synapse-orch-ai 1.9.0 → 1.9.2

package/README.md

@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ docker run -d \
 
 Then open `http://localhost:3000`. See the [Docker guide](https://docs.synapseorch.com/getting-started/installation#docker) in the docs for custom ports and environment variable configuration.
 
+> **Security:** publish only the frontend port `3000` — the backend (`8765`) serves an internal API and should not be exposed on `0.0.0.0` (docker-compose binds it to `127.0.0.1`). The container auto-generates a shared internal token so that surface is authenticated by default. For any network-reachable deployment, enable **login** (Settings → Security) and/or set `allow_stdio_mcp=false`, since registering a stdio MCP server launches local commands.
+
 ### Upgrading
 
 | Install method | Upgrade command |
@@ -73,6 +75,8 @@ Then open `http://localhost:3000`. See the [Docker guide](https://docs.synapseor
 | npm | `npm update -g synapse-orch-ai` |
 | Docker | `docker pull synapseorchai/synapse-ai:latest` |
 
+> **Upgrade note (security hardening):** the backend now auto-generates a shared internal token and, under docker-compose, binds its port to `127.0.0.1` by default. The UI and its API are unaffected (the frontend proxies the backend internally). If you previously called the **backend directly** on `:8765` (e.g. external API clients), either point them at the frontend instead — `http://host:3000/api/v1|v2/...` — or set `SYNAPSE_BACKEND_BIND=0.0.0.0` in `.env` to keep publishing `:8765`.
+
 ---
 
 ## Scale Mode

package/backend/core/config.py

@@ -108,6 +108,16 @@ def load_settings():
         "messaging_enabled": True,
         "embed_code": False,
         "bash_allowed_dirs": [],
+        # ── MCP stdio server registration (security) ──
+        # stdio MCP servers launch local OS processes (npx/uvx/python/…). This is
+        # a powerful, admin-only capability. Allowed by default for local
+        # single-user use, but force-disabled in scale mode (multi-tenant /
+        # network-exposed) — see stdio_mcp_allowed(). See GHSA-3j67-x3j8-r32x.
+        "allow_stdio_mcp": True,
+        # Optional hardening: when non-empty, only these command basenames may be
+        # registered as stdio servers. Empty = allow any command in PATH.
+        # Recommended for exposed UIs: ["npx","uvx","uv","node","python","python3","docker"]
+        "mcp_command_allowlist": [],
         "login_enabled": False,
         "login_username": "",
         "login_password_hash": "",

