tenjin-cli 0.1.0-alpha.33 → 0.1.0-alpha.35

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (495) hide show
  1. package/NOTICE.md +110 -0
  2. package/README.md +87 -81
  3. package/dist/{_esm-BIN7VY2L.js → _esm-2KST7HQ7.js} +7 -7
  4. package/dist/alive-5TV22PNF.js +51 -0
  5. package/dist/auth-XI7BJFLW.js +47 -0
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- {"version":3,"sources":["../src/lib/policy.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Spend-policy evaluation, pure and provider-agnostic. The wallet provider layer\n * (lib/wallet/spend.ts) owns the ledger and calls this; a future hosted provider\n * (Privy, B5) reuses the same decision rules, so the knobs live in exactly one\n * place. Nothing here does IO, the caller supplies the already-spent total and\n * decides how to satisfy a `confirm` decision (a `--yes`, a TTY prompt, or a\n * non-interactive refusal).\n */\n\nexport type PaymentMode = 'automatic' | 'manual';\n\nexport interface SpendPolicy {\n /** Automatic per-call ceiling; zero blocks positive automatic payments. */\n maxAutoSpendAtomic: bigint;\n /** Rolling ceiling on automatic exposure. null = no ceiling; zero blocks positive automatic payments. */\n sessionBudgetAtomic: bigint | null;\n /** Creators (handle or 0x-address, lowercased) all payments are restricted to.\n * Empty = no restriction. A non-empty list is a hard gate: a non-member is\n * denied even with `--yes`. */\n allowlistCreators: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface SpendRequest {\n /** Omitted by legacy consumers: conservatively automatic. */\n mode?: PaymentMode;\n amountAtomic: bigint;\n /** Creator identity from the 402 preview / candidate, handle or 0x address. */\n creator: string;\n /** The caller's `--max-price` cap, if given. A hard ceiling, never bypassable. */\n maxPriceAtomic?: bigint;\n /** Cumulative spend already recorded in this rolling session window. */\n sessionSpentAtomic: bigint;\n}\n\n/**\n * `allow`: within policy, proceed silently. `confirm`: an approval is required ,\n * the caller satisfies it with `--yes`, an interactive prompt, or refuses. `deny`:\n * a hard gate blocked it (price cap, allowlist, session budget); NOT satisfiable\n * by `--yes` or a prompt.\n */\nexport type SpendDecision = 'allow' | 'confirm' | 'deny';\n\n/**\n * `duplicate_in_flight` is the one reason this pure evaluator never returns: it\n * is a fact about the ledger (an identical request already holds a reservation\n * in this turn), so the authorizer raises it. It lives in the union because\n * every caller renders a decision's reason from one vocabulary.\n */\nexport type PolicyReason =\n | 'within_policy'\n | 'duplicate_in_flight'\n | 'price_cap_exceeded'\n | 'not_allowlisted'\n | 'session_budget_exceeded'\n | 'above_auto_spend'\n | 'confirm_always';\n\nexport interface PolicyEvaluation {\n decision: SpendDecision;\n reason: PolicyReason;\n message: string;\n}\n\n/** Normalize a creator identity for allowlist comparison (case-insensitive; a\n * word-handle and a 0x address are both single tokens). */\nfunction normCreator(value: string): string {\n return value.trim().toLowerCase();\n}\n\n/** Whether `allowlistCreators` lets this creator be paid: any, when it is empty. */\nfunction allowsCreator(policy: SpendPolicy, creator: string): boolean {\n return (\n policy.allowlistCreators.length === 0 ||\n policy.allowlistCreators.map(normCreator).includes(normCreator(creator))\n );\n}\n\n/** Hard price/creator checks apply in both modes. Manual payments require consent;\n * automatic payments must fit both configured ceilings without prompting. */\nexport function evaluateSpendPolicy(policy: SpendPolicy, req: SpendRequest): PolicyEvaluation {\n if (req.maxPriceAtomic !== undefined && req.amountAtomic > req.maxPriceAtomic) {\n return {\n decision: 'deny',\n reason: 'price_cap_exceeded',\n message: `Price ${req.amountAtomic} exceeds the --max-price cap ${req.maxPriceAtomic}.`,\n };\n }\n\n if (!allowsCreator(policy, req.creator)) {\n return {\n decision: 'deny',\n reason: 'not_allowlisted',\n message: `Creator \"${req.creator}\" is not in allowlistCreators.`,\n };\n }\n\n if (req.mode === 'manual') {\n return req.amountAtomic > 0n\n ? {\n decision: 'confirm',\n reason: 'confirm_always',\n message: 'Manual payment requires explicit consent.',\n }\n : { decision: 'allow', reason: 'within_policy', message: 'No payment required.' };\n }\n\n if (policy.sessionBudgetAtomic !== null) {\n const projected = req.sessionSpentAtomic + req.amountAtomic;\n if (projected > policy.sessionBudgetAtomic) {\n return {\n decision: 'deny',\n reason: 'session_budget_exceeded',\n message: `This spend would bring the session total to ${projected}, over sessionBudget ${policy.sessionBudgetAtomic}.`,\n };\n }\n }\n\n if (req.amountAtomic > policy.maxAutoSpendAtomic) {\n return {\n decision: 'deny',\n reason: 'above_auto_spend',\n message: `Price ${req.amountAtomic} is above maxAutoSpend ${policy.maxAutoSpendAtomic}; automatic payment refused.`,\n };\n }\n\n return { decision: 'allow', reason: 'within_policy', message: 'within spend policy' };\n}\n\n/**\n * WHETHER ONE CALL'S PAYMENTS FIT, AS A WHOLE, before any is signed. Every\n * payee meets the allowlist on its own; their TOTAL meets the session budget\n * with what the window already spent, and `maxAutoSpend`, which is the\n * automatic limit for the whole call however many payments it makes. The\n * first refusal is the answer; each payment still meets the gate when it is\n * signed.\n */\nexport function evaluatePlan(\n policy: SpendPolicy,\n payments: readonly { amountAtomic: bigint; creator: string }[],\n sessionSpentAtomic: bigint,\n): PolicyEvaluation {\n const outside = payments.find((payment) => !allowsCreator(policy, payment.creator));\n if (outside !== undefined) {\n return {\n decision: 'deny',\n reason: 'not_allowlisted',\n message: `Creator \"${outside.creator}\" is not in allowlistCreators.`,\n };\n }\n if (payments.length === 0) {\n return { decision: 'allow', reason: 'within_policy', message: 'No payment required.' };\n }\n return evaluateSpendPolicy(policy, {\n mode: 'automatic',\n amountAtomic: payments.reduce((sum, payment) => sum + payment.amountAtomic, 0n),\n creator: payments[0]!.creator,\n sessionSpentAtomic,\n });\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AAiEA,SAAS,YAAY,OAAuB;AAC1C,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY;AAClC;AAGA,SAAS,cAAc,QAAqB,SAA0B;AACpE,SACE,OAAO,kBAAkB,WAAW,KACpC,OAAO,kBAAkB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC;AAE3E;AAIO,SAAS,oBAAoB,QAAqB,KAAqC;AAC5F,MAAI,IAAI,mBAAmB,UAAa,IAAI,eAAe,IAAI,gBAAgB;AAC7E,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS,SAAS,IAAI,YAAY,gCAAgC,IAAI,cAAc;AAAA,IACtF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACvC,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS,YAAY,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,IAClC;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,IAAI,SAAS,UAAU;AACzB,WAAO,IAAI,eAAe,KACtB;AAAA,MACE,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS;AAAA,IACX,IACA,EAAE,UAAU,SAAS,QAAQ,iBAAiB,SAAS,uBAAuB;AAAA,EACpF;AAEA,MAAI,OAAO,wBAAwB,MAAM;AACvC,UAAM,YAAY,IAAI,qBAAqB,IAAI;AAC/C,QAAI,YAAY,OAAO,qBAAqB;AAC1C,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,QAAQ;AAAA,QACR,SAAS,+CAA+C,SAAS,wBAAwB,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAAA,MACrH;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,IAAI,eAAe,OAAO,oBAAoB;AAChD,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS,SAAS,IAAI,YAAY,0BAA0B,OAAO,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACvF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,UAAU,SAAS,QAAQ,iBAAiB,SAAS,sBAAsB;AACtF;AAUO,SAAS,aACd,QACA,UACA,oBACkB;AAClB,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,cAAc,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC;AAClF,MAAI,YAAY,QAAW;AACzB,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ,OAAO;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,WAAW,GAAG;AACzB,WAAO,EAAE,UAAU,SAAS,QAAQ,iBAAiB,SAAS,uBAAuB;AAAA,EACvF;AACA,SAAO,oBAAoB,QAAQ;AAAA,IACjC,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,cAAc,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE;AAAA,IAC9E,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC,EAAG;AAAA,IACtB;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AACH;","names":[]}
@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
1
- import { createRequire as __tenjinCreateRequire } from 'node:module'; const require = __tenjinCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
2
- import {
3
- AGENT_ID_RE
4
- } from "./chunk-XKESD27X.js";
5
-
6
- // src/hooks/constants.ts
7
- var HARNESS_MS = 5e3;
8
- var MAX_BODY_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
9
- var LOG_TRUNCATE_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
10
- var CONTEXT_MAX = 1e4;
11
-
12
- // src/adapters/error-markers.ts
13
- var ERROR_MARKERS = [
14
- // Test-runner verdicts. Uppercase only, and a whole word.
15
- /\bFAIL\b/,
16
- /AssertionError/,
17
- /\b[1-9]\d* (?:failed|failing|errors?)\b/i,
18
- // `Error:`, `TypeError:`, `ReferenceError:`, `ModuleNotFoundError:` — the
19
- // JS and Python convention of naming the class before the colon — and the
20
- // lowercase `error:` that rustc, gcc, clang, esbuild and git open a
21
- // diagnostic line with. Line-start only: "an error: occurred" mid-sentence
22
- // is prose.
23
- /^[ \t]*(?:\w*Error|error):/m,
24
- /Traceback \(most recent call last\)/,
25
- /ModuleNotFoundError|ImportError:/,
26
- /Cannot find module/i,
27
- // A code the shell or a runner states outright. Never zero.
28
- /exit code [1-9]\d*/i,
29
- // libuv/POSIX codes: unambiguous, and the common real failures.
30
- /\b(?:ENOENT|EADDRINUSE|ECONNREFUSED|EACCES|EPERM)\b/,
31
- // Toolchain-specific prefixes: npm, pnpm, tsc, cargo, go, git.
