theokit 0.2.4 → 0.4.0

package/dist/chunk-NM4WF3XD.js

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// src/server/realtime/channel-manager.ts
+var ChannelManager = class {
+  rooms = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  wsRooms = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  subscribe(ws, room) {
+    let roomSet = this.rooms.get(room);
+    if (!roomSet) {
+      roomSet = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+      this.rooms.set(room, roomSet);
+    }
+    roomSet.add(ws);
+    let wsSet = this.wsRooms.get(ws);
+    if (!wsSet) {
+      wsSet = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+      this.wsRooms.set(ws, wsSet);
+    }
+    wsSet.add(room);
+  }
+  unsubscribe(ws, room) {
+    this.rooms.get(room)?.delete(ws);
+    if (this.rooms.get(room)?.size === 0) this.rooms.delete(room);
+    this.wsRooms.get(ws)?.delete(room);
+    if (this.wsRooms.get(ws)?.size === 0) this.wsRooms.delete(ws);
+  }
+  broadcast(room, data, exclude) {
+    const clients = this.rooms.get(room);
+    if (!clients) return;
+    const msg = JSON.stringify(data);
+    for (const ws of clients) {
+      if (ws !== exclude) ws.send(msg);
+    }
+  }
+  broadcastAll(data) {
+    const msg = JSON.stringify(data);
+    const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+    for (const clients of this.rooms.values()) {
+      for (const ws of clients) {
+        if (!seen.has(ws)) {
+          ws.send(msg);
+          seen.add(ws);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  getRoomSize(room) {
+    return this.rooms.get(room)?.size ?? 0;
+  }
+  cleanup(ws) {
+    const rooms = this.wsRooms.get(ws);
+    if (rooms) {
+      for (const room of rooms) {
+        this.rooms.get(room)?.delete(ws);
+        if (this.rooms.get(room)?.size === 0) this.rooms.delete(room);
+      }
+    }
+    this.wsRooms.delete(ws);
+  }
+};
+
+export {
+  ChannelManager
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NM4WF3XD.js.map

package/dist/chunk-NM4WF3XD.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/server/realtime/channel-manager.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { WebSocketLike } from '../define/define-websocket.js'\n\nexport class ChannelManager {\n  private rooms = new Map<string, Set<WebSocketLike>>()\n  private wsRooms = new Map<WebSocketLike, Set<string>>()\n\n  subscribe(ws: WebSocketLike, room: string): void {\n    let roomSet = this.rooms.get(room)\n    if (!roomSet) {\n      roomSet = new Set()\n      this.rooms.set(room, roomSet)\n    }\n    roomSet.add(ws)\n\n    let wsSet = this.wsRooms.get(ws)\n    if (!wsSet) {\n      wsSet = new Set()\n      this.wsRooms.set(ws, wsSet)\n    }\n    wsSet.add(room)\n  }\n\n  unsubscribe(ws: WebSocketLike, room: string): void {\n    this.rooms.get(room)?.delete(ws)\n    if (this.rooms.get(room)?.size === 0) this.rooms.delete(room)\n\n    this.wsRooms.get(ws)?.delete(room)\n    if (this.wsRooms.get(ws)?.size === 0) this.wsRooms.delete(ws)\n  }\n\n  broadcast(room: string, data: unknown, exclude?: WebSocketLike): void {\n    const clients = this.rooms.get(room)\n    if (!clients) return\n\n    const msg = JSON.stringify(data)\n    for (const ws of clients) {\n      if (ws !== exclude) ws.send(msg)\n    }\n  }\n\n  broadcastAll(data: unknown): void {\n    const msg = JSON.stringify(data)\n    const seen = new Set<WebSocketLike>()\n    for (const clients of this.rooms.values()) {\n      for (const ws of clients) {\n        if (!seen.has(ws)) {\n          ws.send(msg)\n          seen.add(ws)\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  getRoomSize(room: string): number {\n    return this.rooms.get(room)?.size ?? 0\n  }\n\n  cleanup(ws: WebSocketLike): void {\n    const rooms = this.wsRooms.get(ws)\n    if (rooms) {\n      for (const room of rooms) {\n        this.rooms.get(room)?.delete(ws)\n        if (this.rooms.get(room)?.size === 0) this.rooms.delete(room)\n      }\n    }\n    this.wsRooms.delete(ws)\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAEO,IAAM,iBAAN,MAAqB;AAAA,EAClB,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAgC;AAAA,EAC5C,UAAU,oBAAI,IAAgC;AAAA,EAEtD,UAAU,IAAmB,MAAoB;AAC/C,QAAI,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI;AACjC,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS;AACZ,gBAAU,oBAAI,IAAI;AAClB,WAAK,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B;AACA,YAAQ,IAAI,EAAE;AAEd,QAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE;AAC/B,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,cAAQ,oBAAI,IAAI;AAChB,WAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,IAC5B;AACA,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EAChB;AAAA,EAEA,YAAY,IAAmB,MAAoB;AACjD,SAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE;AAC/B,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,SAAS,EAAG,MAAK,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI;AAE5D,SAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,IAAI;AACjC,QAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,EAAG,MAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE;AAAA,EAC9D;AAAA,EAEA,UAAU,MAAc,MAAe,SAA+B;AACpE,UAAM,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI;AACnC,QAAI,CAAC,QAAS;AAEd,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/B,eAAW,MAAM,SAAS;AACxB,UAAI,OAAO,QAAS,IAAG,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,aAAa,MAAqB;AAChC,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/B,UAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAmB;AACpC,eAAW,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AACzC,iBAAW,MAAM,SAAS;AACxB,YAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG;AACjB,aAAG,KAAK,GAAG;AACX,eAAK,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,QACb;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,YAAY,MAAsB;AAChC,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,QAAQ;AAAA,EACvC;AAAA,EAEA,QAAQ,IAAyB;AAC/B,UAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE;AACjC,QAAI,OAAO;AACT,iBAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACxB,aAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE;AAC/B,YAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,SAAS,EAAG,MAAK,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,MAC9D;AAAA,IACF;AACA,SAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE;AAAA,EACxB;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-NPMCKOX4.js

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NPMCKOX4.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-VRHXOKRP.js → chunk-NZXH2LQQ.js}

@@ -1,59 +1,11 @@
-// src/server/http/cookies.ts
-function parseCookieHeader(header) {
-  const map = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-  if (!header) return map;
-  for (const pair of header.split(";")) {
-    const trimmed = pair.trim();
-    const eqIdx = trimmed.indexOf("=");
-    if (eqIdx === -1) continue;
-    const key = trimmed.slice(0, eqIdx);
-    const rawValue = trimmed.slice(eqIdx + 1);
-    let value;
-    try {
-      value = decodeURIComponent(rawValue);
-    } catch {
-      value = rawValue;
-    }
-    map.set(key, value);
-  }
-  return map;
-}
-function getCookie(req, name) {
-  const cookies = parseCookieHeader(req.headers.cookie);
-  const value = cookies.get(name);
-  if (value === void 0) return void 0;
-  if (/(?:%[^0-9A-Fa-f])|(?:%[0-9A-Fa-f]$)/.test(value)) return void 0;
-  return value;
-}
-function setCookie(res, name, value, options) {
-  const opts = {
-    httpOnly: true,
-    secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production",
-    sameSite: "lax",
-    path: "/",
-    ...options
-  };
-  const parts = [`${name}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`];
-  if (opts.httpOnly) parts.push("HttpOnly");
-  if (opts.secure) parts.push("Secure");
-  const sameSiteCanonical = opts.sameSite.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + opts.sameSite.slice(1);
-  parts.push(`SameSite=${sameSiteCanonical}`);
-  if (opts.maxAge !== void 0) parts.push(`Max-Age=${opts.maxAge}`);
-  if (opts.path) parts.push(`Path=${opts.path}`);
-  if (opts.domain) parts.push(`Domain=${opts.domain}`);
-  const existing = res.getHeader("Set-Cookie");
-  let cookies = [];
-  if (Array.isArray(existing)) {
-    cookies = existing.map(String);
-  } else if (existing !== void 0) {
-    cookies = [String(existing)];
-  }
-  cookies.push(parts.join("; "));
-  res.setHeader("Set-Cookie", cookies);
-}
-function deleteCookie(res, name, options) {
-  setCookie(res, name, "", { maxAge: 0, path: options?.path ?? "/" });
-}
+import {
+  appendCookieToHeaders,
+  appendDeleteCookieToHeaders,
+  deleteCookie,
+  getCookie,
+  getCookieFromRequest,
+  setCookie
+} from "./chunk-ZJQ4O76G.js";
 
 // src/server/auth/crypto.ts
 var encoder = new TextEncoder();
@@ -143,17 +95,29 @@ function normalizeSecrets(input) {
   }
   return arr;
 }
+async function encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge) {
+  const envelope = {
+    data,
+    exp: Date.now() + maxAge * 1e3
+  };
+  return encrypt(envelope, secrets[0]);
+}
+async function decryptSessionWithFallback(raw, secrets) {
+  const results = await Promise.all(
+    secrets.map(async (secret, i) => {
+      const env = await decrypt(raw, secret);
