thaddeus 1.0.26 → 1.0.28

package/src/utils/permissions/permissions.js

@@ -0,0 +1,1063 @@
+import { feature } from 'bun:bundle';
+import { APIUserAbortError } from '@anthropic-ai/sdk';
+import { getToolNameForPermissionCheck, mcpInfoFromString, } from '../../services/mcp/mcpStringUtils.js';
+import { AGENT_TOOL_NAME } from '../../tools/AgentTool/constants.js';
+import { shouldUseSandbox } from '../../tools/BashTool/shouldUseSandbox.js';
+import { BASH_TOOL_NAME } from '../../tools/BashTool/toolName.js';
+import { POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME } from '../../tools/PowerShellTool/toolName.js';
+import { REPL_TOOL_NAME } from '../../tools/REPLTool/constants.js';
+import { extractOutputRedirections } from '../bash/commands.js';
+import { logForDebugging } from '../debug.js';
+import { AbortError, toError } from '../errors.js';
+import { logError } from '../log.js';
+import { SandboxManager } from '../sandbox/sandbox-adapter.js';
+import { getSettingSourceDisplayNameLowercase, SETTING_SOURCES, } from '../settings/constants.js';
+import { plural } from '../stringUtils.js';
+import { permissionModeTitle } from './PermissionMode.js';
+import { applyPermissionUpdate, applyPermissionUpdates, persistPermissionUpdates, } from './PermissionUpdate.js';
+import { permissionRuleValueFromString, permissionRuleValueToString, } from './permissionRuleParser.js';
+import { deletePermissionRuleFromSettings, shouldAllowManagedPermissionRulesOnly, } from './permissionsLoader.js';
+/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports */
+const classifierDecisionModule = feature('TRANSCRIPT_CLASSIFIER')
+    ? require('./classifierDecision.js')
+    : null;
+const autoModeStateModule = feature('TRANSCRIPT_CLASSIFIER')
+    ? require('./autoModeState.js')
+    : null;
+import { addToTurnClassifierDuration, getTotalCacheCreationInputTokens, getTotalCacheReadInputTokens, getTotalInputTokens, getTotalOutputTokens, } from '../../bootstrap/state.js';
+import { getFeatureValue_CACHED_WITH_REFRESH } from '../../services/analytics/growthbook.js';
+import { logEvent, } from '../../services/analytics/index.js';
+import { sanitizeToolNameForAnalytics } from '../../services/analytics/metadata.js';
+import { clearClassifierChecking, setClassifierChecking, } from '../classifierApprovals.js';
+import { isInProtectedNamespace } from '../envUtils.js';
+import { executePermissionRequestHooks } from '../hooks.js';
+import { AUTO_REJECT_MESSAGE, buildClassifierUnavailableMessage, buildYoloRejectionMessage, DONT_ASK_REJECT_MESSAGE, } from '../messages.js';
+import { calculateCostFromTokens } from '../modelCost.js';
+/* eslint-enable @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports */
+import { jsonStringify } from '../slowOperations.js';
+import { createDenialTrackingState, DENIAL_LIMITS, recordDenial, recordSuccess, shouldFallbackToPrompting, } from './denialTracking.js';
+import { classifyYoloAction, formatActionForClassifier, } from './yoloClassifier.js';
+const CLASSIFIER_FAIL_CLOSED_REFRESH_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000; // 30 minutes
+const PERMISSION_RULE_SOURCES = [
+    ...SETTING_SOURCES,
+    'cliArg',
+    'command',
+    'session',
+];
+export function permissionRuleSourceDisplayString(source) {
+    return getSettingSourceDisplayNameLowercase(source);
+}
+export function getAllowRules(context) {
+    return PERMISSION_RULE_SOURCES.flatMap(source => (context.alwaysAllowRules[source] || []).map(ruleString => ({
+        source,
+        ruleBehavior: 'allow',
+        ruleValue: permissionRuleValueFromString(ruleString),
+    })));
+}
+/**
+ * Creates a permission request message that explain the permission request
+ */
+export function createPermissionRequestMessage(toolName, decisionReason) {
+    // Handle different decision reason types
+    if (decisionReason) {
+        if ((feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER') || feature('TRANSCRIPT_CLASSIFIER')) &&
+            decisionReason.type === 'classifier') {
+            return `Classifier '${decisionReason.classifier}' requires approval for this ${toolName} command: ${decisionReason.reason}`;
+        }
+        switch (decisionReason.type) {
+            case 'hook': {
+                const hookMessage = decisionReason.reason
+                    ? `Hook '${decisionReason.hookName}' blocked this action: ${decisionReason.reason}`
+                    : `Hook '${decisionReason.hookName}' requires approval for this ${toolName} command`;
+                return hookMessage;
+            }
+            case 'rule': {
+                const ruleString = permissionRuleValueToString(decisionReason.rule.ruleValue);
+                const sourceString = permissionRuleSourceDisplayString(decisionReason.rule.source);
+                return `Permission rule '${ruleString}' from ${sourceString} requires approval for this ${toolName} command`;
+            }
+            case 'subcommandResults': {
+                const needsApproval = [];
+                for (const [cmd, result] of decisionReason.reasons) {
+                    if (result.behavior === 'ask' || result.behavior === 'passthrough') {
+                        // Strip output redirections for display to avoid showing filenames as commands
+                        // Only do this for Bash tool to avoid affecting other tools
+                        if (toolName === 'Bash') {
+                            const { commandWithoutRedirections, redirections } = extractOutputRedirections(cmd);
+                            // Only use stripped version if there were actual redirections
+                            const displayCmd = redirections.length > 0 ? commandWithoutRedirections : cmd;
+                            needsApproval.push(displayCmd);
+                        }
+                        else {
+                            needsApproval.push(cmd);
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                if (needsApproval.length > 0) {
+                    const n = needsApproval.length;
+                    return `This ${toolName} command contains multiple operations. The following ${plural(n, 'part')} ${plural(n, 'requires', 'require')} approval: ${needsApproval.join(', ')}`;
