synabun 2.0.10 → 2.1.0

package/neural-interface/lib/opencode2-proxy.js

@@ -1,37 +1,34 @@
 // ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-// OpenCode 2 — the raw OpenCode 1 requests SynaBun makes, answered on OpenCode 2.
+// The raw requests SynaBun makes to a serve, answered through OpenCode 2's API.
 //
-// Besides the SDK, server.js and the panel's request module call a serve over
-// plain HTTP (`ocpProxy(method, path, body)`): /provider, /agent, /question,
-// /config, /mcp, DELETE /session/:id, … Those are OpenCode 1 paths. On an
-// OpenCode 2 serve every one of them would land on the web app (an HTML page,
-// status 200), so ocpProxy hands them here instead: each known path is
-// answered through the OpenCode 2 client (lib/opencode2-client.js), in the
-// shape OpenCode 1 gave, as `{ status, data }`. A path under /api/ is the same
-// family of routes on both majors (OpenCode 1.18's own /api/* surface became
-// OpenCode 2's API) and goes through with the serve's password. Anything else
-// gets a clear 501 instead of a web page.
+// Besides the client's methods, server.js and the panel's request module call
+// a serve by path (`ocpProxy(method, path, body)`): the provider and agent
+// lists, a session's deletion, the pending questions and a question's answer,
+// the MCP resources, and OpenCode 2's own /api/* routes. Those paths are the
+// ones SynaBun has always named (OpenCode 1's); every one of them would land
+// on OpenCode 2's web app (an HTML page, status 200), so each is answered here
+// through the OpenCode 2 client (lib/opencode2-client.js), in the shapes
+// SynaBun reads, as `{ status, data }`. A path under /api/ goes through with
+// the serve's password. Anything else gets a clear 501 instead of a web page.
 // ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 const json = (status, data) => ({ status, data });
 
 function asProxyResult(result, okStatus = 200) {
-  if (!result) return json(500, { error: 'OpenCode 2 gave no answer' });
+  if (!result) return json(500, { error: 'OpenCode gave no answer' });
   if (result.error) {
     const status = Number(result.response?.status) || 500;
     const error = result.error;
-    const message = typeof error === 'string' ? error : (error?.message || error?.data?.message || 'OpenCode 2 request failed');
+    const message = typeof error === 'string' ? error : (error?.message || error?.data?.message || 'OpenCode request failed');
     return json(status >= 400 ? status : 500, { error: message, ...(error && typeof error === 'object' ? { name: error._tag || error.name || undefined } : {}) });
   }
   return json(okStatus, result.data === undefined ? true : result.data);
 }
 
-const notOnV2 = (what) => json(501, { error: `${what} is not available on OpenCode 2 from SynaBun yet. Use the OpenCode 2 app or CLI for it.` });
-
 /**
- * Answer one raw OpenCode 1 request on an OpenCode 2 serve. `client` is an
- * OpenCode 2 client (createOpencode2Client), `rawFetch(path, init)` sends a
- * request under /api/ with the serve's password (the pass-through).
+ * Answer one raw request on a serve. `client` is an OpenCode 2 client
+ * (createOpencode2Client), `rawFetch(path, init)` sends a request under /api/
+ * with the serve's password (the pass-through).
  */
 export async function opencode2Proxy(client, method, path, body = null, { rawFetch = null } = {}) {
   const url = new URL(path, 'http://opencode.invalid');
@@ -45,37 +42,17 @@ export async function opencode2Proxy(client, method, path, body = null, { rawFet
     return rawFetch(`${route}${url.search}`, { method: verb, body });
   }
 
-  // ── The serve itself ──
-  if (route === '/global/health' && verb === 'GET') return asProxyResult(await client.global.health());
-  // OpenCode 2 has no "dispose": its instances end with the process, which
-  // SynaBun stops right after asking.