package/backend/core/egress_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+"""Egress policy for tools that fetch user- or model-supplied URLs.
+
+A tool's URLs are data, not configuration: they arrive from a prompt, and a
+prompt can be steered by whatever the last scraped page said. A fetcher that
+goes wherever it is pointed will sooner or later be pointed at the network
+the process itself runs on — the cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254,
+169.254.170.2), loopback services on its own host, or anything else the
+subnet can reach. On a cloud runtime the metadata endpoint alone turns one
+injected URL into live credentials.
+
+The policy: http(s) only, and only to addresses that are actually on the
+public internet. Every address a hostname resolves to is checked, not just
+the first — a name with one public and one private record must not pass.
+
+`EGRESS_ALLOW_HOSTS` (comma-separated hostnames) exempts specific hosts from
+the address checks, for installs that genuinely scrape an intranet or a
+localhost dev server, and for tests dialing loopback stand-ins. Empty —
+deny — is the default.
+
+The DNS-rebinding window (resolution here vs. resolution at connect time) is
+deliberately not closed: closing it means owning socket creation and TLS SNI
+handling in every fetch path. Network-level egress control is the layer for
+that; this module is the in-process guard in front of it.
+
+Deliberately stdlib-only, and deliberately not a Settings consumer: it is
+imported by tool subprocesses that must construct in any environment.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import ipaddress
+import os
+import socket
+import time
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+#: Carrier-grade NAT. Not covered by `is_private`, and it is where several
+#: managed-Kubernetes overlays put internal services.
+_CGNAT = ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10")
+
+#: One resolution per host per window is enough for a page's subresources;
+#: short enough that the cache is not itself a rebinding aid.
+_RESOLVE_TTL_SECONDS = 60.0
+_RESOLVE_CACHE_MAX = 512
+
+_resolve_cache: dict[str, tuple[float, list[str]]] = {}
+
+
+class BlockedEgress(ValueError):
+    """A URL that must not be fetched. The message is safe to echo to the model."""
+
+
+class MalformedUrl(BlockedEgress):
+    """Not a URL with a scheme, so it names no destination to check.
+
+    A subclass for the same reason `UnresolvedHost` is: the scraper should
+    refuse what it cannot evaluate. A custom HTTP tool should not, because the
+    commonest way to get here is an unrendered `{{global.api_base}}` — a missing
+    variable, whose own error message names the variable and is worth more than
+    this one. Nothing is conceded: a string with no scheme is one httpx refuses
+    to send anywhere. A URL with a scheme that is simply not http stays a plain
+    `BlockedEgress`.
+    """
+
+
+class UnresolvedHost(BlockedEgress):
+    """The host could not be resolved, so nothing is known about where it points.
+
+    A subclass, so every existing caller keeps failing closed: for the scraper,
+    which is handed URLs a model invented, "unknown" is the right thing to
+    refuse. A *saved* custom HTTP tool is the other case — the host may be an
+    internal API, a service not yet deployed, or a DNS blip, and refusing it is
+    a guess about somebody else's network. `core/builder_tools.py` already says
+    so in as many words about the same URLs at creation time.
+
+    Letting it through concedes nothing: httpx resolves through the same stack
+    a moment later and fails the same lookup. What is not conceded is an
+    address — an IP literal always "resolves", so `169.254.169.254` is still
+    refused by the check below.
+    """
+
+
+def allowed_hosts() -> frozenset[str]:
+    raw = os.environ.get("EGRESS_ALLOW_HOSTS", "")
+    return frozenset(h.strip().lower() for h in raw.split(",") if h.strip())
+
+
+def reject_address(address: str) -> str | None:
+    """Return a reason to refuse this IP, or None to allow it.
+
+    Grouped by what each range would reach, because the point is not that the
+    addresses are unusual but that they are *ours*.
+    """
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(address)
+    except ValueError:
+        return f"{address} is not an IP address"
+
+    # An IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (`::ffff:169.254.170.2`) reaches the IPv4
+    # host while failing every IPv4 range check, so unwrap before testing.
+    if isinstance(ip, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and ip.ipv4_mapped is not None:
+        ip = ip.ipv4_mapped
+
+    if ip.is_loopback:
+        return "loopback"
+    if ip.is_link_local:
+        # 169.254.0.0/16 and fe80::/10 — the cloud metadata range.
+        return "link-local, including the cloud metadata endpoint"
+    # Before `is_private`, which also covers 0.0.0.0/8 and would report the
+    # unspecified address as "private" — true, and unhelpful to whoever typed it.
+    if ip.is_unspecified:
+        return "the unspecified address"
+    if ip.is_private:
+        return "private network"
+    if ip.is_multicast or ip.is_reserved:
+        return "multicast or reserved"
+    if ip.version == 4 and ip in _CGNAT:
+        return "shared address space"
+    return None
+
+
+async def resolve(host: str) -> list[str]:
+    """All addresses `host` resolves to, via the event loop's resolver, cached briefly."""
+    now = time.monotonic()
+    hit = _resolve_cache.get(host)
+    if hit is not None and now - hit[0] < _RESOLVE_TTL_SECONDS:
+        return hit[1]
+
+    loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
+    try:
+        infos = await loop.getaddrinfo(host, None, proto=socket.IPPROTO_TCP)
+    except socket.gaierror as exc:
+        raise UnresolvedHost(f"could not resolve {host}") from exc
+    # sockaddr[0] is typed `str | int` because the tuple shape differs by
+    # address family; for AF_INET and AF_INET6 it is always the address.
+    addresses = sorted({str(info[4][0]) for info in infos})
+
+    if len(_resolve_cache) >= _RESOLVE_CACHE_MAX:
+        _resolve_cache.clear()
+    _resolve_cache[host] = (now, addresses)
+    return addresses
+
+
+async def check_host(host: str) -> None:
+    """Raise `BlockedEgress` unless every address behind `host` is public."""
+    host = host.strip().lower().strip("[]")
+    if not host:
+        raise BlockedEgress("that URL has no host")
+    if host in allowed_hosts():
+        return
+
+    try:
+        ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+        addresses = [host]
+    except ValueError:
+        addresses = await resolve(host)
+
+    for address in addresses:
+        reason = reject_address(address)
+        if reason is not None:
+            # `host` is echoed because the caller supplied it. The addresses
+            # it resolved to are not: that is internal topology, and reading
+            # it back is exactly what an attacker is probing for.
+            raise BlockedEgress(f"{host} resolves to a blocked range: {reason}")
+
+
+async def check_tool_url(url: str) -> None:
+    """`check_url`, with the posture a *saved* custom tool needs.
+
+    The scraper is handed URLs a model invented, so refusing whatever it cannot
+    evaluate is right for it. A custom HTTP tool is different: its URL was
+    written by a person, saved, and may name an internal API, a service not yet
+    deployed, or a host this machine simply cannot resolve. Refusing those is a
+    guess about somebody else's network, and it concedes nothing to allow them —
+    httpx resolves through the same stack a moment later and fails the same
+    lookup, and a string with no scheme is one httpx will not send anywhere.
+
+    What is *not* conceded is an address: an IP literal always resolves, so the
+    cloud metadata endpoint and loopback are refused here exactly as they are
+    for the scraper.
+
+    One function because there are two call sites — the ReAct loop and the
+    orchestration TOOL step — and a control written twice is a control that
+    drifts. That is the lesson the stdio-MCP gate had to be moved for.
+    """
+    try:
+        await check_url(url)
+    except (UnresolvedHost, MalformedUrl):
+        return
+
+
+async def check_url(url: str) -> None:
+    """Check one URL, or raise `BlockedEgress`."""
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    if not parsed.scheme:
+        raise MalformedUrl("that is not a URL; it has no http:// or https:// scheme")
+    if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"}:
+        raise BlockedEgress(
+            f"{parsed.scheme} URLs are not supported; use http or https"
+        )
+    await check_host(parsed.hostname or "")