32
- /^[ \t]*npm ERR!/m,
33
- /ERR_PNPM_/,
34
- /error TS\d+:/,
35
- /^[ \t]*error\[E\d+\]/m,
36
- /^[ \t]*panic:/m,
37
- /^[ \t]*fatal:/m,
38
- /Unhandled(?:PromiseRejection|Rejection)/,
39
- /segmentation fault/i
40
- ];
41
- function hasErrorMarker(text) {
42
- return ERROR_MARKERS.some((re) => re.test(text));
43
- }
44
-
45
- // src/adapters/codex-wire.ts
46
- var NATIVE_TO_EVENT = {
47
- SessionStart: "session.start",
48
- UserPromptSubmit: "prompt",
49
- PreToolUse: "tool.before",
50
- PostToolUse: "tool.after",
51
- SubagentStart: "agent.start",
52
- SubagentStop: "agent.stop",
53
- Stop: "turn.end"
54
- };
55
- var SHELL_TOOL = "Bash";
56
- var PATCH_TOOL = "apply_patch";
57
- var BLOCK_EVENTS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["turn.end", "agent.stop"]);
58
- function isRecord(v) {
59
- return typeof v === "object" && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
60
- }
61
- function str(v) {
62
- return typeof v === "string" ? v : void 0;
63
- }
64
- var PATCH_PATH_RE = /^\*\*\* (?:Add File|Update File|Delete File|Move to): (.+)$/;
65
- function patchPaths(patch) {
66
- const out = [];
67
- for (const line of patch.split("\n")) {
68
- const m = PATCH_PATH_RE.exec(line.trimEnd());
69
- const path = m?.[1]?.trim();
70
- if (path !== void 0 && path.length > 0 && !out.includes(path)) out.push(path);
71
- }
72
- return out;
73
- }
74
- function canonicalTool(name, input) {
75
- if (name === SHELL_TOOL) return { name, kind: "shell", command: str(input.command) ?? "" };
76
- if (name === PATCH_TOOL)
77
- return { name, kind: "edit", paths: patchPaths(str(input.command) ?? "") };
78
- if (name === "webrun") {
79
- const queries = input.search_query;
80
- if (Object.keys(input).every((key) => key === "search_query" || key === "response_length") && Array.isArray(queries) && queries.length === 1 && isRecord(queries[0]) && Object.keys(queries[0]).every((key) => key === "q") && typeof queries[0].q === "string" && queries[0].q.trim().length > 0) {
81
- return { name, kind: "web", query: queries[0].q };
82
- }
83
- }
84
- return { name, kind: "other" };
85
- }
86
- var HTTP_URL_RE = /^https?:\/\//i;
87
- var plainSearch = (v) => isRecord(v) && Object.keys(v).every((key) => key === "q") && typeof v.q === "string" && v.q.trim().length > 0;
88
- var urlOpen = (v) => isRecord(v) && typeof v.ref_id === "string" && HTTP_URL_RE.test(v.ref_id.trim());
89
- function splitWebrun(input) {
90
- const searches = Array.isArray(input.search_query) ? input.search_query : [];
91
- const opens = Array.isArray(input.open) ? input.open : [];
92
- const s = searches.findIndex(plainSearch);
93
- const o = s === -1 ? opens.findIndex((v) => urlOpen(v) && Object.keys(v).every((k) => k === "ref_id")) : -1;
94
- if (s === -1 && o === -1) return null;
95
- const key = s !== -1 ? "search_query" : "open";
96
- const index = s !== -1 ? s : o;
97
- const entry = s !== -1 ? { tool: "WebSearch", query: searches[s].q } : { tool: "WebFetch", url: opens[o].ref_id.trim() };
98
- const rest = { ...input };
99
- const left = (s !== -1 ? searches : opens).filter((_, i) => i !== index);
100
- if (left.length === 0) delete rest[key];
101
- else rest[key] = left;
102
- const others = [
103
- ...searches.flatMap(
104
- (v, i) => key === "search_query" && i === index ? [] : isRecord(v) && typeof v.q === "string" && v.q.trim().length > 0 ? [{ tool: "WebSearch", query: v.q }] : []
105
- ),
106
- ...opens.flatMap(
107
- (v, i) => key === "open" && i === index || !urlOpen(v) ? [] : [{ tool: "WebFetch", url: v.ref_id.trim() }]
108
- )
109
- ];
110
- const operations = Object.keys(rest).filter((k) => k !== "response_length");
111
- return { entry, rest: operations.length === 0 ? null : rest, targets: [entry, ...others] };
112
- }
113
- function decode(raw) {
114
- if (!isRecord(raw)) return null;
115
- const native = str(raw.hook_event_name);
116
- if (native === void 0) return null;
117
- const event = NATIVE_TO_EVENT[native];
118
- if (event === void 0) return null;
119
- const session = str(raw.session_id);
120
- if (session === void 0 || session.length === 0) return null;
121
- const input = {
122
- harness: "codex",
123
- event,
124
- native: { event: native },
125
- session,
126
- cwd: str(raw.cwd) ?? "",
127
- raw
128
- };
129
- if (raw.agent_id !== void 0 && raw.agent_id !== null) {
130
- const id = raw.agent_id;
131
- if (typeof id !== "string" || !AGENT_ID_RE.test(id)) return null;
132
- input.agent = id;
133
- }
134
- const turn = str(raw.turn_id);
135
- if (turn !== void 0) input.turn = turn;
136
- const prompt = str(raw.prompt);
137
- if (prompt !== void 0) input.prompt = prompt;
138
- const agentType = str(raw.agent_type);
139
- if (agentType !== void 0) input.agentType = agentType;
140
- const lastMessage = str(raw.last_assistant_message);
141
- if (lastMessage !== void 0) input.lastMessage = lastMessage;
142
- if (typeof raw.stop_hook_active === "boolean") input.stopFuse = raw.stop_hook_active;
143
- const source = str(raw.source);
144
- if (source !== void 0) input.source = source;
145
- const path = str(raw.transcript_path);
146
- const agentPath = str(raw.agent_transcript_path);
147
- if (path !== void 0 || agentPath !== void 0) {
148
- input.transcript = {};
149
- if (path !== void 0) input.transcript.path = path;
150
- if (agentPath !== void 0) input.transcript.agentPath = agentPath;
151
- }
152
- if (event === "tool.before" || event === "tool.after") {
153
- const name = str(raw.tool_name) ?? "";
154
- const tool = canonicalTool(name, isRecord(raw.tool_input) ? raw.tool_input : {});
155
- const callId = str(raw.tool_use_id);
156
- if (callId !== void 0) tool.callId = callId;
157
- if (event === "tool.after") {
158
- const blocks = Array.isArray(raw.tool_response) ? raw.tool_response : void 0;
159
- const text = str(raw.tool_response) ?? (blocks?.every((b) => isRecord(b) && b.type === "input_text" && typeof b.text === "string") ? blocks.map((b) => String(b.text)).join("\n") : void 0);
160
- if (text !== void 0) tool.result = { text };
161
- if (tool.kind === "shell" && text !== void 0 && hasErrorMarker(text)) tool.ok = false;
162
- }
163
- input.tool = tool;
164
- }
165
- return input;
166
- }
167
- function encode(emit, input) {
168
- if (emit === null || emit.context === void 0 || emit.context.length === 0) return null;
169
- const text = emit.context.slice(0, CONTEXT_MAX);
170
- if (BLOCK_EVENTS.has(input.event)) return { decision: "block", reason: text };
171
- return { hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: input.native.event, additionalContext: text } };
172
- }
173
-
174
- export {
175
- HARNESS_MS,
176
- CONTEXT_MAX,
177
- hasErrorMarker,
178
- SHELL_TOOL,
179
- PATCH_TOOL,
180
- splitWebrun,
181
- decode,
182
- encode
183
- };
184
- //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-3623BLPV.js.map
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
1
- {"version":3,"sources":["../src/hooks/constants.ts","../src/adapters/error-markers.ts","../src/adapters/codex-wire.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * THE KERNEL'S bounds: every number the lifecycle, the store, the daemon and the\n * shim use that is not one of the two config knobs (`loop.human_wait_ms`,\n * `loop.tool_wait_ms`), each with the reason it is a constant\n * (tenjin-notes loop-redesign/02-redesign.md §7).\n *\n * AN ARM's own bounds are not here and must not be moved here: they are evidence\n * about one arm's input — a prompt's junk rules, the head a skipped row stores,\n * the shelf's own query bound — and each is only readable next to the code and\n * the measurement that justifies it. They live in `hooks/question.ts`,\n * `hooks/text.ts`, `hooks/legs/shelf.ts` and the arm files, and every one\n * carries its reason there the way these do here.\n */\n\n/** Left on every fetch so the response can be encoded and flushed before the\n * fire's own deadline lands. */\nexport const RESERVE_MS = 150;\n\n/** The gap between a fire's deadline and the harness's own kill: encode, socket\n * write, and the harness's parse. */\nexport const SLACK_MS = 500;\n\n/**\n * The harness timeout `install` stamps on every entry, in ms. A backstop only:\n * the fire's own deadline (2500 or 4000) always lands first, and a hung daemon\n * costs a session this much per fire, never a stuck turn. Derived:\n * `tool_wait_ms + SLACK_MS = 4500 -> 5 s`.\n */\nexport const HARNESS_MS = 5000;\n\n/**\n * How long the shim polls `/health` after spawning a daemon. A minimal daemon\n * measured 75 to 120 ms cold on this laptop (03-decisions.md, \"Measured\"); the\n * smoke test re-measures the real bundle against this number.\n */\nexport const SPAWN_MS = 500;\n\n/** The shim's `GET /health` budget. Loopback answers in 1 to 2 ms; anything\n * slower is a daemon mid-exit or a foreign listener. */\nexport const HEALTH_MS = 200;\n\n/**\n * After a spawn that never became healthy, no shim spawns again for this long.\n * A corrupt `loop.db` or a half-written bundle must not cost every prompt a\n * spawn plus `SPAWN_MS`. The record is the mtime of an empty `daemon.spawn`\n * file; `tenjin doctor` reads it (PR E).\n */\nexport const SPAWN_BACKOFF_MS = 60_000;\n\n/** Ledger rows older than this are deleted at the daemon's idle exit. Matches\n * Claude Code's own transcript sweep default. */\nexport const RETENTION_DAYS = 30;\n\n/** And past this many `fires` rows the oldest go regardless of age: a bound for\n * a team on default-on, not for one laptop. */\nexport const FIRES_ROW_CAP = 50_000;\n\n/** Retention runs in batches of this many rows: node 24's `node:sqlite` lacks\n * `DELETE ... LIMIT`, so it is `WHERE id IN (SELECT ... LIMIT n)` looped. */\nexport const RETENTION_BATCH = 500;\n\n/** Retention at idle exit stops after this long so a successor daemon is never\n * refused the port for longer than a shim will wait. */\nexport const RETENTION_MAX_MS = 5000;\n\n/** A request handler whose synchronous span exceeds this logs a warning: the\n * daemon serves every session on the machine from one loop. */\nexport const IDLE_SYNC_WARN_MS = 20;\n\n/** Largest hook body the daemon reads. A `tool_response` or\n * `last_assistant_message` past this is 413 and a log line. */\nexport const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;\n\n/** `daemon.log` is truncated at daemon start once it passes this. No rotation:\n * the idle exit bounds a log's lifetime already. */\nexport const LOG_TRUNCATE_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024;\n\n/** After the idle timer fires this much later than armed, the laptop slept:\n * re-arm for {@link SLEEP_REARM_MS} instead of exiting under a resumed turn. */\nexport const SLEEP_GRACE_MS = 60_000;\nexport const SLEEP_REARM_MS = 120_000;\n\n/** The daemon's `busy_timeout`: the CLI writes `loop.db` rarely and briefly, so\n * a busy wait this long only ever happens at a CLI write's tail. */\nexport const DAEMON_BUSY_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;\n\n/** `server.requestTimeout` and `headersTimeout` for the daemon's listener. */\nexport const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\nexport const HEADERS_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;\n\n/** The derived port range: `30000 + hash % 2000` sits below Linux's default\n * ephemeral range (32768+) and below macOS/Windows's (49152+), so a transient\n * outbound socket can never squat it. */\nexport const PORT_BASE = 30_000;\nexport const PORT_SPAN = 2000;\n\n/** Claude Code caps `additionalContext` here; both encoders slice their context to it. */\nexport const CONTEXT_MAX = 10_000;\n\n/** How long `tenjin daemon stop` waits after SIGTERM before SIGKILL. */\nexport const STOP_GRACE_MS = 3000;\n","/**\n * What a Bash `PostToolUse` has to print to count as a failure\n * (13-pr-d-local-arms.md, decision 9). Claude Code raises `PostToolUseFailure`\n * only when the tool itself fails; a command that exits non-zero inside a pipe,\n * or a runner that prints its verdict and exits zero, arrives as a plain\n * `PostToolUse`. So the adapter scans stdout and stderr for a marker a real\n * toolchain emits, and `decode` sets `tool.ok` from it — the arm never reads\n * text to decide.\n *\n * Case-sensitive where the case IS the signal: `FAIL` is a vitest/jest/pytest\n * verdict, `fail` and `failed` are prose. The anchored patterns carry `m` so\n * they work on a whole stdout blob, and leading indentation is allowed because\n * runners indent their own output.\n */\nexport const ERROR_MARKERS: readonly RegExp[] = [\n // Test-runner verdicts. Uppercase only, and a whole word.\n /\\bFAIL\\b/,\n /AssertionError/,\n /\\b[1-9]\\d* (?:failed|failing|errors?)\\b/i,\n // `Error:`, `TypeError:`, `ReferenceError:`, `ModuleNotFoundError:` — the\n // JS and Python convention of naming the class before the colon — and the\n // lowercase `error:` that rustc, gcc, clang, esbuild and git open a\n // diagnostic line with. Line-start only: \"an error: occurred\" mid-sentence\n // is prose.\n /^[ \\t]*(?:\\w*Error|error):/m,\n /Traceback \\(most recent call last\\)/,\n /ModuleNotFoundError|ImportError:/,\n /Cannot find module/i,\n // A code the shell or a runner states outright. Never zero.\n /exit code [1-9]\\d*/i,\n // libuv/POSIX codes: unambiguous, and the common real failures.\n /\\b(?:ENOENT|EADDRINUSE|ECONNREFUSED|EACCES|EPERM)\\b/,\n // Toolchain-specific prefixes: npm, pnpm, tsc, cargo, go, git.\n /^[ \\t]*npm ERR!/m,\n /ERR_PNPM_/,\n /error TS\\d+:/,\n /^[ \\t]*error\\[E\\d+\\]/m,\n /^[ \\t]*panic:/m,\n /^[ \\t]*fatal:/m,\n /Unhandled(?:PromiseRejection|Rejection)/,\n /segmentation fault/i,\n];\n\n/** Whether `text` carries any marker above. The whole output, no bound: the\n * body is already bounded by the daemon's request cap and each pattern is one\n * linear scan. */\nexport function hasErrorMarker(text: string): boolean {\n return ERROR_MARKERS.some((re) => re.test(text));\n}\n","import { AGENT_ID_RE } from '../lib/grade';\nimport { CONTEXT_MAX } from '../hooks/constants';\nimport { hasErrorMarker } from './error-markers';\nimport type { Emit, Event, HookInput, HookTool } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Codex CLI as a harness. Every mapping here is backed by a payload the\n * installed `codex-cli 0.153.4` sent (`fixtures/codex/README.md`, captured\n * 2026-09-08); the schema source is openai/codex at `rust-v0.153.4`.\n *\n * What is NOT mapped, on purpose: the spawn tool (`collaborationspawn_agent`)\n * carries its task as opaque ciphertext, so there is no work order to look up\n * and no dispatch handoff; a shell PostToolUse carries no exit status, so a\n * failure is known only from an error marker and success is never known; the\n * web tool (`webrun`) maps to `web` only as one plain search, while the router\n * reads any `webrun` call through {@link splitWebrun}.\n * Other web operations stay `other`; unknown versions are reported by doctor,\n * not used to disable otherwise valid web events.\n */\n\nconst NATIVE_TO_EVENT: Record<string, Event> = {\n SessionStart: 'session.start',\n UserPromptSubmit: 'prompt',\n PreToolUse: 'tool.before',\n PostToolUse: 'tool.after',\n SubagentStart: 'agent.start',\n SubagentStop: 'agent.stop',\n Stop: 'turn.end',\n};\n\n/** The hook-facing tool names, spelled once for the decoder and the matchers. */\nexport const SHELL_TOOL = 'Bash';\nexport const PATCH_TOOL = 'apply_patch';\n\n/** The events whose only continuation is `decision: block`: their response\n * schema has no `hookSpecificOutput` at all (schema.rs, StopCommandOutputWire). */\nconst BLOCK_EVENTS: ReadonlySet<Event> = new Set<Event>(['turn.end', 'agent.stop']);\n\nfunction isRecord(v: unknown): v is Record<string, unknown> {\n return typeof v === 'object' && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);\n}\n\nfunction str(v: unknown): string | undefined {\n return typeof v === 'string' ? v : undefined;\n}\n\n/** `*** Add File: p`, `*** Update File: p`, `*** Delete File: p`, `*** Move to: q`. */\nconst PATCH_PATH_RE = /^\\*\\*\\* (?:Add File|Update File|Delete File|Move to): (.