+                }
+                return `This ${toolName} command contains multiple operations that require approval`;
+            }
+            case 'permissionPromptTool':
+                return `Tool '${decisionReason.permissionPromptToolName}' requires approval for this ${toolName} command`;
+            case 'sandboxOverride':
+                return 'Run outside of the sandbox';
+            case 'workingDir':
+                return decisionReason.reason;
+            case 'safetyCheck':
+            case 'other':
+                return decisionReason.reason;
+            case 'mode': {
+                const modeTitle = permissionModeTitle(decisionReason.mode);
+                return `Current permission mode (${modeTitle}) requires approval for this ${toolName} command`;
+            }
+            case 'asyncAgent':
+                return decisionReason.reason;
+        }
+    }
+    // Default message without listing allowed commands
+    const message = `Thaddeus requested permissions to use ${toolName}, but you haven't granted it yet.`;
+    return message;
+}
+export function getDenyRules(context) {
+    return PERMISSION_RULE_SOURCES.flatMap(source => (context.alwaysDenyRules[source] || []).map(ruleString => ({
+        source,
+        ruleBehavior: 'deny',
+        ruleValue: permissionRuleValueFromString(ruleString),
+    })));
+}
+export function getAskRules(context) {
+    return PERMISSION_RULE_SOURCES.flatMap(source => (context.alwaysAskRules[source] || []).map(ruleString => ({
+        source,
+        ruleBehavior: 'ask',
+        ruleValue: permissionRuleValueFromString(ruleString),
+    })));
+}
+/**
+ * Check if the entire tool matches a rule
+ * For example, this matches "Bash" but not "Bash(prefix:*)" for BashTool
+ * This also matches MCP tools with a server name, e.g. the rule "mcp__server1"
+ */
+function toolMatchesRule(tool, rule) {
+    // Rule must not have content to match the entire tool
+    if (rule.ruleValue.ruleContent !== undefined) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // MCP tools are matched by their fully qualified mcp__server__tool name. In
+    // skip-prefix mode (CLAUDE_AGENT_SDK_MCP_NO_PREFIX), MCP tools have unprefixed
+    // display names (e.g., "Write") that collide with builtin names; rules targeting
+    // builtins should not match their MCP replacements.
+    const nameForRuleMatch = getToolNameForPermissionCheck(tool);
+    // Direct tool name match
+    if (rule.ruleValue.toolName === nameForRuleMatch) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // MCP server-level permission: rule "mcp__server1" matches tool "mcp__server1__tool1"
+    // Also supports wildcard: rule "mcp__server1__*" matches all tools from server1
+    const ruleInfo = mcpInfoFromString(rule.ruleValue.toolName);
+    const toolInfo = mcpInfoFromString(nameForRuleMatch);
+    return (ruleInfo !== null &&
+        toolInfo !== null &&
+        (ruleInfo.toolName === undefined || ruleInfo.toolName === '*') &&
+        ruleInfo.serverName === toolInfo.serverName);
+}
+/**
+ * Check if the entire tool is listed in the always allow rules
+ * For example, this finds "Bash" but not "Bash(prefix:*)" for BashTool
+ */
+export function toolAlwaysAllowedRule(context, tool) {
+    return (getAllowRules(context).find(rule => toolMatchesRule(tool, rule)) || null);
+}
+/**
+ * Check if the tool is listed in the always deny rules
+ */
+export function getDenyRuleForTool(context, tool) {
+    return getDenyRules(context).find(rule => toolMatchesRule(tool, rule)) || null;
+}
+/**
+ * Check if the tool is listed in the always ask rules
+ */
+export function getAskRuleForTool(context, tool) {
+    return getAskRules(context).find(rule => toolMatchesRule(tool, rule)) || null;
+}
+/**
+ * Check if a specific agent is denied via Agent(agentType) syntax.
+ * For example, Agent(Explore) would deny the Explore agent.
+ */
+export function getDenyRuleForAgent(context, agentToolName, agentType) {
+    return (getDenyRules(context).find(rule => rule.ruleValue.toolName === agentToolName &&
+        rule.ruleValue.ruleContent === agentType) || null);
+}
+/**
+ * Filter agents to exclude those that are denied via Agent(agentType) syntax.
+ */
+export function filterDeniedAgents(agents, context, agentToolName) {
+    // Parse deny rules once and collect Agent(x) contents into a Set.
+    // Previously this called getDenyRuleForAgent per agent, which re-parsed
+    // every deny rule for every agent (O(agents×rules) parse calls).
+    const deniedAgentTypes = new Set();
+    for (const rule of getDenyRules(context)) {
+        if (rule.ruleValue.toolName === agentToolName &&
+            rule.ruleValue.ruleContent !== undefined) {
+            deniedAgentTypes.add(rule.ruleValue.ruleContent);
+        }
+    }
+    return agents.filter(agent => !deniedAgentTypes.has(agent.agentType));
+}
+/**
+ * Map of rule contents to the associated rule for a given tool.
+ * e.g. the string key is "prefix:*" from "Bash(prefix:*)" for BashTool
+ */
+export function getRuleByContentsForTool(context, tool, behavior) {
+    return getRuleByContentsForToolName(context, getToolNameForPermissionCheck(tool), behavior);
+}
+// Used to break circular dependency where a Tool calls this function
+export function getRuleByContentsForToolName(context, toolName, behavior) {
+    const ruleByContents = new Map();
+    let rules = [];
+    switch (behavior) {
+        case 'allow':
+            rules = getAllowRules(context);
+            break;
+        case 'deny':
+            rules = getDenyRules(context);
+            break;
+        case 'ask':
+            rules = getAskRules(context);
+            break;
+    }
+    for (const rule of rules) {
+        if (rule.ruleValue.toolName === toolName &&
+            rule.ruleValue.ruleContent !== undefined &&
+            rule.ruleBehavior === behavior) {
+            ruleByContents.set(rule.ruleValue.ruleContent, rule);
+        }
+    }
+    return ruleByContents;
+}
+/**
+ * Runs PermissionRequest hooks for headless/async agents that cannot show
+ * permission prompts. This gives hooks an opportunity to allow or deny
+ * tool use before the fallback auto-deny kicks in.