-  if (route === '/global/dispose' && verb === 'POST') return json(200, true);
-
-  // ── Providers, agents, config ──
+  // ── Providers, agents ──
   if (route === '/provider' && verb === 'GET') return asProxyResult(await client.provider.list({ directory }));
-  if (route === '/provider/auth' && verb === 'GET') return json(200, {});
-  if (segments[0] === 'provider' && segments[2] === 'oauth') return notOnV2('Signing in to a provider');
-  if (segments[0] === 'auth' && segments.length === 2) return notOnV2('Saving provider credentials');
   if (route === '/config/providers' && verb === 'GET') return asProxyResult(await client.config.providers({ directory }));
-  if (route === '/config' && verb === 'GET') return asProxyResult(await client.config.get({ directory }));
-  if (route === '/config' && verb === 'PATCH') return notOnV2('Changing the running OpenCode config');
   if (route === '/agent' && verb === 'GET') return asProxyResult(await client.app.agents({ directory }));
-  if (route === '/command' && verb === 'GET') return asProxyResult(await client.command.list({ directory }));
-  if (route === '/experimental/tool/ids' && verb === 'GET') return json(200, []);
 
-  // ── MCP ──
-  if (route === '/mcp' && verb === 'GET') return asProxyResult(await client.mcp.status({ directory }));
-  if (route === '/mcp' && verb === 'POST') return asProxyResult(await client.mcp.add({ name: body?.name, config: body?.config, directory }));
-  if (segments[0] === 'mcp' && segments.length === 3 && verb === 'POST') {
-    if (segments[2] === 'connect') return asProxyResult(await client.mcp.connect({ name: segments[1], directory }));
-    if (segments[2] === 'disconnect') return asProxyResult(await client.mcp.disconnect({ name: segments[1], directory }));
-  }
-  if (segments[0] === 'mcp' && segments[2] === 'auth') return notOnV2('Signing in to an MCP server');
+  // ── MCP resources ──
   if (route === '/experimental/resource' && verb === 'GET' && typeof rawFetch === 'function') {
     const located = directory ? `?location%5Bdirectory%5D=${encodeURIComponent(directory)}` : '';
     const listed = await rawFetch(`/api/mcp/resource${located}`, { method: 'GET' });
     if (listed.status !== 200) return listed;
-    // OpenCode 1: { "<server>:<uri>": { name, uri, client, … } }
+    // { "<server>:<uri>": { name, uri, client, … } }
     const out = {};
     for (const resource of Array.isArray(listed.data?.data?.resources) ? listed.data.data.resources : []) {
       if (!resource?.uri) continue;
@@ -86,31 +63,14 @@ export async function opencode2Proxy(client, method, path, body = null, { rawFet
 
   // ── Questions ──
   if (route === '/question' && verb === 'GET') return asProxyResult(await client.question.list({ directory }));
-  if (segments[0] === 'question' && segments.length === 3 && verb === 'POST') {
-    if (segments[2] === 'reply') return asProxyResult(await client.question.reply({ requestID: segments[1], answers: body?.answers, directory }));
-    if (segments[2] === 'reject') return asProxyResult(await client.question.reject({ requestID: segments[1], directory }));
-  }
-
-  // ── Permissions ──
-  if (route === '/permission' && verb === 'GET') return asProxyResult(await client.permission.list({ directory }));
-  if (segments[0] === 'permission' && segments.length === 3 && segments[2] === 'reply' && verb === 'POST') {
-    return asProxyResult(await client.permission.reply({ requestID: segments[1], reply: body?.reply, message: body?.message, directory }));
+  if (segments[0] === 'question' && segments.length === 3 && segments[2] === 'reply' && verb === 'POST') {
+    return asProxyResult(await client.question.reply({ requestID: segments[1], answers: body?.answers, directory }));
   }
 
   // ── Sessions ──
-  if (route === '/session' && verb === 'GET') return asProxyResult(await client.session.list({ directory }));
-  if (segments[0] === 'session' && segments.length === 2) {
-    const sessionID = segments[1];
-    if (verb === 'GET') return asProxyResult(await client.session.get({ sessionID }));
