floor(counter / 0x100000000)\n  const lo = counter >>> 0\n  out[0] = (hi >>> 24) & 0xff\n  out[1] = (hi >>> 16) & 0xff\n  out[2] = (hi >>> 8) & 0xff\n  out[3] = hi & 0xff\n  out[4] = (lo >>> 24) & 0xff\n  out[5] = (lo >>> 16) & 0xff\n  out[6] = (lo >>> 8) & 0xff\n  out[7] = lo & 0xff\n  return out\n}\n\nasync function hmac(\n  secret: Uint8Array,\n  message: Uint8Array,\n  algorithm: TotpAlgorithm,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    secret as BufferSource,\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: algorithm },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  const sig = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, message as BufferSource)\n  return new Uint8Array(sig)\n}\n\n/** RFC 4226 §5.3 dynamic truncation. */\nfunction truncate(mac: Uint8Array, digits: number): string {\n  const offset = mac[mac.length - 1] & 0x0f\n  const code =\n    ((mac[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((mac[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((mac[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (mac[offset + 3] & 0xff)\n  const mod = 10 ** digits\n  return String(code % mod).padStart(digits, '0')\n}\n\n/** Generate a TOTP code for a given time. */\nexport async function generateTotp(opts: TotpOptions): Promise<string> {\n  const secret = normalizeSecret(opts.secret)\n  const step = opts.step ?? DEFAULT_STEP\n  const digits = opts.digits ?? DEFAULT_DIGITS\n  const algorithm = opts.algorithm ?? DEFAULT_ALGORITHM\n  const time = opts.time ?? Date.now()\n  const mac = await hmac(secret, counterBytes(time, step), algorithm)\n  return truncate(mac, digits)\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a TOTP code against the current window ± `window` steps.\n *\n * Returns `false` for malformed tokens (non-digit, wrong length) without\n * throwing — defensive against accidental user-input passthrough.\n */\nexport async function verifyTotp(token: string, opts: VerifyTotpOptions): Promise<boolean> {\n  if (typeof token !== 'string') return false\n  const digits = opts.digits ?? DEFAULT_DIGITS\n  if (!/^\\d+$/.test(token) || token.length !== digits) return false\n\n  const step = opts.step ?? DEFAULT_STEP\n  const algorithm = opts.algorithm ?? DEFAULT_ALGORITHM\n  const time = opts.time ?? Date.now()\n  const drift = opts.window ?? 1\n  const secret = normalizeSecret(opts.secret)\n\n  // Walk the whole drift range constant-time-ish (no early exit).\n  let matched = false\n  for (let delta = -drift; delta <= drift; delta++) {\n    const t = time + delta * step * 1000\n    const code = truncate(await hmac(secret, counterBytes(t, step), algorithm), digits)\n    if (constantTimeEquals(code, token)) matched = true\n  }\n  return matched\n}\n\n/** Generate a cryptographically random TOTP secret. Default 20 bytes (RFC minimum). */\nexport function generateTotpSecret(bytes = 20): Uint8Array {\n  if (bytes < 16) {\n    throw new Error('TOTP secret must be at least 16 bytes (RFC 6238 §3 minimum)')\n  }\n  const out = new Uint8Array(bytes)\n  crypto.getRandomValues(out)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an `otpauth://` URI for QR code enrollment. Format follows the\n * de facto Google Authenticator spec adopted by every major TOTP app.\n *   otpauth://totp/<issuer>:<account>?secret=<base32>&issuer=<issuer>&algorithm=<alg>&digits=<n>&period=<sec>\n */\nexport interface TotpUriOptions {\n  secret: Uint8Array\n  issuer: string\n  account: string\n  algorithm?: TotpAlgorithm\n  digits?: 6 | 7 | 8\n  step?: number\n}\n\nexport function totpUri(opts: TotpUriOptions): string {\n  const label = `${opts.issuer}:${opts.account}`\n  const params = new URLSearchParams({\n    secret: base32Encode(opts.secret),\n    issuer: opts.issuer,\n    algorithm: opts.algorithm ?? DEFAULT_ALGORITHM,\n    digits: String(opts.digits ?? DEFAULT_DIGITS),\n    period: String(opts.step ?? DEFAULT_STEP),\n  })\n  return `otpauth://totp/${encodeURIComponent(label)}?${params.toString()}`\n}\n","/**\n * T6.3 — Backup codes for 2FA recovery.\n *\n * generateBackupCodes returns N plaintexts (display once to user) + hashes\n * (store in DB). verifyBackupCode constant-time-walks all hashes and\n * returns the matchedHash so caller can delete the used code from storage\n * — replay protection lives at the caller (we can't see their database).\n *\n * SECURITY NOTES:\n *   - Codes have ~40 bits entropy (8 chars × 5 bits per char from a\n *     32-char alphabet excluding I/L/O/0/1). Single-use → argon2id\n *     overhead is unnecessary; SHA-256 of the normalized code suffices.\n *   - The caller MUST atomically delete the matched hash on successful\n *     verify. Without that, the code is replayable. We surface\n *     matchedHash explicitly so this step is conspicuous.\n *   - Pair this with throttleLoginAttempts (T6.1) on the verify endpoint\n *     to prevent online brute-force against the 40-bit space.\n */\n\nexport interface BackupCodeOptions {\n  /** How many codes to generate. Default 10. */\n  count?: number\n  /** Length in chars (excluding separator). Default 8. */\n  length?: number\n  /** Separator inserted at the midpoint. Default '-'; pass null to omit. */\n  separator?: '-' | null\n  /** Custom alphabet. Default excludes ambiguous chars (I, L, O, 0, 1). */\n  alphabet?: string\n}\n\nexport interface BackupCode {\n  plaintext: string\n  hash: string\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_ALPHABET = 'ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789' // no I, O, 0, 1\nconst DEFAULT_COUNT = 10\nconst DEFAULT_LENGTH = 8\n\n/**\n * Generate cryptographically random backup codes + their SHA-256 hashes.\n *\n * Plaintext is uppercase alphanumeric (default alphabet excludes ambiguous\n * chars). Separator inserted at the midpoint (default `-`).\n */\nexport async function generateBackupCodes(opts: BackupCodeOptions = {}): Promise<BackupCode[]> {\n  const count = opts.count ?? DEFAULT_COUNT\n  const length = opts.length ?? DEFAULT_LENGTH\n  const separator = opts.separator === undefined ? '-' : opts.separator\n  const alphabet = opts.alphabet ?? DEFAULT_ALPHABET\n\n  // CR-022 fix: bound count and length explicitly. Pathological inputs\n  // (count=Infinity, length=0) would cause an infinite loop or wasteful\n  // resource usage. Bounds are generous (count ≤ 1000, length ∈ [4, 64])\n  // — well above any realistic 2FA backup-codes use case.\n  if (!Number.isInteger(count) || count <= 0 || count > 1000) {\n    throw new RangeError(\n      `generateBackupCodes: count must be an integer in [1, 1000] (got ${String(count)})`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (!Number.isInteger(length) || length < 4 || length > 64) {\n    throw new RangeError(\n      `generateBackupCodes: length must be an integer in [4, 64] (got ${String(length)})`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (alphabet.length < 8) {\n    throw new RangeError(\n      `generateBackupCodes: alphabet must contain at least 8 distinct chars (got ${alphabet.length})`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  const codes: BackupCode[] = []\n  const seen = new Set<string>()\n  while (codes.length < count) {\n    const raw = randomFromAlphabet(length, alphabet)\n    if (seen.has(raw)) continue\n    seen.add(raw)\n    const plaintext = formatWithSeparator(raw, separator)\n    const hash = await sha256Hex(normalizeCode(plaintext))\n    codes.push({ plaintext, hash })\n  }\n  return codes\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a code against a list of stored hashes. Walks all hashes\n * constant-time (no early exit). Returns `valid:true` + matchedHash on\n * hit; `valid:false` otherwise.