+      return env ? { envelope: env, index: i } : null;
+    })
+  );
+  for (const result of results) {
+    if (result) return result;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
 function createSessionManager(config) {
   const secrets = normalizeSecrets(config.secret);
   const cookieName = config.cookieName ?? "theo_session";
   const maxAge = config.maxAge ?? 604800;
-  async function encryptEnvelope(data) {
-    const envelope = {
-      data,
-      exp: Date.now() + maxAge * 1e3
-    };
-    return encrypt(envelope, secrets[0]);
-  }
   function writeCookie(res, token) {
     setCookie(res, cookieName, token, {
       httpOnly: true,
@@ -162,18 +126,6 @@ function createSessionManager(config) {
       path: "/"
     });
   }
-  async function decryptWithFallback(raw) {
-    const results = await Promise.all(
-      secrets.map(async (secret, i) => {
-        const env = await decrypt(raw, secret);
-        return env ? { envelope: env, index: i } : null;
-      })
-    );
-    for (const result of results) {
-      if (result) return result;
-    }
-    return null;
-  }
   return {
     async getSession(req) {
       const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(req);
@@ -182,7 +134,7 @@ function createSessionManager(config) {
     async getSessionWithMeta(req) {
       const raw = getCookie(req, cookieName);
       if (!raw) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } };
-      const decoded = await decryptWithFallback(raw);
+      const decoded = await decryptSessionWithFallback(raw, secrets);
       if (!decoded) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } };
       if (decoded.envelope.exp < Date.now()) {
         return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: false } };
@@ -193,7 +145,7 @@ function createSessionManager(config) {
       };
     },
     async createSession(res, data) {
-      const token = await encryptEnvelope(data);
+      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge);
       writeCookie(res, token);
     },
     destroySession(res) {
@@ -202,12 +154,65 @@ function createSessionManager(config) {
     async rotateSession(req, res) {
       const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(req);
       if (data === null) return null;
-      const token = await encryptEnvelope(data);
+      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge);
       writeCookie(res, token);
       return data;
     }
   };
 }
+function createSessionManagerWeb(config) {
+  const secrets = normalizeSecrets(config.secret);
+  const cookieName = config.cookieName ?? "theo_session";
+  const maxAge = config.maxAge ?? 604800;
+  function writeCookieWeb(target, token) {
+    appendCookieToHeaders(target, cookieName, token, {
+      httpOnly: true,
+      sameSite: "lax",
+      maxAge,
+      path: "/"
+    });
+  }
+  return {
+    async getSession(request) {
+      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(request);
+      return data;
+    },
+    async getSessionWithMeta(request) {
+      const raw = getCookieFromRequest(request, cookieName);
+      if (raw === void 0) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } };
+      const decoded = await decryptSessionWithFallback(raw, secrets);
+      if (!decoded) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } };
+      if (decoded.envelope.exp < Date.now()) {
+        return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: false } };
+      }
+      return {
+        data: decoded.envelope.data,
+        meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: decoded.index > 0 }
+      };
+    },
+    async createSession(target, data) {
+      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge);
+      writeCookieWeb(target, token);
+    },
+    destroySession(target) {
+      appendDeleteCookieToHeaders(target, cookieName);
+    },
+    async rotateSession(request, target) {
+      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(request);
+      if (data === null) return null;
+      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge);
+      writeCookieWeb(target, token);
+      return data;
+    }
+  };
+}
+async function rotateIfNeededWeb(sm, request, target) {
+  const { data, meta } = await sm.getSessionWithMeta(request);
+  if (data !== null && meta.needsReencrypt) {
+    await sm.createSession(target, data);
+  }
+  return data;
+}
 async function rotateIfNeeded(sm, req, res) {
   const { data, meta } = await sm.getSessionWithMeta(req);
   if (data !== null && meta.needsReencrypt) {
@@ -573,14 +578,12 @@ async function discoverOidcProvider(issuer) {
 }
 
 export {
-  parseCookieHeader,
-  getCookie,
-  setCookie,
-  deleteCookie,
   encrypt,
   decrypt,
   _resetKeyCacheForTests,
   createSessionManager,
+  createSessionManagerWeb,
+  rotateIfNeededWeb,
   rotateIfNeeded,
   assertProductionSecret,
   generateTotp,
@@ -598,4 +601,4 @@ export {
   clearOidcCache,
   discoverOidcProvider
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VRHXOKRP.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NZXH2LQQ.js.map

package/dist/chunk-NZXH2LQQ.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/server/auth/crypto.ts","../src/server/auth/session.ts","../src/server/_internal/encoding.ts","../src/server/auth/auth-totp.ts","../src/server/auth/auth-backup-codes.ts","../src/server/auth/auth-throttle.ts","../src/server/auth/oauth-pkce.ts","../src/server/auth/oauth-state.ts","../src/server/auth/oidc-discovery.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// AES-GCM-256 token encryption with cached key derivation.\n//\n// CR-002 fixes:\n//   - KDF: HKDF (RFC 5869) over the raw secret, not raw SHA-256.\n//     HKDF binds the application context (\"theo-session-v1\") into the\n//     derived key so the same secret used elsewhere cannot decrypt these\n//     tokens. SHA-256 of the raw secret has neither domain separation nor\n//     proper key-stretching guarantees.\n//   - Cache: derived `CryptoKey` is memoized per (secret, info) tuple.\n//     Pre-fix, every encrypt/decrypt re-ran SHA-256 + importKey, which (a)\n//     burned CPU on every authenticated request and (b) made\n//     `decryptWithFallback` leak rotation-array position via timing.\n//   - Buffer typing: `Uint8Array` flows directly into Web Crypto\n//     (`BufferSource`-compatible). The previous `as unknown as ArrayBuffer`\n//     double-cast (CR-016) is removed.\n\nconst encoder = new TextEncoder()\nconst decoder = new TextDecoder()\n\nconst HKDF_INFO_DEFAULT = encoder.encode('theo-session-v1')\nconst HKDF_SALT_EMPTY = new Uint8Array(0)\n\n// Memoize derived keys. Bounded by the number of distinct secrets the app\n// ever uses (typically 1 in steady state, 2-5 during rotation). Map-based\n// so distinct secrets do not evict each other.\nconst keyCache = new Map<string, Promise<CryptoKey>>()\n\nasync function deriveKey(secret: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const cached = keyCache.get(secret)\n  if (cached) return cached\n\n  const derive = (async () => {\n    const keyMaterial = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n      'raw',\n      encoder.encode(secret),\n      { name: 'HKDF' },\n      false,\n      ['deriveKey'],\n    )\n    return crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n      { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt: HKDF_SALT_EMPTY, info: HKDF_INFO_DEFAULT },\n      keyMaterial,\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n      false,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  })()\n\n  keyCache.set(secret, derive)\n  // If derivation fails (invalid secret), evict so a retry can try fresh.\n  derive.catch(() => {\n    keyCache.delete(secret)\n  })\n  return derive\n}\n\nfunction toBase64Url(data: Uint8Array): string {\n  return Buffer.from(data).toString('base64url')\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a base64url string into a `Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>`. The explicit\n * generic matters: Web Crypto APIs expect `BufferSource`, and TS 5.7+\n * tightened `Uint8Array` to `Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>` which includes\n * `SharedArrayBuffer`. Returning the narrower generic lets the value pass\n * `crypto.subtle.decrypt` without `as` casts (CR-016 follow-through).\n */\nfunction fromBase64Url(str: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {\n  const buf = Buffer.from(str, 'base64url')\n  const copy = new Uint8Array(buf.length)\n  copy.set(buf)\n  return copy\n}\n\n// The `T` generic exists so call sites get type-safe round-tripping\n// (`encrypt<Session>(s, ...)` pairs with `decrypt<Session>(...)`); the\n// runtime body just stringifies `data`, hence T does not appear in the\n// signature beyond the argument.\n// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unnecessary-type-parameters -- T documents the round-trip contract with decrypt<T>\nexport async function encrypt<T>(data: T, secret: string): Promise<string> {\n  const key = await deriveKey(secret)\n  const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  const plaintext = encoder.encode(JSON.stringify(data))\n  const ciphertext = new Uint8Array(\n    await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv }, key, plaintext),\n  )\n  return `${toBase64Url(iv)}:${toBase64Url(ciphertext)}`\n}\n\nexport async function decrypt<T>(token: string, secret: string): Promise<T | null> {\n  try {\n    const parts = token.split(':')\n    if (parts.length !