+)$/;\n\n/**\n * Every path an apply_patch names, in order, once each. The patch grammar is\n * the tool's own (apply-patch/src/parser.rs); a rename names both its source\n * and its target, because both were attempted work.\n */\nexport function patchPaths(patch: string): string[] {\n const out: string[] = [];\n for (const line of patch.split('\\n')) {\n const m = PATCH_PATH_RE.exec(line.trimEnd());\n const path = m?.[1]?.trim();\n if (path !== undefined && path.length > 0 && !out.includes(path)) out.push(path);\n }\n return out;\n}\n\nfunction canonicalTool(name: string, input: Record<string, unknown>): HookTool {\n if (name === SHELL_TOOL) return { name, kind: 'shell', command: str(input.command) ?? '' };\n if (name === PATCH_TOOL)\n return { name, kind: 'edit', paths: patchPaths(str(input.command) ?? '') };\n if (name === 'webrun') {\n const queries = input.search_query;\n // One complete, unfiltered operation only. Never deny a batch after\n // replacing its first member, or discard another operation/filter.\n if (\n Object.keys(input).every((key) => key === 'search_query' || key === 'response_length') &&\n Array.isArray(queries) &&\n queries.length === 1 &&\n isRecord(queries[0]) &&\n Object.keys(queries[0]).every((key) => key === 'q') &&\n typeof queries[0].q === 'string' &&\n queries[0].q.trim().length > 0\n ) {\n return { name, kind: 'web', query: queries[0].q };\n }\n }\n return { name, kind: 'other' };\n}\n\n/** One search or one page open, as the router weighs it. */\nexport type WebrunEntry = { tool: 'WebSearch'; query: string } | { tool: 'WebFetch'; url: string };\n\n/**\n * A `webrun` call as the router reads it: the one entry it weighs, the exact\n * rest of the call, and every search and URL in it.\n */\nexport interface WebrunSplit {\n entry: WebrunEntry;\n /** The input without the entry, filters and all; null when no operation remains. */\n rest: Record<string, unknown> | null;\n /** Every search and URL in the call, the entry first. */\n targets: WebrunEntry[];\n}\n\nconst HTTP_URL_RE = /^https?:\\/\\//i;\n\nconst plainSearch = (v: unknown): v is { q: string } =>\n isRecord(v) &&\n Object.keys(v).every((key) => key === 'q') &&\n typeof v.q === 'string' &&\n v.q.trim().length > 0;\n\nconst urlOpen = (v: unknown): v is { ref_id: string } =>\n isRecord(v) && typeof v.ref_id === 'string' && HTTP_URL_RE.test(v.ref_id.trim());\n\n/**\n * Pure. The entry is the first search that is only `q`, else the first open of\n * an http(s) URL with no `lineno`; null when the call holds neither. The rest\n * is the input minus that one entry, so entry plus rest is the whole call.\n */\nexport function splitWebrun(input: Record<string, unknown>): WebrunSplit | null {\n const searches = Array.isArray(input.search_query) ? (input.search_query as unknown[]) : [];\n const opens = Array.isArray(input.open) ? (input.open as unknown[]) : [];\n const s = searches.findIndex(plainSearch);\n const o =\n s === -1\n ? opens.findIndex((v) => urlOpen(v) && Object.keys(v as object).every((k) => k === 'ref_id'))\n : -1;\n if (s === -1 && o === -1) return null;\n const key = s !== -1 ? 'search_query' : 'open';\n const index = s !== -1 ? s : o;\n const entry: WebrunEntry =\n s !== -1\n ? { tool: 'WebSearch', query: (searches[s] as { q: string }).q }\n : { tool: 'WebFetch', url: (opens[o] as { ref_id: string }).ref_id.trim() };\n const rest: Record<string, unknown> = { ...input };\n const left = (s !== -1 ? searches : opens).filter((_, i) => i !== index);\n if (left.length === 0) delete rest[key];\n else rest[key] = left;\n const others: WebrunEntry[] = [\n ...searches.flatMap((v, i): WebrunEntry[] =>\n key === 'search_query' && i === index\n ? []\n : isRecord(v) && typeof v.q === 'string' && v.q.trim().length > 0\n ? [{ tool: 'WebSearch', query: v.q }]\n : [],\n ),\n ...opens.flatMap((v, i): WebrunEntry[] =>\n (key === 'open' && i === index) || !urlOpen(v)\n ? []\n : [{ tool: 'WebFetch', url: v.ref_id.trim() }],\n ),\n ];\n const operations = Object.keys(rest).filter((k) => k !== 'response_length');\n return { entry, rest: operations.length === 0 ? null : rest, targets: [entry, ...others] };\n}\n\n/**\n * Pure. Returns null for an unknown event, a missing session, or an `agent_id`\n * that is present but fails `AGENT_ID_RE`, exactly as the Claude adapter does:\n * a child this build cannot name is dropped rather than filed under the lead.\n */\nexport function decode(raw: unknown): HookInput | null {\n if (!isRecord(raw)) return null;\n const native = str(raw.hook_event_name);\n if (native === undefined) return null;\n const event = NATIVE_TO_EVENT[native];\n if (event === undefined) return null;\n const session = str(raw.session_id);\n if (session === undefined || session.length === 0) return null;\n\n const input: HookInput = {\n harness: 'codex',\n event,\n native: { event: native },\n session,\n cwd: str(raw.cwd) ?? 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- {"version":3,"sources":["../src/lib/client-meta.ts","../src/lib/http.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import pkg from '../../package.json';\nimport { PRODUCTION_ORIGIN } from './production-origin';\n\n/**\n * The RFC 9110 product token naming this CLI. It leads every User-Agent the\n * shared transport sends, because the server's `parseUserAgentProduct()` (tenjin\n * PR #544) attributes on the FIRST product only and the CLI is the user agent\n * that constructed and sent the request.\n */\nexport const TENJIN_PRODUCT = `tenjin-cli/${pkg.version}`;\n\n/** The product NAME alone, which is what identifies a copy of us in a handoff. */\nexport const TENJIN_PRODUCT_NAME = 'tenjin-cli';\n\n/**\n * The product the WebSearch hook leads with, so a ridealong query is separable\n * from a deliberate `tenjin search`. Leading is the mechanism: the server\n * attributes on the FIRST User-Agent product, landing here in `client_name`.\n *\n * The separation is the deliverable, not any one consumer: whatever judges hook\n * demand needs these populations distinguishable at ingest (tenjin#704,\n * tenjin-agent#179). A rename breaks no filter today, it merges them again. */\nexport const WEBSEARCH_HOOK_PRODUCT_NAME = 'tenjin-websearch-hook';\nexport const WEBSEARCH_HOOK_PRODUCT = `${WEBSEARCH_HOOK_PRODUCT_NAME}/${pkg.version}`;\n\n/** Every identity of ours a handoff may carry, which composition drops rather\n * than duplicate, whichever product is leading. */\nexport const OWN_PRODUCT_NAMES = [TENJIN_PRODUCT_NAME, WEBSEARCH_HOOK_PRODUCT_NAME];\n\n/**\n * The identifying comment. It rides LAST so a caller's products keep the order\n * they were handed off in, and so stripping it is enough to recover the caller's\n * sequence from an already-composed field (see `composeUserAgent`).\n */\nexport const TENJIN_COMMENT = `(+${PRODUCTION_ORIGIN})`;\n\n/**\n * The CLI's identity on every HTTP request, sent as the standard `User-Agent`\n * header from the shared transport (`http.ts`). `X-Tenjin-Client` is retired and\n * this CLI sends it nowhere.\n */\nexport const TENJIN_USER_AGENT = `${TENJIN_PRODUCT} ${TENJIN_COMMENT}`;\n\n/** The same field for the WebSearch hook, which identifies as its own product. */\nexport const WEBSEARCH_HOOK_USER_AGENT = `${WEBSEARCH_HOOK_PRODUCT} ${TENJIN_COMMENT}`;\n\n/** The handoff seam for an agent that launches the CLI as a subprocess. */\nexport const CALLER_USER_AGENT_ENV = 'TENJIN_CALLER_USER_AGENT';\n\n/** The server's bound: a longer field is discarded whole, never truncated. */\nexport const USER_AGENT_MAX_LENGTH = 512;\n\n/**\n * One RFC 9110 product: a token, optionally `/token`. The handoff accepts a\n * sequence of these and nothing else (no comments, no free text), which is what\n * structurally keeps a user, wallet, session, hostname, or machine identifier\n * out of the field rather than a blocklist that has to guess at one.\n */\nexport const PRODUCT_RE = /^[!#$%&'*+.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z-]+(?:\\/[!#$%&'*+.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z-]+)?$/;\n\n/** Printable ASCII, the only range the server parses; also excludes CR/LF/tab. */\nexport const PRINTABLE_ASCII_RE = /^[\\x20-\\x7e]*$/;\n\nexport interface ComposeUserAgentInput {\n /** A caller's product sequence, passed programmatically; wins over the env. */\n caller?: string | undefined;\n /** Environment seam; defaults to `process.env`. */\n env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n /** The product to lead with; the WebSearch hook passes its own. */\n product?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compose the field the transport sends: the Tenjin product, then the caller's\n * products in their original order, then the Tenjin comment. The handoff is\n * SELF-REPORTED TELEMETRY and never trusted policy input; nothing here or on the\n * server may read it to decide entitlement, spend, or trust.\n *\n * Idempotent by construction: the caller value is decomposed into tokens, our own\n * product and comment are dropped from it, and the field is rebuilt from\n * `TENJIN_PRODUCT`, so re-composing an already-composed field (a retry, a nested\n * helper, an agent re-exporting the env it received) yields the same string\n * rather than a second `tenjin-cli` token. Caller products survive byte for byte.\n *\n * Rejection is total, never partial: a non-printable, non-product, or overlong\n * handoff is OMITTED and the Tenjin identity travels alone, because truncating a\n * product token would mint a different, false identity.\n */\nexport function composeUserAgent(input: ComposeUserAgentInput = {}): string {\n const product = input.product ?? TENJIN_PRODUCT;\n const alone = `${product} ${TENJIN_COMMENT}`;\n const raw = input.caller ?? (input.env ?? process.env)[CALLER_USER_AGENT_ENV];\n const products = callerProducts(raw);\n if (products.length === 0) return alone;\n const composed = `${product} ${products.join(' ')} ${TENJIN_COMMENT}`;\n return composed.length <= USER_AGENT_MAX_LENGTH ? composed : alone;\n}\n\n/** The caller's products, or none at all when any part of the handoff is unusable. */\nfunction callerProducts(raw: string | undefined): string[] {\n if (raw === undefined || !PRINTABLE_ASCII_RE.test(raw)) return [];\n // Printable ASCII leaves the space as the only whitespace, so it is the only\n // separator a product sequence can have.\n const tokens = raw.split(' ').filter((token) => token.length > 0 && !isOwnIdentity(token));\n return tokens.every((token) => PRODUCT_RE.test(token)) ? tokens : [];\n}\n\n/**\n * Our own identity inside a caller value, matched case-insensitively: a product\n * token is case-sensitive to the server, but a copy of ours in any casing is\n * still a duplicate identity, and dropping it is what makes composition total.\n */\nfunction isOwnIdentity(token: string): boolean {\n const lower = token.toLowerCase();\n // Both sides are lowered: comparing a lowered token against a constant that is\n // merely all-lowercase TODAY would break silently the day either gains a\n // capital, and it fails safe (the stale copy stops matching, then fails\n // PRODUCT_RE, and the whole handoff drops), so nothing would notice.\n if (lower === TENJIN_COMMENT.toLowerCase()) return true;\n return OWN_PRODUCT_NAMES.some((name) => {\n const own = name.toLowerCase();\n return lower === own || lower.startsWith(`${own}/`);\n });\n}\n","import { CliError } from './errors';\nimport { composeUserAgent } from './client-meta';\n\n/**\n * The single JSON client the whole CLI grows on: `doctor` uses it in B1, `search`\n * reuses it in B2. It never throws on a transport/protocol failure — it returns a\n * discriminated result so callers decide how each failure class maps to a check\n * or an error. `fetchImpl` is injectable so tests never touch the network.\n */\nexport interface FetchJsonOptions {\n /** Abort the request after this many milliseconds. */\n timeoutMs: number;\n /** Override global fetch (tests inject a stub returning canned Responses). */\n fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;\n /** Optional request headers, merged onto the User-Agent this module always sends. */\n headers?: Record<string, string>;\n /** The team shelf's bypass secret and its origin; see {@link ShelfBypass}. */\n bypass?: ShelfBypass;\n /**\n * INTERNAL. A caller's own product sequence, composed BEHIND the CLI's\n * identity (see `composeUserAgent`). The package ships a `bin` and no\n * `exports` map, so this is not a supported seam for code outside this repo:\n * the documented handoff is the `TENJIN_CALLER_USER_AGENT` environment\n * variable, which is what a subprocess launcher sets and what this falls back\n * to. Kept as an option so an in-repo caller can pass a value the environment\n * does not carry.\n */\n callerUserAgent?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The team shelf's Vercel \"Protection Bypass for Automation\" header.\n *\n * A door key for a protected preview deployment, not a credential of anyone's:\n * it gets a request past Deployment Protection and authenticates nobody. It is\n * NOT in {@link CREDENTIAL_HEADERS}, whose members are wallet-signed material a\n * redirect target could REPLAY — this one cannot be replayed into a signature.\n * It is still a secret, and DISCLOSING it is the whole harm: whoever holds it\n * walks into the team shelf. So it pins redirects exactly as a signed header\n * does (see {@link carriesBypassKey}), and where it may go is decided here and\n * nowhere else.\n */\nexport const SHELF_BYPASS_HEADER = 'x-vercel-protection-bypass';\n\n/**\n * A bypass secret and the origin it belongs to.\n *\n * THE ORIGIN IS PART OF THE VALUE, and that is the whole design. The CLI talks\n * to two shelves in team mode — the team's own deployment and the public\n * marketplace — and a caller that decides \"this request is to the team shelf, so\n * attach the key\" is a caller that eventually gets it wrong once. So callers\n * pass the pair and this transport does the compare: the header is attached from\n * the REQUEST URL, so a request to any other host cannot carry it, whatever the\n * call site believed.\n */\nexport interface ShelfBypass {\n /** `URL.origin` of the shelf the secret opens (the configured `baseUrl`). */\n origin: string;\n secret: string;\n}\n\n/** The bypass header for `url`, or nothing. Exported for the hook-script mirror\n * test, which runs the generated copy of this rule against this one. */\nexport function shelfBypassHeaders(\n url: string,\n bypass: ShelfBypass | undefined,\n): Record<string, string> {\n if (bypass === undefined || bypass.secret.length === 0) return {};\n let origin: string;\n try {\n origin = new URL(url).origin;\n } catch {\n return {};\n }\n if (origin !== bypass.origin) return {};\n return { [SHELF_BYPASS_HEADER]: bypass.secret };\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether the request being assembled actually carries the door key.\n *\n * A request that carries it MUST NOT follow a redirect. `fetch`'s default\n * `redirect: 'follow'` re-sends request headers verbatim to the new host (Node\n * strips only `Authorization`), so a single 3xx anywhere on the shelf origin —\n * the Vercel Authentication interstitial a rotated bypass secret gets, a domain\n * alias, a CDN rule — would hand the team shelf's key to whatever `Location`\n * names. Nothing else is needed to walk in afterwards, so the key never leaves\n * the origin it was paired with, not even one hop.\n *\n * Read off the BUILT headers rather than off `opts.bypass`, for the same reason\n * {@link CREDENTIAL_HEADERS} is matched by name: attaching the secret is what\n * arms the protection, so an off-origin request (which gets no header) keeps\n * ordinary transport and a call site cannot forget to ask for the pin.