\n *\n * `matchedHash` is the EXACT string the caller stored, ready to be passed\n * to a `DELETE FROM backup_codes WHERE hash = ?` query.\n */\nexport async function verifyBackupCode(\n  code: string,\n  hashes: readonly string[],\n): Promise<{ valid: boolean; matchedHash?: string }> {\n  const candidate = await sha256Hex(normalizeCode(code))\n  let matchedHash: string | undefined\n  // Constant-time iteration over hashes: never short-circuit.\n  for (const h of hashes) {\n    if (constantTimeEquals(h, candidate)) {\n      matchedHash = h\n    }\n  }\n  return matchedHash ? { valid: true, matchedHash } : { valid: false }\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalize a code for hashing: uppercase + strip separator. This way\n * `abcd-efgh` and `ABCDEFGH` produce the same hash. Whitespace is also\n * stripped defensively.\n */\nfunction normalizeCode(input: string): string {\n  return input.toUpperCase().replace(/[-\\s]+/g, '')\n}\n\nfunction formatWithSeparator(raw: string, separator: '-' | null): string {\n  if (!separator || raw.length < 4) return raw\n  const mid = Math.floor(raw.length / 2)\n  return raw.slice(0, mid) + separator + raw.slice(mid)\n}\n\nfunction randomFromAlphabet(length: number, alphabet: string): string {\n  const random = new Uint8Array(length)\n  crypto.getRandomValues(random)\n  let out = ''\n  for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) {\n    out += alphabet[random[i] % alphabet.length]\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\nasync function sha256Hex(input: string): Promise<string> {\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(input)\n  const hash = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', bytes)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(hash))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\nfunction constantTimeEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  if (a.length !== b.length) return false\n  let diff = 0\n  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) diff |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i)\n  return diff === 0\n}\n","import type { RateLimitStore } from '../rate-limit/rate-limit-store.js'\n\n/**\n * T6.1 — Login throttling primitive.\n *\n * Per-credential failure counter backed by any `RateLimitStore`. After\n * `maxAttempts` failures within `windowMs`, the identifier is locked\n * for `lockoutMs`. Successful login resets the counter.\n *\n * Usage in a login handler:\n *\n *   const state = await checkThrottle({ store, identifier: hash(email) })\n *   if (!state.allowed) return 429\n *   const valid = await verifyPassword(creds)\n *   await recordAttempt({ store, identifier: hash(email) }, valid)\n *   if (!valid) return 401\n *\n * SECURITY:\n *   - NEVER pass raw email/username as `identifier`. Hash or normalize\n *     first (e.g. SHA-256 of the lowercased email). This prevents PII\n *     from landing in the rate-limit store or audit logs.\n *   - Combine with the per-route IP rate limit (T2.2) for layered defense:\n *     IP-level limits stop scripted floods; credential-level limits stop\n *     distributed brute force.\n */\n\nexport interface ThrottleOptions {\n  store: RateLimitStore\n  /**\n   * Stable identifier per credential. Hash raw emails/usernames before\n   * passing in — never leak PII to the rate-limit key space.\n   */\n  identifier: string\n  /** Failures before lockout. Default 5. */\n  maxAttempts?: number\n  /** Sliding window for counting failures. Default 15 minutes. */\n  windowMs?: number\n  /** Lockout duration after maxAttempts hit. Default 1 hour. */\n  lockoutMs?: number\n}\n\nexport interface ThrottleState {\n  allowed: boolean\n  remainingAttempts: number\n  /** Set when `allowed === false`. Absolute timestamp when the lockout expires. */\n  lockedUntil?: Date\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 5\nconst DEFAULT_LOCKOUT_MS = 60 * 60_000\n\n/**\n * Read the current throttle state for an identifier WITHOUT modifying\n * the counter. Call before validating credentials so locked attempts\n * are rejected fast.\n */\nexport async function checkThrottle(opts: ThrottleOptions): Promise<ThrottleState> {\n  const maxAttempts = opts.maxAttempts ?? DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS\n  const state = await opts.store.get(opts.identifier)\n  if (!state) {\n    return { allowed: true, remainingAttempts: maxAttempts }\n  }\n  if (state.count >= maxAttempts) {\n    return {\n      allowed: false,\n      remainingAttempts: 0,\n      // Lockout expires when the store TTL fires.\n      lockedUntil: new Date(state.resetAt),\n    }\n  }\n  return {\n    allowed: true,\n    remainingAttempts: Math.max(0, maxAttempts - state.count),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Record an attempt outcome. On success → reset the counter. On failure\n * → increment within the sliding window. Returns the new throttle state.\n *\n * Storage model: the store entry's TTL is `lockoutMs` (which doubles as\n * the failure-accumulation window). When `lockoutMs` is short — common\n * in tests or for soft lockouts — the entry auto-expires and the next\n * attempt starts fresh.\n */\nexport async function recordAttempt(\n  opts: ThrottleOptions,\n  success: boolean,\n): Promise<ThrottleState> {\n  const maxAttempts = opts.maxAttempts ?? DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS\n  if (success) {\n    await opts.store.reset(opts.identifier)\n    return {\n      allowed: true,\n      remainingAttempts: maxAttempts,\n    }\n  }\n  const lockoutMs = opts.lockoutMs ?? DEFAULT_LOCKOUT_MS\n  const state = await opts.store.incr(opts.identifier, lockoutMs)\n\n  if (state.count >= maxAttempts) {\n    return {\n      allowed: false,\n      remainingAttempts: 0,\n      lockedUntil: new Date(state.resetAt),\n    }\n  }\n  return {\n    allowed: true,\n    remainingAttempts: Math.max(0, maxAttempts - state.count),\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * T7.3 — RFC 7636 PKCE primitive.\n *\n * Reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636\n *\n * Pure-function, dependency-free implementation using Web Crypto.\n *\n * Usage in an OAuth authorization-code flow:\n *\n *   const { codeVerifier, codeChallenge, codeChallengeMethod } = await generatePkceChallenge()\n *   // Store codeVerifier in the user's session\n *   // Send codeChallenge + codeChallengeMethod in the /authorize redirect\n *   // ... user authenticates with provider ...\n *   // On /callback, send codeVerifier with the code → token exchange\n */\n\nexport interface PkceChallenge {\n  codeVerifier: string\n  codeChallenge: string\n  codeChallengeMethod: 'S256'\n}\n\n// CR-020 DRY: single canonical base64url encoder lives in _internal/encoding.\nimport { base64urlEncode } from '../_internal/encoding.js'\n\n/**\n * Compute the code_challenge from a code_verifier per RFC 7636 §4.2.\n * Exported separately to enable RFC 7636 Appendix B vector testing.\n */\nexport async function pkceChallengeFromVerifier(verifier: string): Promise<string> {\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(verifier)\n  const hash = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', bytes)\n  return base64urlEncode(new Uint8Array(hash))\n}\n\n/**\n * Generate a fresh PKCE challenge pair.\n *\n * Verifier: 32 cryptographically random bytes → 43-char base64url string.\n * RFC 7636 §4.1 allows 43–128 chars; we ship the minimum-safe default.\n *\n * Method: 'S256' only — no 'plain' fallback. RFC 7636 §7.2 strongly\n * discourages plain and modern providers reject it.