== 2) return null\n\n    const iv = fromBase64Url(parts[0])\n    const ciphertext = fromBase64Url(parts[1])\n    const key = await deriveKey(secret)\n\n    const plaintext = await crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv }, key, ciphertext)\n    return JSON.parse(decoder.decode(plaintext)) as T\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reset the derived-key cache. Test helper — never call from production code.\n * Used by Vitest to guarantee isolation between tests that use distinct\n * secrets and want to confirm the derivation path runs.\n */\nexport function _resetKeyCacheForTests(): void {\n  keyCache.clear()\n}\n","import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http'\n\nimport {\n  getCookie,\n  setCookie,\n  deleteCookie,\n  getCookieFromRequest,\n  appendCookieToHeaders,\n  appendDeleteCookieToHeaders,\n} from '../http/cookies.js'\n\nimport { encrypt, decrypt } from './crypto.js'\n\nexport interface SessionConfig {\n  /**\n   * Session secret. Either a single string (legacy) or an array of strings\n   * where index 0 is the newest. The array form enables dual-key rotation\n   * (T3.1 / ADR D5): encrypt always uses `secrets[0]`, decrypt walks the\n   * array, transparent re-encrypt on legacy hits (T3.2).\n   *\n   * EC-1: array length capped at 5 — enforced via throw at construction.\n   */\n  secret: string | string[]\n  cookieName?: string\n  maxAge?: number\n}\n\ninterface SessionEnvelope<T> {\n  data: T\n  exp: number\n}\n\nexport interface SessionMeta {\n  /** Index of the secret that decrypted the session. 0 = newest; > 0 = legacy. */\n  secretIndex: number\n  /** True when the decrypt used a legacy secret and the cookie should be re-encrypted. */\n  needsReencrypt: boolean\n}\n\nexport interface SessionManager<TSession> {\n  getSession(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<TSession | null>\n  /**\n   * T3.2 — Variant of `getSession` that surfaces decrypt metadata.\n   * Used by `api-middleware.ts` to wire transparent re-encrypt BEFORE\n   * the handler runs (so streaming SSR routes don't miss the Set-Cookie\n   * window — EC-4).\n   */\n  getSessionWithMeta(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<{ data: TSession | null; meta: SessionMeta }>\n  createSession(res: ServerResponse, data: TSession): Promise<void>\n  destroySession(res: ServerResponse): void\n  /**\n   * T3.3 — OWASP A07:2021 session fixation mitigation. Re-encrypts the\n   * current session with a fresh IV and refreshed expiry. No-op when no\n   * session is present.\n   */\n  rotateSession(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): Promise<TSession | null>\n}\n\n/**\n * EC-1 — array length cap. Enforced via throw at construction. Silent\n * truncation would create false sense of rotation; silent acceptance\n * would create unbounded CPU on legacy decrypt walks.\n */\nconst MAX_SECRETS = 5\n\n/**\n * Validate + normalize the secret config into a non-empty array of\n * strings ≥ 32 chars each.\n */\nfunction normalizeSecrets(input: string | string[]): string[] {\n  const arr = Array.isArray(input) ? input.slice() : [input]\n  if (arr.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error('Session secret must be non-empty (received an empty array)')\n  }\n  if (arr.length > MAX_SECRETS) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Session secret array exceeds maximum of ${MAX_SECRETS} entries — drop the oldest before adding a new one (received ${arr.length})`,\n    )\n  }\n  const wasArray = Array.isArray(input)\n  for (let i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) {\n    const s = arr[i]\n    if (typeof s !== 'string' || s.length < 32) {\n      const where = wasArray ? ` at index ${i}` : ''\n      throw new Error(`Session secret${where} must be at least 32 characters for secure encryption`)\n    }\n  }\n  return arr\n}\n\n/**\n * T5a.2 Phase D slice 3/3 — module-level pure helpers extracted so\n * `createSessionManager` (IncomingMessage path) and\n * `createSessionManagerWeb` (Web path) share the same encryption +\n * dual-key rotation logic without code duplication (sonarjs\n * no-identical-functions). Both wrappers pass `secrets` + `maxAge`\n * captured from their respective factory scope.\n */\nasync function encryptSessionEnvelope(\n  data: unknown,\n  secrets: string[],\n  maxAge: number,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const envelope: SessionEnvelope<unknown> = {\n    data,\n    exp: Date.now() + maxAge * 1000,\n  }\n  return encrypt(envelope, secrets[0]) // newest\n}\n\n/**\n * CR-002 constant-time: try EVERY rotation entry in parallel, then pick\n * the newest match. Sequential early-exit leaked rotation position via\n * timing (success on entry 0 returned in ~3 ms; success on entry 4 in\n * ~15 ms). Running in parallel binds wall-clock to the slowest single\n * attempt, independent of which entry actually matched. With derived-key\n * cache (CR-002 in crypto.ts), the CPU multiplier per request is ~0\n * after the first request per secret.\n */\nasync function decryptSessionWithFallback<TSession>(\n  raw: string,\n  secrets: string[],\n): Promise<{ envelope: SessionEnvelope<TSession>; index: number } | null> {\n  const results = await Promise.all(\n    secrets.map(async (secret, i) => {\n      const env = await decrypt<SessionEnvelope<TSession>>(raw, secret)\n      return env ? { envelope: env, index: i } : null\n    }),\n  )\n  for (const result of results) {\n    if (result) return result\n  }\n  return null\n}\n\nexport function createSessionManager<TSession>(config: SessionConfig): SessionManager<TSession> {\n  const secrets = normalizeSecrets(config.secret)\n  const cookieName = config.cookieName ?? 'theo_session'\n  const maxAge = config.maxAge ?? 604800 // 7 days\n\n  function writeCookie(res: ServerResponse, token: string): void {\n    setCookie(res, cookieName, token, {\n      httpOnly: true,\n      sameSite: 'lax',\n      maxAge,\n      path: '/',\n    })\n  }\n\n  return {\n    async getSession(req) {\n      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(req)\n      return data\n    },\n\n    async getSessionWithMeta(req) {\n      const raw = getCookie(req, cookieName)\n      if (!raw) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      const decoded = await decryptSessionWithFallback<TSession>(raw, secrets)\n      if (!decoded) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      if (decoded.envelope.exp < Date.now()) {\n        return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      }\n      return {\n        data: decoded.envelope.data,\n        meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: decoded.index > 0 },\n      }\n    },\n\n    async createSession(res, data) {\n      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge)\n      writeCookie(res, token)\n    },\n\n    destroySession(res) {\n      deleteCookie(res, cookieName)\n    },\n\n    async rotateSession(req, res) {\n      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(req)\n      if (data === null) return null\n      // Fresh IV per encrypt call (Web Crypto guarantee — see crypto.ts)\n      // + refreshed expiry. Last write wins for the cookie value.\n      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge)\n      writeCookie(res, token)\n      return data\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * T5a.2 Phase D slice 3/3 — Web-Standards session manager.\n *\n * Mirror of `SessionManager<TSession>` for the Web `Request` + `Headers`\n * shape. Same `SessionConfig`, same encryption (`encrypt`/`decrypt` from\n * `./crypto.js`), same dual-key rotation logic (CR-002 constant-time\n * decrypt fallback walk + transparent re-encrypt), same OWASP A07\n * `rotateSession` invariant.\n *\n * **Signature differences vs `SessionManager`:**\n *   - Read methods take `Request` (instead of `IncomingMessage`).\n *   - Write methods take a `Headers` instance to mutate (instead of\n *     `ServerResponse`) — caller passes the headers they're building\n *     for their `Response` constructor.\n *\n * Uses `getCookieFromRequest` / `appendCookieToHeaders` /\n * `appendDeleteCookieToHeaders` from Phase B slice 6/6.\n */\nexport interface SessionManagerWeb<TSession> {\n  getSession(request: Request): Promise<TSession | null>\n  getSessionWithMeta(request: Request): Promise<{ data: TSession | null; meta: SessionMeta }>\n  createSession(target: Headers, data: TSession): Promise<void>\n  destroySession(target: Headers): void\n  rotateSession(request: Request, target: Headers): Promise<TSession | null>\n}\n\nexport function createSessionManagerWeb<TSession>(\n  config: SessionConfig,\n): SessionManagerWeb<TSession> {\n  const secrets = normalizeSecrets(config.secret)\n  const cookieName = config.cookieName ?? 'theo_session'\n  const maxAge = config.maxAge ?? 