-    if (verb === 'DELETE') return asProxyResult(await client.session.delete({ sessionID }));
-    if (verb === 'PATCH') return asProxyResult(await client.session.update({ sessionID, ...(body || {}) }));
-  }
-  if (segments[0] === 'session' && segments.length === 3 && verb === 'POST' && segments[2] === 'abort') {
-    return asProxyResult(await client.session.abort({ sessionID: segments[1] }));
-  }
-  if (segments[0] === 'session' && segments.length === 3 && verb === 'GET' && segments[2] === 'message') {
-    return asProxyResult(await client.session.messages({ sessionID: segments[1], directory }));
+  if (segments[0] === 'session' && segments.length === 2 && verb === 'DELETE') {
+    return asProxyResult(await client.session.delete({ sessionID: segments[1] }));
   }
 
-  return json(501, { error: `SynaBun does not translate ${verb} ${route} for OpenCode 2.` });
+  return json(501, { error: `SynaBun does not translate ${verb} ${route} for OpenCode.` });
 }

package/neural-interface/lib/opencode2-translate.js

@@ -84,9 +84,58 @@ export function rulesToV1(rules) {
     .map((rule) => ({ permission: v1ToolName(rule.action), pattern: str(rule.resource || '*'), action: str(rule.effect) }));
 }
 
+/** The variables an OpenCode 2 integration reads a provider's key from (its `env` methods). */
+export function integrationEnvNames(integration) {
+  const names = [];
+  for (const method of Array.isArray(integration?.methods) ? integration.methods : []) {
+    if (method?.type !== 'env' || !Array.isArray(method.names)) continue;
+    for (const name of method.names) if (typeof name === 'string' && name && !names.includes(name)) names.push(name);
+  }
+  return names;
+}
+
+/**
+ * How each provider is connected, from OpenCode 2's integrations, in OpenCode 1's shape:
+ * `{ [id]: [{ type: 'api', label? } | { type: 'oauth', label, id }] }` — a key method is `api`, a sign-in method
+ * `oauth` (its `id` is the method SynaBun starts). Methods that take a form of their own (an AWS profile, a
+ * Google Cloud project) or run a command are left out; so is an integration with no method left.
+ */
+export function integrationsToAuthMethods(integrations) {
+  const out = {};
+  for (const integration of Array.isArray(integrations) ? integrations : []) {
+    const id = str(integration?.id);
+    if (!id) continue;
+    const methods = [];
+    for (const method of Array.isArray(integration.methods) ? integration.methods : []) {
+      if (method?.type === 'key' && !(Array.isArray(method.form) && method.form.length)) methods.push({ type: 'api', ...(method.label ? { label: str(method.label) } : {}) });
+      else if (method?.type === 'oauth' && method.id && !(Array.isArray(method.form) && method.form.some((field) => field?.required && !field.hidden && field.default === undefined))) {
+        methods.push({ type: 'oauth', label: str(method.label || 'Sign in'), id: str(method.id) });
+      }
+    }
+    if (methods.length) out[id] = methods;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** The integrations with a credential of their own stored (an `env` connection is the user's environment, not one). */
+export function integrationsWithCredentials(integrations) {
+  return (Array.isArray(integrations) ? integrations : [])
+    .filter((integration) => integration?.id && (Array.isArray(integration.connections) ? integration.connections : []).some((connection) => connection?.type === 'credential' && connection.id))
+    .map((integration) => str(integration.id));
+}
+
+/** The credential ids an integration stored. */
+export function integrationCredentialIds(integration) {
+  return (Array.isArray(integration?.connections) ? integration.connections : [])
+    .filter((connection) => connection?.type === 'credential' && connection.id)
+    .map((connection) => str(connection.id));
+}
+
 /**
- * OpenCode 1 rules (`[{ permission, pattern, action }]`, or the config's
- * `{ bash: 'ask', edit: { '*.md': 'allow' } }` map) → OpenCode 2 rules.