+ *
+ * Returns a PermissionDecision if a hook made a decision, or null if no
+ * hook provided a decision (caller should proceed to auto-deny).
+ */
+async function runPermissionRequestHooksForHeadlessAgent(tool, input, toolUseID, context, permissionMode, suggestions) {
+    try {
+        for await (const hookResult of executePermissionRequestHooks(tool.name, toolUseID, input, context, permissionMode, suggestions, context.abortController.signal)) {
+            if (!hookResult.permissionRequestResult) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            const decision = hookResult.permissionRequestResult;
+            if (decision.behavior === 'allow') {
+                const finalInput = decision.updatedInput ?? input;
+                // Persist permission updates if provided
+                if (decision.updatedPermissions?.length) {
+                    persistPermissionUpdates(decision.updatedPermissions);
+                    context.setAppState(prev => ({
+                        ...prev,
+                        toolPermissionContext: applyPermissionUpdates(prev.toolPermissionContext, decision.updatedPermissions),
+                    }));
+                }
+                return {
+                    behavior: 'allow',
+                    updatedInput: finalInput,
+                    decisionReason: {
+                        type: 'hook',
+                        hookName: 'PermissionRequest',
+                    },
+                };
+            }
+            if (decision.behavior === 'deny') {
+                if (decision.interrupt) {
+                    logForDebugging(`Hook interrupt: tool=${tool.name} hookMessage=${decision.message}`);
+                    context.abortController.abort();
+                }
+                return {
+                    behavior: 'deny',
+                    message: decision.message || 'Permission denied by hook',
+                    decisionReason: {
+                        type: 'hook',
+                        hookName: 'PermissionRequest',
+                        reason: decision.message,
+                    },
+                };
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        // If hooks fail, fall through to auto-deny rather than crashing
+        logError(new Error('PermissionRequest hook failed for headless agent', {
+            cause: toError(error),
+        }));
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+export const hasPermissionsToUseTool = async (tool, input, context, assistantMessage, toolUseID) => {
+    const result = await hasPermissionsToUseToolInner(tool, input, context);
+    // Reset consecutive denials on any allowed tool use in auto mode.
+    // This ensures that a successful tool use (even one auto-allowed by rules)
+    // breaks the consecutive denial streak.
+    if (result.behavior === 'allow') {
+        const appState = context.getAppState();
+        if (feature('TRANSCRIPT_CLASSIFIER')) {
+            const currentDenialState = context.localDenialTracking ?? appState.denialTracking;
+            if (appState.toolPermissionContext.mode === 'auto' &&
+                currentDenialState &&
+                currentDenialState.consecutiveDenials > 0) {
+                const newDenialState = recordSuccess(currentDenialState);
+                persistDenialState(context, newDenialState);
+            }
+        }
+        return result;
+    }
+    // Apply dontAsk mode transformation: convert 'ask' to 'deny'
+    // This is done at the end so it can't be bypassed by early returns
+    if (result.behavior === 'ask') {
+        const appState = context.getAppState();
+        if (appState.toolPermissionContext.mode === 'dontAsk') {
+            return {
+                behavior: 'deny',
+                decisionReason: {
+                    type: 'mode',
+                    mode: 'dontAsk',
+                },
+                message: DONT_ASK_REJECT_MESSAGE(tool.name),
+            };
+        }
+        // Apply auto mode: use AI classifier instead of prompting user
+        // Check this BEFORE shouldAvoidPermissionPrompts so classifiers work in headless mode
+        if (feature('TRANSCRIPT_CLASSIFIER') &&
+            (appState.toolPermissionContext.mode === 'auto' ||
+                (appState.toolPermissionContext.mode === 'plan' &&
+                    (autoModeStateModule?.isAutoModeActive() ?? false)))) {
+            // Non-classifier-approvable safetyCheck decisions stay immune to ALL
+            // auto-approve paths: the acceptEdits fast-path, the safe-tool allowlist,
+            // and the classifier. Step 1g only guards bypassPermissions; this guards
+            // auto. classifierApprovable safetyChecks (sensitive-file paths) fall
+            // through to the classifier — the fast-paths below naturally don't fire
+            // because the tool's own checkPermissions still returns 'ask'.
+            if (result.decisionReason?.type === 'safetyCheck' &&
+                !result.decisionReason.classifierApprovable) {
+                if (appState.toolPermissionContext.shouldAvoidPermissionPrompts) {
+                    return {
+                        behavior: 'deny',
+                        message: result.message,
+                        decisionReason: {
+                            type: 'asyncAgent',
+                            reason: 'Safety check requires interactive approval and permission prompts are not available in this context',
+                        },
+                    };
+                }
+                return result;
+            }
+            if (tool.requiresUserInteraction?.() && result.behavior === 'ask') {
+                return result;
+            }
+            // Use local denial tracking for async subagents (whose setAppState
+            // is a no-op), otherwise read from appState as before.
+            const denialState = context.localDenialTracking ??
+                appState.denialTracking ??
+                createDenialTrackingState();
+            // PowerShell requires explicit user permission in auto mode unless
+            // POWERSHELL_AUTO_MODE (ant-only build flag) is on. When disabled, this
+            // guard keeps PS out of the classifier and skips the acceptEdits
+            // fast-path below. When enabled, PS flows through to the classifier like
+            // Bash — the classifier prompt gets POWERSHELL_DENY_GUIDANCE appended so
+            // it recognizes `iex (iwr ...)` as download-and-execute, etc.