\n */\nfunction carriesBypassKey(headers: Record<string, string>): boolean {\n return Object.keys(headers).some((name) => name.toLowerCase() === SHELF_BYPASS_HEADER);\n}\n\n/** The anonymous install id: a random UUID minted once per data dir. */\nexport const INSTALL_ID_HEADER = 'tenjin-install-id';\n\n/**\n * Who is using the router, for Tenjin's own request telemetry: an anonymous\n * install id, random and tied to nothing but the data dir.\n *\n * Same shape as {@link ShelfBypass}, for the same reason: the transport decides\n * where it goes, from the REQUEST URL, so a call site cannot send it to a\n * provider by believing it is talking to Tenjin. `pay` runs over this transport\n * to third-party sellers, and none of them gets the header.\n *\n * Process-wide rather than a per-call option because it is not a per-call\n * decision: every request to Tenjin carries it, and threading it through forty\n * call sites is forty chances to forget one. Set only by the two process entries\n * (the CLI's `index.ts` and the daemon), so an in-process test that never sets\n * it sends exactly what it always did.\n *\n * Redirects are left to the request's usual transport: an unpinned request\n * follows them as `fetch` does, headers and all. Tenjin's origins redirect only\n * to Tenjin's own hosts, and the id is not a credential, so it is not worth the\n * redirect pin the bypass key and signed headers get.\n */\nexport interface TenjinIdentity {\n /** The origins that are Tenjin's own for this process. */\n origins: () => Promise<readonly string[]>;\n /** The install id; absent when it could not be read or created. */\n installId: () => Promise<string | undefined>;\n}\n\nlet tenjinIdentity: TenjinIdentity | undefined;\n\nexport function setTenjinIdentity(identity: TenjinIdentity | undefined): void {\n tenjinIdentity = identity;\n}\n\n/**\n * The telemetry headers for `url`, or nothing. NEVER THROWS: a data dir that\n * cannot be read costs the request its telemetry and nothing else.\n */\nexport async function tenjinIdentityHeaders(url: string): Promise<Record<string, string>> {\n const identity = tenjinIdentity;\n if (identity === undefined) return {};\n try {\n if (!(await identity.origins()).includes(new URL(url).origin)) return {};\n const id = await identity.installId();\n return id !== undefined ? { [INSTALL_ID_HEADER]: id } : {};\n } catch {\n return {};\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * The one place the identity is written for anything that can import it; both\n * transports funnel their Headers through it, so a third entry point on this\n * side cannot ship without it. `.set` on a Headers\n * object is what makes this total: a caller header spelled `User-Agent` in any\n * case lands in the same slot and is overwritten, never duplicated, so a\n * call-specific header cannot erase the composed field or add a second one.\n */\nfunction applyUserAgent(headers: Headers, callerUserAgent?: string): Headers {\n headers.set('user-agent', composeUserAgent({ caller: callerUserAgent }));\n return headers;\n}\n\n/** The same write for `fetchJson`'s plain-object headers; Headers.entries() is lowercase-keyed. */\nfunction withUserAgent(\n callerHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n callerUserAgent?: string,\n): Record<string, string> {\n return Object.fromEntries(\n applyUserAgent(new Headers(callerHeaders ?? {}), callerUserAgent).entries(),\n );\n}\n\n/** A successful 2xx whose body parsed as JSON. */\nexport interface FetchJsonSuccess {\n ok: true;\n status: number;\n json: unknown;\n /** The server's `x-request-id`, when it sent one — useful in error reports. */\n requestId?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A failed request, tagged by class so the caller maps it deliberately:\n * `network`/`timeout` (never reached the server or no answer), `http` (a non-2xx\n * status), `invalid-json` (2xx but the body was not JSON).\n */\nexport interface FetchJsonFailure {\n ok: false;\n kind: 'network' | 'timeout' | 'http' | 'invalid-json' | 'blocked-redirect' | 'oversized-header';\n status?: number;\n requestId?: string;\n message: string;\n /**\n * On `invalid-json`, and on `http` when the status is 401/403: the response\n * looks like an access-protection or sign-in page rather than an API answer.\n * See {@link accessGateSignals} for what \"looks like\" means. Callers use it to\n * point at the missing credential instead of at the base URL, which is the one\n * setting that was already correct (#218).\n */\n gateSuspected?: boolean;\n /**\n * Present (true) only where the response left the host that was asked for:\n * `gateSuspected`'s STRONGER signal (the final URL's host differs), or, on\n * `blocked-redirect`, a `Location` that resolves to another host. An HTML\n * content-type alone proves a page came back, not who sent it, and a 3xx\n * alone proves only that the URL moved; leaving the host is what lets a\n * caller name access protection outright.\n */\n gateOffOrigin?: boolean;\n /**\n * On `network`: the layer the error chain names, when it names one. The\n * origin never answered, so a caller that blames it (or its base URL) gives\n * the wrong fix. See {@link transportFailure}.\n */\n transport?: TransportFailure;\n /**\n * On a `timeout` that came after the response headers did (`httpRequest`\n * only): a case-insensitive lookup over them. A seller can name where a long\n * job's result will be with its first byte, and only the body ran out of time.\n */\n header?: (name: string) => string | undefined;\n}\n\n/** Which layer refused a request that never reached the origin. */\nexport interface TransportFailure {\n layer: 'proxy' | 'dns' | 'tls' | 'connect';\n /** The socket's own error code, for every layer but `proxy`. */\n code?: string;\n /** What the proxy answered to `CONNECT`, for `proxy` only. */\n proxyStatus?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Does this response read as a protection page rather than as an API answer?\n *\n * Two independent signals, reported separately because they prove different\n * amounts (the caller's wording must not outrun the evidence):\n *\n * - an HTML content-type, because a Vercel Deployment Protection interstitial\n * and every sign-in wall answer with a page;\n * - a final URL whose host is not the one asked for, because a gate that\n * redirects to sign in lands the probe on another host and `fetch` follows it\n * silently on the unpinned requests this function serves.\n *\n * Decided HERE because this transport is the only place holding the `Response`;\n * a caller re-deriving it from the failure message would be guessing. An\n * unreadable final URL is NOT suspicion: `res.url` is empty on a synthesized\n * Response, so only a host that reads AND differs counts.\n */\nfunction accessGateSignals(\n requestedUrl: string,\n res: Response,\n): { gateSuspected: boolean; gateOffOrigin?: true } {\n const html = /^\\s*text\\/html\\b/i.test(res.headers.get('content-type') ?? '');\n let offOrigin = false;\n if (res.url.length > 0) {\n try {\n offOrigin = new URL(requestedUrl).host !== new URL(res.url).host;\n } catch {\n offOrigin = false;\n }\n }\n return {\n gateSuspected: html || offOrigin,\n ...(offOrigin ? { gateOffOrigin: true as const } : {}),\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * Does an unfollowed 3xx point off the host that was asked for?\n *\n * The pinned branch never follows, so `res.url` is still the requested URL and\n * `Location` is the only evidence about where the hop went. That distinction\n * carries the whole verdict downstream: a gate's sign-in interstitial lands on\n * another host, while an `http://` base URL that 301s to https, or a host\n * normalising to its canonical name, does not, and reading either as a refused\n * credential blames the wrong setting. A relative target resolves against the\n * request, so it is same-host by construction; a missing or unparseable one is\n * NOT an off-host claim.\n */\nfunction redirectLeavesHost(requestedUrl: string, location: string | null): boolean {\n if (location === null || location.length === 0) return false;\n try {\n return new URL(requestedUrl).host !== new URL(location, requestedUrl).host;\n } catch {\n return false;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Header names that carry wallet-signed material.\n *\n * A request bearing any of these must NEVER follow a redirect. `resource-ref`\n * pins the invariant — \"nothing signed may leave for a host the user did not\n * configure\" — but `assertOnBaseOrigin` only checks the URL the caller asked\n * for, and `fetch`'s default `redirect: 'follow'` re-sends request headers\n * verbatim to the new host (Node strips only `Authorization`). A 3xx anywhere on\n * the configured origin would therefore hand a signature BOUND TO THE REAL\n * DOMAIN to whoever `Location` points at, replayable against it for the\n * signature's lifetime.\n *\n * Detected by header NAME rather than by a caller-supplied \"this is signed\" flag\n * so the protection cannot be forgotten at a call site: attaching the credential\n * is what arms it. Matched case-insensitively. Kept as literals so the base\n * transport keeps its single dependency; `http.test.ts` pins them against the\n * real constants in `lib/siwx` and the x402 payment headers.\n *\n * All three wallet-signed families this CLI sends are here: the SIWX auth\n * header, the x402 payment header (`payment-signature` for x402 v2, plus\n * `x-payment`, the v1 spelling `@x402/core` can emit, as drift insurance even\n * though `read-client` pins v2), and `tenjin-session-delegation` — a REUSABLE\n * session-lifetime SIWX signature `session-key` attaches to every session-signed\n * write, which makes it the most replayable credential of the set. The RFC 9421\n * `Signature`/`Signature-Input` pair riding alongside it is deliberately absent:\n * it covers method, URL, and body digest, so it is not usefully replayable at\n * another host.\n */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = new Set([\n 'sign-in-with-x',\n 'payment-signature',\n 'x-payment',\n 'tenjin-session-delegation',\n]);\n\nfunction carriesSignedMaterial(headers: Record<string, string>): boolean {\n return Object.keys(headers).some((name) => CREDENTIAL_HEADERS.has(name.toLowerCase()));\n}\n\n/**\n * A request header name this client sets itself and an operator may not: the\n * wallet-signed material above, the shelf bypass secret, this install's\n * identity, and the x402 payment namespace. Kept beside the set so the two\n * cannot drift.\n */\nexport function isReservedRequestHeader(name: string): boolean {\n const lowered = name.toLowerCase();\n return (\n CREDENTIAL_HEADERS.has(lowered) ||\n lowered === SHELF_BYPASS_HEADER ||\n lowered === INSTALL_ID_HEADER ||\n lowered.startsWith('payment-') ||\n lowered.startsWith('x-payment')\n );\n}\n\n/** One header name, as RFC 9110 spells a token. */\nconst HEADER_NAME = /^[!#$%&'*+.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z-]+$/;\n/** Names the transport or the body encoding own. */\nconst TRANSPORT_HEADERS = new Set(['host', 'content-length', 'content-type', 'user-agent']);\n\n/**\n * Why a request header someone else names (an operator's `-H`, a catalog\n * spec) cannot ride a paid request, or null when it can: `name` for a name\n * that is not a token or a value that is empty, `reserved` for a name this\n * client signs or sets itself or the transport owns, `value` for a value over\n * 1,024 characters or one that spans lines. `ownContentType` lets the caller\n * name `content-type`, for a body this client does not encode.\n */\nexport function requestHeaderProblem(\n name: string,\n value: string,\n ownContentType = false,\n): 'name' | 'reserved' | 'value' | null {\n if (!HEADER_NAME.test(name) || value.length === 0) return 'name';\n const lowered = name.toLowerCase();\n const contentType = ownContentType && lowered === 'content-type';\n if (isReservedRequestHeader(lowered) || (TRANSPORT_HEADERS.has(lowered) && !contentType)) {\n return 'reserved';\n }\n if (value.length > 1_024 || /[\\r\\n]/.test(value)) return 'value';\n return null;\n}\n\nexport type FetchJsonResult = FetchJsonSuccess | FetchJsonFailure;\n\nexport async function fetchJson(url: string, opts: FetchJsonOptions): Promise<FetchJsonResult> {\n const doFetch = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch;\n const controller = new AbortController();\n let timedOut = false;\n // The timer stays armed until the body is fully consumed (cleared in the outer\n // finally), so a server that sends headers then stalls the body still trips the\n // deadline instead of hanging forever on res.json().\n const timer = setTimeout(() => {\n timedOut = true;\n controller.abort();\n }, opts.timeoutMs);\n\n try {\n let res: Response;\n // `new Headers` throws on a malformed caller header, so building them stays\n // inside the catch that turns any pre-flight refusal into the same\n // discriminated network failure a dead socket gets.\n let pinned = false;\n try {\n const headers = withUserAgent(\n { ...opts.headers, ...shelfBypassHeaders(url, opts.bypass) },\n opts.callerUserAgent,\n );\n // fetchJson sends no signed material — doctor's probes and the contract\n // checks are anonymous — so the door key is the one thing here worth\n // pinning, and it pins the same way it does in httpRequest.\n pinned = carriesBypassKey(headers);\n res = await doFetch(url, {\n signal: controller.signal,\n headers: { ...headers, ...(await tenjinIdentityHeaders(url)) },\n ...(pinned ? { redirect: 'manual' as const } : {}),\n });\n } catch (err) {\n // A timeout is a network failure the AbortController induced; distinguish it\n // from an organic one so the caller can say \"timed out\" rather than a raw\n // AbortError message.\n return timedOut\n ? timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs)\n : { ok: false, kind: 'network', message: `Request to ${url} failed: ${errorMessage(err)}` };\n }\n\n const requestId = res.headers.get('x-request-id') ?? undefined;\n\n // Fail CLOSED, ahead of the ordinary non-2xx branch, so an unfollowed 3xx is\n // never reported as a plain HTTP status a caller might retry by hand.\n if (pinned && res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'blocked-redirect',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n // Where it pointed, not that it pointed: only a hop that leaves the host\n // asked for is evidence about the key. Same-host 3xx happens to a base\n // URL that needs fixing, with a perfectly good key.\n ...(redirectLeavesHost(url, res.headers.get('location'))\n ? { gateOffOrigin: true as const }\n : {}),\n message:\n `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}) while carrying the team shelf's ` +\n 'bypass key; refusing to follow it, because the key opens only the configured origin.',\n };\n }\n\n if (!res.ok) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'http',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n // 401/403 is one of the three shapes deployment protection answers with\n // (200 HTML and a 30x interstitial are the others), so the gate signals\n // ride here too. Other statuses stay unmarked: a 404 or 500 HTML page is\n // an ordinary broken deployment, not a credential problem.\n ...(res.status === 401 || res.status === 403 ? accessGateSignals(url, res) : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} failed with status ${res.status}`,\n };\n }\n\n let json: unknown;\n try {\n json = await res.json();\n } catch (err) {\n // The body read can fail three ways. A timeout wins first: the abort fires\n // synchronously with `timedOut`, so any abort-induced rejection here is our\n // deadline. Otherwise a SyntaxError is a genuine parse failure (invalid\n // JSON); anything else is a transport failure mid-body (network).