\n */\nexport async function generatePkceChallenge(): Promise<PkceChallenge> {\n  const random = new Uint8Array(32)\n  crypto.getRandomValues(random)\n  const codeVerifier = base64urlEncode(random)\n  const codeChallenge = await pkceChallengeFromVerifier(codeVerifier)\n  return { codeVerifier, codeChallenge, codeChallengeMethod: 'S256' }\n}\n","/**\n * T7.4 — OAuth `state` parameter helpers (RFC 6749 §10.12).\n *\n * `state` is a cryptographically random anti-CSRF token. The client\n * stores it (in session/cookie/db) before redirecting to the\n * authorization endpoint and verifies it on the callback. Without it,\n * an attacker can authorize on the user's account using a captured code.\n */\n\n// CR-020 DRY + CR-012 constant-time: shared helpers in _internal/encoding.\nimport { base64urlEncode, constantTimeEquals } from '../_internal/encoding.js'\n\n/**\n * Generate a cryptographically random state token. Default 32 bytes\n * (~43 base64url chars). Increase for higher entropy if your provider\n * supports it.\n */\nexport function generateOAuthState(opts: { bytes?: number } = {}): string {\n  const len = opts.bytes ?? 32\n  const buf = new Uint8Array(len)\n  crypto.getRandomValues(buf)\n  return base64urlEncode(buf)\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a state token. Constant-time compare. Empty inputs always fail\n * (defensive — never accept empty as \"they match\").\n *\n * CR-012 fix: `constantTimeEquals` does not early-exit on length mismatch,\n * so the comparison time is independent of how the input was forged.\n */\nexport function verifyOAuthState(provided: string, stored: string): boolean {\n  return constantTimeEquals(provided, stored)\n}\n","/**\n * T7.4 — OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 metadata fetcher.\n *\n * Reference: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html\n *\n * Caches metadata in module scope. Cache key is the exact issuer string\n * (trailing-slash sensitive per RFC 8414 §3). Failures are NOT cached —\n * subsequent calls retry the fetch.\n *\n * EC-7 — HTTPS enforced. RFC 8414 §3 requires HTTPS for OIDC issuers.\n * Localhost (loopback) is allowed for development.\n */\n\nexport interface OidcMetadata {\n  issuer: string\n  authorization_endpoint: string\n  token_endpoint: string\n  jwks_uri?: string\n  userinfo_endpoint?: string\n  end_session_endpoint?: string\n  scopes_supported?: string[]\n  response_types_supported?: string[]\n  grant_types_supported?: string[]\n  id_token_signing_alg_values_supported?: string[]\n  [key: string]: unknown // OIDC providers ship many optional fields\n}\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, Promise<OidcMetadata>>()\n\n/** Clear the discovery cache. Used by tests. */\nexport function clearOidcCache(): void {\n  cache.clear()\n}\n\nfunction isLoopback(host: string): boolean {\n  return host === 'localhost' || host === '127.0.0.1' || host === '[::1]' || host === '::1'\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch (or return cached) OIDC provider metadata.\n *\n * Throws when:\n *   - Issuer URL is malformed\n *   - Issuer is HTTP and not a loopback host (EC-7)\n *   - HTTP response is non-OK\n *   - Metadata lacks `authorization_endpoint` (sanity check)\n */\nexport async function discoverOidcProvider(issuer: string | URL): Promise<OidcMetadata> {\n  const issuerStr = typeof issuer === 'string' ? issuer : issuer.toString()\n  // Validate protocol BEFORE checking cache — invalid issuers should never poison.\n  const url = new URL(issuerStr)\n  if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !isLoopback(url.hostname)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `OIDC issuer must use HTTPS (received \"${url.protocol}//${url.hostname}…\"). ` +\n        `RFC 8414 §3 forbids plain HTTP except for loopback hosts.`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  const cached = cache.get(issuerStr)\n  if (cached) return cached\n\n  const promise = (async () => {\n    const wellKnown = new URL(\n      '.well-known/openid-configuration',\n      issuerStr.endsWith('/') ? issuerStr : issuerStr + '/',\n    )\n    const res = await fetch(wellKnown)\n    if (!res.ok) {\n      throw new Error(`OIDC discovery failed: ${res.status} ${res.statusText} at ${wellKnown}`)\n    }\n    const metadata = (await res.json()) as OidcMetadata\n    if (!metadata.authorization_endpoint) {\n      throw new Error('OIDC metadata missing authorization_endpoint — provider response is invalid')\n    }\n    return metadata\n  })()\n  // Cache the promise; on rejection, remove so the next call retries.\n  cache.set(issuerStr, promise)\n  promise.catch(() => {\n    if (cache.get(issuerStr) === promise) cache.delete(issuerStr)\n  })\n  return promise\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;AAgBA,IAAM,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY;AAChC,IAAM,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY;AAEhC,IAAM,oBAAoB,QAAQ,OAAO,iBAAiB;AAC1D,IAAM,kBAAkB,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC;AAKxC,IAAM,WAAW,oBAAI,IAAgC;AAErD,eAAe,UAAU,QAAoC;AAC3D,QAAM,SAAS,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM;AAClC,MAAI,OAAQ,QAAO;AAEnB,QAAM,UAAU,YAAY;AAC1B,UAAM,cAAc,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MACtC;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MACrB,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,MACA,CAAC,WAAW;AAAA,IACd;AACA,WAAO,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MACnB,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,iBAAiB,MAAM,kBAAkB;AAAA,MAChF;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,MAC/B;AAAA,MACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,IACvB;AAAA,EACF,GAAG;AAEH,WAAS,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;AAE3B,SAAO,MAAM,MAAM;AACjB,aAAS,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,EACxB,CAAC;AACD,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,YAAY,MAA0B;AAC7C,SAAO,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,WAAW;AAC/C;AASA,SAAS,cAAc,KAAsC;AAC3D,QAAM,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,WAAW;AACxC,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM;AACtC,OAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AACZ,SAAO;AACT;AAOA,eAAsB,QAAW,MAAS,QAAiC;AACzE,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AAClC,QAAM,KAAK,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AACpD,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AACrD,QAAM,aAAa,IAAI;AAAA,IACrB,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,EACrE;AACA,SAAO,GAAG,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,YAAY,UAAU,CAAC;AACtD;AAEA,eAAsB,QAAW,OAAe,QAAmC;AACjF,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7B,QAAI,MAAM,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;AAE/B,UAAM,KAAK,cAAc,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AACjC,UAAM,aAAa,cAAc,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AACzC,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AAElC,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,UAAU;AACtF,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,EAC7C,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAOO,SAAS,yBAA+B;AAC7C,WAAS,MAAM;AACjB;;;ACjDA,IAAM,cAAc;AAMpB,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAAoC;AAC5D,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACzD,MAAI,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG;AACpB,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,4DAA4D;AAAA,EAC9E;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