+            // Note: this runs inside the behavior === 'ask' branch, so allow rules
+            // that fire earlier (step 2b toolAlwaysAllowedRule, PS prefix allow)
+            // return before reaching here. Allow-rule protection is handled by
+            // permissionSetup.ts: isOverlyBroadPowerShellAllowRule strips PowerShell(*)
+            // and isDangerousPowerShellPermission strips iex/pwsh/Start-Process
+            // prefix rules for ant users and auto mode entry.
+            if (tool.name === POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME &&
+                !feature('POWERSHELL_AUTO_MODE')) {
+                if (appState.toolPermissionContext.shouldAvoidPermissionPrompts) {
+                    return {
+                        behavior: 'deny',
+                        message: 'PowerShell tool requires interactive approval',
+                        decisionReason: {
+                            type: 'asyncAgent',
+                            reason: 'PowerShell tool requires interactive approval and permission prompts are not available in this context',
+                        },
+                    };
+                }
+                logForDebugging(`Skipping auto mode classifier for ${tool.name}: tool requires explicit user permission`);
+                return result;
+            }
+            // Before running the auto mode classifier, check if acceptEdits mode would
+            // allow this action. This avoids expensive classifier API calls for safe
+            // operations like file edits in the working directory.
+            // Skip for Agent and REPL — their checkPermissions returns 'allow' for
+            // acceptEdits mode, which would silently bypass the classifier. REPL
+            // code can contain VM escapes between inner tool calls; the classifier
+            // must see the glue JavaScript, not just the inner tool calls.
+            if (result.behavior === 'ask' &&
+                tool.name !== AGENT_TOOL_NAME &&
+                tool.name !== REPL_TOOL_NAME) {
+                try {
+                    const parsedInput = tool.inputSchema.parse(input);
+                    const acceptEditsResult = await tool.checkPermissions(parsedInput, {
+                        ...context,
+                        getAppState: () => {
+                            const state = context.getAppState();
+                            return {
+                                ...state,
+                                toolPermissionContext: {
+                                    ...state.toolPermissionContext,
+                                    mode: 'acceptEdits',
+                                },
+                            };
+                        },
+                    });
+                    if (acceptEditsResult.behavior === 'allow') {
+                        const newDenialState = recordSuccess(denialState);
+                        persistDenialState(context, newDenialState);
+                        logForDebugging(`Skipping auto mode classifier for ${tool.name}: would be allowed in acceptEdits mode`);
+                        logEvent('thaddeus_auto_mode_decision', {
+                            decision: 'allowed',
+                            toolName: sanitizeToolNameForAnalytics(tool.name),
+                            inProtectedNamespace: isInProtectedNamespace(),
+                            // msg_id of the agent completion that produced this tool_use —
+                            // the action at the bottom of the classifier transcript. Joins
+                            // the decision back to the main agent's API response.
+                            agentMsgId: assistantMessage.message
+                                .id,
+                            confidence: 'high',
+                            fastPath: 'acceptEdits',
+                        });
+                        return {
+                            behavior: 'allow',
+                            updatedInput: acceptEditsResult.updatedInput ?? input,
+                            decisionReason: {
+                                type: 'mode',
+                                mode: 'auto',
+                            },
+                        };
+                    }
+                }
+                catch (e) {
+                    if (e instanceof AbortError || e instanceof APIUserAbortError) {
+                        throw e;
+                    }
+                    // If the acceptEdits check fails, fall through to the classifier
+                }
+            }
+            // Allowlisted tools are safe and don't need YOLO classification.
+            // This uses the safe-tool allowlist to skip unnecessary classifier API calls.
+            if (classifierDecisionModule.isAutoModeAllowlistedTool(tool.name)) {
+                const newDenialState = recordSuccess(denialState);
+                persistDenialState(context, newDenialState);
+                logForDebugging(`Skipping auto mode classifier for ${tool.name}: tool is on the safe allowlist`);
+                logEvent('thaddeus_auto_mode_decision', {
+                    decision: 'allowed',
+                    toolName: sanitizeToolNameForAnalytics(tool.name),
+                    inProtectedNamespace: isInProtectedNamespace(),
+                    agentMsgId: assistantMessage.message
+                        .id,
+                    confidence: 'high',
+                    fastPath: 'allowlist',
+                });
+                return {
+                    behavior: 'allow',
+                    updatedInput: input,
+                    decisionReason: {
+                        type: 'mode',
+                        mode: 'auto',
+                    },
+                };
+            }
+            // Run the auto mode classifier
+            const action = formatActionForClassifier(tool.name, input);
+            setClassifierChecking(toolUseID);
+            let classifierResult;
+            try {
+                classifierResult = await classifyYoloAction(context.messages, action, context.options.tools, appState.toolPermissionContext, context.abortController.signal);
+            }
+            finally {
+                clearClassifierChecking(toolUseID);
+            }
+            // Notify ants when classifier error dumped prompts (will be in /share)
+            if (process.env.USER_TYPE === 'ant' &&
+                classifierResult.errorDumpPath &&
+                context.addNotification) {
+                context.addNotification({
+                    key: 'auto-mode-error-dump',
+                    text: `Auto mode classifier error — prompts dumped to ${classifierResult.errorDumpPath} (included in /share)`,
+                    priority: 'immediate',
+                    color: 'error',
+                });
+            }
+            // Log classifier decision for metrics (including overhead telemetry)
+            const yoloDecision = classifierResult.unavailable
+                ? 'unavailable'
+                : classifierResult.shouldBlock
+                    ? 'blocked'
+                    : 'allowed';
+            // Compute classifier cost in USD for overhead analysis
+            const classifierCostUSD = classifierResult.usage && classifierResult.model
+                ? calculateCostFromTokens(classifierResult.model, classifierResult.usage)
+                : undefined;
+            logEvent('thaddeus_auto_mode_decision', {
+                decision: yoloDecision,
+                toolName: sanitizeToolNameForAnalytics(tool.name),
+                inProtectedNamespace: isInProtectedNamespace(),
+                // msg_id of the agent completion that produced this tool_use —
+                // the action at the bottom of the classifier transcript.