\n if (timedOut) return timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs);\n if (err instanceof SyntaxError) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'invalid-json',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n ...accessGateSignals(url, res),\n message: `Response from ${url} was not valid JSON`,\n };\n }\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} failed while reading the response body: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n };\n }\n\n return {\n ok: true,\n status: res.status,\n json,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n };\n } finally {\n clearTimeout(timer);\n }\n}\n\nfunction timeoutFailure(url: string, timeoutMs: number): FetchJsonFailure {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'timeout',\n message: `Request to ${url} timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`,\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * A full HTTP round trip that surfaces the STATUS, headers, and best-effort JSON\n * body for ANY status. Unlike fetchJson (2xx-only), the B2 read/pay flow needs\n * the body on a 402 (the leak-safe preview) and a 409 (the owned-re-pay gate),\n * and search/outcome need a 4xx validation envelope. A transport/timeout failure\n * still returns the discriminated FetchJsonFailure so callers map it uniformly.\n */\nexport interface HttpRequestOptions {\n method?: 'GET' | 'POST' | 'PUT' | 'PATCH' | 'DELETE';\n timeoutMs: number;\n headers?: Record<string, string>;\n /** The team shelf's bypass secret and its origin; see {@link ShelfBypass}. */\n bypass?: ShelfBypass;\n /** INTERNAL; see `FetchJsonOptions.callerUserAgent`. */\n callerUserAgent?: string;\n /** A JSON body (POST); serialized with a content-type header set automatically. */\n jsonBody?: unknown;\n /**\n * A body the CALLER already encoded, sent byte for byte with no content-type\n * of this transport's choosing: the router's provider leg is handed a request\n * the server built, and re-encoding it would make the bytes signed for and\n * the bytes sent two different things. The caller's own `headers` carry the\n * content type. Ignored when `jsonBody` is set.\n */\n rawBody?: string;\n fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;\n /**\n * A caller's own abort, combined with (never replacing) `timeoutMs`. The loop's\n * legs pass the fire's signal here so a harness that closed its socket stops the\n * request in flight; a caller with no such signal is unchanged.\n */\n signal?: AbortSignal;\n /**\n * Refuse redirects even when the request carries no signed header. For a\n * caller whose response becomes a durable local artifact (`fetchRead`: the\n * 200 is written to the library as an entitlement record under the\n * server-chosen id/slug), following a cross-origin redirect would let\n * another host's bytes be recorded as if the configured origin served them.\n * Off by default so search/outcome/publish/doctor keep normal transport.\n */\n blockRedirects?: boolean;\n /**\n * Keep a binary body as bytes. A sound, an image or any other non-text\n * payload decoded as text is corrupted, so with this set a response whose\n * content type is not text ({@link isBinaryContentType}) comes back with\n * `bytes` and an empty `text`. The router's provider leg sets it; every other\n * caller reads text as before.\n */\n binaryBody?: boolean;\n /** The cap on such a body; over it the response is a failure, never a\n * buffer that grows without bound. Defaults to {@link MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES}. */\n maxBinaryBytes?: number;\n /**\n * Send no install id, and mint none. For a request that checks the network\n * rather than uses Tenjin (the reachability probe), so it never counts as an\n * install in request telemetry.\n */\n anonymous?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** The same cap the router's linked-media download uses. */\nexport const MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES = 200 * 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * The body's bytes, read chunk by chunk and abandoned the moment they pass\n * `max`; null over the cap. A declared length over it is refused unread.\n */\nasync function readCapped(res: Response, max: number): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {\n const declared = Number(res.headers.get('content-length') ?? '0');\n if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > max) {\n await res.body?.cancel().catch(() => undefined);\n return null;\n }\n if (res.body === null) return new Uint8Array();\n const reader = res.body.getReader();\n const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];\n let size = 0;\n for (;;) {\n const { done, value } = await reader.read();\n if (done) break;\n size += value.byteLength;\n if (size > max) {\n await reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);\n return null;\n }\n chunks.push(value);\n }\n return new Uint8Array(Buffer.concat(chunks));\n}\n\n/**\n * A content type whose body is not text: anything that is not `text/*` and\n * not a JSON, XML, JavaScript, YAML or form type. An absent header is text, as\n * it always was here.\n */\nexport function isBinaryContentType(contentType: string | undefined): boolean {\n const type = (contentType ?? '').split(';')[0]!.trim().toLowerCase();\n if (type.length === 0) return false;\n if (type.startsWith('text/')) return false;\n return !/(?:json|xml|javascript|ecmascript|yaml|x-www-form-urlencoded)/.test(type);\n}\n\nexport interface HttpResponse {\n ok: true;\n status: number;\n /** Case-insensitive header lookup over the response. */\n header(name: string): string | undefined;\n /** Parsed JSON body, or undefined when the body was empty or not JSON. */\n json: unknown;\n /** The raw body text; what a non-JSON endpoint actually said (`pay` delivers it). */\n text: string;\n /** The body's bytes, only for a binary body read with `binaryBody`; `text`\n * is then empty. */\n bytes?: Uint8Array;\n requestId?: string;\n}\n\nexport type HttpResult = HttpResponse | FetchJsonFailure;\n\n/** The wire form of one request: what to send, and whether it may follow a redirect. */\ninterface PreparedRequest {\n ok: true;\n headers: Record<string, string>;\n body: string | undefined;\n signed: boolean;\n bypassed: boolean;\n pinned: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Assemble the request and DERIVE its redirect decision from the headers that\n * were actually built, in one place and one pass. The redirect flags are\n * returned rather than assigned, so they have no value until the headers do:\n * there is no state in which `pinned` is readable but not yet computed, which\n * is what would let a signed request follow a 3xx to another host. Anything\n * that refuses here (`new Headers` throws on a malformed caller header) becomes\n * the same discriminated failure a dead socket does, because this transport\n * documents a returned failure for every refusal, not an exception.\n */\nfunction prepareRequest(url: string, opts: HttpRequestOptions): PreparedRequest | FetchJsonFailure {\n try {\n let body: string | undefined;\n // The bypass rides in with the caller's headers rather than being set after\n // them, so a caller cannot spell it a second way and win the slot.\n const merged = new Headers({ ...opts.headers, ...shelfBypassHeaders(url, opts.bypass) });\n if (opts.jsonBody !== undefined) {\n body = JSON.stringify(opts.jsonBody);\n merged.set('content-type', 'application/json');\n } else if (opts.rawBody !== undefined) {\n body = opts.rawBody;\n }\n const wantsAccept =\n opts.method === 'POST' ||\n opts.method === 'PUT' ||\n opts.method === 'PATCH' ||\n body !== undefined;\n if (wantsAccept && !merged.has('accept')) merged.set('accept', 'application/json');\n // An `accept`/`content-type` set here wins the slot regardless of how a\n // caller cased its own copy.\n const headers = Object.fromEntries(applyUserAgent(merged, opts.callerUserAgent).entries());\n\n // Signed requests opt out of redirect following entirely; see CREDENTIAL_HEADERS.\n // So does a request carrying the team shelf's bypass key: it cannot be\n // replayed, but a 3xx would DISCLOSE it, and that is the whole harm (see\n // carriesBypassKey). A caller can also pin an unsigned, keyless request\n // (blockRedirects) when the response it gets back becomes a durable local record.\n const signed = carriesSignedMaterial(headers);\n const bypassed = carriesBypassKey(headers);\n return {\n ok: true,\n headers,\n body,\n signed,\n bypassed,\n pinned: signed || bypassed || opts.blockRedirects === true,\n };\n } catch (err) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n message: `Request to ${url} failed: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n };\n }\n}\n\nexport async function httpRequest(url: string, opts: HttpRequestOptions): Promise<HttpResult> {\n const doFetch = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch;\n const controller = new AbortController();\n let timedOut = false;\n const timer = setTimeout(() => {\n timedOut = true;\n controller.abort();\n }, opts.timeoutMs);\n // The caller's abort is combined with the timeout rather than chosen between:\n // whichever fires first ends the request, and `timedOut` still says which.\n const signal =\n opts.signal === undefined\n ? controller.signal\n : AbortSignal.any([controller.signal, opts.signal]);\n\n try {\n const prepared = prepareRequest(url, opts);\n if (!prepared.ok) return prepared;\n const { headers, body, signed, bypassed, pinned } = prepared;\n\n let res: Response;\n try {\n res = await doFetch(url, {\n method: opts.method ?? 'GET',\n headers:\n opts.anonymous === true ? headers : { ...headers, ...(await tenjinIdentityHeaders(url)) },\n body,\n signal,\n ...(pinned ? { redirect: 'manual' as const } : {}),\n });\n } catch (err) {\n if (timedOut) return timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs);\n if (isHeaderOverflow(err)) return oversizedHeaderFailure(url);\n const transport = transportFailure(err);\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n message: `Request to ${url} failed: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n ...(transport !== undefined ? { transport } : {}),\n };\n }\n\n const requestId = res.headers.get('x-request-id') ?? undefined;\n\n // Fail CLOSED on a redirect the request was not allowed to follow. This\n // returns a failure rather than the 3xx response so no caller can mistake an\n // unfollowed redirect for a normal status and retry it by hand.\n if (pinned && res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'blocked-redirect',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: signed\n ? `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}) while carrying a signed header; ` +\n 'refusing to follow it, because the signature is bound to the configured origin.'\n : bypassed\n ? `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}) while carrying the team shelf's ` +\n 'bypass key; refusing to follow it, because the key opens only the configured origin.'\n : `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}); ` +\n 'refusing to follow it, because the response must come from the configured origin.',\n };\n }\n // Read the raw text once; parse best-effort. A non-JSON body (empty 202, an\n // HTML error page) yields `undefined` rather than a thrown parse, because a\n // 402/409 caller keys off the STATUS and only some statuses carry JSON.\n let text: string;\n let bytes: Uint8Array | undefined;\n try {\n if (opts.binaryBody === true && isBinaryContentType(res.headers.get('content-type') ?? '')) {\n const read = await readCapped(res, opts.maxBinaryBytes ?? MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES);\n if (read === null) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} returned a file over the ${Math.round((opts.maxBinaryBytes ?? MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES) / 1_048_576)} MB cap; it was not kept.`,\n };\n }\n bytes = read;\n text = '';\n } else {\n text = await res.text();\n }\n } catch (err) {\n if (timedOut) {\n return {\n ...timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs),\n header: (name) => res.headers.get(name) ?? undefined,\n };\n }\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} failed while reading the response body: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n };\n }\n let json: unknown;\n if (text.length > 0) {\n try {\n json = JSON.parse(text);\n } catch {\n json = undefined;\n }\n }\n return {\n ok: true,\n status: res.status,\n header: (name) => res.headers.get(name) ?? undefined,\n json,\n text,\n ...(bytes !== undefined ? { bytes } : {}),\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n };\n } finally {\n clearTimeout(timer);\n }\n}\n\nexport interface FailureToCliErrorOptions {\n fix?: string;\n details?: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalize a fetch failure into the CLI error contract: network/timeout are a\n * NETWORK_ERROR, an `http` status (server reachable but errored — commonly 5xx)\n * is API_UNREACHABLE, and a 2xx that failed to parse when JSON was required is a\n * CONTRACT_MISMATCH. Callers that need a check-specific code (doctor) build their\n * own CliError; this is the default B2's passthrough leans on.\n */\nexport function fetchFailureToCliError(\n failure: FetchJsonFailure,\n opts: FailureToCliErrorOptions = {},\n): CliError {\n const code =\n failure.kind === 'network' || failure.kind === 'timeout'\n ? 'NETWORK_ERROR'\n : failure.kind === 'invalid-json'\n ? 'CONTRACT_MISMATCH'\n : failure.kind === 'oversized-header'\n ? 'CHALLENGE_TOO_LARGE'\n : 'API_UNREACHABLE';\n // The one failure with a remedy nobody can apply from inside the process, so\n // it names the operator's knob rather than suggesting a retry.\n // The knob, with no claim about payment: a caller that knows its leg passes\n // its own `fix` and says what happened to the money there.\n const fix =\n opts.fix ??\n (failure.kind === 'oversized-header'\n ? 'Raising `--max-http-header-size` on the node process that runs this CLI would let the header be read; that is an operator decision, not a default this build changes.'\n : undefined);\n return new CliError(code, failure.message, {\n ...(fix !== undefined ? { fix } : {}),\n ...(opts.details !== undefined ? { details: opts.details } : {}),\n });\n}\n\nfunction errorMessage(err: unknown): string {\n return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n}\n\n/**\n * Does this transport failure mean the response HEADERS were too big for this\n * process to read?\n *\n * Node caps them at 16 KiB unless `--max-http-header-size` says otherwise, and\n * an x402 challenge is a header: a seller that embeds its whole output schema\n * in one can exceed the cap on its own (AnyAPI's is 52 KB, measured\n * 2026-09-22). undici then aborts the request and the generic path reported\n * `fetch failed` with no status and nothing naming the cause, which reads as\n * \"the endpoint is down\" for a seller that is answering perfectly.\n *\n * The message is undici's, matched on its stable text and on the code it\n * attaches; the CAUSE is the one that carries either, so both are checked.\n */\nfunction isHeaderOverflow(err: unknown): boolean {\n const seen = [err, (err as { cause?: unknown } | null)?.cause];\n return seen.some((candidate) => {\n if (candidate === null || typeof candidate !