+ * Permission rules as OpenCode 2 takes them: its own `{ action, resource,
+ * effect }` as they are, the OpenCode 1 shapes a caller or a user's file may
+ * still hold (`[{ permission, pattern, action }]`, or the
+ * `{ bash: 'ask', edit: { '*.md': 'allow' } }` map) converted.
  */
 export function rulesToV2(rules) {
   if (rules == null) return undefined;

package/neural-interface/lib/owner-authority.js

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════
+// SynaBun — the one decision for the owner's routes: who may act with the owner's powers
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════
+//
+// Many of SynaBun's routes act with the owner's own powers without asking for the page secret: they were guarded
+// by the Host, the Origin and the guest rules only (lib/http-guards.js ownerRouteGuard, lib/request-gate.js). A
+// page of the app passes those by being a page of the app — and so did SynaBun's automation browser, which a
+// sandboxed worker drives with its sanctioned browser tools: it could open the File Explorer and write anywhere,
+// save in the code editor, run git, start the tunnel, make an invite, change Settings, open a terminal tab or an
+// agent panel and type into it — each a way out of the worker's sandbox. A local relay (a proxy, ssh -L, any program
+// that listens and calls SynaBun) was the same way out for a worker that cannot reach SynaBun's port itself.
+//
+// This module is the one decision for all of them, made on what the request cannot choose: the automation
+// browser's marker (lib/page-session.js) and the process at the other end of the connection (lib/peer-identity.js,
+// whose verdict the peer middleware keeps on the request). It covers:
+//   • every request to /api that is not a GET / HEAD / OPTIONS (default-deny: a route added later is covered), but
+//     for FEATURE_OPEN_PREFIXES — the hooks' own routes and the feature data the agents' MCP tools write too
+//     (memories, cards, the whiteboard…), where a refusal would stop the owner's integrations and buy nothing;
+//   • the two reads that hand out a secret: GET /api/mcp-key (the whole MCP key) and GET /api/mcp/env/<name>?reveal=1;
+//   • the owner's own reads (OWNER_READ_PREFIXES: what a guest is refused, and git), for the peers that are never the
+//     owner — the code editor's and File Explorer's roots include SynaBun's data home, whose secrets the worker
+//     sandbox keeps from a worker; an agent's tree reads them as before;
+//   • the owner's sockets: a terminal, the Claude / Codex / OpenCode panels, the Assistant, the browser panel —
+//     and /ws/sync, which stays open (the app's pages need it to draw) but read-only.
+//
+// Refused, whatever the request says (headers, pins, cookies, Origin): a request with the automation browser's
+// marker; a peer that is SynaBun's automation browser or any browser started for automation, a relay (named, or a
+// program that listens), another SynaBun server, a remote login (sshd), or a client that left before it was
+// identified. Refused too, unless it is an agent's own call: an AI agent's process tree, and SynaBun's own MCP server
+// over HTTP (mcp-server/dist/http.js: it listens, so it would read as a relay; lib/peer-identity.js knows it by its
+// main script inside this install, and its tools call with the stdio MCP server's pin). An agent's own call is
+// one that says who it is — an agent pin (X-Synabun-Terminal / -Role / -Assistant / -Desktop-Grant) or a brain
+// credential that survived the peer check — and stays on its route's rules (the MCP git tool, desktop, loop and
+// browser tools; the brain; the Assistant's route gate, asked with the session's pin by the OpenCode plugin and the
+// Codex hook, which checks the session's own token), as do the few routes agents call without a pin
+// (AGENT_OPEN_PREFIXES: the server's stop and restart the CLI asks, the MCP server's tab release, and the loops and
+// schedules the /synabun skill creates with curl).
