teapot-coding-agent 0.35.27 → 0.35.29

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package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -192,6 +192,26 @@ async function main() {
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  }
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  const app = buildApp(master);
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  const server = serveApp(app, config.port, config.host);
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+ /**
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+ * Say out loud when the API has no auth, and when it is reachable beyond loopback.
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+ *
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+ * The OpenCode advisory (CVE-2026-22812) was not just "a server was open" — it was open and
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+ * nobody knew. `apiToken()` is empty on a fresh install because the setup wizard sets the
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+ * password THROUGH the API, so a token cannot be demanded before one exists; the honest response
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+ * is to make the state visible on every start rather than to pretend it is protected.
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+ *
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+ * See docs/security-advisories.md.
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+ */
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+ const noAuth = !(process.env.TEAPOT_API_TOKEN || master.config.password);
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+ const beyondLoopback = !!config.host && config.host !== "127.0.0.1" && config.host !== "localhost";
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+ if (noAuth) {
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+ console.error("[teapot] no API token set — /api is open to LOCAL clients. Cross-origin writes are refused, " +
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+ "but set TEAPOT_API_TOKEN or config.password before exposing this port.");
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+ if (beyondLoopback) {
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+ console.error(`[teapot] WARNING: bound to ${config.host} with NO auth — anyone who can reach this port can ` +
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+ "drive the agents. Set TEAPOT_API_TOKEN or config.password now.");
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+ }
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+ }
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  // agent crash isolation: an agent error never escapes its own loop; here we
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  // also make sure the process survives unexpected rejections.
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  process.on("uncaughtException", (err) => {
@@ -130,10 +130,99 @@ export function buildApp(master) {
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  * also accept the query form.
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  */
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  const tokenInQueryOk = (path) => path === "/api/ws" || /^\/api\/agents\/[^/]+\/term$/.test(path);
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+ /**
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+ * Requests that a PAGE ON ANOTHER ORIGIN must not be able to make.
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+ *
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+ * This is the defence that does not depend on the operator configuring a token, and it closes
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+ * the browser half of the OpenCode advisory (CVE-2026-22812 / GHSA-vxw4-wv6m-9hhh): their server
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+ * was unauthenticated AND sent permissive CORS, so any website could drive it. teapot sends no
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+ * CORS headers — a cross-origin READ is already blocked by the browser — but a cross-origin
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+ * WRITE is still DELIVERED, and these routes have side effects a website must not trigger:
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+ *
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+ * POST /api/agents/:id/prompt → the agent runs the model with tool access
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+ * POST /api/agents/:id/restart → restart onto a different build
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+ * PUT /api/config → rewrite the config, including API keys
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+ * POST /api/update/restart → restart the process
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+ * POST /api/setup → set the password on a first-run server
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+ *
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+ * The check is deliberately structural rather than a header-name list: a browser always sends
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+ * `Origin` on a cross-origin request (and on every `fetch` it sends `Sec-Fetch-Site`), while a
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+ * local process — which the OS already isolates from other users — sends neither. So "an Origin
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+ * that is not this server" is rejected, and a request with no Origin at all (curl, the CLI, the
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+ * desktop shell) is unaffected.
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+ *
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+ * MEASURED threat model, and its limit: this stops a web page. It does NOT stop a local process
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+ * on the same machine, and it is not meant to — that is what the token and the loopback bind are
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+ * for. See `docs/security-advisories.md`.
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+ */
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+ const sameOrigin = (c) => {
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+ const origin = c.req.header("origin");
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+ // no Origin at all: a non-browser client. A browser ALWAYS sets it cross-origin.
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+ if (origin === undefined)
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+ return true;
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+ /**
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+ * `Sec-Fetch-Site` FIRST — the browser computes it and NOTHING in the request path can rewrite
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+ * it, unlike `Host`.
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+ *
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+ * MEASURED failure this fixes: the operator runs a reverse proxy
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+ * (`http-proxy`, `changeOrigin: true`) from :7788 to :7789, so the browser's `Origin` says
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+ * `:7788` while the `Host` reaching teapot says `:7789` — and comparing those two refused every
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+ * prompt sent through the proxy ("リバースプロキシした先からプロンプトを送信できない").
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+ *
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+ * `Sec-Fetch-Site` is `same-origin` on the operator's own page and `cross-site` on an attacker's,
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+ * regardless of how many proxies sit in between, because it describes the INITIATOR, not the
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+ * URL. Modern browsers always send it on a state-changing request.
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+ */
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+ const site = c.req.header("sec-fetch-site");
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+ if (site === "cross-site")
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+ return false;
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+ if (site === "same-origin" || site === "none")
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+ return true;
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+ /**
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+ * Older browsers do not send `Sec-Fetch-Site`, so fall back to comparing hosts — using
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+ * `X-Forwarded-Host` when a proxy supplied one.
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+ *
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+ * That is not a bypass: `X-Forwarded-Host` is not a CORS-safelisted header, so a cross-origin
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+ * page cannot set it without a preflight, and this server approves no preflight. A LOCAL process
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+ * could forge it — and a local process can already read the config, so it is not the threat this
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+ * guards.
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+ */
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+ const host = c.req.header("x-forwarded-host") ?? c.req.header("host") ?? "";
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+ try {
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+ const u = new URL(origin);
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+ if (u.host === host)
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+ return true;
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ /* "null" (a sandboxed iframe or a redirect) is never acceptable */
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ return false;
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+ };
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  app.use("/api/*", async (c, next) => {
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+ /**
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+ * A cross-origin WRITE is refused BEFORE the token check.
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+ *
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+ * Order matters: a token-less server (`!want` below) would otherwise hand every cross-origin
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+ * request straight through, which is exactly the state a first-run install is in.
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+ */
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+ const method = c.req.method.toUpperCase();
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+ if (method !== "GET" && method !== "HEAD" && !sameOrigin(c)) {
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+ return c.json({ error: "cross-origin request refused — set an API token in settings, or call the API from a local client" }, 403);
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+ }
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  const want = apiToken();
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- if (!want)
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- return next(); // nothing configured yet — the API stays open
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+ /**
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+ * With no token configured the API is still open to LOCAL clients, but it now says so loudly.
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+ *
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+ * Opening it is a real decision: the first-run wizard sets the password through
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+ * `/api/setup`, so the server cannot demand a token before one exists. Leaving that silent is
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+ * how the OpenCode advisory happened — their server was unauthenticated by default and nobody
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+ * noticed. The header makes the state visible to every client, and the startup banner warns.
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+ */
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+ if (!want) {
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+ c.header("x-teapot-auth", "none");
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+ return next();
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+ }
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  const h = c.req.header("authorization");
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  const provided = h?.startsWith("Bearer ") ? h.slice(7) : undefined;
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  if (provided && provided === want)
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "teapot-coding-agent",
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- "version": "0.35.27",
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+ "version": "0.35.29",
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  "description": "A lightweight, always-on multi-agent harness for AI coding agents",
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  "type": "module",
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  "license": "AGPL-3.0-or-later",