604800 // 7 days\n\n  function writeCookieWeb(target: Headers, token: string): void {\n    appendCookieToHeaders(target, cookieName, token, {\n      httpOnly: true,\n      sameSite: 'lax',\n      maxAge,\n      path: '/',\n    })\n  }\n\n  return {\n    async getSession(request) {\n      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(request)\n      return data\n    },\n\n    async getSessionWithMeta(request) {\n      const raw = getCookieFromRequest(request, cookieName)\n      if (raw === undefined) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      const decoded = await decryptSessionWithFallback<TSession>(raw, secrets)\n      if (!decoded) return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: -1, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      if (decoded.envelope.exp < Date.now()) {\n        return { data: null, meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: false } }\n      }\n      return {\n        data: decoded.envelope.data,\n        meta: { secretIndex: decoded.index, needsReencrypt: decoded.index > 0 },\n      }\n    },\n\n    async createSession(target, data) {\n      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge)\n      writeCookieWeb(target, token)\n    },\n\n    destroySession(target) {\n      appendDeleteCookieToHeaders(target, cookieName)\n    },\n\n    async rotateSession(request, target) {\n      const { data } = await this.getSessionWithMeta(request)\n      if (data === null) return null\n      const token = await encryptSessionEnvelope(data, secrets, maxAge)\n      writeCookieWeb(target, token)\n      return data\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * T5a.2 Phase D slice 3/3 — Web-Standards transparent re-encrypt helper.\n *\n * Mirror of `rotateIfNeeded(sm, req, res)` for the Web Request + Headers\n * shape. Reads session via `getSessionWithMeta`; if the cookie was\n * decrypted with a legacy secret (index > 0), re-issues the cookie with\n * the newest secret via `createSession(target, data)`.\n *\n * **EC-4 honest framing:** unlike the IncomingMessage path where the\n * timing constraint is \"before `res.writeHead` fires\", the Web Request\n * path's constraint is \"before the `Response` object is constructed and\n * returned to the runtime\". Caller MUST invoke `rotateIfNeededWeb`\n * BEFORE building the final `Response(body, { headers: target })` so the\n * re-encrypted Set-Cookie lands on the wire.\n */\nexport async function rotateIfNeededWeb<TSession>(\n  sm: SessionManagerWeb<TSession>,\n  request: Request,\n  target: Headers,\n): Promise<TSession | null> {\n  const { data, meta } = await sm.getSessionWithMeta(request)\n  if (data !== null && meta.needsReencrypt) {\n    await sm.createSession(target, data)\n  }\n  return data\n}\n\n/**\n * T3.2 — Transparent re-encrypt helper (EC-4 timing-safe wrapper).\n *\n * Call this in your `createContext` (before any rendering / streaming\n * starts). It:\n *   1. Reads the session via `getSessionWithMeta`.\n *   2. If the cookie was decrypted with a legacy secret (index > 0), it\n *      immediately re-issues the cookie with `secrets[0]` so the next\n *      request lands on the newest key.\n *   3. Returns the session data (or null) for use downstream.\n *\n * EC-4: this MUST run before `renderToPipeableStream` / `res.writeHead`\n * fires. Calling it inside an SSR component or handler body that has\n * already streamed bytes makes the re-encrypt a silent no-op (Set-Cookie\n * is locked once headers commit), trapping users on the legacy secret\n * forever once it's removed from the array.\n */\nexport async function rotateIfNeeded<TSession>(\n  sm: SessionManager<TSession>,\n  req: IncomingMessage,\n  res: ServerResponse,\n): Promise<TSession | null> {\n  const { data, meta } = await sm.getSessionWithMeta(req)\n  if (data !== null && meta.needsReencrypt) {\n    await sm.createSession(res, data)\n  }\n  return data\n}\n\n/**\n * EC-2 — Production secret guard. Refuses to boot when `NODE_ENV === 'production'`\n * AND the secret is too short (< 32 chars) OR matches a known placeholder.\n *\n * Accepts a single secret OR an array. In array form, each entry is validated\n * independently — a single bad entry refuses boot with an index-qualified message.\n */\nconst PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN = /CHANGE_ME|demo[-_]|placeholder/i\n\nexport function assertProductionSecret(secret: string | string[]): void {\n  const arr = Array.isArray(secret) ? secret : [secret]\n  const isProd = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) {\n    const s = arr[i]\n    const isPlaceholder = PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN.test(s)\n    const isTooShort = s.length < 32\n    const prefix = arr.length > 1 ? `Session secret at index ${i}` : 'Session secret'\n\n    if (isProd) {\n      if (isTooShort) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `${prefix} too short for production (${s.length} chars; minimum 32). ` +\n            `Set a 32+ random char secret in your env (e.g., \\`openssl rand -hex 32\\`).`,\n        )\n      }\n      if (isPlaceholder) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `${prefix} looks like a placeholder (\"${s.slice(0, 16)}…\") and NODE_ENV is \"production\". ` +\n            `Replace it with a 32+ random char secret (e.g., \\`openssl rand -hex 32\\`) before deploying.`,\n        )\n      }\n      continue\n    }\n    if (isPlaceholder || isTooShort) {\n      console.warn(\n        `[theokit] WARNING: ${prefix.toLowerCase()} is a placeholder or too short. ` +\n          `This is OK for dev, but the production server will REFUSE to boot until you replace it.`,\n      )\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Shared encoding utilities for crypto-adjacent code.\n *\n * CR-020 DRY: `base64urlEncode` was duplicated across `oauth-pkce.ts` and\n * `oauth-state.ts`. Duplication in cryptographic helpers is a bug class —\n * a future RFC-driven tweak (e.g., padding semantics) would diverge across\n * files. Centralizing the single canonical implementation eliminates that\n * vector.\n *\n * Module is intentionally under `_internal/` so it is **not** part of the\n * public API surface. Consumers outside `packages/theo/src/server` must\n * not import from here.\n */\n\n/**\n * RFC 4648 §5 — base64url-encode bytes without padding. Used wherever an\n * RFC requires URL-safe base64 (PKCE per RFC 7636 §4.1, JWT per RFC 7515,\n * etc.). Pure function — does not mutate `bytes`.\n */\nexport function base64urlEncode(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let s = ''\n  for (const b of bytes) s += String.fromCharCode(b)\n  // The `=+$` trailing-padding regex is bounded (at most 2 chars for\n  // base64). sonarjs flags the `+` quantifier conservatively, but the\n  // input is the output of `btoa()` — a string with at most 2 trailing\n  // `=` characters by spec.\n  // eslint-disable-next-line sonarjs/slow-regex -- bounded trailing-padding pattern (max 2 chars)\n  return btoa(s).replace(/\\+/g, '-').replace(/\\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '')\n}\n\n/**\n * Constant-time string equality.\n *\n * CR-012: prior implementations early-exited on length mismatch\n * (`if (a.length !== b.length) return false`). That early exit leaks\n * the comparison-target length via wall-clock timing — observable when\n * the secret length is itself sensitive (length-based bucket assignment,\n * variable-length nonces). This implementation always iterates\n * `max(a.length, b.length)` characters, OR-folding mismatches into a\n * single accumulator that is checked once at the end.\n *\n * Returns `false` for empty inputs as a defensive default — never accept\n * \"both empty\" as a match.\n */\nexport function constantTimeEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  if (typeof a !== 'string' || typeof b !== 'string') return false\n  if (a.length === 0 || b.length === 0) return false\n\n  const maxLen = Math.max(a.length, b.length)\n  let diff = a.length ^ b.length\n  for (let i = 0; i < maxLen; i++) {\n    // charCodeAt returns NaN for out-of-range indices; (NaN ^ x) is x, so we\n    // explicitly substitute 0 to keep the OR-fold meaningful.\n    const ca = i < a.length ? a.charCodeAt(i) : 0\n    const cb = i < b.length ? b.charCodeAt(i) : 0\n    diff |= ca ^ cb\n  }\n  return diff === 0\n}\n","/**\n * T6.2 — RFC 6238 TOTP primitive.\n *\n * Reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6238\n * HMAC-based one-time password (HOTP) base: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4226\n *\n * Pure-function, dependency-free implementation via Web Crypto. Secrets\n * may be passed as Uint8Array (preferred) or base32 string.\n *\n * SECURITY NOTES (documented per EC-13):\n *   - TOTP secrets are equivalent to passwords. Encrypt at rest using a\n *     separate KMS key from the session secret. If your DB leaks, ALL\n *     2FA codes are compromised — rotate by forcing all users to re-enroll.\n *   - Use `verifyTotp` constant-time (we use crypto.timingSafeEqual internally).\n */\n\n// CR-012 fix: use the shared constant-time helper that does not early-exit\n// on length mismatch (the previous local version did, leaking the digit\n// count via timing).