+//
+// Never refused by this module: the owner's own browser and the SynaBun app (the peer lookup allows them), this
+// server itself, a request from outside (the tunnel, the invite proxy: the guest rules decide those, and the
+// tunnel's own process would otherwise read as a relay), and any request whose peer could not be looked up (the
+// rules from before apply: a failed lookup never locks the owner out).
+
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { AGENT_HEADERS, sendGuardError } from './http-guards.js';
+import { BRAIN_HEADER, PEER_VERDICT } from './peer-identity.js';
+import { ADMIN_ONLY_PREFIXES, routedForms } from './request-gate.js';
+
+const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS']);
+
+/** Writes left open to every caller the rules before allowed: the hooks' own routes, and the feature data the
+ *  agents' MCP tools write too. A path counts as open only when every reading of it is open. */
+export const FEATURE_OPEN_PREFIXES = Object.freeze([
+  '/api/hook-', '/api/greeting', '/api/sessions',
+  '/api/memory', '/api/memories', '/api/memory-maintenance', '/api/categories', '/api/trash', '/api/search',
+  '/api/cards', '/api/whiteboard', '/api/images', '/api/games',
+  '/api/cache', '/api/fetch-markdown', '/api/last-session', '/api/health',
+  '/api/ui-blobs',
+]);
+/** Paths under an open prefix that are not open: the code editor's copies of unsaved buffers (file content). */
+export const NEVER_OPEN_PREFIXES = Object.freeze(['/api/ui-blobs/editor-backups']);
+/** Routes agents call without a pin: an agent's tree may call them as it did (the other peers are still refused). */
+export const AGENT_OPEN_PREFIXES = Object.freeze(['/api/server/', '/api/browser/release', '/api/loop', '/api/schedules', '/api/schedule-groups']);
+/** The peers whose own calls (pinned, or on an agent-open route) keep their route's rules: an AI agent's process tree,
+ *  and SynaBun's own MCP server over HTTP (lib/peer-identity.js isSynabunMcpServer), as the stdio one in an agent's tree. */
+export const AGENT_CALL_KINDS = Object.freeze(['agent', 'synabun-mcp']);
+/**
+ * The owner's own reads: what a guest is refused (lib/request-gate.js ADMIN_ONLY_PREFIXES — the owner's settings,
+ * the code editor's and the File Explorer's file contents, whose roots include SynaBun's data home with its secrets,
+ * the runs' transcripts, MCP and plugin configuration…) and git. Refused to the automation browser, relays, other
+ * SynaBun servers, remote logins and closed clients (the sandbox keeps a worker out of the data home; these reads
+ * would hand it over through a browser or a relay). An agent's tree reads them as before (it is not sandboxed when
+ * it can reach SynaBun at all, and the CLI and the MCP tools read some of them). The hooks' own routes are not here.
+ */
+export const OWNER_READ_PREFIXES = Object.freeze([...ADMIN_ONLY_PREFIXES.filter((prefix) => prefix !== '/api/hook-'), '/api/git']);
+/** The owner's sockets: a terminal, the agent panels, the Assistant, the browser panel. */
+export const OWNER_SOCKET_PREFIXES = Object.freeze(['/ws/terminal/', '/ws/claude-skin', '/ws/codex-skin', '/ws/opencode-v2', '/ws/assistant/', '/ws/browser/']);
+/** Sockets that stay open for the app's pages to draw, read-only for a peer the owner's powers are refused to. */
+export const READ_ONLY_SOCKET_PATHS = Object.freeze(['/ws/sync']);
+
+/** A path form under a prefix: a prefix ending in "/" or "-" is a plain prefix, any other is a whole segment. */
+function under(form, prefix) {
+  if (prefix.endsWith('/') || prefix.endsWith('-')) return form.startsWith(prefix);
+  return form === prefix || form.startsWith(`${prefix}/`);
+}
+
+// ── A proxy between the owner's browser and SynaBun ──────────────────────────
+// A relay is refused because it hides who asked: through a system proxy, ssh -D or a proxy extension, the owner's own
+// browser reads as the relay. Browsers normally send localhost and 127.0.0.1 straight past a system proxy, so this
+// takes a browser told to proxy them (an extension, a PAC file, Firefox's localhost setting) or SynaBun opened by a
+// name or address the bypass list lacks. The refusal then says what to do, in the request's language (Accept-Language:
+// the i18n files' `ownerAuthority` strings). A relay is never trusted instead, not even one whose parents lead back to
+// the owner's browser: who its client is cannot be seen from SynaBun, and a guarded worker's sandbox keeps the system
+// proxy reachable for the worker's internet, so its requests would arrive from that same relay.