== 'object') return false;\n const code = (candidate as { code?: unknown }).code;\n if (code === 'UND_ERR_HEADERS_OVERFLOW' || code === 'HPE_HEADER_OVERFLOW') return true;\n const message = (candidate as { message?: unknown }).message;\n return typeof message === 'string' && /headers overflow|header overflow/i.test(message);\n });\n}\n\nconst DNS_CODES = new Set(['ENOTFOUND', 'EAI_AGAIN', 'EAI_FAIL', 'EAI_NODATA', 'EAI_NONAME']);\nconst CONNECT_CODES = new Set([\n 'ECONNREFUSED',\n 'ECONNRESET',\n 'EHOSTUNREACH',\n 'ENETUNREACH',\n 'ETIMEDOUT',\n 'UND_ERR_CONNECT_TIMEOUT',\n 'UND_ERR_SOCKET',\n]);\nconst TLS_CODE = /^(?:ERR_TLS_|ERR_SSL_|CERT_|UNABLE_TO_|SELF_SIGNED_|DEPTH_ZERO_)/;\n/** undici's text when a proxy answers `CONNECT` with anything but 200. */\nconst PROXY_REFUSAL = /Proxy response \\((\\d{3})\\)/;\n\n/**\n * The layer a `fetch failed` came from, read down the `cause` chain. fetch\n * wraps the real error twice: a proxy refusing the tunnel is\n * `TypeError: fetch failed`, then `Request was cancelled.`, then undici's\n * `UND_ERR_ABORTED` with the proxy's status in its message (Node 24.18,\n * measured 2026-10-05). Undefined when no link names a layer.\n */\nexport function transportFailure(err: unknown): TransportFailure | undefined {\n let link: unknown = err;\n for (let depth = 0; depth < 5 && link !== null && typeof link === 'object'; depth += 1) {\n const { code, message, cause } = link as { code?: unknown; message?: unknown; cause?: unknown };\n const proxy = typeof message === 'string' ? PROXY_REFUSAL.exec(message) : null;\n if (proxy !== null) return { layer: 'proxy', proxyStatus: Number(proxy[1]) };\n if (typeof code === 'string') {\n if (DNS_CODES.has(code)) return { layer: 'dns', code };\n if (TLS_CODE.test(code)) return { layer: 'tls', code };\n if (CONNECT_CODES.has(code)) return { layer: 'connect', code };\n }\n link = cause;\n }\n return undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * The named refusal for that case. NOT a `network` failure: nothing is wrong\n * with the connection, and a caller that retries gets the same 52 KB again.\n *\n * SAYS NOTHING ABOUT PAYMENT. This transport serves the unpaid probe and the\n * paid retry alike and cannot tell them apart, so a message asserting either\n * way is wrong on one of them: it read as \"nothing was sent\" on a leg where a\n * signed authorization had already left. The leg adds that sentence, because\n * the leg is what knows; see `runPay`.\n */\nfunction oversizedHeaderFailure(url: string): FetchJsonFailure {\n let origin = url;\n try {\n origin = new URL(url).origin;\n } catch {\n // Keep the raw string; this is a diagnostic, not a destination.\n }\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'oversized-header',\n message:\n `${origin} answered with a response header block larger than this process will read. ` +\n 'An x402 challenge travels in a header, and a seller that embeds its whole output ' +\n 'schema in one can exceed the limit, so the response could not be read.',\n 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1
- {"version":3,"sources":["../src/lib/passphrase-record.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { mkdir, readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { writeFileAtomic } from './atomic-json';\nimport { CliError } from './errors';\nimport { passphraseRecordPath } from './paths';\nimport type { DurableStore } from './wallet-unlock';\n\n/**\n * WHERE EACH WALLET'S PASSPHRASE WAS SAVED, beside the wallet:\n * `<dataDir>/passphrase-store.json`, keyed by lowercase address.\n *\n * Why not a field in wallet.json: that file holds a funded key, and rewriting\n * it to record a storage choice risks the key for no gain. An older CLI also\n * reads wallet.json strictly, and must keep reading it after this one has\n * saved a passphrase somewhere new. So wallet.json is never touched, and the\n * choice lives here, where losing the file costs nothing: an absent,\n * unreadable, unparseable or newer-schema sidecar, or an unknown store value,\n * all read as \"no record\", which means today's lookup order.\n *\n * Hook-safe: `alive` and the hooks read it, so it imports only node, zod and\n * the lib modules the chunk graph allows. Reads never write (no lazy\n * migration): the router's read path stays free of side effects.\n *\n * Only `wallet create`, `wallet create --replace` and `wallet repair` write it,\n * and they hold `wallet.create.lock` while they do, so the read-modify-write\n * below never races another writer. An entry is never deleted in PR 1: a\n * restored archive (`mv wallet.<addr>.json.bak wallet.json`) finds its own\n * entry again by address.\n */\n\nexport const PASSPHRASE_RECORD_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;\n\nexport interface PassphraseRecordEntry {\n store: DurableStore;\n recordedAt: string;\n by: 'create' | 'repair' | 'replace';\n}\n\nconst EntrySchema = z\n .object({\n store: z.enum(['keychain', 'secret-service', 'dpapi', 'file']),\n recordedAt: z.string(),\n by: z.enum(['create', 'repair', 'replace']),\n })\n .strict();\n\n/**\n * The envelope. 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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
1
- {"version":3,"sources":["../src/lib/env-proxy.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import * as http from 'node:http';\n\n/** Named, never quoted: a proxy URL can carry its own credentials. */\nexport const PROXY_VARIABLES = ['HTTPS_PROXY', 'https_proxy', 'HTTP_PROXY', 'http_proxy'] as const;\n\ntype SetGlobalProxy = (env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) => () => void;\n\n/** Node 24.14 added it. `engines` admits 22.0, where it is absent. */\nconst nodeSetGlobalProxy = (http as { setGlobalProxyFromEnv?: SetGlobalProxy })\n .setGlobalProxyFromEnv;\n\n/** The first proxy variable this environment sets, or undefined. */\nexport function proxyVariable(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | undefined {\n return PROXY_VARIABLES.find((name) => (env[name] ?? '') !== '');\n}\n\n/** Can this Node route `fetch` through the proxy the environment names? */\nexport function envProxySupported(setGlobal: unknown = nodeSetGlobalProxy): boolean {\n return typeof setGlobal === 'function';\n}\n\nexport type EnvProxyResult = 'none' | 'set' | 'unsupported' | 'invalid';\n\n/**\n * Send `fetch` and `https.request` through the proxy the environment names.\n * Node's `fetch` ignores HTTPS_PROXY, HTTP_PROXY and NO_PROXY unless\n * NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY=1, so on a network where the proxy is the only way out the\n * harness reaches the internet and Tenjin does not. Called once by the bin\n * entry, so the CLI, the hooks and `tenjin mcp` all get it. Never throws: a\n * proxy URL Node cannot parse leaves the transport as it was.\n */\nexport function useEnvProxy(\n env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n setGlobal: SetGlobalProxy | null = nodeSetGlobalProxy ?? null,\n): EnvProxyResult {\n if (proxyVariable(env) === undefined) return 'none';\n if (typeof setGlobal !== 'function') return 'unsupported';\n try {\n setGlobal(env);\n return 'set';\n } catch {\n return 'invalid';\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Why this Node's requests go past the proxy the environment names, or null\n * when none is named or this Node can use it. On a network whose only way out\n * is that proxy, a download then fails however often it is retried while the\n * same Node runs it, so a failure is said as this, never as a bare retry.\n */\nexport function proxySkipped(\n env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n supported: boolean = envProxySupported(),\n): string | null {\n const name = proxyVariable(env);\n if (name === undefined || supported) return null;\n return `this shell sets ${name}, which Node ${process.versions.node} cannot send downloads through`;\n}\n\n/** The step that works once a download skipped the proxy: one run on a Node that uses it. */\nexport function proxyNodeStep(command: string): string {\n return `run \\`${command}\\` once with Node 24.14 or newer, which uses the proxy; Tenjin's own Node does from then on`;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AAAA,YAAY,UAAU;AAGf,IAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC,eAAe,eAAe,cAAc,YAAY;AAKxF,IAAM,qBACH;AAGI,SAAS,cAAc,KAA4C;AACxE,SAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,EAAE;AAChE;AAGO,SAAS,kBAAkB,YAAqB,oBAA6B;AAClF,SAAO,OAAO,cAAc;AAC9B;AAYO,SAAS,YACd,KACA,YAAmC,sBAAsB,MACzC;AAChB,MAAI,cAAc,GAAG,MAAM,OAAW,QAAO;AAC7C,MAAI,OAAO,cAAc,WAAY,QAAO;AAC5C,MAAI;AACF,cAAU,GAAG;AACb,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAQO,SAAS,aACd,KACA,YAAqB,kBAAkB,GACxB;AACf,QAAM,OAAO,cAAc,GAAG;AAC9B,MAAI,SAAS,UAAa,UAAW,QAAO;AAC5C,SAAO,mBAAmB,IAAI,gBAAgB,QAAQ,SAAS,IAAI;AACrE;AAGO,SAAS,cAAc,SAAyB;AACrD,SAAO,SAAS,OAAO;AACzB;","names":[]}
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1
- {"version":3,"sources":["../src/lib/errors.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { ErrorCode } from '../schemas';\n\n/**\n * The process exit code is API (spec 10): 0 success, 1 runtime/network, 2 usage,\n * 3 understood-but-refused (policy refusal, publish confirmation/hard-block), 4 a\n * failure AFTER an approved spend or write (a settlement that failed, a publish\n * that failed post-consent).\n */\nexport type ExitCode = 1 | 2 | 3 | 4;\n\nexport interface CliErrorOptions {\n /** A copy-pasteable command or one-line remediation. */\n fix?: string;\n /** Structured detail for machine consumers; serialized into the envelope. */\n details?: unknown;\n /** Override the default exit code for this error's code. */\n exitCode?: ExitCode;\n /** Underlying cause, preserved on the Error but never serialized. */\n cause?: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Default code -> exit-code mapping. USAGE/CONFIG_INVALID are malformed\n * invocations (2); WALLET_EXISTS/REFUSED are understood-but-refused (3);\n * everything else is a runtime/network failure (1). A CliError may override its\n * own exit code, but the table is the default every caller relies on.\n */\nconst EXIT_BY_CODE: Record<ErrorCode, ExitCode> = {\n NODE_UNSUPPORTED: 1,\n USAGE: 2,\n CONFIG_INVALID: 2,\n WALLET_EXISTS: 3,\n WALLET_MISSING: 1,\n WALLET_INVALID_KEY: 1,\n PROVIDER_ERROR: 1,\n RPC_ERROR: 1,\n API_UNREACHABLE: 1,\n CONTRACT_MISMATCH: 1,\n REFUSED: 3,\n NETWORK_ERROR: 1,\n INTERNAL: 1,\n NOT_IMPLEMENTED: 1,\n POLICY_REFUSED: 3,\n PAYMENT_FAILED: 4,\n RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND: 1,\n SEARCH_NOT_FOUND: 1,\n RATE_LIMITED: 1,\n // A publish awaiting confirmation or hard-blocked is understood-but-refused (3),\n // the same posture as POLICY_REFUSED; a write that failed after approval is a\n // settlement-class failure (4), like PAYMENT_FAILED.\n NEEDS_CONFIRMATION: 3,\n PUBLISH_BLOCKED: 3,\n PUBLISH_FAILED: 4,\n // A send that reverted or stalled AFTER the human approved it and it was\n // broadcast: the post-decision failure class (4), like PAYMENT_FAILED.\n SEND_FAILED: 4,\n // A delete the operator confirmed and the server then refused: same class.\n DELETE_FAILED: 4,\n UPDATE_FAILED: 1,\n // Refused BEFORE any signature existed: the Bazaar lane's fail-closed check.\n REGISTRY_MISMATCH: 3,\n // The seller's 402 challenge does not fit this process's header limit, so the\n // terms could not be read and nothing was sent. Understood and refused (3),\n // not a transport failure: the connection was fine and a retry changes\n // nothing without an operator raising `--max-http-header-size`.\n CHALLENGE_TOO_LARGE: 3,\n};\n\nexport function exitCodeFor(code: ErrorCode): ExitCode {\n return EXIT_BY_CODE[code];\n}\n\n/**\n * The one error type commands throw. It carries the machine `code`, the resolved\n * `exitCode`, and an optional `fix`/`details` that flow straight into the failure\n * envelope. Commands throw it; the CLI dispatcher catches, serializes, and exits.\n */\nexport class CliError extends Error {\n readonly code: ErrorCode;\n readonly exitCode: ExitCode;\n readonly fix?: string;\n readonly details?: unknown;\n\n constructor(code: ErrorCode, message: string, opts: CliErrorOptions = {}) {\n super(message, opts.cause !== undefined ? { cause: opts.cause } : undefined);\n this.name = 'CliError';\n this.code = code;\n this.exitCode = opts.exitCode ?? exitCodeFor(code);\n this.fix = opts.fix;\n this.details = opts.details;\n }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AA2BA,IAAM,eAA4C;AAAA,EAChD,kBAAkB;AAAA,EAClB,OAAO;AAAA,EACP,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAChB,eAAe;AAAA,EACf,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAChB,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAChB,WAAW;AAAA,EACX,iBAAiB;AAAA,EACjB,mBAAmB;AAAA,EACnB,SAAS;AAAA,EACT,eAAe;AAAA,EACf,UAAU;AAAA,EACV,iBAAiB;AAAA,EACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAChB,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAChB,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,kBAAkB;AAAA,EAClB,cAAc;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAId,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,iBAAiB;AAAA,EACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGhB,aAAa;AAAA;AAAA,EAEb,eAAe;AAAA,EACf,eAAe;AAAA;AAAA,EAEf,mBAAmB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKnB,qBAAqB;AACvB;AAEO,SAAS,YAAY,MAA2B;AACrD,SAAO,aAAa,IAAI;AAC1B;AAOO,IAAM,WAAN,cAAuB,MAAM;AAAA,EACzB;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EAET,YAAY,MAAiB,SAAiB,OAAwB,CAAC,GAAG;AACxE,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,MAAS;AAC3E,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY,YAAY,IAAI;AACjD,SAAK,MAAM,KAAK;AAChB,SAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,EACtB;AACF;","names":[]}
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1
- {"version":3,"sources":["../src/lib/install-identity.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';\nimport { writeFileAtomicExclusive } from './atomic-json';\nimport { loadRawConfig, resolveSettings } from './config';\nimport { hasCode } from './errno';\nimport { setTenjinIdentity, type TenjinIdentity } from './http';\nimport { installIdPath } from './paths';\nimport { knownDeploymentOrigins } from './production-origin';\nimport { isTeamModeConfig } from './settings';\n\n/**\n * The install id the transport attaches to Tenjin-bound requests (see\n * `TenjinIdentity` in lib/http), and the rule for which origins are Tenjin's.\n *\n * Nothing here may fail a request: every read that goes wrong is an absent\n * header. 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@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
1
- import { createRequire as __tenjinCreateRequire } from 'node:module'; const require = __tenjinCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
2
-
3
- // src/lib/permissions.ts
4
- var PUBLISH_MODE_ALLOWLIST = [
5
- {
6
- rule: "Bash(tenjin publish:*)",
7
- command: "tenjin publish",
8
- note: "PUBLISHES PUBLICLY under your identity, and is cleared only while publish.mode is auto or full-auto: the mode is the consent, and the harness prompt would ask for it twice. Three things it clears that the free tier never did. It OPENS THE KEYSTORE: publish always resolves a signer, and with no usable session it mints one at read+write scope, which is strictly broader than the read-only key `tenjin read` mints to recover an owned piece. It publishes the contents of ANY REGULAR LOCAL FILE the agent can read, gated only by the heuristic scan. And it is a PREFIX rule, so it pins the verb and not the flags: `--base-url` rides it (see the flag caveat), and `--yes` is an ordinary flag on the same verb that clears exactly the WARN findings auto stopped on, so a re-run collapses auto into full-auto with nobody asked. The local scan is warn-only now and every finding routes through the same consent flow this mode already governs; what still refuses a publish outright is the SERVER\u2019s ingest gate (vendor tokens, private keys, seed phrases, DB passwords, bearer headers), which no mode and no flag clears. The skills hold the rest of that line. Set publish.mode back to review and the rule is retracted."