\nimport { constantTimeEquals } from '../_internal/encoding.js'\n\n/** Supported HMAC algorithms per RFC 6238 §1.2. Default SHA-1. */\nexport type TotpAlgorithm = 'SHA-1' | 'SHA-256' | 'SHA-512'\n\nexport interface TotpOptions {\n  /** Shared secret — bytes (preferred) OR base32 string. */\n  secret: Uint8Array | string\n  /** Time step in seconds. Default 30 (RFC 6238 §5.2 recommended). */\n  step?: number\n  /** Code length: 6, 7, or 8 digits. Default 6. */\n  digits?: 6 | 7 | 8\n  /** HMAC algorithm. Default SHA-1 (RFC default). */\n  algorithm?: TotpAlgorithm\n  /** Time in ms since epoch. Default Date.now(). */\n  time?: number\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyTotpOptions extends TotpOptions {\n  /**\n   * Drift tolerance in number of steps on each side. Default 1\n   * (RFC 6238 §5.2 recommends ±1 step = 90s total window).\n   */\n  window?: number\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_STEP = 30\nconst DEFAULT_DIGITS = 6\nconst DEFAULT_ALGORITHM: TotpAlgorithm = 'SHA-1'\n\n/** Decode base32 (RFC 4648, no padding) to bytes. Throws on invalid input. */\nfunction base32Decode(s: string): Uint8Array {\n  const alphabet = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567'\n  // Trailing `=` is bounded by spec to 0..6 chars; `\\s+` collapses runs\n  // of whitespace. Input length is the user's TOTP secret (10..50 chars\n  // typical), so super-linear backtracking cannot escalate.\n  // eslint-disable-next-line sonarjs/slow-regex -- bounded inputs (TOTP secrets are short)\n  const clean = s.toUpperCase().replace(/=+$/, '').replace(/\\s+/g, '')\n  if (!/^[A-Z2-7]+$/.test(clean)) {\n    throw new Error('Invalid base32 secret')\n  }\n  const bits: number[] = []\n  for (const c of clean) {\n    const idx = alphabet.indexOf(c)\n    for (let i = 4; i >= 0; i--) bits.push((idx >> i) & 1)\n  }\n  // Trim trailing partial byte\n  const fullBytes = Math.floor(bits.length / 8)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(fullBytes)\n  for (let i = 0; i < fullBytes; i++) {\n    let v = 0\n    for (let j = 0; j < 8; j++) v = (v << 1) | bits[i * 8 + j]\n    out[i] = v\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/** Encode bytes to base32 (RFC 4648, no padding). */\nfunction base32Encode(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  const alphabet = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567'\n  let out = ''\n  let buffer = 0\n  let bits = 0\n  for (const b of bytes) {\n    buffer = (buffer << 8) | b\n    bits += 8\n    while (bits >= 5) {\n      out += alphabet[(buffer >> (bits - 5)) & 0x1f]\n      bits -= 5\n    }\n  }\n  if (bits > 0) out += alphabet[(buffer << (5 - bits)) & 0x1f]\n  return out\n}\n\nfunction normalizeSecret(secret: Uint8Array | string): Uint8Array {\n  if (typeof secret === 'string') return base32Decode(secret)\n  return secret\n}\n\n/** Counter (8-byte big-endian) from time in ms / step in seconds. */\nfunction counterBytes(timeMs: number, stepSec: number): Uint8Array {\n  const counter = Math.floor(timeMs / 1000 / stepSec)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(8)\n  // Two 32-bit halves (Number can safely represent up to 2^53; OK until year 285,000+)\n  const hi = Math.floor(counter / 0x100000000)\n  const lo = counter >>> 0\n  out[0] = (hi >>> 24) & 0xff\n  out[1] = (hi >>> 16) & 0xff\n  out[2] = (hi >>> 8) & 0xff\n  out[3] = hi & 0xff\n  out[4] = (lo >>> 24) & 0xff\n  out[5] = (lo >>> 16) & 0xff\n  out[6] = (lo >>> 8) & 0xff\n  out[7] = lo & 0xff\n  return out\n}\n\nasync function hmac(\n  secret: Uint8Array,\n  message: Uint8Array,\n  algorithm: TotpAlgorithm,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    secret as BufferSource,\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: algorithm },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  const sig = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, message as BufferSource)\n  return new Uint8Array(sig)\n}\n\n/** RFC 4226 §5.3 dynamic truncation. */\nfunction truncate(mac: Uint8Array, digits: number): string {\n  const offset = mac[mac.length - 1] & 0x0f\n  const code =\n    ((mac[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((mac[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((mac[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (mac[offset + 3] & 0xff)\n  const mod = 10 ** digits\n  return String(code % mod).padStart(digits, '0')\n}\n\n/** Generate a TOTP code for a given time. */\nexport async function generateTotp(opts: TotpOptions): Promise<string> {\n  const secret = normalizeSecret(opts.secret)\n  const step = opts.step ?? DEFAULT_STEP\n  const digits = opts.digits ?? DEFAULT_DIGITS\n  const algorithm = opts.algorithm ?? DEFAULT_ALGORITHM\n  const time = opts.time ?? Date.now()\n  const mac = await hmac(secret, counterBytes(time, step), algorithm)\n  return truncate(mac, digits)\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a TOTP code against the current window ± `window` steps.\n *\n * Returns `false` for malformed tokens (non-digit, wrong length) without\n * throwing — defensive against accidental user-input passthrough.\n */\nexport async function verifyTotp(token: string, opts: VerifyTotpOptions): Promise<boolean> {\n  if (typeof token !== 'string') return false\n  const digits = opts.digits ?? DEFAULT_DIGITS\n  if (!/^\\d+$/.test(token) || token.length !== digits) return false\n\n  const step = opts.step ?? DEFAULT_STEP\n  const algorithm = opts.algorithm ?? DEFAULT_ALGORITHM\n  const time = opts.time ?? Date.now()\n  const drift = opts.window ?? 1\n  const secret = normalizeSecret(opts.secret)\n\n  // Walk the whole drift range constant-time-ish (no early exit).\n  let matched = false\n  for (let delta = -drift; delta <= drift; delta++) {\n    const t = time + delta * step * 1000\n    const code = truncate(await hmac(secret, counterBytes(t, step), algorithm), digits)\n    if (constantTimeEquals(code, token)) matched = true\n  }\n  return matched\n}\n\n/** Generate a cryptographically random TOTP secret. Default 20 bytes (RFC minimum). */\nexport function generateTotpSecret(bytes = 20): Uint8Array {\n  if (bytes < 16) {\n    throw new Error('TOTP secret must be at least 16 bytes (RFC 6238 §3 minimum)')\n  }\n  const out = new Uint8Array(bytes)\n  crypto.getRandomValues(out)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an `otpauth://` URI for QR code enrollment. Format follows the\n * de facto Google Authenticator spec adopted by every major TOTP app.\n *   otpauth://totp/<issuer>:<account>?secret=<base32>&issuer=<issuer>&algorithm=<alg>&digits=<n>&period=<sec>\n */\nexport interface TotpUriOptions {\n  secret: Uint8Array\n  issuer: string\n  account: string\n  algorithm?: TotpAlgorithm\n  digits?: 6 | 7 | 8\n  step?: number\n}\n\nexport function totpUri(opts: TotpUriOptions): string {\n  const label = `${opts.issuer}:${opts.account}`\n  const params = new URLSearchParams({\n    secret: base32Encode(opts.secret),\n    issuer: opts.issuer,\n    algorithm: opts.algorithm ?? DEFAULT_ALGORITHM,\n    digits: String(opts.digits ?? DEFAULT_DIGITS),\n    period: String(opts.step ?? DEFAULT_STEP),\n  })\n  return `otpauth://totp/${encodeURIComponent(label)}?${params.toString()}`\n}\n","/**\n * T6.3 — Backup codes for 2FA recovery.\n *\n * generateBackupCodes returns N plaintexts (display once to user) + hashes\n * (store in DB). verifyBackupCode constant-time-walks all hashes and\n * returns the matchedHash so caller can delete the used code from storage\n * — replay protection lives at the caller (we can't see their database).\n *\n * SECURITY NOTES:\n *   - Codes have ~40 bits entropy (8 chars × 5 bits per char from a\n *     32-char alphabet excluding I/L/O/0/1). Single-use → argon2id\n *     overhead is unnecessary; SHA-256 of the normalized code suffices.\n *   - The caller MUST atomically delete the matched hash on successful\n *     verify. Without that, the code is replayable. We surface\n *     matchedHash explicitly so this step is conspicuous.\n *   - Pair this with throttleLoginAttempts (T6.1) on the verify endpoint\n *     to prevent online brute-force against the 40-bit space.\n */\n\nexport interface BackupCodeOptions {\n  /** How many codes to generate. Default 10. */\n  count?: number\n  /** Length in chars (excluding separator). Default 8. */\n  length?: number\n  /** Separator inserted at the midpoint. Default '-'; pass null to omit. */\n  separator?: '-' | null\n  /** Custom alphabet. Default excludes ambiguous chars (I, L, O, 0, 1). */\n  alphabet?: string\n}\n\nexport interface BackupCode {\n  plaintext: string\n  hash: string\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_ALPHABET = 'ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789' // no I, O, 0, 1\nconst DEFAULT_COUNT = 10\nconst DEFAULT_LENGTH = 8\n\n/**\n * Generate cryptographically random backup codes + their SHA-256 hashes.\n *\n * Plaintext is uppercase alphanumeric (default alphabet excludes ambiguous\n * chars). Separator inserted at the midpoint (default `-`).\n */\nexport async function generateBackupCodes(opts: BackupCodeOptions = {}): Promise<BackupCode[]> {\n  const count = opts.count ?? DEFAULT_COUNT\n  const length = opts.length ?? DEFAULT_LENGTH\n  const separator = opts.separator === undefined ? '-' : opts.separator\n  const alphabet = opts.alphabet ?? DEFAULT_ALPHABET\n\n  // CR-022 fix: bound count and length explicitly. Pathological inputs\n  // (count=Infinity, length=0) would cause an infinite loop or wasteful\n  // resource usage. Bounds are generous (count ≤ 1000, length ∈ [4, 64])\n  // — well above any realistic 2FA backup-codes use case.