+
+/** The refusal kinds that mean "something carries this request for someone else". */
+export const PROXY_REFUSAL_KINDS = Object.freeze(['relay', 'listener']);
+const COPY_LOCALES = Object.freeze(['en', 'pt-BR']);
+let ownerCopies = null;
+/** The `ownerAuthority` strings of every locale (read once, when a refusal first needs them). */
+function ownerCopy(locale) {
+  if (!ownerCopies) {
+    ownerCopies = {};
+    for (const code of COPY_LOCALES) {
+      try { ownerCopies[code] = JSON.parse(readFileSync(new URL(`../i18n/${code}.json`, import.meta.url), 'utf8'))?.ownerAuthority || {}; } catch { ownerCopies[code] = {}; }
+    }
+  }
+  return { ...(ownerCopies.en || {}), ...(ownerCopies[locale] || {}) };
+}
+/** The request's language among the i18n files' (pt-* → pt-BR), by the Accept-Language preference order; else en. */
+export function requestLocale(req) {
+  const header = String(req?.headers?.['accept-language'] || '');
+  const ranked = header.split(',').map((part, index) => {
+    const [tag, ...params] = part.trim().split(';');
+    const q = Number(params.map((p) => /^\s*q=([\d.]+)\s*$/.exec(p)?.[1]).find(Boolean) ?? 1);
+    return { tag: tag.trim().toLowerCase(), q: Number.isFinite(q) ? q : 0, index };
+  }).filter((x) => x.tag && x.q > 0).sort((a, b) => b.q - a.q || a.index - b.index);
+  for (const { tag } of ranked) {
+    if (tag === 'pt' || tag.startsWith('pt-')) return 'pt-BR';
+    if (tag === 'en' || tag.startsWith('en-')) return 'en';
+  }
+  return 'en';
+}
+/** What to do when the owner's browser reaches SynaBun through a proxy (`ownerAuthority.proxyRefused`), filled in. */
+export function proxyRefusalText(req, refuse) {
+  const template = ownerCopy(requestLocale(req)).proxyRefused;
+  const params = { name: String(refuse?.name || 'a proxy').slice(0, 64), pid: String(refuse?.pid ?? '?') };
+  if (typeof template !== 'string' || !template) return `Your browser reaches SynaBun through ${params.name} (pid ${params.pid}), a proxy or relay, so SynaBun refused this: add localhost and 127.0.0.1 to the proxy's bypass list, or turn the proxy off for SynaBun, then reload.`;
+  return template.replace(/\{(\w+)\}/g, (whole, key) => (params[key] != null ? params[key] : whole));
+}
+
+/** Does a request say it is an agent's own call (a pin, or a brain credential that survived the peer check)? */
+export function isAgentCall(req) {
+  const h = req?.headers || {};
+  return AGENT_HEADERS.some((name) => h[name] !== undefined) || typeof h[BRAIN_HEADER] === 'string';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Where an HTTP request stands: `gated` (one of the owner's writes, one of the owner's reads, or a secret read), and
+ * `agentOpen` (an agent's tree may call it without a pin: every owner's read but the secret ones, and the
+ * AGENT_OPEN_PREFIXES writes). A path with no safe reading is gated.