,SAAS,aAAa;AAC5B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,2CAA2C,WAAW,qEAAgE,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,IAClI;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK;AACpC,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK;AACnC,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;AACf,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI;AAC1C,YAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,aAAa,CAAC,KAAK;AAC5C,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,uDAAuD;AAAA,IAC/F;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAUA,eAAe,uBACb,MACA,SACA,QACiB;AACjB,QAAM,WAAqC;AAAA,IACzC;AAAA,IACA,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,EAC7B;AACA,SAAO,QAAQ,UAAU,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AACrC;AAWA,eAAe,2BACb,KACA,SACwE;AACxE,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM;AAC/B,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAmC,KAAK,MAAM;AAChE,aAAO,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI;AAAA,IAC7C,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACA,aAAW,UAAU,SAAS;AAC5B,QAAI,OAAQ,QAAO;AAAA,EACrB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEO,SAAS,qBAA+B,QAAiD;AAC9F,QAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,OAAO,MAAM;AAC9C,QAAM,aAAa,OAAO,cAAc;AACxC,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU;AAEhC,WAAS,YAAY,KAAqB,OAAqB;AAC7D,cAAU,KAAK,YAAY,OAAO;AAAA,MAChC,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,UAAU;AAAA,MACV;AAAA,MACA,MAAM;AAAA,IACR,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AAEA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK;AACpB,YAAM,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,mBAAmB,GAAG;AAClD,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,IAEA,MAAM,mBAAmB,KAAK;AAC5B,YAAM,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,UAAU;AACrC,UAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,IAAI,gBAAgB,MAAM,EAAE;AAChF,YAAM,UAAU,MAAM,2BAAqC,KAAK,OAAO;AACvE,UAAI,CAAC,QAAS,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,IAAI,gBAAgB,MAAM,EAAE;AACpF,UAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AACrC,eAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,MACnF;AACA,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,MAAM,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,QACvB,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO,gBAAgB,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,MACxE;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,IAEA,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM;AAC7B,YAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,uBAAuB,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAChE,kBAAY,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,IACxB;AAAA,IAEA,eAAe,KAAK;AAClB,mBAAa,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,IAEA,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,KAAK;AAC5B,YAAM,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,mBAAmB,GAAG;AAClD,UAAI,SAAS,KAAM,QAAO;AAG1B,YAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,uBAAuB,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAChE,kBAAY,KAAK,KAAK;AACtB,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AA4BO,SAAS,wBACd,QAC6B;AAC7B,QAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,OAAO,MAAM;AAC9C,QAAM,aAAa,OAAO,cAAc;AACxC,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU;AAEhC,WAAS,eAAe,QAAiB,OAAqB;AAC5D,0BAAsB,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO;AAAA,MAC/C,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,UAAU;AAAA,MACV;AAAA,MACA,MAAM;AAAA,IACR,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AAEA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS;AACxB,YAAM,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,mBAAmB,OAAO;AACtD,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,IAEA,MAAM,mBAAmB,SAAS;AAChC,YAAM,MAAM,qBAAqB,SAAS,UAAU;AACpD,UAAI,QAAQ,OAAW,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,IAAI,gBAAgB,MAAM,EAAE;AAC7F,YAAM,UAAU,MAAM,2BAAqC,KAAK,OAAO;AACvE,UAAI,CAAC,QAAS,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,IAAI,gBAAgB,MAAM,EAAE;AACpF,UAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AACrC,eAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,MACnF;AACA,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,MAAM,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,QACvB,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO,gBAAgB,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,MACxE;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,IAEA,MAAM,cAAc,QAAQ,MAAM;AAChC,YAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,uBAAuB,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAChE,qBAAe,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,IAEA,eAAe,QAAQ;AACrB,kCAA4B,QAAQ,UAAU;AAAA,IAChD;AAAA,IAEA,MAAM,cAAc,SAAS,QAAQ;AACnC,YAAM,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,mBAAmB,OAAO;AACtD,UAAI,SAAS,KAAM,QAAO;AAC1B,YAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,uBAAuB,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAChE,qBAAe,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC5B,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAiBA,eAAsB,kBACpB,IACA,SACA,QAC0B;AAC1B,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,mBAAmB,OAAO;AAC1D,MAAI,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,gBAAgB;AACxC,UAAM,GAAG,cAAc,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,EACrC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAmBA,eAAsB,eACpB,IACA,KACA,KAC0B;AAC1B,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,mBAAmB,GAAG;AACtD,MAAI,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,gBAAgB;AACxC,UAAM,GAAG,cAAc,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,EAClC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AASA,IAAM,sBAAsB;AAErB,SAAS,uBAAuB,QAAiC;AACtE,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM;AACpD,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,aAAa;AAExC,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK;AACnC,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;AACf,UAAM,gBAAgB,oBAAoB,KAAK,CAAC;AAChD,UAAM,aAAa,EAAE,SAAS;AAC9B,UAAM,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;AAEjE,QAAI,QAAQ;AACV,UAAI,YAAY;AACd,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,GAAG,MAAM,8BAA8B,EAAE,MAAM;AAAA,QAEjD;AAAA,MACF;AACA,UAAI,eAAe;AACjB,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,GAAG,MAAM,+BAA+B,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,QAExD;AAAA,MACF;AACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,iBAAiB,YAAY;AAC/B,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN,sBAAsB,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC;AAAA,MAE5C;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;AC7VO,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAA2B;AACzD,MAAI,IAAI;AACR,aAAW,KAAK,MAAO,MAAK,OAAO,aAAa,CAAC;AAMjD,SAAO,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE;AAC1E;AAgBO,SAAS,mBAAmB,GAAW,GAAoB;AAChE,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO;AAC3D,MAAI,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;AAE7C,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM;AAC1C,MAAI,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE;AACxB,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK;AAG/B,UAAM,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI;AAC5C,UAAM,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI;AAC5C,YAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,EACf;AACA,SAAO,SAAS;AAClB;;;ACbA,IAAM,eAAe;AACrB,IAAM,iBAAiB;AACvB,IAAM,oBAAmC;AAGzC,SAAS,aAAa,GAAuB;AAC3C,QAAM,WAAW;AAKjB,QAAM,QAAQ,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;AACnE,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG;AAC9B,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,uBAAuB;AAAA,EACzC;AACA,QAAM,OAAiB,CAAC;AACxB,aAAW,KAAK,OAAO;AACrB,UAAM,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC9B,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,IAAK,MAAK,KAAM,OAAO,IAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EACvD;AAEA,QAAM,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAC5C,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AACpC,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK;AAClC,QAAI,IAAI;AACR,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,IAAK,KAAK,KAAK,IAAK,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;AACzD,QAAI,CAAC,IAAI;AAAA,EACX;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,SAAS,aAAa,OAA2B;AAC/C,QAAM,WAAW;AACjB,MAAI,MAAM;AACV,MAAI,SAAS;AACb,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,aAAW,KAAK,OAAO;AACrB,aAAU,UAAU,IAAK;AACzB,YAAQ;AACR,WAAO,QAAQ,GAAG;AAChB,aAAO,SAAU,UAAW,OAAO,IAAM,EAAI;AAC7C,cAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,EAAG,QAAO,SAAU,UAAW,IAAI,OAAS,EAAI;AAC3D,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,gBAAgB,QAAyC;AAChE,MAAI,OAAO,WAAW,SAAU,QAAO,aAAa,MAAM;AAC1D,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,SAAS,aAAa,QAAgB,SAA6B;AACjE,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,MAAO,OAAO;AAClD,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC;AAE5B,QAAM,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,UAAW;AAC3C,QAAM,KAAK,YAAY;AACvB,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,OAAO,KAAM;AACvB,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,OAAO,KAAM;AACvB,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,OAAO,IAAK;AACtB,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK;AACd,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,OAAO,KAAM;AACvB,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,OAAO,KAAM;AACvB,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,OAAO,IAAK;AACtB,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK;AACd,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,eAAe,KACb,QACA,SACA,WACqB;AACrB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,IAChC;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,MAAM;AAAA,EACT;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAuB;AACzE,SAAO,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG;AAC3B;AAGA,SAAS,SAAS,KAAiB,QAAwB;AACzD,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI;AACrC,QAAM,QACF,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,QAAS,MACvB,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,QAAS,MAC3B,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,QAAS,IAC5B,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI;AACrB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAClB,SAAO,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,GAAG;AAChD;AAGA,eAAsB,aAAa,MAAoC;AACrE,QAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB,KAAK,MAAM;AAC1C,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ;AAC1B,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,UAAU;AAC9B,QAAM,YAAY,KAAK,aAAa;AACpC,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI;AACnC,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,SAAS;AAClE,SAAO,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM;AAC7B;AAQA,eAAsB,WAAW,OAAe,MAA2C;AACzF,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AACtC,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,UAAU;AAC9B,MAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,OAAQ,QAAO;AAE5D,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ;AAC1B,QAAM,YAAY,KAAK,aAAa;AACpC,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI;AACnC,QAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,UAAU;AAC7B,QAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB,KAAK,MAAM;AAG1C,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,WAAS,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,SAAS;AAChD,UAAM,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO;AAChC,UAAM,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM;AAClF,QAAI,mBAAmB,MAAM,KAAK,EAAG,WAAU;AAAA,EACjD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGO,SAAS,mBAAmB,QAAQ,IAAgB;AACzD,MAAI,QAAQ,IAAI;AACd,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,gEAA6D;AAAA,EAC/E;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK;AAChC,SAAO,gBAAgB,GAAG;AAC1B,SAAO;AACT;AAgBO,SAAS,QAAQ,MAA8B;AACpD,QAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO;AAC5C,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACjC,QAAQ,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,IAChC,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,IACb,WAAW,KAAK,aAAa;AAAA,IAC7B,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,cAAc;AAAA,IAC5C,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,YAAY;AAAA,EAC1C,CAAC;AACD,SAAO,kBAAkB,mBAAmB,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACzE;;;ACtLA,IAAM,mBAAmB;AACzB,IAAM,gBAAgB;AACtB,IAAM,iBAAiB;AAQvB,eAAsB,oBAAoB,OAA0B,CAAC,GAA0B;AAC7F,QAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS;AAC5B,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,UAAU;AAC9B,QAAM,YAAY,KAAK,cAAc,SAAY,MAAM,KAAK;AAC5D,QAAM,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY;AAMlC,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAM;AAC1D,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,mEAAmE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,IAClF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI;AAC1D,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,kEAAkE,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,IAClF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACvB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,6EAA6E,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,IAC9F;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,QAAsB,CAAC;AAC7B,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAY;AAC7B,SAAO,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO;AAC3B,UAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC/C,QAAI,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,EAAG;AACnB,SAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AACZ,UAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,KAAK,SAAS;AACpD,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,SAAS,CAAC;AACrD,UAAM,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EAChC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAUA,eAAsB,iBACpB,MACA,QACmD;AACnD,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,IAAI,CAAC;AACrD,MAAI;AAEJ,aAAW,KAAK,QAAQ;AACtB,QAAIA,oBAAmB,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG;AACpC,oBAAc;AAAA,IAChB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,MAAM;AACrE;AAOA,SAAS,cAAc,OAAuB;AAC5C,SAAO,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,WAAW,EAAE;AAClD;AAEA,SAAS,oBAAoB,KAAa,WAA+B;AACvE,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,SAAS,EAAG,QAAO;AACzC,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC;AACrC,SAAO,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG;AACtD;AAEA,SAAS,mBAAmB,QAAgB,UAA0B;AACpE,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM;AACpC,SAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAC7B,MAAI,MAAM;AACV,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC/B,WAAO,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,EAC7C;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,eAAe,UAAU,OAAgC;AACvD,