\n  if (!Number.isInteger(count) || count <= 0 || count > 1000) {\n    throw new RangeError(\n      `generateBackupCodes: count must be an integer in [1, 1000] (got ${String(count)})`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (!Number.isInteger(length) || length < 4 || length > 64) {\n    throw new RangeError(\n      `generateBackupCodes: length must be an integer in [4, 64] (got ${String(length)})`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (alphabet.length < 8) {\n    throw new RangeError(\n      `generateBackupCodes: alphabet must contain at least 8 distinct chars (got ${alphabet.length})`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  const codes: BackupCode[] = []\n  const seen = new Set<string>()\n  while (codes.length < count) {\n    const raw = randomFromAlphabet(length, alphabet)\n    if (seen.has(raw)) continue\n    seen.add(raw)\n    const plaintext = formatWithSeparator(raw, separator)\n    const hash = await sha256Hex(normalizeCode(plaintext))\n    codes.push({ plaintext, hash })\n  }\n  return codes\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a code against a list of stored hashes. Walks all hashes\n * constant-time (no early exit). Returns `valid:true` + matchedHash on\n * hit; `valid:false` otherwise.\n *\n * `matchedHash` is the EXACT string the caller stored, ready to be passed\n * to a `DELETE FROM backup_codes WHERE hash = ?` query.\n */\nexport async function verifyBackupCode(\n  code: string,\n  hashes: readonly string[],\n): Promise<{ valid: boolean; matchedHash?: string }> {\n  const candidate = await sha256Hex(normalizeCode(code))\n  let matchedHash: string | undefined\n  // Constant-time iteration over hashes: never short-circuit.\n  for (const h of hashes) {\n    if (constantTimeEquals(h, candidate)) {\n      matchedHash = h\n    }\n  }\n  return matchedHash ? { valid: true, matchedHash } : { valid: false }\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalize a code for hashing: uppercase + strip separator. This way\n * `abcd-efgh` and `ABCDEFGH` produce the same hash. 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After\n * `maxAttempts` failures within `windowMs`, the identifier is locked\n * for `lockoutMs`. Successful login resets the counter.\n *\n * Usage in a login handler:\n *\n *   const state = await checkThrottle({ store, identifier: hash(email) })\n *   if (!state.allowed) return 429\n *   const valid = await verifyPassword(creds)\n *   await recordAttempt({ store, identifier: hash(email) }, valid)\n *   if (!valid) return 401\n *\n * SECURITY:\n *   - NEVER pass raw email/username as `identifier`. Hash or normalize\n *     first (e.g. SHA-256 of the lowercased email). This prevents PII\n *     from landing in the rate-limit store or audit logs.\n *   - Combine with the per-route IP rate limit (T2.2) for layered defense:\n *     IP-level limits stop scripted floods; credential-level limits stop\n *     distributed brute force.\n */\n\nexport interface ThrottleOptions {\n  store: RateLimitStore\n  /**\n   * Stable identifier per credential. Hash raw emails/usernames before\n   * passing in — never leak PII to the rate-limit key space.\n   */\n  identifier: string\n  /** Failures before lockout. Default 5. */\n  maxAttempts?: number\n  /** Sliding window for counting failures. Default 15 minutes. */\n  windowMs?: number\n  /** Lockout duration after maxAttempts hit. Default 1 hour. */\n  lockoutMs?: number\n}\n\nexport interface ThrottleState {\n  allowed: boolean\n  remainingAttempts: number\n  /** Set when `allowed === false`. Absolute timestamp when the lockout expires. */\n  lockedUntil?: Date\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 5\nconst DEFAULT_LOCKOUT_MS = 60 * 60_000\n\n/**\n * Read the current throttle state for an identifier WITHOUT modifying\n * the counter. Call before validating credentials so locked attempts\n * are rejected fast.\n */\nexport async function checkThrottle(opts: ThrottleOptions): Promise<ThrottleState> {\n  const maxAttempts = opts.maxAttempts ?? DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS\n  const state = await opts.store.get(opts.identifier)\n  if (!state) {\n    return { allowed: true, remainingAttempts: maxAttempts }\n  }\n  if (state.count >= maxAttempts) {\n    return {\n      allowed: false,\n      remainingAttempts: 0,\n      // Lockout expires when the store TTL fires.\n      lockedUntil: new Date(state.resetAt),\n    }\n  }\n  return {\n    allowed: true,\n    remainingAttempts: Math.max(0, maxAttempts - state.count),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Record an attempt outcome. On success → reset the counter. On failure\n * → increment within the sliding window. Returns the new throttle state.\n *\n * Storage model: the store entry's TTL is `lockoutMs` (which doubles as\n * the failure-accumulation window). When `lockoutMs` is short — common\n * in tests or for soft lockouts — the entry auto-expires and the next\n * attempt starts fresh.\n */\nexport async function recordAttempt(\n  opts: ThrottleOptions,\n  success: boolean,\n): Promise<ThrottleState> {\n  const maxAttempts = opts.maxAttempts ?? DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS\n  if (success) {\n    await opts.store.reset(opts.identifier)\n    return {\n      allowed: true,\n      remainingAttempts: maxAttempts,\n    }\n  }\n  const lockoutMs = opts.lockoutMs ?? DEFAULT_LOCKOUT_MS\n  const state = await opts.store.incr(opts.identifier, lockoutMs)\n\n  if (state.count >= maxAttempts) {\n    return {\n      allowed: false,\n      remainingAttempts: 0,\n      lockedUntil: new Date(state.resetAt),\n    }\n  }\n  return {\n    allowed: true,\n    remainingAttempts: Math.max(0, maxAttempts - state.count),\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * T7.3 — RFC 7636 PKCE primitive.\n *\n * Reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636\n *\n * Pure-function, dependency-free implementation using Web Crypto.\n *\n * Usage in an OAuth authorization-code flow:\n *\n *   const { codeVerifier, codeChallenge, codeChallengeMethod } = await generatePkceChallenge()\n *   // Store codeVerifier in the user's session\n *   // Send codeChallenge + codeChallengeMethod in the /authorize redirect\n *   // ... user authenticates with provider ...\n *   // On /callback, send codeVerifier with the code → token exchange\n */\n\nexport interface PkceChallenge {\n  codeVerifier: string\n  codeChallenge: string\n  codeChallengeMethod: 'S256'\n}\n\n// CR-020 DRY: single canonical base64url encoder lives in _internal/encoding.\nimport { base64urlEncode } from '../_internal/encoding.js'\n\n/**\n * Compute the code_challenge from a code_verifier per RFC 7636 §4.2.\n * Exported separately to enable RFC 7636 Appendix B vector testing.\n */\nexport async function pkceChallengeFromVerifier(verifier: string): Promise<string> {\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(verifier)\n  const hash = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', bytes)\n  return base64urlEncode(new Uint8Array(hash))\n}\n\n/**\n * Generate a fresh PKCE challenge pair.\n *\n * Verifier: 32 cryptographically random bytes → 43-char base64url string.\n * RFC 7636 §4.1 allows 43–128 chars; we ship the minimum-safe default.\n *\n * Method: 'S256' only — no 'plain' fallback. 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Default 32 bytes\n * (~43 base64url chars). Increase for higher entropy if your provider\n * supports it.\n */\nexport function generateOAuthState(opts: { bytes?: number } = {}): string {\n  const len = opts.bytes ?? 32\n  const buf = new Uint8Array(len)\n  crypto.getRandomValues(buf)\n  return base64urlEncode(buf)\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a state token. Constant-time compare. Empty inputs always fail\n * (defensive — never accept empty as \"they match\").\n *\n * CR-012 fix: `constantTimeEquals` does not early-exit on length mismatch,\n * so the comparison time is independent of how the input was forged.\n */\nexport function verifyOAuthState(provided: string, stored: string): boolean {\n  return constantTimeEquals(provided, stored)\n}\n","/**\n * T7.4 — OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 metadata fetcher.\n *\n * Reference: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html\n *\n * Caches metadata in module scope. Cache key is the exact issuer string\n * (trailing-slash sensitive per RFC 8414 §3). Failures are NOT cached —\n * subsequent calls retry the fetch.\n *\n * EC-7 — HTTPS enforced. RFC 8414 §3 requires HTTPS for OIDC issuers.\n * Localhost (loopback) is allowed for development.\n */\n\nexport interface OidcMetadata {\n  issuer: string\n  authorization_endpoint: string\n  token_endpoint: string\n  jwks_uri?: string\n  userinfo_endpoint?: string\n  end_session_endpoint?: string\n  scopes_supported?: string[]\n  response_types_supported?: string[]\n  grant_types_supported?: string[]\n  id_token_signing_alg_values_supported?: string[]\n  [key: string]: unknown // OIDC providers ship many optional fields\n}\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, Promise<OidcMetadata>>()\n\n/** Clear the discovery cache. Used by tests. */\nexport function clearOidcCache(): void {\n  cache.clear()\n}\n\nfunction isLoopback(host: string): boolean {\n  return host === 'localhost' || host === '127.0.0.1' || host === '[::1]' || host === '::1'\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch (or return cached) OIDC provider metadata.\n *\n * Throws when:\n *   - Issuer URL is malformed\n *   - Issuer is HTTP and not a loopback host (EC-7)\n *   - HTTP response is non-OK\n *   - Metadata lacks `authorization_endpoint` (sanity check)\n */\nexport async function discoverOidcProvider(issuer: string | URL): Promise<OidcMetadata> {\n  const issuerStr = typeof issuer === 'string' ? issuer : issuer.toString()\n  // Validate protocol BEFORE checking cache — invalid issuers should never poison.\n  const url = new URL(issuerStr)\n  if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !isLoopback(url.hostname)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `OIDC issuer must use HTTPS (received \"${url.protocol}//${url.hostname}…\"). ` +\n        `RFC 8414 §3 forbids plain HTTP 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package/dist/{chunk-2BQYEBCK.js → chunk-OLPB36O2.js}