+                agentMsgId: assistantMessage.message
+                    .id,
+                classifierModel: classifierResult.model,
+                consecutiveDenials: classifierResult.shouldBlock
+                    ? denialState.consecutiveDenials + 1
+                    : 0,
+                totalDenials: classifierResult.shouldBlock
+                    ? denialState.totalDenials + 1
+                    : denialState.totalDenials,
+                // Overhead telemetry: token usage and latency for the classifier API call
+                classifierInputTokens: classifierResult.usage?.inputTokens,
+                classifierOutputTokens: classifierResult.usage?.outputTokens,
+                classifierCacheReadInputTokens: classifierResult.usage?.cacheReadInputTokens,
+                classifierCacheCreationInputTokens: classifierResult.usage?.cacheCreationInputTokens,
+                classifierDurationMs: classifierResult.durationMs,
+                // Character lengths of the prompt components sent to the classifier
+                classifierSystemPromptLength: classifierResult.promptLengths?.systemPrompt,
+                classifierToolCallsLength: classifierResult.promptLengths?.toolCalls,
+                classifierUserPromptsLength: classifierResult.promptLengths?.userPrompts,
+                // Session totals at time of classifier call (for computing overhead %).
+                // These are main-transcript-only — sideQuery (used by the classifier)
+                // does NOT call addToTotalSessionCost, so classifier tokens are excluded.
+                sessionInputTokens: getTotalInputTokens(),
+                sessionOutputTokens: getTotalOutputTokens(),
+                sessionCacheReadInputTokens: getTotalCacheReadInputTokens(),
+                sessionCacheCreationInputTokens: getTotalCacheCreationInputTokens(),
+                classifierCostUSD,
+                classifierStage: classifierResult.stage,
+                classifierStage1InputTokens: classifierResult.stage1Usage?.inputTokens,
+                classifierStage1OutputTokens: classifierResult.stage1Usage?.outputTokens,
+                classifierStage1CacheReadInputTokens: classifierResult.stage1Usage?.cacheReadInputTokens,
+                classifierStage1CacheCreationInputTokens: classifierResult.stage1Usage?.cacheCreationInputTokens,
+                classifierStage1DurationMs: classifierResult.stage1DurationMs,
+                classifierStage1RequestId: classifierResult.stage1RequestId,
+                classifierStage1MsgId: classifierResult.stage1MsgId,
+                classifierStage1CostUSD: classifierResult.stage1Usage && classifierResult.model
+                    ? calculateCostFromTokens(classifierResult.model, classifierResult.stage1Usage)
+                    : undefined,
+                classifierStage2InputTokens: classifierResult.stage2Usage?.inputTokens,
+                classifierStage2OutputTokens: classifierResult.stage2Usage?.outputTokens,
+                classifierStage2CacheReadInputTokens: classifierResult.stage2Usage?.cacheReadInputTokens,
+                classifierStage2CacheCreationInputTokens: classifierResult.stage2Usage?.cacheCreationInputTokens,
+                classifierStage2DurationMs: classifierResult.stage2DurationMs,
+                classifierStage2RequestId: classifierResult.stage2RequestId,
+                classifierStage2MsgId: classifierResult.stage2MsgId,
+                classifierStage2CostUSD: classifierResult.stage2Usage && classifierResult.model
+                    ? calculateCostFromTokens(classifierResult.model, classifierResult.stage2Usage)
+                    : undefined,
+            });
+            if (classifierResult.durationMs !== undefined) {
+                addToTurnClassifierDuration(classifierResult.durationMs);
+            }
+            if (classifierResult.shouldBlock) {
+                // Transcript exceeded the classifier's context window — deterministic
+                // error, won't recover on retry. Skip iron_gate and fall back to
+                // normal prompting so the user can approve/deny manually.
+                if (classifierResult.transcriptTooLong) {
+                    if (appState.toolPermissionContext.shouldAvoidPermissionPrompts) {
+                        // Permanent condition (transcript only grows) — deny-retry-deny
+                        // wastes tokens without ever hitting the denial-limit abort.
+                        throw new AbortError('Agent aborted: auto mode classifier transcript exceeded context window in headless mode');
+                    }
+                    logForDebugging('Auto mode classifier transcript too long, falling back to normal permission handling', { level: 'warn' });
+                    return {
+                        ...result,
+                        decisionReason: {
+                            type: 'other',
+                            reason: 'Auto mode classifier transcript exceeded context window — falling back to manual approval',
+                        },
+                    };
+                }
+                // When classifier is unavailable (API error), behavior depends on
+                // the thaddeus_iron_gate_closed gate.
+                if (classifierResult.unavailable) {
+                    if (getFeatureValue_CACHED_WITH_REFRESH('thaddeus_iron_gate_closed', true, CLASSIFIER_FAIL_CLOSED_REFRESH_MS)) {
+                        logForDebugging('Auto mode classifier unavailable, denying with retry guidance (fail closed)', { level: 'warn' });
+                        return {
+                            behavior: 'deny',
+                            decisionReason: {
+                                type: 'classifier',
+                                classifier: 'auto-mode',
+                                reason: 'Classifier unavailable',
+                            },
+                            message: buildClassifierUnavailableMessage(tool.name, classifierResult.model),
+                        };
+                    }
+                    // Fail open: fall back to normal permission handling
+                    logForDebugging('Auto mode classifier unavailable, falling back to normal permission handling (fail open)', { level: 'warn' });
+                    return result;
+                }
+                // Update denial tracking and check limits
+                const newDenialState = recordDenial(denialState);
+                persistDenialState(context, newDenialState);
+                logForDebugging(`Auto mode classifier blocked action: ${classifierResult.reason}`, { level: 'warn' });
+                // If denial limit hit, fall back to prompting so the user
+                // can review. We check after the classifier so we can include
+                // its reason in the prompt.