9
- },
10
- {
11
- rule: "Bash(tenjin edit:*)",
12
- command: "tenjin edit",
13
- note: "Updates posts your wallet ALREADY OWNS: reprices, refreshes an as-of date, repairs an answer card, and flips status both ways, so it CAN PROMOTE A DRAFT TO PUBLISHED under this same gate (promotion re-runs the block-tier secret scan over the stored body). Owner-scoped on both legs (GET and PUT /api/posts/<id> are signed and owner-only), spends nothing, moves no keys, and mints no new posts: a narrower blast radius than the publish rule beside it, though promotion means existing drafts can go public. It rides the same mode for the same reason: edit runs the identical publish.mode consent gate in the CLI (lib/consent.ts needsConfirmation), so a mode that publishes unattended and then cannot fix its own post\u2019s price is the asymmetry the mode exists to remove. It opens the keystore on the same terms as the publish rule beside it, and takes the same prefix-rule caveats. Removed by the same return to review."
14
- }
15
- ];
16
- function modeGatedAllowlist(mode) {
17
- return mode === "review" ? [] : PUBLISH_MODE_ALLOWLIST.map((e) => ({ ...e }));
18
- }
19
- var PERMISSIONS_DOC_URL = "https://github.com/BackTrackCo/tenjin-agent/blob/main/docs/agent-permissions.md";
20
- function modeGatedPointer(mode, missing, remedy = "tenjin install") {
21
- if (modeGatedAllowlist(mode).length === 0 || missing.length === 0) return null;
22
- return `publish.mode=${mode} also needs ${missing.join(" and ")} in your harness allowlist, or it will prompt anyway; \`${remedy}\` writes them.`;
23
- }
24
-
25
- export {
26
- PERMISSIONS_DOC_URL,
27
- modeGatedPointer
28
- };
29
- //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-4LMUQMBH.js.map
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
1
- {"version":3,"sources":["../src/lib/permissions.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The recommended HARNESS permission allowlist: the exact rule lines an operator\n * pastes into Claude Code (or an equivalent harness) so auto mode stops denying\n * the free Tenjin verbs, and so the one paying verb is cleared deliberately\n * rather than by accident.\n *\n * This is a HARNESS-side allowlist (which shell commands the agent may run at\n * all). It is NOT the CLI's spend policy and shares nothing with it: the shipped\n * `allowlistCreators` config key gates WHO you may pay, this file gates WHICH\n * COMMANDS the harness will run without a prompt. The two are deliberately kept\n * apart in name and in code — clearing `Bash(tenjin buy:*)` here never raises a\n * spend cap. That is a claim about this file, NOT a claim that the spend policy\n * stops an allowlisted `buy`: `--yes` is an ordinary flag on an allowlisted verb\n * and `confirmSpend` returns true on it before any TTY check\n * (src/commands/buy.ts), so under CONFIG_DEFAULTS nothing denies. See\n * OPT_IN_ALLOWLIST's note for the walk-through.\n *\n * These are static, shipped constants on purpose: there is NO config key for\n * them. An operator-editable \"which commands may run\" list stored next to the\n * spend policy would be a second, weaker copy of a control the harness already\n * owns, and a CLI that could widen its own permission grant is exactly the shape\n * this file exists to avoid.\n *\n * Scope: `tenjin mcp` exposes the same command cores over MCP, where the harness\n * gates TOOLS, not Bash lines. These rules say nothing about that surface, which\n * is why `tenjin mcp` is itself never recommended here: clearing it would route\n * around every rule below. MCP_CAVEAT names the tools to leave gated for an\n * operator who runs the server anyway.\n *\n * LIMIT OF A PREFIX RULE, read this before adding an entry: the rule constrains\n * the VERB and nothing else. `addGlobalFlags` (src/cli.ts) puts `--json`,\n * `--timeout`, and `--base-url` on every leaf command, so every rule below also\n * clears `--base-url <url>` in trailing position. `--base-url` is validated as a\n * URL and nothing more, and it wins settings precedence, so it re-points the\n * trust boundary itself: the `search` question goes to that host, `doctor` probes\n * it, and `assertOnBaseOrigin` only checks that a resource URL shares an origin\n * with the CONFIGURED base, so an attacker-controlled pair satisfies the pin. No\n * prefix syntax expresses \"this verb but not that flag\", so the mitigation is\n * disclosure rather than a narrower rule: FLAG_CAVEAT rides the `--json` payload\n * and docs/agent-permissions.md, every human surface points at that page, and the\n * skills tell the agent never to pass `--base-url` on an allowlisted verb. Pinning\n * the paying path to a constant origin instead is the real fix and is an\n * x402/payments-semantics change, tracked separately.\n */\n\nimport type { PublishMode } from './config';\n\n/** One pasteable allowlist rule plus why it is safe (or what it costs). */\nexport interface AllowlistEntry {\n /** The exact line to add to the harness permission allowlist. */\n rule: string;\n /** The verb it clears. */\n command: string;\n /** Why it is safe to pre-clear, or what the operator is opting into. */\n note: string;\n}\n\n/** A verb deliberately kept OUT of the recommended allowlist, and why. */\nexport interface ExcludedVerb {\n command: string;\n reason: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * FREE verbs: they CANNOT SPEND. That is the whole definition of this tier, and\n * it is deliberately narrower than the older \"no wallet, no signing, no\n * payment\" — which stopped being true the moment `read` gained the ability to\n * recover an owned piece. `read` signs, with a P-256 delegation, and mints one\n * with a wallet signature when none is live; what it cannot do is produce the\n * secp256k1/EIP-712 signature a payment authorization needs (wrong curve), which\n * is test-pinned by its import graph never reaching the payment module. Money\n * stays out of reach; a signature, and the keystore access behind minting one,\n * no longer do, so the tier says what it means. `doctor` decrypts locally to\n * check the wallet still opens.\n *\n * What the tier does NOT claim, because it is not true: that the read scope\n * limits what a leaked delegation is worth. Scope is enforced only on the request\n * shape that carries both a session signature and the delegation header; the same\n * delegation replayed as a plain `SIGN-IN-WITH-X` takes a different server path\n * where no scope logic runs. So a session file is a wallet-derived credential\n * with the authority of the wallet behind it, and the mitigations that actually\n * hold are the ones in this repo: it is 0600, short-lived (≤24h, server-clamped),\n * bound to the origin it was minted for, and never presented off that origin.\n * Treat \"read is allowlisted\" as \"read may transmit that credential to the\n * configured origin\", and see FLAG_CAVEAT for why the configured origin is not\n * automatically the one you configured.\n *\n * Not all of them are read-only, and the difference is disclosed rather than\n * papered over — `search` POSTs the (generalized, anonymous) question off-machine\n * and records it locally, `outcome` POSTs a report that moves the marketplace's\n * reuse signal (both unauthenticated remote writes), and `read` writes locally,\n * saving a delivered piece to the library, and `doctor` decrypts the keystore\n * locally to check it opens. Pre-clearing them is defensible because they cost\n * nothing and none of it leaves the machine; calling them read-only to justify it\n * would not be.\n *\n * Rules are PREFIX rules: `Bash(tenjin search:*)` clears commands that start with\n * `tenjin search` and nothing else. The narrow `wallet show` / `wallet balance` /\n * The `config get` form is deliberate: a `Bash(tenjin wallet:*)`\n * or `Bash(tenjin config:*)` rule would silently swallow `wallet create` and\n * `config set`, and `config set` can raise the spend caps.\n *\n * Two known gaps, both fail-closed (denied, never wrongly allowed):\n * - Bare `tenjin config` (runConfigList) is as read-only as `config get`, but no\n * prefix rule reaches it without also covering `config set`, so it stays out.\n * Use `tenjin config get <key>`, which is a different supported command rather\n * than a reworded one.\n * - Group-level flag forms like `tenjin wallet --json show` are not covered.\n * Put global flags AFTER the leaf verb (`tenjin wallet show --json`); the\n * CLI parses either, and only the trailing form matches these rules.\n */\nexport const ALWAYS_SAFE_ALLOWLIST: readonly AllowlistEntry[] = [\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin search:*)',\n command: 'tenjin search',\n note:\n 'Free anonymous marketplace search. No wallet, no signing, no payment. ' +\n 'Not read-only: it POSTs the generalized question off-machine and records ' +\n 'the search locally.',\n },\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin wallet fund:*)',\n command: 'tenjin wallet fund',\n note:\n 'Owner call (2026-08-12): free on both surfaces, because the command just opens the ' +\n 'fund modal. Minting moves no money: the destination is server-pinned to the wallet ' +\n 'that signed, the CLI refuses any checkout host but pay.coinbase.com, and payment ' +\n 'happens behind Coinbase\\u2019s own human gate. The usual --base-url caveat does not ' +\n 'apply: fund is pinned to the production origin and takes no override from flag, ' +\n 'env, or config.',\n },\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin inspect:*)',\n command: 'tenjin inspect',\n note: 'Free pre-purchase card and preview. Never signs, never pays, never saves.',\n },\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin read:*)',\n command: 'tenjin read',\n note:\n 'Free-only delivery: free pieces, local-library re-reads, and pieces this ' +\n 'wallet already owns. Cannot spend: the payment module is absent from its ' +\n 'import graph, and the key it signs with is a P-256 delegation, the wrong ' +\n 'curve to authorize a payment. OPENS THE KEYSTORE (one wallet signature) ' +\n 'when an owned piece is not on this machine and no session key is live, ' +\n 'minting the same ≤24h read-scoped delegation `publish` and `edit` mint; ' +\n 'every later owned read reuses it and asks for nothing. TRANSMITS A ' +\n 'CREDENTIAL: that wallet-derived delegation goes to the server on a cold ' +\n '402. It is minted and presented only for the origin of the piece being ' +\n 'read, and never for a second origin while one for another is cached, ' +\n 'which is what bounds a stray `--base-url`; no scope on it limits what a ' +\n 'holder could do with it. Not read-only: a freshly delivered piece is ' +\n 'saved to the library.',\n },\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin outcome:*)',\n command: 'tenjin outcome',\n note:\n 'Free honest outcome report on a past search. No wallet, no payment. ' +\n 'Not read-only: it POSTs a report that moves the marketplace reuse signal.',\n },\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin doctor:*)',\n command: 'tenjin doctor',\n note:\n 'Local environment and API reachability diagnostics. Decrypts the wallet ' +\n 'locally to check it still opens; signs nothing and sends nothing.',\n },\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin wallet show:*)',\n command: 'tenjin wallet show',\n note: 'Prints the wallet address and key source. Never prints the key.',\n },\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin wallet balance:*)',\n command: 'tenjin wallet balance',\n note: 'Read-only USDC balance query on Base.',\n },\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin config get:*)',\n command: 'tenjin config get',\n note:\n 'Reads one effective config value. `config set` is excluded on purpose. ' +\n 'Note `config get rpcUrl` returns your RPC URL, which commonly embeds a ' +\n 'provider API key: no wallet secret, but a credential-adjacent read.',\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The verbs offered as EXPLICIT opt-in lines rather than shipped in the safe set:\n * the one that spends, and the one that opens the keystore.\n *\n * Read the buy note carefully before pasting the line: on the DEFAULT config this\n * rule authorizes unattended spending up to the wallet balance. Walking\n * `--yes` clears confirmation only. Zero daily budget refuses positive payments,\n * finite budgets cap cumulative exposure, and `none` explicitly removes that cap.\n */\nexport const OPT_IN_ALLOWLIST: readonly AllowlistEntry[] = [\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin buy:*)',\n command: 'tenjin buy',\n note:\n 'SPENDS USDC on Base, unrefundably. This authorizes UNATTENDED purchases: ' +\n '`--yes` is an ordinary flag on the same allowlisted verb and it clears the ' +\n 'confirm gate only. Manual purchases do not obey maxAutoSpend or sessionBudget; those limits apply only to automatic router spending. ' +\n 'This permission never raises a spend cap, but those automatic caps do not bound this verb. Use --max-price for an explicit per-purchase ceiling and require consent for the quoted purchase.',\n },\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin pay:*)',\n command: 'tenjin pay',\n note:\n 'SPENDS USDC on Base, unrefundably. Only for explicit user-requested payments with consent for the live quote; never an autonomous router-refusal workaround. Automatic router limits do not apply. Registry lookup failures or listed-term mismatches require --ignore-warnings ' +\n 'for that invocation, and --yes confirms payment only. Both still obey an explicit --max-price, ' +\n 'balance and destination checks. maxAutoSpend and sessionBudget apply only to automatic router spending. Every paid call can spend again.',\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The one rule that is neither always-safe nor a standing opt-in: it exists only\n * while `publish.mode` is `auto` or `full-auto`.\n *\n * The mode IS the consent. An operator who set auto has already said a clean\n * publish should proceed without asking; leaving the harness prompt in front of\n * it asks the same question a second time, in a place the mode cannot answer,\n * and the agent that hits it does the only safe thing and stops. That was the\n * observed failure: a session ran `tenjin config get publish.mode` mid-publish to\n * discover it had permission it had already been given (#161).\n *\n * NOT part of {@link recommendedRules}, and not a tier an operator picks from.\n * There is no line to paste and no flag that adds it: `install` writes it when\n * the mode it just settled is auto or full-auto, takes it back when the mode is\n * review, and `uninstall` reclaims it like every other rule this CLI wrote.