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-import {
-  walkSourceFiles
-} from "./chunk-X2VVCJ4V.js";
 import {
   HTTP_METHODS
 } from "./chunk-WSJKACWB.js";
+import {
+  walkSourceFiles
+} from "./chunk-X2VVCJ4V.js";
 
 // src/server/scan/match.ts
 function compilePattern(routePath) {
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ function matchRoute(url, routes) {
 
 // src/server/scan/scan.ts
 import { existsSync, statSync } from "fs";
-import { extname, join, relative } from "path";
+import { basename, extname, join, relative } from "path";
 
 // src/server/scan/detect-http-methods.ts
 import { readFileSync } from "fs";
@@ -89,8 +89,88 @@ function detectExportedHttpMethods(filePath, content) {
   return [...found].sort();
 }
 
+// src/server/scan/errors.ts
+var ROUTER_MIGRATION_GUIDE_URL = "https://theokit.dev/migration/0.3-to-0.4-router";
+var RouterConventionError = class extends Error {
+  name = "RouterConventionError";
+  file;
+  suggestion;
+  migrationUrl;
+  constructor(opts) {
+    const migrationUrl = opts.migrationUrl ?? ROUTER_MIGRATION_GUIDE_URL;
+    const message = [
+      `Router convention violation: dotted route basename is not supported in theokit 0.4+.`,
+      ``,
+      `  File: ${opts.file}`,
+      `  Use directory-nested form: ${opts.suggestion}`,
+      ``,
+      `Migration guide: ${migrationUrl}`,
+      `Run \`theokit migrate router\` to convert all dotted basenames automatically.`
+    ].join("\n");
+    super(message);
+    this.file = opts.file;
+    this.suggestion = opts.suggestion;
+    this.migrationUrl = migrationUrl;
+  }
+};
+
 // src/server/scan/scan.ts
 var ROUTE_EXTENSIONS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([".ts", ".tsx", ".js", ".jsx"]);
+var TEST_OR_SPEC_RE = /\.(test|spec)\.[jt]sx?$/;
+function isTestOrSpecFile(filePath) {
+  return TEST_OR_SPEC_RE.test(basename(filePath));
+}
+function hasDotOutsideBrackets(segment) {
+  let depth = 0;
+  for (const ch of segment) {
+    if (ch === "[") depth++;
+    else if (ch === "]") depth--;
+    else if (ch === "." && depth === 0) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+function splitDottedSegmentOutsideBrackets(segment) {
+  const parts = [];
+  let current = "";
+  let depth = 0;
+  for (const ch of segment) {
+    if (ch === "[") {
+      depth++;
+      current += ch;
+    } else if (ch === "]") {
+      depth--;
+      current += ch;
+    } else if (ch === "." && depth === 0) {
+      if (current) parts.push(current);
+      current = "";
+    } else {
+      current += ch;
+    }
+  }
+  if (current) parts.push(current);
+  return parts;
+}
+function buildDirectoryNestedSuggestion(filePath, routesDir) {
+  const rel = relative(routesDir, filePath).replace(/\\/g, "/");
+  const ext = extname(rel);
+  const withoutExt = rel.slice(0, -ext.length);
+  const segments = withoutExt.split("/").flatMap(splitDottedSegmentOutsideBrackets);
+  return `routes/${segments.join("/")}${ext}`;
+}
+function assertNoDottedSegment(filePath, routesDir) {
+  const rel = relative(routesDir, filePath).replace(/\\/g, "/");
+  const ext = extname(rel);
+  const withoutExt = rel.slice(0, -ext.length);
+  const segments = withoutExt.split("/");
+  for (const seg of segments) {
+    if (hasDotOutsideBrackets(seg)) {
+      throw new RouterConventionError({
+        file: filePath,
+        suggestion: buildDirectoryNestedSuggestion(filePath, routesDir)
+      });
+    }
+  }
+}
 function fileToRoutePath(filePath, routesDir) {
   let rel = relative(routesDir, filePath);
   const ext = extname(rel);
@@ -112,6 +192,8 @@ function scanServerRoutes(serverDir) {
   }
   const results = [];
   walkSourceFiles(routesDir, { extensions: ROUTE_EXTENSIONS }, (absPath) => {
+    if (isTestOrSpecFile(absPath)) return;
+    assertNoDottedSegment(absPath, routesDir);
     const routePath = fileToRoutePath(absPath, routesDir);
     const { pattern, paramNames } = compilePattern(routePath);
     const methods = detectExportedHttpMethods(absPath);
@@ -174,4 +256,4 @@ export {
   scanServerRoutes,
   scanWebSocketRoutes
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-2BQYEBCK.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OLPB36O2.js.map

package/dist/chunk-OLPB36O2.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/server/scan/match.ts","../src/server/scan/scan.ts","../src/server/scan/detect-http-methods.ts","../src/server/scan/errors.ts","../src/server/scan/ws-scan.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export interface ServerRouteNode {\n  filePath: string\n  routePath: string\n  paramNames: string[]\n  pattern: RegExp\n  /** HTTP methods (uppercase) the route file exports. Optional for backward\n   * compatibility with manifests generated before G1. 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The `security/detect-non-literal-regexp`\n  // rule cannot see this constraint — disable narrowly.\n  // eslint-disable-next-line security/detect-non-literal-regexp -- route pattern from build-time scan, never HTTP input\n  return { pattern: new RegExp(`^${regexStr}$`), paramNames }\n}\n\nexport function matchRoute(\n  url: string,\n  routes: ServerRouteNode[],\n): { route: ServerRouteNode; params: Record<string, string> } | null {\n  // Strip query string and trailing slash\n  let path = url.split('?')[0]\n  if (path.length > 1 && path.endsWith('/')) {\n    path = path.slice(0, -1)\n  }\n\n  for (const route of routes) {\n    const match = route.pattern.exec(path)\n    if (match) {\n      const params: Record<string, string> = {}\n      route.paramNames.forEach((name, i) => {\n        params[name] = match[i + 1]\n      })\n      return { route, params }\n    }\n  }\n  return null\n}\n","/* eslint-disable security/detect-non-literal-fs-filename --\n * Build-time scanner: walks `serverDir/routes/` derived from cwd.\n * No HTTP input ever reaches these fs calls.\n */\nimport { existsSync, statSync } from 'node:fs'\nimport { basename, extname, join, relative } from 'node:path'\n\nimport { walkSourceFiles } from '../_internal/scan-walker.js'\n\nimport { detectExportedHttpMethods } from './detect-http-methods.js'\nimport { RouterConventionError } from './errors.js'\nimport { compilePattern, type ServerRouteNode } from './match.js'\n\nconst ROUTE_EXTENSIONS = new Set(['.ts', '.tsx', '.js', '.jsx'])\n\n// EC-4: Co-located unit/spec tests must be silently skipped by the scanner,\n// BEFORE the dotted-basename check fires. Matches `*.test.ts|tsx|js|jsx`\n// and `*.spec.ts|tsx|js|jsx`.\nconst TEST_OR_SPEC_RE = /\\.(test|spec)\\.[jt]sx?$/\n\nfunction isTestOrSpecFile(filePath: string): boolean {\n  return TEST_OR_SPEC_RE.test(basename(filePath))\n}\n\nfunction hasDotOutsideBrackets(segment: string): boolean {\n  let depth = 0\n  for (const ch of segment) {\n    if (ch === '[') depth++\n    else if (ch === ']') depth--\n    else if (ch === '.' && depth === 0) return true\n  }\n  return false\n}\n\nfunction splitDottedSegmentOutsideBrackets(segment: string): string[] {\n  const parts: string[] = []\n  let current = ''\n  let depth = 0\n  for (const ch of segment) {\n    if (ch === '[') {\n      depth++\n      current += ch\n    } else if (ch === ']') {\n      depth--\n      current += ch\n    } else if (ch === '.' && depth === 0) {\n      if (current) parts.push(current)\n      current = ''\n    } else {\n      current += ch\n    }\n  }\n  if (current) parts.push(current)\n  return parts\n}\n\nfunction buildDirectoryNestedSuggestion(filePath: string, routesDir: string): string {\n  const rel = relative(routesDir, filePath).replace(/\\\\/g, '/')\n  const ext = extname(rel)\n  const withoutExt = rel.slice(0, -ext.length)\n  const segments = withoutExt.split('/').flatMap(splitDottedSegmentOutsideBrackets)\n  return `routes/${segments.join('/')}${ext}`\n}\n\nfunction assertNoDottedSegment(filePath: string, routesDir: string): void {\n  const rel = relative(routesDir, filePath).replace(/\\\\/g, '/')\n  const ext = extname(rel)\n  const withoutExt = rel.slice(0, -ext.length)\n  const segments = withoutExt.split('/')\n  for (const seg of segments) {\n    if (hasDotOutsideBrackets(seg)) {\n      throw new RouterConventionError({\n        file: filePath,\n        suggestion: buildDirectoryNestedSuggestion(filePath, routesDir),\n      })\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction fileToRoutePath(filePath: string, routesDir: string): string {\n  let rel = relative(routesDir, filePath)\n  // Strip extension\n  const ext = extname(rel)\n  rel = rel.slice(0, -ext.length)\n  // Normalize separators\n  rel = rel.replace(/\\\\/g, '/')\n  // Strip index suffix\n  if (rel.endsWith('/index')) {\n    rel = rel.slice(0, -6)\n  } else if (rel === 'index') {\n    rel = ''\n  }\n  // Replace [...param] with :...param (catch-all, before regular params).