talentos 1.4.13 → 1.4.15
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/agent/adapters.js +13 -3
- package/dist/agent/codex-policy.js +13 -0
- package/dist/agent/gemini-policy.js +3 -3
- package/dist/agent/native/codex-fence.js +13 -3
- package/dist/agent/native/codex-launch.js +2 -0
- package/dist/agent/native/hook-entry.js +1 -0
- package/dist/agent/native/launch.js +4 -0
- package/dist/agent/native/paths.js +29 -2
- package/dist/agent/native/policy.js +2 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/agent/adapters.js
CHANGED
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { redactAgentOutput, } from "../agent-link.js";
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import { gatewayLauncherPath } from "../gateway-install.js";
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import { providerPathEnv, resolveProviderBinary } from "../provider-binary.js";
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import { codexImagesProven, probeCodexImages } from "./codex-image-probe.js";
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-
import { codexRoomArgs,
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import { codexRoomArgs, ROOM_DIRECT_TOOLS, ROOM_PROXY_ONLY_TOOLS, } from "./codex-policy.js";
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import { binaryIdentity, CodexBoundaryError, CodexProbeInterrupted, codexWebProven, probeCodexBoundary, } from "./codex-probe.js";
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import { geminiRoomArgs } from "./gemini-policy.js";
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import { GeminiBoundaryError, probeGeminiBoundary } from "./gemini-probe.js";
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@@ -67,7 +67,15 @@ const CLAUDE_ISOLATION_FLAGS = [
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];
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// What Codex prints when the required room server never listed its tools.
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const ROOM_SERVER_FAILED = /required MCP servers failed to initialize/u;
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-
const CLAUDE_TOOLS =
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const CLAUDE_TOOLS = ROOM_DIRECT_TOOLS.map((tool) => `mcp__talentos__${tool}`).join(",");
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// Denied as well as left out of the allow list: a denied tool is not shown to
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// the model, an unlisted one is only refused when it is called.
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const CLAUDE_DISALLOWED = [
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"Bash",
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"Agent",
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"Task",
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...ROOM_PROXY_ONLY_TOOLS.map((tool) => `mcp__talentos__${tool}`),
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].join(",");
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// A room job with web: Claude's own search (run by Anthropic, it reads nothing on
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// this computer), no other built-in tool. WebFetch stays out: it would run on the
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// owner's computer and could be pointed at their network (#13155 review). Pages
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@@ -468,6 +476,7 @@ export async function runProvider(input) {
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roomId: job.packet.room?.id,
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roomFileIds: roomFileIds(job.packet),
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triggerId: job.packet.trigger?.id,
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ownAsk: job.native?.ownAsk,
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sessionId,
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sharedRoom: job.native?.sharedRoom,
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workspace: input.owner.workspace,
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@@ -521,6 +530,7 @@ export async function runProvider(input) {
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roomId: job.packet.room?.id,
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roomFileIds: roomFileIds(job.packet),
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triggerId: job.packet.trigger?.id,
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ownAsk: job.native?.ownAsk,
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sessionId,
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sharedRoom: job.native?.sharedRoom,
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signal,
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@@ -576,7 +586,7 @@ export async function runProvider(input) {
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? `${CLAUDE_TOOLS},${CLAUDE_WEB_TOOLS},${READ_PAGE_TOOL}`
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: CLAUDE_TOOLS,
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"--disallowedTools",
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-
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CLAUDE_DISALLOWED,
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"--permission-mode",
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"dontAsk",
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// None of the owner's CLAUDE.md, rules, hooks or output style. The login
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@@ -52,6 +52,19 @@ export const ROOM_TOOLS = [
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"room_default_remove",
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"whoami",
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];
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// The upload tools run in the talentos CLI's stdio proxy (mcp-proxy.ts), which
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// reads the file from the job's folder and streams it to storage; the server's
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// own upload_file only refuses. A room-only Claude Code or Gemini CLI job
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// reaches /mcp directly, with no proxy, and has no shell or file tool that could
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// make a file to name, so those launches never offer these (a Codex job, which
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// goes through the proxy, keeps them).