+                const denialLimitResult = handleDenialLimitExceeded(newDenialState, appState, classifierResult.reason, assistantMessage, tool, result, context);
+                if (denialLimitResult) {
+                    return denialLimitResult;
+                }
+                return {
+                    behavior: 'deny',
+                    decisionReason: {
+                        type: 'classifier',
+                        classifier: 'auto-mode',
+                        reason: classifierResult.reason,
+                    },
+                    message: buildYoloRejectionMessage(classifierResult.reason),
+                };
+            }
+            // Reset consecutive denials on success
+            const newDenialState = recordSuccess(denialState);
+            persistDenialState(context, newDenialState);
+            return {
+                behavior: 'allow',
+                updatedInput: input,
+                decisionReason: {
+                    type: 'classifier',
+                    classifier: 'auto-mode',
+                    reason: classifierResult.reason,
+                },
+            };
+        }
+        // When permission prompts should be avoided (e.g., background/headless agents),
+        // run PermissionRequest hooks first to give them a chance to allow/deny.
+        // Only auto-deny if no hook provides a decision.
+        if (appState.toolPermissionContext.shouldAvoidPermissionPrompts) {
+            const hookDecision = await runPermissionRequestHooksForHeadlessAgent(tool, input, toolUseID, context, appState.toolPermissionContext.mode, result.suggestions);
+            if (hookDecision) {
+                return hookDecision;
+            }
+            return {
+                behavior: 'deny',
+                decisionReason: {
+                    type: 'asyncAgent',
+                    reason: 'Permission prompts are not available in this context',
+                },
+                message: AUTO_REJECT_MESSAGE(tool.name),
+            };
+        }
+    }
+    return result;
+};
+/**
+ * Persist denial tracking state. For async subagents with localDenialTracking,
+ * mutate the local state in place (since setAppState is a no-op). Otherwise,
+ * write to appState as usual.
+ */
+function persistDenialState(context, newState) {
+    if (context.localDenialTracking) {
+        Object.assign(context.localDenialTracking, newState);
+    }
+    else {
+        context.setAppState(prev => {
+            // recordSuccess returns the same reference when state is
+            // unchanged. Returning prev here lets store.setState's Object.is check
+            // skip the listener loop entirely.
+            if (prev.denialTracking === newState)
+                return prev;
+            return { ...prev, denialTracking: newState };
+        });
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Check if a denial limit was exceeded and return an 'ask' result
+ * so the user can review. Returns null if no limit was hit.
+ */
+function handleDenialLimitExceeded(denialState, appState, classifierReason, assistantMessage, tool, result, context) {
+    if (!shouldFallbackToPrompting(denialState)) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const hitTotalLimit = denialState.totalDenials >= DENIAL_LIMITS.maxTotal;
+    const isHeadless = appState.toolPermissionContext.shouldAvoidPermissionPrompts;
+    // Capture counts before persistDenialState, which may mutate denialState
+    // in-place via Object.assign for subagents with localDenialTracking.
+    const totalCount = denialState.totalDenials;
+    const consecutiveCount = denialState.consecutiveDenials;
+    const warning = hitTotalLimit
+        ? `${totalCount} actions were blocked this session. Please review the transcript before continuing.`
+        : `${consecutiveCount} consecutive actions were blocked. Please review the transcript before continuing.`;
+    logEvent('thaddeus_auto_mode_denial_limit_exceeded', {
+        limit: (hitTotalLimit
+            ? 'total'
+            : 'consecutive'),
+        mode: (isHeadless
+            ? 'headless'
+            : 'cli'),
+        messageID: assistantMessage.message
+            .id,
+        consecutiveDenials: consecutiveCount,
+        totalDenials: totalCount,
+        toolName: sanitizeToolNameForAnalytics(tool.name),
+    });
+    if (isHeadless) {
+        throw new AbortError('Agent aborted: too many classifier denials in headless mode');
+    }
+    logForDebugging(`Classifier denial limit exceeded, falling back to prompting: ${warning}`, { level: 'warn' });
+    if (hitTotalLimit) {
+        persistDenialState(context, {
+            ...denialState,
+            totalDenials: 0,
+            consecutiveDenials: 0,
+        });
+    }
+    // Preserve the original classifier value (e.g. 'dangerous-agent-action')
+    // so downstream analytics in interactiveHandler can log the correct
+    // user override event.
+    const originalClassifier = result.decisionReason?.type === 'classifier'
+        ? result.decisionReason.classifier
+        : 'auto-mode';
+    return {
+        ...result,
+        decisionReason: {
+            type: 'classifier',
+            classifier: originalClassifier,
+            reason: `${warning}\n\nLatest blocked action: ${classifierReason}`,
+        },
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Check only the rule-based steps of the permission pipeline — the subset
+ * that bypassPermissions mode respects (everything that fires before step 2a).
+ *
+ * Returns a deny/ask decision if a rule blocks the tool, or null if no rule
+ * objects. Unlike hasPermissionsToUseTool, this does NOT run the auto mode classifier,
+ * mode-based transformations (dontAsk/auto/asyncAgent), PermissionRequest hooks,
+ * or bypassPermissions / always-allowed checks.
+ *
+ * Caller must pre-check tool.requiresUserInteraction() — step 1e is not replicated.