\n */\nexport const PUBLISH_MODE_ALLOWLIST: readonly AllowlistEntry[] = [\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin publish:*)',\n command: 'tenjin publish',\n note:\n 'PUBLISHES PUBLICLY under your identity, and is cleared only while publish.mode is ' +\n 'auto or full-auto: the mode is the consent, and the harness prompt would ask for it ' +\n 'twice. Three things it clears that the free tier never did. It OPENS THE KEYSTORE: ' +\n 'publish always resolves a signer, and with no usable session it mints one at ' +\n 'read+write scope, which is strictly broader than the read-only key `tenjin read` ' +\n 'mints to recover an owned piece. It publishes the contents ' +\n 'of ANY REGULAR LOCAL FILE the agent can read, gated only by the heuristic scan. And it is a ' +\n 'PREFIX rule, so it pins the verb and not the flags: `--base-url` rides it (see the ' +\n 'flag caveat), and `--yes` is an ordinary flag on the same verb that clears exactly ' +\n 'the WARN findings auto stopped on, so a re-run collapses auto into full-auto with ' +\n 'nobody asked. The local scan is warn-only now and every finding routes through the ' +\n 'same consent flow this mode already governs; what still refuses a publish outright is ' +\n 'the SERVER’s ingest gate (vendor tokens, private keys, seed phrases, DB passwords, ' +\n 'bearer headers), which no mode and no flag clears. The skills hold the rest of that ' +\n 'line. Set publish.mode back to review and the rule is retracted.',\n },\n {\n rule: 'Bash(tenjin edit:*)',\n command: 'tenjin edit',\n note:\n 'Updates posts your wallet ALREADY OWNS: reprices, refreshes an as-of date, repairs an ' +\n 'answer card, and flips status both ways, so it CAN PROMOTE A DRAFT TO PUBLISHED under ' +\n 'this same gate (promotion re-runs the block-tier secret scan over the stored body). ' +\n 'Owner-scoped on both legs (GET and PUT /api/posts/<id> are signed and owner-only), ' +\n 'spends nothing, moves no keys, and mints no new posts: a narrower blast radius than ' +\n 'the publish rule beside it, though promotion means existing drafts can go public. It ' +\n 'rides the same mode for the same reason: edit runs the identical publish.mode consent ' +\n 'gate in the CLI (lib/consent.ts needsConfirmation), so a mode that publishes ' +\n 'unattended and then cannot fix its own post\\u2019s price is the asymmetry the mode ' +\n 'exists to remove. It opens the keystore on the same terms as the publish rule beside ' +\n 'it, and takes the same prefix-rule caveats. Removed by the same return to review.',\n },\n];\n\n/** The mode-gated rules in effect for `mode`; empty on review. */\nexport function modeGatedAllowlist(mode: PublishMode): AllowlistEntry[] {\n return mode === 'review' ? [] : PUBLISH_MODE_ALLOWLIST.map((e) => ({ ...e }));\n}\n\n/**\n * Verbs that must NEVER appear in the recommended allowlist, with the reason each\n * one is a human decision. `tenjin wallet send` is the wallet escape hatch\n * (tenjin-agent #40) and heads this list: it moves USDC to an arbitrary address,\n * outside the spend policy that bounds `buy`. Naming it here is load-bearing even\n * in versions where the verb does not exist yet — the exclusion ships before the\n * verb does.\n *\n * `tenjin publish` stays on this list under its own terms: nothing RECOMMENDS it,\n * and no line here or on the doc page adds it. {@link PUBLISH_MODE_ALLOWLIST} is\n * not a recommendation — it is what one specific operator choice already means.\n */\nexport const NEVER_ALLOWLISTED: readonly ExcludedVerb[] = [\n {\n command: 'tenjin wallet send',\n reason:\n 'Moves USDC out of the wallet to an arbitrary address (the escape hatch, #40). ' +\n 'Irreversible and not bounded by the buy spend policy. Always a human decision.',\n },\n {\n command: 'tenjin publish',\n reason:\n 'Puts your content on a public marketplace under your identity. Never pre-cleared by the ' +\n 'free tier or an opt-in line: the only thing that clears it is `publish.mode` auto or ' +\n 'full-auto, which is the same human decision said once instead of twice (see ' +\n 'PUBLISH_MODE_ALLOWLIST). Back on review, `install` takes the rule away again.',\n },\n {\n command: 'tenjin edit',\n reason:\n 'Write-capable despite the no-flag form reading as a pure show: it edits live posts ' +\n 'and answer cards under your identity, and moves prices. A prefix rule pins the verb, ' +\n 'not the flags, so no rule can clear the read half without clearing the write half. ' +\n 'Never pre-cleared as a recommendation: like `tenjin publish`, the only thing that ' +\n 'clears it is `publish.mode` auto or full-auto, whose consent gate it already shares ' +\n '(see PUBLISH_MODE_ALLOWLIST). Back on review, `install` takes the rule away again.',\n },\n {\n command: 'tenjin delete',\n reason:\n 'Destroys a published piece. It is the one write verb `publish.mode` deliberately does NOT ' +\n 'carry: the mode is consent to publish, and reading it as consent to destroy would let one ' +\n 'decision authorize a different, irreversible one. So no mode ever clears this rule, and ' +\n 'the CLI confirms on every run regardless — a prefix rule here would only remove the ' +\n 'harness prompt in front of a command that asks its own question anyway. Reach for ' +\n '`tenjin edit --status draft` when the piece should come down reversibly.',\n },\n {\n command: 'tenjin wallet create',\n reason: 'Creates the payment credential; a stray run is a wallet you did not mean to have.',\n },\n {\n command: 'tenjin wallet repair',\n reason:\n 'Saves the passphrase that unlocks the payment credential, typed by a person; a rule ' +\n 'would let an agent overwrite the stored passphrase without the person seeing it.',\n },\n {\n command: 'tenjin config set',\n reason:\n 'Can raise maxAutoSpend / sessionBudget, i.e. widen the agent’s own spend policy — ' +\n 'and, through shelfBypassSecret + baseUrl, put the machine in team mode, where a publish ' +\n 'skips the scan’s warn tier (except secret-assignment, and hex32-value, the warn form a ' +\n 'block-tier check demotes to) and prices at 0. It also writes ' +\n 'publish.ackServerWarnings on, the most direct consent-loosening write on this verb: ' +\n 'it lets one --yes cover the marketplace’s own scan findings, which no payload had ' +\n 'rendered when that yes was given.',\n },\n {\n command: 'tenjin install',\n reason: 'Writes into harness config and skills directories.',\n },\n {\n command: 'tenjin mcp',\n reason:\n 'Long-running server that re-exposes every command core over stdio; ' +\n 'clearing it would indirectly clear everything above.',\n },\n {\n command: 'tenjin update',\n reason:\n 'Replaces the tenjin binary the agent then runs, with whatever npm serves ' +\n 'next. Which build an agent executes is an operator decision, not something ' +\n 'a rule pre-clears. `--check` only reports, but a prefix rule pins the verb, ' +\n 'not the flags.',\n },\n];\n\n/**\n * The flag-surface caveat. A prefix rule pins the verb, never the flags, and the\n * flag that matters is `--base-url`: it is accepted on every leaf, validated only\n * as a URL, and it wins settings precedence, so it moves the destination of every\n * allowlisted verb. Printed with the rules everywhere they are printed, because\n * an operator who only reads the verb list would never learn it.\n */\nexport const FLAG_CAVEAT: readonly string[] = [\n 'Caveat: a prefix rule pins the VERB, not the flags. Every line above also clears',\n '`--base-url <url>` on that verb, which re-points where the question, the probe, the',\n 'session key `read` mints and presents, and (for buy) the signature and payment go.',\n 'Signed and credential-bearing traffic is NOT confined to the paying verb: `read` is in',\n 'the safe tier and both mints a wallet-derived delegation and transmits it, which is why',\n 'that delegation is bound to the origin it was minted for and refused elsewhere.',\n 'Allowlist these verbs only if you are content for the agent to choose the destination',\n 'host, and set the base URL in config instead of letting it be an argument. The skills',\n 'tell agents never to pass --base-url on an allowlisted verb, but that is a convention,',\n 'not an enforced boundary.',\n 'This covers the two rules your publish.mode carries as well, and bites hardest there:',\n '`tenjin publish --base-url <host>` is cleared by default on auto, and it signs against',\n 'the host it is given.',\n];\n\n/**\n * The MCP caveat. `tenjin mcp` is never recommended as a Bash rule, but an\n * operator who registers the server anyway is on a different permission surface\n * (tools, not command strings) where three excluded verbs come back.\n */\nexport const MCP_CAVEAT: readonly string[] = [\n 'Note the asymmetry: publish.mode writes the Bash rules for `publish` and `edit`, and',\n 'deliberately does not touch the MCP tool grants below. The mode is a CLI-side consent',\n 'gate, and nothing reads it on the MCP surface, so clearing those tools would hand out',\n 'the same authority with none of the same gate. Aligning the two is tracked separately.',\n 'Running the local MCP server (`tenjin mcp`) instead? That is a different permission',\n 'surface: the harness gates TOOLS there, and these Bash rules do not apply. Leave',\n '`mcp__tenjin__tenjin_publish`, `mcp__tenjin__tenjin_edit`,',\n '`mcp__tenjin__tenjin_delete`, and `mcp__tenjin__tenjin_wallet` gated. `tenjin_buy` is',\n 'the same opt-in decision as the buy line above. `tenjin_delete` is the one whose own',\n 'core still confirms even if you clear it: it never reads publish.mode.',\n];\n\n/** The machine shape emitted by `tenjin doctor --json` and `tenjin install --json`. */\nexport interface RecommendedPermissions {\n alwaysSafe: AllowlistEntry[];\n optIn: AllowlistEntry[];\n neverAllowlisted: ExcludedVerb[];\n /**\n * Rules the CURRENT publish.mode carries, empty on review. Separate from the\n * three tiers above because it is not a recommendation to weigh: it is what\n * this machine's mode already means, so a consumer that renders it beside the\n * others would be offering a choice that has been made.\n */\n modeGated: AllowlistEntry[];\n /**\n * Whether any harness on THIS machine can carry the rules above. They are\n * `Bash(...)` lines, Claude Code's grammar; a reader that took this payload\n * for a description of a Codex-only machine concluded `publish.mode=auto`\n * was in force while Codex was rejecting `tenjin publish` before the CLI ran\n * (tenjin-agent#342). The document still ships for a harness you have not\n * installed yet, so check this before treating any rule below as granted.\n */\n effective: boolean;\n /** Caveats that qualify the rules above; never omit them when rendering. */\n caveats: { flags: string[]; mcp: string[] };\n}\n\n/**\n * `mode` defaults to the shipped `review`, i.e. no mode-gated rules.\n * `effective` defaults to FALSE, so a caller that has not established such a\n * harness cannot have the payload claim one by omission.\n */\nexport function recommendedPermissions(\n mode: PublishMode = 'review',\n effective = false,\n): RecommendedPermissions {\n return {\n alwaysSafe: ALWAYS_SAFE_ALLOWLIST.map((e) => ({ ...e })),\n optIn: OPT_IN_ALLOWLIST.map((e) => ({ ...e })),\n neverAllowlisted: NEVER_ALLOWLISTED.map((e) => ({ ...e })),\n modeGated: modeGatedAllowlist(mode),\n effective,\n caveats: { flags: [...FLAG_CAVEAT], mcp: [...MCP_CAVEAT] },\n };\n}\n\n/** Every rule this module recommends adding (safe + opt-in). */\nexport function recommendedRules(): string[] {\n return [...ALWAYS_SAFE_ALLOWLIST, ...OPT_IN_ALLOWLIST].map((e) => e.rule);\n}\n\n/**\n * The permission caveats' one home. `doctor` used to print the whole thing —\n * nine rules, both opt-in notes, every exclusion, the flag caveat and the MCP\n * caveat, ~60 lines ahead of the check list it was actually run for. No doctor\n * command in the wider ecosystem carries security prose, and an operator reading\n * a wall of it in a terminal cannot paste from it, search it, or link a colleague\n * to a section. The page can do all three, so it is where the caveats live and\n * where every human surface points; `--json` still carries them as data\n * (`recommendedPermissions`), which is what an agent reads.\n */\nexport const PERMISSIONS_DOC_URL =\n 'https://github.com/BackTrackCo/tenjin-agent/blob/main/docs/agent-permissions.md';\n\n/**\n * The rules the current mode is missing, or null when it needs none. This one\n * DOES name them: they are not a tier to weigh and paste, they\n * are lines that should already be in the operator's settings file, and an\n * operator whose agent is being prompted for work the mode said not to ask about\n * needs to see exactly which rules are missing.\n *\n * CONSULTS THE MACHINE. Rendering from the mode alone told operators to add\n * rules their settings file already had, and named a remedy that in one case\n * would not have written anything — a nag that is wrong twice over on a line\n * whose whole job is to prevent an agent stalling on a prompt (#161).\n */\nexport function modeGatedPointer(\n mode: PublishMode,\n /** The mode-gated rules this machine is actually MISSING. Empty renders nothing. */\n missing: readonly string[],\n /**\n * The command that would fix it. `tenjin install` for the ordinary case; a\n * mode coming from TENJIN_PUBLISH_MODE needs `config set` instead, because\n * install resolves the mode from the global file and would write nothing.\n */\n remedy = 'tenjin install',\n): string | null {\n if (modeGatedAllowlist(mode).length === 0 || missing.length === 0) return null;\n return `publish.mode=${mode} also needs ${missing.join(' and ')} in your harness allowlist, or it will prompt anyway; \\`${remedy}\\` writes them.`;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AAyOO,IAAM,yBAAoD;AAAA,EAC/D;AAAA,IACE,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,SAAS;AAAA,IACT,MACE;AAAA,EAeJ;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,IACE,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,SAAS;AAAA,IACT,MACE;AAAA,EAWJ;AACF;AAGO,SAAS,mBAAmB,MAAqC;AACtE,SAAO,SAAS,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,uBAAuB,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE;AAC9E;AA8LO,IAAM,sBACX;AAcK,SAAS,iBACd,MAEA,SAMA,SAAS,kBACM;AACf,MAAI,mBAAmB,IAAI,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;AAC1E,SAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,eAAe,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,2DAA2D,MAAM;AAClI;","names":[]}