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const PROXY_ONLY_TOOLS = new Set([
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"upload_file",
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"prepare_upload",
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"commit_upload",
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]);
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export const ROOM_DIRECT_TOOLS = ROOM_TOOLS.filter((tool) => !PROXY_ONLY_TOOLS.has(tool));
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export const ROOM_PROXY_ONLY_TOOLS = ROOM_TOOLS.filter((tool) => PROXY_ONLY_TOOLS.has(tool));
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// A TOML inline table of string pairs, for a `-c` value.
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const tomlTable = (pairs) => `{${pairs.map(([key, value]) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}=${JSON.stringify(value)}`).join(",")}}`;
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export function codexRoomArgs(input) {
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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-
import {
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import { ROOM_DIRECT_TOOLS } from "./codex-policy.js";
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// A Gemini CLI room job's boundary, written as the CLI's own policy engine and
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// user settings (verified against @google/gemini-cli 0.65.0 with its own
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// binary: see docs/features/agent-access/README.md, "Gemini CLI"). Three layers:
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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ denyMessage = "A room job can only use its room tools."
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[[rule]]
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mcpName = "${GEMINI_SERVER}"
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-
toolName = ${JSON.stringify([...
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toolName = ${JSON.stringify([...ROOM_DIRECT_TOOLS])}
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decision = "allow"
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priority = 100
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`;
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@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ export function geminiRoomSettings(input) {
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httpUrl: input.mcpUrl,
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// The server lists more than a room job may use: only these are ever
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// registered with the model.
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-
includeTools: [...
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includeTools: [...ROOM_DIRECT_TOOLS],
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},
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},
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privacy: { usageStatisticsEnabled: false },
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@@ -105,10 +105,10 @@ const OWNER_FEATURE_ARGS = [
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"features.multi_agent=false",
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"agents.enabled=false",
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"tools.experimental_request_user_input.enabled=false",
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// Owner call: an owner-native Codex brings its own memory into room jobs
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// (it reads it), but never writes teammates' room work into it. Room-only
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// jobs keep both off (codex-policy.ts).
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"memories.generate_memories=false",
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// Owner call: Codex's own memory stays out of room jobs; the room is the
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// shared record (room-only jobs turn it off too, codex-policy.ts).
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"memories.use_memories=false",
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];
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/**
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* The owner-native launch arguments, minus the hook-trust argument (built
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@@ -129,6 +129,16 @@ export function codexOwnerArgs(input) {
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"-c",
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'approval_policy="never"',
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...OWNER_FEATURE_ARGS.flatMap((flag) => ["-c", flag]),
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// Never list a skill the agent cannot open (#14449): include_instructions
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// hides the whole list, skip_host_skill_discovery the owner's own folders.
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...(input.ownAsk
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? []
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: [
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"-c",
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"skills.include_instructions=false",
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"-c",
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"features.skip_host_skill_discovery=true",
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]),
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"-c",
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`model_catalog_json=${JSON.stringify(input.catalogPath)}`,
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"-c",
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ export async function prepareCodexOwnerLaunch(input) {
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await writePrivateFile(join(jobDir, "context.json"), JSON.stringify({
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...(input.askSocket ? { askSocket: input.askSocket } : {}),
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home: input.home,
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...(input.ownAsk ? { ownAsk: true } : {}),
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...(input.roomId ? { roomId: input.roomId } : {}),
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...(input.roomFileIds ? { roomFileIds: input.roomFileIds } : {}),
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...(input.triggerId ? { triggerId: input.triggerId } : {}),
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@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ export async function prepareCodexOwnerLaunch(input) {
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catalogPath,
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mcpArgs: mcp.args,
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mcpCommand: mcp.command,
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ownAsk: input.ownAsk,
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prompt: input.prompt,
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sessionId: input.sessionId,
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writableRoot: input.workspace.writeRoots[0] ?? input.workspace.cwd,
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@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ export async function runHook(jobDir, raw, holdMs = HOLD_MS) {
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home: context.home,
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roomId: context.roomId,
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roomFileIds: context.roomFileIds,
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skillsReadable: context.ownAsk === true,
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triggerId: context.triggerId,
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writeRoots: context.writeRoots,
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};
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@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ export async function prepareOwnerLaunch(input) {
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await writePrivateFile(join(jobDir, "context.json"), JSON.stringify({
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...(input.askSocket ? { askSocket: input.askSocket } : {}),
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home: input.home,
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...(input.ownAsk ? { ownAsk: true } : {}),
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...(input.roomId ? { roomId: input.roomId } : {}),
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...(input.roomFileIds ? { roomFileIds: input.roomFileIds } : {}),
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...(input.triggerId ? { triggerId: input.triggerId } : {}),
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@@ -91,6 +92,9 @@ export async function prepareOwnerLaunch(input) {
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join(jobDir, "mcp.json"),
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"--disallowedTools",
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DISALLOWED,
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// Never list a skill the agent cannot open (#14449): off unless the
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// server said this is the owner's own ask, the only one the hook opens.