+ */
+export function restScope(req) {
+  const method = String(req?.method || 'GET').toUpperCase();
+  const forms = routedForms(String(req?.path ?? req?.url ?? ''));
+  if (!forms) return { gated: !SAFE_METHODS.has(method), agentOpen: false, reason: 'no safe reading of the path' };
+  if (SAFE_METHODS.has(method)) {
+    if (method === 'OPTIONS') return { gated: false, agentOpen: false };
+    const reveal = String(req?.query?.reveal || '') === '1';
+    if (forms.some((form) => form === '/api/mcp-key' || (reveal && form.startsWith('/api/mcp/env/')))) {
+      return { gated: true, agentOpen: false, reason: 'a read that hands out a secret' };
+    }
+    // (ADMIN_ONLY_PREFIXES are plain prefixes, as lib/request-gate.js reads them)
+    const ownerRead = forms.some((form) => OWNER_READ_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => form.startsWith(prefix)));
+    return { gated: ownerRead, agentOpen: true, reason: ownerRead ? 'one of the owner\'s reads' : null };
+  }
+  if (!forms.some((form) => under(form, '/api'))) return { gated: false, agentOpen: false };
+  const open = (form) => FEATURE_OPEN_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => under(form, prefix)) && !NEVER_OPEN_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => under(form, prefix));
+  if (forms.every(open)) return { gated: false, agentOpen: false };
+  return { gated: true, agentOpen: forms.every((form) => AGENT_OPEN_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => under(form, prefix))), reason: 'one of the owner\'s writes' };
+}
+
+/** Where a socket stands: `owner` (refused to the peers below) or `readOnly` (open, read-only for them). */
+export function socketScope(pathname) {
+  const p = String(pathname || '');
+  if (OWNER_SOCKET_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => (prefix.endsWith('/') ? p.startsWith(prefix) : p === prefix))) return { owner: true, readOnly: false };
+  if (READ_ONLY_SOCKET_PATHS.includes(p)) return { owner: false, readOnly: true };
+  return { owner: false, readOnly: false };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The decision for one request whose peer verdict is on it (or not: then only the marker counts).
+ * @param {object} req
+ * @param {{ agentOpen?: boolean, fromWorkerBrowser?: (req) => boolean }} o
+ * @returns {{ code: string, error: string, hint?: string, peer?: object } | null} `hint: 'proxy'` (with the relay's
+ *   kind, pid and name) when the peer carries requests for others: `error` then says what to do, in the request's language
+ */
+export function ownerRefusal(req, { agentOpen = false, fromWorkerBrowser = () => false } = {}) {
+  let marked = false;
+  try { marked = !!fromWorkerBrowser(req); } catch { marked = false; }
+  if (marked) return { code: 'WORKER_BROWSER', error: 'SynaBun\'s automation browser cannot act as the owner: it reads SynaBun\'s pages, clicks and screenshots; the owner\'s own settings, files and actions are the owner\'s, from the owner\'s browser or the app.' };
+  const peer = req?.[PEER_VERDICT];
+  if (!peer) return null;
+  if (peer.status === 'gone') return { code: 'PEER_REFUSED', error: `This is the owner's, and ${peer.reason || 'the connection closed before its request was identified'}.` };
+  if (peer.status !== 'ok' || peer.self || !peer.refuse) return null;
+  if (AGENT_CALL_KINDS.includes(peer.refuse.kind) && (agentOpen || isAgentCall(req))) return null; // an agent's own call: its route's rules
+  if (PROXY_REFUSAL_KINDS.includes(peer.refuse.kind)) {
+    return { code: 'PEER_REFUSED', error: proxyRefusalText(req, peer.refuse), hint: 'proxy', peer: { kind: peer.refuse.kind, pid: peer.refuse.pid, name: peer.refuse.name } };
+  }