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK;AAC5C,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK;AACxD,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC,EACnC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,EAC1C,KAAK,EAAE;AACZ;AAEA,SAASA,oBAAmB,GAAW,GAAoB;AACzD,MAAI,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,OAAQ,QAAO;AAClC,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAK,SAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAC3E,SAAO,SAAS;AAClB;;;ACjGA,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAC7B,IAAM,qBAAqB,KAAK;AAOhC,eAAsB,cAAc,MAA+C;AACjF,QAAM,cAAc,KAAK,eAAe;AACxC,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU;AAClD,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,mBAAmB,YAAY;AAAA,EACzD;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,SAAS,aAAa;AAC9B,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,SAAS;AAAA,MACT,mBAAmB;AAAA;AAAA,MAEnB,aAAa,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACrC;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS;AAAA,IACT,mBAAmB,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,cAAc,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,EAC1D;AACF;AAWA,eAAsB,cACpB,MACA,SACwB;AACxB,QAAM,cAAc,KAAK,eAAe;AACxC,MAAI,SAAS;AACX,UAAM,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU;AACtC,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,SAAS;AAAA,MACT,mBAAmB;AAAA,IACrB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,YAAY,KAAK,aAAa;AACpC,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,YAAY,SAAS;AAE9D,MAAI,MAAM,SAAS,aAAa;AAC9B,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,SAAS;AAAA,MACT,mBAAmB;AAAA,MACnB,aAAa,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACrC;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS;AAAA,IACT,mBAAmB,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,cAAc,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,EAC1D;AACF;;;AClFA,eAAsB,0BAA0B,UAAmC;AACjF,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC/C,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK;AACxD,SAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC;AAC7C;AAWA,eAAsB,wBAAgD;AACpE,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE;AAChC,SAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAC7B,QAAM,eAAe,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAC3C,QAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,0BAA0B,YAAY;AAClE,SAAO,EAAE,cAAc,eAAe,qBAAqB,OAAO;AACpE;;;ACjCO,SAAS,mBAAmB,OAA2B,CAAC,GAAW;AACxE,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAC1B,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG;AAC9B,SAAO,gBAAgB,GAAG;AAC1B,SAAO,gBAAgB,GAAG;AAC5B;AASO,SAAS,iBAAiB,UAAkB,QAAyB;AAC1E,SAAO,mBAAmB,UAAU,MAAM;AAC5C;;;ACNA,IAAM,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAmC;AAG9C,SAAS,iBAAuB;AACrC,QAAM,MAAM;AACd;AAEA,SAAS,WAAW,MAAuB;AACzC,SAAO,SAAS,eAAe,SAAS,eAAe,SAAS,WAAW,SAAS;AACtF;AAWA,eAAsB,qBAAqB,QAA6C;AACtF,QAAM,YAAY,OAAO,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,OAAO,SAAS;AAExE,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS;AAC7B,MAAI,IAAI,aAAa,YAAY,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC1D,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,yCAAyC,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,IAExE;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS;AAClC,MAAI,OAAQ,QAAO;AAEnB,QAAM,WAAW,YAAY;AAC3B,UAAM,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,MACpB;AAAA,MACA,UAAU,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,YAAY,YAAY;AAAA,IACpD;AACA,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,SAAS;AACjC,QAAI,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI;AACX,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,0BAA0B,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,IAC1F;AACA,UAAM,WAAY,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AACjC,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS,wBAAwB;AACpC,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,kFAA6E;AAAA,IAC/F;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,GAAG;AAEH,QAAM,IAAI,WAAW,OAAO;AAC5B,UAAQ,MAAM,MAAM;AAClB,QAAI,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,MAAM,QAAS,OAAM,OAAO,SAAS;AAAA,EAC9D,CAAC;AACD,SAAO;AACT;","names":["constantTimeEquals"]}

package/dist/{chunk-B6RP57M3.js → chunk-OLPB36O2.js}

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-import {
-  walkSourceFiles
-} from "./chunk-X2VVCJ4V.js";
 import {
   HTTP_METHODS
 } from "./chunk-WSJKACWB.js";
+import {
+  walkSourceFiles
+} from "./chunk-X2VVCJ4V.js";
 
 // src/server/scan/match.ts
 function compilePattern(routePath) {
@@ -256,4 +256,4 @@ export {
   scanServerRoutes,
   scanWebSocketRoutes
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-B6RP57M3.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OLPB36O2.js.map

package/dist/chunk-PIVX3DYW.js

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+// src/config/load-env.ts
+import { lstatSync, readFileSync, realpathSync, statSync } from "fs";
+import { resolve } from "path";
+import dotenv from "dotenv";
+import { expand } from "dotenv-expand";
+var MAX_ENV_FILE_BYTES = 1048576;
+var cache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+function _resetEnvCache() {
+  cache.clear();
+}
+function envFilesInPriorityOrder(mode) {
+  const files = [`.env.${mode}.local`, `.env.local`, `.env.${mode}`, `.env`];
+  if (mode === "test") {
+    return files.filter((f) => f !== ".env.local");
+  }
+  return files;
+}
+function readEnvFile(path) {
+  let stat;
+  try {
+    stat = statSync(path);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (!stat.isFile() && !stat.isFIFO()) return null;
+  if (stat.size > MAX_ENV_FILE_BYTES) {
+    console.warn(
+      `[theokit] .env file at ${path} exceeds ${MAX_ENV_FILE_BYTES} bytes \u2014 skipping (likely a generated artifact, not a real env file)`
+    );
+    return null;
+  }
+  try {
+    const lstat = lstatSync(path);
+    if (lstat.isSymbolicLink()) {
+      const real = realpathSync(path);
+      console.info(`[theokit] .env at ${path} is a symlink \u2192 ${real}`);
+    }
+  } catch {
+  }
+  try {
+    const content = readFileSync(path, "utf-8");
+    return dotenv.parse(content);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+function loadEnv(options = {}) {
+  const cwd = options.cwd ?? process.cwd();
+  const mode = options.mode ?? process.env.NODE_ENV ?? "development";
+  const cacheKey = `${cwd}:${mode}`;
+  if (!options.forceReload) {
+    const cached = cache.get(cacheKey);
+    if (cached) return cached;
+  }
+  const fileNames = envFilesInPriorityOrder(mode);
+  const filePaths = fileNames.map((f) => resolve(cwd, f));
+  const merged = {};
+  const loadedFromFiles = [];
+  for (const path of [...filePaths].reverse()) {
+    const parsed = readEnvFile(path);
+    if (parsed === null) continue;
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(parsed)) {
+      merged[k] = v;
+    }
+    loadedFromFiles.unshift(path);
+  }
+  if (merged.NODE_ENV && process.env.__THEOKIT_USER_NODE_ENV === void 0) {
+    process.env.__THEOKIT_USER_NODE_ENV = merged.NODE_ENV;
+  }
+  delete merged.NODE_ENV;
+  const processEnvClone = {};
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
+    if (typeof v === "string") processEnvClone[k] = v;
+  }
+  try {
+    expand({ parsed: merged, processEnv: processEnvClone });
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err instanceof RangeError) {
+      console.warn(
+        `[theokit] .env expansion overflow (likely circular reference like A=\${B}, B=\${A}). Leaving values as literals.`
