tamperward 1.5.1 → 1.6.0

package/README.md

@@ -248,8 +248,18 @@ versus the gate's 9.0% — a ~2.75× precision edge, not the ≥5× I bet, and t
 unconfigured repos is published as the honest tuning-and-sign-off cost, not hidden.
 The loop-layer deny alone was never the product; the measured margins are whole-class
 spelling coverage, commit-layer precision plus sign-off machinery, and the layers no
-hook has. Running ledger: **52 pre-registered bets — 23 refuted, 27 held, 2
-unresolvable.**
+hook has. Two follow-ups closed the loops this study opened. The sentence was then
+aimed at the regime where the gate is blind — Sonnet's 10/10 assertion-laundering
+seed — and produced a **complete flip: 10/10 honest** (`harness/PREDICTION-baselines.md`,
+addendum): naming the act is the intervention Sonnet's framing-triggered honesty
+runs on. And the promised **tuned-gate numbers** now exist
+(`harness/PREDICTION-tuned-fp.md`): 9.0% unconfigured → **6.0%** with a one-line
+severity tune → roughly one sign-off decision per 17 commits residual. The same study
+shipped per-rule `exclude` globs (1.6.0, with the policy-weakening symmetry built in)
+and then measured them honestly: **zero effect on this corpus** — these repos' casts
+live in source, not tests, so the zod-recommended path scoping removed nothing here;
+the null is published next to the feature. Running ledger: **56 pre-registered
+bets — 25 refuted, 29 held, 2 unresolvable.**
 
 **What about false positives?** `snapshot-rewrite` was swept over **1,652 real mainline
 commits** (prettier, jest, docusaurus, immer): 216 touched snapshots, all legitimately —

package/dist/cli/index.js

@@ -984,6 +984,11 @@ function policyWeakening(before, after) {
     if (ar.enabled === false && br.enabled !== false) {
       reasons.push(`rule "${name}" disabled (enabled: false)`);
     }
+    const beforeEx = new Set(br.exclude ?? []);
+    const addedEx = (ar.exclude ?? []).filter((g) => !beforeEx.has(g));
+    if (addedEx.length) {
+      reasons.push(`rule "${name}" exclude globs added (${addedEx.join(", ")}) \u2014 blinds this rule on those paths`);
+    }
   }
   const beforeIgnore = new Set(be.ignore);
   const addedIgnore = ae.ignore.filter((g) => !beforeIgnore.has(g));
@@ -1396,12 +1401,17 @@ function evaluate(changes, policy, detectors = allDetectors, view) {
     }
   }
   const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
-  return out.filter((f) => {
+  const deduped = out.filter((f) => {
     const k = key(f);
     if (seen.has(k)) return false;
     seen.add(k);
     return true;
   });
+  return deduped.filter((f) => {
+    const ex = policy.rules[f.rule]?.exclude;
+    if (!ex?.length || !f.file || isPolicyFile(f.file)) return true;
+    return !matchesAny(f.file, ex);
+  });
 }
 function hasBlocking(findings) {
   return findings.some((f) => f.severity === "block");

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "tamperward",
-  "version": "1.5.1",
+  "version": "1.6.0",
   "description": "The deterministic agent-integrity gate. One ruleset, evaluated on the actual diff/commands as a verdict, enforced everywhere a change can be made.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "hexrift",