+  return { code: 'PEER_REFUSED', error: `This is the owner's, from the owner's own browser or the app; this request comes from ${peer.refuse.why}: pid ${peer.refuse.pid} (${peer.refuse.name}).` };
+}
+
+/**
+ * @param {object} o
+ * @param {() => ({ fromWorkerBrowser(req): boolean } | null)} [o.pageSession] the page session (read at request time)
+ * @param {(req) => boolean} [o.isRemote] a request from outside (the tunnel, the invite proxy): the guest rules decide
+ * @param {{ lookup(req): Promise<object> }} [o.peer] lib/peer-identity.js (for sockets: no middleware runs for them)
+ * @param {(line: string) => void} [o.log]
+ */
+export function createOwnerAuthority({ pageSession = () => null, isRemote = () => false, peer = null, log = () => {} } = {}) {
+  const fromWorkerBrowser = (req) => { const s = pageSession(); return typeof s?.fromWorkerBrowser === 'function' ? s.fromWorkerBrowser(req) : false; };
+  const remote = (req) => { try { return isRemote(req) === true; } catch { return false; } };
+  const logged = new Map();
+  const note = (key, line) => {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    if (now - (logged.get(key) || 0) < 60_000) return;
+    logged.set(key, now);
+    if (logged.size > 500) logged.delete(logged.keys().next().value);
+    try { log(line); } catch { /* a logger's own failure */ }
+  };
+
+  /** Whether the peer middleware should look this request up (it is one of the owner's, and not from outside). */
+  function needsLookup(req) {
+    if (remote(req)) return false;
+    try { return restScope(req).gated; } catch { return true; }
+  }
+
+  /** Express middleware, mounted after the peer middleware: 403 for a refused request to one of the owner's routes
+   *  (its writes, its reads, a secret read). */
+  function restGate(req, res, next) {
+    let scope;
+    try { scope = restScope(req); } catch { scope = { gated: true, agentOpen: false }; }
+    if (!scope.gated || remote(req)) return next();
+    const refused = ownerRefusal(req, { agentOpen: scope.agentOpen, fromWorkerBrowser });
+    if (!refused) return next();
+    note(`${refused.code}:${req[PEER_VERDICT]?.pid || 'marker'}:${String(req.path).slice(0, 80)}`, `[owner-authority] refused ${req.method} ${String(req.path).slice(0, 120)}: ${refused.hint === 'proxy' ? `${req[PEER_VERDICT]?.refuse?.why}: pid ${refused.peer?.pid} (${refused.peer?.name})` : refused.error}`);
+    if (refused.hint) return res.status(403).json({ ok: false, code: refused.code, error: refused.error, hint: refused.hint, peer: refused.peer });
+    return sendGuardError(res, 403, refused.code, refused.error);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The decision for a WebSocket upgrade (no middleware runs for one): looks the peer up for an owner socket and for
+   * /ws/sync. → { refuse: boolean, readOnly: boolean, code?, error? }. Never rejects; a lookup that cannot run
+   * refuses nothing.
+   */
+  async function checkUpgrade(req, pathname) {
+    const scope = socketScope(pathname);
+    if ((!scope.owner && !scope.readOnly) || remote(req)) return { refuse: false, readOnly: false };
+    if (peer && typeof peer.lookup === 'function' && !req[PEER_VERDICT]) {
+      try { req[PEER_VERDICT] = await peer.lookup(req); } catch { /* unknown: the rules from before */ }
+    }
+    const refused = ownerRefusal(req, { agentOpen: false, fromWorkerBrowser });
+    if (!refused) return { refuse: false, readOnly: false };
+    note(`ws:${refused.code}:${req[PEER_VERDICT]?.pid || 'marker'}:${pathname}`, `[owner-authority] ${scope.owner ? 'refused' : 'read-only'} socket ${pathname}: ${refused.error}`);
+    return scope.owner ? { refuse: true, readOnly: false, ...refused } : { refuse: false, readOnly: true, ...refused };
+  }
+
+  return { needsLookup, restGate, checkUpgrade, restScope, socketScope };
+}