+      );
+    } else {
+      throw err;
+    }
+  }
+  const loaded = {};
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(merged)) {
+    if (process.env[k] !== void 0) continue;
+    process.env[k] = v;
+    loaded[k] = v;
+  }
+  process.env.__THEOKIT_PROCESSED_ENV = "true";
+  const result = { loaded, loadedFromFiles };
+  cache.set(cacheKey, result);
+  return result;
+}
+
+// src/server/transformer.ts
+import superjson from "superjson";
+var superjsonTransformer = {
+  name: "superjson",
+  serialize: (v) => JSON.stringify(superjson.serialize(v)),
+  deserialize: (raw) => {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+    return superjson.deserialize(parsed);
+  }
+};
+var jsonTransformer = {
+  name: "json",
+  serialize: (v) => JSON.stringify(v),
+  deserialize: (raw) => JSON.parse(raw)
+};
+var BUILT_INS = {
+  superjson: superjsonTransformer,
+  json: jsonTransformer
+};
+function resolveTransformer(selector) {
+  if (typeof selector === "string") {
+    const built = BUILT_INS[selector];
+    if (built === void 0) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `Unknown transformer "${selector}". Built-in options: ${Object.keys(BUILT_INS).join(", ")}.`
+      );
+    }
+    return built;
+  }
+  if (typeof selector !== "object" || typeof selector.serialize !== "function" || typeof selector.deserialize !== "function") {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Custom transformer must have serialize and deserialize functions. Got: ${JSON.stringify(selector)}`
+    );
+  }
+  return selector;
+}
+
+export {
+  _resetEnvCache,
+  loadEnv,
+  superjsonTransformer,
+  jsonTransformer,
+  resolveTransformer
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-PIVX3DYW.js.map

package/dist/chunk-PIVX3DYW.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/config/load-env.ts","../src/server/transformer.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/* eslint-disable security/detect-non-literal-fs-filename --\n * Reads `.env` files from a CLI-controlled `cwd`. File names are a fixed\n * literal set. Build-time + CLI tool; no HTTP input.\n */\n/**\n * `loadEnv()` — auto-loads `.env` files into `process.env` for server code.\n *\n * Implements the Next.js `loadEnvConfig` algorithm\n * (`referencias/next.js/packages/next-env/index.ts:114-180`) with TheoKit\n * adaptations:\n *\n * - EC-1: 1MB file-size cap (anti-OOM, anti-supply-chain).\n * - EC-2: `_resetEnvCache()` test-only side-door.\n * - EC-8: `dotenv-expand` circular-ref safe (lib-provided).\n * - EC-13: log when `.env` is a symlink (transparency).\n * - D6: real `process.env` wins over `.env`-file values.\n * - NODE_ENV stash: `.env`-set NODE_ENV NEVER overrides the real\n *   `process.env.NODE_ENV`. Stashed in `__THEOKIT_USER_NODE_ENV` instead.\n */\n\nimport { lstatSync, readFileSync, realpathSync, statSync } from 'node:fs'\nimport { resolve } from 'node:path'\n\nimport dotenv from 'dotenv'\nimport { expand, type DotenvPopulateInput } from 'dotenv-expand'\n\nimport type { LoadEnvOptions, LoadEnvResult } from './load-env-types.js'\n\n/** EC-1: 1MB cap. Real `.env`s are < 10KB. */\nconst MAX_ENV_FILE_BYTES = 1_048_576\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, LoadEnvResult>()\n\n/** Test-only side-door for EC-2 — clear the module-level cache between vitest test files. */\nexport function _resetEnvCache(): void {\n  cache.clear()\n}\n\nfunction envFilesInPriorityOrder(mode: string): string[] {\n  // Top of list = highest priority. Will be read in REVERSE so first-in\n  // wins via overwrite during merge.\n  const files = [`.env.${mode}.local`, `.env.local`, `.env.${mode}`, `.env`]\n  // Test mode skips `.env.local` per dotenv convention (avoid leaking dev\n  // secrets into the test suite).\n  if (mode === 'test') {\n    return files.filter((f) => f !== '.env.local')\n  }\n  return files\n}\n\nfunction readEnvFile(path: string): Record<string, string> | null {\n  let stat\n  try {\n    stat = statSync(path)\n  } catch {\n    return null // ENOENT / EACCES → skip\n  }\n\n  // Allow files + FIFOs (1Password/SOPS pipe support).\n  if (!stat.isFile() && !stat.isFIFO()) return null\n\n  // EC-1 — anti-OOM cap.\n  if (stat.size > MAX_ENV_FILE_BYTES) {\n    console.warn(\n      `[theokit] .env file at ${path} exceeds ${MAX_ENV_FILE_BYTES} bytes — skipping (likely a generated artifact, not a real env file)`,\n    )\n    return null\n  }\n\n  // EC-13 — symlink transparency. Don't refuse; just log.\n  try {\n    const lstat = lstatSync(path)\n    if (lstat.isSymbolicLink()) {\n      const real = realpathSync(path)\n      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console -- intentional transparency log on a build-time tool\n      console.info(`[theokit] .env at ${path} is a symlink → ${real}`)\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // lstat failure is non-fatal — fall through to read.\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const content = readFileSync(path, 'utf-8')\n    return dotenv.parse(content)\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n// eslint-disable-next-line complexity -- canonical env-load algorithm (priority → expand → guards → apply); inlining branches is clearer than extracting micro-helpers\nexport function loadEnv(options: LoadEnvOptions = {}): LoadEnvResult {\n  const cwd = options.cwd ?? process.cwd()\n  const mode = options.mode ?? process.env.NODE_ENV ?? 'development'\n  const cacheKey = `${cwd}:${mode}`\n\n  if (!options.forceReload) {\n    const cached = cache.get(cacheKey)\n    if (cached) return cached\n  }\n\n  const fileNames = envFilesInPriorityOrder(mode)\n  const filePaths = fileNames.map((f) => resolve(cwd, f))\n\n  // Read in REVERSE — lower-priority files first, so higher-priority\n  // (lower-index) overwrites during merge.\n  const merged: Record<string, string> = {}\n  const loadedFromFiles: string[] = []\n  for (const path of [...filePaths].reverse()) {\n    const parsed = readEnvFile(path)\n    if (parsed === null) continue\n    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(parsed)) {\n      merged[k] = v\n    }\n    loadedFromFiles.unshift(path) // keep priority order in result\n  }\n\n  // NODE_ENV stash — `.env`-set NODE_ENV never overrides real process.env.NODE_ENV.\n  if (merged.NODE_ENV && process.env.__THEOKIT_USER_NODE_ENV === undefined) {\n    process.env.__THEOKIT_USER_NODE_ENV = merged.NODE_ENV\n  }\n  delete merged.NODE_ENV // never propagate\n\n  // EC-8 — dotenv-expand@11 stack-overflows on circular refs (A=${B}, B=${A}).\n  // Wrap in try/catch — on overflow, leave the parsed map untouched (literal\n  // values survive). Tested via test_loadEnv_circular_expand_no_loop_EC8.\n  // Pass a CLONE of process.env (string-only, filtered) so expand can\n  // reference real env without mutating it.\n  const processEnvClone: DotenvPopulateInput = {}\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(process.env)) {\n    if (typeof v === 'string') processEnvClone[k] = v\n  }\n  try {\n    expand({ parsed: merged, processEnv: processEnvClone })\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof RangeError) {\n      console.warn(\n        `[theokit] .env expansion overflow (likely circular reference like A=\\${B}, B=\\${A}). Leaving values as literals.`,\n      )\n    } else {\n      throw err\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Apply: D6 — real process.env wins over file values.\n  const loaded: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(merged)) {\n    if (process.env[k] !