\n  // Replace [param] with :param. Inputs are file paths bounded by the\n  // OS filename limit; the bracket capture is bounded by `]`.\n  rel = rel.replace(/\\[\\.\\.\\.([^\\]]+)\\]/g, ':...$1')\n  // eslint-disable-next-line sonarjs/slow-regex -- bounded by `]`; input is a single filename\n  rel = rel.replace(/\\[([^\\]]+)\\]/g, ':$1')\n  return `/api/${rel}`\n}\n\nexport function scanServerRoutes(serverDir: string): ServerRouteNode[] {\n  const routesDir = join(serverDir, 'routes')\n  if (!existsSync(routesDir) || !statSync(routesDir).isDirectory()) {\n    return []\n  }\n\n  const results: ServerRouteNode[] = []\n  walkSourceFiles(routesDir, { extensions: ROUTE_EXTENSIONS }, (absPath) => {\n    // EC-4: skip co-located test/spec files BEFORE the dotted-basename check\n    if (isTestOrSpecFile(absPath)) return\n\n    // G6 T1.1: reject dotted basenames (legacy convention that produced wrong\n    // paramNames due to greedy `:(?:\\.\\.\\.)?([^/]+)` regex in compilePattern).\n    assertNoDottedSegment(absPath, routesDir)\n\n    const routePath = fileToRoutePath(absPath, routesDir)\n    const { pattern, paramNames } = compilePattern(routePath)\n    const methods = detectExportedHttpMethods(absPath)\n    results.push({\n      filePath: absPath,\n      routePath,\n      paramNames,\n      pattern,\n      methods,\n    })\n  })\n\n  // T1.4 / EC-2 — refuse to scan if a user route collides with the reserved\n  // batch endpoint path. User must rename or disable batching.\n  const conflicting = results.find((r) => r.routePath === '/api/__theo_batch__')\n  if (conflicting) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Server route ${conflicting.filePath} resolves to '/api/__theo_batch__' which is reserved for the batch endpoint. Rename the route or disable batching in theo.config.ts.`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Sort: static first, then dynamic, then catch-all last\n  const isCatchAll = (route: ServerRouteNode) => route.routePath.includes(':...')\n  results.sort((a, b) => {\n    const aStatic = a.paramNames.length === 0\n    const bStatic = b.paramNames.length === 0\n    const aCatchAll = isCatchAll(a)\n    const bCatchAll = isCatchAll(b)\n\n    // Static routes first\n    if (aStatic && !bStatic) return -1\n    if (!aStatic && bStatic) return 1\n    // Catch-all routes last\n    if (aCatchAll && !bCatchAll) return 1\n    if (!aCatchAll && bCatchAll) return -1\n    return a.routePath.localeCompare(b.routePath)\n  })\n\n  return results\n}\n","/**\n * Detect which HTTP-method named exports a route file declares.\n *\n * Uses the TypeScript compiler API (not regex) per G1 edge-case review EC-4:\n * regex over file content emits false positives for `// export const GET = ...`\n * in comments and `` `export const GET = ...` `` in template literals. AST\n * walking avoids both classes of bug.\n *\n * `typescript` ships as CommonJS with internal dynamic `require('fs')`.\n * When loaded via ESM `import`, the dynamic requires fail at module-bootstrap.\n * We use `createRequire(import.meta.url)` to keep the package on its native\n * CJS path. The type-only namespace import gives us the AST helpers shape.\n *\n * Returns the set of HTTP methods (uppercase) the file exports. Empty array\n * means the file has no HTTP exports (the route file is util-only).\n */\n\nimport { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'\nimport { createRequire } from 'node:module'\n\nimport type * as TS from 'typescript'\n\nimport { HTTP_METHODS, type HttpMethod } from '../../core/contracts/http-methods.js'\n\nconst require_ = createRequire(import.meta.url)\n// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports\nconst ts = require_('typescript') as typeof TS\n\nconst HTTP_METHOD_NAMES = new Set<string>(HTTP_METHODS)\n\nfunction hasExportModifier(modifiers: readonly TS.Modifier[] | undefined): boolean {\n  if (!modifiers) return false\n  for (const m of modifiers) {\n    if (m.kind === ts.SyntaxKind.ExportKeyword) return true\n  }\n  return false\n}\n\nfunction collectFromStatement(stmt: TS.Statement, found: Set<HttpMethod>): void {\n  // `export const GET = ...` / `export function GET ...` / `export async function GET ...`\n  if (ts.isVariableStatement(stmt) && hasExportModifier(ts.getModifiers(stmt))) {\n    for (const decl of stmt.declarationList.declarations) {\n      if (ts.isIdentifier(decl.name) && HTTP_METHOD_NAMES.has(decl.name.text)) {\n        found.add(decl.name.text as HttpMethod)\n      }\n    }\n    return\n  }\n\n  if (\n    (ts.isFunctionDeclaration(stmt) || ts.isClassDeclaration(stmt)) &&\n    hasExportModifier(ts.getModifiers(stmt))\n  ) {\n    if (stmt.name && HTTP_METHOD_NAMES.has(stmt.name.text)) {\n      found.add(stmt.name.text as HttpMethod)\n    }\n    return\n  }\n\n  // `export { GET }` / `export { handler as GET } from './shared'` (EC-5)\n  if (ts.isExportDeclaration(stmt) && stmt.exportClause && ts.isNamedExports(stmt.exportClause)) {\n    for (const spec of stmt.exportClause.elements) {\n      // spec.name is the exported (re-)name; spec.propertyName is the original (when renamed)\n      if (HTTP_METHOD_NAMES.has(spec.name.text)) {\n        found.add(spec.name.text as HttpMethod)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nexport function detectExportedHttpMethods(filePath: string, content?: string): HttpMethod[] {\n  const src = content ?? readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8')\n  const sourceFile = ts.createSourceFile(\n    filePath,\n    src,\n    ts.ScriptTarget.Latest,\n    /* setParentNodes */ false,\n    ts.ScriptKind.TS,\n  )\n  const found = new Set<HttpMethod>()\n  for (const stmt of sourceFile.statements) {\n    collectFromStatement(stmt, found)\n  }\n  return [...found].sort()\n}\n","/**\n * Router-convention errors thrown by the server-route scanner.\n *\n * Plan: .claude/knowledge-base/plans/g6-router-convention-plan.md v1.1\n *\n * theokit 0.4.0+ enforces directory-nested file-system routing\n * (`auth/[provider]/login.ts`) and REJECTS dotted-basename routes\n * (`auth.[provider].login.ts`) because the legacy regex extracted the\n * dotted basename incorrectly — `params.provider` was undefined at request\n * time. See ADR-XXX (router-convention-decision) in CHANGELOG 0.4.0.\n */\n\n/**\n * Canonical migration guide URL. T4.2 establishes this as the authoritative\n * landing page. EC-3: error message uses this constant so the URL never\n * drifts from the doc location.\n */\nexport const ROUTER_MIGRATION_GUIDE_URL = 'https://theokit.dev/migration/0.3-to-0.4-router'\n\nexport interface RouterConventionErrorOptions {\n  /** Absolute path of the offending route file. */\n  file: string\n  /** Suggested directory-nested replacement path (relative, e.g. `routes/auth/[provider]/login.ts`). */\n  suggestion: string\n  /** Migration guide URL (defaults to `ROUTER_MIGRATION_GUIDE_URL`). */\n  migrationUrl?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown by `scanServerRoutes` when a route file uses the legacy\n * dotted-basename convention (`auth.[provider].login.ts`).\n *\n * The error is FAIL-FAST by design — running with a route that has wrong\n * `paramNames` produces silent 404s at request time, which is strictly\n * worse than a build-time error.\n */\nexport class RouterConventionError extends Error {\n  override readonly name = 'RouterConventionError'\n  readonly file: string\n  readonly suggestion: string\n  readonly migrationUrl: string\n\n  constructor(opts: RouterConventionErrorOptions) {\n    const migrationUrl = opts.migrationUrl ?? ROUTER_MIGRATION_GUIDE_URL\n    const message = [\n      `Router convention violation: dotted route basename is not supported in theokit 0.4+.`,\n      ``,\n      `  File: ${opts.file}`,\n      `  Use directory-nested form: ${opts.suggestion}`,\n      ``,\n      `Migration guide: ${migrationUrl}`,\n      `Run \\`theokit migrate router\\` to convert all dotted basenames automatically.`,\n    ].join('\\n')\n    super(message)\n    this.file = opts.file\n    this.suggestion = opts.suggestion\n    this.migrationUrl = migrationUrl\n  }\n}\n","/* eslint-disable security/detect-non-literal-fs-filename --\n * Build-time scanner: walks `serverDir/ws/` derived from cwd.\n * No HTTP input ever reaches these fs calls.\n */\nimport { existsSync, statSync } from 'node:fs'\nimport { extname, join, relative } from 'node:path'\n\nimport { walkSourceFiles } from '../_internal/scan-walker.js'\n\nconst WS_EXTENSIONS = new Set(['.ts', '.tsx', '.js', '.jsx'])\n\nexport interface WebSocketRouteNode {\n  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