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...(input.ownAsk ? [] : ["--disable-slash-commands"]),
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];
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if (input.sessionId) {
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args.push("--resume", input.sessionId);
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@@ -30,6 +30,15 @@ const HOME_DIRS = [
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"Library/Application Support/Microsoft Edge",
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"Library/Application Support/1Password",
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];
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/**
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* Skill folders inside a provider's own folder. The one part of it a read may
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* reach, and only on the owner's own ask (#14449): the agent lists these skills
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* to the model, so a skill it cannot open is a dead end. Never a write.
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*/
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const HOME_SKILL_DIRS = [
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{ dir: ".claude/skills", provider: ".claude" },
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{ dir: ".codex/skills", provider: ".codex" },
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];
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/** Home-relative files: credentials, provider config and shell start-up files. */
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const HOME_FILES = [
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".claude.json",
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@@ -92,8 +101,22 @@ export function isInside(child, parent) {
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function homeEntries(home, names) {
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return names.map((name) => canonical(join(home, name), home, home));
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}
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/**
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* The skills folders by real path, each kept only when it is exactly its own
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* provider folder's `skills`. Dropping anything else is deliberate and fail-closed:
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* a skills folder that is a link (to ~/.ssh, to ~/.codex/sessions, or to a
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* dotfiles repo) stays closed on purpose, so a link can never open what it points
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* at. An owner who links their skills folder gets no skills read, never a wider one.
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*/
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function skillFolders(home) {
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return HOME_SKILL_DIRS.map((entry) => ({
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dir: canonical(join(home, entry.dir), home, home),
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provider: canonical(join(home, entry.provider), home, home),
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})).filter((entry) => entry.dir === join(entry.provider, "skills"));
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}
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export function protectedPaths(home, options = {}) {
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return {
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readOpen: options.skillsReadable ? skillFolders(home) : [],
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readWrite: [
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...homeEntries(home, HOME_DIRS),
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...homeEntries(home, HOME_FILES),
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@@ -104,7 +127,11 @@ export function protectedPaths(home) {
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/** Why a canonical path is off limits, or undefined. `mode` "read" skips write-only protections. */
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export function protectedReason(path, mode, home, guard = protectedPaths(home)) {
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for (const entry of guard.readWrite) {
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-
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// Only the entry that is a skills folder's own provider folder is lifted,
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// and only for a read.
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if (isInside(path, entry) &&
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!(mode === "read" &&
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guard.readOpen.some((open) => open.provider === entry && isInside(path, open.dir)))) {
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return "credentials or provider settings";
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}
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}
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@@ -1366,7 +1366,8 @@ function classifyWrite(tool, real, ctx, content) {
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: allow(true);
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}
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export function classifyCall(call, context) {
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const guard = context.guard ??
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const guard = context.guard ??
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protectedPaths(context.home, { skillsReadable: context.skillsReadable });
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const ctx = { ...context, guard, cwd: call.cwd };
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const { tool, toolInput: input } = call;
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if (tool.startsWith("mcp__")) {
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package/package.json
CHANGED