+ */
+export async function checkRuleBasedPermissions(tool, input, context) {
+    const appState = context.getAppState();
+    // 1a. Entire tool is denied by rule
+    const denyRule = getDenyRuleForTool(appState.toolPermissionContext, tool);
+    if (denyRule) {
+        return {
+            behavior: 'deny',
+            decisionReason: {
+                type: 'rule',
+                rule: denyRule,
+            },
+            message: `Permission to use ${tool.name} has been denied.`,
+        };
+    }
+    // 1b. Entire tool has an ask rule
+    const askRule = getAskRuleForTool(appState.toolPermissionContext, tool);
+    if (askRule) {
+        const canSandboxAutoAllow = tool.name === BASH_TOOL_NAME &&
+            SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() &&
+            SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() &&
+            shouldUseSandbox(input);
+        if (!canSandboxAutoAllow) {
+            return {
+                behavior: 'ask',
+                decisionReason: {
+                    type: 'rule',
+                    rule: askRule,
+                },
+                message: createPermissionRequestMessage(tool.name),
+            };
+        }
+        // Fall through to let tool.checkPermissions handle command-specific rules
+    }
+    // 1c. Tool-specific permission check (e.g. bash subcommand rules)
+    let toolPermissionResult = {
+        behavior: 'passthrough',
+        message: createPermissionRequestMessage(tool.name),
+    };
+    try {
+        const parsedInput = tool.inputSchema.parse(input);
+        toolPermissionResult = await tool.checkPermissions(parsedInput, context);
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        if (e instanceof AbortError || e instanceof APIUserAbortError) {
+            throw e;
+        }
+        logError(e);
+    }
+    // 1d. Tool implementation denied (catches bash subcommand denies wrapped
+    // in subcommandResults — no need to inspect decisionReason.type)
+    if (toolPermissionResult?.behavior === 'deny') {
+        return toolPermissionResult;
+    }
+    // 1f. Content-specific ask rules from tool.checkPermissions
+    // (e.g. Bash(npm publish:*) → {ask, type:'rule', ruleBehavior:'ask'})
+    if (toolPermissionResult?.behavior === 'ask' &&
+        toolPermissionResult.decisionReason?.type === 'rule' &&
+        toolPermissionResult.decisionReason.rule.ruleBehavior === 'ask') {
+        return toolPermissionResult;
+    }
+    // 1g. Safety checks (e.g. .git/, .claude/, .vscode/, shell configs) are
+    // bypass-immune — they must prompt even when a PreToolUse hook returned
+    // allow. checkPathSafetyForAutoEdit returns {type:'safetyCheck'} for these.
+    if (toolPermissionResult?.behavior === 'ask' &&
+        toolPermissionResult.decisionReason?.type === 'safetyCheck') {
+        return toolPermissionResult;
+    }
+    // No rule-based objection
+    return null;
+}
+async function hasPermissionsToUseToolInner(tool, input, context) {
+    if (context.abortController.signal.aborted) {
+        throw new AbortError();
+    }
+    let appState = context.getAppState();
+    // 1. Check if the tool is denied
+    // 1a. Entire tool is denied
+    const denyRule = getDenyRuleForTool(appState.toolPermissionContext, tool);
+    if (denyRule) {
+        return {
+            behavior: 'deny',
+            decisionReason: {
+                type: 'rule',
+                rule: denyRule,
+            },
+            message: `Permission to use ${tool.name} has been denied.`,
+        };
+    }
+    // 1b. Check if the entire tool should always ask for permission
+    const askRule = getAskRuleForTool(appState.toolPermissionContext, tool);
+    if (askRule) {
+        // When autoAllowBashIfSandboxed is on, sandboxed commands skip the ask rule and
+        // auto-allow via Bash's checkPermissions. Commands that won't be sandboxed (excluded
+        // commands, dangerouslyDisableSandbox) still need to respect the ask rule.
+        const canSandboxAutoAllow = tool.name === BASH_TOOL_NAME &&
+            SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() &&
+            SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() &&
+            shouldUseSandbox(input);
+        if (!canSandboxAutoAllow) {
+            return {
+                behavior: 'ask',
+                decisionReason: {
+                    type: 'rule',
+                    rule: askRule,
+                },
+                message: createPermissionRequestMessage(tool.name),
+            };
+        }
+        // Fall through to let Bash's checkPermissions handle command-specific rules
+    }
+    // 1c. Ask the tool implementation for a permission result
+    // Overridden unless tool input schema is not valid
+    let toolPermissionResult = {
+        behavior: 'passthrough',
+        message: createPermissionRequestMessage(tool.name),
+    };
+    try {
+        const parsedInput = tool.inputSchema.parse(input);
+        toolPermissionResult = await tool.checkPermissions(parsedInput, context);
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        // Rethrow abort errors so they propagate properly
+        if (e instanceof AbortError || e instanceof APIUserAbortError) {
+            throw e;
+        }
+        logError(e);
+    }
+    // 1d. Tool implementation denied permission
+    if (toolPermissionResult?.behavior === 'deny') {
+        return toolPermissionResult;
+    }
+    // 1e. Tool requires user interaction even in bypass mode
+    if (tool.requiresUserInteraction?.() &&
+        toolPermissionResult?.behavior === 'ask') {
+        return toolPermissionResult;
+    }
+    // 1f. Content-specific ask rules from tool.checkPermissions take precedence
+    // over bypassPermissions mode. When a user explicitly configures a
+    // content-specific ask rule (e.g. Bash(npm publish:*)), the tool's
+    // checkPermissions returns {behavior:'ask', decisionReason:{type:'rule',
+    // rule:{ruleBehavior:'ask'}}}. This must be respected even in bypass mode,
+    // just as deny rules are respected at step 1d.
+    if (toolPermissionResult?.behavior === 'ask' &&
+        toolPermissionResult.decisionReason?.type === 'rule' &&
+        toolPermissionResult.decisionReason.rule.ruleBehavior === 'ask') {
+        return toolPermissionResult;
+    }
+    // 1g. Safety checks (e.g. .git/, .claude/, .vscode/, shell configs) are
+    // bypass-immune — they must prompt even in bypassPermissions mode.
+    // checkPathSafetyForAutoEdit returns {type:'safetyCheck'} for these paths.