== undefined) continue // real env wins\n    process.env[k] = v\n    loaded[k] = v\n  }\n\n  // Sentinel\n  process.env.__THEOKIT_PROCESSED_ENV = 'true'\n\n  const result: LoadEnvResult = { loaded, loadedFromFiles }\n  cache.set(cacheKey, result)\n  return result\n}\n","import superjson from 'superjson'\n\n/**\n * T5.2 — pluggable response/request transformer.\n *\n * `superjson` is the default, preserving Date/Map/Set/BigInt/etc.\n * `json` is the lightweight option (plain JSON.stringify/parse).\n * Users can supply a custom object implementing this contract.\n */\nexport interface TheoTransformer {\n  name: string\n  serialize: (value: unknown) => string\n  deserialize: (raw: string) => unknown\n}\n\nexport const superjsonTransformer: TheoTransformer = {\n  name: 'superjson',\n  serialize: (v) => JSON.stringify(superjson.serialize(v)),\n  deserialize: (raw) => {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as Parameters<typeof superjson.deserialize>[0]\n    return superjson.deserialize(parsed)\n  },\n}\n\nexport const jsonTransformer: TheoTransformer = {\n  name: 'json',\n  serialize: (v) => JSON.stringify(v),\n  deserialize: (raw) => JSON.parse(raw) as unknown,\n}\n\nconst BUILT_INS: Record<string, TheoTransformer> = {\n  superjson: superjsonTransformer,\n  json: jsonTransformer,\n}\n\nexport function resolveTransformer(\n  selector: 'json' | 'superjson' | TheoTransformer,\n): TheoTransformer {\n  if (typeof selector === 'string') {\n    // selector is 'json' | 'superjson' literal — both keys exist in\n    // BUILT_INS by construction. Type system guarantees a hit; we keep\n    // a defensive fallback that the compiler cannot see is unreachable\n    // at runtime, just in case someone adds a new literal to the union\n    // but forgets to register the built-in.\n    const built = BUILT_INS[selector]\n    // Defensive: the public union ensures `built` is defined, but if a\n    // future contributor extends the union without registering the impl,\n    // the cast keeps the failure mode loud.\n    if ((built as TheoTransformer | undefined) === undefined) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Unknown transformer \"${selector}\". Built-in options: ${Object.keys(BUILT_INS).join(', ')}.`,\n      )\n    }\n    return built\n  }\n  if (\n    typeof selector !== 'object' ||\n    typeof selector.serialize !== 'function' ||\n    typeof selector.deserialize !== 'function'\n  ) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Custom transformer must have serialize and deserialize functions. Got: ${JSON.stringify(selector)}`,\n    )\n  }\n  return selector\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAoBA,SAAS,WAAW,cAAc,cAAc,gBAAgB;AAChE,SAAS,eAAe;AAExB,OAAO,YAAY;AACnB,SAAS,cAAwC;AAKjD,IAAM,qBAAqB;AAE3B,IAAM,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAA2B;AAGtC,SAAS,iBAAuB;AACrC,QAAM,MAAM;AACd;AAEA,SAAS,wBAAwB,MAAwB;AAGvD,QAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU,cAAc,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AAGzE,MAAI,SAAS,QAAQ;AACnB,WAAO,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY;AAAA,EAC/C;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,YAAY,MAA6C;AAChE,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,EACtB,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAGA,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,EAAG,QAAO;AAG7C,MAAI,KAAK,OAAO,oBAAoB;AAClC,YAAQ;AAAA,MACN,0BAA0B,IAAI,YAAY,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC9D;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAGA,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI;AAC5B,QAAI,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG;AAC1B,YAAM,OAAO,aAAa,IAAI;AAE9B,cAAQ,KAAK,qBAAqB,IAAI,wBAAmB,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,IACjE;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AAAA,EAER;AAEA,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,UAAU,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO;AAC1C,WAAO,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,EAC7B,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAGO,SAAS,QAAQ,UAA0B,CAAC,GAAkB;AACnE,QAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI;AACvC,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY;AACrD,QAAM,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI;AAE/B,MAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,aAAa;AACxB,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ;AACjC,QAAI,OAAQ,QAAO;AAAA,EACrB;AAEA,QAAM,YAAY,wBAAwB,IAAI;AAC9C,QAAM,YAAY,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;AAItD,QAAM,SAAiC,CAAC;AACxC,QAAM,kBAA4B,CAAC;AACnC,aAAW,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC3C,UAAM,SAAS,YAAY,IAAI;AAC/B,QAAI,WAAW,KAAM;AACrB,eAAW,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;AAC3C,aAAO,CAAC,IAAI;AAAA,IACd;AACA,oBAAgB,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,EAC9B;AAGA,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,QAAQ,IAAI,4BAA4B,QAAW;AACxE,YAAQ,IAAI,0BAA0B,OAAO;AAAA,EAC/C;AACA,SAAO,OAAO;AAOd,QAAM,kBAAuC,CAAC;AAC9C,aAAW,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG;AAChD,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAU,iBAAgB,CAAC,IAAI;AAAA,EAClD;AACA,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,YAAY,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAAA,EACxD,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,QAAI,eAAe,YAAY;AAC7B,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF,OAAO;AACL,YAAM;AAAA,IACR;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,SAAiC,CAAC;AACxC,aAAW,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;AAC3C,QAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,OAAW;AAClC,YAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI;AACjB,WAAO,CAAC,IAAI;AAAA,EACd;AAGA,UAAQ,IAAI,0BAA0B;AAEtC,QAAM,SAAwB,EAAE,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AACxD,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,MAAM;AAC1B,SAAO;AACT;;;AC7JA,OAAO,eAAe;AAef,IAAM,uBAAwC;AAAA,EACnD,MAAM;AAAA,EACN,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,EACvD,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ;AACpB,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7B,WAAO,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM;AAAA,EACrC;AACF;AAEO,IAAM,kBAAmC;AAAA,EAC9C,MAAM;AAAA,EACN,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC;AAAA,EAClC,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AACtC;AAEA,IAAM,YAA6C;AAAA,EACjD,WAAW;AAAA,EACX,MAAM;AACR;AAEO,SAAS,mBACd,UACiB;AACjB,MAAI,OAAO,aAAa,UAAU;AAMhC,UAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,QAAQ;AAIhC,QAAK,UAA0C,QAAW;AACxD,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,wBAAwB,QAAQ,wBAAwB,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC3F;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,MACE,OAAO,aAAa,YACpB,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc,cAC9B,OAAO,SAAS,gBAAgB,YAChC;AACA,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,0EAA0E,KAAK,UAAU,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,IACpG;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-7TOMTMHT.js → chunk-R7OC6UDK.js}

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ var ActionScanError = class extends Error {
   conflictingPaths;
   constructor(code, message, conflictingPaths) {
     super(message);
+    this.name = "ActionScanError";
     this.code = code;
     this.conflictingPaths = conflictingPaths;
   }
@@ -152,4 +153,4 @@ export {
   scanServerActions,
   scanServerActionsEnriched
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7TOMTMHT.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-R7OC6UDK.js.map