+    if (toolPermissionResult?.behavior === 'ask' &&
+        toolPermissionResult.decisionReason?.type === 'safetyCheck') {
+        return toolPermissionResult;
+    }
+    // 2a. Check if mode allows the tool to run
+    // IMPORTANT: Call getAppState() to get the latest value
+    appState = context.getAppState();
+    // Check if permissions should be bypassed:
+    // - Direct bypassPermissions mode
+    // - Plan mode when the user originally started with bypass mode (isBypassPermissionsModeAvailable)
+    const shouldBypassPermissions = appState.toolPermissionContext.mode === 'bypassPermissions' ||
+        (appState.toolPermissionContext.mode === 'plan' &&
+            appState.toolPermissionContext.isBypassPermissionsModeAvailable);
+    if (shouldBypassPermissions) {
+        return {
+            behavior: 'allow',
+            updatedInput: getUpdatedInputOrFallback(toolPermissionResult, input),
+            decisionReason: {
+                type: 'mode',
+                mode: appState.toolPermissionContext.mode,
+            },
+        };
+    }
+    // 2b. Entire tool is allowed
+    const alwaysAllowedRule = toolAlwaysAllowedRule(appState.toolPermissionContext, tool);
+    if (alwaysAllowedRule) {
+        return {
+            behavior: 'allow',
+            updatedInput: getUpdatedInputOrFallback(toolPermissionResult, input),
+            decisionReason: {
+                type: 'rule',
+                rule: alwaysAllowedRule,
+            },
+        };
+    }
+    // 3. Convert "passthrough" to "ask"
+    const result = toolPermissionResult.behavior === 'passthrough'
+        ? {
+            ...toolPermissionResult,
+            behavior: 'ask',
+            message: createPermissionRequestMessage(tool.name, toolPermissionResult.decisionReason),
+        }
+        : toolPermissionResult;
+    if (result.behavior === 'ask' && result.suggestions) {
+        logForDebugging(`Permission suggestions for ${tool.name}: ${jsonStringify(result.suggestions, null, 2)}`);
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+/**
+ * Delete a permission rule from the appropriate destination
+ */
+export async function deletePermissionRule({ rule, initialContext, setToolPermissionContext, }) {
+    if (rule.source === 'policySettings' ||
+        rule.source === 'flagSettings' ||
+        rule.source === 'command') {
+        throw new Error('Cannot delete permission rules from read-only settings');
+    }
+    const updatedContext = applyPermissionUpdate(initialContext, {
+        type: 'removeRules',
+        rules: [rule.ruleValue],
+        behavior: rule.ruleBehavior,
+        destination: rule.source,
+    });
+    // Per-destination logic to delete the rule from settings
+    const destination = rule.source;
+    switch (destination) {
+        case 'localSettings':
+        case 'userSettings':
+        case 'projectSettings': {
+            // Note: Typescript doesn't know that rule conforms to `PermissionRuleFromEditableSettings` even when we switch on `rule.source`
+            deletePermissionRuleFromSettings(rule);
+            break;
+        }
+        case 'cliArg':
+        case 'session': {
+            // No action needed for in-memory sources - not persisted to disk
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    // Update React state with updated context
+    setToolPermissionContext(updatedContext);
+}
+/**
+ * Helper to convert PermissionRule array to PermissionUpdate array
+ */
+function convertRulesToUpdates(rules, updateType) {
+    // Group rules by source and behavior
+    const grouped = new Map();
+    for (const rule of rules) {
+        const key = `${rule.source}:${rule.ruleBehavior}`;
+        if (!grouped.has(key)) {
+            grouped.set(key, []);
+        }
+        grouped.get(key).push(rule.ruleValue);
+    }
+    // Convert to PermissionUpdate array
+    const updates = [];
+    for (const [key, ruleValues] of grouped) {
+        const [source, behavior] = key.split(':');
+        updates.push({
+            type: updateType,
+            rules: ruleValues,
+            behavior: behavior,
+            destination: source,
+        });
+    }
+    return updates;
+}
+/**
+ * Apply permission rules to context (additive - for initial setup)
+ */
+export function applyPermissionRulesToPermissionContext(toolPermissionContext, rules) {
+    const updates = convertRulesToUpdates(rules, 'addRules');
+    return applyPermissionUpdates(toolPermissionContext, updates);
+}
+/**
+ * Sync permission rules from disk (replacement - for settings changes)
+ */
+export function syncPermissionRulesFromDisk(toolPermissionContext, rules) {
+    let context = toolPermissionContext;
+    // When allowManagedPermissionRulesOnly is enabled, clear all non-policy sources
+    if (shouldAllowManagedPermissionRulesOnly()) {
+        const sourcesToClear = [
+            'userSettings',
+            'projectSettings',
+            'localSettings',
+            'cliArg',
+            'session',
+        ];
+        const behaviors = ['allow', 'deny', 'ask'];
+        for (const source of sourcesToClear) {
+            for (const behavior of behaviors) {
+                context = applyPermissionUpdate(context, {
+                    type: 'replaceRules',
+                    rules: [],
+                    behavior,
+                    destination: source,
+                });
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // Clear all disk-based source:behavior combos before applying new rules.
+    // Without this, removing a rule from settings (e.g. deleting a deny entry)
+    // would leave the old rule in the context because convertRulesToUpdates
+    // only generates replaceRules for source:behavior pairs that have rules —
+    // an empty group produces no update, so stale rules persist.
+    const diskSources = [
+        'userSettings',
+        'projectSettings',
+        'localSettings',
+    ];
+    for (const diskSource of diskSources) {
+        for (const behavior of ['allow', 'deny', 'ask']) {
+            context = applyPermissionUpdate(context, {
+                type: 'replaceRules',
+                rules: [],
+                behavior,
+                destination: diskSource,
+            });
+        }
+    }
+    const updates = convertRulesToUpdates(rules, 'replaceRules');
+    return applyPermissionUpdates(context, updates);
+}
+/**
+ * Extract updatedInput from a permission result, falling back to the original input.
+ * Handles the case where some PermissionResult variants don't have updatedInput.
+ */
+function getUpdatedInputOrFallback(permissionResult, fallback) {
+    return (('updatedInput' in permissionResult
+        ? permissionResult.updatedInput
+        : undefined) ?? fallback);
+}